

History OF THE Dvaita School OF Vedānta AND ITS Literature



♦ B.N.K. Sharma ♦



Sālagrāva idol of Bāla Kṛṣṇa from Dvārakā installed by
Madhvācārya at his Mutt in Uḍipi

निर्मथ्योप्रभवार्षवे निजमनोभीष्टं दिशामीति यः
सम्यज्ज्ञापयितुं करेण विलसन्मन्थानमन्येन च ।
रम्यं दाम दधन्महेशरजतग्रामश्रियोऽलंकृतिः
कर्मन्दीश्वरभक्तबन्धनवशः प्रीतोऽस्तु कृष्णः प्रभुः ॥

(Vādirāja's *Tirthaprabandha*, i. 11)

Frontispiece

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DEDICATED TO
THE 'MUNITRAYAM' OF DVAITA VEDĀNTA

Śrīmad Ānandatīrtha Bhagavatpāḍācārya

Śrī Jayatīrtha and

Śrī Vyāsātīrtha

FOREWORD

Dr. B. N. K. Sharma gives in this work a comprehensive account of the Dvaita School of Vedānta and Its Literature, from the earliest beginnings up to our own times. His work fills a gap in the literature on the Vedānta available in English. While we have many accounts of Śaṅkara's Advaita, a comprehensive treatment of the Dvaita philosophy of Madhva has not been written. So, Dr. Sharma, with his equipment in Sanskrit and competence in philosophy, has given us this work. It is my hope that the book will be widely read.

New Delhi,
20th February 1960.

S. RADHAKRISHNAN
Vice-President of India.

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ABBREVIATIONS

Aitareya Āraṇyaka
Akhila Bharata Mādhva Mahāmandal (Uḍipi)
Annamalai University Journal
Annals of Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute
(Poona)
Advaitasiddhi
Aitareya Upaniṣad Bhāṣya
Atharva Veda
Anu-Vyākhyāna (Madhva)
Benaras Sanskrit College Library
Bhāgavata
Bibliotheca Indica
Brahmopaniṣad
Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad
Brahma Sūtras
Brahmasūtrabhāṣya
Brahmasūtras and Their Principal Commentaries
Bhāgavata-Tātparya
Commentary
Commentaries
Catalogue
Catalogus Catalogorum
Calcutta Oriental Series
Chāndogya Upaniṣad
Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series
Citsukha
Devanāgarī
Descriptive Catalogue
Epigraphia Indica
Epilogue
Epigraphia Carnāṭica
Epigraphia Carnatica Supplement
Footnote
and the following
Gītā Bhāṣya
Government Oriental Library
Gauḍapāda Kārikās
Gaekwad Oriental Series
Gītā Tātparya
Gopal Vilas Library Catalogue (Kumbakonam)
Historical Manuscripts

| | |
|----------------------|---|
| H.I.S. | Heritage of India Series |
| I.A. | Indian Antiquary |
| I.H.Q. | Indian Historical Quarterly |
| I.O. Cat. | India Office Library Catalogue |
| I. Phil. | Indian Philosophy |
| J. | Jayatīrtha |
| J.B. | Jaiminiya Brāhmaṇa |
| J.A.R.S. | Journal of Assam Research Society |
| J.B.B.A.S. | Journal of Bombay Branch of Asiatic Society |
| JV. | Jayatīrtha Vijaya |
| K.L. | Kathālakṣaṇa |
| K.N. | Karma Nirṇaya |
| M. | Madhva |
| Madras Ep. Rep. | Madras Epigraphical Report |
| Madras G.O.S. | Madras Government Oriental Series |
| Madras TC | Madras Triennial Catalogue (of G.O. Mss. Lib) |
| Madras Uni.His. Ser. | Madras University Historical Series |
| M.BSB. | Madhva's Brahmasūtrabhāṣya |
| Mbh. | Mahābhārata |
| Mbh. T.N. | Mahābhārata Tātparya Nirṇaya |
| M. Kh.ṭ. | Mithyātva Anumāna Khaṇḍana ṭikā |
| Mith.Kh. | Mithyātvānumānakhaṇḍana |
| M.M. Sangha | Madhvamuni Seva Sangha (Uḍipi) |
| Ms. (s) | Manuscript (s) |
| M.Vij. | Madhva Vijaya |
| Mys. Arch. Rep. | Mysore Archaeological Report |
| Mys. O.L. | Mysore Government Oriental Mss. Library |
| ND. | Nyāyadīpikā (Jayatīrtha) |
| N.I.A. | New Indian Antiquary |
| NS. | Nyāya Sudhā |
| NV. | Nyāya Vivaraṇa |
| Ny.S. | Nyāya Sūtras |
| Nym. | Nyāyāmṛta |
| O.L. | Oriental Library |
| Pāṇ | Pāṇini |
| PL. | Pramāṇa Lakṣaṇa |
| P.M.K. | Prapañcamithyātvānumānakhaṇḍana |
| P.M.S. | Pūrva Mīmāṃsā Sūtras |
| PO | Poona Orientalist |
| P.O.C. | Proceedings of Oriental Conference |
| PPRI | Pūrṇaprajña Research Institute |
| PP. | Pramāṇa Paddhati |
| R. | Rāmānuja |
| R. GB. | Rāmānuja : Gītābhāṣya |
| R.P.R. | Review of Philosophy and Religion, Poona |
| R.V. | Ṛgveda |

| | |
|--------------------|---|
| R.V. Kh. | Ṛgveda Khila |
| S | Śaṃkara |
| Ś.B. | Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa |
| Sb | Sorab |
| S.B.E.S. | Sacred Books of the East Series |
| SDS | Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha |
| SDVP | Satyadyānavidyāpīṭha (Publications), Bombay |
| S.K. | Sat Kathā |
| S.I.I. | South Indian Inscriptions |
| S.M. | Stotra Mahodadhi (Belgaum) |
| S.M.S.O. Sabha | Sriman Madhva Siddhāntonnāhinī Sabhā (Tirupati) |
| S.V. | Sāmaveda |
| Śvet. Up. | Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad |
| T.Ā. | Taittirīya Āraṇyaka |
| Taitt. Up. | Taittirīya Upaniṣad |
| T.B. | Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa |
| TC | Tātparya Candrikā (Vyāsatīrtha) |
| TD | Tattvapradīpa |
| Td | Tattvodyota |
| TP. | Tattvaparakāśikā |
| T.P.L. | Tanjore Palace Library |
| T.S. | Tattva Saṅkhyāna |
| T.S.ṭ. | Tattvasaṅkhyānaṭīkā |
| TT | Tarkatāṇḍava |
| TV | Tattvaviveka |
| U.K. | Upādhi Khaṇḍana |
| V.S. | Vājasaneyi-Saṃhitā |
| V.Sū. | Vaiśeṣika Sūtras |
| Vij. Sexcent. Vol. | Vijayanagar Sexcentenary Commemoration Volume |
| VTN. | Viṣṇutattvanirṇaya |
| VTNṭ | Viṣṇutattvanirṇayaṭīkā |
| Vy. Carita | Vyāsayogicarita |
| VādirājaG.V Carit. | Vādirāja Guruvara Caritāmṛta |
| VR | Vādaratnāvali |

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION

THIS *History of Dvaita School of Vedānta and Its Literature* was first published in 1960-61, in two volumes. The nature, scope and purpose of the work, its contents and source materials have been fully set forth in the Preface to the first edition, which precedes this.

The work has been widely acknowledged to be the only "thoroughgoing study we have of the Dvaita school of Vedānta and its literature that exists" and "the most important contribution to the history of Indian philosophy" as such. It was accorded the highest national literary honor and recognition of the Sāhitya Akademi Award of the Government of India, in 1964. By 1968, the work had gone out of print and there has been an insistent demand, at home and abroad, for a second edition of it. I am happy M/s Motilal Banarsidass, the foremost of our Indological Publishers, have come forward to meet this demand.

I have agreed to their suggestion to have the book now issued conveniently in a single volume to suit the practical requirements of a standard work of constant reference and consultation. The two separate Prefaces of the two volumes of the earlier edition have accordingly been fused together. The chapters have been numbered consecutively and the Appendices, all of them, have been placed at the very end.

The structural pattern of the work remains the same. The material changes made are few and far between, consisting mostly of careful revision and corrections of the text, incorporation of supplementary historical and biographical data here and there and more precise and detailed description of the contents of some of the works like the *Saṅgraha-Rāmāyaṇa* of Nārāyaṇa Paṇḍita and the *Bhāṭṭasaṅgraha* of Rāghavendra (which latter has now been made available in print), which had been skipped over. The omission of some authors like Dhīrendra, Varadendra, Madhvamuni, Ghanaśyāma (Kavi) and Satyavara has been made good.

Much of the supplementary matter will be found in the Appendices III, VII-IX. The question of the real birthplace of Purandara Dāsa has been considered afresh. Correction of dates and facts have been carried out in a few cases. The survey of present day literature in English and other modern languages on Dvaita philosophy has been brought up to date, by and large.

"Raṅgadhām"

111. Raja Street,
Coimbatore 641001.

Diwali Day, 6th Nov. 1980

B. N. K. Sharma

DVAITA, Advaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita are the principal schools of Vedānta, presenting the widest possible points of departure of philosophical thought emerging from the interpretation of the Prasthānatrayī, or the triune authority of the Vedānta, in the medieval period of Indian history. To this day, they enjoy the status of living systems of Vedāntic thought, in India, each with its own well-defined community of followers, religious institutions and extensive philosophical literature in Sanskrit. The Dvaita and the Viśiṣṭādvaita schools have also to their credit a substantial body of devotional literature in the Kannaḍa and Tamil languages, respectively.

Though chronologically the last and having perhaps fewer followers than the other two, the Dvaita system has been the chief rival in thought to the Advaita of Śaṅkara, in the history of Indian philosophy. Though the first Theistic reaction to Advaita came from Rāmānuja, it is to the Dvaita-Vedānta of Madhva and his eminent followers that we have to turn for a robust and uncompromising metaphysical resistance to Advaita philosophy and for a complete vindication of Vedāntic Theism in conformity with its oldest and the most genuine textual traditions. To give but one instance, the Advaita had tried to strike at the very root of 'Sāṅkhya' realism (accepted in the Vedas, the Upaniṣads and the Epic) by denying to "Prakṛti" any *locus standi* in the Śāstras. (See Śaṅkara B. S. B. i, 1, 5) *The Rāmānuja school winked at this blatant injustice to Prakṛti, despite its own accommodation of Prakṛti within its metaphysics, as a distinct and necessary material principle operating in the Universe, in subordination to Brahman (See R. on B. S. i, 4, 3).* It was the Dvaita school of Madhva which set right this anomaly and injustice to Prakṛti, by taking the bold step of rejecting the 'fashionable' interpretation of B. S. i, 1, 5-11, and restoring Prakṛti to its right and rightful place in the Vedānta, as the material principle dependent on Brahman and providing the stuff of the universe. This clear and unambiguous vindication of the position of Prakṛti in Vedānta metaphysics knocked off the bottom of Pantheism and Māyāvāda in Vedānta and helped to reinstate the purely Theistic view of Brahman as the "Kevala-nimitta-Kāraṇa" in respect of the cosmos, as conceived in the hymns of the R̥g-veda, the Antaryāmi-Brāhmaṇa, the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad, the Epic and the Purāṇas. Of course, Madhva's conception of Brahman as "nimitta-kāraṇa" did not remain at the purely Deistic level of the Nyāya school. It was metaphysically more penetrative in that it was intimately connected with the concept of Brahman as "Svatantra" defined in terms of "Sārva-sattāpratītipravṛttinimittam" (as explained in the opening chapter here).

After the downfall of the Sāṅkhya and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realisms, as a result of the dialectic onslaughts of Advaitins, it was the Dvaita Vedānta of Madhva that stood up for Realism in Indian thought against all forces

of idealism and acosmism. It had, accordingly, to fight with Indian monism a battle royal on its own ground, during the last seven centuries. The history of this philosophical polemics has been a glorious chapter in the annals of the Vedānta. It attracted all-India attention and drew some of the redoubtable scholars of the north and south of India, as participants therein. As a result of this high-level polemics which went on between the two schools in the Post-Jayatīrtha period, the Dvaita system emerged as a front-rank philosophical system of all-India reputation, throwing the Rāmānuja school completely into the shade. As Dasgupta says, "the logical and dialectical thinkers of the Viśiṣṭādvaita were decidedly inferior to the prominent thinkers of the Śaṅkara and the Madhva school. There is hardly anyone in the whole history of the development of the Rāmānuja school whose logical acuteness could be compared with that of Śrīharṣa or Citsukha or with that of Jayatīrtha or Vyāsatīrtha" (*His. of I. Phil.* vol. iii, p. 111). In the Preface to the fourth volume of his *History of I. Phil.*, he says again, "in my opinion, *Jayatīrtha and Vyāsatīrtha present the highest dialectical skill in Indian thought.* There is a general belief among many that the monism of Śaṅkara presents the final phase of Indian thought. But the readers of the present volume who will be introduced to the philosophy of Jayatīrtha and particularly of Vyāsatīrtha would realize the strength and uncompromising impressiveness of the Dualistic position. *The logical skill and depth of acute dialectic thinking shown by Vyāsatīrtha stands almost unrivalled in the whole range of Indian thought*" (p. vii-Italics mine).

The thinkers of the Dvaita school have made many outstanding contributions to the problems of philosophy. Their works could be studied with profit by modern minds also. The views propounded by Madhva on the nature of Sākṣī, Viśeṣa, Bheda, substance and attributes, the universal, space and time, etc., are very much in advance of his times and remarkably suggestive. Vyāsatīrtha's review of the doctrines, categories, concepts and definitions of the Navya-Nyāya of Gaṅgeśa and his school, in his *Tarkatāṇḍava*, put a timely check on the overgrowth of formalism in Indian logic and enunciated the principles of a *Novum Organum* in Post-Gaṅgeśa logic. The Theism of the Nyāya would have been a living force to this day, if it had cared to listen to Vyāsatīrtha and profit by his criticisms. It is admitted that the birth of Neo-Advaita in the seventeenth century was largely due to the impact of Mādhva dialectics.

The achievements of the Dvaita school far outweigh the numerical strength, influence and distribution of its followers. The Caitanya Sampradāya of Bengal derives not only its preceptorial order but its doctrines of Viśeṣa, Siddharūpā-Bhakti and other tenets from Mādhva thought. The devotional movement of the Haridāśas of Karnataka was a spontaneous expression of Mādhva religious thought in the regional language of the majority of its adherents and its appeal reached the common people. The vitality of the system can be judged from the fact that it has been able to penetrate and overcome the barriers of language and assimilate among

its followers today speakers of five Aryan and three Dravidian languages of India.

In its own right, then, this system deserves wider attention in India and abroad than it has received till now from the public and from our present day scholars. Especially after the attainment of national independence by our country, when former prejudices are being shed and every valuable heritage of the country's past is coming to be studied with an open mind, and in a spirit of sympathy and understanding, it is reasonable to expect a renewal of interest among our countrymen and women in the study of the literature and philosophy of the Dvaita school of Vedānta also which has made a sizable contribution to Indian thought. I earnestly hope the publication of this History of the Dvaita School and its Literature, at this propitious juncture, will go a long way in rousing public interest in the study of Madhva and his school of thought and meet the demand for a comprehensive work on the subject in English, written from an objective standpoint. The Dvaita school has made history in Indian philosophy. But this history has not been written so far. I have ventured to write and publish it. I hope it will open our eyes to the rich legacy of thought which the makers of the Dvaita school of Vedānta have left to posterity. This is the first complete and systematic work on the origin and development of this important school of Vedānta to appear in print. There is no other standard work of this size and scope on this subject in the field. It is based on a revised and enlarged version of a part of my Thesis for the Ph.D. degree of the Madras University, awarded in 1948. Fairness and accuracy combined with sympathy and understanding make for true and inspiring historical presentation. I hope I have been able to achieve these two objectives, in a commendable measure, in this work. *I sincerely hope it will set the model for similar histories of other schools of Vedānta which are equally in need of them.*

II

Dvaita literature is very extensive. Much of it still remains unpublished and unexplored. The early generation of Orientalists had neglected Madhva's philosophy. Later, pioneers like Subbarao and Padmanabhachar translated some works of Madhva into English and expounded some of his tenents. It could not perhaps be helped at that initial stage that the significance and bearing of M's foundational concepts like Svatantra, Sākṣī, Viśeṣas and Parādhīnaviśeṣāpti in contributing to the architectonic unity and individuality of his philosophical system were left more or less obscure and unnoticed in their writings. Nevertheless, their works roused interest among Western scholars and at least one foreign scholar, Helmuth Glasenapp was attracted to Madhva's school and wrote his 'Madhvas Philosophie des Viṣṇu-Glaubens', in German (Leipzig, 1923). But the first philosophical account of Madhva's thought to appear in English was in Dr Radhakrishnan's *Indian Philosophy* (1927). Then followed further expositions of different aspects of Mādhva thought, by

some of his own followers like C. R. Krishnarao, R. Nagaraja Sarma, H. N. Raghvendrachar, Alur Venkatarao, P. Nagarajao and myself during the last three decades. The latest account of M's system and of his great interpreters Jayatīrtha and Vyāsātīrtha is to be found in Dasgupta's *History of Indian Philosophy* Vol. IV. He has dealt with their treatment of some important problems in philosophy and has given a general review of certain important topics of M's interpretation of the Brahmasūtras. Apart from the fact that even this work does not give us a systematic and coordinated exposition of M's philosophy as such and as a whole or go into the bearings and significance of his philosophical doctrines and their interrelation, its account of Dvaita literature as such is very inadequate and not properly arranged and contains many misstatements of facts. There is thus a very real need for a complete, authentic and systematic exposition of the history of the school and its extensive literature.

Considering the position, importance and achievements of Dvaita thought in Indian philosophy and its literary output, it seemed to me to be a great deficiency that there was no authentic history of its literary and philosophical development, in English or in any other language, on modern lines,—in a proper chronological setting, based upon all available materials, literary, historical and epigraphic. The works already in the field, on Madhva, had either *not* dealt with the extensive literature of his school, including his own works, in full or else only cursorily, with a few works chosen at random. Even the survey of Dvaita literature in Glasenapp's pioneering work is more or less bibliographical in its nature and by no means full or systematic at it. He has not gone into the contents of the works or the lives and dates of the authors mentioned or presented the literary materials on an orderly plan of topics and division of periods or given us a historical survey of the evolution of thought.

III

Two main difficulties beset the historian of Dvaita literature. The first is that of chronology of authors and works and the second is about the works themselves. There has been a surprising amount of ignorance about the writers of the Mādhva school, their places in its history and the value of their contributions to thought. As a result, a grave injustice has been done and is still being done, even in accredited works on Indian history, culture and philosophy, by eminent Indian scholars themselves, to the distinguished exponents of this school like Madhva, Jayatīrtha, Vyāsātīrtha, Vādirāja, Vijayīndra and others, whom every Indian ought to know and would be the better for knowing.

The bulk of the evidence and materials from literary and epigraphical sources have been utilized here, for the first time, in a systematic way. New evidence has been cited at times from hitherto unexplored sources, literary as well as epigraphical. The dates of almost all the writers have been discussed, some at length and others in brief. Where the dates of some authors have been discussed by me elsewhere, the details have

been omitted here and only the conclusions reached have been indicated, giving references to the sources where fuller information could be had.

The difficulty about the materials is that out of more than a hundred authors and more than seven hundred works brought together in the two volumes of the present work, hardly ten or twelve writers are widely known and studied and not more than a hundred important works are available in print. About two-thirds of the rest are still in mss., and one-third known only through cross-references and quotations in extant works. Some are attested only by tradition. Some rare works in mss., like the *Ṣattarkadi-pāvali*, *Vādaratnāvali* and *Koṅkaṇābhhyudaya* have also been drawn upon.

A majority of these manuscripts are preserved in the great manuscript Libraries at Mysore, Madras and Tanjore; and the rest in the private Libraries of Sode, Palimār, Pejāvar and Kāṇūr Mutts at Uḍipi, the Uttarādi Mutt (Bangalore) and the Rāghavendra Svāmi Mutt (Nañjangūḍ). The descriptive catalogues of Sanskrit mss., of the Baroda and the India office Library and of the Bodleian Library (Oxford) have also been consulted. Most of the mss. have been studied at first hand, so far as time and resources permitted and interesting facts about their contents have been given.

Besides the above sources of mss., Aufrecht's *Catalogus Catalogorum* and many handlists and notices of mss. secured by me during my tours in search of mss., in S. Kanara, North Karnatak and Tamilnadu have been utilized. Many of these lists are made up of details from floating traditions only. Two Mādhva hagiological works in Kannaḍa, (1) the *Sat Kathā* of B. S. Kamalapur (Dharwar, 1896 and 1931) and (2) *Gurucarite* by H. K. Vedavyasacharya (Mysore, 1949) have also been drawn upon. The first one deals mainly with the lives of Mādhva Ācāryas (both laymen and Pontiffs) belonging to the Uttarādi Mutt. But, its chronology and even its purely traditional accounts of authors contain many anachronisms and errors of commission and omission (See *S. K.*, pp. 37, 38 and 64). Its ascriptions of works to individual authors and dates assigned to them are not supported by any evidence. It cannot, therefore, be taken as a strictly historical account. It is, however, a useful compendium of information. I have used it with caution. The other work is confined to the lives and works of the Pontiffs of the Rāghavendra Svāmi Mutt. It gives short biographical information about the Svāmis. Their dates are given on the authority of the Mutt traditions and occasionally of inscriptions, some of which have been pronounced to be untrustworthy by the epigraphical authorities. The contents of the works of authors mentioned have not been described, as a rule. The book has raised a controversy over the origin of the Uttarādi Mutt. I have used it for occasional references and some criticism here and there.

Another important hagiological work I have utilized is the *Gurucaryā* of unknown authorship, in Sanskrit verse, dealing with the lives of the Pontiffs of the Uttarādi Mutt, ending with Satyanidhi Tīrtha (1638-48). The ms. of this work was secured by me on loan from the Mutt

Library at Nanjangud, in 1939. It gives valuable chronological data and much interesting information about the former names, sub-community, cyclic year of succession to Pīṭha and demise and total period of rule of the Pontiffs. This work would appear to be the source of other traditional accounts in such works as the *S.K.* itself and in the *Ānandatīrthaguruvāṁśa-Kathākalpataru* (m) (Mys. O.L.C. 2418) from which extracts have been supplied to me by Sri H. Seshāṅgiri Rao of Mysore and Sri Dhirendra Ritti of Savanur.

Among additional sources utilized for the Post-Jayatīrtha period, are to be mentioned (1) the general catalogue of all extant and non-extant works attributed to various authors in Sanskrit literature, including those on Dvaita system, published by the Gopal Vilas Library (G.V.L. Cat) founded by the late Dewan Bahadur R. Raghunatha Rao of Kumbakonam and (2) the list of Dvaita works attributed to various authors, given in the first volume of the Kannaḍa translation of Madhva's collected works (Sarvamūla) published by the Madhva Muni Seva Sangha of Uḍipi. (3) The *Koṅkaṇābhyaudaya* described in Appendix IV has been drawn upon for purposes of that appendix and in a few other places also. Other sources like the *Vidyādhiśa-Vijaya* and *Vādirājaguruvaracaritāmṛta* will be referred to in their relevant contexts.

It may appear to some that in the plan of exposition adopted by me in Part I, the account of Indian thought prior to M. has been wholly governed by what M. himself contends about it in his works and that the matter gets repeated under "Works of Madhva", in Part II. But in reality, the purpose of the first Part is to discover and exhibit the seeds of Dvaita thought as they may be found scattered and mixed up with much other diversified matter in the source-books of Hindu thought and how they contributed to the formulation of a new system of thought at the hands of Madhva after having been subjected to a series of metaphysical vicissitudes in successive periods. The way in which I have visualised and exhibited the evolution of Dvaita thought from these source materials of the Vedic and the Post-Vedic periods, from a historical standpoint, so far as it may be possible or permissible to apply such a method to the fascinating study of this subject is certainly different from what Madhva himself contends about it. At least insofar as the historical and the traditional methods and points of view differ in their approach and presuppositions, there cannot be any actual repetition or overlapping of thought-process or interpretation of facts between them. It would have surprised and disappointed many a modern scholar if I had begun my history of the Dvaita school of Vedānta, abruptly, with the works of Madhva himself without a historical or philosophical background of the earlier thought from which it was derived and the impact of forces from other systems which necessitated a reorientation of thought.

Most of the modern Indian scholars and writers on Indian philosophy have a preconceived way of looking at the evolution of Indian thought as beginning with the "crude Polytheism" of the Vedic Ṛṣis and as culminat-

ing in the grand monism of the Śāṅkarite description, with a few productive germs of Monism conveniently lodged in the body of the R̥gveda and elsewhere. This dictatorial way of reading the evolution of Indian thought has hypnotized the minds of modern scholars to such an extent that Madhva's philosophy gets shunted off the 'main' line of Upaniṣadic thought by a most convenient fiction of Oriental scholarship. It is necessary to break this spell to secure a proper hearing to Madhva's philosophy as an integral part of Vedic no less than the Upaniṣadic thought and one in which the fundamental thought of the Veda-Śāstra has been preserved more meaningfully, consistently and fully than in many others which have come to be credited with that honour. The Oriental scholars and those who follow their ways of thinking must be made to see this truth by adopting their own method of approach and exposition. It was for this reason I have had to depart from the rigid orthodox way of approach to Madhva philosophy from the standpoint of 'Vedāpauruṣeyatva', in which there will be no scope for logical evolution or chronological development of thought. I expect that orthodox opinion, while it may not approve or endorse this method of approach, will at least see and concede the *rationale* of it or its expediency, in this light, as a kind of "Abhyupagā-mavāda" or a "Praudhivāda".

IV

In tracing the evolution of Mādhva thought in and through its source-books, I have, while following the generally accepted views of modern scholars (as indicated above) about their *successive stages* of growth, worked out my own theory regarding *the time and direction* of their ideological development. Most of the important works of Indian and European scholars like Ranade, Dasgupta, Radhakrishnan, Barth, Keith, Carpenter, Deussen, Muir, Macdonnel, Griswold, Bloomfield and others have been consulted in this Part. My acknowledgements to these scholars will be found in the body of the work and in the footnotes. I have however departed from their theories on many points or given them suitable orientations (See under Āraṇyakas, Ekāyana and Post-Śvetāśvatara periods).

Under "Works of Madhva" I have surveyed and critically summarized the contents of his thirty seven works (Sarvamūla) and brought out the general tenor of their arguments and drawn attention to their other salient features. This would enable the reader to appreciate fully the subject matter of their commentaries and glosses, noticed subsequently, in their turn, in the succeeding Parts. This saves the necessity of traversing the same ground in dealing with the commentaries and glosses on the Sarvamūla, while setting forth their contribution to thought. It is not possible, in a rapid summary of the Sarvamūla to go into the intricacies of their arguments or the niceties of the logical and interpretational issues raised by the texts. These have been reserved for treatment under certain appropriate sections pertaining to the dialectical contributions of Jaya-

tīrtha, Vyāsātīrtha and others. Some idea of Madhva's dialectics has been given in connection with his *G. T.*, *VTN* and *AV*.

Besides bringing out the special features of M's literary and philosophical style and his method of exposition, I have devoted some space to a discussion of the 'problem' of his "Sources". This and the vindication of the merits of his interpretation of the Brahmasūtras against the severe strictures of V. S. Ghate, undertaken here, for the first time, would be particularly useful to Post-Graduate students and teachers of Vedānta, in our Universities. In my opinion, Ghate's *Critique of the Sūtrabhāṣya of Madhva* has adversely affected the latter's reputation as an interpreter of the Brahmasūtras among our modern scholars, University Professors and students and has been allowed to go unchallenged far too long. I intend to bring out an independent work on the subject of critical and comparative study of Madhva's interpretation of the Brahmasūtras in relation to the interpretational traditions of the Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja and other schools at a future date. Meanwhile the discussion I have raised here over this problem may be taken as my own initial contribution to Dvaita polemics in this direction.

The next section deals with the early development of Madhva's school under his immediate disciples and followers and with their activities and contributions. This period is marked by the emergence of the various Mutts which have played a major role in the development of the school and its spread in various parts of the country.

V

Dvaita Literature falls into two great natural divisions,—the works of Madhva and those of his followers. Though deriving his thought from the source-books of Indian philosophy, Madhva has been in fact the actual *historical founder* of his system, *in the form in which he has expounded it, in his works*. His works, therefore, are of primary interest and significance to us, in showing the nature and extent of his creative genius and the extent of his indebtedness to his sources.

The Post-Madhva period is even more important to us, in a sense, as it is in that period that a mighty and voluminous literature has grown round the works of Madhva. It has produced the foremost interpreters, commentators and dialecticians of the school, whose works to this day could regale the most ardent Tarkarasikas—lovers of logic and metaphysics. This is the period of (i) the standardization of Dvaita thought and its interpretation by Jayatīrtha; (ii) its dialectic and polemical reinforcement under Viṣṇudāsācārya and Vyāsātīrtha and subsequent controversialists; (iii) its constructive development and elucidation of Siddhānta by a host of major and minor commentators; and (iv) last, but not least, of the rise of that new *genre* of religious and devotional literature of the school in the regional language of Kannaḍa, under the leadership of the celebrated Mystics of the Haridāsa Kūṭa.

It is mainly on account of this stupendous work and the many-sided activities of his eminent successors that Madhva's system has attained and has retained its accredited position as one of the principal schools of Vedānta. By his creative genius, Śrī Madhva had evolved the seminal ideas of his system from the nucleus of thought in the original sources. It was enriched and perfected in its various aspects by his eminent expositors like Jayatīrtha, Vyāsātīrtha and others and attained its full stature under them. It is however very remarkable that throughout this long period of its development, there has been no rift or divergence of doctrine *within the school*,¹ as there has been in the other schools of Vedānta. The Dualists' sense of loyalty to the views of Madhva has been remarkably steady and consistent throughout. Even the frigid article of faith in the existence of a class of Tamoyogyas among Souls has not evoked any perceptible opposition from within. But changes in *emphasis* on doctrines or in the technique of their presentation according to the exigencies of the times and contemporary thought-needs and trends and variation in methods of treatment or exposition of doctrines have not been wanting. These as well as other important landmarks and turning points in the history and literature of the school have been indicated in the present work in relevant contexts. That the Caitanya school, in spite of its formal affiliation with the Madhva Sampradāya has discarded some of its theological beliefs and tenets may be construed as an internal rift or schism if not a break-away.

VI

Part III deals with the first and at the same time the most important phase in the history of the school *after* Madhva, represented by the standardization and accredited interpretation of Madhva's thought by his chosen commentator Jayatīrtha.

VII

Parts IV-VIII deal exhaustively with the Post-Jayatīrtha period in Mādhva thought and literature, from the beginning of the 15th century to our own times. This history of six hundred years has been as great and epoch-making in its achievements as the history of the earlier period dealt with in Parts II and III. I have always kept in view that there is a qualitative difference between the two orders of intellectual performance of M. and his commentator Jayatīrtha—the creative genius of the one and the expository brilliance of the other and that for obvious reasons M. could not have spared more time and space for finish of form and amplification of technical details and paraphernalia of system-building in his works, which were left to his successor. I must ask the reader to keep this in mind and

¹. The unorthodox view of "Svarūpa sṛṣṭi" of jivas which H. N. Raghavendrachar (*Dvaita Philosophy, Its Place in the Vedānta, Mys. Uni. 1941*) has attempted to read into Madhva's works has not found any support in any quarter. (It has died a natural death after him.)

apply the same principle *mutatis mutandis* in estimating the contributions of subsequent writers also. Such qualitative differences exist between the performance of Jayatīrtha and Vyāsatīrtha too. The requirements of Vyāsatīrtha's times were different and he addressed himself to the task which the great Jayatīrtha himself had reserved for him (See Chap. XX). I need hardly say, then, that a frank estimate of how M's idiosyncrasies of language and style may appear to a stickler for form and conventional standards or a reference to what may be regarded by others as shortcomings in his writings ought not to be mistaken for a *depreciation* of Madhva—which does not admit of anything more to be said in his favour, defence or justification.

The literature produced in the Post-Jayatīrtha period is a voluminous one. Its chief merit lies in the resplendent variety and richness of its output. It is the age of centrifugal development of Mādhva thought. Here we find the mighty tree of Madhva-Siddhānta growing to its full stature and strength putting forth fine foliage and fragrant flowers and bearing its rich and luscious fruits of philosophy, logic and theology, daring dialectics, constructive development of Siddhānta, doctrinal elaboration, religious mysticism, controversial literature, commentaries, elucidations and glosses.

Part IV opens with the era of Neo-dialecticism in Dvaita Vedānta inaugurated by Viṣṇudāsācārya of Vādaratnāvali-fame. Its zenith was reached under Vyāsatīrtha, whose works constitute the last word on Dvaita metaphysics and its interpretation of the Sūtras. I have tried to introduce the reader to some striking facets of the acute dialectical thinking displayed by these veterans, so that one may form some idea of their impressiveness, even from a respectful distance. Dasgupta; as has already been shown, has paid the highest tribute to Vyāsatīrtha as an analytic thinker.

Chapter XXVII gives a resume of Vyāsatīrtha's critical assessment of the interpretations of two adhikaraṇas of the B. S. by the three great Bhāṣyakāras : Ś. R. and M. and his penetrating analysis and criticism of the alignment of adhikaraṇas and theme and sequence of Pādas in the I Adhyāya, according to the first two. As his *Tātparyacandrikā* happens to be the only work in Sanskrit philosophical literature which gives us a critical and comparative estimate of the B. S. interpretations of the major schools of Vedānta, its study should be very instructive indeed to modern scholars and critics of B. S. interpretation. Among modern writers on Indian philosophy, Dasgupta has been the first to utilize some material from this unique work of Vyāsatīrtha. Much more could be written on Vyāsatīrtha's contribution to the subject of B. S. interpretation which would require a separate volume. What has been provided here is just enough to whet the appetite. Those who have carefully considered my critique of V. S. Ghate's estimate of M's BSB. in Chap. XII will find much more from the *TC* in this chapter, to regale themselves with.

Chapter XXVIII is a brief study of the vigorous discussions of such important problems of philosophy as the definition of reality (*sattvanirukti*)

and the concept of “Viśeṣas” from Vyāsatīrtha’s *Nym*. His vindication of the Dvaita interpretation of ‘Tat tvam asi’ is also set forth here, for the first time, in all its wealth of detail. That will convey to the reader some measure of the forcefulness, and cogency of arguments with which Vyāsatīrtha has demonstrated the untenability of the familiar Advaitic interpretation of that ‘Mahāvākya’ and made out a strong case for its Dualistic interpretation.

Chapter XXX describes the impact of his *Nym* on the Advaita school and the sequel to such an impact, the counter-attacks of the *Advaitasiddhi* and the *Brahmānandīya* and their refutations, again, by the champions of the Dvaita view. This brisk exchange of high level philosophical polemics between these two mighty schools of Vedānta will remain the admiration of all students and scholars of Vedānta philosophy, as long as such great philosophical classics continue to be read and appreciated in this country and elsewhere, in the original Sanskrit or in their translations.

Part V deals with the history of the spirited and spectacular theological controversies for the reinforcement of Dvaita Siddhānta carried on by a band of distinguished Theologians and controversialists of the school such as Vijayīndra, Vādirāja and Nārāyaṇācārya with champions of the Advaita school such as the famous Appayya Dīkṣita and Parakāla Yati.

Part VI describes the sumptuous contributions which a large number of non-Polemical commentators of the school such as Vidyādhirāja, Vijayadhva, Vyāsatīrtha, Raghūttama, Rāmacandra, Sudhīndra, Yadupati, Vidyādhīśa, Keśavācārya, Rāghavendra, the writers of the Chalāri family, Raghunātha, Jagannātha, Kuṇḍalagiri Sūri, Sumatīndra and Satyadharma have made to Dvaita literature. These writers have nourished the system of Madhva and built up its reputation by their patience, industry and scholarship in many branches of learning. To this day, their works enjoy a living reputation and continue to shed light on many aspects of Dvaita philosophy. They continue to guide and inspire the faithful as beacon lights of Brahma-vidyā. Many of these were distinguished Pontiffs of Mutts in their days and have exercised a wholesome influence on society and the cultural history of their times and their memories are still cherished with warm affection and esteem by all sections of the Mādhva community.

There can be no two opinions that some account of the great religious institutions of the Mādhva Sampradāya called Maṭhas is certainly called for in what purports to be a history of the Dvaita school in its widest sense. It is mainly through these Mutts that the traditions of Dvaita thought and literature have been preserved, fostered and handed down in unbroken continuity, for the past several centuries. The Mutts have been very largely responsible for making Dvaita Siddhānta a living faith of the people in different parts of the country. They have been the nerve-centres of the religious and philosophical life of the community. It would be an act of gross ingratitude on the part of any historian of the Mādhva school and its literature to ignore their existence and the memorable part they have played

in the development of Madhva's philosophy and its literature. It would be impossible to write about the great makers of Dvaita literature (many of whom have been Pontiffs of different Mutts) without referring to their career and mentioning the particular institutions with which they were connected as Pontiffs; and unless a clear account of the origin and development of these Mutts themselves is given, the details regarding their succession and dates and many other facts connected with the expansion of the Madhva Sampradāya itself would be left obscure. Such an account may be out of place in a work exclusively on Madhva's *philosophy*. But it would be quite *necessary and essential in a History of the school*. The Mutts should be given their due. If they cannot find a prominent place in a *history* of the Dvaita school, their existence would hardly have served any purpose. That there have been some minor quarrels among some of them should not blind us to their importance as spiritual centres of the community.

Among these commentators of the Post-Jayatīrtha period, there were many who were householders (*grhīṇaḥ*) hailing from distinguished families of scholars, in which the tradition of learning and lifelong devotion to Śāstras was handed down for generations as the highest ideal of Tapas and Upāsana (Cf. *Svādhyāyapracāraṇe eveti Nāko Maudgalyaḥ* (*Taitt. Up.*) and *Sopāsana ca dvividhā Śāstrābhyāśasvarūpiṇi* (*AV*). This example of hearty cooperation between the Pontiffs and the Gr̥hastha scholars in serving the cause of their Siddhānta has been a happy feature of the spiritual and intellectual life of the Mādhva community for many centuries, now,—a fact of which it could legitimately be proud.

Part VII presents the history of the Order of the Haridāśas of Karnataka. It gives an account of the lives and works of the great Mystics of the Mādhva school who brought the message of M's philosophy and way of life and the path to Mokṣa through Bhakti to the common people, through thrilling medium of song and music. The rise of the Haridāśa Kūṭa from the soil of Mādhva thought is itself a standing proof of the spiritual vitality of Madhvasiddhānta and its deep solicitude for the spiritual uplift of the humble folk. The contribution of the Haridāśas of Karnataka to Hindu Mysticism and to the philosophy of Bhakti are of a very high order, comparable in every way to what kindred movements such as those of the Āzhvārs and the Nāyanmārs to the revival of the true spirit of religion in Tamilnāḍu and what the Mystics of Maharashtra and Gujarat have made in their respective regions through the medium of the language of their provinces. The central figure of the Haridāśa Kūṭa was the great Vyāsatīrtha himself who combined in his person the leadership of both the 'Vyāsakūṭa' and the 'Dāsakūṭa'. A standard edition of the entire legacy of the Haridāśa Sāhitya is a *desideratum*. It would be fitting tribute to the memory of the great Vyāsatīrtha, if his present Pontifical successor at Sosale would take effective steps to give us such an authorized edition; which, with his equipment, resources and drive, it should be quite easy for him to do.

Chapter XXXIX throws light on the nature and extent of the influence of Mādhva thought on both the earlier and the later phases of

Bengal Vaiṣṇavism. It describes the works of two important later writers of the Caitanya school : the great Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa and his preceptor Rādhā Dāmodara of Kānyakubja. In this connection I have discussed the much-debated question of the spiritual descent of the Caitanya school from Madhva's and its doctrinal affiliations with it. This question has come to receive much attention of late in Bengal and Assam, from spokesmen of rival theories on the subject. My interest in this controversy, as in others of its kind, is purely academic. It is a pity that within the Mādhva community itself and among the custodians of the Mādhva Sampradāya viz., the Pontiffs of various Mutts, there is not a sign of awareness of such historical controversies in the air which have an intimate bearing on the past history and traditions of the Sampradāya. A more deplorable state of affairs can hardly be imagined. I have therefore thought it fit to discuss this important question here, in the light of all the relevant materials and come to a definite conclusion as far as evidences permit. The views put forward by Dr Nandi in his doctoral thesis on the subject of Baladeva and the points which have been raised by some other scholars in a recent issue of the Journal of the Gauḍīya Mutt, Madras, have been taken into account.

Chapter XL goes into (i) the territorial expansion of the Madhva Sampradāya in Tamilnadu, Āndhra, Karnataka, Maharashtra areas of S. India and in northern India (U. P.) and (ii) its diffusion among the Gauḍa-Sārasvatas of Goa and their settlements on the west coast of Kerala and Karnataka and among some other communities. I have drawn materials for this chapter from a number of Marathi works such as the critical edition of the *Ĵñāneśvari*, published by the Government of Maharashtra, Pangarkar's *Marāṭhi Vāṇmayācā Itihās*, V. L. Bhavē's *Mahāraṣṭra Sārasvata*, *Ĵñāneśvari Darśan* (Part I) published by the Vāṇmayopāsak Mandal, Ahmadnagar and Prof. S. N. Banahatti's two essays on the Madhva Sampradāya in Maharashtra, published in his *Vāṇmayavimarśa* (Poona 1935). I acknowledge my debt to these works and authors.

Part VIII deals with the transitional literature on Mādhva thought produced in the last century by the 'rear guards' of the old generation and tradition. This is followed by a general bibliographical review of all the important modern works on Madhva philosophy and literature published in the present century, in English, French, German, Sanskrit, Kannaḍa, Tamil and other languages.

Chapter XLII is a brief account of the main achievements of the Dvaita school in the course of its history and it concludes with some observations about contemporary awakening and trends in the social, literary and philosophical life of the Mādhva community and about the prospects of this school of thought in the context of swift changes in the intellectual life and climate of our times.

Dealing with one's own age is perhaps the most difficult task of all; for no one who is in it can take a completely detached view of it. As criticism cannot altogether be excluded in evaluation, one cannot also entirely avoid the expressions of opinion on contemporary works, authors

VIII APPENDIXES

There are nine Appendixes to this work. The first one gives a Consolidated List of all the original and mostly non-extant source-books which have been cited by Madhva in the course of his different works. Their total number runs over two hundred and ninety.

The second reproduces the text of the famous Śrīkūrmam Inscription of Narahari Tirtha which is of decisive importance in fixing the date of Madhva. I have added a brief note explaining and justifying the need for agreeing to a transposition of the second and the third verses as they are found inscribed in the epigraph on one of the stone pillars of the Śrīkūrmam temple (in the Telugu script), so that the statement made in the second verse of the inscription (as it stands) can be reconciled with known and established facts.

The next Appendix gives a consolidated list of all the insufficiently known or undatable authors and anonymous works in Dvaita literature.

Appendix IV deals for the first time in a work on the Mādhva school with the Gauḍa-Sārasvat Brahmin community which now constitutes a major linguistic group in the larger Mādhva community in the country. Among the important points dealt with here are the conversion of this community to the Madhva Sampradāya, the historic migrations of large sections of it from the Goa territory in the 16th and 17th centuries and its settlement along the West coast. The origin and development of the Kāśī and the Gokarna Maṭhas, which now exercise spiritual jurisdiction over the members of this community have also been examined here, at some length, for the first time. This question assumes historical interest in view of the wide difference of opinion in the informed circles of this community itself over the probable date, period and circumstances and manner of origination and bifurcation of these two Mutts. As a historian of the Dvaita school, its literature and institutions, I have naturally felt it necessary to devote some space to a brief discussion of this problem here. As Mādhva Maṭhas these do certainly come within the purview of my work. I have tried to weigh the materials bearing on the question, as far as they have come within my knowledge and have tried to indicate what seemed to me to be the most reasonable view of the entire issue. The conclusions I have reached are purely tentative and are bound to remain so until fuller materials on all the aspects of the problem are collected, enabling us to take a final view. In view of the importance of the subject, I have thought it necessary to raise the question here. So far as I know, there is no other work on the subject of the Gauḍa-Sārasvata Mādhvas and their Mutts, in English. The *Satkathā* and the *Gurucarite* both in Kannaḍa do *not* deal with them. In the same way the hagiological works pertaining to the Gauḍa-Sārasvat Mutts such as the *Guruparamparāmṛta* are confined to the lives of the Svamis of their Mutts. I feel that the different linguistic groups of the Mādhva community should forge closer links together and strive for rapprochments more strenuously than they have done so far. There is much that their Mutts can do in this direction. I would therefore earnestly

hope that the comprehensive account of the diffusion of the Madhva Sampradāya among the Gauḍa-Sārasvatas and the history of their Mutts and the many interesting evidences of friendly relations which have existed in the past between them and the other Mādhva Maṭhas, as shown by the *Koṅkaṇābhyudaya* and other sources, referred to here, will help to foster a truer sense of ideological unity and fellowship flowing from allegiance to one distinctive school of thought and its founder (Sampradāya Ācārya) among all the various linguistic groups that constitute the Mādhva community. The future of this community will depend largely on its ability and preparedness to think, feel and act as an integral and integrated whole, in essentials. The establishment of the Akhila Bharata Mādhva Mahāmaṇḍal augurs well for such true emotional and ideological integration.

The *Govinda-Bhāṣya* of Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa on the Brahmasūtras forms the subject of Appendix V. This Bhāṣya has an important bearing on the question of the nature and extent of the influence of Mādhva thought on the Caitanya Sampradāya. Some articles on the Caitanya school and one on the *Govinda-Bhāṣya* itself, which appeared in the Gaudīya (Sep. 1960) have necessitated a more critical examination of the *Govinda-Bhāṣya* itself here, with a view to adjudging the nature and extent of its doctrinal and interpretational relationship with Madhva's own Bhāṣya on the Sūtras. In this connection, I have discussed the most important question of the philosophical nexus between Madhva's doctrine of Viśeṣas and Saviśeṣābheda and the 'Acintyābheda' theory of the Caitanya School and how far it would be possible to sustain the view that the latter is derived from or has been suggested by or is identical with or is an improvement on the former. As the necessity to discuss the *Govinda-Bhāṣya* and the Acintyābheda view arose *after* the typescript of the present work had been sent to the Press, this discussion had to be reserved for the Appendix. Appendix VI brings to light the name of a hitherto unknown work of Vyāsatīrtha, to which reference is made in a significant context of the *Vyāsa-yogicarita*. Appendix VII examines afresh the question of the birth place of Purandara Dāsa. Appendix VIII gives a historical sketch of the Gokarṇa Partagāli Mutt and discusses, incidentally, the conflicting data of the genealogies of the Kāśī Mutt. Appendix IX is an excerpt of a Sanskrit Kāvya by Krishnadevarāya in which he mentions Vyāsatīrtha as his Guru.

IX

My work represents the fruit of many years' labour of love. As the literature dealt with in the book is predominantly philosophical in content, it has not been possible to keep out of its purview the discussion of logical, philosophical or even theological problems altogether. A comprehensive treatment of Madhva's philosophy as a whole as expounded by his two great expositors—Jayatīrtha and Vyāsatīrtha would however require a separate work in itself—which I hope to write in due course.

The present work deals *primarily* with the history of the Dvaita school and its entire literature and *only indirectly* with its philosophical tenets as

embodied in it. It is intended to meet the requirements of the general reader as well as of the advanced scholar and the specialists in the field. It is addressed not merely to the followers of Madhva, but to all those genuinely interested in having authentic information about the origin and development of the great Vedāntic School of Madhva and its profound contributions to the perennial problems of philosophy as such. No efforts have been spared to make the work readable, interesting, authentic and informative. I have kept close to the standards of modern historical scholarship and research. It is for *Sahṛdayas* and *Parikṣakas* to say how far I have succeeded in placing before them a perspective and properly documented History of the Dvaita School of Vedānta and its Literature.

Publication of this work had been delayed for over ten years for want of funds. Often, it seemed a dream impossible of fulfilment. Thanks however to a grant in aid of Rs. 750/- made by the Bombay University and the financial assistance given by the revered Heads of the Maṭha-traya, the Admar and the Sode Mutts of Uḍipi, the Bhandarkere, the Gokarna and the Kāśi Mutts as well as by my esteemed friends and well-wishers interested in bringing the memorable contribution of the makers of Dvaita philosophy to the sum total of Indian thought to the knowledge of the western world besides its dissemination among our own educated men and women, it has at last been possible for me to meet the Publisher's stipulation for a subsidy. Shri D. M. Tilak, the Publisher has shown a commendable breadth of vision, love of learning, and boldness of spirit in coming forward to take up the major share of the financial and other responsibilities of the publication. He deserves thanks of the entire Mādhva community for this, valuable service to the cause of Dvaita thought.

I am deeply grateful to Dr Radhakrishnan the distinguished philosopher of modern India and the Vice-President of India, for his courtesy in writing a Foreword to this work as a token of his continued interest in my work.

I pay my humble respects to the Svamijis (past and present) of the several Mādhva Maṭhas for the personal interest they have shown in my research work on Dvaita philosophy and its literature since 1930. I have derived much valuable help from them on various points of doctrine and tradition. They have loaned me rare manuscripts from their Mutt Libraries and have permitted me to consult and take notes from them. They have also enlightened me on various points connected with the traditions of their Mutts. Their help and guidance have contributed greatly to the authoritativeness of the materials presented in this work. The chief among them has been the late Svami Satyadhyāna Tīrtha of the Uttarādi Mutt, who among Pontiffs of his days had fully realized the necessity, value and benefits of research work on modern lines in Dvaita philosophy and its literature. Unfortunately, he did not live to see the work, in whose progress he was so keenly interested, in print. I tender my thanks to Sri Dvarakanatha Tīrtha Svamiji of the Gokarna-Partagali Mutt for permitting me to take copies of two records of his Mutt referred to in Appendix IV,

for use here. I thank Sri Shenoy of the Kāśī Mutt for his kindness in giving me useful particulars regarding the traditions of the Mutt. Sri S. R. Gopalakrishna, Advocate, Tumkur is entitled to my sincere thanks for placing at my disposal the photograph copy of the Navabṛndāvana at Anegondi, reproduced here. I owe the photograph of the idol of Sri Uḍipi Krishna in its unadorned (Viśvarūpa) form, reproduced here which was first taken during the Paryāya of Sri Viśveṣa Tīrtha of the Pejavar Mutt, in 1952, to his kind courtesy.

It is a matter of supreme satisfaction to me that I have been able to fulfil a duty to Madhva and his school by bringing out this work in a language which enjoys the widest international currency and status. I look forward to bringing out an abridged edition of this work in my own mother tongue and in a few other modern Indian languages, in due course.

Looking back on the effort of the last ten years to get this work printed and published, I can now truly echo the poet's sentiment :

क्लेशः फलेन हि पुनर्नवतां विधत्ते

on its realization. I offer the work to my Antaryāmin as my humble 'Jñānayajña', in the words of Śrī Vyāsatīrtha :

मत्प्रेरकेण हरिणा या पूजा स्वस्य कारिता ।

वाग्यज्ञरूपा लक्ष्मीशस्तया प्रीणातु केशवः ॥

4/2 Shah Building,
Bhagat Gully,
Bombay—16.

B. N. K. SHARMA

Evolution of Dvaita Thought

CHAPTER I

THE CONCEPT OF "DVAITA" AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE

BEFORE we enter upon a study of the History of the Dvaita school of Vedānta and its Literature, it would be necessary to have a clear definition of the term "Dvaita", commonly used to designate Śrī Madhva's system. The opinion is gaining ground among a section of the followers of Madhva,¹ that this term, though traditionally current for the system, is not really commensurate with or fully expressive of its true metaphysical ideology. It is also argued that the Sanskrit term "Dvaita" and its English equivalent "Dualism" have certain association of ideas with established schools of ancient and modern thought, which are *not true* of Madhva's philosophy and that, therefore, the careless application of such names to designate his philosophy would be and *has been*, a source of much unfortunate misconception about the highest reach of its thought, tending to its summary dismissal in modern 'philosophical circles', as a "hopeless Dualism".

There is some truth in this contention. A certain misconception *has* already set in, in recent times, even in 'informed circles', about the true and the highest metaphysical position of Madhva. The lay reader cannot be blamed then, if he goes away with an altogether wrong notion of Madhva's "Dualism", or is scared away by it. It is, therefore, necessary to explain the true significance which the term "Dvaita" has had, in the authentic traditions of the school of Madhva and show in what sense it *should be understood, as applied to his system of philosophy*. Its association of ideas, elsewhere, should not be allowed to cloud the judgment. One may *then* consider, keeping in view the modern philosophic temper and its likes and dislikes, the question of the adequacy of this current designation or the desirability of going in for a new and a more expressive one.

Dualism, as understood in Western philosophy, is a "theory which admits two independent and mutually irreducible substances".² In Indian philosophy, the Sāṃkhya Dualism would answer to this definition. But the 'Dualism' of Madhva, while admitting two mutually irreducible principles as constituting Reality as a whole, regards only *one* of them, viz.

1. See the views expressed by H. N. Raghavendrachar and Alur Venkatarao in their works on Madhva's philosophy.

2. *Dictionary of Philosophy*, Dogbert D. Runes, New York, 1955, p. 84.

God, as Independent and the other as dependent. God or the Supreme Being is the ONE AND ONLY INDEPENDENT PRINCIPLE and all finite reality comprising the Prakṛti, Puruṣas, Kāla, Karma, Svabhāva etc., is dependent (Para-tantra). This concept of two orders of reality (*tattvas*) viz., “Svatantra” and “Paratantra”, is the keynote of Madhva’s philosophy:

स्वतन्त्रमस्वतन्त्रं च द्विविधं तत्त्वमिष्यते ।

(*Tattvasaṁkhyāna* of Madhva)

The usual objection to a metaphysical Dualism, in the Western sense of the term, that it is an unphilosophical attitude entailing an “eternal opposition” between the reals, which are “set against each other”, in a perpetual strife, could not really be raised against Madhva’s view as set forth above. Indeed, it is precisely to avoid such a “nemesis of Dualism” in its odious sense that Madhva has taken special care to insist on a difference in *status* between the two principles accepted by him and make one of them (the finite) dependent completely on the other (Svatantra), for its being and becoming. This is clear from the very definition of the terms “Svatantra” and “Paratantra” given by his commentator Jayatīrtha :

स्वरूपप्रमितिप्रवृत्तिलक्षणसत्तात्रैविध्ये परापेक्षं स्वतन्त्रम् । परापेक्षमस्वतन्त्रम् ।

(*T. S. Tikā*)

It is indeed a pity that in spite of such plain speaking on the part of the Dvaita philosophers, modern critics of the system should persist in missing Madhva’s point and affect to deplore his “hopeless dualism”. It is, therefore, imperative to warn the readers to be on their guard against being taken in by the ignorant or deliberate misrepresentation of the true bearings of Madhva’s Dualism and to take care to understand the Sanskrit term “Dvaita” and its English equivalent “Dualism” as applied to his philosophy, in a restricted sense of specialised application, not applicable to the older scholastic Dualisms of the East or the ancient and modern Dualisms of the West.

Broadly speaking, the term “Dvaita”, in Indian thought, signifies a system of philosophy which posits more than one fundamental metaphysical principle or category to explain the Universe,¹ or a fundamental distinction between the human souls and the Supreme Being, for all time. According to Śaṅkara, Dualists are those who recognise the states of bondage and release as *real states* or experiences pertaining to the Ātman, while “Advaitins” would deny the *reality* of these states *as such for the Ātman* :

आत्मनो बन्धमुक्तावस्थे परमार्थत एव वस्तुभूते मते सर्वेषां द्वैतवादिनाम् । अद्वैतिनां पुनः
अवस्थाभेदवत्त्वानुपपत्तेः ॥

(Śaṅkara’s *Gītābhāṣya*, xii, 2).

This introduces us to another aspect of Dualistic thought, touching its ‘realistic’ attitude to the experiences of life, which is true of Madhva’s

1. द्वैतिनो हि ते सांख्या योगाश्च नात्मैकत्वदर्शिनः ।

(Śaṅkara, *B. S. B.* ii, 1. 3).

Dualism, as indeed of others, that our finite experiences of embodied existence and our efforts to achieve freedom from bondage, have *both* a real value and validity of their own¹ and are not mere bubbles of Avidyā.²

The main emphasis of "Dualism" as such, would seem to lie on the *number of ultimate reals* or categories rather than on the question of their mutual status. For, just as Realists may believe in *one or more* ultimate reals or categories and also regard them as *knowable in themselves or not*, "Dualists" also may hold divergent views regarding the status and mutual interdependence or independence or other relationship between the categories or principles accepted by them.

Madhva, however, shows by an analysis of thought³ that the acceptance of *two equally independent ultimate principles* or reals, would involve a logical monstrosity and a contradiction.⁴ There can be only *One Independent Reality* and all else must be rigorously subordinated to it and deemed dependent. In true philosophic spirit then, he dichotomizes reality into Independent and Dependent, as has already been shown.

God or the Supreme Being is the Svatantra or the ONE AND ONLY INDEPENDENT SUBSTANCE, in the Spinozistic sense of the term.⁵ All else, such as Prakṛti, Puruṣas, Kāla, Karma, Svabhāva is Paratantra. This dependence is metaphysical and fundamental to the very being and becoming of the Finite which can never outgrow it. The dependent reals exist no doubt from eternity (in the Vedānta); but they do so not in their *own right* but on sufferance of the Supreme. They are not in *despite* of the Lord; but because of Him :

द्रव्यं कर्म च कालश्च स्वभावो जीव एव च ।

यदनुग्रहतः सन्ति न सन्ति यदुपेक्षया ॥

(Bhāg. ii, 10, 12, quoted by M.)

They owe their very existence, knowledge, activity etc., to Him. This clear definition of the status of the two reals Svatantra and Paratantra enables Madhva to effect a happy rapprochement between the claims of finite reality and the demands of the so-called 'Monistic ideal' of the Upaniṣads, in terms of a mystic idealism. The significance of the Upaniṣadic concept of "*Ekam eva advitiyam (Brahma)*" and the language of trans-

1. 'स दुःखी स सुखी चैव स पात्रं बन्धमोक्षयोः ।'

2. G. K. ii, 31.

3. Cf. "सर्वस्य स्वतन्त्रत्वे नित्यसुखादिप्रसंगः । अस्वातंत्र्ये, न कस्यापि प्रवृत्तिः । अन्धपंगुवत् स्यादिति चेन्न; प्रत्यासत्तेरेवानुपपत्तेः । यदि सर्वमेव स्वतन्त्रं स्यात् तदा पारतन्त्र्यादिप्रतीतिविरोधः । नित्यसुखादिप्रसंगश्च । यदि वा परतन्त्रमेव तत्त्वं भवेत्तदा अनवस्थितेरसंभवाच्च न कस्यापि सत्तादिकं स्यात् । आगमविरोधाच्च ॥

(T. S. Tikā, Jayatīrtha).

4. "Monotheism is inevitable with any true conception of God. The Supreme can only be one. We cannot have two Supreme and unlimited beings."

—Radhakrishnan, I. Phil. 1, p. 90.

5. Of being *res completa*, "complete in itself, determined by itself and capable of being explained entirely by itself".

cidental monism of the Upaniṣads lies, according to Madhva, *not* in an acosmistic monism of the type of Śaṅkara's but in the thesis of the primacy of the Supreme as the centre of all reality — the explanation of the reality of all other reals (सत्यस्य सत्यम्) and of the eternity of other eternal (नित्यो नित्यानाम्) in short, the explanation of everything in the womb of Nature and of all Nature herself. The realisation of this truth impels a striving for the realisation of such a Being to the exclusion of all other ends, pursuits and attractions of finite life. The presence of finite reality thus acquires a teleological purpose and significance in the scheme of Upaniṣadic thought. Jayatīrtha gives classical expression to this new metaphysical ideology of the Upaniṣads, adumbrated by Madhva:

सर्वाण्यपि हि वेदान्तवाक्यान्त्यसंख्येयकल्याणगुणाकरं सकलदोषगन्धविधुरं परं ब्रह्म. प्रतिपादयन्ति । तत्र (१) कानिचित् सर्वज्ञत्वसर्वेश्वरत्वसर्वान्तर्यामित्वसौन्दर्यौदार्यादिगुणविशिष्टतया (२) कानिचित् अपहृतपाप्मत्वनिर्दुःखत्वप्राकृतभौतिकविग्रहरहितत्वादिदोषाभावविशिष्टतया (३) कानिचित् अतिगहनताज्ञापनाय बाह्यमनसागोचरत्वाकारेण (४) कानिचित् सर्वपरित्यागेन तस्यैवोपादानाय अद्वितीयत्वेन (५) कानिचित् सर्वसत्ताप्रतीतिप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तताप्रतिपत्त्यर्थं सर्वात्मकत्वेन, इत्येवमाद्यनेकप्रकारैः परमपुरुषं बोधयन्ति ॥

(*Nyāya Sudhā*, on *AV.*, p. 124).

“All Vedāntic texts proclaim with one voice the majesty of the Supreme as a storehouse of numberless auspicious attributes and free from all imperfections. Of these, (1) some represent It as endowed with such (positive) attributes as omniscience, lordship of creatures, control of beings from within and other excellences; (2) others describe It *negatively* as free from such blemishes as sin and suffering and liability to material embodiment; (3) yet others speak of It as being beyond the reach of mind and words, in order to bring home to us Its comparative inaccessibility; (4) many others depict It as the Only One that exists, so as to make it clear that man must seek It to the exclusion of all else; and (5) a few more proclaim It as the Self of all, so that It may be realised as conferring on all else, their existence, knowability, activity etc. Thus do Scriptures depict the Brahman in diverse ways and from different standpoints all converging towards the one purpose (*mahātātparya*) of expounding the transcendent and immanent majesty of God in Himself in the Ātman and in the world.”

This means that as the Only *Independent Real* that exists, in its own right and in the highest sense of the term, the Supreme may well be and is at times, referred to in the Scriptures as the *One without a Second*, without any prejudice to the reality and subordinate existence of the finite selves, Prakṛti etc., which, as compared with the Supreme Reality, are *nought as it were* : *Quo comparata nec pulchra sunt, nec bona sunt, nec sunt* as St Augustine so aptly puts it. This sentiment is heartily echoed by Madhva:

नहि तदधीनं पृथगित्येवोच्यते । —*Brh. Up.* com. iv, 4, 14.

जगतो नास्तिता सैव या पराधीनता मता । —*B. T.* ix, 28, 27.

This conception of “Svatantra” and “Paratantra” checks all possibility of a ‘hopeless Dualism’ between the reals without in any way sacrificing the reality of the Finite. The unity, sovereignty and independence of God are thus made consistent with the claims of reason and the demands of metaphysics. A synthesis is thus arrived at which is at once an improvement on the abstract Monism of Śaṅkara on the one hand and a ‘hopeless Dualism’ on the other. This is Madhva’s contribution to Vedāntic thought.

The English term “Dualism” is inadequate to express the full content and depth of meaning that Madhva has put into the term “Dvaita” as it is to be applied to *his* system. Even the Sanskrit term “Dvaita” is *not literally* capable of expressing *more than the number of fundamental principles accepted*.¹ The details of the mutual relation of the reals and their relative metaphysical status etc., must be supplied by special definition and clarification :

व्याख्यानतो विशेषप्रतिपत्तिर्न हि सन्देहादलक्षणम् ।

It may, therefore, be conceded that there is a good case for considering a more suitable philosophical designation for the system of Madhva.

I would venture to suggest “Svatantra-advitīya-Brahmavāda” as an *alternative* designation for Madhva’s system, capable of conveying directly rather than by implication or definition, the highest reach of its thought and its metaphysical ideology so often stressed by Madhva and so well expounded by Jayatīrtha. It may be seen that such a term would do justice to both the aspects of reality — the finite and the infinite. For, the term “Advitīyatva” has been interpreted by Madhva, in the *Chāṇdogya Bhāṣya*, in terms of “absence of a peer and superior” to Brahman, conceding, by implication, the existence and reality of “lesser reals” like Matter and souls, under the *aegis* of God. The first part of the text has been taken to emphasise the unity of God-head by excluding internal distinctions of substance and attributes in Brahman in conformity with texts like नेह नानास्ति किञ्चन which are understood as negating certain *internal distinctions* (*nānātva*) alone in Brahman. The only internal distinctions that are logically conceivable in Brahman, are those of attributes. This is negated by way of *significant negation*. The adjunct “Svatantra” would thus serve to emphasise the transcendence of the Supreme over the other reals and its immanence in them and show how the conception of Brahman, here, differs from the “Nirviśeṣādvaita” of Śaṅkara. It would also stand terminologically balanced with the designations of other Vedāntic systems like “Nirviśeṣādvaita”, “Śuddhādvaita”, and “Viśiṣṭādvaita”. It would also lay direct emphasis on the primacy of the Supreme as the “Para-Siddhānta” of Madhva’s thought, and put the teachings about the finite in their proper place as constituting the “Apara-siddhānta” (subsidiary

1. Cf. the use of the term, by Madhva himself in such contexts as द्वैतस्य सत्यता स्वत एव चेत् (AV).

truths).¹ The name I suggested forty years ago (in the AUJ and subsequently in my book *Svatantrādvaita*, Madras 1942) has had the high Pontifical approval of the late Svāmi Satyadhyāna Tīrtha of the Uttarādi Mutt. Its adoption may help substantially in focussing attention on the highest metaphysical standpoint of the system to a greater extent and much more pointedly than the current designation. It is for the followers of Madhva to consider the suggestion on its merits.²

1. द्विविधः सत्सिद्धान्तः । परापरभेदात् । * * * अनेनापरसिद्धान्तान्तरमाह * * * उपलक्षणं चैतत् । प्रपञ्चसत्यत्वादिकमपि ग्राह्यम् । —*N. S.* p. 518b.

2. In a Kannada publication on Madhva, entitled *Madhvamunivijaya*, Dharwar 1958, Śrī Viśveśa Tīrtha, Svamiji of Pejāwar Mutt, has held “Tattvavāda” rather than “Dvaita” to be the authentic and traditionally accepted name for the system. But, then, “Tattvavāda” would tell us nothing definite about the nature and classification of “Tattva” according to Madhva. Moreover, “Tattvavāda” itself in so far as it implies a repudiation of “Māyāvāda” would emphasise only the reality of world experience, without touching the nature of the higher reality (Brahman) and so be inadequate. Anyway, his opinion that “Dvaita” is not a traditionally approved designation for the system, does not seem to be well-founded, as Vyāsatīrtha, in the colophon to his gloss on *U. Kh. īkā* calls his Guru Śrīpādarāya, a leader of “Dvaita-thinkers” (द्वैतिकुलतिलक), as pointed out by me, elsewhere. Cf. also : तव द्वैत इव ममाद्वैते तात्पर्यघीः —*Nym.* i, 17.

MANTRAS, BRĀHMAṆAS AND ĀRAṆYAKAS

MADHVA quotes profusely from the whole range of Vedic and Post-Vedic Literature—from the Vedic hymns and their *Khilas*, the *Brāhmaṇas*, *Āraṇyakas*, *Upaniṣads*, *Ekāyana Śrutis*, *Epics*, *Purāṇas*, *Pañcarātra Saṁhitās*, *Gītā*, *Brāhmasūtras* and a large body of interpretive and exegetical tracts based on these, in support of his line of interpretation on the Vedānta. It would be convenient to follow the course of development of religious and philosophical thought in these texts accepted by modern scholars in order to have a proper historical background of the nature and extent of support that could legitimately be claimed in them for his viewpoint.

According to Madhva,¹ God is the One Supreme Reality. He is the Creator, Preserver etc., of the entire world of Matter and Souls. World-experience is real. Souls are many and are dependent for ever on the Supreme. They are delivered from bondage by His grace. Salvation is a state of active enjoyment of supreme felicity. These pivotal points find good support in the Vedic hymns.

Viṣṇu is Madhva's equivalent of the God of religion, the Brahman of the Vedānta and the One Supreme Real (*Ekam Sat*) of the Vedas. He resolves the conflicting testimony of the Mantras, in respect of multiplicity of gods by (1) correlating the various descriptions of Vedic gods in cosmic terms, in the Mantras, to One Supreme who has been clearly recognised in *R. V.* i, 164, 45 as the “Sarvanāmavān” or the Being who is diversely sung by different names and is the “bearer of the names of all the gods” (x, 82, 3); and (2) by equating this “Sarvanāmavān” with Viṣṇu (understood in the etymological sense of the term) as the being which is ‘Vyāpta’ or unlimited (*aparichinna*) by time, space and auspicious attributes on the evidence of some of the hymns themselves (e. g. x, 82, 6). He thus steers clear of the difficulties of Polytheism and Kathenotheism in the Vedas, which face modern interpreters of Vedic thought and establishes after a wide discussion of the problem, that Monotheism (of Viṣṇu) is the true faith of Vedic poets.

POSITION OF VIṢṆU

(i) In the opinion of modern scholars, however, Viṣṇu occupies but a subordinate position in the Vedic Pantheon. He is lauded in far

1. Cf. the oft-quoted verse summarising his chief tenets :

‘श्रीमन्मध्वमते हरिः परतरः सत्यं जगत्तत्त्वतो
भिक्षा जीवगणा हरेरनुचरा नीचोन्वभावं गताः ।
मुक्तिर्नेजमुखानुभूतिरमला भक्तिश्च तत्साधनं
ह्यक्षादिन्नित्यं प्रमाणमखिलाम्नायैकवेद्यो हरिः ॥

fewer hymns than addressed to other gods like Varuṇa, Indra and Agni. "He is celebrated in not more than five whole hymns (Sūktas) and in part of another and his name occurs only about a hundred times altogether in the *Rg Veda*." (Macdonell, *Vedic Mythology*, p. 37). In a large number of short passages, he is introduced just as one among a crowd of divinities from which he is in no way distinguished. Further, the *R.V.* contains numerous hymns in which the Ṛṣis ascribe to Indra, Varuṇa and other gods, the same transcendental attributes and functions as to Viṣṇu. In one place, *R.V.* viii, 12, 27, the power by which Viṣṇu takes his three strides, is derived from Indra and in ix, 96, 5, he is said to have been generated by Soma. In his original setting in the *R. V.* (i, 22, 17 and *Nirukta* xii, 19), Viṣṇu appears to have been nothing more than the Sun-god. (Muir, *Sanskrit Texts*, iv, p. 98).

The verdict of modern historical scholarship based on statistical evidence is not, thus, particularly favourable to Viṣṇu. But it is conceded that "his personality there, is, at the same time, more important than would appear from the statistical standard alone" (Macdonell, *Vedic Mythology*, p. 37). He is the god of the three strides. He dwells inscrutable in the realm of light where even the birds cannot fly (i, 155, 5). To reach the highest step of Viṣṇu, is the ambition of man, in the Upaniṣads, too (*Kaṭha*, i, 3, 1). Viṣṇu is entrusted with the task of delivering from distress (v, 149, 13). The *Yajur Veda* identifies the yajña with Viṣṇu. In the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, (v, 2, 5, 2-3) men are said to be Viṣṇus. He is the helper of the gods as against the Asuras, in the *Ait. Br.* He becomes a dwarf, to recover the earth from the Asuras, for the gods (*Ś. B.* i, 2, 5, 5).¹

From the beginning, then, Viṣṇu appears to have been marked out for a great future. The opening line of the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* of the *R. V.* :

अग्निर्वेदेवानामवमो विष्णुः परमः² । तदन्तरा सर्वा देवताः ॥

bears testimony to the fact that by the close of the Ṛg Vedic period, Viṣṇu had definitely come to be accepted as the head of the Vedic Pantheon. No wonder that he had earlier attained to a position of such warm affection in the hearts of the Seers as to be thought of and mentioned in terms of high regard in Monotheistic circles : i, 164, 36 Monotheism is the acknowledgment and worship of the One true God. It implies a denial of other gods, at any rate, of their jurisdiction over the Cosmos. It was not the way of the Hindu mind to rise to the apogee of Christian Monotheism by *denying* the national gods. "The Seers of the *Rg Veda* were interested in discovering a single creative principle behind all phenomena, itself uncreated and imperishable. The only logical way of establishing such a

1. Radhakrishnan, *I. Phil.* i, 492-3.

2. There can be no doubt that "Parama" signifies the "highest" and not merely the "first" : See :, विष्णुः परम उत्तमः । "देवतानां सङ्गतानामुत्तमो विष्णुरासीत्" इति मन्त्रः । (Śaṅkara's com. on *A. B.*, Uni. of Travancore Ser. cxlix, 1942). Vide also similar uses : या ते धामानि परमाणि (*Rv.* x, 81, 5).

Monotheism was by subordinating the gods to One Highest Controlling Spirit, which is immanent everywhere ($\sqrt{\text{vis}}$), envelopes all ($\sqrt{\text{vr}}$) and which regulates the workings of all other powers and gods.¹ This process satisfied the craving for One God and yet allowed them to keep up their continuity with the past. Indian thought, however daring and sincere, was never hard and rude. It did not usually care to become unpopular and generally made compromises.”² Perhaps, the search for a compromise led to a fresh insight into the truth.

The precise identity of the One Supreme, however, gave no end of trouble to earnest seekers, then, as now. The so-called Henotheism of Vedas was just one of the attempts to arrive at such a precision. But its very shifting uncertainty was the cause of its failure. Henotheism was either Polytheism grown cold in service or an opportune Monotheism. In neither case could it give real satisfaction. It had only put off, but not answered the question : कस्मै देवाय हविषा विधेम ?

It was necessary, in order to do so, to find a basis on which the position of the minor gods could be reduced to subordination to the One Supreme. What was to be the principle or criterion on which the supremacy of the One was to be grounded ? That was the whole point. The weakness of Henotheism had been that it had grounded the subordination of other gods to One, more on individual fancy or the passing moods of the hour than on any logical criterion of divine supremacy. The only criterion of such primacy that could possibly be advanced, was what may be termed the principle of “Sarvanāmatā” as Madhva has so happily phrased it, which came to be clearly adumbrated in the later Maṇḍalas of the *Rg Veda* :

१. इन्द्रं मित्रं वरुणमग्निमाहुः

एकं सत् विप्रा बहुधा वदन्ति । —*R. V. i*, 164, 46.

२. यो देवानां नामधा^३ एक एव —*R. V. x*, 82, 3.

The Supreme was the One lauded by all the names of the other gods.

Madhva takes his stand on these texts and tries to identify the Sarvanāmatā with Viṣṇu. But the identification rests not so much on any express declaration to that effect in the *Rg. Veda* as upon the allusion to certain significant personal characteristics of Viṣṇu (मन्त्रलिङ्ग) that are discernible there, according to him :

1. Vide विवेश भूतानि चराचराणि (*T. Ā. x*, 1, 1.)

„ यच्च किञ्चिज्जगत्सर्वं दृश्यते श्रूयतेऽपि वा ।

अन्तर्बहिश्च तत्सर्वं व्याप्य नारायणः स्थितः ॥

„ तत्र तत्र स्थितो विष्णुः तत्तच्छक्तिप्रबोधकः ।

एक एव महाशक्तिः कुरुते सर्वमञ्जसा ॥ (Madhva, *AV.*)

2. S. Radhakrishnan, *I, Phil.*, i, p. 92.

3. Madhva's interpretation of नामधा: as “bearer of the names of the gods (instead of as “giver of names....”) is supported by Sāyana on *Atharva Veda* ii, 1, 1, 3 : तत्तन्नामानि, स्वयमेव धत्ते इति नामधाः । तथा चाम्नायते—‘तदेवाग्निस्तदु चन्द्रमाः । इन्द्रं मित्रं...’ । ‘एकं सद्विप्रा इति ॥

अजस्य नाभावध्येकमपितं यस्मिन्विष्वा भुवनानि तस्युः ॥ (R. V. x, 82, 6)
इति हि विष्णोर्लिङ्गम् ।¹ —M. B. S. B.

As for the other text : एकं सत् विप्रा बहुधा वदन्ति (1. 164. 46) he draws pointed attention to the express mention of Viṣṇu in terms of unmistakable supremacy, earlier in the same *sūkta* : सप्तार्धगर्भा² भुवनस्य रेतो विष्णोस्तिष्ठन्ति प्रदिशा विघ्नमणि (i, 164. 36). This is a point which cannot be easily passed over.

As for more objective criteria of the Supreme, Madhva enumerates some, which he finds fulfilled in Viṣṇu, more than in any other god of the Vedic Pantheon, in Vedic and post-Vedic evidences.³ But the fact remains that there is no express equation of Viṣṇu with the “Sarvanāmavān” except in a Khila of the Bhāllavis :

नामानि सर्वाणि यमाविशन्ति तं वै विष्णुं परममुदाहरन्ति ।

cited by him (in his bhāṣya on B. S. i, 1, 1). Another quotation from the Bhāllavi Śākhā given by Sureśvara in his *Bṛhadvārttika* (Anandasram Edn. pp. 219-20) clearly shows that the Bhāllavins had accepted the Supreme Being to be Viṣṇu and warmly advocated Niṣkāmakarma dedicated to him to be the means of deliverance. But the allusion to Viṣṇu (as the Sarvanāmavān) in R. V. x, 82. 6, is endorsed by a passage in the *Mahābhārata*, xii, 47, 58 (Kumbakonam Edn.).

The “Being in the Waters” (later Nārāyaṇa) had, by the time of the Nāsadiya Sūkta, come to be regarded as the Supreme :

सलिलं सर्वमा इदं । आनीदवातं स्वधया तदेकं
तस्माद्धान्यन्न परः किंच नास । —x, 129, 3 and 2 ed.
एकः सुपर्णः स समुद्रमाविवेश । —x, 114, 4.

This Being stands sharply distinguished from both of the Four-faced Brahmā and Rudra and many other gods, in the Āmbhṛṇī Sūkta (x, 125) :

यं कामये तं तमुग्रं कृणोमि तं ब्रह्माणं तमृषिं तं सुमेधाम् ।

and in T. Ā. iii, 11, 1. These, combined with the testimony of the-Post-Vedic literature, which uniformly applies the name “Nārāyaṇa” as a synonym of the primeval being in the waters, to Viṣṇu, leads Madhva to assume that he alone, had, from the beginning, the highest claims to be treated as the Supreme Being of Hindu religious philosophy.

1. Cf. J. Gonda, *Aspects of Early Viṣṇuism*, p. 89.

2. In his recent study of the “Asya Vāmasya Hymn” of the Rg Veda., (Ganesh and Co., Madras, 1956) Dr. C. Kunhan Raja confesses that “we don’t know the exact significance of the seven-fold seed of creation of the world” referred to in this hymn and that we have “lost the clue to the correct interpretation of the poem and do not know many of the symbols and conventions of those days” (Introd. pp. xxxv and xxxviii). The identification of the ‘seven seeds’ of creation, as the seven evolutes of Prakṛti, in the Madhva tradition, may therefore be deemed to be certainly helpful in interpreting this line.

3. See his *Mbh. T. N.* (p. 3); *AV.* (p. 26) and his *VTN.*

(ii) The doctrine of "Sarvanāmvān" did not do away with the other gods. They were not banished. They were simply brought into a position of subordinate relation to the One Supreme, as created by the One (x, 129, 6; 125, 1-2; 90, 13) "as sharers in one life (x, 121, 7) or as obedient subjects (x, 121, 2; 8; 90, 2) or as ministers of One Lord (x, 72, 7; 81, 4). In this capacity, they were not unlike of the *malachim* angels of the Old Testament" (Griswold, *Brahman, A Study*, 1900, p. 54). This is attested by the Brāhmaṇas, Āranyakas and the Upaniṣads:

अग्निर्वै देवानामवमो विष्णुः परमः —A. B. i, 1.

तस्मै त्वा; तेभ्यस्त्वा —T. B. iii, 7, 9, 4.

भीषास्माद्वातः पवते भीषोदेति सूर्यः —Taitt. Up. ii, 8.

The love of the national gods and the conservatism of the masses would have proved too strong for the development of any other type of Monotheism in India. Belief in the Sarvanāmvān could be made consistent with the admission of the existence of 'minor' gods, only by agreeing to a dual-application of names (Vṛtti-dvaya) in their primary and secondary senses. It would be obvious that such a theory of Vedic interpretation forms the basis of the Samanvayādhyāya of the *Brahmasūtras*. Madhva successfully adopts this technique in his interpretation of not only the Sūtras, but of the Vedic hymns as well. He finds anticipations of this approach in such texts as:

कश्छन्दसां योगमावेद धीरः —x, 114, 9.

अवस्वराति गर्गरो गोघ्ना परिसनिष्वदत् ।

पिङ्गा परिचनिष्कददिन्द्राय ब्रह्मोद्यम् —viii, 69, 9.

सर्वे वेदाः सर्वे घोषा एकैव व्याहृतिः प्राणऋच इत्येव विद्यात्

—Ā. A. II, 2, 2.

and clear evidence of its acceptance in जनित्रो वायोः

तस्मै सोममेभ्यो जुहोमि ()

यो देवानां देवतमस्तपोजाः । तस्मै त्वा तेभ्यस्त्वा —T. B. iii, 7, 9, 4.

HIERARCHY OF GODS

Though we have a tacit acquiescence in the preeminance of One Supreme Being over all other gods, there is in the Mantras, no systematic hierarchy of the gods worked out. There are references to the comparative thralldom and inferiority of many of them.¹ Rudra, is in R. V. vii, 40, 5, said to have owed his position to Viṣṇu.² Some of the major Upaniṣads, notably *Īśa* and *Chāndogya* are conscious of gradation among the gods. The *Taittiriya Up.* affirms, what has been called a 'beatific calculus' and in that connection, grades the gods, Gandharvas, Pitṛs, Ājānadevas, Indra, Bṛhaspati and Brahmā, in an ascending order. Madhva sees in this a gradation of released souls. But it is only in the Ekāyana and Pañcarātra texts cited by him, that we see a full-fledged scheme of Devatātāratamya.

1. R. V. ii, 38, 9; x, 125, 8; x, 86, 1; ii, 12, 7.

2. See the interpretation of Yāmuna, in his *Āgama Prāmāṇya*, p. 44 and of Madhva (AV).

ETHICS

There is no sign of aversion to the world nor a feverish anxiety to get rid of life on earth in the *R. V.*¹ The Védic people had complete confidence in their gods to make their life on earth pleasant and comfortable in every way and bestow on them worldly goods, cattle and progeny. They were not over-anxious about the "other world" and were at peace enough with themselves and the world around to pray for a hundred years of life.² The note of pessimism of later Upaniṣads is still absent.³ The doctrine of transmigration had not yet become an obsession and consequently there was no problem of bondage or a systematic code of Sādhana. But a certain yearning for spiritual knowledge could be detected in texts like यस्तं न वेद किमुचा करिष्यति (*R. V. i*, 164, 39, and in *R. V. i*, 164, 5-6). The attainment of the world of Yama⁴ or of Viṣṇu⁵ sometimes was the recognised goal of man. This could be achieved either by pleasing the gods or by sacrifices (vii, 48, 3). There was no mention of Bhakti or Jñāna as technical aids to salvation. Germs of the Bhakti⁶ doctrine could however be detected in the striking expression "*bhāga-bhaktasya*" met with in *R. V. i*, 24, 5, its accent notwithstanding. But it was only in the Upaniṣads that the nature of God, the world and the souls was fully sought to be elucidated and definite places assigned to Bhakti, Jñāna etc.⁷ The earliest recognition of Bhakti is in the *Śvetāśvatara*, vi, 23,; though a Khila of the Māṭharas cited by Madhva, refers to Bhakti as the sole and only means of salvation.⁸ Full-fledged eschatological theories also came to be formulated only during the age of the Upaniṣads; though stray but specific references to the two paths of Devayāna and Pitryāna and to *repeated births in this world*, are found in *R. V. i*, 164, 30-31, 38 and in x, 16, 3; 19, 1; 88, 15, etc.

HEAVEN AND HELL

There are several passages which lie scattered in the *R. V.*, out of which one could piece together a rosy picture of the joys of Heaven and gruesome pictures of the horrors of hell. Madhva has naturally drawn on these in setting forth his idea of Mokṣa and of Tamas (Hell). Heaven

1. *R. V. i*, 1, 6.

2. जीवेम शरदः शतम्.

3. "The early Vedic Āryans were full of the zest for life. The vitality and affirmation of life pervading them, are extraordinary." Jawaharlal Nehru, *Discovery of India*, p. 78.

4. एका यमस्य भुवने विराषाट्.

5. *R. V. Kh. ix*, 113, 1.

6. H. D. Velankar, in his work in Marathi, '*Rgvedāntil Bhaktimārga*', Poona, 1952, admits (p. 70) that the quality and aim of devotion met with in the hymns of the *R. V.* are different and much below the mark associated with the classical Bhakti of later times. He has, however, drawn attention to some interesting passages like i, 24, 1; 62, 11 and vii, 22, 5, giving touching expression to devotion. It is curious, however, that he should have passed over i, 24, 5.

7. 'विद्ययामृतमश्नुते' । 'नान्यः पन्था विद्यतेऽयनाय' । 'विद्यैव तु निर्धारणात्'.

8. 'भक्तिरेवैनं नयति, भक्तिरेवैनं दर्शयति, भक्तिवशः पुरुषः' (*M. B. S. B. iii*, 3, 54).

is said to be the abode of eternal, unalloyed bliss.¹ There is no support in the *R. V.*, for the monistic conception of the released state as one of isolation, devoid of all company and subject-object consciousness. The authors of the hymns do not evince any sympathy with the desire to get rid of all action, personal existence and enjoyment, in the life to come.

The conception of Hell is equally well-defined in the *R. V.* It is known by its proper name. "Naraka", with all its horrors and tortures, is familiar enough in the *A. V.* xii, 4, 36 and *V. S.* 30, 5. The impious enemies of the gods and unbelieving folk are smashed and annihilated by Indra : छन् शिश्नदेवानभिवर्षसा भूत् (x, 99, 3). They are to be eternally shut out from the truth : मा शिश्नदेवा अपि गुह्यतं नः (vii, 21, 5). In *R. V.* vii, 104, we read : "Burn, slay, pierce and hurl down the malefactors into bottomless darkness. Let them boil like cauldron on flames. Punish them with your deadly thunderbolt, with your scorching darts. Give them over to the lap of Nirṛti. Sweep them away with all their offspring. Let them sink without a sound underneath the might of the worlds."² Indra is conjured to put down with a heavy hand, the undeserving and the Satanic who get on so well in this life, in spite of their wickedness and aspire for Heaven :

मायाभिरुत्तिसृप्तत इन्द्र दामारुरुक्षतः

अव दस्यूनघनुयाः (vii, 14, 14).

He puts down the wicked and the unholy and seldom tolerates their undeserved successes in life :

श्रण्वे वीर उग्रमुग्रं दमायन् अन्यमन्यमतिनेनीयमानः ।

एधमानद्विद् उभयस्य राजा चोष्कूयते विश इन्द्रो मनुष्यान् ॥ (vi, 47, 16).

Many of these texts have come in handy for Madhva to formulate his theory of the tripartite classification of souls and their innate distinction and the eternal punishment of the sworn enemies of Theism. *R. V.* vi, 47, 16, refers to three kinds of beings : (1) those whom Indra leads on to Heaven; (2) those whom he repeatedly drags down; and (3) those whom he keeps weltering in the world, thus anticipating, in a remarkable manner, Madhva's theory of Trividhajīvas, consisting of Muktiyogya, Tamoyogya and Nitya-samsārins. It is obvious that Hell, like Heaven, was in the *R. V.* both eternal and beginningless.¹ The "seven hells" of the *Vedānta Sūtra*

1. यत्नानन्दाश्च मोदाश्च मदः प्रमुद आसते ।

देवैः सुकृतकर्मभिस्तत्र माममृतं कृधि ॥ (ix, 113, 1).

* * *
यत्र कामा निकामाश्च यत्र ब्रह्मस्य विष्टपम् ।

स्वधा च यत्र तृप्तिश्च तत्र माममृतं कृधि (ix, 113, 10).

Cf. also *R. V.* x, 135; *AV.* iii, 29, 3; *JB* xiv, 7, 1, 32-33.

2. Tr. Ranade *Creative Period in the History of I. Phil.* p. 27. These passages have been cited by Trivikrama Paṇḍitācārya, in his com. on Madhva's *B. S. B.* i, 2, 12. See also *S. B.* 11, 6, 1; *JB.* i, 42, 4.

3. The expression "अनारभणे तमसि" is actually to be met with in *R. V.* vii, 104, 3. Does it, however, merely signify 'supportless' as in *R. V.* 1, 116, 5 a? The *Viṣṇurahasya* puts the argument for eternal hell, thus :

iii, 1, 15, and the gruesome accounts of the different hells in the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa* (ii, 6, 2-5) the *Mahābhārata* (xiii, 2, 23-25) and the *Garuḍa Purāṇa* (ii, 2, 3, 3-104) are later developments along the same lines.

COSMOGONIC THEORIES OF THE VEDAS

(i) The cosmogonic theories of the Vedas are mostly realistic. Several gods like Indra, Varuṇa and Savitr are spoken of as authors of the world. The process of creation is likened to the art of the carpenter or the smith; but more often, it is a procreative act : यो नः पिता जनिता (x, 82, 3).¹ “The origin of the world is conceived in three different ways, as a process of generation, as a process of architecture and as a process of sacrificial dismemberment. The notion of building underlies the names Tvaṣṭā, Viśvakarman (all-worker), Dhātṛ and Vidhātṛ (ordainer, creator). It also underlies the question in x, 81, 4, from what material (*Vanam Vṛkṣa*) the world, conceived as a house, was built. Closely connected with this is the conception of the world as a work of creative smith who forges or welds together heaven and earth (x, 81, 3 : 72, 3). In these representations we have the argument from design in its crudest forms. But the dominant conception of the world is as a process of generation. Thus, whatever is (Sat) is born, including Heaven and Earth, Sun and Moon (x, 90, 13), the four Vedas (90, 9), law and truth (190, 91) the animals (90, 10), the gods (72, 15), original matter conceived as Infinite (Aditi, x, 72, 4) and as primordial watery chaos (121, 9; x, 190, 1 and 90, 5).”²

In the words of a distinguished historian of Indian philosophy, “there is no basis for any conception of the unreality of the world, in the hymns of the *Rg Veda*.”³ No doubt, the expression “Māyā” occurs; but it merely conveys the idea of mysterious power, as when Indra is said to have assumed many forms on account of his power : इन्द्रो मायाभिः पुरुरूप ईयते (*R. V.* vi, 47, 18). Māyā does certainly signify some kind of power, magical or other, in such texts as मायाभिरुत्सृष्टतः (viii, 14, 4). According to Macdonell, “the term signifies occult power, applicable in a good sense to gods and in a bad sense to demons. It has an almost exact parallel in the English word ‘craft’, which, in its old significance meant occult power, magic, skilfulness, and art, on the one hand and deceitful skill, vile, on the other. By occult power, Varuṇa standing in the air, measures out the earth with the Sun, as with a measure. And so, the epithet “Māyī”, “crafty”, is chiefly applied to Varuṇa among the gods : *R. V.* vi, 48, 14; vii, 28, 4; x, 99, 10; x, 147, 5.”⁴

अन्यथा कस्तमो यायाद्यदनारंभणश्रुतौ ।

अनन्तं वन्नमित्युक्तं न परावर्तते यतः ॥

—p. 50. ver. 102. Ms. with me.

1. Which, therefore, rules out the material causality of God, according to Madhva : अङ्गीकृतं तत्पितृवन्नैव विश्वात्मना भवः (*A.V.*)

2. Griswold, *Brahman, A Study*, 1900, p. 38.

3. S. Radhakrishnan, *I. Phil.*, i. p. 103.

4. *Vedic Mythology*, p. 24.

The Vedic poets were fully imbued with the beauty and majesty of creation and had been more or less forced by sheer admiration into the consciousness of an All-Powerful Being who could be the author of such a stupendous handiwork.

इयं विसृष्टिर्यत आबभूव (x, 129, 7).

A sublime wonder was the father of philosophy in this case. The variety and magnitude of creation, not to say its reality, points to the excellence and sovereignty of the Creator. It would appear that we have almost the beginnings of the teleological argument here. The reality of creation is, of course, an obvious presumption in such an argument.

(ii) In this connection, we have to consider the Nāsadiya Sūkta, which is believed by some to “overcome dualistic metaphysics in a higher monism”.¹ The hymn is a rare example of sustained thought, though Macdonell thinks, “it has all the defects of the Indian mind, such as its indefiniteness and its tendency to make reasoning depend on mere words”.² According to another estimate, the hymn “brings out the inadequacies of our thought-categories to unravel the mysteries of the Universe and establishes the Absolute as its ground”.³ Sāyaṇa has given a Monistic interpretation to this Sūkta, equating “Tamas” mentioned there, with the “Māyā” of the Advaita. Madhva, in his *Tattvodyota*, has disputed the monistic interpretation and tried to give it a Theistic interpretation. Without lingering over the exact sense of the opening terms “Sat” and “Asat”,⁴ we may note that the spirit of the Sūkta is more theistic than strictly “Advaitic”. Tamas is admitted to have *existed* (तम आसीत्) side by side with the One breathing windless by its own power. It is impossible to resist the feeling that this “Tamas” is the prototype of the Prakṛti of the later Sāṃkhya.⁵ There is no room for any illusionism or a colourless monism in all this.

The creative process is no doubt taken to start “automatically” out of the desire of the One. But that does not mean the denial of a pre-existent matter : *Tama āsit*. The One sets the Other in motion by the sheer power of its will (*Kāma*) and the latter unfolds itself. This will is spontaneous in that it is unconditioned by anything in the nature of the other. It is in this sense that the creative process itself is “automatic”. And when the hymn goes on to say that the One breathed windless, by itself by its own power (स्वध्या), there certainly is the implication that the “other” i.e. “Tamas”, lacked such power of self-driven activity. We have here the

1. S. Radhakrishnan, *I. Phil.*, i. p. 103.

2. *History of Sanskrit Literature*, p. 137.

3. S. Radhakrishnan, *I. Phil.* i. p. 101.

4. *The Brh. Up.* ii, 3, 2, 3 gives them a technical sense of “mūrta” and “amūrta” which is followed by Madhva. See also : एष पृथिवी रयिर्देवः सदसच्चामृतं च यत् । (*Praśna Up.* ii. 5) and Śaṃkara thereon : सन् मूर्तमसदमूर्तम् ।

5. Keith, *Religion and Philosophy of the Vedas*, HOS, 32, p. 533. Cf. also the reference to the seven seeds of creation in i. 164, 36 which remind us of the seven evolutes of Prakṛti in Sāṃkhya.

germ of the idea of 'Svatantra' as the highest Real. If the very existence of a *second* principle were unacceptable to the poet, he would have worded the concluding line accordingly as तस्माद्वा न्यन्न किं च नास instead of as तस्माद्वा न्यन्न परः किंच नास. This additional term "Para", suggests that what is sought to be denied is *not* the merest existence of an "other" beside the One, but the existence of anything "above" or "higher" than that One, i.e. to say "independent" of it. This force of "Para" could be easily seen in a parallel passage of the *Gītā* : मत्तः परतरं नान्यकिंचिदस्ति (vii, 7). We have already seen that the existence of "Tamas" as a principle has been conceded in the hymn. On the whole, the Sūkta seems to establish that the Supreme is the One independent Real and that matter is dependent. The words of B. S. सत्त्वाच्चावरस्य (ii, 1, 16) seem to embody the same idea.

There is thus no possibility of a "Vivartavāda", in this¹ or any other Sūkta of the *Rg Veda*. It is equally misleading to see in *Ekam sad viprā* . . *R. V.* i, 164, 46, any germs of a philosophical monism, as Radhakrishnan does (*I. Phil.* i, p. 94). For, as Kunhan Raja rightly points out, "the context is about the gods known by different names and *not* about the reality of the Universe" (*Asya Vāmasya Hymn*, introd. p. xxxv). The acceptance of the two categories of "Tamas" and "the one" (tad ekam) would seem to lead up legitimately to "Prakṛtyupādāna" and "Īśvara-nimittakāraṇa" theories. Prof. Ranade's remark,² that "in the description of how things stood before creation, we get perhaps, the earliest germs of what later developed into the Parīṇāmavāda or doctrine of evolution", comes as a partial confirmation of this. In any case, it would not be correct to interpret the passage as establishing that "the Absolute Reality which is not characterizable as "Sat" or "Asat", (existent or non-existent), is at the back of the world".³ For, the opening lines "नासदासीन्नो सदसीत्" in which such negatives are employed, have no reference to the Absolute reality "which is at the back of the world", but to the world itself and its constituent elements like *Rajas*, *vyoman* etc. The Absolute reality itself must indeed be characterizable as "Sat" and has been so characterized, not only in the very act of describing it as an "Absolute Reality" but also in the text : तस्माद्वा न्यन्नपरः किंच नास and elsewhere : आत्मा वा इदमेक एवाग्र आसीत् । ब्रह्म वा इदमग्र आसीत् । सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीत् । It would be "sham profundity", as one European critic puts it, to deny even reality or existence to the Absolute. That would throw the Absolute straight into the arms of the "Anirvacanīya", as has been rightly pointed out by Madhva. If the residual Absolute, were *neither Sat nor Asat*, it would turn out to be Anirvacanīya, i.e., "mithyā", a position which the Indian Monist could ill afford to concede.

We may, therefore, conclude that the reality of the world was taken for granted in the Mantras and that there was no need to establish it with

1. The Sūkta speaks of "kāma" as the seed of creation. No "vivarta" is brought about by the deliberate "wish" of the substrate.

2. *Op. cit.* ii, 24.

3. *Op. cit.* i, 101.

special arguments or emphasis. It is impossible to evade the spirit of realism that pervades a host of texts like the following :¹

यच्चिकेत सत्यमित् (x, 55, 6) विश्वं सत्यम् (ii, 24, 12).

प्र धान्वस्य महतो महानि सत्या सत्यस्य करणानि (ii, 15, 1).

ध्रुवा पृथिवी (x, 173, 4.) सुपारक्षत्रः सतो अस्य राजा (vii. 87, 6).

ध्रुवासु तासु क्षितिषु क्षियन्तो. (vii. 88, 7).

Some of the above have naturally been cited by Madhva. They may not all of them have been uttered with any conscious or deliberate intention to emphasize the reality of the world; but they speak volumes in favour of an undying and universal faith in a realistic world. Such casual and unintentional testimony is all the more valuable and convincing.

BRĀHMAṆAS AND ĀRANYAKAS

(i) During the period of the Brāhmaṇas, the science of sacrifice and the institution of priesthood gained dominance and as the interest was mainly sacrificial, no significant advance in higher religion or metaphysics had been made.

But the urge for speculation could not be stifled altogether, sacrifice or no sacrifice. A sense of dissatisfaction with the routine of study and sacrifice was in the air : तद्वैतत्पश्यन्तो विद्वांसो ऋषयः कावषेया आहुः किमर्था वयमघ्येष्यामहे किमर्था वयं यक्ष्यामह इति। (A. Ā. III. 2-3). Though the Brāhmaṇas did not plunge directly into speculative waters, they paved the way for it to some extent, by their mystic approach to the details of the sacrifice. They assumed a mystic correspondence between things and resorted frequently to fanciful etymology in search of such correspondence. Logical and scientific thought is based on scrutiny of facts of experience, noting differences and avoiding false or facile generalisations. But the early stages of Vedic thought abound in crude and sweeping generalisations based on insufficient and often specious data, slurring over points of difference and ending in identifications bold and bald. "We see in them symbolism gone mad. Everything is equated with everything else. They illustrate the fact that ritualism thrives on symbolism. Still, the wild and incoherent identifications of the Brāhmaṇas, indicate at least the general trend and direction of Indian speculation".² "The religion of the Brāhmaṇas became overloaded with symbolic subtleties. Every act done, every syllable uttered at a ceremony was important" (Radhakrishnan, *I. Phil.*, i, p. 125). But by widening the scope of Polytheism, they were making a steady, if also unconscious, approach to the great truth of everything in the world being permeated by one uniform divine principle. Their innate desire to see correspondences even where they were hidden from profane eyes, and through them to bridge the gulf between the varying data of sense

1. R. V. i, 67, 5; 70, 8; 129, 7; 190, 3; ii, 6, 32; iv, 17, 5; v, 45, 7; 73, 9; viii, 2, 37; 62, 12; vi, 67, 10; vii, 60, 2; ix, 62, 5.

2. Griswold, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

perception and the requirements of the religious consciousness raises them above the level of wooden sacrificialism with which they are so widely, but uncharitably, identified. The value of these new approaches was soon to be realised in the Āraṇyakas, which probably under the impact of strong opposition to the basic sacrificial cult of the Brāhmaṇas, tended to lead the course of speculation more and more into mystic and meditative channels and finally ended by replacing their objective and concrete sacrificialism by an abstract and symbolic one. Dim and distant echoes of these new ideas are to be found in the Brāhmaṇas themselves.

“Thought was the ladle; intelligence the ghee, speech the altar, study the grass, insight the fire, knowledge the priest who enkindles, breath the oblation, chanting the Adhvaryu, Vācaspati the Hotṛ and mind the Upavaktṛ”¹ (*Ait. Br.* V, 25.). Here, we see the Brāhmaṇa sacrificialism already tending towards the path of symbolic sacrifice and meditation which were soon to become the regular feature of the Āraṇyakas and partially also of the *Upaniṣads*. Small wonder, then, that the first chapter of the second Āraṇyaka of the *Aitareya*, should begin with the memorable words : एष पन्था एष कर्मैतत्सत्यम् । “He is the way, He is the Karma” and later on observe, एतं ह्येव बहुधा महत्युक्ते मीमांसन्ते (A. Ā. III. 2, 3), which recall the words of the Bible : “I am the way, and the Truth and the Life” (John, xii, 25). There is a movement in all this from naive pluralism to higher Monotheism that is as yet undefined and which may be taken to reach its fulfilment in the Antaryāmi Brāhmaṇa of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*.

(ii) The Āraṇyakas were, by their very nature, treatises meant for study in the seclusion of forests,² and were cast in a mystic mould. Allegorical interpretation of sacrifices, symbolism, fanciful etymologies³ of names for purposes of meditation, were the rule in them. A revolt against the concrete sacrificialism of the *Brāhmaṇas* had already been set on foot. It must be said to the credit of the Āraṇyakas that they succeeded in giving a spiritual turn to the prevailing mysticism and symbolism of the *Brāhmaṇas*. Attention, as a result, was shifted from the sacrifices *per se* to the Supreme Being who was upheld as the centre of all sacrifice and goal of human effort. One or two instances of this far-reaching transformation in outlook may be noted :

१. एतं ह्येव बहुधा महत्युक्ते मीमांसन्ते, एतमग्नावध्वर्यवः. एतं महान्नते छन्दोगा एतमस्यामेतं दिवि एतं वायौ, एतमाकाशे एतमप्स्वेतमोषधीषु. . . . सर्वेषु भूतेष्वेतमेव ब्रह्मेत्याचक्षते” (A. Ā. iii, 2, 3).

२. एतद्वस्म वै विद्वांसो ऋषयः कावषेया आहुः किमर्था वयमध्येष्यामहे किमर्था वयं यस्यामह इति ॥ (*ibid.* iii, 2, 6).

३. ऋचोऽक्षरे परमे व्योमन् यस्मिन्देवा अग्नि विश्वे निषेदुः ।

यस्तं न वेद किमच्चा करिष्यति ? (*R. V.* i, 164, 39).

The old doctrine of “*Ekam sad viprā bahudhā vadanti*”, was still further extended and harnessed to the spiritual mysticism of the day by attuning

1. Tr. Ranade, *Constructive Survey of I. Phil.*, ii, p. 51.

2. अरण्याध्ययनाच्चैवमारण्यकमितीर्यते (*Sureśvara, Bṛhadvārttika*).

3. *Chān. Up.* viii, 5, 1-2; *Bṛh. Up.* i, 1, 1; “We are asked to meditate on the horse-sacrifice” Radhakrishnan, *I. Phil.*, i, 148.

everything to God : सर्वे वेदाः सर्वे घोषा एकैव व्याहृतिः प्राणऋच इत्येव विद्यात्¹ ॥ (A. Ā. ii, 2, 2). The erratic etymologies of *Brāhmaṇas* also, were given a similar turn and the pursuit of the Brahman through all forms of worship and meditation, came to be recognised. In an age of suspicion and distrust of the aboriginal non-Aryan², a mystic garb was deliberately given to the utterances of the Āranyakas, in order to have the truths confined to the select few. "For the gods love the indirect mode of exposition and hate the direct".³ These elaborate precautions taken to keep the esoteric truths closely guarded, were evidently the beginnings of the doctrine of "Adhikāra", of later times.

1. This text has been fully utilised by Madhva in favor of his far-reaching application of the doctrine of Sarvaśabda-samanvaya, in Brahman.

2. विद्या ह वै ब्राह्मणमाजगाम गोपाय मां शेवधिष्टेऽहमस्मि ।
अनार्यकायानृजवेऽयताय न मा ब्रूया ऋजवे ब्रूहि नित्यम् ॥

(*Khilaśruti*, Yāska, *Nirukta*).

In A. B. XXXIII. 6, the Āndhras are included among Non-Aryan Dasyus.

3. परोक्षप्रिया इव हि देवाः प्रत्यक्षद्विषः (A. Ā. II, 4, 3).

EARLY UPANIṢADS

(i) THE historical traces of the intimate connection between the *Āraṇyakas* and the *Upaniṣads*, would show how naturally should the air of mysticism, secrecy and symbolism that pervaded the former, have passed on to their logical and chronological successors : the *Upaniṣads*. The latter interpret the sacrifices and allegorize them. In some passages, we are asked to meditate on the horse-sacrifice. This is as good as performing one. Such meditation helps one to realise the inner purpose of sacrifice. The detailed description of the “kind of plank, the nature of the wood and references to the number of bricks, their kind and manner of arrangement (या इष्टका यावतीर्वा यथा वा *Kaṭha*) show that they were not yet *indifferent* to sacrifices. But, while adhering to their *forms*, they try to improve and refine their spirit. Sacrifices are necessary at a certain stage. But they alone will not do. They have to be harnessed to the soul-sense : तमेतं वेदानुवचनेन ब्राह्मणा विविदिषन्ति यज्ञेन... (*Brh. Up.* iv, 4, 22). Else, they would prove to be frail boats across the ocean of Samsāra : प्लवा ह्येते अदृढा यज्ञरूपाः । (*Mund.* 1, 2, 7). The theme of the *Upaniṣads*, is thus *Jñāna*. They condemn the narrow view which is responsible for the performance of rites and sacrifices with the sole object of getting large returns of outward good in this or another life. They set themselves resolutely against the mechanical conception of Dharma and Karma of the *Brāhmaṇas*. But they are not explicit about “work as worship of God”, though the idea may be traced to *Īśa Up.* i.

(ii) We find in the *Upaniṣads* a steady advance on the Vedic and *Brāhmaṇa* conception of future life. While the *Brāhmaṇas* allowed for future life only in the next world, the *Upaniṣads* extended it to this world also.

While the *Mantras* merely sang the glories of the gods and the *Brāhmaṇas* elaborated the sacrifices whereby to please them, and the *Āraṇyakas* meditated on their deeper significance, the *Upaniṣads* turned attention to the actual problems of religion and philosophy and questions of the inter-relation of the data of life here with the life beyond, the nature and limitations of personality, of the ultimate destiny of man, his relation to the world of experience, the status of the gods and the necessity for assuming a Transcendental Principle underlying all phenomena and its relationship to the embodied spirit.

(iii) While the method of treatment was laudatory in the *Mantras* and mandatory in the *Brāhmaṇas*, here, in the *Upaniṣads*, the mystic

method of the Āraṇyakas was blended¹ with the illustrative.¹ Metaphysical discussions were couched in highly elusive terminology² with a good deal of apparent contradiction between the opening and the ending,³ between the crisp, sententious conclusions and the loose, roundabout premises, arguments and analogies leading to them. This may be seen to be the case with most of the texts at issue, later, between Monism and Dualism.

(iv) While the Mantras and the *Brāhmaṇas* dealt with God as an external Being, the *Āraṇyakas* turned attention to the immanent aspect of the Deity. The sources of man's spiritual insight are twofold—the objective and the subjective, the wonders of the world without and the light of the inner self. In the Vedas, the vast order and movement of nature engages attention. In the *Upaniṣads*, we turn to explore the depths of the inner world (*Kaṭha Up.* iv, 1). From the outward physical facts attention is now shifted to the inner immortal self. Thus, it becomes an established fact in the *Upaniṣads*, to treat of the *God in man*. Hence the name “Adhyātma Vidyā”,⁴ given to them. With this shifting of emphasis from the outer to the inner world, came the birth of true philosophy. The idea of a central power behind the Universe, had already been reached in the *Saṁhitās*. But it had remained at the outer level of a power behind the gods : सहैव सन्तं न विजानन्ति देवाः । (*T. Ā.* iii, 11, 5). It had not yet been extended to the whole of reality. This the *Upaniṣads* undertook to do : ऐतदात्म्यमिदं सर्वम् । (*Chān. Up.*). This naturally led to a philosophical inquiry into the human personality in relation to the Deity, etc., on the one hand and the formulation of definite theories of creation and of the life and destiny of man and his relation to his world of action and enjoyment, on the other.

The *Upaniṣads* assume two spiritual principles : the individual and the Universal : the Ātman and Brahman, the psychic and the cosmic. By a vigorous application of the method of psychological elimination, they try to separate,⁵ the twin principles from all that is impermanent and corporeal and ascribe to them such exalted attributes as reality, knowledge and bliss. Metaphysical systems are to be based on the data of psychological

1. “When the problem of the coexistence of plurality and unity is taken up, the *Upaniṣads* speak in the language of similes and symbols but do not give any definite answer.” Radhakrishnan, *I. Phil.* i, 183. “Their weakness lies in the fact that their philosophical synthesis is achieved not so much by explicit reason as by intuition” (*op. cit.* p. 264).

2. “Even here, it is not unusual to find things equated with and identified with one another on mere syllabic similarities and other fanciful analogies of one sort or another” Ranade, *I. Phil.* ii, p. 144.

3. “The method of argumentation also, can hardly be called philosophical. Even in one of the best instances of sustained argumentation (*Chān.* vi) there is, at the best, a mere piling up of similes one over the other” (*ibid.* p. 144) “There are many inconsistencies and contradictions that largely impede the progress of the argument, and far-fetched analogies (p. 141). “We meet with fanciful word-plays, ritualistic conceits and thread-bare symbolizing” (*ibid.*).

4. Cf. अघ्नरीश्वरे (*Pāṇ.* 1. 4, 97).

5. “They arrive at the ground of all things by stripping off the self veil after veil of contingency.” Radhakrishnan, *I. Phil.* i, 388.

sciences also. Western metaphysics is one-sided in that its attention is confined to the waking state alone. Indian thought, on the other hand, undertakes a synthetic survey of the modifications of the waking, dream and dreamless states. As a result of such an investigation of the three states (*Avasthātraya*), the essence of the individual is claimed to be that which persists in and through the changes — the residuum or common factor of all the states of waking, dream, dreamless sleep, death, re-birth and release. Hence the discussion of these stages in the *Upaniṣads* and in the *Brahma-sūtras*, where by a deeper inquiry into the conditions of these states, the dependence of the individual on the Supreme is established (*B. S.* iii, 2, 1-7).

(v) Consistent with their high philosophical purpose, the *Upaniṣads* try not only to *derive* the world of matter and souls *from* Brahman, but also to *trace it back* to it.¹ But their theories in these respects are not at all set out with any clearness. Nor are the isolated and often apparently contradictory and conflicting statements worked out into a coherent system. Not being the productions of a single author or of the same age, they contain matter of manifold variety and order of excellence. They disclose no philosophical synthesis as such. “So numerous are their suggestions of truth and so varied their guesses at God, that almost anybody may seek in them what he wants and find what he seeks.”² It is, therefore, difficult to reduce them to a definite system of thought.

Indian commentators pledged to the belief in the infallibility of the Scriptures, have, naturally, assumed that the *Upaniṣads* have but one system to propound, one doctrine to teach. On this assumption, they have proceeded to unify the divergent and often hopelessly irreconcilable utterances of the *Upaniṣads* into a single system. The Advaita of Śaṁkara, the Viśiṣṭādvaita of Rāmānuja and the Dvaita of Madhva, are all the outcome of such attempts. Each one takes his stand on texts or groups of texts that appear to him to represent and agree with the truth arrived at by him after deep independent reflection on the problems of philosophy, — the question of the degree and extent of spiritual satisfyingness, and the logico-metaphysical finality of one or more of the primary data of experience, in all their completeness — the Ego, Matter and God, — and the degree of philosophical prominence to be assigned to one or more of them, in any balanced metaphysical theory. Each one starts with a pre-established outline before him arrived at by intensive thinking and correlates the various groups of texts so as to fit in with such an outline. Each one takes his stand on texts which appear to him to represent the highest truth (arrived at on grounds of independent ratiocination and a general view of the texts)³ and these he tries to harmonise with those less favorable

1. Cf. यमप्येति भुवनं साम्प्रदाये (*Ghṛtasūktā*)

यत्प्रयन्त्यभिसंविशन्ति । (*Taitt. Up.*)

2. Radhakrishnan, *I. Phil.*, i, p. 140.

3. “The Indian thinkers first arrive at a system of consistent doctrine and then look about for texts of an earlier age to support their position. They either force them into such support or ingeniously explain them away” (*op. cit.*, i, 130).

to his position and explain (away) the rest which go against his views. *In adopting such a procedure, the Indian commentators have shown themselves to be makers of "Mokṣa-śāstra" rather than strict historical interpreters of Indian philosophy.*

(vi) The possibilities of arriving at the true and original philosophy of the Upaniṣads, by a process of historical criticism has been debated by scholars. Some have wondered if it would be possible to show that one view in them is fundamental and that all others are derived from it by a process of development or degradation. Others have attempted to discover sufficient data for the construction of a theory of historical development of thought by which each successive stage of thought could be explained as the "outworking" of the ideas contained in the one that went before it. The greatest impediment to such speculative endeavours is the absence of a reliable chronology for the *Upaniṣads*. The methods of literary criticism may give us some sort of a tentative chronology. The relative order of some of the Upaniṣads may be fixed thereby; but the question of earlier and later strata of thought in one and the same Upaniṣad and the problem of the stratification of the texts as we now have them, are all too vague and unsettled to admit of any definite theory of the philosophical evolution of ideas being formulated authoritatively. Deussen pitched upon the "uncompromising idealism" of Yājñavalkya as the *normal view* of Upaniṣadic philosophy from which all differing views represent a departure and decline, — a steady falling off in course of time, due no doubt to the 'interference of religious prejudice' with the genuine spirit of philosophic speculation! He has, no doubt, cleverly argued his thesis and shown the process of gradual decline of thought by which the Pantheistic, Cosmogonic, Theistic, Atheistic and Deistic views followed in the wake of one another. But apart from the glamour and attractiveness of the theory, there are serious difficulties in the way of its acceptance. There is much in the earlier parts of the *Chāndogya* and *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, which goes against the grain of his theory. The plea that it has all been *put there* with a special pedagogic purpose,¹ viz. to prepare the learner for the doctrine of the One Ātman, sounds artificial and partisan. That is not all. The most abstruse and the highest theory of monistic idealism is placed at the beginning and the relatively imperfect views are considered subsequent to it! This is a strange reversal of both the intellectual and the historical order of thought as we understand it. Moreover, granting that Monism is the *norm* of the Upaniṣads, it is strange that we should have really no evidence of the steps by which the highest insight was obtained. It would be bad enough if the cart were put before the horse; but worse still, if it should, as in this case, be made to draw itself! It would be futile to take shelter under the theory of "Kṣatriya origin" of Upaniṣadic monism, in order to escape this difficulty. Such an assumption is disproved by the continuity

1. Cf. the Advaitic device :

‘अध्यारोपापवादाभ्यां निष्प्रपञ्चं प्रपञ्च्यते’ ।

of thought of the *Upaniṣads* with that of the *Brāhmaṇas* and *Āraṇyakas*. Lastly, there is hardly any hint in the passages which develop the 'Panthestic view that they are a falling off from the original idealistic creed.

Deussen's theory, moreover, does scant justice to the prevailing Theism of the earlier periods by coolly ignoring it as if it were of no account. It is very strange also, that the same Yājñavalkya is credited with the "Antar-yāmi Brāhmaṇa" which is the bedrock of Theism. It appears, on the contrary, that the language of uncompromising idealism is only occasionally to be met with and does not warrant the assumption of its being the "normal view" of the *Upaniṣads*. It was at best a "novelty" and felt as such, as could be gathered from the kind of expressions used : मोहान्तमापीपिप् (Bṛh. Up.) उत तमादेशमप्राप्यो येनाश्रुतं. (Chān.) तस्योपनिषदहमिति (Bṛh. v, 5, 4)

In the light of the great Theistic orientation undertaken by the *Śvetāśvatara*, the more reasonable hypothesis would be to assume that Theism was the normal view of the *Upaniṣads* and the natural and logical development of Vedic 'polytheism'.¹ The idealism of the *Upaniṣads* could be regarded as an esoteric presentation of the Immanence and Transcendence of the Deity, in arresting terms.² As Kunhan Raja says, "The *Upaniṣads* are more attempts to preserve and understand an ancient tradition, than a new illumination" (*Asya Vamasya Hymn. xxxix*). Such an interpretation alone would be consistent with the widely accepted historical and interpretational traditions of the various strata of religious and philosophical literature now available to us.³ It would be clearly unhistorical to ignore the natural order of growth in favour of a fanciful theory dictated by a fashionable regard for certain types of idealistic and illusionistic theories pushed into prominence by a set of commentators on the Vedānta influenced by the idealism of the Buddhists, under a complacent notion of Monism being the only rational world-view.

(vii) The *Upaniṣads* agree in making Brahman the ultimate source of the world of matter and souls. Brahman is the "Jagadyoni." But considering the variety of their theories on the subject, it is difficult to determine *in what precise sense it is so*.

(1) There are passages which tend to make It the *sole and whole explanation* of the Universe, its efficient (*nimitta*) as well as material (*upādāna*) cause :

यथा सतः पुरुषात्केशलोमानि तथाक्षरात्संभवतीह विश्वम् (Munḍ i. i. 7).

सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म तज्जलानिति (Chān. iii. 14. 1).

तदैक्षत बहु स्यां प्रजायेय (ibid. vi. 2, 3).

इदं ब्रह्म (Bṛh. II, 4, 6).

1. Cf. तद्वचन्यादेरप्यस्ति वेदादौ (Madhva G. B.).

2. Cf. सर्वपरित्यागेन तस्यैवोपादानाय अद्वितीयत्वेन, सर्वसत्ताप्रतीतिप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तताप्रतिपत्त्यर्थं सर्वात्मकत्वेन परपुरुषं बोधयन्ति ।

(NS p. 124)

3. Cf. तत्स्थत्वादनूपश्यन्ति ह्येक एवेति साधवः । (Mbh. XII. 323, 56).

विश्वमेवेदं पुरुषः तद्विश्वमुपजीवति (Puruṣasūkta).

which form the basis of the “*Abhinna-nimittopādānavāda*” or the *Brahma-pariṇāma-vāda* of the *Vṛttikāra*, *Bhāskara*, etc.

(2) There are again traces of another view that Matter exists from eternity, which God fashions but does not create. This is characteristic of the Epic *Sāṃkhya* and is adopted by the *Seśvara-Sāṃkhya* of *Patañjali*.

(3) It is sometimes admitted, by implication, that God creates the Universe out of nothing as it were :

असद्वा इदमग्र आसीत्ततो वै सदजायत (*Taitt.* ii, 7).

तत्सृष्ट्वा तदेवानु प्राविशत् (*Taitt.* ii, 6).

स ईक्षत लोकान्नु सृजा इति (*A. Ā.* ii, 4, 1).

नैवेह किञ्चनाग्र आसीत् (*Bṛh.* i, 2).

यतः प्रसूता जगत्तः प्रसूती तोयेन जीवान् व्यससर्ज भूम्याम् (*T. A.* x. i, 1).

This corresponds to the Christian viewpoint which does not seem to have been paralleled in any of the Indian schools.

(4) There is a fourth view that both Matter and Souls coexist with God though always dependent upon Him :

यस्तमसि तिष्ठन्स्तभोज्ज्त्रो यमयति * * * य आत्मनि तिष्ठन्

आत्मानमन्त्रो यमयति (*Bṛh.* iii, 7, 13-14).

यच्च स्वभावं पचति विश्वयोनिः (*Śvet.* v, 5).

पाच्यांश्च सर्वान्परिणामयेद्यः (*ibid.*).

ज्ञाज्ञौ द्वावजौ ईशानीशौ (*op. cit.* i, 9).

The act of creation, on this view, would be an emanatory process of making manifest what is unmanifest, the endowing of matter and souls with name and form by the Deity :

अनेन जीवेनात्मना अनुप्रविश्य नामरूपे व्याकरवाणि (*Chān. Up.* vi, 3).

It was this view that was destined to attain considerable popularity in the Epics and *Purāṇas*,¹ the *Pañcarātra*,² and the *Gītā*,³ and became the basis of the *Viśiṣṭādvaita* of *Rāmānuja* and the *Dvaita* of *Madhva*. It avoids the irrationality of assuming that *God alone was*, once upon a time,⁴ and that at a certain point in His history, He brought matter and souls into existence *de novo* and *ex nihilo*. Instead of making God cause antecedent in time to the world, it looks upon its actualisation as the result of the expression of the Divine Will, a sort of self-limitation which provides sufficient check

1. प्रकृतिं पुरुषं चैव प्रविश्याशु महेश्वरः ।

चोदयामास संप्राप्ते सर्गकाले व्ययाव्ययौ ॥ (*Viṣṇu.* i, 2, 29).

2. See passage from *Paramasāṃhitā* (ii, 18-19) q. *Śrībhāṣya* ii, 2, 44.

3. प्रकृतिं पुरुषं चैव विद्वद्यनादी उभावपि ।

तासां ब्रह्म महद्योनिरहं बीजप्रदः पिता ।

मम योनिर्महद्ब्रह्म तस्मिन् गर्भं दधाम्यहम् ।

4. “This defect of Creationistic theory lurks even behind the Absolutistic view. We cannot ask how the relationless Brahman is related to the world. The presumption is that the world of relations does not in any way affect the nature of the Brahman. The world is not an-essential factor in the existence of the Brahman” (*Radhakrishnan*, i, 184).

against a "Dualism", in that Matter and souls are *ex hypothesi* dependent upon Him.¹

(viii) The *Upaniṣads* generally assume that "creation", on the whole, is a *real process*, in whatever way it may be effected. The entry of the Creator into His creation, is also frequently referred to : तत्सृष्ट्वा तदेवानेप्राविशत् (*Taitt. ii, 6, Brh. Up. i, 4* and *Chān. vi, 2*). Proofs are afforded of His presence in the creature (*Maitr. Up. ii, 6; Brh. Up. v, 9*).

There are, however, passages which give room for the later doctrine of Illusion (*māyāvāda*) :

एकमेवाद्वितीयम् (*Chān. vi, 2, 1*) नेह नानास्ति किञ्चन (*Brh. iv, 4, 19*).

नीहारेण प्रावृताः (VS. xvii, 31) असंगो ह्ययं पुरुषः (*Brh. iv, 3, 15*).

अयमात्मा ब्रह्म (iv, 5, 19) मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यम् (*Chān. iv, 1, 4*).

"But the Indian doctrine of the identity of cause and effect would seem to be against the conjecture of unreality of creation. Passages like Psalm xxxiii, 6; 9, suggest primarily the lack of the effort with which God creates."²

That is why Radhakrishnan repudiates "the popular view which identifies the Upaniṣadic doctrine with an abstract monism which reduces the rich life of this world to an empty dream".³ It is taken to be the intention of the Upaniṣadic Monism to make the Absolute, "a unity *with a difference*⁴ or a concrete dynamic spirit. We then reach the self and the not-self which interact and develop the whole Universe. Self-expression thus becomes the essence of the Absolute".⁵

(ix) As regards the goal of human effort, the Upaniṣads agree that it is a return to the Absolute. Release is riddance of the cycle of births and deaths and attainment of communion with the Divine : ब्रह्म प्राप्तो विरजोऽमृद्विमृत्युः (*Kaṭha, ii, 3, 18*). But there is as much vagueness and conflict in their statement of the nature of the goal as there is in the starting point.

There are texts which represent the highest stage in monistic parlance and there are others which presuppose a frank dualism in release. There are positive accounts of the state of release from a purely "A-dvaitic" point of view, as well as negative ones from the same standpoint. There are dualistic accounts which demand the survival of the human personality side by side with the Supreme and which also invest the former with an amount of godliness almost equal to that of the Supreme. There are

1. Cf. द्रव्यं कर्म च कालश्च स्वभावो जीव एव च ।

यदनुग्रहतः सन्ति न सन्ति यदुपेक्षया ॥ (*Bhāg. ii, 10, 12*).

2. Cf. 'अकर्माक्लिष्टकारित्वात्' (q. by Madhva). See Śaṅkara BSB. i, 1, 3; ii, 1, 33.

3. Radhakrishnan, *I. Phil.* i, 186.

4. *Ibid.* p. 186.

5. It would be impossible on this view, to hold Brahman to be absolutely "Nir-viśeṣa" or aspectless as Śaṅkara would have it. The idea of both unity and diversity being real and true (अनेकान्तवाद) is sternly repudiated by Śaṅkara (under B.S. ii. 1. 14). Contrast the plea for 'integral idealism' by N. G. Damle, *Contemporary Ind. Phil.*, 1952, pp. 188-9.

pictures of Mokṣa drawn in frankly "sensuous" colors, depicting the various super-mundane enjoyments which are possible for the released. And, lastly, there are texts which carry this dualism to its logical limit and place certain irrevocable limitations on the freedom and sovereignty of the released and subject them to the sway of God :

- I. 1. ब्रह्म वेद ब्रह्मैव भवति । (*Mund.* iii, 2, 9).
2. तत्र को मोहः कः शोक एकत्वमनुपश्यतः (*Īśa.* 7).
3. परेऽव्यये सर्वे एकीभवन्ति । (*Mund.* iii, 2, 7).
4. स सर्वज्ञः सर्वो भवति । (*Praśna*, iv, 10).
5. यथा नद्यः स्यन्दमानाः समद्रेऽस्तं गच्छन्ति नामरूपे विहाः
तथा विद्वान् पुण्यपापे विधूय निरञ्जनः (*Mund.* iii, 2, 8).

The above seem to imply that there is no sense of individuality and hence no possibility of action in Mokṣa.

- II. 1. यत्र हि द्वैतमिव भवति (*Bṛh.* iv, 5, 15).
2. यत्र नान्यत्पश्यति नान्यच्छृणोति (*Chān.* vii, 24, 1).
3. न प्रेत्य संज्ञास्ति (*Bṛh.* ii, 4, 12).
4. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* iii, 8, 11.

These would appear to insist that on attaining release, the Mukta rests in the contemplation of his own bliss and reality and has no thought for any others : स्वे महिम्नि प्रतिष्ठितः । (*Chān.* vii, 24, 1). There is no object-consciousness. But the subject-consciousness is not denied : तदात्मानमेवावेदहं ब्रह्मास्मीति । (*Bṛh.* i, 4, 10).

- अहं विश्वं भुवनमभ्यभवाम् (*Taitt.* iii, 10, 6).
- अविनाशी वा अरेऽयमात्मा अनुच्छित्तिघर्मा (*Bṛh.* iv, 5, 14).

"The non-conscious condition of the self is not also bereft of the power to know; only, there is nothing other than his own self that can be known. Hence, we say : he does not know. Knowledge there is indeed; for, knowing is inseparable from the knower because he is imperishable and because it is the very nature of the knower to know; but there is no second, nothing else different from him which he could know. Some sort of Transcendental consciousness seems to be implied in the paradoxical statement that when in that condition, he does not know, yet he is knowing. Here, the soul is its own object or better, there is no distinction there, between subject and object, because the soul is like the Ocean, single and all-embracing" (Griswold *op. cit.*, p. 54). Madhva, however, interprets Yājñavalkya's dictum यत्र तु सर्वमात्मैवाभूत् as a *reductio ad absurdum* intended to establish the survival of individual consciousness and subject-object relation in Mokṣa. See my 'Yājñavalkyan Fiction', A Critique, (*J. A. B. M. M.* 56).

- III. 1. निरञ्जनः परमं साम्यमुपैति (*Mund.* iii, 1, 3).
2. सोऽश्नुते सर्वान्कामान्सह ब्रह्मणा (*Taitt.* ii, 1, 1).
3. एतत्साम गायत्रास्ते हावु हावु (*ibid.* 3, 10, 5).
- IV. 1. *Chān. Up.* viii, 12, 3 and viii, 5, 3.
2. „ „ viii, 2, 1-10.
3. *Kauṣītaki Up.* i, 3-4 :—

“In this world are the great lake Āra, the ageless river Virajā, the tree Illya, the station called Sārajya and the unassailable place called Aparājītā, with Indra and Prajāpati as its door-keepers. There is further the audience hall of Brahman called Vibhu. Here the various nymphs are engaged in weaving garlands of flowers. Five hundred nymphs approach the released and receive him in advance, a hundred with fruits, another hundred with perfumes, a third batch with gorgeous apparel and the last with garlands. They adorn him with ornaments. He moves on, crosses the Āra and the Virajā and sinks all the opposites of good and bad. He moves on through Illya, Sārajya and Aparājītā and ultimately reaches the place of Brahman and is received by him.”

In the passages of groups III and IV, the survival of the human personality is definitely assumed. However much the soul of man may resemble God in its spiritual excellence, it stands to reason that a certain amount of disparity must still exist between the two, having regard, at any rate, to the status of the individual *before* release and the peculiarities of the two, viz. the Nityamuktatva of God and the “once-baddhatva” of the soul of man. Logic cannot reconcile itself to the position that the Supreme shall engage Itself in creation without some kind of bliss arising from it : आनन्दाद्व्येव खल्विमानि भूतानि जायन्ते (Taitt. Up. 3, 6), over and above the released souls which do nothing of the kind : जगद्व्यापारवर्जम् (B. S. iv, 4, 17).

The idea must have been prevalent then, that notwithstanding the amount of “equality”, in many respects between the two, the Jīva was in some measure, still inferior and subject to the Lord, even in the state of release. This is unmistakably implied in at least one passage : उत्तामृत-त्वस्येशानः (T. Ā. iii, 12, 1) which receives enthusiastic iteration in subsequent literature¹ अत एव चानन्याधिपतिः । जगद्व्यापारवर्जम् (B. S. iv. 4, 9; 17). It is from these and other texts that Madhva draws support for his distinctive view of Mokṣa, after giving suitable explanations for the eulogistic and other texts from Groups I and II.

The distinction of the human personality from the divine is accepted both in the state of dream and dreamless sleep :

स्वप्नान्तं जागरितान्तं चोभौ येनानुपश्यति ।

महान्तं विभुमात्मानं मत्वा धीरो न शोचति ॥ (Kāṭha ii, 1, 4).

स्वप्नेन शारीरमभिप्रहृत्यासुप्तः सुप्तानभिचाकशीति ।

शुक्रमादाय पुनरेति स्थानम् (Brh. Up. iv, 3, 12).

यत्रायं पुरुषः प्राज्ञेनात्मना संपरिष्वक्तः (ibid. iv, 3, 21).

and in the state of exit:

एवमेवायं शारीर आत्मा प्राज्ञेनात्मना अन्वारूढ उत्सर्जयति (ibid., iv, 3, 35).

and in release: प्रज्ञानेनोऽलोकः (Ait. Up.) एतस्मिन्.... प्रतिष्ठां विन्दते । अथ सोऽभयं गतो भवति आनन्दं ब्रह्मणो विद्वान् न बिभेति (Taitt. ii, 7-9).

ब्रह्म प्राप्तो विरजोऽभूत् (Kāṭha, ii, 3, 18).

जुष्टं यदा पश्यत्यन्यमीशम् (Muṇḍ. iii, 1, 2).

1. आधिपत्यं विना तुल्या ब्रह्मणस्ते महीजसः (Brahmāṇḍa Purāṇa, iii, 2, 81).

मुक्तानां परमा गतिः । (Mbh.).

कृष्णो मुक्तैरिज्यते वीतमोहः । (Mbh.).

On the physical plane itself, the Upaniṣads do keep the individual and the Supreme clear from each other. The otherness of the human soul from God and its dependence upon Him, are clearly recognised :

द्वा सुपर्णा सयुजा सखाया समानं वक्षं परिषस्वजाते ।

तयोरन्यः पिप्पलं स्वाद्वत्ति अनश्नन्नन्योऽभिचाकशीति ॥

समाने वृक्षे पुरुषो विमग्नोऽनीशया शोचति मुह्यमानः । (*Muṇḍ.* iii, 1, 1-2).

The need for worshipping the Deity and earning Its grace are beginning to be recognised :

शरं ह्युपासानिशितं समिन्धते (*Muṇḍ.* ii, 2, 3).

तेन त्यक्तेन भुञ्जीथाः (*Īśa*, 1).

एष ह्येव साधुकर्म कारयति यं यमेभ्यो लोकेभ्य उन्निनीषते (*Kauṣītaki* iii, 9).

यमेवैष वृणुते तेन लभ्यः तस्यैष आत्मा

विवृणुते तनूं स्वाम् । (*Kaṭha*, u, 2, 23).

ज्ञानप्रसादेन विशुद्धसत्त्वः (*Muṇḍ.* iii, 1, 8).

एको बहूनां यो विदधाति कामान् (*Kaṭha*. ii, 2, 13).

LATER UPANIṢADS AND ŚVETĀSVATARA

(i) THE period of the major Upaniṣads was essentially a creative one. The various thought-currents at work were never brought to a head. The forces of Realism and Dualism battled freely with those of Idealism and Monism. The pendulum of thought kept swinging from one side to the other. There was no final pronouncement of opinion or even if there had been one, we have no means of knowing it in the absence of a definite chronology for the early Upaniṣads. Some of the Yājñavalkya passages came perilously near an abstract Monism :

न प्रेत्य संज्ञास्ति । ध्यायतीव लेलायतीव । विज्ञातारमरे केन विजानीयात् ? असंगो ह्ययं पुरुषः ॥

But, even in the 'great symposium' at Janaka's court, the same Yājñavalkya comes down from his higher metaphysical altitude and "in almost a Deistic vein endows the Ātman (iii, 6, 7-8) with the character of an Omnipotent Lord that indwells and controls all Cosmic operations and even dispenses rewards and punishments."¹

(ii) Texts favourable to Monism had not always been adequately or even properly worded. They afforded plenty of loop-holes for Dualism, contained admissions and undercurrents which were thoroughly damaging to the interests of pure monism. In "*Na pretya samjñā asti*" we have, no doubt, a monistic ideal in view; but it is not the characterless monism of pure being. The text अविनाशी वा अरे अयमात्मा which follows न प्रेत्य declares that the Ātmā is indestructible and *so are his attributes* (अनुच्छित्तिधर्मा). Madhva's commentator has urged that the first term *avināśi* emphasises the personal immortality of the soul as against the Advaitic doctrine of the annihilation of the individual self *as such*. The second term *anucchitti-dharmā*, affirms the indestructibility of its special properties of knowledge, will, activity and so on, as against the views of the Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas. The released may not see, hear or smell any *other*; but it is unnecessary to conclude from this text, that they are essentially *devoid* of the power (*dharma*) to see, hear or smell. Indeed, another text hastens to observe that they do *not* lack such power : नहि द्रष्टृदृष्टे-विपरिलोपो विद्यते . . . (*Bṛh.* iv. 3, 23). What are we to infer from such correctives ? Can it be that their powers of hearing, sight and smell are intact though they *do not exercise* them ? It seems hardly likely, if regard be paid to what is said elsewhere in an allied Upaniṣad on the question of the enjoyment of certain pleasures by the released : स तत्र पर्येति जक्षत्क्रीडन्; स यदि पितृलोककामो भवति; स यदि गन्धमात्यलोककामो भवति... (*Chān.* viii, 2, 6). Is the entire dialogue, then, beginning with यन्न हि द्वैतमिव भवति . . . a *reductio ad absurdum* on the Absolutist doctrine

1. Ranade, *I. Phil.* ii, 434.

of release ? The epistemological dogma of Monism that “the subject of all experience cannot itself be an object of experience”, is negated in many places in the Upaniṣads : स यो ह वै, तदक्षरं वेदयते, स सर्वज्ञः (*Praśna* iv, 11) तदात्मानमेवावेदहं ब्रह्मास्मीति (*Bṛh.* i, 4, 10), आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः . . . मन्तव्यः (*op. cit.* iv, 5, 6). The self of the knower may become merged in the Brahman and become one with it. But it is difficult to see how his *works* (कर्माणि) also, could do so :

कर्माणि विज्ञानमयश्च आत्मा परेऽव्यये सर्व एकीभवन्ति । (*Muṇḍ.* iii, 2, 7).

as these are perishable and *jaḍa* (insentient) and are, moreover, already destroyed *before* release :

क्षीयन्ते चास्य कर्माणि तस्मिन् दृष्टे परावरे । (*Muṇḍ.* ii, 2, 8).

The Monism of the Upaniṣads had thus its own weak spots. Since no people can afford to remain content with a literature of contradictions, attempts were bound to be made to reduce its teachings to an acceptable system and give a lead one way or the other. Such a system and lead we find in the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*, admittedly the *latest* of the major Upaniṣads, from the standpoint of pure Theism.

(iii) The contents of the *Śvetāśvatara* show it to have been the outcome of a strong Theistic reaction against several contemporary schools of thought : Pantheistic, Materialistic and Monistic.¹ The way for such a reaction had already been paved by the strong note of realism that had been struck in several of the early metrical Upaniṣads, notably, in the *Īśa*, *Muṇḍaka* and *Kaṭha*. One writer says that “It is noteworthy that the *Muṇḍaka* stands in a sense apart from the other Upaniṣads, in as much as it asserts rather too prominently, a metaphysical realism.”² Elsewhere, the same writer adds that “the conception of cosmogony in the *Muṇḍaka* is a definitely realistic one, in as much as it calls the physical world, a real world designating it as “satyam” (ii, 1).³ It is impossible not to be struck by the voice of realism in such cases as *Muṇḍ.* i, 1, 1; 3, 2; *Īśa* 8; *Kaṭha* i, 2, 12; i, 2, 23; ii, 1, 13, etc. The loose and ambiguously worded similes coupled with an excessive love of mystery and antithesis, lent an air of plausibility to the Monistic and Pantheistic interpretations of some of the older texts.⁴ The analogy of rivers emptying themselves into the Sea (*Chān.* vi, 10) had been rather too often and freely appropriated by the Monist. The tocsin of revolt had, therefore, to be sounded early in *Kaṭha*

1. “It seems in other words as if the *Śvetāśvatara* puts up a philosophy of Śaiva Theism against all Naturalism and even against Sāṃkhya and Vedānta doctrines, although, in this last respect, its attack seems to be directed against the extreme Pantheism of the school” (Ranade, ii, 304). The Professor’s exclusion of the illusionistic Vedānta is unsustainable. The statement of issues in the opening verse : कुतः स्म जाता जीवाम केन । अधिष्ठिताः केन सुखे तरेषु । (i, 1) make it clear that the experience of pleasure and pain was accepted as real.

2. *op. cit.* ii, 282.

3. *op. cit.* p. 281.

4. ‘यथोदकं शुद्धे शब्दे’ (*Kaṭha* ii, 1, 15) इति चैवमादीनि मुक्तिस्वरूपनिरूपणपराणि वाक्यान्त्य-विभागेनैव दर्शयन्ति, नदीसमुद्रादिनिदर्शनानि च ॥ (*Śaṃkara, B. S. B.* iv, 4, 4).

ii, 4, 15, where there is a passing attempt to draw attention to the fact that there is no room for identity in such cases. When a quantity of water is poured into another, it becomes *like that* (तादृगेव भवति); but not identical with it.¹ Even so, in respect of the rivers mingling with the sea and the Jivas with Brahman. A similar corrective to ब्रह्म वेद ब्रह्मैव भवति (*Mund.* iii, 2, 9) स य एवं वेदाहं ब्रह्मास्मीति स इदं सर्वं भवति (*Bṛh.* i, 4, 10) may be detected in *Praśna*, iv, 11. A calm and comprehensive re-examination of these and similar issues was thus urgently needed in the interests not only of clearness of thought but also of bringing the issues to a decision and giving a correct lead to thought. The *Śvetāśvatara* appears to have addressed itself to this task.

(iv) It begins by striking at the root of Monism, in dismissing the claims of the individual soul (Puruṣa)² along with those of Time, Nature, Fate, the elements, etc., to be regarded as responsible for world-creation. In doing so, it urges the same objection : आत्माप्यनीशः सुखदुःखहेतोः (i, 2) as is done later on, by the author of the *Brahma Sūtras* : हिताकरणादिदोषप्रसक्तेः (ii, 1, 21). It posits coexistent matter (*ajā*) and souls (*jñā*) both of which God actuates to develop and rules over. He is declared to be the supreme ruler of the Cosmos, utterly different from the human soul (iv, 6) and is all-knowing (*sarvavid* vi, 2), omnipotent and endowed with attributes (vi, 2). This Upaniṣad opposes in no uncertain terms the dogma of the Nirguṇa Brahman, by ascribing to Brahman such attributes as *jñāna*, *bala* and *kriyā* which are *not* the result of Avidyā,³ but form part of its nature (*svābhāviki*).

Texts like : न तत्समश्चाभ्यधिकश्च दृश्यते (vi, 8) and साक्षी चेता केवलो निर्गणश्च (vi, 11) seem to be striving clearly towards a Theistic reorientation of such seemingly monistic ones as : एकमेवाद्वितीयम् अशब्दमस्पर्शम् and those that make Brahman utterly devoid of attributes.⁴ Bhakti is inculcated and the grace of God : देवप्रसाद (vi, 21) is said to be the means of release (iv, 7). Nay, the Upaniṣad goes on to assert in true Theistic fashion that God is the

1. It is only similarity of form that is held in view in such cases. This is proved by the interesting statement of *Manu*, ix, 22,

यादृग्गुणेन भर्ता स्त्री संयुज्येत यथाविधा ।

तादृग्गुणा संभवति समुद्रेणेव निम्नगा ।

The husband and the wife do not obviously become *one entity*. They merely share some attributes in common. Vācaspati Miśra, in his *Bhāmātī* (i, 4, 22) is the earliest to explode the myth of identity of rivers and ocean in this analogy, and *declare* that there is no case for factual identity here.

2. भूतानि योनिः पुरुष इति चिन्त्यम् ।

आत्माप्यनीशः सुखदुःखहेतोः । (i, 2).

3. परास्य शक्तिर्विविधैव श्रूयते ।

स्वाभाविकी ज्ञानबलक्रिया च । (vi, 8).

4. As pointed out by Madhva, in his *Karmanirṇaya* a string of attributes like *sākṣitva*, *ekatva* etc., are ascribed to the Brahman in the first part of this text. The term "Nirguṇa" at the end must, therefore, be interpreted so as not to contradict the predications already made. The *Śvetāśvatara*, accordingly, takes particular care to describe the Supreme as गुणी सर्वविद्यः (vi, 2).

author of the soul's bondage and *ergo* of its redemption : संसारमोक्षस्थितिबन्धहेतुः (vi, 16 and vi, 13). This idea is distinctive of Madhva. The visualisation of God as the Ruling Spirit qualifies for Mokṣa (i, 6) : मुमुक्षुर्वै शरणमहं प्रपद्ये (vi, 18) सत्त्वस्यैष प्रवर्तकः (iii, 12) तस्मात्प्रपञ्चः परिवर्ततेऽयम् । ज्ञात्वात्मसंस्थम् (vi, 6 and iv, 7).

The idea that God does *not create Matter* and its modifications or the potencies of Karma, but merely *actuates* and *directs* them is forcibly put in :

यच्च स्वभावं पचति विश्वयोनिः पाच्यांश्च सर्वान् परिणामयेद्यः ।

सर्वमेतद्विश्वमधितिष्ठत्येको गुणांश्च सर्वान् विनियोजयेद्यः ॥ (V, 5).

- Even this essential nature of things (*svabhāva*) cannot work out of its own accord; but is in need of divine direction:

पाच्यांश्च सर्वान् परिणामयेत् । यच्च स्वभावं पचति । सत्त्वस्यैष प्रवर्तकः । These are completely in line with Madhva's view of God being the सर्वसत्ताप्रतीतिप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तम् । As pointed out by him, this idea has received graphic expression in the Epics and Purāṇas :

नभो ददाति श्वसतां मार्गं यन्नियमाददः (Bhāg. iii, 30, 43).

द्रव्यं कर्म च कालश्च स्वभावो जीव एव च ।

यदनुग्रहतः सन्ति न सन्ति यदुपेक्षया ॥ (ibid. ii, 10, 12).

We have again similar clarification of quasi-Pantheistic texts like : यथोर्णनाभिः सृजते । यथा सतः पुरुषात्केशलोमानि... The transformation is of Matter alone and *not* of the spirit of *Brahmacaitanya* :

यस्तूर्णनाभ इव तन्तुभिः प्रधानजैः स्वभावत आवृणोति (vi, 10).

The language of identity employed in such passages as तन्मयो भवेत् (Mund. ii, 2, 4) सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म (Chān.) तत्त्वमसि (vi, 12, 3) आत्मैवाधस्तात् आत्मैवोपरिष्ठात् आत्मैवेदं सर्वम् (vii, 25, 2) इदं क्षत्रमिमे लोका इमे देवा इमानि भूतानि इदं सर्वं यदयमात्मा । (Brh. ii, 4, 6) is re-defined in terms of the special immanence of the Deity in every jot and tittle of Matter and Spirit : येनावृतं (vi, 2) अणोरणीयान् महतो महीयानात्मास्य (ii, 20). नित्यो नित्यानां... (vi, 13) and this Immanence of God *within* and outside matter and souls (अन्तर्बहिश्च) is illustrated by the following very expressive similes :

तिलेषु तैलं एवमात्मनि गृह्यतेऽसौ । (i, 15).

सर्वव्यापिनमात्मानं क्षीरे सर्पिरिवार्षितम् । (i, 16).

The most significant fact is perhaps the identification¹ of the Māyā of Monistic metaphysics with the "Prakṛti" of Sāṃkhya Realism : मायां तु प्रकृतिं विद्यात् and the recognition of the three categories of Soul (*jñā*) Matter (*Ajā* or *Prakṛti*) and an Overlord or God above them : क्षरात्माना-वीशते देव एकः । These constitute the quintessence of Theism and the antithesis of every form and species of Monism and Absolutism. No wonder, Deussen called the Śvetāśvatara "a monument of Theism" (Radhakrishnan, *I. Phil.* i, p. 511). It was natural to find the early Upaniṣads with their proverbial love of equations, similes, enigmas and equivocations to clothe their thoughts in mystic and esoteric phraseology often

1. The very manner of the equation Māyā = Prakṛti, not the other way about, is significant, according to the Śatadūṣaṇī of Vedānta Deśika : नहि तत्र प्रकृत्यनुवादेन मिथ्यात्वं विधीयते, अपि तु मायानुवादेन प्रकृतित्वम् ।

(Śāstramuktāvali Ser. no. 48, Conjeeveram 1926, p. 204).

bordering on monistic idealism. The studied and persistent attempts of the *Śvetāśvatara* to stick to Theism at all costs and give Theistic reorientations to passages that bear a different hue elsewhere, or are likely to be taken in a monistic sense,¹ render it very probable that as the last and the most definite among the major Upaniṣads, it had come to the conclusion that Theism alone *should* be regarded as the true basic philosophy of the Upaniṣads.

1. Cf. यथोर्णनाभिः . . . (*Mund.* i, 7) and यस्तूणनाभ (*Śvet.* vi, 10).

POST-ŚVETĀŚVATARA THOUGHT-FERMENT EKĀYANA, KHILA AND OTHER EXPATIATORY LITERATURE

AFTER the Theistic orientation given to the philosophy of the Upaniṣads in the *Śvetāśvatara*, it was natural to expect a rich harvest of Theistic speculation in the succeeding period.¹ Already, during the time of the *Bṛhad-āranyaka*, a nucleus of interpretive literature was coming into existence. The *Ekāyana* Śrutis, which are the basis of the Theistic philosophy of the *Pañcarātras*, (*Chān. Up.* vii, 1, 2), gained further weight in the light of the undisguised support to Theism in the *Śvetāśvatara*. It is significant to note the expression "conclusion of the Vedas", which Madhva applies to them, on the authority of a text.² *Bṛh. Up.* ii, 4, 10, speaks of *Ślokas*, *Sūtras*, *Vyākhyānas* and *Anuvyākhyānas*. The "Ślokas" referred to are evidently the literature of the *Pañcarātra*, which as Prof. Schrader has shown, so richly deserves the name.³ Madhva points out on the authority of the *Hayagrīva-Saṃhitā* (one of the books of the *Pañcarātra* system)⁴ that the term "Ślokas" is used in that sense. The appearance of long lists of Seers (Vamśa-Brāhmaṇa) in *Bṛh. Up.* iv, 6, containing such names as Pautimāṣya, Gaupavana, Agniveśya, Kauśika, Pārāśaryāyaṇa, Mādhyandināyana, Saukarāyaṇa Kāṣāyaṇa, Bābhavya and the reference to the views of Kauṇṭharavya, Vādhva, Kāvaṣeya in *Ait. Āranyaka* (iii, 1-2) and to Indradyumna Bhāllaveya, Udara Śāṇḍilya mentioned in Vamśa B. and Śārkarākṣya in *Chān. Up.* v, 15, 1; v, 14, 1 and i, 9, 1, show that there was a lot of independent popular speculation going on, during this period, the bulk of which remained probably uncanonised. Many of the authors of such 'outlandish' Śrutis, as Pārāśaryāyaṇa, Bhāllaveya, Kāṣāyaṇa, Āgniveśya, Saukarāyaṇa, Māthara, Paimgi, Tura, etc. cited by Madhva, in his works, are recognisable among the names of bygone Seers recorded in the extant *Upaniṣads* and *Āranyakas*. Though most of the Seers mentioned in the Vamśa-Brāhmaṇas, are now no more than mere names to us, there is nothing improbable in their having engaged themselves in independent speculation and elaborated certain views. Their utterances were never probably collected together but allowed to float

1. The lead given by the *Śvetāśvatara* in साक्षी चेत्ता केवलो निर्गुणश्च गुणी सर्वविद्यः was taken up by the *Ekāyana* in expressly excluding (for the first time) derogatory attributes Cf. निरनिष्टो निरवद्यः which is further developed by the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa*, following the same interpretational tradition.

2. वाकोवाक्यं मूलवेदो वेदसारोपसंहृतिः ।

एकायनमिति प्रोक्तम् ।

3. *Introduction to Pañcarātra*, Adyar, 1929, p. 14. Also see *NS.* p. 426b.

4. *op. cit.* No. 206.

about. Or, not having been carefully preserved, were forgotten after a time, or were superseded by hostile or more fashionable views. Whatever the causes or the circumstances to which this new type of interpretive and expatiatory literature owed its origin and disappearance, there can be no doubt that a vast mass of them did once exist. That they are not altogether mythical, is clear from references to them in the *Śrauta* and *Dharma Sūtras*¹ and the *Mahābhāṣya*² and in the later religious and philosophical writings of Śaṅkara,³ Sureśvara,⁴ Viśvarūpa,⁵ Utpala Vaiṣṇava⁶ of Kashmir (10th century), Sudarśana Sūri⁷ and Vedānta Deśika.⁸ Judging from the specimens of the Khila Śrutis cited by Madhva and the other writers named above, it would appear that speculation in them had been directed to various aspects of Esotericism, questions relating to the nature and means of release,⁹ the personality of God,¹⁰ Cosmogony, dream-psychology, theological problems of Laya¹¹ Vyāha,¹² divine attributes, manifestations (Avatāras),¹³ etymologies of terms etc., and solutions on Theistic lines offered. Referring to the Pāñcarātra doctrine of Vyāhas, Śaṅkara (*B. S. B.* ii, 2, 44) makes a statement on the basis of a quotation from the Pāñcarātra (Śruti),¹⁴ that the Bhāgavatas teach that the Supreme Being, Para-Vāsudeva, is endowed with all the six auspicious attributes and that the manifestations of the Lord — Aniruddha, Pradyumna, Saṅkarṣaṇa, etc. are, at the same time, identical with the original (mūlarūpa) Vāsudeva, in essence and in attributes : ईश्वरा एवैते सर्वे ज्ञानैश्वर्यशक्तिबलवीर्यतेजोभिरैश्वरैर्धर्मैरन्विताः । वासुदेवा एवैते निर्दोषा निरनिष्टा निरवद्याश्च” इति । This is sufficient to establish that on the Pāñcarātrika view, there is no distinction of substance and attributes, in God or among His various manifestations. This is precisely the view of Madhva (technically known as Svagatabhedābhāva (absence of internal distinction) or Saviśeṣābheda or colorful identity of substance and attri-

1. Pārāśaryāyaṇa is referred to in Sāmavidhāna Br., the Bhāllavi Gāthas in Bodh. D. S. 1. 1. 2.

तप्ते पयसि दध्यानयति सा वैश्वदेव्यामिक्षा वाजिभ्यो वाजिनम् ।
वसन्ते वसन्ते ज्योतिषा यजेत (*Bodhāyana Śrauta Sūtra*).
पशुना यजेत (*Bodhāyana and Satyāśāḍha*).

2. न म्लेच्छतवै नापभाषितवै ।

3. *B. S. B.* iii, 2, 17; iii, 3, 26.

4. *Bṛhadvārtika*. i, 4, 14; pp. 1263-4; 1928.

5. *Bālakrīḍā*, com. on *Yājñavalkya-smṛti* T. S. S. p. 8.

6. *Spanda-Kārikās*. Viz. Skt. Ser., pp. 2, 35 and 40.

7. *Śrutaprakāśa*, on *Śrībhāṣya*, (Benares) p. 1824-5.

8. See his com. on Rāmānuja's *GB*. Ānanda Press, Madras, p. 270.

9. Madhva, *B. S. B.* iii, 4, 31 and 33.

10. 'किमात्मको भगवान्—ज्ञानात्मको ऐश्वर्यात्मकः शक्त्यात्मकः' (*Ekāyana Śruti* q. by M. BSB ii, 2. 41. and Deśika : *Nyāyasiddhāntasiddhāntajana*).

11. *ibid.* ii, 3, 17.

12. *ibid.* ii, 3, 49.

13. *ibid.* ii, 3, 48.

14. This is clear from the comment of *Prakāṣārthavivaraṇa* an early com. on Śaṅkara's *BSB*. (vol. ii, p. 333. Madras O. Mss. Lib. Ms). The commentator is anterior to Ānandagiri.

butes, emphasised by him in many of his works, on the authority of Pāñcārātrika works like the *Paramopaniṣad* and the *Brahmatarka*. The doctrine attributed to the Bhāgavatas, by Śaṅkara, is in line with many others referred to by Madhva, on the authority of the *Nārada-Pañcarātra*,¹ *Pādma*,² *Brahmatarka*,³ *Mahāvarāha*,⁴ *Caturvedaśikhā*⁵ etc. To the same period of transition of thought from the Vedic to the Purāṇic period, may be assigned the bulk of semi-Vedic literature of an interpretive and expatiatory nature such as the *Brahmasāra*, the *Ṛk*, *Yajus* and *Sāma Samhitās* (not the Vedic works of those names), *Mahāmīmāṃsā*, *Tattvanirṇaya*, etc. cited by Madhva, which, to judge from his quotations, appear to have freely commented on some of the Upaniṣads or parts thereof. The *Bṛh. Up.* speaks, as we have seen, of the presence of Commentaries and Tracts (*vyākhyānāni, anuvyākhyānāni*).⁶ The *Harivaṃśa* (ii, 168, 5) refers to Khilas, Upakhilas and Commentaries :

“..... खिलान्युपखिलान्यपि ।

अंगान्युपांगानि तथा व्याख्यानानि च पान्तु माम् ॥”

Elsewhere, in the *Harivaṃśa* (110, 79), reference is made to Bhāṣyas, Gāthās, etc. The various etymological works dealing with the derivation of names, and principles of interpretation, like the *Śabdanirṇaya*, *Nāmanirukti*, *Vyāsanirukta*, etc., (cited by Madhva) also bear testimony to the continuation of interpretive and exegetical activity along Theistic lines.

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1. आनन्दमात्रकरपादमुखोदरादिः सर्वत्र च स्वगतभेदविवर्जितात्मा ॥
(*Mbh. T. N.*) q. by Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa, in his *Prameyaratnāvali* (S.B.H. Allahabad.).
 2. *B. S. B.* i, 1, 9.
 3. Quoted by Rūpagosvāmi in his *Laghu-Bhāgavatāmṛta*, p. 163, Bombay, 1902.
 4. *ibid.* p. 121-22.
 5. Madhva, *B. S. B.* ii, 3, 49.
 6. *Bṛh. Up.* ii, 4, 10; iv, 1, 2; iv, 5, 11.

POST-VEDIC PERIOD:
EPICS, PURĀṆAS, PAÑCARĀTRA AND GĪTĀ

THE next stage is that of the Epics and Purāṇas. So far, the truths of the Vedas and Upaniṣads, had been confined to the higher orders of Brahminical society. The *Brāhmaṇas* had hardened caste. The *Upaniṣads* could not entirely break away from the bonds of the caste system, even though they made occasional attempts to throw the gates of spirituality open to all without distinction of caste or sex. But examples of a Maitreyī here or a Satyakāma Jābāla there or even a Janaśruti Pautrāyaṇa (termed a Śūdra) were few and far between. That these were exceptions to the rule is clear from *Bṛh. Up.* iv, 5, 1, where we are told that of the two wives of Yājñavalkya, Maitreyī alone was philosophically-minded (*Brahmavādinī*); while Kātyāyanī remained like “most other women” (*striprajñā*). But the light of the Vedas could no longer be hidden under a bushel. Sooner or later, it had to be made available to all. The claims of the women and Śūdras no less than those of the “fallen Brahmins and the alien races which were being fast absorbed into the Āryan fold, had to be satisfied. The absolute exclusion of these from the highest knowledge might give a handle to the enemies of the Vedic religion who were, by this time, making their first appearance (*Haitukas*).¹ Apart from this social need of the hour, the conflicting testimony of the Vedic literature itself had to be reconciled. The divergent currents of thought and the discordant solutions of religious and philosophical questions offered hitherto were enough to drive common men to distraction :

स्मृतिविभिन्ना श्रुतयश्च भिन्ना नैको ऋषिर्यस्य मतं प्रमाणम् ।

धर्मस्य तत्त्वं निहितं गुहायाम् । ॥ (*Mbh.* ii, 14, 119).

विरुद्धवत्प्रतीयन्ते आगमा यत्र वै मिथः ।²

Humanity was groping in the dark, not having been provided with the right key to the solution of the intricacies of the Scriptures. Something had to be done for the enlightenment of the masses that had no access to the wisdom of the Vedas. This was what the Epics and the Purāṇas undertook to do :

स्त्रीशूद्रब्रह्मबन्धूनां त्रयी न श्रुतिगोचरा ।

इति भारतमाख्यानं कृपया मुनिना कृतम् ॥³

1. अथ ज्ञानोपसर्गाः ये चान्ये मिथ्यावादैः कुहकेन्द्रजालैर्वेदिकेषु परिस्थातुमिच्छन्ति . . . ॥
(*Maitrī, Up.* vii, 8).

2. Madhva *B. S. B.* ii, 1, 18.

3. *Bhāgavata*, i, 4, 24.

इतिहासपुराणाभ्यां वेदं समुपबृंहयेत् ।
 बिभेत्यल्पश्रुताद्वेदो मामयं प्रचलिष्यति ॥¹
 यो विद्याच्चतुरो वेदान् साङ्गोपनिषदान्निजः ।
 न चेत्युराणं संविद्यान्नैव स स्याद्विचक्षणः ॥²

We cannot, however, embark on any elaborate or systematic inquiry into the nature of the religious and philosophical viewpoint of the “original kernel” and of the “later accretions” of the Epics and Purāṇas. The problem of the gradual evolution and final stratification of the Epics and Purāṇas, in their present form is an intriguing one and the several authorities who have given their undivided and scholarly attention to it have by no means, come to any unanimous conclusion. We can do no more than take a comparative view of their philosophical contents, as they stand, and offer our remarks on the particular view point which they appear to adopt. In doing so, we cannot but take the liberty of making broad generalizations.

EPICS

The Epics and Purāṇas are essentially Theistic in outlook :

वेदे रामायणे चैव पुराणे भारते तथा ।
 आदावन्ते च मध्ये च विष्णुः सर्वत्र गीयते ॥

(*Harivaṃśa*, iii, 323, 34).

The plurality of selves and the acceptance of a Supreme Governor over them, are clearly set forth in reply to Yudhiṣṭhira's query :

बहवः पुरुषा ब्रह्मन् उताहो एक एव तु ।
 बहवः पुरुषा राजन् सांख्ययोगविचारिणाम् ॥ १ ॥
 नैतदिच्छन्ति पुरुषमेकं कुरुकुलोद्वह ।
 बहूनां पुरुषाणां तु यथैका योनिरुच्यते ॥
 तथा तं पुरुषं विश्वमाख्यास्यामि गुणाधिकम् ।
 ममान्तरात्मा तव च ये चान्ये देहसंस्थिताः ॥ ४ ॥
 महापुरुषशब्दं स बिभर्त्येकः सनातनः ॥ ९ ॥
 सांख्यज्ञाने तथा योगे यथावदनुवर्णितम् ॥ (*Mbh.* xii, 361-22).

There is no reason to suppose that the doctrine of plurality of souls attributed to the thinkers of the “Sāṃkhya and Yoga” here, is only a Pūrvaapakṣa view.³ The occurrence of the phrase सांख्यज्ञाने तथा योगे again, in the concluding portion, shows that only the Siddhānta view is being summed up here, according to which “there is a Supreme Being which is the Source of the many (*bahūnām yoniḥ*) and their inner Ruler (*antarātmā*) and who is, for that reason, termed “Mahāpuruṣa”, in contrast with the ordinary Puruṣas.⁴ This is on a par with the distinction between

1. *Mbh.* i, 1, 67-68.

2. *Brahmāṇḍa Purāṇa*, (*Prakriyāpāda*).

3. As contended by Śaṅkara in his *B. S. B.* ii, 1. 1.

4. That such is the natural purport of the passage, is conceded by Amalānanda, in his *Kalpataru*, though he seeks to escape this natural interpretation with some special pleading. (ii, 1. 2).

Puruṣas and Puruṣottama, in the *Gītā*. It would appear that बहवः पुरुषा ब्रह्मन् and महापुरुषशब्दं च . . . both represent the Siddhānta; while नैतदिच्छन्ति पुरुषमेकं . . . represents a Pūrvapakṣa of the Monists that there is no Overlord other than the Ātman existing in different bodies. The next line and the particle “तु” allude to this pūrvapakṣa and point out the additional peculiarity that the selves are *not* equal; that there is One amongst them that is superior to all (*guṇādhika*) and the Creator of all (*bahūnām yoniḥ*).

The cosmology of the *Mahābhārata* accepts the ‘Sāṃkhya’ theory of evolution with a *twenty-sixth principle added* :

अन्यश्च राजन् स परः तथान्यः पञ्चविंशकः ।

The world is regarded as a real development. Though the distinction of Prakṛti and Puruṣas is recognised, a Dualism is overcome as they are both dependent on the Supreme :

मयाध्यक्षेण प्रकृतिः सूयते सचराचरम् । (*Gītā*)

Many contexts indicate the separate existence of freed souls :

मोक्षो दोषो महानेष यदि सिद्धिं गतानृषीन् ।

प्राप्य

मग्नस्य हि परेज्ज्ञाने किं दुःखतरं भवेत् (*Mbh.* xii, 307, 83.)

Nārada’s visit to Śvetadvīpa and his meeting the released souls there and their description, is a typical instance in point.

PURĀṆAS

The usual contents of a Purāṇa :

सर्गश्च प्रतिसर्गश्च वंशो सन्वन्तराणि च ।

show that they are cast in a necessarily Theistic and pluralistic mould.¹ That they do not all of them preach the worship of the same deity is an open secret. They have perhaps carried the Polytheism of the Vedas to its logical conclusion. Or, perhaps, their conflicting views are the result of an attempt at tempering Theism to suit different tastes : (Cf. *Gītā* ix, 23).

There cannot, however, be any difficulty in determining their central vein of thought. The *Matsya Purāṇa* (53, 68-69) makes a three-fold distinction of “Sāttvika”, “Rājasa” and “Tāmasa” Purāṇas. The “Viṣṇuite Purāṇas” are generally classed as “Sāttvika” and the Śaiva ones as “Tāmasa”. The former uphold the supremacy of Viṣṇu.² This comes into conflict with the Śaiva Purāṇas which extol Śiva as the author of the Universe and the highest Being. The conflict is removed by explaining that the Śaiva Purāṇas owe their origin to a ‘campaign of deception’

1. *Viṣṇu Purāṇa*, iii, 6, 25 and *Matsya*, 53, 65. Also :

महतां च पुराणानां लक्षणं कथयामि ते । सृष्टिश्चापि विसृष्टिश्च स्थितिस्तेषां च पालनम् । कर्मणां वासना वार्ता मनूनां च क्रमेण च । वर्णनं प्रलयानां च मोक्षस्य च निरूपणम् । उत्कीर्तनं हरेरेव देवानां च पृथक् पृथक् ॥

(*Brahmavaivārta*, Kṛṣṇajanmakhaṇḍa, Ch. 132).

2. The Śaiva Purāṇas also, sometimes eulogise Viṣṇu from the standpoint of “Samādhi-bhāṣā” (*Skānda* ii, 20, 52-53; ii, 7, 19, 9).

(*mohana*) on the part of Rudra and some other gods and sages, at the behest of Viṣṇu, to delude and mislead the “Āsuric” and the undeserving.¹

There can be no doubt that the prominence given in the Epics and Purāṇas to cosmological stories and the various Avatārs of God and their exploits, gives them an indisputably realistic and Theistic stamp.²

The following remarks of Dasgupta, on the philosophical viewpoint of the Purāṇas, are noteworthy : “It is highly probable that at least one important school of ideas, regarding the philosophy of the *Upaniṣads* and the *Brahmasūtras*, was preserved in the Purāṇic tradition. The theosophy of the Purāṇas was much influenced by that of the Sāṃkhya and Yoga. Śaṅkara’s interpretation of the philosophy of the *Upaniṣads* and the *Sūtras*, seems to have diverged very greatly from the semi-realistic interpretations of them found in the Purāṇas. It was probable for this reason, that Śaṅkara seldom refers to the Purāṇas. But since Śaṅkara’s line of interpretation is practically absent in the Purāṇas, and since the extreme Monism of some passages of the *Upaniṣads* is softened and modified by other considerations, it may be believed that the views of the Vedānta as found in the *Purāṇas* and the *Gītā*, present, at least in a general manner, the oldest outlook of the philosophy of the *Upaniṣads* and the *Brahmasūtras*.”³

On the practical, side the Purāṇas advocate enthusiastic performance of one’s Karma in a spirit of dispassionate dedication to God.⁴ The individual has no right to arrogate to himself the initiative and conduct of affairs.⁵ He must realise his dependence on God and make his life a continuous worship.⁶ This is the essence of the doctrine of “Naiṣkarmya” of the *Pañcarātras* and the *Gītā*, to be referred to presently.

PAÑCARĀTRAS

(i) Like the Epics and the Purāṇas, the *Pañcarātras* also, were intended to expound the truths of the Vedas for the benefit of those who were denied access to the Vedic lore :

स्त्रीशद्रब्रह्मबन्धूनां तन्त्रज्ञानेऽधिकारिता ।

(*Vyomasamhitā*, q. by Madhva, B. S. B. i, 1, 1)

1. *Varāha*, ch. 70, 36-37. एष मोहं सृजाम्याशु यो जनान्मोहयिष्यति * * * It would be beside our point to enter into the question of the moral propriety of such a theory. From the modern point of view, the ‘campaign of deception’ may be treated as a “Purāṇic fiction” to harmonise their conflicting utterances and evolve a single unified doctrine. However that may be, the device has been used by all Vedāntic schools to damn those hostile to their ways of thinking. See *Annals B. O. R. I.*, xiv, 3-4.

2. On a truly monistic view, these have really no meaning or purpose — न चैवं सृष्टिविषयं किमपि फलं श्रूयते । (Śaṅkara, B. S. B. i, 4, 14). The theist, however, looks upon world-creation as a standing proof, however inadequate, of the unutterable majesty of God. Cf. बहुचित्तजगत् बहुधाकरणात् परशक्तिरनन्तगुणः परमः (Madhva).

3. Dasgupta, *His. of Ind. Phil.*, iii, p. 496.

4. वर्णाश्रमाचारवता पुरुषेण परः पुमान् ।

विष्णुराराध्यते येन नान्यत् ततोषकारणम् ॥ (*Viṣṇu* q. by Rāmānuja).

5. *Gītā* iii, 9. Cf. Śaṅkara’s comment on it, in his bhāṣya on *Sanatsujātiya* (Vani Vilas edn. vol. 13, pp. 184-5 and

नाहं कर्ता न कर्ता त्वं, कर्ता यस्तु सदा प्रभुः (*Mbh.* xii, 235, 84; 231, 17).

6. तत्कर्म हरितोषं यत् (*Bhāg.* iv, 29, 49) वृणीमहे ते परितोषणाय (iv, 30, 40).

The *Mahābhārata* speaks of it as the highest kind of knowledge :

ज्ञानेष्वेतेषु राजेन्द्र सर्वेष्वेतद्विशिष्यते (xii, 309, 68).

taught by Nārāyaṇa himself.

According to Schrader (p. 16) the Pañcarātras originated in N. India and subsequently spread to the South. It is significant that one of Yāmuna's works now lost to us and devoted to the vindication of the validity of Pañcarātra was entitled *Kāśmirāgama-prāmānya*. Utpala-Vaiṣṇava of Kashmir (10th cent.) refers in his *Spandapradīpikā* (Viz. Skt. Ser. pp. 9, 11, 33 and 34) to Pañcarātra Śrutis and Upaniṣads besides their Saṁhitās such as *Hamsapārameśvara*, *Vaiḥāyasa*, *Sāttvata*. His father Trivikrama Utpala was originally a Vaiṣṇava. After the rise of the Trika system in Kashmir, philosophical Vaiṣṇavism became extinct in Kashmir.

The literature of the Pañcarātras is a voluminous one, comprising both revealed and non-revealed matter.¹ The *Īśvara Saṁhitā* says that the Ekāyana Veda was the source of all other Vedas and that it originated with Vāsudeva and existed in the earliest stage, as the root of all other Vedas which were introduced at a later age and were, therefore, called "Vikāra-Vedas"² (Dasgupta, *I. Phil.* iii, p. 21).

Though nothing is known about the nature and extent of the Ekāyana Śākhā, we are in a position to state from certain quotations in the works of Yāmuna-cārya, Utpala Vaiṣṇava and others that they consisted of prose as well as metrical passages. The *Parama Śruti*, *Mūla Śruti*,³ *Caturveda-sikhā* etc., of Madhva, belong to this category. Schrader has shown⁴ that there are over two hundred Saṁhitās of the Pañcarātra. A very large number of these is still available in manuscripts.⁵

(ii) The metaphysics of the Pañcarātras is essentially Theistic.⁶ Śaṁkara himself accepts its tenets in the main, save those relating to the alleged creation of the *Jīvas*. He makes it clear that the Pāñcarātrikas teach Vāsudeva to be the Supreme Being with all auspicious attributes. Rāmānuja cites two passages from the *Parama Saṁhitā* :

अचेतना परार्था च नित्या सततविक्रिया ।

सह्यनादिरनन्तश्च परमार्थेन निश्चितः ॥

त्रिगुणा कर्मणां क्षेत्रं प्रकृते रूपमुच्यते ।

प्राप्तिरूपेण संबन्धः तस्याश्च पुरुषस्य च ॥ (ii, 18-19)

1. Schrader, p. 2.

2. Cf. Madhva's q. in his *Up. bhāṣya* :

'वाकोवाक्यं मूलवेदो वेदसारोपसंहृतिः ।

एकायनमिति प्रोक्तं . . . ॥'

and प्रतिपादकता सिद्धा मूलवेदाख्यता द्विजाः ॥

3. Vide f. n. 2, above on "Vikāra-Vedas".

4. *Introd. to Pañcarātra*, p. 6.11 (Adyar, 1916).

5. Madhva makes copious use of many of these Saṁhitās. His citations go to show that the special features of his system have good support in them. Vide, for example, light, thrown on his doctrine of "Guṇaguṇyabheda" in Brahman, by Śaṁkara's reference to the Pañcarātra doctrine on this point.

6. "The general trend of the Pañcarātra is clearly non-Advaitic". (Schrader, *ibid.*, p. 91).

which clearly prove that the metaphysics of the Pañcarātra was out and out realistic, recognizing an eternal matter (Prakṛti) and equally co-existent souls.

The individual soul transmigrates on account of beginningless Karma associated with Vāsanās, at the will of God :

अनादिकर्मणा बद्धो जीवः संसारमण्डले ।

वासुदेवाज्ञया नित्यं भ्रमति * * * (q. by Madhva)

For the removal of these Vāsanās, a certain power emanates from Brahman and impelled by His will, so works within the inner microcosm of man that the Jīva is ultimately freed from bondage and his personality and innate bliss are revealed in full. It may perhaps be pointed out that while some of the works of the present Pañcarātra texts betray monistic leanings, there are some works of the school which uphold a sternly non-absolutistic view. The difference may probably be due to the existence of two currents of thought of which the absolutistic one may be the result of the realistic strata becoming overlaid with monistic terminology. The cosmological account of the *Jayākhya Samhitā* is thus palpably monistic. It is significant that except for the terminology of “Cidaciccharīratva” of the Brahman and the “Brahmātmakatva” of Prakṛti and the souls and a certain peculiar way of putting things, the works of Rāmānuja and his followers have not drawn upon any of these monistic-looking passages at all, in the exposition of their philosophy; but have throughout been all unconscious of the existence of any such strikingly monistic tendency in these Source-books of their system which they hold as sacred. But that a monistic current had been introduced into the Pañcarātra may be gathered from a quotation given by Vācaspati Miśra in his *Bhāmati* (on *B. S. i, 4, 21*) :

आ मुक्तेर्भेद एवस्याज्जीवस्य च परस्य च ।

मुक्तस्य तु न भेदोऽस्ति भेदेहेतोरभावतः ॥

which is expressly attributed to the Pāñcarātrikas. Dr. S. R. Bhatt has attempted to show in his *Philosophy of Pañcarātra—An Advaitic Approach* (Ganesh and Co. Madras, 1968) that “there is overwhelming support in the texts which convincingly indicates the basic Advaitic position of the Pañcarātra school and that its teaching at its core is unmistakably Advaitic and that the doctrine of the ‘nirguṇa’ nature of ultimate reality, the theory of Bimbapratibimba and Avacchedavāda and all-pervasive nature of the self, the phenomenal nature of the world, knowledge as the only efficient means of realization are the most fundamental teachings of the Pañcarātra, when abstracted from the theological and mythological accretions reveal the Advaitic nucleus.”

This is too ambitious and venturesome a bid. Even Śaṅkara while rejecting what is not acceptable to him in the teachings of the *PR* leaves no room for doubt that Brahman in *PR* is entirely ‘Saviśeṣa’ being ‘nirañ-janajñānasvarūpa’ and not ‘nirviśeṣa’ that ‘avyakta’ or Prakṛti is real and subject to such a Brahman. These do not add up to a monism. We have therefore to concede that the original Theistic nucleus of the *PR* thought must have been subjected to a steady process of monistic overwriting in the

Post-Śaṅkara period so as to disguise their fundamental Theistic character. and transform it. If there was “overwhelming evidence in the *PR* texts which convincingly indicate their basic Advaitic position”, as contended by Dr. Bhatt, there is no reason why Śaṅkara or any of his commentators should have refrained from making use of it. It is on record that Madhva has drawn heavily on the *PR*. sources in support of his vigorous Theism. This makes it clear that the original and genuine elements of *PR* philosophy are best preserved and faithfully reflected in the large body of texts from *PR* sources cited by Madhva in most of his works (For titles see Appendix). As regards the verse “Ā mukter bheda eva syāj jīvasya ca para-sya ca. . . .” cited by Vācaspati, the verse admits of quite a different interpretation consistent with Theism if “bheda” is understood in its other authenticated meaning of ‘estrangement’ or ‘discord’ as in :

भवन्ति भेदा ज्ञातीनां कलहाश्च वृकोदर

(*Mbh.* III, 244, 2. Kumb. edn.)

What the *PR*. text conveys is that in the state of Samsāra Jīvas suffer from estrangement and discord with the Supreme and attain complete harmony with the Lord in Mokṣa. There is thus no need to take the expression ‘bheda’ used in the *PR*. text cited by the *Bhāmati* in the *ontological sense* of ‘difference’.

(iii) On the practical side, the Pañcarātras teach the cult of Naiṣkarmya :

तद्धं सात्वतमाचष्टे नैष्कर्म्यं कर्मणां यतः । (*Bhāg.* i, 3, 8)

But in the light of the emphasis laid by the Pañcarātra on rituals, and worship (*ijyā*, *abhigamana*, *dāna* etc., as admitted by Śaṅkara, under *B. S.* ii, 2, 42) its Naiṣkarmya must be radically different from the cult of “no-action”. That such action and worship are not confined to any particular state, as the “Avidyāvasthā” of Śaṅkara, but may be continued even after Siddhi or Mokṣa, is the keynote of the Epics, Purāṇas and the Pañcarātras,¹ Naiṣkarmya, in other words, is not so much “no action”, as enlightened action :

निष्कामं ज्ञानपूर्वं तु निवृत्तमिह चोच्यते ।

It is not turning away from action as from a forbidden fruit. In all this, we have a successful reorientation of the ascetic ideal of certain Upaniṣads

न कर्मणा न प्रजया धनेन त्यागेनैकेनमृतत्वमानशुः । संन्यासयोगान् यतयः शुद्धसत्त्वाः ॥

The change was effected without violent break of any kind :

कुर्वन्नेवेह कर्माणि जिजीविषेच्छतं समाः । तेन त्यक्तेन भुञ्जीथाः ॥

एवं न कर्म लिप्यते नरे । (*Iśa Up.*)

but by a subtle change of emphasis from Karma-tyāga to Phalatyāga. There was thus no break with the sacrificial tradition of the Vedas; but only a reorientation of outlook, which reached its culmination in the philosophy of action preached by the *Gītā* :

1. नैष्कर्म्यमप्यच्यतभाववर्जितं न शोभते ज्ञानमलं निरञ्जनम् (*Bhāg.* i, 5, 12).

आत्मारामाश्च मुनयो निर्ग्रन्था अप्युरुक्रमे ।

कुर्वन्त्यहैतुकीं भक्तिं * * * ॥ (*Ibid.* 1, 7, 10).

सर्वकर्मफलत्यागं प्राहुस्त्यागं विचक्षणाः ।
 यस्तु कर्मफलत्यागी स त्यागी परमो मतः ॥
 संगं त्यक्त्वा फलानि च * * * ।
 कर्तव्यानीति मे पार्थ निश्चितं मतमुत्तमम् ॥

It is not action *per se* that binds; but selfish action : निष्कामं ज्ञानपूर्वं तु निवृत्तमिह चोच्यते । (*Vyāsasmṛti*) The above view of Naiṣkarmya or Nivṛtti Mārga, receives the most remarkable support from the *Kūrma Purāṇa* :

तस्माज्ज्ञानेन सहितं कर्मयोगं समाचरेत् ।
 प्रवृत्तं च निवृत्तं च द्विविधं कर्म वैदिकम् ॥
 ज्ञानपूर्वं निवृत्तं तु प्रवृत्तं यदतोऽन्यथा ।
 निवृत्तं सेवमानस्तु याति तत्परमं पदम् ॥ (i, 2, 63-64)
 कर्मणा सहिताज्ज्ञानात्सम्यग्योगोऽभिधीयते ।
 ज्ञानं च कर्मसहितं जायते दोषवर्जितम् ॥
 तस्मात्सर्वप्रयत्नेन यत्र कुत्राश्रमे रतः ।
 कर्माणीश्वरतुष्ट्यर्थं कुर्यान्नैष्कर्म्यमाप्नुयात्¹ ॥
 संप्राप्य परमं ज्ञानं नैष्कर्म्यं तत्प्रसादतः ।
 एकाकी निर्ममः शान्तो जीवन्नेव विमुच्यते ॥ (i, 3, 23-25)

Cf. also the text from the *Pañcarātra* cited by Rāmānuja :

तस्मात्सम्यक् परं ब्रह्म वासुदेवाख्यमव्ययम् ।
 अस्मादवाप्यते शास्त्रात् ज्ञानपूर्वेण कर्मणा ॥

(*Śribhāṣya*, p. 1608, Benares edn.)

All these bear out the complete unity of standpoint in regard to the conception of Naiṣkarmya or Nivṛttimārga taught by the Epics, Purāṇas and the *Pañcarātra*, which is faithfully reflected by Madhva, who defines Naiṣkarmya in the same sense and quotes a similar passage from the *Vyāsasmṛti* :

निष्कामं ज्ञानपूर्वं तु निवृत्तमिह चोच्यते ।

(iv) There can be no doubt that by the time of the Epic and the Purāṇas, the *Pañcarātras* had already gained an honored place among the Śāstras.² A passage in the *Skānda* reckons them as one of the Śāstras :

शास्त्रं च वेदाः स्मृतयः पुराणं चैतदात्मकम् ।
 इतिहासः पञ्चरात्रं भारतं च महामते ॥ (ii, 7, 19, 12)

The *Mahābhārata* itself, has nothing but eulogy for it, in many places (xii, 348, 62-63). The *Varāha Purāṇa* (66, 19) not only places it on a par with the Vedas :

वेदेन पञ्चरात्रेण भक्त्या यज्ञेन चैव हि ।
 दृश्योऽहं नान्यथा दृश्यो वर्षकोटिशतैरपि ॥³

but also opines that where Vedic mantras are not available, one may worship according to *Pañcarātra* rites :

अलाभे वेदमंत्राणां पञ्चरात्रोदितेन हि ।
 मार्गेण मां यजन्ते यत् ते मां प्राप्स्यन्ति नारद ॥

(*Catalogus Codicum Manuscriptorum Bibliotheca Bodleina*, p. 58, col. 2)

1. For a diametrically opposite view, see Śaṅkara on *Gītā* ii, 48 :

ईश्वरो मे तुष्यतु इति संगं त्यक्त्वा ॥

2. Rāmānuja (in his *Śribhāṣya*) and Jayatirtha (in his *Nyāyasudhā*, B. S. ii, 2, adh. 12) have replied to Śaṅkara's charge of anti-Vedism against the *Pañcarātra*. Belvalkar (*Brahmasūtras* Tr. of Ś. B. ii, 2, Poona, 1938) also says that such a charge is "untenable" (p. 206).

3. Quoted by Madhva, in his *Anuvyākhyāna* (ii, 2, p. 304).

BHAGAVAD GĪTĀ

(i) It is to the *Bhagavadgītā* that we must turn for the most sublime theory of works. The *Gītā* transforms the ordinary Vedic theory of sacrifice and reconciles it with spiritual knowledge and perfects the theory of Naiṣkarmya taught in the *Purāṇas* and the *Pañcarātra* by enlarging the idea of dependence of all on God, as the *raison d' être* of dedication of all Karma. It is freely asserted that "the Bhāgavata religion was the immediate stimulus to the synthesis of the *Gītā*"¹ and that "the teaching of the *Gītā* is identical with that of the doctrine of Bhāgavatas".² It is stated by Madhva, on the authority of the *Brahmavaivarta Purāṇa*³ that the *Gītā* is, in fact, a summary of the teachings of the *Pañcarātra* :

इति गीता च तच्छास्त्रसंक्षेप इति हीरितम् (AV. ii, 2)

The *Gītā* would like to shift the emphasis of the Vedas, as superficially understood, from works to wisdom. Works are not ends in themselves; but only a means to an end :

वेदवादरताः पार्थ नान्यदस्तीति वादिनः (ii, 42)

It is not so much a censure on the Vedas as a plea for a higher point of view. The wisdom lies not in looking down upon the Vedas; but in attuning them to God :

अहं हि सर्वयज्ञानां भोक्ता च प्रभुरेव च (ix, 24)

वेदैश्च सर्वैरहमेव वेद्यः (xv, 15)⁴

The *Gītā* opposes the superficial understanding of the Upaniṣadic view that salvation is not to be gained by works or by offspring, but by renunciation alone. Naiṣkarmya interpreted as abstention from Karma, is not the true law of morality; but Niṣkāmatā or disinterested performance.⁵ All desires are not bad. The desire for righteousness is divine.⁶

(ii) As for the metaphysics of the *Gītā*, it is agreed⁷ that it "accepts the Sāṃkhya theory of evolution of the manifold from heterogeneous indeterminate matter." God puts His seed into Prakṛti (xiv, 3) and

1. Radhakrishnan, *I. Phil.* i, p. 526.

2. *Ibid.*

3. ब्रह्मरुद्रेन्द्रसूर्याणां यदुत्तं विष्णुना पुरा ।

पञ्चरात्रात्मकं ज्ञानं व्यासोऽदात्पाण्डवेषु तत् ॥

तेषामेवावतारेषु सेनामध्येऽर्जुनाय च ।

प्रादाद्गीतेति निर्दिष्टं संक्षेपेणायुयुत्सवे ॥ (NS. ii, p. 425)

4. Cf. मां विघ्नतेऽभिघ्नते मां विकल्प्योऽपोह्य इत्यहम् ।

इत्यस्या हृदयं साक्षान्नान्यो मद्देव कश्चन ॥ (Bhāg. xi, 21, 43)..

5. न कर्मणामनारम्भान्नैष्कर्म्यं पुरुषोऽश्नुते (iii, 4)

एतान्यपि तु कर्माणि * * संगं त्यक्त्वा कर्तव्यानीति (xviii, 6)

6. "If it be self-seeking to apply to God for help in becoming like Himself and doing His Will, this is a form of self-seeking indistinguishable from the highest moral aspiration." Peterson, *The Nature of Religion*, Gifford Lectures, p. 223. Cf. Madhva : अन्यफलाभावेऽपि मत्प्रसादाख्यफलसद्भावात् । इच्छा च तस्य युक्ता । 'वृणीमहे ते परितोषणाय' (भाग ४, ३०, ४०) इति महदाचारात् । अनिन्दनाद्विशेषत इतरनिन्दनात् (G. B. ii, 47). See also his *Mbh. T.N.* xxix, 56-61.

7. Radhakrishnan, *I. Phil.* i, 526.

hence creation proceeds. The *Gītā* “repudiates the view that the world is untrue¹ (xvi, 8). We have a real development presided over by *Īśvara*.² “We cannot say that the *Gītā* looks upon the world as real, only so long as we live in it.”³

“The *Gītā* does not assert anywhere that Brahman is the only reality and all else that appears is false and unreal. The word *Māyā*, is no doubt, used there, in three passages; but its meaning is not what Śaṅkara ascribes to it, in his famous interpretation of Vedāntic thought. Thus in vii, 14, *Māyā* is described as being of the nature of *Guṇas*. Śaṅkara’s phrasing of it as a deception (*chadma* in xviii, 61) is quite inappropriate. Thus, it is evident that the *Gītā* does not know the view that the world may be regarded as a manifestation of *Māyā* or illusion.” (Dasgupta, *I. Phil.* ii, 478). “The eternality and plurality of *Puruṣas* is assumed in it”⁴ (ii, 12; xiv, 2). There is no evidence that it permits a duality of standpoints—the “*Puruṣottama* level” and the “standpoint of the absolute truth”, or that “even the *Puruṣottama* is *imaginary*, since there is in Him, an element of not-self”⁵. The manner of wording in the so-called ‘*Puruṣottama* level’ (xv, 18-20), shows no trace of the consciousness of the presence of a higher stage in the mind of the author of the *Gītā* (xiv, 1-3; vii, 2; 7; ix, 1-4; xv, 18-18-20). The teaching about the ‘triple *Puruṣas*’ — *Kṣara*, *Akṣara* and *Puruṣottama*, is *not* made with any mental reservation in favor of a still higher stage. The distinction holds good “within this world of experience” and in the Scriptures. It is concluded to be the “most precious secret (*guhyaṭamam śāstram*) and even Śaṅkara, concedes that it is, indeed, the very essence “not only of the *Gītā* but also of the entire *Veda*”⁶.

1. Dasgupta *I. Phil.* ii, 552.

2. “We cannot doubt that there existed early a Vaiṣṇavism with a Sāṃkhya metaphysics”. Barth, *Religions of India*, p. 195.

3. Radhakrishnan, *I. Phil.* i, 548.

4. *Ibid.* p. 550.

5. Radhakrishnan, *I. Phil.*, p. 549.

6. सर्वोहि गीताशास्त्रार्थ अस्मिन्नध्याये समासेनोक्तः । न केवलं गीताशास्त्रार्थ एव; किंतु सर्वश्च वेदार्थ इह परिसमाप्तः ॥ (Śaṅkara, *G. B.* xv, 20).

THE DAWN OF SCHISM AND HERETICAL SCHOOLS

THE currents of Theistic Realism, which originated in their fountain-head, the Vedas, and had kept an unbroken course till the days of the Epics and Purāṇas, had, at last, to face the disintegrating rocks of schism and heresy. Many were the causes of unrest and dissatisfaction. For one thing, the literature of the Vaidikas had grown beyond useful proportions, comprising in its fold the four Vedas and their numerous Śākhās, Brāhmaṇas, Khilas, Upaniṣads, Āraṇyakas, Ślokas, Vyākhyānas, Anuvyākhyānas, Itihasas, Purāṇas, Āgamas and Tantras. Scared by the voluminosity of this literature, sceptics began to doubt if it was worth their while to wade through this ocean of knowledge, in search of God. True, one Upaniṣad had counselled : 'Brood not over a plethora of words; for it is a waste of breath' (*Brh.* iv, 4, 21). But the warning had gone unheeded. The routine of Vedādhyayana, Agnihotra, Aupāsana and the Pañcamahāyājñas became a regular boredom to those who were unable to bear its strain. The creative period in Indian Philosophy seemed to have come to an end, already, by the close of the Epic Period. Too much groping in the dark within an enormous body of revealed texts, which had ceased to be intelligible on account of their sharp mutual conflicts of views and interest, and too many splits in their own camp as a result of honest attempts at trying to evolve order out of chaos had dulled the edge of men's intuition. The only result of their labors was an increase in the bulk of the interpretive literature called *Smṛtis* and *Purāṇas*.¹ The upshot was a curious medley of loss of courage, blind homage to authority, religiosity, naive emotionalism, scepticism, divided allegiance, intellectual indolence and restlessness leading to Agnosticism. "A congeries of conflicting theories and guesses accepted by some and denied by others, changing with men and reflecting the individual characters, emotions and wishes of their authors, filled the air. There was no admitted facts or principles which all recognised; but only dissolving views and institutions. . . . Some were busy building up elaborate metaphysical theories, others were equally busy demolishing them. Many theories independent of Vedic tradition arose." (Radhakrishnan *I. Phil.* i, 352).

At such a time as this, a few bold attempts were made to explore new avenues of thought under the nominal suzerainty of the Vedas. The Āstika Darśanas like the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Sāṃkhya were nothing but the responses to the needs of the hour, — attempts to flush out the spiritual stagnation of the race by the supply of

1. 'इतिहासपुराणाभ्यां वेदं समुपबृंहयेत्' ।

fresh blood and currents of thought. But in spite of these attempts to bring comfort and consolation to the distracted, the founding of new schools of thought, like the Sāṅkhya and Mīmāṃsā, only added to the prevailing confusion of thought. The Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā had, no doubt, evolved a set of canons of interpretation to be applied to the bewildering mass of religious literature to arrive at truth. But it had given a false turn to the wheel by making the Scripture hinge on sacrifices. There was nothing in its Sacrificialism to touch the heart and make it glow. The Mīmāṃsā and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika were barren and cold in the spiritual sense of the term. The Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā had well-nigh abolished God; the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika threatened to solve all problems of the world by the method of 'agreement and difference'.¹ The Sāṅkhya had demonstrated the superfluity of God for metaphysics and the Yoga gave but a grudging place to Him : ईश्वरप्रणिधानाद्वा (Y. S. i, 2, 3). Even the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Dr. Banerji thinks, "was originally atheistic"; though "their modern adherents have made theistic systems of them". According to Kumārila, atheistic sentiments were common among the adherents of the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā".²

The attempt at religious and philosophical renaissance had thus to retreat behind the dust and din of warring creeds which it had helped to raise. Darkness and confusion began to reign once again : स्मृत्यनवकाशदोषप्रसंग इति चेन्न, अन्यस्मृत्यनवकाशदोषप्रसंगात् (B. S. ii, 1, 1). The *Brahmajāla Sutta* mentions sixty-two theories which prevailed at the time of the Buddha. Faith in the usefulness of the Vedic literature having been undermined, the ground lay open for atheistic and materialistic invasions.

"A period of disintegration followed, when attempts were made to carry out the Upaniṣadic revolt in a more systematic manner. The illogical combination of Upaniṣadic Monism and Vedic Sacrificialism could no longer live together. Reconstruction was thus the greatest need of the hour. Before a true synthesis could be obtained, the elements artificially combined required to be torn asunder. The Buddhist, Jain and Cārvāka pointed to the artificial condition of the prevailing religion" (Radhakrishnan, *I. Phil.* i, 289). "The ideology of the Upaniṣads did not penetrate the masses and in course of time there was a powerful wave of material philosophy, Jainism, Agnosticism and Atheism" (Jawaharlal Nehru, *Discovery of India*, 1946, p. 97). The stray references to Cārvāka, Buddhist and Jain theories in the Epics and Purāṇas³ probably represent the first

1. * * * साधर्म्यवैधर्म्यज्ञानान्निःश्रेयसाधिगमः ।

2. Radhakrishnan, *I. Phil.* i, 281, f. n.

3. *Vālmiki Rāmāyaṇa*, ii, 109, 34; *Gītā* xvi, 8. *Manu*, ii, 11, 22; 33. *Viṣṇu Purāṇa* iii, 18, 24-26. *Maitrī Up.* vii, 8 ff. Also : पाषण्डवामशैवाद्यैर्वेदमार्गाः कलौ यथा । (*Bhāg* x, 20, 23 Vij.)

"अहमासं पण्डितको हैतुको वेदनिन्दकः

आन्वीक्षिकीं तर्कविद्यामनुरक्तो निरर्थिकाम् " (*Mbh.* xii, 108, 47)

Cf. *Pādma* q. by Madhva in his *B. T.* :—

सांख्यमासुरयेऽन्यस्मै कुतर्कपरिबृंहितम् ।

appearance of these ideas and the attempts made to nip these ideas in the bud.

The spread of Cārvāka, Jain and Buddhist doctrines shook the foundations of Vedic belief and authority. The Cārvāka soon became world-wide (Lokāyata).¹ It had an irresistible appeal to the hedonistic instincts of the masses.

The Buddhist appealed to the more cultured section of the people, which had a lingering faith in the concepts of right and wrong and inculcated a stern code of ethics, to purge it of all dross and facilitate the attainment of Nirvāṇa. "The majesty of God and prestige of Providence pale into insignificance before the principle of Karma and the noble eightfold Path. Not a hair can drop from the head without the decree of Karma. A God who can neither adapt nor alter, neither produce nor modify is no God at all" (Radhakrishnan, *Ibid*, p. 454). "The Buddhist denied the authority of the Vedas, rejected the institution of Varnas and steered clear of profitless metaphysical discussions. It was essentially psychology, logic and ethics and *not* metaphysics" (*op. cit* p. 353).

The Buddhist's Nirvāṇa was not particularly alluring; but he managed to hide the icy nature of it by a well-chosen veil of ineffability.² By an adroit turn of emphasis,³ he impressed upon the world that the question of how to get rid of Samsāra was far more insistent and important than that of how men would spend their leisure hours after they got rid of it ! "Buddhism was more concerned with the believers' moral needs than with any intellectual interpretation of the world. Not the Universe and the nature of its cause was the theme of inquiry; but the character of human experience, its dangers and variety" (Carpenter, *Theism in Medieval India*, p. 53). "Buddhism, then, had a cure of souls" (Barth, *Religions of India*, p. 120).

Royal patronage was not long in coming.⁴ The Jains also made their influence felt by active propaganda. The austere heights to which they carried their doctrine of Ahimsā, the more elaborate and rigorous system of their Ethics, the acceptance by them of the soul as a permanent

1. अत एव तस्य चार्वाकमतस्य लोकायतमित्यन्वर्थमपरं नामधेयम् ।

(*Sarvadarśana Saṁgraha*, p. 1)

2. Cf. अप्रतीतमसंप्राप्तमनुच्छिन्नमशाश्वतम् ।

अविरुद्धमनुत्पन्नमेवं निर्वाणमुच्यते ॥ (Nāgārjuna, xxx, 3)

and शून्यतायां विशुद्धायां नैरात्म्यान्मार्गलाभतः

बुद्धाः शुद्धात्मलाभित्वात् गता आत्ममहात्मताम् ॥

(Asaṅga, ix, 23, *Mahāyānasūtrālamkāraśāstra*)

3. The *Majjima Nikāya* i, 29, says "For those burning in fire, it is not the time to discuss about it but to escape from it".

4. "Even the proceedings connected with its erection into a State religion by Asoka appear to have been accomplished, if not by violence, at any rate with coercion, as is evident from the expressions ascribed to the Prince : "In less than two years," he says, "the gods who were worshipped as true divinities, in Jambūdvīpa, have now been rendered false, and this result is not the effect of my greatness but of my zeal" (Insc. of Sahasram, Rūpnath and Bairat, I. A. 156. (Barth, *op. cit.* p. 135).

entity in contrast to Buddhism,¹ and the more colorful conception of Kaivalya put forward by them and the weight and prestige of royal patronage which they too gained before long, also tended to ensure their progress.

The combined strength of these three soon forced orthodox Hinduism to take stock of the situation and meet the danger to its solidarity. The metaphysical objection to a plurality of gods had to be answered. It would appear from the *Lalitavistara* that the sectarian worship of the various gods of Hinduism, like Śiva and Viṣṇu was already well established at the time of the revolt of Buddhism.² If so, we cannot be wrong in having dated the Purāṇic and Pañcarātra literature, prior to the rise of Buddhism.³

The Buddhists opposed the view of a sentient first cause⁴ of the Universe which would itself remain uncaused. The Jains had, for their own reasons, repudiated a Creator-God and so did the Cārvāka. "The iconoclastic fervor of the Materialists, the Sceptics and some of the followers of Buddhism had destroyed all grounds of certitude" (Radhakrishnan, *op. cit.* ii, p. 19). The Saptabhaṅginaya of the Jains was an open invitation to Scepticism. In these circumstances, the reality of the world and its values could hardly be upheld. In the interests of the stability of the old faith, it was necessary to silence the various heresies and show a way out of the confusion caused by the enormous overgrowth of the literature of the Hindu faith. There was no use adding to the bulk of the existing literature, which had already grown beyond useful proportions.

What was wanted was a stock-taking, — a brief authoritative pronouncement on the philosophy of the Vedaśāstra, providing not only a key to the solution of the contradictions of thought and conflict of opinions, but a reorientation of some of the older views that had become either corrupted or superseded by hostile views; and last, but not least, a manual of self-defence and self-preservation, capable also of a crushing dialectical refutation of all heretical views.⁵ This the *Vedānta Sūtras* of Bādarāyaṇa undertook to supply.⁶

1. Dasgupta, *op. cit.* ii, 521.

2. "The *Lalitavistara* describes the state of India at the time the Buddha preached, in these words : — "While at Uruvela, the Śākya thought : Here I am, born in Jambūdvīpa, among people who have no prospect of intellectual redemption, crowded by Tirthikas with diverse wishes. Some adore cows, deer, horses and hogs. Some pride themselves on their saluting Brahmā, Indra, Rudra, Viṣṇu, Devi, Kumāra etc. (Radhakrishnan, *op. cit.* i, 336 f.).

3. See Bühler, *I. A.* xxiii, p. 248 (1894).

4. "The Buddhists and Jains deny the existence of an intelligent first cause. (Radhakrishnan, *op. cit.* i, 289). "The Buddhists oppose the view of a single all-creating Deity because of their belief that everything originates from a conglomeration of causes : तस्याः एको कृता नास्तीति । इमं पि अत्यं दीयते । (Quoted from Buddhaghosa's com. on a work of the *Abhidharma Piṭaka*, Yamakami Sogen, *Systems of Buddhist Thought*, Calcutta, 1912, p. 21.

5. "It is well-known that the conflict with the Buddhists has largely stimulated philosophical inquiry in most of the systems of Hindu thought." (Dasgupta, *op. cit.* i, p. 78).

6. "When the Vedic literature became unwieldy, the Sūtra literature arose" (Radhakrishnan, *op. cit.* ii, p. 22) Cf. also : वेदान्तकुसुमग्रन्थनार्यत्वात्सूत्राणाम् । वेदान्तवाक्यानि हि सूत्रैरुदाहृत्य विचार्यन्ते । (Śaṅkara, *B. S. B.* i, 1, 1).

BRAHMA SŪTRAS

(i) THE Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa are the earliest aphoristic manual of a "system of Vedānta" that has come down to us. Internal evidence shows that there had been other attempts to reduce the conflicting speculative utterances of the Vedas and Upaniṣads to some order and evolve a single system of thought out of them. Jaimini, Bādari, Āśmarathya etc., are some of the names which occur in the Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa; but we cannot be sure, if any or all of them had traversed the entire field of metaphysical system-building or had merely confined themselves to partial aspects thereof. It is probable that Bādarāyaṇa's work was of a much wider range than those of his predecessors and that the critique of other Darśanas, given by him, was a decidedly new and original contribution of his. By its merits, this work seems to have eclipsed all others of its kind.

As a full-fledged Darśana, this work consists of a constructive exposition (Svapakṣa-sthāpana) and a dialectical refutation of other systems (Parapakṣa-nirākṛti), whose tenets are likely to challenge its exclusive claims to highest metaphysical satisfyingness.

(ii) The date of the *Brahmasūtras* is uncertain. The problem of successive interpolations into the original text of the sūtras, raised by some scholars, would complicate matters still further. In their present form, the Sūtras are clearly Post-Buddhistic¹ and are acquainted with a number of orthodox and heretical schools.² That they were cast in the mould of Brahminical orthodoxy is clear from the ban on the study of the Vedas by the Śūdras (i, 3, 36-38) and their attitude of quiet approval to Vedic sacrifices (iii, 1, 25), which deserves to be contrasted with the Buddhistic and Sāṃkhya aversion to them. They may, tentatively, be assigned to the first two centuries of the Christian era.

(iii) Despite their annoying brevity, the Sūtras disclose a firm realistic and Theistic background, not only in their scheme of topics but in their wording and drift of argument. They are arranged in four chapters : Samanvaya, Avirodha, Sādhana and Phala, of four *pādas* each. The first chapter opens by enjoining metaphysical inquiry into Brahman (for the attainment of Mokṣa). The second sūtra defines Brahman as the Being from which the creation, preservation and dissolution of the Universe proceed. The third shows a partiality for revealed religion, when it affirms that God can be known only through Scripture. The objection that Scripture speaks not only of Brahman, but of several other principles as well, such as Pradhāna, Ākāśa and Vaiśvānara as responsible for world-

1. ii, 2, 18-32.

2. ii, 2.

creation, wholly or in part, is met by the fourth sūtra, which provides for the attunement of such texts in Brahman, by means of an elaborate process of textual synthesis called "Samanvaya". This is worked out in the course of practically the whole of the I Adhyāya, which is therefore called "Samanvayādhyāya." It should be noted that this specialised form of "esoteric" Samanvaya is effected without any prejudice to the individuality and *status quo* of the various principles or deities in their own recognised spheres. *Ākāśa tallīngāt*, for instance, is not tantamount to a denial of *Ākāśa* as a distinct material principle, altogether.¹ This is conclusively established by the trend of the context and the "Viyadadhikaraṇa" (ii, 3, 1-7) in particular, which establishes that (*bhūta*)-*ākāśa* is a product. Here, at least, *Ākāśa* cannot be the Brahman. It should be evident from such sūtras that terms like *Ākāśa*, *Avyakta*, etc. are employed, according to the *Sūtrakāra*, in a dual sense, once in the fulness of their etymological significance (परममुख्यवृत्ति) that is fulfilled only in Brahman and again in a conventional, popular or secondary sense (*laukika-vyavahāra* or *mukhyavṛtti*). This is the grammar of Samanvaya attempted by the *Sūtrakāra*. This important aspect of the teaching of the Sūtra is fully developed and worked out by Madhva, in his Sūtra-interpretation, to its fullest extent. The doctrine of twofold application of names and epithets was already mooted in the Vedic age by the idea of the "Sarva-nāmavān". The Sūtras have shown its application in the Upaniṣads too and in the entire Cosmos. It underlies Rāmānuja's dictum :

सर्वशब्दानां लोकव्युत्पत्त्यवगततत्तत्पदार्थविशिष्टब्रह्माभिधायित्वं सिद्धम् ।

Sribhāṣya, Medical Hall Press, p. 560 and *R. G. B.* x, 21 :

शरीरवाचकानां शब्दानां शरीरिपर्यन्तवाचकत्वोपगमः * * यथा देवो मनुष्य इत्यादयः, शरीराणि प्रतिपादयन्तस्तत्तदात्मनि पर्यवस्यन्ति ॥

The second chapter meets objections brought against the thesis of Brahman's authorship of the Universe and refutes a good many anti-theistic theories, in an attempt at strengthening the basic position of the *Sūtrakāra*. It also gives an account of the world's dependence on Brahman. The third pāda, here, removes certain internal contradictions in the Scriptural texts themselves.² The purpose of this attempt is not merely to establish the validity of the Śāstra as a whole, in a logical sense, but also to establish Brahman alone as the *highest Source* of all origination, preservation etc. wherever found. This could not be done until the true nature of the world is made out. That could not be done until the contradictions of texts which set forth the inner nature of the world are removed. Hence the need for resolution of inner contradictions in the *Adhidaiva*, *Adhibhautika* and other spheres of creation etc. From ii, 3, 18, onwards, we have interesting discussions about the nature of the soul, its attributes and relation to Brahman. The III Chapter expounds the ways and means of release

1. Cf. the clinching argument of Jayatirtha (*T. P.* i, 4, 27) : न ह्याकाशादिशब्दानां ब्रह्मणि समत्वयेऽभिहिते, कथं तर्हि जगदवकाश इति शङ्कोत्पन्ना नापि सूत्रकृता पराकृता ॥

2. Cf. 'अनादिर्वायिमाकाशः' । 'आकाशवत्सर्वगतश्च नित्यः' । 'आत्मन आकाशः संभूतः' ॥

(Sādhana) such as Vairāgya, Bhakti, Upāsana and Aparokṣa. The last deals with the fruits of Brahmajñāna and gives an elaborate account of the destruction of Karmas, ways of Exit (Devayāna and Pitṛyāna), the intricacies of the theological problem of Laya (absorption) of different principles in order, and the benefits of lordliness accruing to the released and the scope and extent of such sovereignty and the nature of their bliss.

In all this, there is hardly any room for a monistic philosophy. The second sūtra defines Brahman as the author of the Universe, — not surely, of an unreal one ! It is with difficulty that the *Pañcapādikā* tries to read into this definition the farfetched notion of a 'taṭastha-lakṣaṇa' (qualification *per accidens*) and deny the real causality of the Brahman which would render It "Saguṇa". Dialectic quibblings apart, the Brahman's knowability through Scripture alone (i. 1, 3) is clearly opposed to the doctrine of its 'self-luminosity' (Svaprakāśatva) defined as अवेद्यत्वे सति, अपरोक्षव्यवहारयोग्यत्वम् (Citsukha, *Tattvapradīpikā*, Bombay, 1915, p. 9). The laborious task of "Samanvaya" could hardly have any meaning, if Brahman were really and wholly beyond the pale of words (Sarvaśabdāvācyam), as contended by Advaitins.

(iv) The Sūtrakāra takes great pains to refute Buddhistic Idealism which regards the world as a mental projection (and the Śūnyavāda which regards it as a void), thus affirming an intensely realistic attitude. He also refutes Kṣaṇabhaṅgavāda which regards the phenomena of creation as but a ceaseless and in itself meaningless procession of moments without unity, stability or a co-ordinating perceiver; and the Yogācāra which denies the difference between jñāna and jñeya (Jñānābhinnam jñeyam). The impassioned refutation of these four schools of Buddhism is sufficient proof of the fact that the Sūtrakāra looks upon the world as (1) real (*satya*); (2) *sthira* (stable) and (3) independent of the mind. (4) The Sūtra : *Vaidharmyācca na svapnādivat* (ii, 2, 29) shows that he would *not* be satisfied with a make-believe reality of the world, such as is assigned to dreams. This shows that he is not for ascribing mere "Vyāvahārikasatya" (phenomenal reality) to the world, which is already conceded by the Buddhist :

द्वे सत्ये समुपाश्रित्य बुद्धानां धर्मदेशना ।

लोके संवृत्तिसत्यं च सत्यं च परमार्थतः ॥ (Nāgārjuna)

"The author of the Sūtras could not have refuted the Sāṃkhya and discussed the theories of creation, so seriously, if he had held that the world was an appearance, in which case, its creatorship is out of the question" (Radhakrishnan, *op. cit.* ii, 443). Under the sūtra "Vaidharmyācca na svapnādivat" even a confirmed Monist like Śaṅkara forgets his own mental reservations and observes that "the objects of the waking state are *not* similarly sublated (as in a dream) *at any time*".¹

1. नैवं जागरितोपलब्धं वस्तु कस्यांचिदप्यवस्थायां बाध्यते ॥

In the second volume of his *History of I. Phil.*, Dasgupta makes it clear how on many occasions Śaṅkara "tries to wriggle out of the sūtras by introducing parenthetical remarks, which are often inconsistent with his own commentary and the context of the Sūtras, as well as their purpose and meaning, so far as it can be made out from such context." *Op. cit.* pp. 42-43 and 44.

(v) The Sūtrakāra is of opinion that man is a real agent though not altogether an independent one; कर्ता शास्त्रार्थवत्वात् । परात् तच्छ्रुतेः' (ii, 3, 33; 41). The Supreme and the Individual dwell in one and the same body; but the former is *not* subject to the evils and imperfections of life. *There* lies His superiority : संभोगप्राप्तिरिति चेन्न वैशेष्यात् (i, 2, 8). He deals out punishment and rewards according to man's deserts (Karma-sāpekṣa) and cannot, therefore, be deemed guilty of partiality or pitilessness in having ordered the world as it is (ii, 1, 34). Man's higher nature lies hidden on account of his neglect of God. When he wakes up from this estrangement and turns to God, for succour, he is freed :

पराभिध्यानात् तिरोहितं ततो ह्यस्य बन्धविपर्ययो (ii, 2, 5).

(vi) The majesty of God is unutterable, inconceivable : विवक्षितगुणोपपत्तेश्च । सर्वधर्मोपपत्तेः । आत्मनि चैवं विचित्राश्च हि । सुखविशिष्टाभिधानादेव च (i, 2, 2; ii, 1, 37; ii, 1, 28; ii, 1, 15). The attributes of Brahman are both negative and positive : अदृश्यत्वादिगुणको धर्मोक्तेः (i, 2, 21). It can be both the subject and the object of its own knowledge कर्मकर्तृव्यपदेशाच्च (i, 2, 4).

(vii) The Sūtrakāra holds the individual soul to be more a "fraction" (*aṁśa*) of the Supreme (ii, 3, 43) than wholly identical with it. He uses the term *aṁśa* in the sense of difference (*nānātvam*) coupled with dependence (*tat-tantratva* in the words of Vācaspati on ii, 3, 43), even as admitted by Śaṅkara :

जीव ईश्वरस्यांशो भवितुमर्हति । कस्मात्पुनः स एव न भवति ? नानाव्यपदेशात् । य आत्मनि तिष्ठन्तित्यादिभेदनिर्देशो, नासति भेदे युज्यते । He also seems to think that the individual, on release, passes on with the best part of his selfhood intact : संपद्याविहाय स्वेन शब्दात् (iv, 4, 1).¹ The merger of the human soul in the Divine is not countenanced by him. "I must give it as my opinion" says Thibaut, "that they (the Sūtras) do not (1) set forth the distinction of higher and lower knowledge in Śaṅkara's sense and that (2) they *do not hold* the doctrine of unreality of the world; and (3) *do not*, with Śaṅkara, proclaim the absolute identity of the individual and the Highest Self" (*S. B. E.* vol. 34).

(viii) The Upaniṣads hold diverse views on the nature of Brahman's causality of the Universe. The author of the Sūtras has naturally discussed them and pronounced his opinion on them. He rejects the doctrine of creation from nothing : असद्व्यपदेशान्नेति चेन्न * * (ii, 1, 17). The definition of the Brahman in the second sūtra, if it is to rule out the Sāṃkhyan Prakṛti, must certainly point to an efficient and intelligent Cause as Creator : ईक्षतेर्नाशब्दम् । गौणश्चेन्नात्मशब्दात् i, 1, 5-6 (as interpreted by Śaṅkara and others). But it is not so certain if he did regard the Brahman as the *material cause also*. True, the Prakṛtyadhikaraṇa (i, 4, 24 *et seq*) has come to be regarded as adumbrating such a view. There are, however, serious objections to the acceptance of this facile view. In the first place, the context of the adhikaraṇa in question is one of Samanvaya (of names and

1. Śaṅkara reads आविर्भावः. The term स्वेन रूपेण in the Up. is anyway significant, in this connection. Cf. *Bhāg.* ii, 10, 6.

epithets) and any discussion of the precise nature of Brahman's causality would be out of place here and should, more properly, be taken up in Chapter II. It would be manifestly illegitimate to stretch a Samanvaya Sūtra beyond its purview. Nor would the reference of terms like Prakṛti, Yoni etc. to Brahman, by way of Samanvaya, do away with the existence of those principles, as has already been made clear. (2) To treat the entire fourth Pāda of the Samanvayādhyāya as having nothing to do with Samanvaya, (as has been done by most commentators — except Madhva) is to flout the very plan of the Sūtrakāra's work. (3) The weakness and artificiality of the "Abhinna-nimittopādāna" interpretation of i, 4, 24, is betrayed by the fact that one at least among the professedly Abhinna-nimittopādānavādins viz., Rāmānuja, whose interpretation of the Sūtras is hailed by Thibaut and others as reflecting the true position of the Sūtrakāra, accepts¹ under this very Sūtra, the existence of a material principle (Avyakta) other than the Brahman, which provides the stuff of which the material world is made and which is claimed to be *ex hypothesi* dependent on Brahman, unlike the Sāṃkhya Prakṛti. Lastly (3) the studied attempts of the Sūtrakāra to distinguish Brahman from the Jīva, gods and material principles विशेषणभेदव्यपदेशाभ्यां च नेतरौ । अत एव न देवता भूतं च । कम्पनात् (i, 2, 22; 27; 3, 39) also render it unlikely that he could have held the view that Brahman Itself transforms itself into the world, which is what is meant by a material cause. The interpretation of the Prakṛtyadhikaraṇa as given by Śaṅkara and others, is thus beside the point and inconsistent with the context. Its interpretation in terms of a pure Samanvaya, as in the case of any other term like Ākāśa, given by Madhva, is free from all such difficulties. His procedure finds support in the *Vāyu Purāṇa*, where, as Dasgupta has shown, the Brahman is said "to be known by various epithets like Prakṛti, Pradhāna, Prasūti, Ātman, Yoni, Kṣetra, Akṣara etc. (*op. cit.* iii, p. 502).² According to the *Ahīrbudhnya Samhitā* "the Brahman is known by many names such as Paramātmā, Bhagavān, Avyakta, Prakṛti and Pradhāna" (Dasgupta, *op. cit.* iii, p. 34). We may, therefore, take it that there is hardly any justification to interpret the Prakṛtyadhikaraṇa as attempting anything more than a mere Samanvaya of terms like Prakṛti, in Brahman. In other contexts, the Sūtrakāra's objection to the Sāṃkhya Prakṛti is not to its existence *per se*; but to its metaphysical independence (as claimed by the Sāṃkhya). The status of Prakṛti, according to the Sūtrakāra, would thus, appear to be the same as in the *Gītā* and the *Purāṇas*.

(ix) The nature of final release set forth in the closing section of the Sūtras, also points to a Theism as the final philosophy of Bādarāyaṇa. The released souls though in the enjoyment of perfect innate bliss, (iv, 4, 22) are yet under certain irrevocable limitations as regards their powers

1. न वयमव्यक्तं तत्परिणामविशेषांश्च स्वरूपेण नाभ्युपगच्छामः । अपि तु, परमपुरुषशरीरतया तदात्म-
कत्वविरहेण । तथानभ्युपगमादेव तन्त्रसिद्धप्रक्रियानिरसनम् ॥ (Śribhāṣya, i, 4, 3).

2. Vide also अक्षरमम्बरान्तघृते: (i, 3, 10).

and sovereignty : जगद्व्यापारवर्जम् (iv, 4, 17).¹ This Sūtra speaks for itself. To all attempts at explaining it away, Thibaut has an effective reply, which hardly admits of improvement : “It is as impossible that the Sūtras should open with a definition of the Lower Principle, as it is unlikely to close with a description of the state of those who know the Lower Brahman only and are thus debarred from obtaining true release” (Tr. Śaṅkara’s *bhāṣya*, S. B. E. p. xcii). Theism, thus, is writ large on the Sūtras.

(x) We cannot say there is any overwhelming support in the Sūtras for the doctrine of the identity of Jīva and Brahman. “I am myself inclined to believe that the dualistic interpretations were probably more faithful to the Sūtras than those of Śaṅkara”, says Dasgupta (*op. cit.* i, 421). “There is strong support for the view that Bādarāyaṇa looks upon the difference between the Brahman and the souls as ultimate, something that persists even when the soul is released” (Radhakrishnan, *op. cit.* ii, p. 440). Apart from the many Sūtras, containing explicit denials of identity and affirming difference : अनवस्थितेरसंभवाच्च नेतरः (i, 2, 17) नेतरोऽनपत्तेः । अनुपपत्तेस्तु न शरीरः । (i, 1, 16; 2, 3) भेदव्यपदेशाच्चाप्यः (i, 1, 21) पृथगुपदेशात्. (ii, 3, 28) शरीरश्चोभयेऽपि हि भेदेनैव मधीयते (i, 2, 20), which have been interpreted by Śaṅkara himself, in a dualistic sense, he and his commentators have expressly admitted that the language and thought of the Sūtras, are, for the most part, dualistic.² Here and there, one meets with a suggestion from them that the utterances of the Sūtrakāra should be taken *cum grano salis* or hears a protest that there need be no doubt of his undying faith in Monism. On their own showing, there are, however, not more than a couple of Sūtras,³ which can be said to be unquestionably monistic in tenor. These are (1) आत्मोति तूपगच्छन्ति ग्राहयन्ति च (iv, 1, 3) and शास्त्रदृष्ट्या तूपदेशो वामदेववत् (i, 1, 30). The first is ambiguously worded. The term Ātman may, no doubt, denote the Jīva; but it is not its *usual* sense in the Sūtras.⁴ Śaṅkara himself in i, 3, 1, proclaims that the “individual soul” is neither the only sense of the term Ātmā, nor even its *primary* sense. The purport of Sūtra iv, 1, 3, may well therefore be that the Supreme Being (who is the object of Jijñāsā) is taught and realised not only as the great Controller of the external Universe and of the gods (as taught in i, 3, 11) but also as the Seeker’s own Inner Ruler,

1. P. M. Modi, in his *A Critique of the Brahmasūtra* i, p. 448, gives a curious and novel explanation of “Jagad-vyāpāra”, which would be redundant in the light of the last sūtra and at variance with its sense in an identical expression used in तत्रापि च तद्व्यापारात् (B. S. iii, 1, 16).

2. ननु जीवब्रह्मणोरभेदं न क्वापि सूत्रकारो मुखतो वक्ति; किंतु सर्वत्र भेदमेव । अतो नैक्यमिष्टम् । तत्राह — प्रतिपाद्यत्विति । आदिपदेन आत्मेत्यादिसंग्रहार्थम् । (Ānandagiri 1, 3, 19.) सूत्रेष्वभेदो नोक्त इति भ्रान्ति निरस्यति—प्रतिपाद्यत्विति । (Ratnaprabhā c. on i, 3, 19).

3. See Śaṅkara on i, 3, 19.

4. आत्मत्वं तावन्मुख्यया वृत्त्या परमेश्वर उपपद्यते । स आत्मा तत्त्वमसीति ।

(Śaṅkara, B. S. B. i, 2, 13).

See the use of आत्मा in this sense in the following Sūtras : आत्मा प्रकरणात् । आत्मकृतेः परिणामात् । आत्मशब्दात् । (3, 3, 15) आत्मनि चैवं विचित्राश्च हि । गौणश्चेन्नात्मशब्दात् । द्युवाचायतनं स्वशब्दात् ।

Ātmā or Antaryāmī. The reference here is obviously to the famous declaration of Yājñavalkya in his Antaryāmi Brāhmaṇa, य आत्मनि तिष्ठन् आत्मानमन्तरो यमयति * * * where the truth is emphasised twenty-one times, with the significant refrain : एष ते आत्मा अन्तर्याम्यमृतः (*Brh.* iii, 7, 3-23). The ultimate sense of Ātman as Inner Ruler (*antaryāmi*) is clearly established in this passage. It looks almost certain that the Sūtrakāra had this very text in view as his Viṣayavākya here. Moreover, it is extremely unlikely that the Sūtrakāra, who has been so anxious to repudiate the “*viśiṣṭaika*” of Indra and Brahman, raised in the pūrvapakṣa in न वक्तुरात्मोपदेशात् (i, 1, 29) and explain it away in the figurative sense of Adhyātmasambandhabhūmā would at all be disposed to identify every ordinary human self who is *prima facie* much inferior to Indra, with the Supreme. Otherwise, there was no reason to reject the supposed identity of Indra and Brahman at the outset. The roundabout way in which the Sūtrakāra tries to justify the identity, in what is obviously a figurative sense, shows that he is not in favor of accepting any essential identity, either between Indra and Brahman or between Jīva and Brahman.

This is made clear by him in i, 1, 30 where he designates the “Adhyātmasambandhabhūmatva” as the “Śāstra-dṛṣṭi” or the mystic point of view of the Śāstras. The two are synonymous. But the expressions “adhyātma”, “sambandha”, “bhūmā” and “asmin”, would be superfluous and out of place, if mere identity were meant to be conveyed. “Sambandha” is not bound to be ‘identity’ (tādātmya), unless so stated. It is “dviniṣṭha,” requiring two real terms to be related. In the present case, the conditioned self of Indra or Vāmadeva *as such* would have ceased to be, the moment it realised its identity with the All-Soul and could not be putting forth specific claims of identity with X, Y, or Z, as is done by Vāmadeva. Further, if the experiences of Vāmadeva recorded in *R. V.* iv, 27, 1-2, cited in the Sūtra i, 1, 30, are any guide to the interpretation of this *adhikaraṇa*, they would be entirely in favor of the view that he was fully conscious of difference between himself and the Supreme and others :

गर्भे नु सन्नन्वेषामवेदमहं देवानां जनिमानि विश्वा ।

शतं मा पुर आयसीररक्षन्ध श्येनो जवसा निरदीयम् ॥

न घा स मामपजोषं जभारा भीमास त्वक्षसा वीर्येण ।

ईर्मा पुरंधिरजहादरातीरुत वाता अतरत् शुशुवानः ॥

Vāmadeva tells us in the above that (1) his mental faculties were not at all clouded at the time of his birth, as in the case of others ; (2) that he was able to rise above the miseries of that state by the power of his enlightenment; (3) that the Supreme Being which sustains all bodies (Puraṁdhiḥ) had killed the enemies that infest the foetus and so on. It is clear from these and other statements of Vāmadeva, such as that he bestowed land on the Āryan (*R. V.* iv, 26, 1) that he had not only *not* lost his individual self-consciousness (as living in the womb) or “other-consciousness” of the gods and creatures (*devānām janimāni*) but that he had a vivid consciousness of the all-directing (*irmā*) presence of the Supreme Being (Puraṁdhi), to whose powers and protection he ascribes his conquest of his foes and

every one of his achievements. In these circumstances, his claims to identity with Manu, Kakṣivān etc. (*R. V.* iv, 26, 1) could only be taken to have been made *in the name of and on behalf of* that Supreme Being itself or by that Being itself speaking through Vāmadeva, at the time of his being possessed and flooded by the contact of the Great Antaryāmī.¹

“*Preponderance of Divine contact*” is, thus, the nearest equivalent of the phrase “*Adhyātmasambandhabhūmā*” used in the Sūtra. Vāmadeva’s speech is to be viewed from the standpoint of the Śāstra, as the words of the Antaryāmī. Similar statements of identity, elsewhere, are to be similarly explained. “When Indra says, ‘Worship Me’, he means ‘worship the God I worship’. On a similar principle, Vāmadeva’s declaration that he was Manu and Sūrya, is explained” (Radhakrishnan, *op. cit.* i, p. 521). There is, thus, no ground for thinking that the Sūtrakāra had any leaning towards an identity of the kind favored by Śaṅkara.

1. The standpoint of the Antaryāmī is the same as that of the *Svatantrādvitiya Brahma*. It is found adopted in *Mbh.* xii, 323, 56 and *Viṣṇu Purāṇa* i, 19, 25.

EARLY COMMENTATORS ON THE SŪTRAS,
RECRUDESCENCE OF BUDDHISM, HINDU
REVIVAL, THE RISE OF THE ADVAITA
VEDĀNTA AND EARLY THEISTIC
REACTIONS TO IT

THERE is sufficient evidence on record that the early commentators on the Brahmasūtras were all Realists.¹ The Sūtras themselves were admittedly realistic in tenor and nothing could be more natural than that their earliest commentators also should have adopted a realistic view of them. Some scholars hold that the Sūtras themselves rose originally amidst Bhāgavata influence. The great Upavarṣa mentioned by Śabara Svāmin,² in his commentary on the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā*, is reported by Śaṅkara³ to have written a commentary on the *Brahmasūtras*. This Upavarṣa is commonly identified with the Vṛttikāra, quoted and criticized⁴ by Śaṅkara, in his commentary on the *Brahmasūtras*. It is clear from Śaṅkara's references to the Vṛttikāra, that the latter was a Realist. He has been further identified with the Vṛttikāra Bodhāyana,⁵ one of the early precursors of the school of Rāmānuja. This identification would appear to have the support of Viśiṣṭādvaitic literary tradition,⁶ which has also preserved the names of nearly half a dozen early commentators of the school, preceding Rāmānuja, viz., Bodhāyana, Ṭaṅka, Dramiḍa, Guhadeva, Kapardi and Bhāruci.⁷ Bhāskara (i, 4, 25) flings one of these early commentators : the Vākya-kāra *alias* Brahmanandin *alias* Ṭaṅka,⁸ in the face of Śaṅkara, saying that the Vivartavāda has no support in the ancient tradition of Sūtra-commentators. It is with difficulty that the *Bhāmati* and *Kalpataru* try to defend Śaṅkara, on this point.⁹ Under iv, 3, 7-14, Śaṅkara cuts himself adrift

1. "Under the influence of Gauḍapāda, Śaṅkara differed from the commentators like Bhartṛprapañca, who had given a realistic interpretation of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up.* by treating the world and souls as real emanations from Brahman. Śaṅkara differed from these commentators and propounded a new type of Advaita, the Māyāvāda" (Dasgupta, *op. cit.* ii, p. 13).

2. अथ गौरित्यत्र कः शब्दः ? गकारौकारविसर्जनीय इति भगवानुपवर्षः (Śabara, PMS. i. 1, 5).

3. Śaṅkara on B. S. iii, 3, 53. Also : अत एवोक्तमुपवर्षाचार्येण आत्मवादं तु शारीरके वक्ष्यामीति । (Bhāskara, B. S. B. i, 1, 1. p. 6).

4. See, i, 1, 19; and iv, 3, 14.

5. See Mm. Kuppasvami Sastri, P. O. C. III (Madras).

6. वक्तिकारस्य बोधायनस्यैव हि उपवर्ष इति स्यान्नाम (Tattvaviveka of Vedānta Deśika, Conjeeveram, 1906, q. in P. O. C. III.).

7. Vide *Siddhitraya* of Yāmuna and *Śrībhāṣya* (introd.).

8. टङ्को ब्रह्मनन्दी (Sudarśana Sūri, Com. on Rāmānuja's *Vedārthasaṅgraha*, Pandit, p. 148).

9. भास्करस्त्विह बभ्राम । * * ब्रह्मनन्दिना हि * * (Kalpataru on B. S. i. 4, 25).

from the established commentaries and turns Siddhānta-Sūtras into Pūrva-pakṣa, just to avoid the admission of Brahman as a qualified Being,¹ for which he is justly taken to task by Bhāskara.² Elsewhere, in his commentary, Śaṅkara refers to the existence of Vedāntins, who unlike himself, believed in the reality of the individual soul : अपरे पारमार्थिकमेव जैव रूपमिति मन्यन्ते अस्मदीयाश्च केचित् । (1, 3, 19). Most of the older commentaries on the Sūtras appear to have advocated certain types of Pantheistic Realism. The names of Brahmadatta, Bhartṛprapañca, Brahmanandin and Bhāskara stand out in this respect. It is clear from Bhāskara's commentary on the Sūtras, that he counted Ṭaṅka or Brahmanandin as a full-blooded Pariṇāmavādi, like himself, who looked upon the world of matter and souls as a direct transformation of Brahman and therefore quite as real as Brahman Itself. He treats the relation in which Brahman stands to the world as one of Bhedābheda. The doctrines of Pariṇāma (of Brahman) and Bhedābheda seem to have been more or less widely held by the early realistic commentators on the Sūtras. The Sūtras themselves were so worded as to render such an interpretation *plausible*. Indeed, so pronounced was the influence of Pariṇāmavāda, that even Rāmānuja, who is no Brahma-Pariṇāmavādin, in point of actual fact, in as much as he accepts the existence of Prakṛti as a dependent material principle (under B. S. i, 4, 3), still considered it prudent to adopt its terminology, for a fashion and put forward what is familiarly known as his "Abhinna-nimittopādāna" theory of Brahman's causality. Two conclusions are possible from this (1) that he had not the courage of his convictions to give up the language of Brahmapariṇāma; or (2) that he could not afford to define his exact position in respect of the actual and precise nature of transformation of Brahman, even to himself, much more clearly and unambiguously, on account, presumably of a conflict of loyalties in his mind between the demands of true Theism in which he was an ardent believer and the influence of the interpretational traditions derived by him from Vṛttikāra and Brahmanandin, as predecessors of his school of thought. Śaṅkara, in his commentary on ii, 1, 14, represents the Vṛttikāra as a frank Brahmapariṇāmavādin; and Ṭaṅka or Brahmanandī was also indubitably one.³ The fact, then, that the same Ṭaṅka is claimed by both Bhāskara and Rāmānuja as the precursor of their faith, confirms the suspicion that Rāmānuja should have made up his mind to part company with the original unexpurgated Pantheism of his acknowledged precursors and adopt a pure Theism, though in the phrasing of it, he could not extricate himself completely from the misleading terminology of Brahmapariṇāma, or bid good-bye to it, but continued to indulge in the language of

1. केचित्तुनः पूर्वाणि सूत्राणि पूर्वपक्षसूत्राणि भवन्त्युत्तराणि सिद्धान्तसूत्राणीति व्यवस्थामनरुद्धयमानाः परविषया एव गतिश्रुतीःप्रतिष्ठापयन्ति । तदनुपपन्नम् । गन्तव्यानपपत्तेर्ब्रह्मणः ॥ (Śaṅkara).

2. iv, 3, 7-14. Śaṅkara treats sūtras 12-14 as Pūrva-pakṣa and 7-11 as Siddhānta.

3. As has been shown by Bhāskara who quotes his words :

परिणामस्तु स्यात् द्रव्यादिवत् ।

Brahmopādānatva, however far removed from the acceptance of actual pariṇāma of Brahmācāitanya or Brahmasvarūpa his position might be. All this would show that there was a long and powerful tradition of realistic interpretation of the Sūtras.

There was, at the same time, a great idealistic revival in Buddhism, in counteraction. The period between the second and the fifth centuries A.D., was one of remarkable activity and noteworthy developments in Buddhistic thought. The criticisms of the Hindu Realists and commentators on the Sūtras, had been met by a number of Buddhist Thinkers. They went a step further and pointed out several inadequacies in the Hindu theories of Causation, God etc.¹ Such of the metaphysical defects of Buddhism, as had been pointed out by the Brahmins, were made good by a number of acute thinkers and dialecticians like Nāgasena, Buddhaghosa and Nāgārjuna. The result of their labors was to raise Buddhistic metaphysics to staggering perfection. The negative dialectic of the Buddhist Logicians created a great sensation and compelled admiration all round. It had an irresistible and instantaneous appeal to the intellectual aristocrats among the Hindus : the Brahmins, who, as a class, were always open to conviction. In a very short space of time, many learned Brahmins went over to Buddhism and became ardent champions of its Subjectivism, Idealism etc. Some of the most distinguished writers on Buddhistic metaphysics known to history were converts from Brahminism—Aśvaghosa,² Nāgārjuna,³ Vasubandhu,⁴ Asaṅga,⁵ Buddaghosa,⁶ and Dignāga.⁷

While many Brahmins thus renounced their old faith and went over to Buddhism, there were yet others among them, on whom the Idealism of the Buddhists had made a profound impression; but, whom it was nevertheless powerless to snatch from the fold of Brahminism. These were perhaps too conservative-minded for violent breaks of any kind. But so deep was the impression made upon them by the excellences of Buddhistic thought and its soaring heights of Subjectivism, Idealism and Acosmism, that they began to search their own literature to see if anything approaching its grandeur could be found in them or be made out of them. Looking as they did through obviously Buddhistic spectacles, nothing was more *natural* than that they should find in some portions of the Upaniṣads, many striking approaches to the metaphysical idealism of the Buddhists and their negative elenchus. There could be only one result of such growing and

1. Vide *Mādhyamika Kārikās*, ch. iv. on the contradictions of the causal relation.

2. Keith, *His. of Skt. Literature*, 1928, p. 56. Winternitz, *IL*. ii, p. 257.

3. Keith, *op. cit.* p. 495. Winternitz. ii, 342, says Nāgārjuna was a South Indian Brahmin.

4. Winternitz, ii, 355.

5. "Asaṅga, more properly, Vasubandhu-Asaṅga was the eldest of three brothers, born as the sons of a Brahmin of the Kauśika family at Peshawar (Winternitz, p. 355).

6. Author of *Viśuddhamagga* (400 A. D.), was a Brahmin convert (Radhakrishnan, i. 346).

7. "Dignāga, a native of Simhāvakra, a suburb of Kāñcī was a Brahmin" (*Pramāṇa-samuccaya*, Mysore Uni. 1930, p. x.).

undisguised admiration for Buddhistic metaphysics and its methods, and that was that these Brahminical admirers of Buddhism charged with Buddhistic ideologies, soon seized upon the Upaniṣads with avidity and fell to unconsciously reading into them all that was great and good in the other. "The Mahāyānists themselves seem to have been aware of the similarity of their position to the Upaniṣadic view, as the *Laṅkāvatāra* says that the explanation of the Tathāgatagarbha, as the ultimate truth and reality, is given in order to attract to our view even those who have superstitious faith in the Ātman theory" (Radhakrishnan, *op. cit.* i, p. 594 f.n.). Certain passages in the early Upaniṣads easily lent themselves to such reorientation. But it was as yet difficult to tackle the Sūtras which were not only openly antagonistic to Buddhism, or even the bulk of the Upaniṣads which were basically realistic. The fifth and sixth centuries A.D. brought further support to Buddhism. "In the 6th century, the revivalist philosophy of Nāgārjuna received a new impetus at the hands of Buddhapālita of Valabhi and of Bhāvaviveka¹ of Orissa. The school of the latter came to be known as Mādhyamikasautrāntika, in view of its supplementing Nāgārjuna's arguments with independent arguments. At the same time, the Yogācāra school of Mahāyāna was developed in the North".² "When Yuan Chwang, in 640 A.D., made his way down to the eastern coast to the Pallava kingdom and stayed at the capital of Kāñcīpura, he found ten thousand Buddhists in the country with a hundred monasteries, and eighty Deva temples, the majority of which were Jain".³ No wonder that at such a time as this, the Brahmin Bhartṛhari (7th century) wavered and wandered between the cloister and the hearth, seven times "after the manner permitted to Buddhists"⁴ and finally produced a work on Sanskrit grammar, in which he advocated a type of monism known as Śabdādvaitya (sound-monism). His commentary on the Brahmasūtras,⁵ was also probably written in a monistic vein. Then came Gauḍapāda, who, in his Kārikās, laid the foundations of a regular system of Upaniṣadic Monism and brought the philosophy of the Upaniṣads, as he conceived it, perilously near Buddhistic Ajātivāda. "Of the unmistakable influence of Vijñānavāda and Mādhyamika schools on his work, there can be no doubt" (Radhakrishnan, ii, p. 464 and also Dasgupta *op. cit.* i, 423). Dasgupta even holds that Gauḍapāda was himself probably a Buddhist.⁶ Only a very thin and artificial veil of mental reservation separated the subjectivism of Gauḍapāda from the Acosmism of the Buddhists. He himself was only too well aware of the nearness of his thought to Buddhism: नैतद् बुद्धेन भाषितम् (iv, 99); which he tried to disguise by pointing to certain other

1. Author of *Tarkajvālā*.

2. Dasgupta *op. cit.* ii, p. 164.

3. Carpenter, *Theism in Medieval India*, p. 352.

4. Keith, *His. of Skt. Lit.* (1928) p. 176.

5. Mentioned by Yāmuna in his *Siddhitraya*.

6. "I believe there is sufficient evidence in his Kārikās for thinking that he (Gauḍapāda) was himself possibly a Buddhist". (*op. cit.* i, p. 423).

points of contrast. Idealism, verging almost literally on that of the Buddhists, was thus the order of the day and it was only a question of time for actual commentaries on the *Upaniṣads*, the *Sūtras* and the *Gītā*, to be undertaken. The *Sūtras*, at any rate, gave no quarter to an Idealism *a lā* Gauḍapāda's; and the *Sūtras* had been admitted in orthodox Brahminical circles as the apex of the *Prasthānatrayī* and the most authoritative exposition of the philosophy of the *Upaniṣads*. It was significant that Gauḍapāda had not made any use of the *Sūtras* of Bādarāyaṇa or attempted to enlist their support to his side. The task of reading his fashionable philosophy of *Māyāvāda*, into the *Sūtras* and give it a *locus classicus* in them was reserved for his gifted grand-disciple Śaṅkara, who, in the 8th century, gave the first systematic and brilliant *Māyāvāda* commentaries on the *Prasthānatrayī*.

Yet, how difficult he himself found the task of making the *Sūtras* yield a Monism of his conception, is proved by the artificiality and *parenthetical irrelevance of his comments* in many places, where he seeks to go against the spirit and letter of the *Sūtras* and their natural drift of arguments and dialectic. That he was fighting with all his might and ingenuity against a long line of realistic commentaries,¹ is not the only fact that makes his commentary suspect. It is more the disharmony of his metaphysical views and presuppositions with the thought of the *Sūtras*, so far as they could be made out from their plan, spirit and letter and according to his own objective interpretations, undistorted by his parenthetical notes, innuendos, correctives, asseverations and remarks *ex cathedra* such as : इदं त्विह वक्तव्यम् । सूत्राणि तु एवं व्याख्येयानि (i, 1, 19) Cf. also on i, 4, 10; ii, 1, 33; iv, 4, 6.

Though many protested in his own time, in unmistakable terms against the new-fangled *Māyāvāda*² and lost no time in exposing its disagreeable resemblances to Buddhism,³ the speculative daring and eloquence⁴ of its champions had raised it to such heights of philosophic eminence that few could hope to bring it down. *Māyāvāda*, in short, had come to stay and even those who did not quite agree with it, had, in course of time, to fall in line with the general trend of its interpretation of the *Sūtras*.

1. ये तु निर्बन्धं कुर्वन्ति ते वेदान्तार्थं बाधमानाः श्रेयोद्वारं सम्यग्दर्शनमेव बाधन्ते ।

(Śaṅkara, B. S. B. i, 4, 22).

2. कर्णो प्यधत्त सिद्धान्ती भाष्यं तच्छ्रुत्वान् मनाक् ।

(Mañimañjarī vi, 49. The reference is to Brahmadatta.)

3. The most virulent and uncompromising of such critics was Bhāskara. He was probably the first to equate *Māyāvāda* with Buddhism. And this charge of "crypto-Buddhism" was hotly repudiated by Sarvajñātman (*Samkṣepaśārīraka* ii, 25-6) and by the author of the *Vivaraṇa* (Viz. Skt. Ser. p. 84).

4. The saying शंकरवाचस्पत्योः शंकरवाचस्पती सदृशौ is no empty boast. *Mahācārya*, a Viśiṣṭādvaitic writer of the 17th cent. pays a grudging tribute to the rhetorical eloquence of the leaders of Advaita and ascribes their influence on the masses and their success to it :

वशिकतटिनीवर्षारिभप्रवाहविडम्बकैरलघुभिरपभ्रश्यद्गुम्भोपलस्मितडम्बरैः ।

उपकरणयन्त्येते बालानुदग्रकुतूहलानुपलनिकरग्रासप्रायैरुपन्यासक्रमैः ॥

(Caṇḍamāruta on Śatadūṣaṇi. Bib. Ind. p. 4, śl. 1)

Royal patronage was not long in coming. Vācaspati was well established in the Court of Nṛga.¹ Sarvajñātman lived in the reign of King Manukulāditya.² For four centuries from the eighth, Advaita remained the vanguard of Indian Philosophy.

At last, there came a realistic upheaval. Between the 10th and 11th centuries, a host of brilliant writers like Udayana,³ Śrīdhara, Śālikanātha,⁴ Śivāditya, Kulārka Paṇḍita, Mānamanoharakāra,⁵ appeared on the scene and began to demolish the foundations and superstructures of Idealistic thought and reinforce those of Logical Realism. They paid a good deal of attention to the formal and material sides of reasoning, revised and perfected their definitions of categories and ushered into vogue improved methods of formalism in thought. Realism began to look the fashionable philosophy of the day, Monism, in the face.

This new danger, had, by the latter part of the twelfth century, assumed such disquieting proportions, that the custodians of Monism were forced to muster their full strength and meet their foes on their own ground. The result was the composition of dialectical classics of matchless brilliance, undermining the very foundations of Realism and overthrowing its concepts and categories and thus breaking up the entire mechanism of its thought and thought-measuring devices and questioning the validity of all Experience upon which Realism thrives. Śrīharṣa was the foremost writer of this age. His main object in his *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā* was to show that "all that is known is indefinable and unreal, being only of a phenomenal nature, having only a relative existence, based purely on practical modes of acceptance and devoid of any permanent value or essence".⁶ In this, he was followed by another great dialectician, Citsukha, who also, commented on Śrīharṣa's work. But he was much more than a mere destructive critic. In addition to his concise refutation of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika categories, he gave an acute analysis and clear interpretation of some of the premier concepts of the Advaita Vedānta. His greatest polemical work was the *Tattvapradīpikā*. In addition to this, he wrote a commentary on Śaṅkara's Bhāṣya on *Brahmasūtras* and one on the *Brahmasiddhi*

1. श्रीमन्नृगेज्कारि मया निबन्धः । (*Bhāmātī* last verse).

2. श्रीमत्यक्षतशासने मनुकुलादित्ये भुवं शासति । (iv, 62).

3. For his scathing condemnation of some of the concepts of Advaita see *Kusumāṅjali* (*passim*) and extracts in Citsukha's work :

(a) एवं च सति यदुदयनेन तात्पर्यपरिशुद्धौ * * * गजितं-किमिदमनिर्वचनीयत्वं नाम ? किं निरुक्तिविरह * * * इत्यादि । Citsukha's Com. (p. 79).

(b) यत्त्वत्रापि तेनैवोक्तं तदनूद्य दूषयति—न च परस्परविरुद्धयोः निषेधसमुच्चयोऽनुपपन्नः * * निषेधसमुच्चयस्य तात्त्विकत्वानङ्गीकारात् (p. 79).

4. तदेतदखिलं अद्वैतश्रुतीनामन्यथासिद्धिपथपरिधावनव्याक्षिप्तचेतसे शालिकनाथायापि कथयत (Citsukhi p. 53).

5. अत्र मानमनोहरकारो नृत्यतिस्म । न च भेदानवस्था बाधिका । भेदान्तरप्रसक्तौ मूलाभावात् । भेदा-भेदिनौ भिन्नौ इति व्यवहारादर्शनात् । (p. 169) नहि द्रष्टुर्दृष्टेर्विपरिलोपो विद्यत इति श्रुत्यैव द्रग्दृष्टयोः सम्बन्धोऽधिगत इति मानमनोहरकारः प्रातिष्ठिपत् । (p. 22).

6. Dasgupta, ii, p. 127.

of Maṇḍana and another on the *Vivaraṇa*. He is supposed to have lived about 1220 A.D. Ānandabodha and Vimuktātman were two other great pioneers in this respect. The former's *Nyāyamakaranda*, is a work of refreshing clarity on the concepts of Advaita. The *Iṣṭasiddhi* of Vimuktātman was probably very much earlier in date.¹ All these works are permeated by the spirit of neo-dialecticism. The *Nyāyasudhā* and the *Jñānasiddhi* of Citsukha's teacher, Jñānottama,² and the *Prakaṭārtha* (c. on Śaṅkara's Bhāṣya on the Sūtras) also belong to this period.

1. M. Hiriyanna opines in his Introduction to the edn. of the *Iṣṭasiddhi* (G. O. S. lxxv, 1933) that it cannot be earlier than 850 A. D. "The limits 850-1050 are all that we can fix" (p. xii).

2. "एवं हि न्यायसुधायामाराध्यपादैरुपपादितम् ॥" (*Citsukhī* p. 385) आराध्यपादाः स्वगुरवो ज्ञानसिद्धिकाराः । तत्प्रणीतं च वदान्तप्रकरणं न्यायसुधा । (Com.).

DECLINE OF MĀYĀVĀDA, THEISTIC REACTION OF RĀMĀNUJA AND THE NEED FOR A NEW DARŚANA

(i) ABOUT the latter part of the twelfth century, when the Doctors of the Advaita Vedānta were thus busy defending their citadel and perfecting the dialectic machinery of their system, signs of a growing discontent with the empty abstractions of Māyāvāda were beginning to be felt. On the philosophical plane itself, it had not long remained unchallenged, much less unchanged. Several versions of the Advaita doctrine, often in conflict with one another, on vital points, had been given, both by the contemporaries and successors of Śaṅkara. "The enunciation of his (Śaṅkara's) own views on the Vedānta is not convincingly clear. This gave rise to various schools of thought which claimed to be the proper interpretation of the monistic ideas of Śaṅkara; but which differ from one another sometimes in a very remarkable manner" (Dasgupta, *Cultural Heritage of India*, Vol. III, 1953, p. 7). While Śaṅkara stuck close to Bhāvādvaita, Maṇḍana gave quarter to "Abhāvādvaita". The Ekajīva-vāda was soon overpowered by "Nānājīva-vāda". Sarvajñātman's Brah-
mājñānavāda ran counter to Vācaspati's Jīvāśritājñānavāda. The Avacchedavādin's disagreed with the Bimbapratibimbavāda. There was no agreement over the definition of "Mithyātva". Five different views of its nature came to be formulated. Impossibilities and contradictions of thought came to be hugged to the bosom as profundities of metaphysical insight :

मायायामनुपपत्तिरलंकार एव (Vācaspati).

दुर्घटत्वमविद्याया भूषणं न तु दूषणम् ।

कथंचिद् घटमानत्वेऽविद्यात्वं दुर्घटं भवेत् ॥ (*Iṣṭasiddhi* i. 140).

अनवस्थादयो दोषाः सत्तां निघ्नन्ति वस्तुनः ।

अद्वैतिनां ते सुहृदः प्रपंचे तत्प्रसंजकाः ॥ (Quoted in *Brahmānandīya*).

Differences arose between master and disciples and among disciples themselves¹ in the elucidation of general principles and doctrines. For over five centuries from the eighth, Monism in some form or other, had held the field. Five centuries of robust life is about the longest that could be expected of any metaphysical system with any following. Popular interest in and admiration for it must inevitably flag, after that. So did it happen in the case of Śaṅkara's Advaita.

1. See the ingenious way in which Appayya Dikṣita tries to gloss over these internal conflicts of views :

‘प्राचीनैर्व्यवहारसिद्धविषयेष्वद्वैतसिद्धौ परं

संन्यादिभ्ररनादरात्सरणयो नानाविधा दशिताः ॥’

(*Siddhāntaleśasamgraha*)

(ii) The twelfth century had already witnessed the rise of overstrained formalism in Logic and metaphysics which had its own repercussions on the prevailing philosophy of Advaita. Under its spell, philosophy had ceased to be an earnest quest of God and the life eternal. It had dwindled into an exercise in definitions and counter-definitions and unmitigated dialecticism. A reaction was soon bound to set in.

(iii) A wave of intense Devotionalism in Religion and Theism in Philosophy was surging through the country at this time. To the average man of the world, it appeared the Advaitins had perverted the goal of oneness held out in the Upaniṣads; while the one they offered in its stead was unrealisable.¹ The monistic Brahman was avowedly incapable of coming within the ambit of experience (अवेद्यत्वं स्वप्रकाशत्वम्). If it did, it would cease to be self-luminous and forthwith become limited and unreal, like everything else in the world : ज्ञेयत्वे घटादिवत् अब्रह्मत्वप्रसंगः (*Iṣṭasiddhi*). The bifurcation of reality into “Vyāvahārika and Pāramārthika” was deemed a challenge to religion and a fraud on the trusting conscience of humanity.² “The theory of Māyā was but a cloak to cover the inner rifts of the system”.³ The denial of will and knowledge to the Deity was something hard to swallow. To be sure, one need not be satisfied with an anthropomorphism; but there are limits even to the sway of reason. It chilled the ardor of even the most non-sentimental of worshippers to be told that the God of their attentions was “after all”, unreal and that “even the Puruṣottama is imaginary !”⁴

(iv) When the Devotionalism of the Southern Vaiṣṇavism reached its height about the 10th century, there was bound to come a demand for a formal alliance with the Vedānta. The Theism of the Vaiṣṇavas could no longer be content with a subordinate place. Its metaphysical potentialities had to be drawn out. The labors of Bodhāyana, Dramiḍa etc., had long been forgotten. They had to be revived. Yāmuna had undertaken the task and had called attention to the defects of Māyāvāda, in his *Siddhitraya*. It was an eye-opener. The ambitions of the Vaiṣṇavas had been roused by it and once roused, they could not be held in check. There probably was a desire to regain all lost ground. A systematic commentary on the Prasthānatrayī was a desideratum. Yāmuna himself had

1. यदेतदात्मैक्यमुपास्तिचोदितं न मे गुरोरप्यपरोक्षतां गतम् ।

(*M. Vij.* iv, 11)

शुको मुक्तो वामदेवो मुक्त इत्यादयस्तु अर्थवादा एव । (Appayya Dikṣita)

2. Cf. Kumārila's tirade against the bifurcation of reality into true and false, which applies with equal force to Advaita :

सत्या चेत्संवृतिः केयं मृषा चेत्सत्यता कथम् ?

सत्यत्वं न च सामान्यं मृषार्थपरमार्थयोः ॥

तस्माद्यन्नास्ति नास्त्येव यदस्ति परमार्थतः ।

वञ्चनार्थमुपन्यासो लालावक्त्रासवादिवत् ॥

3. Radhakrishnan, *op. cit.* ii, 472.

4. *Op. cit.* i, 549.

restored the lost glory and prestige of the Pañcarātras and secured social and philosophical recognition to their followers. But nothing approaching the grandeur of the Śārīrakamīmāṃsābhāṣya of Śaṅkara had been reached. The ancient works of Bodhāyana, Ṭaṅka, etc., had evidently been lost; or had become completely out of date, in style or method and totally eclipsed by the famous commentary of Śaṅkara. The task of writing a new commentary, on a par with the best in the field, so as to push Vaiṣṇava Theism into the focus of contemporary philosophic thought was an urgent one. It was taken up by Rāmānuja, who wrote lengthy commentaries on the *Sūtras* and the *Gītā* and dealt with a number of Upaniṣadic texts and their philosophy in his *Vedārthasaṃgraha* and thus established Vedāntic Realism on a firm basis, both logical and textual.

(v) Still, there was much that had been left undone or insufficiently done by Rāmānuja. In the first place, to put it bluntly, the Advaita had *not* been dislodged from its pedestal on the Upaniṣads. A passing notice of a few passages from the principal Upaniṣads, such as was attempted by Rāmānuja, was not sufficient to inspire confidence. The entire bulk of the ten Upaniṣads, held in admiration by the Monists, had to be reinterpreted line by line, on Theistic lines. Only then, could the Advaitins' claim to "Aupaniṣadattva" be taken to have been credibly and effectively challenged.

(vi) It seemed the Viśiṣṭādvaita had, to some extent, played into the hands of Monists in respect of some of its theological and metaphysical views. By turning a cold shoulder to the entire body of Pre-Upaniṣadic literature and perpetuating the distinction between the Karma and Jñāna Kāṇḍas, it had unwittingly put a premium upon indifference to the Vedas and disproportionately exalted the Upaniṣads over the Mantras.

(vii) The label and ideology of "Viśiṣṭādvaita" were alike distasteful and compromising to genuine Theism. The majesty, transcendence and personal homogeneity of Godhead were on the brink of extinction, on such a view. Say what one may, no genuine Theist can, for a moment, consent to tie down his Deity (as does the Viśiṣṭādvaitin) to an existence perpetually "qualified" by two attributes (Viśeṣas) *one* of which is sentient (Cit) and the other insentient (Acit)! It can never be the highest philosophy to say that in the highest reality, called Brahman, we have "limitation, difference and other-being" (Radhakrishnan, ii, 683). The Infinite cannot be a mere cross. The eternal, irrevocable, apposition of the dual attributes of Cit and Acit with the Deity must perforce, mar its self-completeness. The world of Matter and Souls may be bound to God perpetually; but such relation can neither be *essential* nor *reciprocal*. The existence of the others must, in the last philosophical analysis, be *immaterial* to the innermost constitution of the Supreme.¹ Anything short of *that* would be restricting the nature of the Brahman.² According to

1. Cf. नहि जीवप्रकृतिभ्यामीश्वरस्यार्थः । (Madhva, *B. T.* ii, 9, 31).

2. The Viśiṣṭādvaitic view of Śeṣaśeṣibhāva", however, presupposes some 'contribution' by the Śeṣa to the Śeṣin. See *Nītimālā*, x, p. 74 (Annamalai Uni. Skt. Series).

such a view, moreover, God, Matter and Souls would *together constitute* Brahman,¹ not God alone, by Himself! The attributes of Brahman could not also be “foreign” to its nature (*viajātiya*) or *inferior* to It — as the Cit and Acit undoubtedly *are*, with reference to the Viśiṣṭādvaitic Brahman. They must be such as could enter into a homogeneous relation with the Substance. The Jīva and Jaḍa, which according to Rāmānuja’s own showing, are essentially and eternally distinct from Brahman cannot, therefore, be treated as its “attributes” in the same sense in which, for instance, “satyam” “jñānam” “anantam” and “ānanda” are treated by the Upaniṣads, as attributes of Brahman, capable of the utmost identification with It : (*Satyam Jñānam Anantam Brahma*) though isolable in thought, from it. The Viśiṣṭādvaitic conception of the relation between Brahman and its so-called attributes of Cit and Acit was, thus, open to serious logical objections.

Viśiṣṭādvaita, then, was clearly inadequate as the highest conception of God to which a Theist may rise. It failed to take proper note of the supreme transcendence and homogeneity of God. It had tied down its Brahman to a relative existence for all time and in so doing, had merely showed its anxiety to assert and safeguard the reality of the world of Cit and Acit, side by side with the Deity. This was certainly a laudable object. But it prevented the theory from rising higher. The Upaniṣads themselves, in various contexts, had placed the Brahman *per se*, before the Seeker as an entirely self-contained, single transcendent substance, having no trace of an “Other”, in its being (*kevalam*) or “*Ekam eva*” as it is described — where the term “*eva*” stands for the complete absence of any ‘internal distinction’ (*svagatabheda*) in Brahman. This is clearly impossible on Rāmānuja’s view of Cit and Acit being essentially *different* from Brahman, though constituting its attributes and existing inseparably (*apṛthaksiddha*) from it. The Upaniṣads clearly contemplate the possibility of conceiving of the Brahman *alone* as it exists *per se*. The Viśiṣṭādvaita, with its solicitude for the Cit and Acit, as unriddable adjuncts of Brahman, had not merely *not* visualised, but had definitely discouraged, attempts at envisaging Brahman in such pristine state of existence. It was, no doubt, risky to stress the abstract and transcendent aspect of Brahman overmuch, for fear of landing in a “Nirviśeṣādvaita”; but with a little more thought and circumspection, it was not difficult to reach a position which would avoid such a nemesis, by denying to the world of matter and souls any existence *as a matter of right*, save by sufferance of the Supreme and at His Will, and hence *ex hypothesi* subject to Him always, depending always on Him and differing in ever so many ways from Him. It was left to Madhva to make good this deficiency and supply the lacuna in Viśiṣṭādvaitic thought and administer the much-needed corrective to its ideology of “*Viśiṣṭa-advaita*” through that of “*Svatantra-advitīya*”.

1. “God is a synthetic unity, consisting of elements, animate and inanimate” (essay on Rāmānuja, in the *Great Men of India*, ed. by Rushbrook Williams, p. 478).

(viii) The label of “Viśiṣṭādvaita”, similarly, betokened a weakness to try to press Theism into a monistic mould, even as regards its appellation and make a watery alliance with it. A “Viśiṣṭaikya” of *one Substance* and *two attributes* all externally related, is no “aikya” at all, except in a very loose and remote sense; more so, when the attributes themselves are heterogeneous and avowedly *different* in essence from *each other* and *from the Substance* itself and when the latter is *greater* than the former. “Though souls and matter are modes of God, they have enjoyed a kind of individual existence which is theirs from all eternity and which cannot be entirely resolved into Brahman”. (Rādhakrishnan, *op. cit.* ii, p. 698).

(ix) Equally artificial and strained was the doctrine of “Paramasāmya” (absolute equality) in bliss, in Mokṣa, between the released souls and God, preached by this school. Such a doctrine was fraught with serious consequences to Theism. There was no knowing where it would stop. If an absolute equality between God and man were possible,¹ where would be the horror or metaphysical incongruity in pressing for an actual identity? There can be no hope of any such equality, so long as there is the sūtra जगद्धापावर्जम् (iv, 4, 17). In the light of this irrevocable limitation, the desire for equality with God could only be described as an impious one. No true Rāmānujīya could afford to accept absolute equality of the individuals and the Supreme, so long as the former is regarded as the “Śeṣas” subservient to the Śeṣī. (God).

(x) In spite of their undoubted ardor for the cause of Vaiṣṇavism, neither Rāmānuja nor his predecessors had given it a firm textual footing in the Vedas, Upaniṣads and Sūtras. There originally were a few presumably Vaiṣṇavite commentaries on the Sūtras, prior to Rāmānuja. But, since for some centuries before and after Śaṅkara, attention had been totally engrossed by higher metaphysical issues of Monism vs Dualism, and latterly, with purely dialectical questions, the merely theological problems of the relative superiority of the gods of the Vedāntic pantheon and their status, or even that of the theological identity of Brahman had no attraction for any commentator. But when the great Bhāgavata religion had come into philosophical prominence, in the 10th and 11th centuries, largely through the efforts of the Tamil Vaiṣṇava Saints (Āḷvārs), side

1. That it is *not* possible is affirmed by the *Śvetāśvatara* न तत्समश्चाभ्यधिकश्च दृश्यते (vi, 8 ab). The creative activity of God also carries with it a certain *ānanda* (*Taitt. Up.* ii, 7) which must necessarily be unique and not available to the released who do not engage in creation etc. Similarly, in respect of every other unique attribute of the Deity such as its “Śeṣitva”. The Viśiṣṭādvaitic acceptance of “Nityasūris” also presupposes some kind of difference and “Tāratamya” in release. The commentaries on the *Tiruvāimozhi* also allude to the unique majesty of God that is beyond the reach and aspiration of the Nityasūris too :—*Ivarkku oppuccollalāvār Samsārigaḷilum ilar Nityasūrigaḷilum ilar.* (See *Iṭṭin Tamilākkam*, Madras University, 1952. vol. i, p. 16). The “Paramasāmya Śruti” has, therefore, been reinterpreted by Madhva, in harmony with all these and other considerations and evidences, in terms of the largest measure of possible equality consisting of दुःखाभावः परानन्दो लिङ्गभेदः समा मताः । (G.B.)

by side with the speculative systems like those of Śaṅkara, it was time to find a place for the highest God of the Bhāgavata cult viz., Viṣṇu-Nārāyaṇa, or Vāsudeva, in the source-books of Hindu philosophy and maintain it. The enthronement of a Personal God in metaphysics, by Rāmānuja, had made the reopening of the old question of the Vedas : कस्मै देवाय हविषा विधेम, inevitable. Rāmānuja himself, had, in his works, sounded a sufficiently 'sectarian' note and upheld Viṣṇu-Nārāyaṇa as the Para Brahman of the Vedānta. Still, it could not be said that he had succeeded in securing for his God that paramount position (for which he had fought and suffered persecution in his own region), in the sacred literature as a whole, inclusive of the Upaniṣads and the Sūtras. As a matter of fact, he had never at all looked at the Ṛg Veda, the Āraṇyakas and the Upaniṣads from that point of view and with that object. That is perhaps why it appears to Thibaut that "the only sectarian feature of his commentary is that he identifies Brahman with Viṣṇu; but, this in no way affects the interpretations put on the Sūtras and the Upaniṣads. Nārāyaṇa, in fact, is but another name of Brahman".¹ An orthodox follower of Rāmānuja, writing on him in the *Great Men of India*, observes, "with characteristic restraint, his comments on the *Brahmasūtras* were made non-sectarian" (p. 478). But the time had come for a more positive and passionate advocacy of the place of Viṣṇu in Hindu religion and philosophy.

(xi) Rāmānuja had, similarly, omitted to find a place for two other vital principles of his system (1) the Śrī-tattva (Lakṣmī) and the doctrines of "Bhakti and Prapatti" which play a vital part in the Vaiṣṇavism of the Ālvars and of himself, in the *Sūtras* (See p. 478, *Great Men of India*, article on Rāmānuja). As the *Sūtras* are the most authoritative pronouncement on the *system* of Vedānta, one must expect to find all one's vital doctrines and details enunciated or foreshadowed in them. They cannot be brushed aside as *trivial*. These omissions, which may prove detrimental to the interests of Vaiṣṇavism, were remedied by Madhva, who brought these pivotal doctrines² of Vaiṣṇava theosophy, directly, within the scope of the *Sūtras*, as the last word on the religion, theology and philosophy of the Vedānta.

(xii) For some inscrutable reason, Rāmānuja had shown a touchy indifference to the great gospel of Vaiṣṇavism : the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa*.³ And so had his predecessor Yāmuna. This neglect, quite naturally, came,

1. Tr. of Rāmānuja's Bhāṣya, *SBE* xxxiv, p. xxxi (Introduction f. n.). But the fact remains that Rāmānuja clearly *denies* the supreme place to Śiva or any other god whom he considers subject to Avidyā and transmigration and Karma and hence unfit for *dhyāna* and worship. See the quotation from *Viṣṇudharmottara*, given by him in his *Srībhāṣya*, in this connection.

2. The Prapatti doctrine is not admitted by Madhva. According to his *Bhāṣya*, the status of Bhakti and of Lakṣmī are discussed in the B. S. iii, 2, 19-21; 48-51 and iii, 3, 40-42; iv, 2, 7-10, respectively.

3. It is certainly earlier than Rāmānuja. See my paper on the 'Date of the Bhāgavata Purāṇa,' *A. B. O. R. I.* xiv, 3-4 (pp. 182-218).

in Advaitic circles, to be interpreted as a tacit admission, on the part of the Vaiṣṇava Realists, of the unquestionable monistic tenor of that Purāṇa. Nothing then was more natural, in the circumstances, than that a few commentators should actually have come forward to enlist the support of that Purāṇa, in the furtherance of their creed. We learn from Jīva Gosvāmin's commentary,¹ that there were at last *two* such early commentaries on the *Bhāgavata* — one by Puṇyāraṇya (said to have been a predecessor of Madhva, by Jīva)² and the other by the celebrated Advaitic dialectician Citsukha.³ As a result of the labors of these two eminent commentators, Vaiṣṇava Realism must have lost ground and much of its prestige and stood in imminent danger of losing its mainstay in the most popular Vaiṣṇava Scripture, unless something was urgently done to rehabilitate it.

(xiii) Parallel to all this and during all these centuries, Śaivism had been growing into a power. From as early as the days of the Purāṇas, the cult of Śiva had been the chief rival of Vaiṣṇavism. The period between the sixth and the twelfth centuries was the heyday of Śaivism in the South and was distinguished for its mighty literary activity of the Tamil Śaiva Saints (Nāyanmārs). The great hagiological work of Tamil Śaivism, the *Periapurāṇam*, was composed in the twelfth century. So great was the influence and ascendancy of Śaivism in the South, then, that Rāmānuja had actually to flee Srirangam and find more congenial haunts for his Vaiṣṇavism, in distant Mysore. In the absence of fuller chronological material, it is difficult to fix the date of the great Śaiva commentator on the Brahmasūtras : Śrīkaṇṭha. He certainly came after Rāmānuja,⁴ though his precise chronological relation to Madhva, is uncertain.⁵ But Śrīkaṇṭha himself refers to many earlier Śaiva commentators on the Sūtras as his Pūrvācāryas,⁶ some of whom, at least, if not Śrīkaṇṭha himself, may have preceded Madhva.

Nearer home, in Upper Karnataka, the Vīraśaiva movement had already been launched by Basaveśvara, minister of Bijjala (1162-67). It was a revolt of Lutheran proportions against Brahminical Hinduism. From its very inception, it was an awakening of the masses towards a new social order and spiritual goal. Its Psalmists came from all walks of life and spoke to the people in their own language, with great lyrical force

1. *Śaṭsandarbha*.

2. Of course, he was an Advaitin : यदेव किल दृष्ट्वा श्रीमद्वाचाचार्यचरणैः वैष्णवान्तराणां तच्छिष्यपुण्यारण्यादिरीतिकव्याख्यानप्रवेशशंकया तत्र तात्पर्यान्तरं लिखद्भिः * * * *

(*Śaṭsandarbha*, p. 18).

3. His commentary on the *Bhāgavata* is often quoted by Jīva, in the course of his own (Br̥ndāvan edn.). Sometimes, Jīva quotes both together : अत्र चित्सुखपुण्यारण्यौ । See also under Madhva's *Bhāgavata Tātparya*.

4. This may be gathered from his indebtedness to the latter's *Śrībhāṣya* and to his philosophy as such.

5. For further remarks see under Madhva's *B. S. B.*

6. Was Rudrabhaṭṭa, mentioned among the Pre-Madhva commentators, a Śaiva by faith ?

and sincerity of feeling, which went straight to their heart. This literary and religious movement, which began a century before Basaveśvara,¹ reached its climax in the twelfth century.²

The combined effects of all these forces must have driven Vaiṣṇava Theism completely to bay. It could not have held out much longer unless some one came forward to rehabilitate its fortunes. And such a one was soon to appear on the scene, as the champion of Vedāntic Theism and Vaiṣṇava Realism, in the person of Śrī Madhvācārya.

1. Devara Dāsimayya, one of the early Viraśaiva Vacanakāras is assigned to 1040 A.D.

2. Among Basaveśvara's contemporaries were Prabhudeva, Cennabasava, Siddharāma and Ekāntada Rāmayya.

The Creative Period of Madhva and His Immediate Disciples Madhva and His Works

CHAPTER XI

DATE, LIFE AND WORKS OF MADHVA

1. MĀDHVA HAGIOLOGY — PREDECESSORS OF MADHVA

NOTHING definite or authentic about the forerunners of Madhva's Theism is known to us, beyond what has been recorded by Nārāyaṇa Paṇḍitācārya, in his *Maṇimañjari*.¹

From this and from the evidence of Madhva's own works, it is clear that his system traces its origin from the ancient Monotheism of the Bhāgavatas.² But for all practical purposes, Madhva himself is the first *historical founder* and exponent of the system of philosophy associated with his name. Pre-Madhva hagiology is a blank save for the merest names of a few "forerunners", preserved to us in the *Maṇimañjari* and some of the Mutt Lists. An account in the *Padma Purāṇa*,³ derives Madhva's school from Brahmā (Brahma-sampradāya). The following is the traditional Guruparamparā down to Madhva :

1. Śrī Hamsa (Nārāyaṇa)
2. Brahmā
3. The Four Sanas
4. Durvāsas
5. Jñānanidhi Tīrtha
6. Garuḍavāhana „
7. Kaivalya „
8. Jñānīśa „
9. Para „
10. Satyaprajña „
11. Prājña „
- * * * * (Gap of about four hundred years)
12. Acyutaprajña *alias* Puruṣottama Tīrtha
13. Ānanda Tīrtha *alias* Madhvācārya.

1. A short poem, furnishing the necessary mytho-poetic-cum-historical background to his more elaborate 'Life of Madhva' in his *Madhvavijaya*.

2. *Maṇimañjari*, viii, 33 (ततः केवलवंशोऽस्मिन्).

3. सम्प्रदाये ब्रह्मनाम्नि मध्वाचार्यः प्रतिष्ठितः ॥

(Introd. to my *Catussūtrī Bhāṣya* of Madhva, 1934, p. xxiv).

It will be seen from the above, that tradition has preserved the names of at least six historical predecessors of Madhva. There is, however, a gap of some four hundred years between Prājña Tīrtha and Acyutaprajña, the immediate predecessor of Madhva. Nothing is known of the persons who flourished in this period. It is alleged that the Saints of the creed, were suffering severe persecution at the hands of the Monists in ascendancy, during the period.¹ A vivid account of this is given in Chapter vii of the *Maṇimañjarī*. The facts of the case would appear to be these :

Driven to desperation by the ascendancy of Advaita, the Dvaita teachers had (outwardly) accepted Monism. All that they could do was to ensure the bare continuation of their preceptorial line and leave the rest to the future.² In the course of two or three generations, when the stormy past had been forgotten, the once quasi-Monists, became full-blooded Monists and remained in that blissful state of ignorance of their original antecedents, till the days of Acyutaprajña. No genuinely historical work on Dvaita could, therefore, have been written or preserved at such times. That is why we *do not* find Madhva referring to any historical work of his predecessors. The last in this line was Puruṣottama Tīrtha³ (*M. Vij.* vi, 33) *alias* Acyutaprajña, more commonly called Acyutaprekṣa, who was the Sannyāsa-Guru of Madhva. It is clear from the *M. Vij.* that he was a warm Advaitin (v, 25; iv, 8; ix, 33-37);⁴ though a different impression is created by passages in the *Maṇimañjarī* (viii, 33 and 36). The very first work on Vedānta in which this teacher instructed Madhva was the *Iṣṭasiddhi* of Vimuktātman (*M. Vij.* iv, 44). It is obvious, therefore, that Madhva himself was the actual historical founder and exponent of his system. No doubt, as we have seen in Part I, the theistic philosophy preached by him had a long and continuous history behind it and goes back to the original and basic literature of Hinduism viz., the Vedaśāstra. But there is no evidence of previous literary activity of individual writers connecting the works of Madhva with these original sources of his system, as we have, for instance, in the case of the works of Śaṅkara or Rāmānuja. We have seen the peculiar circumstances which are said to have rendered such links impossible, for the early forerunners of the Dvaita school.⁵ Such absence, however, cannot in any way lessen the importance or take away the textual authenticity or innate metaphysical worth of the system; for

1. For parallels *see* Indian and Classical history.

2. Such existence *incognito* is held to account for the non-preservation of the names of the teachers subsequent to Prājña Tīrtha (a contemporary of Śaṅkara).

3. It is by this name he is referred to in the Śrikūrmam Ins. of Narahari Tīrtha (1281 A.D.)

4. It is said there were frequent disagreements between Madhva and his Guru. It was with some difficulty that the latter was ultimately converted to the views of Madhva (*M. Vij.* ix, 33-37).

5. Even the four names of the (historical) predecessors of Paratīrtha are purely traditional. They are not recorded either in the *Maṇimañjarī* or the *M. Vij.*, the earliest extant biographical sketches of Madhva. They are, however, found given in the genealogical Tables of the Bhaṇḍārkere Mutt of Acyutaprekṣa and of the other Mādhva Maṭhas.

obviously, in the last resort, such links in the chain must end somewhere and the only appeal, thereafter, will have to be to the basic Scriptures or the logical foundations on which a given system rests its claims. That is why Madhva himself has bypassed all his historical predecessors, including Acyutaprajña, and claims to have received his inspiration directly from Bādarāyaṇa-Vyāsa.¹ Throughout his works, he acknowledges no other teacher save Vyāsa; and has not even once mentioned the name of Acyutaprekṣa, in his works.² Of course, no offence was meant to nor any taken by Acyutaprekṣa. The history of Dvaita Literature proper, thus, begins with Madhva.

2. DATE OF MADHVA

There has been a controversy within the limits of a century or so, over the date of Madhva. Both the 'traditional' date of birth : 1199 A.D. claimed for him on the authority of a passage in his *Mahābhārata-Tātparyanirṇaya* (xxxii, 131)³ and the date Śaka 1040-1120, proposed in some of the geneo-chronological tables of the Uttarādi and other Mutts, have now been set at rest by the discovery and publication of the inscriptions of Narahari Tīrtha (particularly the one dated Śaka 1203) — a direct disciple and second "successor" of Madhva on the "Pīṭha". The evidence of these inscriptions shows that Narahari was in Kalinga between 1264 and 1293 A.D. It appears also he was Prime Minister of the kingdom between 1281-93. If the statement of the *Mbh. T. N.* then, were to be taken in its literal sense, Madhva would have lived up to 1278 only, as he is traditionally assigned a life of seventynine years (See *Aṇumadadvacarita* of Hṛṣīkeśa Tīrtha). Now according to the uniform testimony of the Mutt lists, he was succeeded" by Padmanābha Tīrtha, who remained on the "Pīṭha" for seven years; and after him by Narahari who occupied the "Pīṭha" for *nine* years. On this view, Narahari would have come to the Pīṭha in 1285. But the evidence of inscriptions shows he was still in Kalinga in the years 1289, 1291 and 1293. The obvious inference from these facts is that he could not have come to the Pīṭha till after 1293. It cannot be supposed he was allowed to be Minister of Kalinga and to occupy the Pīṭha, at one and the same time, between 1285-93. The Mutt lists agree in placing his demise in the cyclic year of *Śrimukha*. These two facts show that that event cannot be placed before 1333 A.D. Calculating backwards from the recorded year of Narahari's demise, we arrive at 1317 (*Pīṅgala*) as the date of Madhva's exit from the world. Assuming that tradition is correct in placing his birth in *Viḷambi*, we get 1238 A.D. as the year of his birth. This agrees very well with the evidence of the inscriptions of Narahari

1. तस्यैव शिष्यो जगदेकभर्तुः (*Mbh. T. N.* xxxii, 170) and similar references in the other works of Madhva and *M. Vij.* viii, 4.

2. Even in his first work, the *GB.*, we have only a salutation to Vyāsa and Nārāyaṇa and Acyutaprekṣa is not mentioned.

3. Dasgupta's inability to "discover" this verse (*op. cit.* iv, p. 51) is surprising.

Tirtha, the terms of one of which (Śrīkūrmam. 1281 A.D.) imply that Madhva was in flesh and blood, at the time. See Appendix II.

1238-1317 A.D. thus appears to be the most satisfactory date for Madhva.¹ The relevant materials bearing on this question have been brought together and discussed by me in two papers on the subject contributed to the AUJ, (Vols. iii, 2 and v, 1) and to them further attention is invited. Other theories on the subject have also been examined and refuted there.

Recently, however, Mr. Shingre² of Poona has tried to reopen the date of birth 1199 A.D. corresponding to that of the *Mbh. T. N.* verse and reconcile it with the epigraphical data by resorting to the device of extending Madhva's span of life from 79 years (as traditionally accepted) to 94½ years.

His new date of 1199-1294 is open to the following objections : (1) It extends the life of Madhva arbitrarily. (2) It flouts the accepted traditions among Mādhva Mutts about the cyclic years *Vilambi* and *Piṅgala* being the years of birth and exit of Madhva. (3) The dates accepted by Shingre for Madhva's successors down to Rāmacandra Tīrtha, similarly, conflict with the cyclic data accepted for them in the Uttarādi and Rāghavendra Svāmi Mutts, which have a common ancestry up to him. (4) The cyclic data of *Vilambi* and *Piṅgala* for Madhva, are endorsed by the *Aṇumadhvacaritam* attributed to Hṛṣīkeśa Tīrtha, a direct disciple of Madhva. (5) These and the data for the successors of Madhva, are endorsed by the *Gurucaryā*.³ (6) Shingre himself accepts the number of years of Pontifical rule traditionally assigned to the various Pontiffs up to Rāmacandra Tīrtha (and beyond) without any independent proof and which are calculated only on the basis of the cyclic data handed down by tradition and preserved in old hagiological works like the *Gurucaryā*. If their evidence is reliable for the successors of Madhva, it should be equally valid for Madhva. (7) Antedating Madhva to 1199-1294, would seriously complicate the question of the date of the Akṣobhya-Vidyāraṇya disputation on *Tat tvam asi*, to an extent that may even threaten its historicity and fail to explain why none of the works of so great a commentator on Madhva, as Jayatīrtha, has been cited in the chapter on Pūrṇaprajña Darśana in the *Sarvadarśana-Saṁgraha*, which could not be dated before 1360, as Vidyāraṇya (1302-87) would hardly have been

1. This date has been accepted by Saletore, *Ancient Karnataka* (History of Tuluva) Poona, 1936. The *Mbh. T. N.* verse could be viewed as a rough statement in terms of centuries, the difference of 39 years being ignored in the circumstances. P. P. S. Sastri, tried to champion the date of the Mutt lists in his paper 'Mādhva Chronology' (Kuppusvami Sastri Com. Vol). With more zeal than regard for facts, he adopted 1181 as the date of the Śrīkūrmam Inscn., forgetting there were five more epigraphs of Narahari dated between 1264 and 1293; wherein the chronograms given admit of no emendations. For a refutation of his theory see my paper in BORI, xix. pt. 3.

2. *Genealogical Tables of the Uttarādi Mutt* with details of period of rule of Pontiffs etc. M. V. Shingre, Sarvodaya Press, Poona 2, (1953).

3. See Preface.

twenty years of age if his debate with Akṣobhya took place in 1321 instead of in 1365 when he would be much older and of a proper age for it. For all these reasons, 1238-1317, would remain the last word on the subject.

3. LIFE OF MADHVA

The *Madhva Vijaya* of Nārāyaṇa Paṇḍitācārya is the earliest biography of Madhva, that has come down to us. We get there a fairly complete and authentic account of his life and activities. There are well known accounts in English of the life and teachings of Madhva.¹ A brief sketch of his life would therefore suffice, here.

Madhva was born of Tuḷu² Brahmin parents of humble status, in the village of Pājaka,³ some eight miles S. E. of the town of Uḍipi, in the S. Kanara district of the present Karnataka State. His father's *family name* was "Naḍḍantillāya" of which the well-known "Madhyageha" and "Madhyamandira"⁴ are Sanskrit equivalents. His actual name though not explicitly stated in the *M. Vij.*, is surmised to have been Nārāyaṇa, on the basis of an allusion in the *M. Vij. Bhavaprakāśikā*. Madhva's original name was Vāsudeva. At the age of seven or so he had his Upanayana and went through a course of Vedic and Śāstra studies, under a teacher of the Toṭantillāya (Pūgavana—*M. Vij.*, iii, 49) family.

The next event in his life was renunciation, probably at the age of sixteen (*M. Vij.* iii, 54-56). His studies in the Śāstras, had, in the meanwhile, created in him a profound dissatisfaction with the prevailing philosophy of Māyāvāda and filled him with a desire to resuscitate the Realistic Theism of the Vedaśāstras, in its pristine purity. The call of the spirit took him to Acyutaprajña, from whom he sought and obtained initiation as a monk under the name of Pūrṇaprajña.

1. By C. M. Padmanabhachar, C. N. Krishnasvami Ayyar, S. Subbarao and C. R. Krishnarao.

2. He was a Tulu *not* a 'Kanarese' Brahmin as supposed by some Western writers. It is too late in history to dispute M's Tulu descent. Karkal Padmanabha Puranik's frivolous attempt in his Kannada work (Mysore, 1972) to give M. a Gauḍa-Sārasvata lineage is an exercise in futility. It stands discredited by (i) the utter absence of any known Gauḍa-Sārasvata among the famous disciples of the Ācārya who succeeded to the Aṣṭamaṭhas of Uḍipi established by him or elsewhere in the Pontifical seats founded by his other successors like Padmanābha Tīrtha, Akṣobhya Tīrtha etc. and (ii) by the equally glaring fact that the contribution of the Gauḍa-Sārasvata community to the voluminous output of the original, commentarial, expository, dialectic and didactic literature of the Dvaita school of philosophy down the centuries has been *nil*.

3. Not Kalyāṇpūr as wrongly stated by Carpenter (p. 406) and Barth (p. 195). Pājakakṣetra is known in Tulu as 'Kakra' where the old family house of Madhva, now under the management of the Kāṇiyūr Mutt of Uḍipi, is still preserved. See photograph reproduced facing p. 79.

4. Not "Madhyamandāra" as in Bhandarkar (*Saivism, Vaiṣṇavism etc.* Strassburg, 1913, p. 58). The equivalent is applied to Madhva also, in the *SDS*, which shows it was only a family name. (See *M. Vij.* ii, 9). As Madhva's father too went by the name, it *cannot be* "traced" to the fact that it (the village of Naḍḍantāḍi (Skt. Madhyatāla) was the midday halting place of Madhva (Saletore, *op. cit.* i, p. 416, f. n. 11).

Some time after initiation was spent in the study of Vedāntic classics beginning with the *Iṣṭasiddhi* of Vimuktātman. Frequent disagreements between master and disciple terminated the studies before long. Pūrṇaprajña was now made the head of the Mutt of Acyutaprekṣa, under the name of Ānandatīrtha. The name "Madhva," by which he is more widely known, was assumed by him as being synonymous with it and for certain esoteric reasons connected with his claim to be an Avatar of Vāyu.

Madhva spent some time in and about Uḍipi, teaching the other disciples of Acyutaprekṣa and trying conclusions with a number of Pandits — Monistic, Jain and Buddhist. The *M. Vij.* (v. 8-16) mentions his encounters with Vāsudeva Paṇḍita, Vādisimha, and Buddhisāgara. This teaching and constant disputations developed his dialectic abilities and made him an adept in polemics that he shows himself to be in his works. Encouraged by these successes, he made up his mind to go on a S. Indian tour to find a wider field for the propagation of his new ideas. Trivandrum, Kanyākumari, Srirangam and Ramesvaram were among the places visited *en route*. In Kanyākumari, he fell into a violent clash with an Advaitic monk, wrongly identified by some with Vidyāśaṃkara Tīrtha,¹ the then (?) Svāmi of the Śringeri Mutt. After the conclusion of "Cāturmāsya" at Rameśvaram (v. 46), he moved on to Srirangam, where he must have come into personal contact with the followers of Rāmānuja, there. From Srirangam, he seems to have returned to Uḍipi, through a northern route.

The southern tour must have taken two or three years. It must have shown Madhva that breaches had already been effected in the citadel of Māyāvāda and this knowledge must have strengthened his original resolve, to establish a new Siddhānta. No wonder that soon after his return to Uḍipi, he began his career as an author, with a new commentary on the *Gītā*, which was not however published till after his return from his first North Indian tour and visit to Badari, which came shortly after.

This time, he had a larger retinue. We have no information of the route taken or the places visited or the incidents on the journey. It is, however, stated that while at the hermitage at Badarinath, Madhva left by himself for Mahābadarikāśrama or the abode of Vyāsa, in the upper regions of the Himalayas. He returned after some *months*, inspired by Vyāsa, and wrote his *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*, which was transcribed to his dictation by Satyatīrtha, (ix, 13). Resuming their homeward march, the party journeying through Bihar and Bengal, came ultimately to the banks of the *Godāvari*. Here, there was a protracted debate with a veteran scholar of those parts, Śobhana Bhaṭṭa at the conclusion of which, the worsted adversary became a disciple of Madhva under the ascetic name of

1. Cf. C. N. K. Ayyar, C. M. Padmanabhachar, and G. M. Bhat and *Madhvamuni-vijaya* (1958). For a refutation of this identification see my paper : The Madhva—Vidyāśaṃkara Meeting, A Fiction' *AUJ.* iii, 1.

Padmanābha Tīrtha. The place of meeting has not been definitely mentioned in the *M. Vij.* Many writers have generally assumed it to have been Rajamundry on the Godāvari, under the impression that Śobhana Bhaṭṭa was probably a native of Āndhra Deśa. But the reference to Padmanābha Tīrtha, as a celebrated leader of the Karṇāṭakas, in the *Hṛṣikeśa Paddhati* (Uḍipi, 1912) renders it probable that he might have been a native of one of the Kannaḍa districts then bordering upon the Godāvarī (*M. Vij.* xv, 120) and that the meeting took place at some important centre of learning on the banks of the Godāvari such as Puntambā or Paithan. The conversion of Narahari Tīrtha also, must have taken place about the same time.¹ He was probably a native of Orissa.

The N. Indian tour had thus made a considerable impression on the people. Till then, Madhva's criticism of the Advaita and other prevailing schools had been merely destructive. He had not offered a new Bhāṣya in place of those he had so ruthlessly criticised (v. 38). But with the publication of his commentaries on *Gītā* and the *Brahmasūtras*, no one could say he had no alternative system to offer in place of those he criticized. His first achievement after his return to Uḍipi was the conversion of Acyutaprekṣa himself, completely, to the new Siddhānta. He fell, not without a fierce resistance (*M. Vij.* ix, 33-37).

The merits of the new system, the living earnestness of its founder, his irresistible personality, incisive logic and massive learning, soon brought many converts and adherents.² To bring and hold them all together, the beautiful image of Śrī Kṛṣṇa [frontispiece] was installed by Madhva at his Mutt (ix, 43) which became the rallying centre of his followers. He also inaugurated some reforms and introduced some changes in the ceremonial code of his followers, such as the substitution of flour-made sheep for living ones, in Vedic sacrifices (Piṣṭapaśuyajñas) and the rigorous observance of fasts on Ekādaśī days. The *M. Vij.* IX, 44-50, refers to one such Piṣṭapaśu Yajña performed at the instance of Madhva, with his younger brother as Hotṛ. We are told that a member of the Maraḍitāya (Jarāghaṭita-gotra) family organised a protest and a boycott of this new type of sacrifice and stirred up a good deal of opposition. But Madhva stood firm and carried the day.

The *M. Vij.* (x. 4-5) records an interesting encounter of the Ācārya, during his first N. Indian tour which, there is evidence to believe, was completed by 1265, with Mahādeva (1260-71) ruler of the Yādava

1. Saleore (*op. cit.* p. 439) is *not* correct in placing Narahari Tīrtha's meeting with Madhva as late as 1270 A.D. The ascetic title "Tīrtha" is found applied to him (as pointed out by me in *AUJ* iii, 2. p. 247), even in the very first inscription of his dated 1264 A.D., This shows that his conversion must have taken place *in* or *before* 1264.

2. Saleore (*op. cit.* pp. 444-449) is incorrect again in connecting the legends touching the conversion of certain members of the Kotīśvara and allied groups, by a Mādhva ascetic, narrated in the Puttige version of the *Grāmapaddhati*, with Madhva himself. Suffice it to say that the expression "Kalau yuge Madhvamata-pracaṇḍam" there, would refer to a follower of the Mādhva Order : See under "Vādirāja" *infra*.

dynasty. The acceptance of 1199 A.D. as M's date of birth would push up the encounter to the sixties in the Ācārya's life which is untenable. For this reason also such a date of birth cannot be accepted.

Kapatral Krishnarao of Shahapur has brought to light a Kannaḍa c. p. dated Sarvajit 1337 A.D. which refers to some purificatory rites administered by Akṣobhya T. to Rangaṇṇa and Dāmaṇṇa, Patils of Malkhed restoring to them their lost social status as Brahmins. (*Tattvavada*, Gadag, April, 1968). This goes to confirm the correctness of M's date as 1238-1317 and 1365 (Viśvāvasu) calculated on that basis, as the year of Akṣobhya's death.

After this, Madhva started on a second N. Indian tour and returned after visiting Delhi, Kurukṣetra, Banaras and Goa (x, 52). The subsequent tours were all confined mostly to the S. Kanara district. Viṣṇumaṅgala (near Kāsargod) Kaṇvatīrtha and Kaḍatīla (near Viṭṭal) were his favorite resorts. The years that followed brought further acquisition of disciples and influence to his fold. Many works had, in the meanwhile, been written by Madhva — such as the Bhāṣyas on the Ten Upaniṣads, the Ten Prakaraṇas and expositions of the *Bhāgavata* and the *Mahābhārata*, (xv, 74-77). The prestige of the new faith had come to be firmly established by such monumental literary activity. The increasing popularity of the new faith naturally caused no small anxiety and heart-burning to the custodians of the established faith, Advaita. Desperate remedies were tried to combat the danger and stem the tide of the new Siddhānta. We are told of an actual raid on the library of Madhva¹ (xiv, 2) which contained a very valuable collection of books. It was, however, partly recovered shortly afterwards and restored to Madhva at the intervention of Jayasimha, Ruler of Kumbla.² The incident, naturally, brought Madhva into touch with the Ruler, at whose request he visited his capital. Close on this visit came the momentous conversion of the great Trivikrama Paṇḍitācārya (presumably the Court-Pandit of Jayasimha) who was the foremost scholar and authority on Advaita Vedānta in those parts (*M. Vij.* xiii, 51). This Trivikrama was the father of Madhva's (future) biographer : Nārayaṇa Paṇḍitācārya. After his conversion, Trivikrama was commissioned to write a commentary on Madhva's *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*, which he did, under the name of *Tattvapradīpa*. By this time, Madhva himself had composed his masterpiece, the *Anuvyākhyāna*, on the *Brahma Sūtras*.

Trivikrama's conversion was a turning point in the history of the

1. Saletore (p. 424) is mistaken in giving "*Madhvasiddhānta*" as the name of one of the works stolen on the occasion. There does not seem to have been any such work in existence; and none is mentioned in the *M. Vij.* or other sources. The raid is said in *M. Vij.* xii, 2, to have been carried out at the instigation of the Advaitic monk Padma Tīrtha, of the Cola country and his ally Puṇḍarika Puri.

2. C. M. Padmanabhachar's identification of the King with the Ruler of Travancore, is unsupportable. See *AUJ* ii, 2.

व्याप्तिर्यस्य निजे निजेन महसा पक्षे सपक्षे स्थिति :
व्यावृत्तिश्च विपक्षतोऽथ विषये सक्तिर्न वै बाधिते ।
नैवास्ति प्रतिपक्षयुक्तिरतुलं शुद्धं प्रमाणं स मे
भूयात् तत्त्वविनिर्णयाय भगवान् आनन्दतीर्थो मुनि : ॥

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faith. Many more joined the fold and Madhva's fame spread far and wide. His parents died about this time (xv, 91) and the next year, his younger brother, and seven other Tauḷava disciples were ordained monks (*M. Vij.* xv, 122-30). These became the founders of what later came to be known as the "Aṣṭa-Maṭhas" of Uḍipi.

The last years of Madhva seem to have been spent in teaching and worship. His three works the *Nyāyavivaraṇa*, the *Karmanirṇaya* and the *Kṛṣṇāmṛta-Mahārṇava*, were all probably composed about this time.

His mission was now completed. His message to the world had been delivered and he had the satisfaction of seeing it well-received. He was honored in his own native region and beyond. His works had been placed on an enduring basis. He had gathered round him a band of ardent and enthusiastic disciples who could be relied upon to carry the light of his teachings all over the country. It was time for him to retire from the scene of his labors and leave them in charge of future work. Charging his disciples with his last message in the closing words of his favourite Upaniṣad, the *Aitareya*, not to sit still but to go forth and preach and spread the truth among the deserving, Śrī Madhva disappeared from view, on the ninth day of the bright half of the month of Māgha, of Piṅgala 1318 A. D. :—

“एकोनाशीतिवर्षाणि नीत्वा मानुषदृष्टिगः ॥

पिङ्गलाब्दे माघशुद्धनवम्यां बदरीं ययौ ॥” (*Aṇumadhvacarita*)

4. WORKS OF MADHVA

The works of Madhva are thirty-seven, collectively called *Sarva-mūla*.¹ They may be classified under four heads (1) commentaries on the *Prasthānatraya*, consisting of the *Gītā*, the *Brahmasūtras* and the *Ten Upaniṣads*. We have two commentaries on the *Gītā* and four works on the *Sūtras* and Bhāṣyas on all the ten *Upaniṣads*. (2) Then come the ten short monographs *Daśa-Prakaraṇas*, some elucidating the basic principles of his system, its logic, ontology, theory of knowledge etc. Others are in the nature of dialectic refutations of certain fundamental theories of Monism. One of them, the *Karma-Nirṇaya*, is a constructive exposition of Madhva's theory of Vedic exegesis in its higher aspect touching the Adhyātma interpretation of the Karma-Kāṇḍa and illustrated with reference

1. Two Devanāgarī editions of the *Sarva Mūla* have been published, one from Kumbakonam and another from Belgaum. Jayatīrtha has commented on eighteen of these works. The authorship of a few more is attested by early references and quotations. There is thus, no 'problem' of authorship in regard to the works of Madhva, as we have, in the case of Śaṅkara and others. A Kannaḍa edn. with translation of all the thirty-seven works of M. has been published by the Madhvamuni Seva Sangha of Uḍipi in twelve volumes (between 1926 and 1968). Two new Devanāgarī edns. of the *Sarvamūla* have been published in recent years (1) by the Pūrṇaprajña Vidyā Piṭha, Bangalore and (2) by the Uttarādi Mutt, Bangalore in 4 vols. The Madhvarāddhānta Samvardhani Sabha of the Palimār Mutt Uḍipi, has published a Devanāgarī edn. of M's Daśaprakaraṇas alone with J's ṭikās and several glosses. (1969).

to a part of the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa*. The *Viṣṇutattvanirṇaya* and *Tattvodyota* are brilliant and persuasive expositions of his Siddhānta and contain equally powerful critiques of Advaita. (3) In the third group may be placed his short commentary and notes on the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa*; his metrical epitome of the *Mahābhārata*, viewed from a new theosophical angle and his original monotheistic and Adhyātmic interpretation of the first three Adhyāyas of the *Rg. Veda*. (4) His minor works include a short Yamaka-Kāvya on the Bharatan Epic and the *Dvādaśa Stotra* in different metres containing many sublime philosophical ideas; an anthology of verses in praise of Kṛṣṇa (*Kṛṣṇāmṛtamahārṇava*); a Tāntric work on rituals and Image worship etc., a compendium of daily conduct and religious routine; a code of the ascetic order and so on.

These works are written in a plain unsophisticated style, without any ornament and flourish. The language of the Prakaraṇas is so terse and elliptical that their meaning could not be fully grasped without a good commentary. This applies to his other philosophical works too. This renders the task of translation into other languages particularly difficult. That is one reason why they have remained a sealed book to the West. But for the illuminating commentaries of Jayatīrtha on them, in the 14th century, it would have been difficult for the philosophy of Mādhva to have risen to that position of importance as a vital limb of the Vedānta, which it did, in the succeeding centuries.

Madhva's works are characterized by an extreme brevity of expression and a rugged simplicity and directness devoid of all literary flourish and bombast. Never once does Madhva glide into the languid grace of a Śaṅkara or a Vācaspati. His metrical works, particularly the *AV* and *Mbh. T. N.*, show a better diction and breathe the spirit of stately dignity, loftiness of ideas and serenity of expression. The Daśaprakaraṇas rank next in order of stylistic merit, the *VTN* and *Td* being good classics of acute philosophic thought, criticism and analysis. The commentaries on the Upaniṣads rise to occasional heights of spiritual fervor; though written mostly in a truncated style, partly, sometimes, in prose. The introduction of frequent and lengthy quotations from a bewildering variety of works, extant and other, often breaks the continuity of ideas and obscures the nature and drift of philosophical doctrines and interpretations. But Madhva's conception of the role of a Bhāṣyakāra and his performance as one, rank him far above his compeers. He explains his texts only where such explanations are absolutely necessary or are called for to obviate a possible misconstruction (Cf. प्रज्ञावादांश्च भाषसे । दैगुण्यविषया वेदाः । मा कर्मफलहेतुः (G. B.) ईक्षणीयत्वात् वाच्यमेव (B. S. B.)) He expands the ideas of the original texts with apt and ample quotations from a variety of sources covering a very wide range of the sacred literature, extant and other (*M. Vij.* ix, 9). He does not comment on texts whose *anvaya*, purport and philosophical significance are obvious. In this, he stands apart from other Vedāntic commentators whose performance often recalls Bhoja's caustic comment on commentators : इति वस्तुविप्लवकृतः सर्वेऽपि टीकाकृतः (*Bhoja Vṛtti*).

One or two links in argument are generally skipped over by Madhva and lie hidden behind the swift march of his thoughts. The criticism that he does not elaborate the details of *adhikaraṇaśārīras* in his *B. S. B* is knocked down by Trivikrama Pandita : किमत्रानधिगतम् ? यस्य यथात्वं सिद्धान्तयति, तस्य तदन्यथात्वं पूर्वपक्षयति इति श्लिष्टम् । न पुनः प्रत्यधिकरणं महदनुसेविनः बहिर्मुखसुखावहामनल्पजल्पमालामाद्विरेरन् (*T D.* i, 3.1). His intimate acquaintance with the Vedic and Epic literature is reflected in the numerous citations he makes from their nooks and corners, with prodigious memory and surprising ease. The range of his studies is well brought out by the variety of topics covered by these quotations. The sureness, precision and aptness of these quotations are such as to impress and inspire confidence, in any unprejudiced mind.

There is, however, a touch of deliberate archaism and eccentricity in his grammar and diction. The very first verse in his *Gītā Bhāṣya* has a 'false' or weak *caesura* : गुरुश्चान् गीतार्थं वक्ष्यामि, which is defended by Jayatīrtha on the basis of similar authentic Śāstraic precedents like 'य उपाधिलंगति साध्ये सम्बन्धविशेषणे' from a Tārkika work, which even some living veterans of Nyāya-śāstra are not able to identify. We have many departures from Pāṇinian usage : the use of "कारण" in the masculine;¹ "गोचर" in the neuter; "उत्त" as a copulative; ऋते with the accusative, the Epic "गृह्य" for गृहीत्वा; पतिना for पत्या; and purely Vedic forms like जनिता (for जनयिता); "विष्णवि" in the locative (*A V.* i, 4, 8 and *BT.* p. 7b, in the citation from *Tantrabhāgavata* and मिथ्यायाः (*AV.*, on which, see *NS* p. 27). He also ignores some Samāsānta terminations prescribed by Pāṇini as in स्त्रीपुंभ्यः (*AV* ii, 2, 12 with *NS* 423 b,) अचिरादिपथा (*Anubhāṣya*) यावद् वायुं (*ibid.*) आदिराजानः (*GB*) and permits himself of euphonic and grammatical liberties like "अपोदितुम्" "गुणोत्तताम्" "सदातना" and occasional *tnesis* as in "चकार चावि;" (*Mbh. T. N.*);² विश्वस्य मित्रं स इहाजगाम (*ibid.*).³ He takes the same liberty in versification as Gauḍapāda, Sureśvara and Vidyāraṇya, in combining passages of different scriptural texts with his own words to make single verses out of them (as in तेजवर्धन्त स्वतवसो in *Mbh. T. N.* from *Rgveda*). These eccentricities have to be explained *a la* Śrīharṣa's *Naiṣadha* xxii, 154). They are not ignorant lapses of a third-rate writer; but deliberate departures from the norm, which could be legitimized with reference to special Vyākaraṇa Sūtras and sanctions. But they are few and far between; and *all* of them have been suitably vindicated by the lynx-eyed commentator Jayatīrtha, on the authority and sanctions of Pāṇini, the *Mahābhāṣya* and other sources. Barring these peculiarities of his style, Madhva is, on the whole, to be recognized as a good writer, a sound thinker and a clear and powerful expositor.

5. PROBLEM OF SOURCES

Another important feature of his writings is the reference, in them,

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1. With this cf. कोऽसावयमनुमानः (*Mahābhāṣya*).
 2. Cf. *Māgha*, x 19; *Raghuvamśa*, xiii. 36.
 3. Cf. पुरं महर्षेः कपिलस्य वस्तु । (*Buddhacarita*).

to the authority of a large body of interpretive and expository literature, extant and other — dealing with various aspects of his theology, questions of logic, grammatical derivation of words, theodicy, mysticism, cosmogony and interpretation of particular groups of texts. In this respect also, his works stand out as a class by themselves. Every point of view and detail of doctrine is supported and amplified by him, in the light of these quotations, drawn from a large body of ancillary literature of both Vedic and Post-Vedic periods. The inaccessibility of many of these sources, at the present time, and difficulty of tracing many of the quotations in the extant sources also, raises a problem as to the genuineness of these passages and the degree and extent of their reliability and the acceptability of the new line of interpretation of the Vedānta, based on them. But, in fairness to Madhva, it must be stated that while (1) the foundations of his theistic system and its general and main outlines are well supported by the extant literature of the Vedic and Post-Vedic periods, its logical and philosophical superstructure is built upon independent philosophical cogitation and analysis of concepts and can bear examination independently of textual authority. (2) The appeal to texts occurs only in respect of purely theological issues and interpretations of disputed texts. But this does not affect the metaphysical bases of his thought, or his ontology and theory of knowledge. This fact is of vital importance to a correct appreciation of true merits of his system and would naturally dispel much of the confusion of thought into which critics of Madhva have been led, in their estimation of his philosophy. Later critics, like Appayya Dīkṣita, have raised the bogey of “untraceable quotations” and tried to make capital out of it.¹ But the matter is not one to be so easily settled *ex parte*. Though most of the works cited by Madhva in the course of his interpretation of extant texts are not now available to us and several of these passages could not be easily traced or located in the extant sources named by him, the possibility of their still representing an old and distinctive line of Theistic interpretation of the philosophy of the Prasthānatrayī cannot be overlooked.² Traces of the ideas and interpretations analogous to those adumbrated by Madhva have been found to occur in the extant literature of the Epics and Purāṇas and Pañcarātras though at times, in a badly mutilated form.³ There is nothing in the extant works that is definitely hostile to his line of interpretation. (3) There is no linguistic or philosophical ground to discredit these as fabrications of an individual commentator, however clever he might have been. The quotations disclose a natural orderliness of thought, internal variation of style, peculiarities of

1. Some modern scholars like Bhandarkar, and Belvalkar have also urged the point against the acceptability of Madhva's interpretations.

2. Cf. the text एष प्रकृतिः * * (*Paimgi Śruti*) cited by Madhva under *B. S. i, 4, 26* and एष ह्येवाव्यक्तः (*Mahopaniṣad*) under *B. S. i, 4, 29* with corresponding views found in *Ahīrbudhnya Saṁhitā* and *Vāyu Purāṇa* referred to by Dasgupta iii, pp. 34, 496 and 502.

3. Cf. *Brahmāṇḍa Purāṇa* iii, 2, 81 with the quotation from the same source given by Madhva (*Bṛh. Up. Bhāṣya* p. 34).

idiom, syntax and vocabulary in common with the *genre* of works to which they pertain and many other indications of genuineness. (4) The large number of works so named and the variety of topics with which they deal, the natural ease and flow of the quotations, the varying lengths of the passages cited — some *in extenso*, running to more than ten or fifteen verses at a stretch, other to three or four lines or less; and yet others in isolation as single verses, hemistichs or quarters, the unfaltering precision of references to particular contexts from which such passages are taken,¹ and allusions even to the names of certain interlocutors² in some contexts, and the general agreement of language and idiom of the citations with the literary patterns of the different strata of literature from which they are drawn are sufficient reasons to establish the *bona fides* of those quotations and accord them due weight and recognition in estimating the value and importance of Madhva's line of interpretation of the texts and traditions of the Prasthānatrayī and the systematization of thought propounded by him in the light of an old and genuine phase of Theistic thought preserved and handed down by them. (5) It is also significant that the genuineness of these sources does *not* appear to have been called into question by any of the critics of Madhva, *in his own days*. We know from the *M. Vij.* that he had to encounter serious opposition to his views from the leading Advaitins of the day. But there is no trace of opposition to or distrust of the sources on which he propounded his views and version of Vedānta, in any of the writings of the older Advaitins of the period of Madhva or his immediate disciples including Jayatīrtha. The *Sarvadarśanasamgraha* of Mādhava gives an honorable place to the philosophy of Madhva in the history of Indian thought; which, it would not have done, had its textual *bona fides* been open to doubt in those days, as resting upon spurious foundations of fabricated texts, on a large scale. Nor do the works of Jayatīrtha and Vyāsatīrtha disclose the least sign of such an opinion having been entertained in any quarter. This is all the more significant as Jayatīrtha is alive to the criticisms on the Bhāṣya and other works of Madhva, including objections taken to the "ungrammatical" *prayogas* there and addresses himself to the task of meeting them. He would not have ignored so serious a matter, as this, if it had actually been raised in his times. It is difficult to believe also, that erstwhile champions of Advaita like Padmanābha Tīrtha and Trivikrama Paṇḍitācārya, who tried conclusions with Madhva and afterwards accepted his system would have been convinced by a heap of fabricated texts, if that was all that Madhva had to show in his support. Nor would they have tamely submitted to them. The attempt to discredit the sources of Madhva is of much later origin, from the days of Appayya Dīkṣita. He was the first to raise the cry which was assiduously taken up by others like Bhaṭṭoji and Venkaṭanātha.³

1. ता एवापो ददौ तत्र स ऋषिः शंसितव्रतः । (GB. ii, 50).

2. कर्मारस्तु तदा बाणं * * (Bṛh. Up. Bhāṣya, p. 47).

3. Appayya's criticisms in this respect have been answered by Vijayindra Tīrtha. (See under VIJAYINDRA TĪRTHA).

(6) Much of their criticism in this respect suffers from sectarian prejudice and a failure to take note of the enormous loss of original texts in many branches of learning in Sanskrit literature, owing to Moslem vandalism and other causes. Madhva draws heavily upon the vast literature of the Samhitās of the Pañcarātra of which over two hundred works are reported by Schrader. A good many of these rare works are still fortunately preserved in various Libraries, awaiting publication and exploration at the hands of modern scholars. A careful investigation of this body of extant literature of the Pañcarātras is bound to throw a good deal of light on this problem and vindicate the *bona fides* of Madhva's sources, to a great extent. The Pontiffs of Mādhva Mutts would be doing the right thing by him and vindicating his prestige, by arranging for the speedy investigation of this available source. Anyway, it would be preposterous to dismiss all untraceable texts of Madhva as forgeries and fabrications without due research. I have probed this matter to some extent and carried out some work in this direction and have found the results encouraging.

(7) Some of the non-extant sources mentioned by Madhva, were for example, known to other writers also,¹ both *earlier* and *later*. The charge of fabrication is, thus, too sweeping and uncharitable. We see from the *GB*, the first work of Madhva, that already at the time of his writing it, he was in a position to lay under contribution most of the important sources which continue to figure more prominently in his later works. It is hard to believe that any sensible philosopher, let alone a rising one seeking to establish a new faith in opposition to a powerful system entrenched in the public affections, would start his career with a cartload of fabricated texts and jeopardize his chances of a sympathetic hearing to his views! (8) Again, some important works like the *Brahmatarka* not cited in the *GB* (his first work), are found quoted in subsequent works, ranking as his important authorities. This shows they were secured by him at a later stage. An interesting sidelight is thrown on the genuineness of the *Brahmatarka* by the significant fact that Advaitānanda (early 17th cent.) author of *Brahmavidyābharaṇa* on Ś's *B. S. B.* has *suo moto* quoted the twin propositions :

प्राबल्यमागमस्यैव जात्या तेषु त्रिषु स्मृतम् ।

उपजीव्यविरोधे तु न प्रामाण्यममुष्य च ॥

embodied in the above text which is not known to us through any other Vedantic writer than M. who cites it from *Brahmatarka* in his *VTN*. In the course of his comments on the issue raised by the second half, Advaitānanda tries to reject the second proposition by appealing to the principle of "Upadesānupadeśatve viparītam balābalaṁ." Apart from the irrelevance of this principle to cases of "parīkṣita-pratyakṣa" such as "Sākṣi-pratyakṣa" upon which M. rests his doctrine of the uncontradictable reality of world-experience and difference between the self and Brahman, the point which concerns us here is that Advaitānanda is fully committed

1. For details see my edn. *Catus-Sūtrī Bhāṣya*, introd. and notes.

to the genuineness of the passage he discusses, which, so far as we know, is not known to us through any other source except the one mentioned by M. This is sufficient proof that the authenticity of the *Brahmatarka* was fully recognized by Advaitic writers like Advaitānanda who came after M. Under *B. S.* i. 1. 20, Trivikrama supplies the fourth quarter of the *Caturvedaśikhā* of which only the first three quarters have been quoted by M. Trivikrama also explains the words of the fourth quarter. This is quite an interesting and important fact. (9) M's own clear statement in his *Mbh. T. N.* (ii, 7-8) shows that he was a patient collector of Mss. from all parts of the country and possessed a unique collection of Mss. (which we learn from the *M. Vij.* xiv, 2, was actually raided and stolen by some disgruntled adversaries, though it was subsequently recovered).

(10) We must, therefore, concede that there must have been some basis for these sources utilized by Madhva. Many causes might have conspired to throw them into oblivion, including the ascendancy of Advaita for some centuries before him. Having been largely utilized only by him, they had not evidently found a wider circle of acceptance and remained unfamiliar to or ignored, suppressed or tampered with by others indifferent or hostile to his viewpoint. It is worthy of note that Madhva himself tells us how the textual traditions had suffered and were suffering interference, interpolation, overwriting, mutilation and tampering with :

क्वचित् ग्रन्थान् प्रक्षिपन्ति क्वचिदन्तरितानपि ।

कुर्युः क्वचिच्च व्यत्यासं प्रमादात् क्वचिदन्यथा ॥

(*Mbh. T. N.* ii, 3-7)

We can only hope that a systematic investigation of this problem of the Sources of Madhva would throw more light on it. Meanwhile, we must give Madhva the benefit of the doubt and not indulge in unseemly charges against a stalwart in Indian thought who, whatever his differences with his compeers like Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja, was, in every respect, as great, sincere and trustworthy as any of them. I have given a consolidated list of the unfamiliar sources drawn upon by Madhva (only titles) in an Appendix at the end of this work, as a preliminary aid to further investigation of the problem by those who may be inclined to undertake it.

GĪTĀ AND SŪTRA PRASTHĀNA

MADHVA wrote two commentaries on the *Gītā* — a *Bhāṣya* and a *Tātparyā*. The former was the earliest work with which he made his *debut* in the philosophical world. For this reason it is also of considerable, historical and philosophical importance to us.

(1) GĪTĀ-BHĀṢYA

This runs to 1500 granthas (units of 32 syllables) opening with salutations to Viṣṇu and Vyāsa. The young and alert mind of Madhva is in evidence on every page of it. So are his earnestness of purpose to serve the cause of Theism and his marvellous equipment for the task of reinterpreting the Vedānta, from a new angle. The work is a revolution in thought and in method. It eschews all purple patches and fine writing, and is as brief and precise as possible. Madhva makes up for the brevity of his comments by quotations from numerous rare sources, not utilized by those who had gone before him. This is a distinctive feature of his other works also. His style is peculiar to himself, — terse and somewhat truncated. He does not indulge in long perorations and explanations; but just puts down important “notes” and “comments” on moot points of interpretation of key words and phrases or parts of verses. He does not comment on all the verses of the text but only a few of them which are in need of critical comment or elucidation. His *Bhāṣya*, thus, marks a new departure in the field.

At the outset, Madhva emphasizes the greatness of the Epic of which the *Gītā* is the pith. The latter is happily and poetically described as the ‘honey of the Epic-Pārijāta’ (*Mahābhāratapārijātamadhubhūtā*). In the first six chapters, the performance of Karma in the true spirit of Karma Yoga is shown to be the unfailing means of acquisition of God-vision. The next *ṣaṭka* is taken up with the majesty of God, His manifestations, vibhūti, Viśvarūpa etc. In the last are explained the nature of beliefs and practices not conducive to spiritual uplift. The work concludes with an insistence on Bhakti as the innermost means of achieving Mokṣa.

REORIENTATION OF KARMA-YOGA

An outstanding contribution of Madhva, to *Gītā*-thought is the reorientation given by him to the interpretation of its theory of “Karma-Yoga”. This reorientation lies in (i) defining its status *vis-à-vis* the two “Niṣṭhās” of Sāṃkhya and Yoga referred to in chapter vi; and (2) in repudiating the view of Śaṅkara that such Karma is essentially applicable to the “Avidyāvasthā” alone ; and (3) in stressing that even this Niṣkāma Karma is of comparatively lesser importance, ultimately, with

regard to Jñāna, being only a step to it and that, therefore, the final view of the *Gītā* is not “Jñānakarmasamuccaya” nor even “Jñānakarmasādhya-Bhaktiyoga”; but pure Aparokṣa-Jñāna alone, brought about by Bhakti. Niṣkāma-karma, however, helps in two ways (1) in cleansing the mind and helping the emergence of Bhakti and Jñāna and (2) in being conducive, when practised *after* the attainment of Aparokṣajñāna, to the manifestation of fresh aspects of bliss, in Mokṣa.

Madhva admits “Aparokṣa-Jñāna” (direct vision of God) as the ultimate means of Mokṣa. This may be attained in two ways (1) by a life of complete renunciation and meditation; or (2) by gradual attainment of Jñāna through an active life of Karma enjoined by the Śāstras, according to one’s station. The former is open *only* to a few highly specialized souls like Sanaka. The rest of humanity has to work its way up through Karma (iii, 3). There is nothing to be ashamed of in an active life on earth provided it is nobly lived. Karma-Yoga points the way to such a life. It is different from the one based on a hedonistic interpretation of life. The pith of Karmayoga lies in the discharge of one’s Karma (nitya, naimittika and even the so-called “Kāmya”) without the least desire for fruit and eschewing all notions of “I” and “mine”. The true Karmayogin looks upon himself as a mere “Pratibimba” of God, whose every wish and activity is *derived* from and dependent on that of the Supreme (Bimbādhīnakriyāvān). God is the real independent doer and enjoyer in all cases (iv, 24; xviii, 16). It is the performance of one’s duties with this consciousness that constitutes true “Naiṣkarmya”, — not mere abstention from Karma. Naiṣkarmya raises the soul from selfishness to god-consciousness. It makes the aspirant see God everywhere and everything in God and trains him to look on himself as no more than an instrument of divine dispensation and thus prepares him for Aparokṣa through mental and spiritual cleansing. Madhva develops the (peculiar) theory that it is never the intention of Scripture (the so-called Karma-kāṇḍa) to stop with the mere fleeting rewards of Heaven and make for a never-ending transmigration. Such narrow view of the Vedas is “Veda-Vāda”¹. The results promised in connection with the performance of sacrifices like Jyotiṣṭoma are not to be interpreted too literally (ii, 44). They are to be viewed as so many *inducements* to attract the attention of average humanity which is always impressed with the promise of rewards (*puṣpitā vāk*). Madhva finds support for this view in the passages of the *Bhāgavata* : कर्ममोक्षाय कर्माणि विधत्ते ह्यगदं यथा (xi, 3, 45) रोचनार्था फलश्रुतिः (x, 3, 47) and in *Gītā* ii, 42. He also refers to Vedic texts like ‘विश्वजिता यजेत’ where no results are expressly referred to and infers from them that results are not primarily or necessarily contemplated by Scripture, — its only motive in prescribing sacrifices, being to induce men to take to them kindly, make them perform them in due course in the true spirit of

1. Cf. the mystic interpretation of Vedic hymns sponsored by Aurobindo Ghose, in our times.

Niṣkāmatā and thus purify them for Aparokṣa. (*B. T.* xi, 21, 24-5). This view has the support of xviii, 6. This is a new and far-reaching interpretation of the practical philosophy of the *Gītā*. It would appear from Śaṅkara's commentary on xviii, 6, that an identical view was held by certain commentators who preceded him. Great, then, is the credit due to Madhva for having revived the old view and presented it in such a striking manner.¹

Madhva looks upon the greatness and majesty of God as the central thesis of the *Gītā* (as indeed of all Śāstra). Other problems discussed in it are all ancillary. The *Gītā* emphasizes this "Mahātātparya" (central thought) through the twin principles of Theism — the immanence and transcendence of God, which are both vividly expounded in it. The Viśvarūpādhyāya and the Puruṣottama-Yoga emphasize the transcendental aspect while God's immanence in the Cosmos is elucidated, according to Madhva, in a very vivid manner in Ch. vii and x. His commentary on these chapters go to the root of the matter and contain much original exposition. The metaphysical dependence (प्रतिबिम्बभाव) of the Jīvas on God is the basis on which Madhva interprets the whole of the ii chapter and resolves its many seeming contradictions of thought between activism and absorption : सर्वमेतत् ब्रह्मेत्युच्यते तदधीनसत्ताप्रवृत्तिमत्त्वात् । न तु तत्स्वरूपत्वात् (G. B.)

He identifies the true Karmayoga of the Lord with the Nivṛtti-Mārga and the narrow hedonism of the Mīmāṃsakas with Pravṛttimārga. He quotes the authority of *Vyāsasmṛti* (not extant) :

निष्कामं ज्ञानपूर्वं तु निवृत्तिमिह चोच्यते ।

निवृत्तं सेवमानस्तु ब्रह्माप्येति सनातनम् ॥²

He does not however confine Karmayoga to the Avidyāvasthā of Śaṅkara : विदुषः कर्मासंभववचनात् यानि कर्माणि शास्त्रेण विधीयन्ते तान्यविदुषो विहिता इति भगवतो निश्चयः (ii, 21); but looks upon it as the right kind of wisdom and action. Even the great Jñānins like Janaka and Priyavrata (*Bhāgavata*, V) are shown to have taken to Niṣkāma Karma, at the bidding of God, to set an example to others. This is a new orientation of the practical philosophy of the *Gītā*, based on a remarkably original and suggestive reinterpretation of "ते" (in ii, 47); which more than anticipates the 'Energism' of the *Gītā* according to Tilak's *Gītārahasya*.

(2) GĪTĀ TĀTPARYA

The *Gītātātparya*- (*Nirṇaya*) is a later and more discursive prose commentary on the *Gītā*, in 1300 granthas. It is written in a more animated style and couched in more elegant form. It seeks to maintain the soundness of the Bhāṣya interpretations with fresh arguments and quotations from the *Brahmatarka* (see under ii, 16) and other works, not utilized earlier. This fact has a bearing on the problem of Madhva's sources, as already shown.

1. For detailed estimate of Madhva's place and achievement as an Interpreter of the *Gītā*, see my English Introduction to the Kannaḍa tr. of Madhva's *Gītā Bhāṣya* M. M. Seva Sangha, *Udipi*, 1954.

2. This verse is found to occur in *Manu Smṛti* xii, 82 : 3.

There is a difference in method of exposition between the two works. While the former comments on selected verses of the *Gītā* citing "Pratīkas", the *G. T.* merely brings out the gist of the verses and expands it with extraneous quotations. Pratīkas are not culled regularly as in the *Bhāṣya* :

शब्दानुकरणाद्यन्तरेण पुनः तात्पर्यमेवोच्यत इति भावः ।

(Jayatīrtha, *G. T. Nyāyadīpikā*, p. 3. Bombay edn). The interpretation of the *GB* are here augmented by newer and additional ones : ii, 16; ii, 45; ii, 42 etc. The interpretations of other schools are only rarely and impliedly noticed in the *GB*. (as of Bhāskara on ब्रह्म (iii, 15) and on केशव (ii, 54) and of Śaṅkara on प्रज्ञावादान् (ii, 11). The *GT*, however, pays greater attention to the refutation of rival interpretations. Among such are those of Śaṅkara¹ and Bhāskara (A forgotten commentator).²

The governing thought of the *Gītā* is, at the outset, impressively summed up by Madhva in his own words, which are then followed by relevant extracts from the text. He vigorously repudiates the idea that a Karmī can do without Jñāna or a Jñānī without Karma. There is an element of the one in the other. Efficiency implies wisdom. That is why Madhva defines here, Karma Yoga as Karma-pracuro yogaḥ (*Bby.* p. 674). Kṛṣṇa declares that one who is efficient in *either* reaps the benefits of *both* (v, 4). This could *not* be, unless both are intertwined and not mutually exclusive, as Śaṅkara would have it. The Jñānin, too, then, has his share of karma which is mostly inward संकोचात् बाह्यकर्मणां (*GT*) ज्ञानिनापि हि कर्मानुष्ठेयं । कर्मिणापि हि ज्ञातव्यो भगवान् । नहि ज्ञाने विना * * *

ज्ञानमार्गः कर्ममार्ग इति भेदस्ततो नहि ।

तस्मादाश्रमभेदोऽयं कर्मसंकोचसंभवः ॥ इति व्यासस्मृतिः (*GT*)

The credit of establishing "Nivṛtta-Karma", as a life of healthy participation in Karma dedicated to God, is exclusively Madhva's. Its true activistic character had been obscured by the early trappings of monistic acosmism. Even the flaming ideal of Niṣkāmatā had been reduced to some kind of glorified Pravṛtti-Mārga, to be revised and transcended by one of higher asceticism and absolute inaction. Madhva corrects this view of Naiṣkarmya with a well chosen quotation from the *Vyāsa-smṛti*, explaining the true nature of *Nivṛttimārga*. The passage, which is available to us in an allied version from the *Manu Smṛti* (xii, 88-89, Medhātithi) and in the *Kūrma Purāṇa* (i, 1, 63-64 cited P. 45 ante), establishes the true and original nature of *Nivṛttimārga* and *Naiṣkarmya*, to be identical with Niṣkāmakarma. From this point of view, Madhva should be

1. P. 710 b of *GT* where his interpretation of cii, 3-4, is specially quoted and criticized. The Māyāvāda interpretation of ii, 16, (not actually found in Śaṅkara, but probably accepted by implication) in terms of सदसद्विलक्षणत्व of the Universe, is similarly refuted (p. 63, Jayatīrtha, *Nyāyadīpikā*).

2. His "Satkāryavāda" interpretation of ii, 16, is refuted in *GT*.

3. For full information re. him and his *Bhāṣya* on the *Gītā*, See my paper 'Bhāskara, A Forgotten Commentator on the *Gītā*, I. H. Q. ix, 1933. A fragment of Bhāskara's *GB*. for some nine Adhyayas has been published.

considered to have done a distinct service to the cause of truth in rescuing the older tradition of interpretation¹ and restoring it to its proper place.

DIALECTIC CRITICISM IN THE *GT*

The *GT* has a powerful critique of the doctrine of Monism that all experience is illusory. Madhva contends that our sufferings and enjoyments in life are quite real; sometimes, vividly so. Such deep and poignant experiences of life are nowhere seen to be mistaken. There is, thus, no justification for dismissing them as illusory. All immediate illusions in experience, proceed *from* the body *towards* external reality. But the self and its inmost experiences are not subject to such illusions. No one doubts: "Am I myself or not"; or mistakes himself for some one else. An experience can be rejected as illusory only when there is clear proof to that effect. The experiences of pleasure and pain are *subjective*, intensely personal and are intuited by the "Sākṣī". If even these experiences, validated by the Sākṣī, are to be rejected as illusory and liable to error, the ultimate authority on which the final decision of the reality or otherwise of particular experiences and judgments is to be taken, viz., the experiencing self (Sākṣī), would itself be open to doubt, *in all cases*. There would, then, be no hope of finality or truth-determination anywhere in any sphere of life, secular, scientific or philosophical. It would be futile to plead that we may get on with some sort of conventional standards of truth and error, verification and validity. There is nothing to show that even this convention may not be in the grip of an illusion; so that nothing could be established for certain or taken for granted — whether illusions or realities ! It would be impossible to indict all experience as illusory. What should be the proof of it that it is illusory and how are we to make sure of its truth ? If all these are to be accepted as a matter of convention, what is the proof of there being such a convention or that there are persons who accept it ? If appearances are the proof of their presence, what is the proof of the appearances ? If appearances in and by themselves are proof of their presence and if some of them could be mistaken, one might legitimately contend that we ourselves are under an illusion that there are such appearances while there is none in fact. The appearances themselves may be "appearances" so to say. The alleged impossibility of an illusion without a basis (*nirālambana*) may itself be due to an illusion of our thought. The proof on which such a thesis is based may itself be an illusion !

Madhva also elucidates his conception of causality and refutes the Anirvacanīya theory under ii, 16. All effects are non-existent "*before causation and after destruction*". The stuff of the effect may be real and existent in some *other form*. But the particular mode (*viśeṣa*) of the thing must at least be accepted as non-existent before production and after destruction. But Madhva is not an "Asat-kāryavādin" in the Buddhist or

1. For the presence of such a pure tradition of Theistic interpretation of the philosophy of the Upaniṣads and Sūtras, see the remarks of Dasgupta, iii, p. 496, (quoted earlier).

Nyāya sense of the term. The effect is not *totally* non-existent before i.e., even as an undetermined something. The particular *form, as an effect*, is however, a novelty which has no prior existence. Even if the Sāṃkhya view of causation as manifestation (*abhivyakti*) is accepted, it must be conceded that the manifestation itself, in *that form*, is a novelty and hence non-existent before manifestation and after its cessation. Otherwise, there would be a *regressus ad infinitum*. It is obvious then, that causation should be understood with reference to the non-existence of something in *some form*. This does not involve the possibility of causation of absolutely non-existent things like the hare's horn. The fact is that we have really to admit "Sadasatkāryavāda" and not "Asatkāryavāda" alone; or "Satkāryavāda" alone. Causation is meaningless and impossible without a cause-stuff (*upādānadraavya*). To that extent it is "satkārya" or rather, "Satkāraṇavāda". But the effect is not pre-existent in the cause *qua* effect (*kāryātmanā*). It is a novelty and has come in there *de novo*. To this existent, it is "Asat-kārya". The cause and effect are, thus, 'different-cum-identical' (*bhinnābhinna*) since both kinds of relation are experienced : मृत् घटः । देहः क्षितितामगात् ।

In this connection, Madhva discusses the interpretation of नसतो विद्यतेभावः (ii, 16), given by some Advaitins, in terms of Anirvacanīyatā. The non-existent cannot come into being and the existent cannot cease to be. The world partaking of the nature of both, in that it has *come into being* and is certain to cease to exist, cannot therefore be regarded as either existent or non-existent : सच्चेन्न बाध्येत । असच्चेन्न प्रतीयेत । Hence, it should be put down as a *tertium quid* : अनिर्वचनीयम् । indescribable in terms of Sat and Asat. Such, in brief, is the familiar argument of the Anirvacanīyavādin, based on this verse. Madhva says this is illogical. There is no proof that any such mysterious entity is brought within the range of experience of anyone. It cannot be contended that such an entity is presented in our *illusions*; or that what is presented in illusions, must necessarily be indescribable, on grounds of "Khyātibādhānyathānupapatti". Madhva says that the presumption in this argument that the non-existent cannot be presented to cognition in *illusions* is itself a gratuitous one. For, even to deny the possibility of such presentation, one must be in a position to conceive of non-existence and that is as good as presentation. If the non-existent had not been presented anywhere, at any time, it would be needless to deny its presentation. If it were utterly unpresentable in illusions and valid experiences alike, the very idea of "Asat" would be illegitimate and would have to be given up. The question is the possibility of presentation of a non-existent 'something' in our *illusions*. It is precisely the appearance or presentation of such non-existent forms, aspects or things *as existent* that goes by the name of "illusions," in all experience : यदविद्यमानं रूपं तस्य सत्त्वेन प्रतीतेरेव भ्रान्तित्वात् । Even on the Advaitic theory that the content of illusions is indefinable, no illusions can be made out without the experience, say of silver, *as if* real, though actually non-existent there, in nacre. It is no doubt true, that the reality of silver there, is purely illusory and not a

fact. Nevertheless, it leads to some sort of activity on the part of the percipient, only when it is perceived *as real and true silver*, for the time being. There could be no illusions so-called, if the indescribable (Anirvacanīya) were to appear *qua* indescribable, as it *is*, in point of fact. There is, thus, no warrant, in or outside illusions, for the acceptance of an “indescribable something” appearing.

The refutation of Anirvacanīya leads on to a critique of “Nirviśeṣa-Brahman”. An uncharacterizable thing is indistinguishable from the Void (Śūnya). Indeed, what is said to be devoid of *all* characteristics could not be shown to *exist* in any sense of the term. Its existence must be referred to in words or indirectly suggested. But even such expressibility, or even suggestibility, constitutes characterization. If they do not amount to characterization, propositions like “Brahman is” (अस्ति ब्रह्म Taitt. Up.) would be redundant. Even supposing that such propositions mean nothing more than “Brahman is *not non-existent*,” such negative characterization would be inconceivable without accepting some negative characteristics at least. We cannot establish a Nirviśeṣa Brahman by suggestion. It is logically impossible to *suggest* what is *absolutely inexpressible*. There is no proof also that a thing that is beyond the pale of every kind of proof exists anywhere. Its non-existence would be easily demonstrable by its being outside the pale of proofs (pramāṇa) and experience, even as in the case of “a seventh rasa” (सप्तमरस). It would be useless to contend that such an inexpressible thing is, however, established by right of self-evidence (स्वप्रकाशत्व). For, even self-evidence has to be established on the basis of actual proof¹. If self-evidence is something different from the thing itself, there is the admission of some characteristic and the “thing” would no longer be devoid of traits. If it is the same as the thing itself, it must be equally open to proof. If no proof of its self-evidence is available and if all that is meant by being “self-evident” is the negation of extraneous proof, self-luminosity would be tantamount to “Aprakāśatva” or absence of luminosity. If self-luminosity were to be established through a process of Arthāpatti, it must be either as a logical sequent, or by means of other independent proof. In either case, self-luminosity must be *knowable* by the Self itself ! But this would be against the Advaitic dogma that the subject of all experience, cannot itself be experienced.² Thus, in as much as the Advaitin does not understand by self-luminosity anything like self-knowability, or revelation by *another*, the concept of Svaprakāśatva must remain unproved and unprovable. The term “Svaprakāśa, would, in such a case, be a misfit and a misnomer. Prakāśa or illumination, moreover, would be inconceivable in the absence of something to be illumined, be it oneself or an “Other”. The plea of “Kartṛkarmabhāvavirodha”, advanced by Advaitins, is opposed to experience and cannot be accepted. Knowledge is never experienced or intuited without reference to a knower

1. Of. an “experience”, in which case, it would be an object of such experience.

2. अनुभूतेरनुभाव्यत्वे घटादिवदननुभूतित्वप्रसंगात् । (Iṣṭasiddhi).

and a "known" or "knowable". A knowledge that is devoid of both a subject and an object is an utter void.

My son Dr. S. K. Bhavani of the Dept. of Sanskrit, Somaiya College Bombay is bringing out a critical and comparative study of the Gītā—as interpreted by the Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja and Madhva schools as well as by modern exponents like Tilak and Aurobindo.

THE SŪTRA PRASTHĀNA

(3) *Brahmasūtra-Bhāṣya*

(i) Madhva's commentary on the *Brahmasūtras* is, in many ways, a new departure in the history of the Vedāntic thought and interpretation. It is, in the first place, written in a plain and unpretentious style, eschewing all ornament and flourish. It showed that truth told in plain words could expect a patient and respectful hearing. In the history of thought it has so often happened that particular texts have come to be victimized by a dominant line of interpretation, which has, for ever afterwards, prevented critics and commentators from venturing to place them in their proper perspective. The Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa had suffered the same fate at the hands of Śaṅkara, Bhāskara and Rāmānuja, whose general interpretation ran more or less parallel to one another.¹ Madhva showed the necessary courage and boldness in breaking the chains that bound commentators to the unwritten laws of fashionable interpretation and chalked out for himself a new line of thought and interpretation, untrammelled by the deadweight of bygone commentators. He wanted men to take a comprehensive view of the Sūtras by themselves and then decide upon the line of interpretation that would do justice to their plan, purpose and wording. His style, though not his line of interpretation,² has made at least one notable convert : Nimbārka.³

(ii) The Sūtras are held in the highest esteem by Madhva. He identifies them with the "Para-Vidyā" of the Upaniṣads and assigns to them a place and importance altogether unique. He regards them as "Nirṇāyaka-Śāstra" and, as such, of more decisive authority than the rest of the sacred literature which are "Nirṇeya Śāstra."⁴

1. See Thibaut, *S. B. E.*, xxxiv, Introd p. lxxxvi.

2. With the exception of his interpretation of ii, 2, 42.

3. His posteriority to Madhva is established by the non-inclusion of his name among the twenty-one commentators whose views were refuted by Madhva (*M. Vij.* ix, 12). Dasgupta places Nimbārka slightly before Madhva. But he notes the following points in favour of the view that he came *after* Madhva (1) absence of reference to Nimbārka in the, *SDS*; (2) Nimbārka's reference to the Vaiṣṇava Sampradāyas of Śrī, Brahmā and Sanaka, the second being that of Madhva; (3) reference to "Kevalabhedavādi" in the *Svadharmābodha* attributed to him (R. A. S. Bengal Ms.) and (4) existence of a work called *Madhvamatamukhamardana* attributed to Nimbārka (N. W. Catal. Ms. no. 274) deposited in Madan Mohan Lib. Benares (*op. cit.* iii, p. 399-400). The last point is evidently due to a mistaken ascription, the work mentioned being presumably the same as that of Appayya Dikṣita. It is unlikely that N. would have so aggressively criticized Madhva or that it would have remained unrefuted by Madhva's followers.

4. द्विविधं शास्त्रं निर्णीतं निर्णेतव्यं च । तत्राद्यं ब्रह्मसूत्रादिकं द्वितीयं वेदादिकं (NS. 536 b).

(iii) There are three other works of Madhva on the Sūtras : the *Aṇu-Bhāṣya*, the *Nyāyavivaraṇa* and the *Anu-Vyākhyāna*. The *Brahma Sūtra-bhāṣya* is sparing in its criticism of other views, which is reserved for the last.

The *M. Vij.* (ix, 12) refers to the *B. S. B.* as having superseded twenty-one earlier commentaries on the Sūtras. The names of these Bhāṣya-kāras are given in Nārāyaṇa Paṇḍitācārya's own commentary (*Bhāva-prakāśikā*) on the text, as follows : (1) Bhāratīvijaya (2) Saccidānanda (3) Brahmaghosa (4) Śatānanda (5) Udvarta (6) Vijaya (7) Rudrabhaṭṭa (8) Vāmana (9) Yādavaprakāśa (10) Rāmānuja (11) Bhartṛprapañca (12) Dramiḍa (13) Brahmadaṭṭa (14) Bhāskara (15) Piśāca (16) Vṛttikāra (17) Vijayabhaṭṭa (18) Viṣṇukrānta (19) Vādindra (20) Mādhavadāsa¹ and (21) Śaṁkara. Of these the Bhāṣyas of only three, have come down to us²—viz., those of Śaṁkara, Bhāskara and Rāmānuja. The rest are now more or less irrevocably lost to us. But some of them are known through quotations and others by mention in other works. They must very early have been superseded by the more classical Bhāṣyas and have died a natural death, for want of following. There is no doubt that most of them had ceased to have anything but an academic and antiquarian interest, long before the time of Madhva. He must, therefore, have confined his attention chiefly to the more important and living commentaries of his times viz., those of Śaṁkara and Rāmānuja and, to a less extent, of Bhāskara. The Bhāṣya of Śaṁkara was, of course, his main target of attack. Next came that of Rāmānuja and then of Bhāskara. There are also traces of a struggle against Śaivite commentaries. His interpretation of i, 1, 3, strikes us as an adroit turning of the tables of the Sūtras upon Śaivism. It is difficult to fix the identity of the Śaiva commentators against whom he had to contend. There is no proof that it was Śrīkaṇṭha; whose name, moreover, is not included in the list of twenty-one Pre-Madhva commentators. The interesting reference to the manner in which the Śaiva establishes the validity of his Āgama,³ has no parallel in Śrīkaṇṭha's Bhāṣya.

(iv) All the four works of Madhva on the Sūtras, or at least three of them, barring the *Aṇubhāṣya*, should be taken together to have a complete and proper idea of his interpretation of the Vedānta. Writers who have not been aware of the existence of these other works of his on the Sūtras, particularly the *Anuvyākhyāna*, which is Madhva's masterpiece in criticism and constructive exposition, or have not studied it, have often passed hasty and untenable judgments on the value and merit of his interpretation of the Sūtras as a whole or of particular contexts thereof. There can be no excuse, save ignorance, for the following remark of Svāmi

1. He was defeated by Parāśarabhaṭṭa, son of Āndāl and afterwards became Nañjiyar (*op. cit.* Dasgupta, iii, p. 110).

2. For further information re. these early commentators, see Introduction to my *Catussūtri Bhāṣya* of Madhva.

3. *Catussūtribhāṣya*, p. 116 (Notes).

Vivekananda : "That thoroughgoing Dualistic commentator, Madhvācārya deals with this passage (*B. S. iv, 4, 17*) in his usual summary method (*Italics mine*) by quoting a verse from the Varāha Purāṇa" (*Bhakti Yoga, Udbodhan, 1926, sixth edn. p. 14*).

In the same way, Drs. Bhandarkar and Ghate have done grave injustice to Madhva, by passing baseless and distorted remarks on the merits of his performance as a Bhāṣyakāra. It is significant that these have not at all taken into consideration Madhva's *Anu-Vyākhyāna*, which discusses, amplifies and critically examines the interpretations of his Bhāṣya and without which no proper estimate of his work as an interpreter of the Sūtras could be made. The Bhāṣya is written in such a terse style as to be intriguing without the aid of a good commentary and is designed to be supplemented by the AV : (*M. Vij. ix, 10*). Madhva himself says about the condensed nature of his work :

ग्रन्थोऽयमपि बहुर्थो भाष्यं चात्यर्थविस्तरम् ।

बहुज्ञा एव जानन्ति विशेषणार्थमेतयोः ॥

The Bhāṣyas of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja, on the Sūtras are, on the other hand, exhaustive — even verbose. Madhva chose to put whatever he had to say on the Sūtras, by way of his own interpretation and his critical examination of the works of his predecessors, in four separate works. It is not difficult to see why he did so, instead of cramming all that matter into one work, — as they had done. The commentaries of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja were already unwieldy. As Madhva had to differ from and comment on their interpretations frequently, it would have enlarged the scope and size of his work beyond convenient limits and proved a hindrance to the readers had he packed all such diversified matter into one work. The fact that he had not only to present his own views but to convincingly refute such powerful commentators as Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja and Bhāskara not to speak of many others already mentioned, induced Madhva to decide wisely, to distribute his critical, constructive and expository contributions to the interpretation of the Sūtras, over two or three well-planned works of definite scope and proportion. To do him justice, his critics must take all these works into account, instead of rushing to hasty conclusions on insufficient data. Drs. Bhandarkar and Ghate have been the worst offenders in this respect. They would have avoided many of their misconceptions about the real position of Madhva and revised their estimate of his performance as a Commentator on the Sūtras, had they taken his *Bhāṣya* and his *AV.*, together, not to say his *NV.* as they *should* have done. I have dealt with Bhandarkar's comments on Madhva's Bhāṣya, in my *Catussūtribhāṣya*.¹ Ghate's work,² published in an English translation in 1926, has been enjoying a wide reputation among University Professors and students, in Maharashtra State, for years, on account of its coordinated study of four other Bhāṣyas besides Madhva's and its

1. Law Journal Press, Madras, 1934.

2. V. S. Ghate, 'The Vedānta' Eng. tr. Bombay Govt. O. S., Poona, '26.

comparative estimate of them all. I have had particular occasion to take into account this work and its critical remarks on Madhva's Bhāṣya, as a Post-Graduate teacher, in the Bombay and the Karnatak Universities. I have found them to be curt and extremely unfair to Madhva and vitiated by mistaken notions and resting on insufficient data. As the work still commands influence in academic circles, in the absence of any other handy work, it is necessary, in the interests of truth and fairness to correct the distorted and misleading impression of Madhva's performance as an interpreter of the Brahmasūtras created by it and to bring out the intrinsic merit, textual fidelity and contextual consistency of his interpretations. I shall, therefore take up some of the main points raised by Ghate's 'Analysis' of Madhva's BSB, along with some others deserving attention, leaving out minor and technical objections to the interpretation of individual sūtras, such as i, 1, 5; i, 3, 8; ii, 1, 13-14; iv, 1, 12; iv, 1, 14; and iv, 2,—which could all be effectively disposed of in the light of the penetrating discussions contained in the *Tātparyā-Candrikā*¹ and other later works of the system.

A REVIEW OF GHATE'S ESTIMATE OF MADHVA'S SŪTRA BHĀṢYA

Madhva's c. on the Sūtras differs *widely* from all those of his predecessors, both in the general drift of interpretation and in the nature of topics raised for discussion under the various adhikaraṇas. The sources from which these topics are chosen for discussion, also, cover a wider range of literature embracing the Samhitās, Āraṇyakas, Khilas and Purāṇas. But these are no grounds for condemning his work as "a performance of little or no merit" (p. 168) as has been done by Ghate.

Coming as it did after twenty-one earlier commentaries in the field, Madhva's Bhāṣya had naturally to differ from them on many vital points of doctrine and interpretation. It can be shown that, in many crucial instances, his interpretations show a decided improvement in quality and details.

(i) The extension of the sense of "ādi" in i, 1, 2, to include five other important cosmic functions of the Supreme, viz., *niyamana*, *jñāna*, *ajñāna*, *bandha* and *mokṣa*, is a step in the right direction, as these are clearly given in the Prasthānatrayī as specific cosmic attributes of Brahman² and any elucidation and complete interpretation of "ādi" must include and

1. Ghate's trivial objection to Madhva's interpretation of i, 3, 8, (p. 168) on the mere "absence of the particle "ca" has been silenced in the *Candrikā* showing how it could be supplied from the following sūtra in the *same* adhikaraṇa. The decisive superiority of Madhva's more comprehensive interpretation of this adhikaraṇa to Śaṅkara's is also brought out therein with more than half a dozen solid arguments. See under "Candrikā" in Chap. XXVI For similar 'apakarṣa' (from a following sūtra (Cf. S. on एक आत्मनः (न व्यतिरेकः) शरीरे भावात् III. 3. 53. Also from one adhi. to the next See S. on B.S. i. 3. 42. (व्यपदेशादित्यनुवर्तते) ।

2. Cf. "Niyamana" (*Brh. Up.* iii, 7, 13-24) "Jñānājñāna" (*Gītā* xv. 15) "Bandha" and "Mokṣa" (*Śvet. Up.* vi, 16). See also B. S. i, 2, 10; 1, 2, 18; ii, 2, 3; i, 3, 2.

take notice of them. There is no question of their subsumption in “*ādi*” when one is *explaining* what “*ādi*” in “*Janmādi*” *stands for*, in the Sūtra. At any rate, a special mention must be made of Mokṣa, which is the goal of Jijñāsā and which cannot simply be subsumed in Laya. See also *Taitt. Up.* यत्प्रयन्त्यभिसंविशन्ति (iii, 1). Texts like *Śvet. Up.* vi. 16 and *B. S.* iii, 2, 5, mention bondage and release separately as depending on Brahman. A special mention of “*mokṣahetutva*” needs must be made, in the circumstances, in elucidating the significance of “*ādi*” in i, 1, 2. Certainly, for a seeker, it is a more important characteristic of Brahman than the creation or destruction of the world ! Madhva, then, has shown greater philosophical vision than others, in specifying the other predications of *niyamana* etc., and particularly “*mokṣa-hetutva*” in the explanation of the term “*ādi*”, in i, 1, 2.

(ii) The fifth adhikaraṇa, as interpreted by Madhva establishes that Brahman is directly denoted and expressed (*vācya*) by the entire Śāstra, in the fullest and primary sense of the terms employed : शास्त्रस्य सर्वशब्दैर्मुच्यतो वाच्यम् । This is necessary in the interests of the “*Samanvaya*” laid down in the previous adhikaraṇa. Here, the question would naturally arise, if one should necessarily accept that Brahman is *vācya* or directly expressed by the words of Scripture; or if the *Samanvaya* proposed could be demonstrated otherwise, on the basis of “*Lakṣaṇāvṛtti*” (secondary application) in view of texts like “*Yato vāco nivartante*” (*Tait. Up.*) Madhva points out that the question has to be mooted in view of the fact that there are other texts which clearly teach that Brahman is directly expressed by the entire Śāstra— सर्वे वेदा यत्प्रदमामनन्ति । वचसां वाच्यमुत्तमम् — and the best and the most proper place to do so would obviously be *before* actually entering into the details of the *Samanvaya* from the *Ānandamayādhikaraṇa* onwards. He is, therefore quite reasonable in having raised the issue and its concomitant details here. He has also argued with great weight that (1) Brahman being “*aupaniṣada*” (knowable *only* through Scripture), there can be no other way of approach to it save through Śabda (words) : औपनिषदत्वान्नावचनेनेक्षणम्.¹ Even *Lakṣaṇāvṛtti* would be impossible in the event of a given thing being inexpressible by any word. A reality that is essentially and absolutely inexpressible (*avācya*) can never be brought within the range of *Lakṣaṇā* also : सर्वशब्दावाच्यस्य लक्षणायुक्तेः² as all *Lakṣaṇāvṛtti* is basically connected with “*vācyatva*” : वाच्यसंबद्धतया ज्ञातस्यैव लक्ष्यत्वात् (*Candrikā*).³

There is, thus, good reason to deal with these logical and philosophical objections to *Samanvaya* at *this* stage and to treat the first five adhikaraṇas in the beginning as, introductory (*Adhyāyapādapīṭha*), as has been done by Madhva. It is surprising then, to be told by Ghate, that Madhva’s interpretation of i, 1, 5 is “unsatisfactory and groundless”

1. स्वप्रकाशतया नित्यसिद्धौ च शास्त्रवैयर्थ्यात् (*Candrikā*, p. 210).

2. This point is further elucidated by Jayatīrtha, with a syllogistic argument of great force and subtlety : विप्रतिपन्नं न लक्ष्यं केनापि पदेनावच्यत्वात्; वैधर्म्येण तीरादिवत् ।

3. Cf. मुख्यार्थबाधे तद्योगे... . (*Sāhityadarpaṇa*, ii, 5).

and that "his interpretation is not supported by the remaining sūtras of the *adhikaraṇa*" (p. 168. *op. cit.*). No reason has however been given to substantiate this remark. As a matter of fact, the whole *adhikaraṇa* stands cogently explained from the point of view of "Vācyatvasamarthana" of Brahman and the different sūtras also fall into their proper places in the argument. The difficulty felt by Ghate, does not, at any rate, exist in any inherent defect in the interpretation of Madhva or its elucidation by his commentators. The sequence of ideas is as follows:

The fifth sūtra : ईक्षतेर्नाशब्दम् maintains that Brahman cannot be regarded as "aśabdām" (i.e. *śabdāvācya*m or inexpressible by words). It must be accepted as सर्वशब्दमुच्यवाच्यम् on account of its being the object of knowledge (ईक्षणीय) of all Śāstras.¹ The next sūtra : गौणश्चेन्नात्मशब्दात् reinforces this point by showing that *ikṣaṇīyatva* pertains to the Supreme Being alone² and not to any other being associated with the three guṇas, the Śaḅala-Brahman or the Jivātman.³ For, the *Ikṣaṇīya* is referred to in the Śrutis, by the term "Ātman", which primarily denotes the Supreme (*B. S. i, 3, 1*). The next two sūtras refute possible objections that this Ātman can be "Gaṇa" (associated with the three guṇas) by showing that there are Scriptural statements to the effect that one who knows the Ātman attains Mokṣa (and it is accepted by all that it is by the knowledge of the very highest Brahman that mokṣa is attained and not by knowledge of the Saguṇa (!) and that He alone should be sought by the Seeker, eschewing all other values (ह्येत्वावचनाच्च). This means that only the "A—gaṇa" Ātmā is the ultimate object of knowledge of the Śāstras (ईक्षणीय), *vācya* and *Muktaprāpya*. The ninth sūtra refers to one other characteristic of the Supreme (Agaṇa-Ātmā) who is revealed by the Śāstras viz., that He is the One 'that emerges from and merges into Himself' (स्वाप्ययात्). The reference is taken by Madhva to be to *Brh. Up. v, 1, 1*, referring to the Infinite (Pūrṇa) coming out of Itself and going back into Itself and always remaining the same Infinite right through. The entry of the Gaṇa (Jīva) into Brahman is put in *different words* by the Sūtrakāra (see i, 1. 19, avoiding "Sva"). This also confirms the correctness of Madhva's interpretation and reference. The point to be noted here is that the Gaṇa-Ātmā, whoever he is, would have to be merged in *another* who is Agaṇa and this would not satisfy the condition of "Svāpyaya". And it would be equally preposterous to merge the

1. ईक्षतेरित्यनेन शब्दमात्रस्यासाधकतया ज्ञानकर्मत्वस्यैव विवक्षणीयत्वात् । (*Candrikā*, p. 215).

2. Cf. यज्ज्ञात्वा नेह भूयोऽन्यत् ज्ञातव्यम् । (*Gītā*).

3. It would be seen that the use of the term "Gaṇaḥ" in the masculine, in the sūtra, is more appropriate to Madhva's explanation of the term : नच गौण आत्मा दृश्यो वाच्यश्च, न निर्गुण इति युक्तम् । than to those of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja, to whom ईक्षते: in the sūtra stands for the root-meaning ईक्षणम् which is claimed to be figuratively applied to the Prakṛti, which is Jaḍa, in the *pūrvapakṣa* (See Śaṅkara; सतस्तु न गौणमीक्षितृत्वमित्युक्तम् i, 1, 6); and in which case, we should have had the neuter noun here गौणं चेन्नात्मशब्दात् in the Sūtra. This is certainly a more serious objection than the one urged by Ghate against Madhva's explanation of i, 3, 8, on the ground of "absence of *ca*" (p. 65).

Agaṇa in the Gaṇa ! The tenth sūtra strengthens the case for “vācyatva” of Brahman by affirming that there is “Gatisāmānya” or complete agreement in the teaching of Scripture about the Agaṇa alone being the *mukhyavācya*, *jñeya* and *muktagamya* and that there is no dissenting voice to this, anywhere in the Scriptures. The *Candrikā* puts the idea of how this sūtra goes to reinforce “vācyatva” as follows : अत एव ‘गतिसामान्यात्’ इत्यस्य संशब्दार्थसमर्थनरूपतयैक्यादेतदधिकरणान्तर्भावः ॥ शाखान्तरे सत्त्वादिगुणयुक्तेऽप्यात्मशब्दो मुख्यतयोच्यतां, तज्ज्ञानान्मोक्षादिश्चोच्यतां, अतश्च नात्मशब्दादिना निर्गुणस्य ईक्षणीयत्वमिति शंका निरासकत्वेन गतिसामान्यस्य अधिकरणान्तर्गतिः ॥

(p. 207).

The last Sūtra : श्रुतत्वाच्च rounds off the discussion, giving one more reason to support “vācyatva” of Brahman viz. that it is “heard”, which is tellingly explained by Madhva : न ह्यशब्दः श्रूयते ! !

Thus, the entire exposition of the Ikṣatyadhikaraṇa, according to Madhva’s line of interpretation, has not only inner consistency but is also free from logical and contextual objections. This cannot be said of the interpretation of this adhikaraṇa by Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja, in terms of a denial of the causation of the Universe, to Prakṛti. Such an interpretation would, in the first place, be out of place in this Samanvayādhyāya. Secondly, it would involve violent twisting of evidence,¹ special pleading and many liberties with the wording of the text of the Sūtras, in construing them. I shall consider the plea of “aśabdatvam” of Prakṛti, later. Confining our attention, now, to the actual construction of the Sūtras, (1) we find no ablative case in “aśabdam” proposed to be treated as a *hetu* (Cf. Śaṅkara : अशब्दं हि तत्). (2) The simplest and most natural way of explaining the Sūtra, as it is, would be to take “aśabdam” as the natural predicate of the Sūtra-proposition ईक्षतेर्नाशब्दम्—the subject being easily understood to be “Brahman” from the first Sūtra or तत् from the immediately preceding one (i, 1, 4). (3) There is no justification to abandon this natural drift of the Sūtra and introduce a new subject in the form of Prakṛti, whose Aśabdatvam is *yet to be proved*, even according to Śaṅkara and others, in the fourth pāda. (4) It is also doubtful, in spite of all the ingenious efforts of Śaṅkara and others to do so, if the Prakṛti can really be dismissed as Aśabdam (‘not supported by the Śruti’) by any dispassionate student of the sacred texts. (5) On Śaṅkara’s interpretation, we have to introduce a fresh predicate “kāraṇam” in i, 1, 5, and (6) to repeat the expression with a modification of the case into the genitive, in order to make out a final reason to reject the causality of Prakṛti. We would thus have virtually two propositions : 1. [प्रधानं] न [कारणं] अशब्द [त्वात्] 2. [कारणस्य] ईक्षतेः । (7) As against all this tortuous proceeding, Madhva’s straight and simple construction of the Sūtra should certainly be deemed *more satisfactory* and *not less*, as there is no point or particular hurry in seeking to refute the Pradhānakāraṇavāda, here, when the same is to be considered (over again, at length in the fourth pāda, according to Śaṅkara and others and) actually in ii, 2.

1. Cf. B. S. i, 1, 22, i, 2, 22; ii, 3, 1.

The refutation of the Sāṃkhya Prakṛti as “foreign to the Vedas” (*aśabdam*) in the Pre-Madhva commentaries on i, 1, 5, is really a contextual misfit in the “Samanvayādhyāya”. This fact must be squarely admitted. The Sūtrakāra is refuting the claims of Prakṛti to be regarded as “Jagat-kāraṇa” in Adhyāya ii, 2, 1-10. There is no need then to anticipate the issue here. The reason given to discredit the Prakṛti, that it is “*aśabdam*” (not recognized in the Śāstras) is untenable; for there are clear texts in the Upaniṣads that accept the Prakṛti as the material principle in the Universe (*Śvet. Up.* iv, 5, 1). There are also many other references to the acceptance of Prakṛti, in the sacred literature¹ which cannot be ignored or explained away. The question of the *status* of Prakṛti (whether operating independently of Brahman, or as a dependent principle) would be an altogether different issue which would not affect its provenness (*Śrautatvam*). No modern scholar feels happy over Śaṃkara’s *tour de force* in banishing the Prakṛti from the domain of Upaniṣadic thought. Dasgupta recognizes Madhva’s interpretation of the Ikṣatyadhikaraṇa as a refutation of the dogma of the “Avācyatva” (inexpressibility) of Brahman as “surely not less cogent” (*op. cit.* vol. IV, p. 130, f. n. 1). It would be obvious that an objection based on the Avācyatva of Brahman would have priority over any other topic *vis à vis* the immediate and main thesis of the Chapter viz. “Samanvaya” (of names and marks).² The fact also that there *are* subsequent adhikaraṇas refuting the causality of Prakṛti (ii, 2, 1 and i, 4, 1; 24 according to Śaṃkara himself), considerably weakens the case for Śaṃkara and others in i, 1, 5. There is greater cogency and fitness in refuting the objection to Samanvaya based on the ground of the Avācyatva dogma, immediately after the enunciation of Samanvaya (*samanvaya-pratijñā*) in i, 1, 4 *than* in criticizing the Jagatkāraṇatva of Prakṛti ! There is no immediate contextual urgency or propriety in raising the issue about Prakṛti at *this stage*. As a matter of fact, it has been rightly reserved to the II adhyāya. If any passing refutation of Prakṛti-kāraṇatva were, however, called for at this stage, it should have been made immediately after the second adhikaraṇa, where Brahman (alone) was defined as the author of the Universe ! It is too much to make the Sūtrakāra digress into that question in one full adhikaraṇa of as many as seven sūtras, instead of making a passing reference to it in a *guṇasūtra* tagged on to, i, 1, 2, if he could not really have waited till Adhyāya ii, where he *is* attacking the causality of Prakṛti, in a full-dress debate. All this shows that the true interpretation of this adhikaraṇa has been missed (whether intentionally or otherwise) by the oldest extant commentator on the Sūtras, Śaṃkara, who has

1. *Cūlika Up.* 3; 5; *Śvet. Up.* i, 9; iv, 5; *Gītā* xiii, 19; *Mbh.* xii, 347, 31; *Bhāgavata* iii, 26, 10; 11; *Viṣṇu Pur.* i, 2, 29. and *B. S.* i, 2, 22.

2. Cf. तथापि शब्दगोचरतैव प्रथमप्रतिपाद्या स्यात् । अवाच्यत्वे हि ब्रह्मणि शब्दसंबन्ध एवानुपपन्नः । जगत्कारणत्वादवाक्यविचारस्तु दूरे । सांख्यनिराकरणाभावे तु, सृष्ट्यादिवाक्यानामेव समन्वयानुपपत्तिः । अतः प्रथमं वाच्यत्वसमर्थनेन समन्वयसंभावनायां सत्यां, वाक्यविशेषनिष्ठस्य विचारस्य पश्चादवसर इति ॥

(NS. p. 120).

sidetracked the issue into a groundless attack on the Sāṃkhya Prakṛti, which has no legs to stand upon. Perhaps, it was a shrewd move on his part to avoid a frontal attack on one of the most cherished dogmas of monism—the Avācyatva of Brahman. This wrong lead has been tamely accepted and followed by all those who came after him, regardless of consistency with Scriptural evidence or even with their own views ! For instance, Rāmānuja adopts the same line of the interpretation. But while it is possible for Śaṅkara to repudiate the category of Prakṛti by reducing it to his “Māyā”, it is *impossible* for Rāmānuja to do away with the Prakṛti as such; inasmuch as it is one of the three categories of Viśiṣṭādvaita. The question of the metaphysical dependence of Prakṛti (Acit) is really irrelevant to the discussion here about its *Śrautatva* (as a category of his and the Sūtrakāra’s Siddhānta). *Accepting, then, the category of Prakṛti or Acit as he does,*¹ Rāmānuja has the least justification to dub Prakṛti “*aśabdam*” following Śaṅkara”. This should be sufficient to show that a grave historical blunder has been committed over the interpretation of the fifth adhikaraṇa by almost all the Pre-Madhva commentators. Madhva has really opened our eyes by giving a correct lead in the matter. Had Ghate weighed this matter carefully and dispassionately, he would not have pronounced Madhva’s interpretations “a performance of little or no merit !” (*op. cit.* p. 168).

(iii) Another adhikaraṇa which has been taken to be indubitably in favor of the view that Brahman is itself the material cause of the world, by most commentators, is the Prakṛtyadhikaraṇa (i, 4, 24, ff.) which has been looked upon as a sort of trump card of Pantheism in the Sūtras. It may be stated at the very outset that the Sūtra is definitely against Vivarta-vāda and the *Bhāmati* tries to wriggle out of this difficulty by specious special pleading. As for the Pariṇāmavāda interpretation, which has been more widely accepted by modern scholars (and adopted by Bhāskara and Rāmānuja) the context comes in its way. For, this adhikaraṇa occurring in the Samanvayādhyāya, must have for its subject-matter the bare Samanvaya (attunement) of terms like “Prakṛti”, “Yoni”, etc., in Brahman and nothing more. It would be stretching the Sūtra beyond its legitimate scope, to attempt to define the nature of Brahman’s causality of the Universe in terms of “*nimitta*” or “*Upādāna*” or *both*. The right place for any such discussion would be in the II Adhyāya, not the first (Samanvaya). It is strange that no modern scholar has bothered to question the propriety of dissociating the entire fourth pāda of the Samanvayādhyāya from “*samanvaya*” proper, and making it discuss a number of miscellaneous topics without any attempt at correlating those topics or the terms under reference there, to *Brahman*. Does not the “performance” of all the commentators who have done so, amount to a cruel dismemberment and amputation of one Pāda from the Samanvayādhyāya ? How could it serve the interests

1. न वयमव्यक्तं तत्परिणामविशेषांश्च स्वरूपेण नाभ्युपगच्छामः । अपि तु, परमपुरुषशरीरतया तदात्म-
कत्वविहेरण । तथानभ्युपगमादेव तन्त्रसिद्धप्रक्रियानिरसनम् ॥ (Śrībhāṣya, i, 4, 3).

of the attunement of the Śāstra to Brahman (and Brahman alone, i, 1, 4), if Brahman is *not* shown to be the real subject of reference, in each of those contexts of the fourth Pāda also? Why should we be asked to make an exception (as regards the nature of the subject) in the case of this last pāda alone? What sort of a Brahmanavāda would the Sūtrakāra's be, if he were made to concede that in some cases there is Samanvaya of Śāstra in things *other than Brahman*.¹ It is utterly pointless to contend under i, 4, 2, as has been done by Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja and others, that the "Avyakta" spoken of in *Kaṭha. Up.* (i, 3, 11) is *not* the Sāṃkhya Prakṛti, by any means; *but* the three subtle elements (*bhūtasūkṣma*) energy, water and food (*tejo-abanna*), of which the gross human body is constituted. The quarrel is not over names; but over the essence of things. Since the so-called *bhūtasūkṣmas* are also material and liable to modification (*vikāri*), they would answer to the definition of Prakṛti and its three *guṇas* and no useful purpose will be served by insisting that this "avyakta", here, is *not* Prakṛti. The more pertinent question to be asked would be, "Is this term "Avyakta", here, made to stand for Brahman? The answer is no—according to almost all the commentators, except Madhva! It is *their* commentary that seems to be "inferior in character" and "of little or no merit" in the present case. And nothing shows the irrelevance and futility of the interpretation of the Ānumānikādhikaraṇa (i, 4, 1-9) by Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja and others than their hazardous identification of the "Avyakta" (i, 4, 1) with the human body (*śarīram*) and their laboured explanation that though gross in itself, the human body is called "avyaktam" here, in the Upaniṣad, in view of the fact that it is composed of the subtle elements (*bhūtasūkṣma*) viz. "tejo-abanna" (energy, water and food) which are *subtle* (*avyakta*). The ultimate futility of this explanation lies in the fact that it is equally fatal to the causality of Brahman, whether "Avyakta" is identified with the Prakṛti or the subtle elements. Moreover, in the last analysis, the "bhūtasūkṣmas" (which are material in essence and subject to modification), would be indistinguishable from Prakṛti and its three strands of *guṇatraya*. Madhva's commentator Jayatīrtha, in a powerful critique of this explanation of i, 4, 2, by the other commentators, shows its utter futility, in the course of his comment on the same point raised by Madhva' in his *AV* :

इदं तु वक्तव्यं कथमव्यक्तशब्देन शरीरमुच्यते इति । न ह्येषा रुद्धिः । नापि योगः संभवति । शरीरस्य व्यक्तत्वात् । ननु, परिहृतमेतत् सूत्रकृता 'सूक्ष्मं तु तदर्हत्वात्' इति । * * * कार्यकारणशब्दाश्च संकीर्यन्ते 'गोभिः श्रीणीत मत्सरम्' इति यथेति । अत्र वक्तव्यम्—किमनेनोक्तं भवतीति? किं शरीरमेवात्रोच्यतेऽव्यक्तशब्दस्तत्रोपचरितः; किंवा * * * पक्षद्वयेऽपि दोषमाह-यत्नेति । * * * अयमभिसन्धिः—सर्वथा तावन्ना-व्यक्तपदं ब्रह्मपरं त्वयोच्यते । किंतु, भूतसूक्ष्मकार्यशरीरस्य भूतसूक्ष्मस्य वाचकमिति । परेण तु, प्रधानवाचकमिति । यदि चाव्यक्तस्य कारणत्वमभिप्रेतं तदा पक्षद्वयमपि ब्रह्मवादस्य प्रतिपक्षभूतमिति, शरीरांगीकारेण प्रधाननिरासो व्यर्थः । कारणत्वाविवक्षायां तु, पक्षद्वयस्याप्यविरुद्धत्वात् किमनेनान्यतरनिराकरणाग्रहेण? विफलत्वादसंग-तत्वाच्च । अथवा, अनादेरुपादानस्य जडस्य भूतसूक्ष्मशब्दाभिधेयस्यांगीकारे प्रधानं नेति रिक्तं वचः । तल्लक्षणत्वात् प्रधानस्य । नास्मिन् विवादायोगात् इति भावः । (NS. pp. 191-192 b).

1. जगत्कारणत्वेन खल्वत्राजा प्रतीयते । सा ब्रह्मवादिना ब्रह्मपरतया समर्थनीया; तेजोऽब्रह्मात्मकतया समर्थनेऽतिव्याप्तेः तुल्यत्वादिति । (NS. p. 193).

It may perhaps be claimed that the “Prakṛtyadhikaraṇa” is intended to clarify the nature of Brahman’s causality, in terms of material causality *also*. But this explanation cannot be accepted, as no satisfactory reason can be given why such a clarification has not been given immediately after i, 1, 2; where Brahman was defined as the cause of the world, were it really necessary. Clarification, moreover, is to be given only when called for. The terms of the definition of Brahman in i, 1, 2, point in the direction of an *efficient cause only*. This is confirmed by the interpretation of the fifth *adhikaraṇa* according to these commentators, where the emphasis laid on sentient activity (*ikṣāpūrvaka-kartṛtvam*) points to an efficient cause (*nimitta*) alone. If, then, the question whether the Brahman is *not also* the material cause of the Universe is to be raised at some stage, it should, naturally, be regarded as a new topic for discussion. Its proper place then, would be in the II Chapter and not in the first.

Perhaps, it may be argued that since the Prakṛti had been denied any Śāstraic place and validity in i, 1, 5 and i, 4, 1, the Brahman itself would have to be regarded as the material cause of the world, in the absence of the category of Pradhāna or any other material principle answering to it; and hence this question of the material causality of Brahman is in order in i, 4, 24. Even this ingenious explanation would be of no avail. For, it should be clarified whether i, 4, 1, really denies the existence of the category of Pradhāna, *as such*; or, simply that terms like “Avyakta” used in the Śāstras, refer to it. The Samanvayādhyāya is not directly concerned with the denial of categories other than Brahman referred to in the Upaniṣads; but in correlating their names in a higher Śāstraic attunement to Brahman, from certain mystic, metaphysical or metaphysico-philological standpoints, leaving their individual existence and functioning in their own limited spheres and their right to be designated by their respective names, in a lesser sense, intact. The non-existence of Pradhāna, as a category, would not, therefore, be a valid inference from the Samanvaya of terms descriptive of Pradhāna, in the Samanvayādhyāya. The question *cannot*, therefore, arise, as to which is the material cause of the world, in the absence of Pradhāna. For there is no absence of Pradhāna at all. The second alternative too, would be to no purpose, *unless and until it is also shown in the same breath*, that such terms descriptive of Pradhāna and other entities, discussed in this Samanvayādhyāya, have reference to Brahman, instead. If that is *not done*, those discussions would be outside the scope of Samanvaya. But that is not the line of interpretation adopted by these commentators ! The nemesis of their failure to do so, is overpervasion of the definition of Brahman as Jagatkāraṇa, in respect of these others. The only correct interpretation then of the various *adhikaraṇas* of the fourth *pāda*, (of the Samanvayādhyāya), would be to correlate terms like Prakṛti, Avyakta, Jyotiḥ, Pañcajana and Yoni, used there, to Brahman as the subject of *Samanvaya*. There is, however, no need to fear that such a samanvaya would *annul* the existence of Prakṛti and other categories *as such*. The non-existence of Prakṛti as a category

would be an illegitimate deduction, as already pointed out, from such Samanvaya. "We could not, surely, deduce the non-existence of a category like Ākāśa, for instance, from the mere fact that that term has been attuned to Brahman, in i, 1, 22. Nor could we, as a consequence of that *adhikaraṇa*, ask, "where should the world exist, in the absence of Ākāśa? Nor has any such issue been raised or answered by the *Sūtrakāra*"¹ Why then, should the case be other, with regard to Prakṛti alone? It is, thus, utterly pointless to contend that Brahman is sought to be established as the material cause of the world, in i, 4, 24, on account of the annulment of Prakṛti as such, as a consequence of the correlation of the term "Avyakta" (and others) to the Brahman. The whole argument is extremely laboured and flimsy. For, it should be clear from the procedure adopted by the *Sūtrakāra*, with reference to terms like Ākāśa (i, 1, 22) and their Samanvaya in Brahman, where despite such an attunement, the existence of the category of Ākāśa *as such* and its normal function, in its own sphere (*Taitt. Up.* ii, 1) are *not* denied. *Sūtra* i, 4, 15, also, establishes Brahman to be the chief and ultimate causal force working in *and through* Ākāśa and others in the production of the evolutionary series of Ākāśa, Vāyu, Agni, Pṛthvī etc. from one another, in the descending order (*Taitt. Up.* ii, 1), and therefore entitled to be designated by those epithets of 'intermediary causes' (अवान्तरं कारणम्) as well.

(iv) This interpretation is fully consistent with the context of Samanvaya of terms in Brahman which is the subject-matter of this Adhyāya. According to Śaṅkara, however, *Sūtra* i, 4, 15, purports to show that there is absolute uniformity of opinion in Scripture about Brahman being the ultimate source of the Universe, notwithstanding certain internal discrepancies, here and there, in the order of evolution of different substances described therein. Such an interpretation is open to several objections. (1) In the first place, it involves a strained additional splitting up of the expression कारणत्वेन into कारणत्वे and न and the ascription of a far-fetched meaning of "but" (तु) to the " च " in कारणत्वेन च आकाशादिषु यथाव्यपदिष्टोक्तेः (i, 4, 15). It also involves, (2) the importation (अध्याहार) of an additional term विगान (discrepancy) to complete the sense of the Pūrvapakṣa. (3) The question of internal contradictions and discrepancies in Scripture, raised by Śaṅkara here, is entirely out of place in the first Adhyāya, That would have to be discussed in Adhyāya II. As a matter of fact Śaṅkara himself

1. Madhva has very briefly referred to the untenability of the interpretation of the Prakṛtyadhikaraṇa in terms of the "Upādānatva" of Brahman according to other Bhāṣyākāras, in his *B. S. B.* : नचान्यत् कल्प्यम् । अप्रामाणिकत्वात् । He has, as usual, reserved a full discussion of this problem to his *AV.* where he examines the Parīṇāma and Vivartavāda explanations of Bhāṣkara and Śaṅkara, at length. Jayatīrtha, in his *NS* on the *AV* has taken the opportunity to examine Rāmānuja's version of the "Abhinnaṇimittopādānavāda". In his *TP.* on Madhva's *B. S. B.*, Jayatīrtha has, on the lines summarized above, ably refuted the generally accepted view of the Upādānakāraṇatva-interpretation of this adhikaraṇa, given by other schools. He has put the whole problem in a new perspective and his observations will have to be seriously considered by all those who profess to make an objective approach to the question of *Sūtra*-interpretation.

discusses such internal and mutual conflicts and discrepancies of Scriptural details in ii, 3 and 4 in the Viyad-adhikaraṇa etc. There is no point in the plea advanced on, Śaṁkara's behalf that in ii, 2, internal conflicts in Scripture are resolved; while i, 4, resolves mutual conflicts among texts. Such nice distinction of details may perhaps necessitate their discussion in two different pādaś (of the same Adhyāya). But in no circumstance can their discussion under *two different Adhyāyas*, as here, be justified. (4) Moreover, Śaṁkara himself has actually discussed such mutual contradictions of texts pertaining to the origination of Ākāśa etc., ii, 3, and 4. (5) His interpretation i, 4, 15, even as it stands, is hardly convincing as it leaves the alleged Scriptural discrepancies in respect of the effects, unresolved, on the one-sided plea that notwithstanding them there is unanimity of view about Brahman being the One Cause. If the discrepancies do not at all matter because the Śrutis have no real interest in creation as such (as Śaṁkara puts in), one would expect the Sūtrakāra not to have bothered himself about similar discrepancies in respect of the evolution of Ākāśa etc., in ii, 3. Thus, Śaṁkara's interpretation of i, 4, 15, is extremely unsatisfactory. Madhva's interpretation of it as establishing that Brahman is not merely the ultimate and primary cause of the evolutionary series; but the proximate cause as well (अवान्तरकारणम्) at every stage of the evolutionary series and therefore entitled to be designated by those terms as well (as 'Ākāśa', 'Vāyu', 'Agni' etc.), has the merit of keeping close to the subject-matter of the Pāda, viz., Samanvaya of terms and marks, in Brahman.

(v) The discussion in ii, 3, 1-7, over the 'creation' of Ākāśa and the ruling given on the point that it (*bhūtākāśa*) is produced¹ clearly presupposes the acceptance by the Sūtrakāra, of a theory of dual reference of terms (Vṛtti-dvaya) viz., the 'Paramamukhya-vṛtti' (highest reference in the transcendental and fullest etymological sense) to Brahman and in a 'Mukhya-vṛtti' or conventional primary sense of ordinary parlance, to express other things. Madhva finds the technique and details of this theory of Samanvaya and its application in one special adhikaraṇa, in this pāda (i, 4, 16-23). Dasgupta has shown (*op. cit.* iii, pp. 34 and 502) that the *Vāyu Purāṇa* and the *Ahīrbudhnya* apply "epithets like Prakṛti, Pradhāna, Prasūti, Yoni, Kṣetra, Akṣara and Avyakta to Brahman." This must suffice to show that Madhva's interpretation of the Prakṛtyadhikaraṇa is neither "fantastic" nor "far-fetched" as Bhandarkar has described it.² On the contrary, it would appear from the evidence supplied by Dasgupta, to represent faithfully, "the oldest traditional outlook of the philosophy of the Upaniṣadas and the Brahmasūtras preserved in the Purāṇic tradition" (*op. cit.* iii, 496). Contextual consistency and traditional sanctions are thus, entirely, in favour of Madhva's integral approach to the interpretation of the Samanvayādhyāya and of all its pādas, without

1. Cf. Śaṁkara also : तस्मात्, ब्रह्मकार्यं वियत् इति सिद्धम् ii, 3, 7.

2. *Vaiṣṇavism, Śaivism* etc., Strassburg, 1913, p. 58.

any exception, in terms of direct Samanvaya of names and epithets. This is in glaring contrast with the performance of all other commentators on the Sūtra, who have allowed themselves to be victimized by Śaṅkara's line of interpretation, which mutilates one whole pāda from the Samanvayādhyāya, to sustain its *tour de force* in banishing the Prakṛti from the Śāstras (i, 1, 5) which is itself open to serious objection. Madhva's interpretation of the entire fourth Pāda also of the I Adhyāya, in strict conformity with Samanvaya of names and epithets, must, unquestionably be recognized as a substantial contribution to its correct understanding. Ghate himself, has complimented Madhva on the remarkable consistency with which he has adhered to the plan of the Sūtrakāra, here; though for reasons best known to himself, he throws consistency to the winds in taking sides with manifestly indefensible interpretations.

(vi) Among other instances of Madhva's faithfulness to the context of the Sūtras may be noted his interpretation of the Sandhyādhikaraṇa (iii, 2, 1-5), in terms of the reality of dream-experiences, which has a direct bearing on the subject-matter of "Sādhana". Śaṅkara's dismissal of dream-experiences as unreal projections of the Ātman would have no conceivable bearing on Sādhana-vicāra, which is the topic of this pāda and so be out of place.¹

(vii) Similarly, the interpretation of तत्रापि च तद्व्यापारादविरोधः (iii, 1, 16). Here, the point raised by Madhva has a bearing on the question of Sādhana; while the issue raised by Śaṅkara, viz., whether Yama or Citragupta should be regarded as the real ruler and dispenser of punishments in Hell turns out to be a mere technical triviality which could make no difference to Sādhana anyway; and is therefore, irrelevant to the main context.

(viii) Throughout the Sādhanādhyāya, neither Śaṅkara nor Rāmānuja has been able to find a place for Bhakti *directly* in the Sūtras. This would be a glaring deficiency in a system of Theistic philosophy such as that of the Sūtrakāra, who is familiar enough with the Pañcarātra and other schools and is even claimed by some to have been a Bhāgavata by faith. That apart, even from the standpoint of the Saguna-Brahman, whom the Sūtrakāra is taken to acknowledge, by Śaṅkara, we have every right to expect a prominent place to be assigned to "Bhakti" within the body of the Sūtras. It is only Madhva who has realized the serious nature of this gap in the earlier interpretation of the Sūtras and filled it by his apt and highly suggestive interpretation of अम्बुवदग्रहणात् न तथात्वम् (iii, 2, 19). According to him, "अम्बुवत्" (like water) expresses through simile, the innate quality of intense love and attachment to God and ग्रहणम् stands for knowledge (ज्ञानम्). The Sūtra as a whole, is thus taken to emphasize that without such a cohesive attachment and love of God going hand in hand with spiritual knowledge, it would not be possible for the human

1. For further discussion of the proper bearing of this adhi. on the theme of Bhakti, see my *Brahmasūtras and Their Principal Commentaries*, Vol III. (1978).

soul to realize its intrinsic spiritual affinity to God and attain communion with Him. Considering the context of this Pāda, viz., Sādhana, it must be conceded that this is quite a happy and reasonable interpretation of the Sūtra in question. The aesthetic and exegetical justification for this obviously figurative construction in the Sūtra is admirably explained by Vādirāja, in his gloss on Jayatīrtha's c. on this Sūtra, which deserves to be quoted :

अल्पाक्षरत्वलाभाय भक्त्यभावादिति वक्तव्ये, यत् 'अम्बुवदग्रहणात्' इति सूत्रं, तद्भक्तेः स्वरूपनिरूपणार्थमिति भावेनोक्तम्—“अम्बुवत् स्नेहेन ग्रहणं ज्ञानम्” इति । माहात्म्यज्ञानपूर्वकस्नेहो हि भक्तिः । तर्हि, 'स्नेहेनाज्ञानादिति कुतो नोक्तमिति चेत्; सत्यम् । अम्बुनि चिक्कणतारव्यः स्नेहो यथा आजानजत्वात् अतिसुदृढः । तथाति-सुदृढस्नेहलाभाय 'अम्बुवत्' इत्युक्तम् । गृह्णाति, कदापि न मुञ्चतीति ज्ञानेऽपि दाढ्यसूचनाय 'ग्रहणम्' इत्युक्तम् । अतः प्रौढशिरोमणिः सूत्रकार इति ज्ञेयम् ॥ (TP—*Gurvarthadipikā*, Udipi, 1954, p. 139).

Madhva has made an equally striking contribution to the question of the scope of the Sūtras. He brings the entire Veda-śāstra and not merely the ten or twelve Upaniṣads under the purview of the Sūtras. Modern thought is just beginning to dive deep into Vedic lore and trying to discover the depth of philosophical insight in them, hitherto held back by artificial dogmas of Sāyaṇic tradition. The writings of Aurobindo Ghosh have rightly awakened interest in the hidden mysteries of sublime philosophy in the Vedas clothed in symbolic language. Prof. Maryla Falk, in her thought-provoking paper, “The oldest Psychology,—Terminus a quo and Aspects”, published in the *Indian Journal of Psychology*, Vol. xviii, pts. 3-4, 1943, has drawn attention to the existence of “a terminology and phraseology relating to a set of psycho-physiological functional hypostases which constitute the basic data of the earliest Yoga theory”, in the hymns of the Ṛg and Atharva Vedas. A seasoned Mīmāṃsaka and Viśiṣṭādvaitic scholar D. T. Tatacharya has in his Krishnaswami Rao Endowment Lectures (1941) at the Madras University, made a strong plea for “applying to the Ṛks and hymns of the Ṛg Veda the principles of interpretation enunciated and employed by Bādarāyaṇa” and asserts that if that is done, “we cannot escape the conclusion that this Veda is as much concerned with the Brahman as the Upaniṣads.”¹

A text from the *Skānda* cited by Madhva and others asserts that the *Brahmasūtras* are meant to be decisive of the purport of the “entire sacred literature : शब्दजातस्य सर्वस्य यत्प्रमाणश्च निर्णयः । This must be the significance of the term विश्वतोमुख applied to the *Brahmasūtras*. It is absurd to explain it as “capable of being interpreted in various senses *ad libitum*” as is done by Ghate (*op. cit.* p. 46). Its true sense is that a sūtra should be able to explain the largest number of concurrent data that could be brought under a single aphorism. The idea is that one should not go on making a Sūtra for each Viśayavākya or datum. The Jijñāsā-Sūtra, for instance, should cover all texts emphasizing the need for inquiry into Brahman, wherever they might be found, in the *Vedas* (e. g. यस्तं न वेद किमुत्रा करिष्यति) *Upaniṣads* or

1. His lectures, it is understood, have since been published in the Journal of the Venkatesvara Oriental Institute, Tirupati.

Purāṇas. There is no harm, then, in Madhva's bringing under the Jan-mādi-sūtra, texts from the *RV.* the *Taitt. Ā.*, *Taitt. Up.* and *Skānda Purāṇa* and other sources "ad libitum." बहुशास्त्रानिर्णयिकत्वम्, as Madhva's commentator puts it, is what primarily विश्वतोमुखम् denotes, as applied to the *Brahma-sūtras*.¹ Madhva's references to the *Samhitās* of the Ṛg Veda and other sources, thus offends against no known interpretational canon. On the other hand, it enriches the thought-content of the Sūtras and widens their scope. One should, therefore, be pleased rather than displeased with Madhva, for bringing under their scope, the *philosophy* of the Vedas also, neglected on account of the artificial traditions of Sāyaṇic interpretation and the naturalistic and mythological attitude of the modern scholars. Madhva speaks of the loss of "ārṣa" tradition of Vedic interpretation,² and the idea is echoed by the modern mystic interpreter of the Ṛg Veda, Aurobindo Ghosh.

(x) It is indeed surprising that Ghate should have taken Madhva to task for his explanation of the phrase सर्ववेदान्तप्रत्ययम् (*B. S.* iii, 3, 1) as : सर्ववेदनिर्णयावगम्यं ब्रह्म. There is nothing in this explanation to warrant Ghate's conclusion that "Vedānta" according to Madhva, signifies only the decision of the Vedas and "not the Upaniṣads" ! (p. 168). This is an utter perversion of Madhva's point that the conclusion (*anta*) of the Vedas and the "Upaniṣads" being the same, Brahman must be understood in the light of the true teachings of the whole Śāstra embracing all the Vedas, Upaniṣads etc., and that a merely literal or superficial understanding of either the Vedas or the Upaniṣads, would *not* represent the true *nirṇaya* of the texts, on the nature of Brahman. Madhva holds that the correct *nirṇaya* of the entire sacred lore can only be obtained with help (*itikaraṇa*) of the *Brahmasūtras* which furnish the master-key to unlocking the hidden truths of the Śāstra and that without the use of this key neither the Vedas nor the Upaniṣads would yield their true Siddhānta.³ The actual *Upaniṣadic* texts cited by Madhva under iii, 3, 1, must show the critic that he has *not ruled out the Upaniṣads* from being treated as "Vedānta" ! True, he insists "that the *Samhitās* also are as important to his doctrine as the *Upaniṣads*" (*op. cit.* p. 168). But that is certainly *not* because "it is very difficult for him to find in the Upaniṣads, a support for his doctrine" (p. 168). For, the same critic has earlier stated that "Madhva always lays stress on those passages in the Upaniṣads which clearly proclaim the difference between Jīva and Brahman such as *Śvet. Up.* i, 6; iv, 5; 4; *Munḍ.* iii, 1, 2, etc." (*op. cit.* p. 34). No dispassionate student of the Upaniṣads will have the temerity to assert that passages supporting the reality of difference between Jīva and Brahman and other tenets of Realism are not sufficiently

1. Vide *B. S.* iii. 2, 18; iii, 3, 26 etc. where according to Śaṅkara himself, reference is made to divergent Śākhās of the Vedas (as viśayavākyas).

2. गौतमस्य ऋषेःशापाज्ज्ञाने त्वज्ञानतां गते (*Skānda*).

3. ब्रह्ममीमांसाशास्त्रव्युत्पादितन्यायानुपकृता हि वेदादयो विष्णोरवाचकाः । तदुपकृताश्च तस्य वाचका भवन्तीति (*NS.* p. 4).

numerous or pronounced in the various Upaniṣads. The “Antaryāmi-Brāhmaṇa of the *Bṛh. Up.* and the Bhūmavidyā of *Chāndogya* are sufficient to rebut any such facile theory. Reference to the chapter on “Upaniṣads” in this book, will establish this point conclusively. There is thus no substance in Ghate’s charge that Madhva fights shy of the Upaniṣads and seeks *escape* in the Philosophy of the Vedas. *Madhva would not have ventured to write commentaries on all the Ten Upaniṣads*, had he felt them to be so set against him !

(xi) Madhva’s interpretation of the Utpattyadhikaraṇa of the *B. S.* ii, 2, *adh.* 12, as a refutation of the Śākta cult and *not* of the Pañcarātra system is another significant departure from the other commentators. While Śaṅkara interprets the *whole adhikaraṇa* as a refutation of the Bhāgavata cult, Rāmānuja pleads its defence in the closing sūtras, the opening ones being interpreted as the Pūrvapakṣa; and he cites *evidence* that the Pañcarātra does *not* really teach the theory of the “creation” of the Jīvas or is *hostile* to Vedic authority, or is *confused and contradictory* on the question of the mutual relation between the Supreme Being and its Vyūhas or their interrelation of attributes of divinity. Madhva sees no justification, in these circumstances, for treating the *adhikaraṇa* in question, either as a refutation or as a vindication of the Pañcarātra, in any way. The issue is simple. (1) If the Pañcarātra does not really teach any of the objectionable doctrines attributed to it by Śaṅkara, there is no *point at all* in introducing a special *adhikaraṇa* in the *B. S.*, *to chase a shadow*: नहि वचनमदृष्ट्वा पूर्वपक्षः। (2) The second Pāda of Adhyāya ii, being devoted to the refutation of hostile Darśanas, the vindication of any particular one out of them as the “Sva-siddhānta” of the Sūtrakāra would be out of place here. (3) The right place for any such establishment of the validity of the Pañcarātra system, if there was any need for it, would have been somewhere else, in the I Adhyāya.¹ (4) Baseless allegations against the Pañcarātra, due to perversion or misunderstanding of its esoteric truths or quibbling over its specialized (esoteric) terminology, can hardly warrant the luxury of an extensive *adhikaraṇa* to refute them. (5) Texts which *seem* to refer to the Jīvas as “created” are *not wanting* in the *Vedas*, *Āranyakas* and *Upaniṣads* : यो नः पिता जनिता (*R. V.* x, 82, 3) तोयेन जीवान् व्यससर्ज भूम्याम् (*T. A.* x. i. i.) सर्व एत आत्मनो व्युच्चरन्ति (*q. Sam B. S.* ii, 3, 17). Similar references in the Pañcarātra can be explained in the same way in which a Vedāntin would meet these cases. (6) *Seeming hostility* to or censure of the Vedas is *not*

1. Madhva, for his part, deftly introduces the question of the validity of the Pañcarātra, under the term “Śāstra” in i, 1, 3. Jayatirtha in his *NS* has an elaborate *critique* of the interpretations of the Utpattyadhikaraṇa, by both Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja. He has also expounded the true position of the Pañcarātra re. the esoterics of Śuddha-sṛṣṭi pertaining to the emergence of the Vyūha forms from Para-Vāsudeva, under the epithets of Saṅkarṣaṇa, Pradyumna etc., which are the names of the Supreme Himself, as the presiding deity over the production of mind etc. Similarly, the doctrine of “Sa-viśeṣābheda” of substance and attributes would meet the difficulties re. the relation between Vāsudeva and the Vyūhas and their lordly attributes, raised by Śaṅkara.

wanting in the *Gitā* (ii, 45; ii, 46; ii, 52) or the *Chān. Up.* vii, 1. 4. But no Vedāntin is perturbed over them. Why, then, should a case be made against the Pañcarātras on these grounds which can be explained consistently with the other Scriptures, whose validity is also accepted by the Pañcarātra ? Madhva, therefore, finds that inasmuch as the allegations against Pañcarātra are flimsy and have no legs to stand upon, they are beneath recognition or rebuttal :

दूषणं पञ्चरात्रस्य वीक्षायामपि न क्षमम् ॥ (A. V.)

It should not be supposed from this that Madhva is trying to escape the problem, here. All that he maintains is that the Pañcarātra is impeccable and can take care of itself and needs no special attention at the hands of commentators on ii, 2, 42-45. The *adhikaraṇa* itself, according to him, then, is to be viewed as a criticism of the Śākta system. Dasgupta (*op. cit.* iv, p. 145) is not, therefore, quite correct in saying that Madhva and his commentators interpret the topic (ii, 2. 42-45) “accordingly” i.e., to justify the authority of the Pañcarātra. Such is not the actual *interpretation* of the *adhikaraṇa*, according to Madhva. His answering some of the charges brought against the Pañcarātra, in his *AV.*, (not in his *B. S. B.*) is merely to show the untenability of the interpretations of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja, in this connection, — the one wholly and the other even in part. He has, thus, shown the correct perspective in interpreting the *Utpattyadhikaraṇa*, in the light of its context and setting in the *Sūtras* without allowing himself to be victimized or rattled by the dominant line of interpretation of his predecessors, which cannot, as we have seen, “bear critical scrutiny”.¹ Here is another instance of the comparative superiority of his interpretations to those of others.

(xii) According to Ghate, Madhva’s “denial of the Brahman being the material cause of the Universe, is *especially against* the spirit of the *Sūtras*” [*Italics mine*]. The presumption that the *Sūtras* teach such a doctrine rests mostly on the *Prakṛtyadhikaraṇa* (i, 4, 24). We have already seen the impossibility of pressing any such interpretation on this *adhikaraṇa*, which is forbidden by the context of *Samanvaya* (in which the *adhikaraṇa* occurs) and its implication. We need not, therefore, labour this point further.

(xiii) The only *adhikaraṇa*, then, that can be brought up in support of the material causality of Brahman, is : तदनन्यत्वमारम्भणशब्दादिभ्यः (ii, 1, 15). Most commentators and modern scholars have sought the help of this *adhikaraṇa* in support of this theory. But coming close on the heels of the न विलक्षणत्वाधिकरणम् (ii, 1, 4-13), as interpreted by Śaṅkara and others, this *adhikaraṇa* would be *redundant* for purposes of establishing the identity (अनन्यत्व) of the world and Brahman. For, if the thesis of *Brahmo-pādānatva* had been established in the preceding *adhikaraṇa* (ii, 1, 4-13), it would automatically follow that the cause (Brahman) and effect

1. “वीक्षायामपि न क्षमम्” as Madhva tellingly puts it.

(the world) *are identical*. Where, then, would be the need to seek to re-establish the same thesis, over again in ii, 1, 15? Thus, from the point of view of *both the Prakṛtyadhikaraṇa* (i, 4, 23-27) and the *Na vilakṣaṇato'adhikaraṇa* (ii, 1, 4-13) the तदनन्यत्वाधिकरण (ii, 1, 15 seq), would be redundant in sense and for the purpose of establishing the identity of Brahman and the world, as material cause and effect. (2) Apart from this, the Advaitic interpretation of “*ananyatvam* as ‘superimposed’ (*āropita*), or ‘unreal’, is, to say the least, extremely tortuous and goes against the thesis of identity of cause and effect, in any *direct sense* of the term. (2) The identification of the “*viṣayavākya*” of this sūtra as यथा सोम्यैकेन मृत्पिण्डेन * * वाचारंभणं विकारो नामधेयं * * (Chān. Up. vi, 1, 42). in terms of a cause-and-effect relation is also open to difficulties. The cause-and-effect relation breaks down completely in the case of the example of nail-scissors and *kārṣṇāyasa*, as pointed out by Jayatīrtha and the explanation of the phrase आरंभणशब्दादिभ्यः as referring to more than one Scriptural text, by Śaṅkara, involves defective construction.

In view of all these difficulties, one is justified in looking for some other explanation of the तदनन्यत्वाधिकरण, connected with the creationistic views of the Upaniṣads. Madhva has suggested for discussion here, a very interesting and vital problem of Theism whether the causal activity of (God) Brahman is independent of all accessories or is simply dependent on them. In other words, the question posed is, (1) Does Brahman need or work with the help of other accessories, in its creative activity? (2) Are these accessories created by It; or coexisting always with It? (3) Are they equally independent principles or are they metaphysically dependent on Brahman? If this problem in Theistic thought deserves attention, the *onus* is on commentators on the Brahmasūtras, ancient and modern, to point out where it is discussed by Bādarāyaṇa, *if not in the present context*. At any rate, Madhva's interpretation of the adhikaraṇa, raises a *new and a very important issue not dealt with before*, in the Sūtras; whereas the interpretations of the other commentators like Śaṅkara *redundantly raise the same point* of identity of the world with Brahman, in one way or the other, in as many as three different adhikaraṇas. It is far more satisfactory to make the Sūtras raise a new problem than make them revert *ad libitum* and *ad nauseam* to the same old question. Even from this point of view, Madhva's interpretation cannot be said to be an “inferior” performance “of little or no merit” (Ghate, *op. cit.* p. 168). Indeed, it is a refreshingly original and brilliant interpretation of great philosophical value. To dismiss it as “quite irrelevant to the topic” (Ghate, p. 168), is to betray one's own philosophical immaturity.

Viewed in the light of ancient and modern thought alike, Madhva's interpretation of this adhikaraṇa assumes very great significance. The wording of i, 4, 15 (कारणत्वेन चाकाशादिषु यथाव्यपदिष्टोक्तेः) presupposes the existence of a series of ‘causes’ in the evolutionary chain. The Śvet. Up. ‘स कारणं कारणाधिपाधिपः’ । ‘यः कारणानि’ (vi. 9; i, 3) recognizes the existence of other ‘causes’

besides Brahman. Their *status* must be clearly defined at some stage or other in the *Vedānta Sūtras*. Christianity, in Western thought, looks upon God as the *sole and only cause*, everything else being deemed to be created *de novo* and *ex nihilo*, by Him. In India, the *Seśvara-Sāṃkhya* posited co-existent *Prakṛti* which does not *owe its existence* to *Īśvara*. This *Prakṛti* is thus *metaphysically independent* of God, in the *Seśvara-Sāṃkhya* Dualism. The question is thus of abiding interest in Indian thought, whether the causes including Brahman, *Prakṛti*, *Puruṣas*, *Kāla* etc., are all merely co-existent principles acting independently of one another; or whether *one of them* (Brahman) is *metaphysically independent* and all the others metaphysically dependent on It, for their very existence, and functioning (सत्ताप्रवृत्ति-निमित्त). Since the acceptance of the hypothesis of a plurality of mutually *independent* co-existent 'causes' would be philosophically unsound, Madhva has done well to pose the problem here and press it to a decision, in the *Sūtras* themselves. Every true philosopher would thus see in his interpretation of this *adhikaraṇa*, the discussion of a problem of perennial interest to all philosophy in general and to Indian philosophy in particular. Indian philosophical tradition recognizes a *number of eternal substances* : ज्ञानो (*Śvet.* i, 9) पाच्यांश्च सर्वान् * * (*ibid* v, 5) तम आसीत् (*Rv.* x, 129, 3) द्रव्यं कर्मच कालश्च स्वभावो जीव एव च । यदनुग्रहतः सन्ति (*Bhāg.* ii, 10. 12). But they should be held to be *ex hypothesi* metaphysically dependent on One Supreme Being. That is precisely what Madhva has done in this *adhikaraṇa*. He interprets the *Sūtra* as laying down that Brahman is the one Independent Cause, in creation, — all the other factors (like *Prakṛti*, *Puruṣa*, *Kāla* etc.) being metaphysically dependent accessories. The proposition is purposely put in a double negative form (*Tad-ananyatvam*) : the Independent (Cause) is not different from (or other than) Brahman, because of the word "ārambhaṇa" and other grounds", — to emphasize the point that Brahman alone is the Independent Cause and that the rest are by implication and *ex hypothesi* metaphysically dependent on It : Cf.

द्रव्यं कर्म च कालश्च स्वभावो जीव एव च ।

यदनुग्रहतः सन्ति न सन्ति यदुपेक्षया ॥ (*Bhāg.* ii, 10.12) There is no *specific* affirmation of Brahman being the only Independent Cause, earlier.¹ Hence there is no redundancy in Madhva's interpretation of this *adhikaraṇa*, as there is in those of the others; such affirmation is necessary to dispose of an objection that might be raised on the analogy of production in general, which presupposes and involves the existence of other pre-existing or co-existent causes, independent of the producer, to which He gives a new name and form. The affirmation through negation of the contrary that Brahman alone is the Independent Cause, clinches the matter beyond doubt.

The *viṣayavākya* here, is किं स्विदासीदधिष्ठानमारंभणं कथमस्त्विह कथासीत्

1. Cf. * * इति युक्तिविरुद्धत्वात् जन्मादिसूत्रेऽभिप्रेतं यत् ब्रह्मणः स्वातंत्र्यं तन्नोपपद्यते । न च श्रुतिविरोधः । श्रुतीनां ब्रह्मणो जगत्कारणत्वमात्रपरत्वात् । स्वतंत्रकारणान्तरनिरासे श्रुतेरेवाभावात् । भावेपि, * * युक्ति प्राबल्यस्यापि संभवात् सत्प्रतिपक्षया श्रुत्याभिप्रेतावधारणानुपपत्तेरिति प्राप्तम् (N.S. p. 297).

R. V. x, 81, 2, where, the existence of independent accessories in creation is challenged (ākṣepa). The query by *ākṣepa* elicits an answer in the negative that there are *no other* Independent causes *than* Brahman, in other words, that Brahman Itself is (the same as) the Independent Cause; (स्वतंत्रकारणम्). It is also significant that the Sūtra refers to “आरंभणम्” as the key-word in the context of the viṣayavākya. One expects this key-word to be an independent expression in the text in question. This condition is satisfied in R. V. X, 81, 2, which is the viṣayavākya according to Madhva’s interpretation. It is *not* satisfied in the interpretations of Śaṅkara and others, according to whom the text cited is *Chān. Up.* vi. 1, 4 wherein the term “आरंभणम्” (as explained by Śaṅkara himself), is used syntactically compounded with another (as वाच्यारंभणम्). The wording of the next sūtra also (सत्त्वाच्चावरस्य ii, 1, 17) confirms the reasonableness of Madhva’s interpretation of ii, 1, 15, as it affirms the existence of inferior (अवर) i.e. dependent reals as accessories in creation. This interpretation of सत्त्वाच्चावरस्य is based on the primary sense of अवर; whereas Śaṅkara’s rendering of it as कार्य because it is posterior in time (अपर) is more a *secondary sense*. The next sūtra असद्वचपदेशान्नेति चेन्न धर्मान्तरेण वाक्यशेषात् (ii, 1, 18) also receives a natural explanation on this interpretation that the denial of other substances but the One Supreme, prior to creation, in the Nāsadiya Sūkta (x, 129, 1) and elsewhere, is not to be taken as an *absolute negation* of their existence as such, but on account of their obvious limitations such as unmanifestedness, dependence, liability to modification and decay.

(xiv) I shall consider one more point raised by Ghate, before concluding this review of his critique of Madhva’s performance. “When we consider the fact that the Sūtras represent an attempt to reconcile the different passages of the Upaniṣads like “Tat tvam asi”, “Dvā suparṇā. . .”, it is impossible to believe that the doctrine of *absolute duality not having anything to do with unity* can be the teaching of the Sūtras” (*op. cit.* p. 170). [Italics mine]. This comment only betrays the author’s deplorable ignorance of the nature of synthesis of “Bheda” and “Abheda” Śrutis, brought about by Madhva, through his doctrine of “Bimbapratibimbabhāva” and his metaphysical ideology of “Svatantrādvitīyatattvavāda” which are specially designed to effect the necessary rapprochement between the two sets of Śrutis consistent with the modicum of difference that must be accepted on the basis of reason, revelation and the verdict of Sākṣi-Pratyakṣa. The sublime heights of unity in the Supreme, for the entire world of matter and souls visualized by Madhva, in virtue of its deriving its very existence, knowability, activity etc., from the One Supreme source of all existence, knowledge and activity (सर्वसत्ताप्रतीतिप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तं), has the merit of not doing any violence to the Pramāṇas which establish and ratify the reality and validity of world-experience and its values, of not denying the world of matter and souls as an unreality and a myth, in order to achieve an abstract, artificial unity with the Supreme. It is a living sense of unity born of the full realization of the world’s metaphysical dependence on the

Brahman¹ that Madhva has tried to impress upon us by his doctrine of the Bimbapratibimbabhāva between God and man and by his ideology of a Svatantra-advitīya-tattva. The full significance of this synthesis, presented by Madhva, in harmonizing the reality of the Universe (and of the souls) with the transcendence and immanence of Brahman has been explained in the introductory Chapter of this book. It is, therefore, a travesty of the truth to say Madhva has not striven to establish any synthesis of the conflict of Bheda and Abheda Śrutis or of Bheda-Pratyakṣa and Aikya Śrutis.

Indeed, every commentator on the Vedānta has tried to solve this conflict of Bheda and Abheda Śrutis on the one hand and Bheda-Pratyakṣa (experience) and Aikya-Śrutis, on the other, in his own way. Madhva is no exception to this. He has not shelved the issue or ignored the need for a synthesis, as Ghate would have us believe. It would have been a different matter if he had been unable to approve of the particular line of synthesis adopted by Madhva. But ignorance of the nature of the synthesis propounded by Madhva is altogether inexcusable. Apart from that, it is not clear what sort of a synthesis or reconciliation of Bheda and Abheda Śrutis, would have Ghate's approval. He merely asserts a truism when he says that the Sūtras represent an attempt to reconcile the Bheda and Abheda Śrutis. But, he himself has not been able to put his finger on the ultimate view of the Sūtras which, in his opinion, represents the true and happy synthesis, beyond confessing that "the phraseology of the Sūtras (iii, 2, 27-28) leaves on our mind an impression of *uncertainty* as to the Sūtrakāra's opinion on the point" (*op. cit.* 182). He refers to the "vague and general words" of the Sūtrakāra, "*not* capable of being explicitly defined", which lead us to believe that the Sūtras, though *intended* to formulate a system from the Upaniṣads, reconciling the contradictions which meet us at every step, represent *a stage of transition from the absolute want of a system to a cut and dry system of the Commentators*" (p. 183). He has not claimed that the Sūtrakāra favors absolute identity between Jīva and Brahman. Sūtra iv, 4, 17, declares that the released soul does *not participate* "in the power of creating and sustaining the world" (p. 164). This posits an *irreducible difference* between the two *even in release*. This must naturally be reckoned with in any synthesis that might be attempted in the last analysis. But it would be no synthesis to say that difference and identity should both be accepted as equally true and real *in the same sense*, in the last analysis. However, Ghate seems to have a soft corner for the Bhedābheda ideal of Nimbārka, which he is, nevertheless, afraid of advocating openly, as he considers it a rather "clumsy stage" from the "philosophical point of view" (183). Why then, should he blame Madhva, for not being satisfied with such a clumsy patch-work of reconciliation which is no reconciliation at all, but an affirmation of the *status quo* of the

1. सर्वसत्ताप्रतीतिप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तताप्रतिपत्त्यर्थं सर्वात्मकत्वेन (परमपुरुषं बोधयन्ति)

(NS. p. 124).

conflicting Śrutis—and exploring the possibility of a more consistent and logically satisfactory solution of the problem by broadening the content of identity in terms of (1) metaphysical dependence (2) similarity of essence (3) coexistence (4) harmony etc.,

स्वातन्त्र्ये च विशिष्टत्वे स्थानमत्यैक्ययोरपि ।

सादृश्ये चैक्यवाक् सम्यक् सावकाशा यथेष्टतः ॥ (A. V.)

instead of viewing it in a narrow sense of “Svarūpaikya” that would be strongly opposed to the “Dvaita Śrutis” like द्वा सुपर्णा and above all to Sākṣi-Pratyakṣa, which is the basis of all other Pramāṇas and the guarantor of their validity; and which would further involve a number of unproved assumptions like (i) the invalidity of Experience on account of (ii) obscuration of the Ātman by Avidyā. It should be noted that Madhva’s way of harmonizing the two sets of texts involves fewer assumptions and is less circuitous. It does not stigmatize the Bheda-Śrutis as non-truth-declaring (*atattvāvedaka*) and does not introduce the fiction of higher and lower validity and so on. It is a practical solution of recognizing the absolute majesty and independence of the Supreme and bringing the world of matter and souls to a realisation of its metaphysical dependence : तत्तन्त्रत्वा-दैतदात्म्यम् ।¹

Ghate concedes that Madhva’s interpretation of ii, 2, 29 that statements of identity (तद्वचपदेश) between Jīva and Brahman as due only to the fact of the Jīva being endowed with a nature closely akin to that of Brahman, in point of reality *jñāna*, *ānanda* etc. (तद्गुणसारत्वात्) * * * is “a good interpretation” (p. 97), “to which we cannot object” (169). If so, other connected interpretations based on the principle of “Tada-dhīnatva” and others, met with in the Upaniṣads² and good support for them in the interpretational canons of the Mīmāṃsakas³ should also be acceptable to him.

The Sūtrakāra uses the ideas of *aṁśa* and *ābhāsa* to define the relation between the Jīva and Brahman (ii, 3, 43-50). He is said to define *aṁśa* “in such a way as to make room for both difference and identity” (p. 102). But not in the sense of difference *and* identity being both equally true in the literal sense and in an equal measure ! In that case, the Sūtrakāra would as well have used the plain term “Bhedābheda” as being more clearly expressive of his meaning, instead of beating about the bush or coining a new term “*aṁśa*” whose *literal sense* of “part” or “fraction” would be unacceptable to any philosopher, including himself, as Brahman is partless. Moreover, difference and identity, being contradictories, cannot co-exist in one. The utmost that can be claimed in such a case, would be that difference in *one sense* and identity in *another* are possible. In that case, Ghate must give up his preference for the Bhedābheda solution of Nimbārka “according to which both difference *and* identity are *equally real*

1. Madhva’s comment on ऐतदात्म्यमिदं सर्वम् (Chān. Up.).

2. Chān. Up. v, 1, 15. Also Śaṅkara and Bhāmatī on BS. ii. 4, 17-19.

3. P. M. S. i, 4, 23.

without the idea of the subordination of one to the other" (p. 183), as coming nearest to the Sūtrakāra's "transitional view" [*Italics mine*]. The actual definitions of Bheda and Abheda, according to Nimbārka, quoted by Ghate, are "Abheda" : *absence of independent existence* (स्वतंत्रसत्ताभावः) and "Bheda" : *separate and dependent existence* (p. 31) or परतंत्रसत्ता (भावः). These fail to support his contention that difference and identity are here retained in their *primary sense*, "without (any) subordination of one to the other." It should be obvious to anyone, that on Nimbārka's own showing, difference and identity are both reduced to the same thing viz. *difference and dependence* ! The one is a paraphrase of the other : स्वतंत्रसत्ताभावः—परतंत्रसत्ताभावः ! ! They are *not* the logical negations or contradictories of each other in their primary sense. The so-called "identity" between Jīva and Brahman, thus consists, on Nimbārka's view, only in "the impossibility of any independent existence (p. 31) for the Jīva from the Brahman ! How is this, in any way different from Madhva's description of it as :

तत्तन्त्रत्वादितदात्म्यम् ।

'यदधीना यस्य सत्ता तत्तदित्येव भण्यते ।

विद्यमाने विभेदेऽपि मिथो नित्यं स्वरूपतः ॥'

सर्वं ब्रह्मेत्युच्यते तदधीनसत्ताप्रवृत्तिमत्त्वात् । न तु तत्स्वरूपत्वात् ।

Only, Madhva puts the matter less mystifyingly and without all the circumlocution of Nimbārka when he says that difference and identity cannot both be accepted in their primary sense (मुख्यार्थ) equally :

भेदाभेदौ न मुख्यतः¹ (B. S. B. ii, 3, 43).

and that therefore, *difference* must be accepted as essential (स्वरूपतः) and identity as *figurative* (गोण) based on intimacy of relation due to resemblance (ii, 2, 29) primacy (i, 4, 3) and independence (i, 1, 30) :

सादृश्याच्च प्रधानत्वात् स्वातन्त्र्यादपि वाऽभिदाम् ।

आदुरीशेन जीवस्य न स्वरूपाभिदां क्वचित् ॥ (A. V.)

An equal and literal emphasis on both difference and identity could never be laid, without logical inconsistency, between two distinct reals such as the Jīva and Brahman. Śaṅkara would reduce the difference to an "appearance" and retain only identity as factual. Rāmānuja's explanation of "Viśiṣṭaika" is ultimately, only a figurative explanation of identity in terms of dependence (शेषत्वं) and inseparableness (अपृथक्सिद्धि) of the Jīva from Brahman, which are compatible only with difference as foundational. In no case, will it be possible to establish any reconciliation without depreciation of sense *somewhere*, i.e., subordinating one idea to the other. The objection, in the last analysis, would be, *not* to the subordination as such, but to its manner, direction and *raison d'être*. The manner of subordination should at least *not impugn* the status or validity of one set of Śrutis against another, or degrade it to a lower level as error-ridden. But that is

1. This quotation does not at all mean that "separateness and non-separateness ought not to be understood literally", as mistranslated by J. E. Carpenter : *Theism in Medieval India*, London, 1921, p. 411. We need not, therefore, deplore with him that "unhappily, Madhva did not adhere to this suggestion" (*ibid*).

what is done by Śaṅkara ! This impugning of the validity of Bheda-Śrutis rests on the assumption that perception of difference and diversity is due to a projection of Ignorance (Avidyā), the *why-how* of it being avowedly a mystery. Thus the Advaitic way reconciling the conflict rests on a series of unwarranted assumptions and is also vitiated by Upajīvyā-pramāṇavirodha.¹ The procedure adopted by Madhva, on the other hand, is a smooth one involving no logical interdependence or other defects.

So long as "Abheda" is not accepted as the logical negation of difference, it cannot be regarded as essential identity of Svarūpa. What Nimbārka has done is merely to resort to "Gaunārtha" when he reduces "identity" to "impossibility of an independent existence" (स्वतंत्रसत्ताभावः p. 31). This is in no way different from Madhva's interpretation of "Abheda" as a figurative one based on the ideas of सादृश्य, प्रधानत्व and स्वातन्त्र्य. It is thus but a vain boast that anybody can accommodate the logically incompatible ideas of identity and difference in their primary sense (मुख्यार्थ). They will certainly cancel each other, if they are equally powerful. If identity is the stronger force, it would swallow up the experience of difference. If, to safeguard difference, "identity" were to be deemed less powerful, it would be impotent and futile. It would thus be impossible to hug to oneself both of them, literally.

That is why Madhva shows better philosophical judgment and logical discernment in accepting difference as a natural and primary fact of experience (of the Sākṣī and not merely of the senses), and interprets the "identity" spoken of in *some* of the Scriptural texts, in conformity with (1) the other Scriptural texts that teach the difference between God and the souls and (2) Sākṣi-Pratyakṣa of difference, which is inviolable as a primary condition of all certitude, in terms of "Amśatva". Ghate has not, therefore, correctly appraised Madhva's position when he says that he *includes* both the meanings of Bheda and Abheda in the connotation of the word Amśa (p. 103). The fact, however, is that the idea of amśa, is introduced by Madhva to rationalize the Scriptural references to "identity" with the basic fact of their foundational difference established by experience, reason and revelation. *Amśatva* is *not* thus, a substitute for *both*; but of identity *alone*. This would have been clear had Ghate looked up Jayatīrtha's clear and illuminating commentary on the point, in Madhva's *B. S. B.*:

न च साक्षात् भेदाभेदावपपन्नौ । विरोधात् । अतः श्रुतिद्वयान्यथानुपपत्त्या, भेदमङ्गीकृत्य, अभेदस्थाने अंशत्वं वक्तव्यमिति भावः ॥ (T. P. ii, 3, 43).

Madhva has also made it clear in his *AV* that Amśatva stands for a peculiar relation of metaphysical dependence, similarity, and "belonging to" God : तत्संबन्धित्वमेवांशत्वम् (J). तत्सादृश्यं तदधीनसत्तादिमत्त्वम् (NS. ii, 453).

Ghate has thus foundered, badly, in his critical estimate of Madhva's performance as an interpreter of the *Brahmasūtras*, partly on account of his superficial knowledge of the general principles of Madhva's Siddhānta and partly on account of his *not* having taken the *AV*. also into

1. See under *Anuvyākhyāna*.

consideration in attempting a critical estimate of Madhva's Sūtra-Interpretation; and, above all, in not having taken the help of the indispensable commentary of Jayatīrtha on the Bhāṣya itself. Had he done so, he would have fared better and revised his estimate of Madhva's Bhāṣya.

(4) AṆU BHĀṢYA

The *Aṇu Bhāṣya* is a short metrical-summary of the *adhikaraṇas* of the *Brahmasūtras*, in thirty-four *Anuṣṭubhs*, said to have been composed to meet a special need of Acyutaprajña. The *M. Vij.* refers to it as a work teeming with a thousand ideas in each verse :

अनन्तोऽर्थः प्रकटितस्त्वयाणौ भाष्यसंग्रहे । (xv. 82).

It is divided into four *Adhyāyas*, each being the summary of one full chapter of the Sūtras. The first chapter shows how the Supreme Being is lauded by a number of names like *Prāṇa*, *Jyotiḥ* etc. The second resolves the conflict of Scripture with historical systems and their doctrines and the contradictions of the Scriptures themselves in the statements of the *order* of creation and dissolution etc. The third deals with the majesty of God and the ways of worship and realisation. The last summarizes the views on *Laya* and the nature of released state. The work can be described as an Index to the Dvaita interpretation of the Sūtras. The *Tattvamañjari* of Rāghavendra is the best known commentary on the text. There is also an earlier, though little known, gloss by a son of Nārāyaṇa Paṇḍitācārya, which will be noticed later.

(5) ANU-VYĀKHYĀNA

(i) The *Anuvyākhyāna* (AV) is both a dissertation on the Sūtras and a critical commentary and supplement to the *B. S. B.* स्वयं कृतापि तद्व्याख्या क्रियते स्पष्टतार्थतः । Its extent is 1985 *granthas*, as against the 2000 of the Bhāṣya. It is a work in which Madhva has put forth his best efforts at interpretation and criticism. It is undoubtedly a classic in the full sense of the term. It is his *magnum opus*. It has logic, dialectic fire, unity, eloquence and a certain stately music of words. Says Madhva of his own work :

ग्रन्थोऽयमपि बह्वर्थो भाष्यं चात्यर्थविस्तरम् ।

बहुज्ञा एव जानन्ति विशेषणार्थमेतयोः ॥

Each line and phrase of it is a veritable seed of ideas. The celebrated commentator Trivikrama Paṇḍitācārya, speaking about it, in his *Tattva-pradīpa* (vi, 2, 7) says that few can do justice to its meteoric swiftness of thought and the resplendent variety of ideas contained in its lines.¹

(ii) The AV., was written by Madhva, at the request of his favorite disciple Trivikrama Paṇḍita, after his conversion (*M. Vij.* xv, 86-9). Criticism and constructive exposition are its twin features. The author is not

1. क्वापि च मुखतोऽविवृतमपि किमपि पदमभिमुखविकसितकरतलविलसितामलकवदविरतमनुवीक्ष्यमाणसूत्रार्थजातानां दुर्विगाहमतिमहासमुद्राणां मितपदं चेदं भाष्यं बह्वर्थमिह कुर्वतां कृपालूनामनुग्रहादर्याक्षिप्तमर्थं दर्शयाम इति । (TD.)

satisfied merely with amplifying the meaning of the sūtras as explained in the Bhāṣya. The explanations of Śaṅkara, naturally, come in for the largest share of his criticism. He deals with all shades of Advaitic thought and interpretation. The views of Śaṅkara, no less than those of his commentators and elaborators are examined in detail. He refutes in full both the Ekajīvājñāna and Bahujīvājñānavādas (p. 14 b. Belgaum Edn).^{*} The expression “Ataḥ” in the opening sūtra, is explained here in four different ways and one of them is directed against the plea of the unreality of the world of bondage read into it, by the author of the *Samkṣepaśārīraka*, Cf. :—

ब्रह्मज्ञानं सूत्रयन्सूत्रकारो बन्धोत्पत्तेर्हेतुविध्वंसनाय ।
एतत्सर्वं सूचयामास तस्मादेतत्सर्वं भाष्यते भाष्यकारैः ॥

and the commentary of Rāmatīrtha on it (p. 66) : अतो ज्ञानेन बन्धनिवृत्ति सूचयता, तस्य मिथ्यात्वमपि सोपपत्तिकं सूचितं भवतीति गम्यते । The views of the Vivaraṇakāra on Bhāvarūpājñāna and Taṭasthalakṣaṇa (in i, 1, 2) are criticized. The destructive dialectic of Śrīharṣa, is incidentally referred to (AV. i, 4, ver. 94-95). In ii, 2, 146-48, Ānandabodha's critique of Difference and the special arguments adduced by him are refuted. The *Iṣṭasiddhi*'s admission of the irrationality of the concept of Avidyā, is commented upon on two occasions (i, 1, 5 ślokas 10-12 and iii, 4, śl. 99).

CRITIQUE OF ADVAITA

In addition to his criticisms of Śaṅkara's interpretations of various Sūtras and adhikaraṇa *passim* Madhva has undertaken a general refutation of some of the fundamental theories of the Advaita Vedānta such as (1) the identity of Jīva and Brahman; (2) the concept of Anirvacanīya; (3) the Advaitic theory of Error; (4) the falsity of the world; (5) and of Difference (p. 13-14); (6) the untrustworthiness of empirical means of proof etc. These criticisms have a distinct stamp of originality and freshness. They are not a *rechauffe* of those of earlier critics of Advaita.

1. IDENTITY OF JĪVA AND BRAHMAN

Madhva opens his attack on the doctrine of Identity by drawing a sharp contrast between the miserable lot of man on earth and the perfect eternal peace and freedom of God. It were blasphemy¹ for a creature like man to think of identity with God. Each moment of his life, man is keenly alive to his thousand imperfections and limitations. These experiences can never be dismissed as illusory. They are felt to be real and true, by the inmost self of man—the Sākṣī,² and are never proved to be false *within one's own conscious experience* (p. 29, śl. 53).

* Page references to the *Sarva Mūla* (works of Madhva) are henceforth to this Edn.

1. Cf. *Lectures and Addresses* by Rabindranath Tagore, ed. by Anthony X. Soares, Macmillan, 1928, p. 152, lines 11-12.

2. The doctrine of Sākṣī is a distinctive contribution of Madhva to Indian epistemology. It plays a vital role in his Realism. For a full exposition of the doctrine and the place of Sākṣī in Madhva's philosophy, see my paper in *Siddha Bhārati* (Siddhesvar Varma Com. Vol.) 1950.

A hundred texts cannot make a crow white.¹ There may be any number of monistic texts which appear to declare the Jīva and Brahman to be one; still, they cannot be accepted at their face value. For, there is the conflict with the consolidated experience of humanity, which no philosophy can flout with impunity. Not all the texts are admitted at their face value, even by the monist. There is, for instance, a text which says that the handful of grass (darbha) is the Sacrificer : *Yajamānāḥ prastaraḥ*. But no one is prepared, on that ground, to identify the grass with the man !

The conviction that the Jīva is other than Brahman is not merely a matter of ordinary experience (Pratyakṣadrṣṭi), but one derived from the teaching of the Scripture itself (Śāstradrṣṭi). Scripture, when and where it speaks of Brahman and reveals its existence, does so *ex hypothesi* as all-knowing, all-powerful Controller of the Universe. The “identity-texts” can operate, if at all, only after the existence of Brahman is first established. And there is no other way of establishing it, save through Śāstra (B. S. i, 1, 3) . If the identity texts should still have their way, they must necessarily give the lie to those august attributes with which the former set of texts had invested the Brahman. But that is hardly possible, or even permissible; since of the two sets of texts, the one that establishes the nature of Brahman as *ex hypothesi* omniscient etc., constitutes the basis (Upa-Jīvyā) of the other and as between the Upajīvyā and the Upajīvaka (supported), the former is more powerful than the latter :

सार्वज्ञ्यादिगुणं जीवाद्भिन्नं ज्ञापयति श्रुतिः ।

ईशं तामुपजीव्यैव वर्तते ह्यैक्यवादिनी ।

उपजीव्यविरोधेन नास्यास्तन्मानता भवेत् ॥ (AV.)

These twin principles of (1) agreement with Upajīvyāśruti and (2) Sākṣi-Pratyakṣa are the corner-stone of Madhva’s interpretation of Advaita Śrutis and their reconciliation with the Bheda-Śrutis (and experience). They are his unique contributions to the problem of harmonizing the two sets of Śrutis. They are foreshadowed in the famous Upaniṣadic text :

पुरुष एवेदं सर्वं; तद्विश्वमुपजीवति ।

In view of Upajīvyavirodha then, the surface interpretation of the monistic texts must be surrendered so as to make them consistent with the reality of the ईशितव्यप्रपञ्च and the implication of the Upajīvyāśruti. This can be done with a slight modification of or departure from their literal sense and interpreting the identity spoken of by them in a figurative sense, in any of the following ways (AV. i, 1, śl. 39) :

स्वातन्त्र्ये च विशिष्टत्वे स्थानमत्यैक्ययोरपि ।

सादृश्ये चैक्यवाक् सम्यक् सावकाशा यथेष्टतः ॥

2. ATTRIBUTELESS BRAHMAN

Madhva opposes the idea of Brahman as devoid of all attributes (nirviśeṣa). The Sūtrakāra ascribes to Brahman such negative attributes

1. न ह्यागमाः सहस्रमपि घटं पटयितुमीशते ! (Bhāmātī, p. 6).

as अदृश्यत्व (i, 2, 21). If negative attributes can be admitted and raised to the rank of attributes (guṇa) here : अदृश्यत्वादिगुणको घर्मोक्ते : there is no reason why positive ones cannot be admitted. There is no use contending that the Advaitin has no fear of “negative attributes” in Brahman (Abhāvādvaita);¹ for, every negation implies an affirmation. An attribute is an adjective that serves to mark off a given thing from all others. Judged in this light, there is no difference in function between positive and negative attributes. The ascription of negative attributes to Brahman, would still leave it qualified (Sa-viśeṣa), if not Sa-dvitiya. Moreover, like negative attributes, the Śrutis predicate positive ones also, such as Satyam (reality) Jñānam (knowledge) and Ānantyam (infinity). There is *prima facie* no reason to reject the positive attributes, directly. If it is feared that the acceptance of a plurality of positive attributes would shatter the unity of Brahman, the proper solution would seem to lie *not* in *denying* all characteristics to Brahman, but in trying to find out other ways of conserving the attributes and their reality, without prejudice to the homogeneity of Brahman. The doctrine of Saviśeṣābheda (of Substance and attributes) propounded by Madhva, is precisely intended to achieve such a result. The Advaitin, however, thinks that only negative attributes can be accommodated in Brahman. Terms like “Satyam”, “Jñānam”, “Anantam”, have power only to deny their opposites of unreality, ignorance and limitation. But unless the denial of opposites affirms some positive features in Brahman, the denial would be in vain; as it would be unable to point out to Brahman as *that* from which the opposites are to be distinguished : किं ब्रह्मविशेषणत्वेनासत्त्वादिव्यावृत्तिबोधः प्रयोजनमुच्यते ? उत स्वतंत्र एव व्यावृत्तिबोधः? नाद्यः । निर्विशेषत्वात् । न द्वितीयः, अजिज्ञासितत्वात् । (NS, p. 103). The definition of Brahman in the second sūtra bestows attributes on It by making It the author of the Universe, its protection etc. There is room neither for negative attributes nor for a Nirguṇa, in this : क्वावकाशोऽत्र निर्गुणे ? (AV). The Monist contends that all attributes like omniscience, which presuppose an “other” (sāpekṣa) are relative and cannot be admitted. If so, he must deny even “existence” to Brahman; for, existence is an idea bound up with the notion of space and time. Knowledge, similarly, implies knowledge “of” something, be it one’s own self or an “other”. Consistently with his own dictum, the Monist cannot also establish Brahman to be “Nirguṇa”, as the conception of Nirguṇa is *relative* to guṇas, and one can’t think of Brahman as “Nirguṇa” without the aid of “Guṇas” !

We can have no knowledge of Brahman, save through Scripture. And if the same Scripture should ascribe attributes to It, why should we fight shy of them or presume to reject them ? What are we to think of a Scripture which attributes false attributes to Brahman ? If what is taught by Scripture can be untrue in one respect, what assurance is there that the thesis of identity, said to be taught by it, may not be equally untrue ? The explanation of attributes as being due to a superimposition, is of no avail;

1. Cf. अभावरूपा घर्मा नाद्वैतं निष्पन्नं । (Maṇḍana).

as superimposition itself presupposes at least one or two general characteristics. But a thing which is claimed to be wholly and utterly devoid of any sort of characteristics whatever, can never become the subject of a superimposition :

सर्वधर्मविहीनस्य धर्मारोपः क्व दृश्यते ?

It will lead to a regress to assume a prior superimposition of some attributes in order to facilitate a subsequent one and so on *ad infinitum* (p. 33).

(iii) The *AV* in many places supplements the *B. S. B.* The equation of Brahman with Viṣṇu, in the latter, is here supported by two Sūtras from the *Daivi-Mimāṃsā* or *Samkarṣaṇa-Kāṇḍa*, as it is called. So far as at present ascertainable, Madhva is the earliest to cite these two Sūtras and make use of them. They are vouched for by the Viśiṣṭādvaitic literary tradition also. The question whether the definition of Brahman proposed by the Sūtrakāra is an intimate (svarūpa) or an accidental (taṭastha) one is settled, for the first time, in the light of a passage from the *Bhāgavata*. The identification of all the five forms of Annamaya, Prāṇamaya, Manomaya, Vijñānamaya and Ānandamaya, as Brahman (*B. S. B.*, i, 1, 12-19), is supported by a passage from the Vādhūla Śākhā. While the Bhāṣya on the fifth adhikaraṇa stops with a criticism of the doctrine of Brahman's *avācya* saying : सर्वशब्दावाच्यस्य लक्षणायुक्तेः the *AV* goes a step further to anticipate and refute a further line of defence of the Advaitic position, based on Daṇḍin's statement:

इक्षुक्षीरगुडादीनां माधुर्यस्यान्तरं महत् ।

तथापि न तदाख्यातुं सरस्वत्यापि शक्यते ॥

Madhva gives a powerful rejoinder to this, citing from a *Sūdaśāstra* (work on culinary science) :

विशदं क्षीरमाधुर्यं स्थिरमाज्यस्य तीक्ष्णकम् ।

गुडस्य पनसादीनां निर्हारीत्यभिधीयते ॥

The *B. S. B.* makes a summary disposal of Śaṅkara's interpretation of "aśabdam" (i, 1, 5) : न चाशब्दत्वमितरसिद्धम्. The *AV* follows this up with a full statement of the textual evidence in favor of the Śāstraic validity of Prakṛti as a metaphysical category. The brief notices of the different systems refuted in ii, 2, is enlarged upon, in the *AV*. The obscurity touching the illustration in ii, 3, 48, is removed and the doctrine of Amśas, in its twofold aspect, is fully explained.

Madhva takes many opportunities afforded by the Sūtras to discuss some of his own metaphysical doctrines and their logical and ontological bearings. He discusses for instance his doctrine of Viśeṣas. Difference (as fundamental to things), Sākṣī, natural gradation of souls and Ānanda-tāratamya in release.

There are two interesting references to Śaivite views in the *AV*., neither of which is traceable in Śrīkaṇṭha's Bhāṣya. One of them refers to the way in which the Śaiva philosopher seeks to establish the validity of his Āgamas by a process of inference from one portion of it which is fruitful. The other is to the interpretation of the *Tāpaniya Śruti* :

ऋतं सत्यं परं ब्रह्म पुरुषं कृष्णपिङ्गलम् ।

ऊर्ध्वरेतं विरूपाक्षं शंकरं नीललोहितम् ॥

on the basis of which the Śaiva seeks to identify Brahman with Śiva. There is no trace of *this Śruti* in Śrīkaṇṭha, though the three quarters of *T. Ā.* x, 12, 1, cited by him, agree with those of the *Tāpaniya* cited by Madhva. But the crux of the problem here hinges on the fourth Pāda of the *Tāpaniya*, which is nowhere cited by Śrīkaṇṭha. It is evident that Madhva is trying, with some difficulty, to give a suitable explanation¹ of the text cited by a Śaiva commentator. He is probably one of the Pre-Madhva commentators named in the list of Nārāyaṇa Paṇḍita.

(6) NYĀYA VIVARAṆA

The *Nyāyavivaraṇa* is a small prose tract in 420 granthas giving the gist of the leading Adhikaraṇas of the *B. S.*, and explaining their Pūrvapakṣa and Siddhānta yuktis. It deals with the technical formalities of interpretation. It is later than the *B. S. B.* and the *AV* : कृत्वा भाष्यानुभाष्ये (p. i.) * * * * *

व्याख्यानव्याख्ययोरेव विस्तरो यदुदीरितः ।

तन्व्यायोद्धरणे शक्ता ॥ (p. 16).

It gives a clear outline of Madhva's interpretation of the crucial adhikaraṇas, — all side-issues being eschewed and quotations reduced to the barest minimum.

The reader's attention is invited to the exhaustive critical and comparative study of Madhva's line of Sūtra interpretation in relation to those of the Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja schools embracing all the main subcommentaries and glosses of all the three schools, published by me in three volumes (Bharatīya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay (1971-78). This work focuses attention for the first time on the systematic examination of the adhikaraṇa-śarīras of these schools in Vyāsātīrtha's *TC* for Adhy. I-II and in the *STC* of his successor for Adhy. III-IV.

1. Madhva splits the text into two halves one referring to Viṣṇu (in the accusative) and the other to Rudra in the nominative (neuter) implying the latter's subordination to Viṣṇu :

विरूपाक्षमपरं ब्रह्मोक्तं तद्व्रते स्थितम् । (*AV*)

(7) BHĀGAVATA-TĀTPARYA

AS is well known, the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* ranks as one of the Gospels of Vaiṣṇavism and has, as such, been held in high esteem by all Vaiṣṇava thinkers of India. The systems of Vallabha and Caitanya have been very much influenced by the doctrine of erotic devotion (प्रेमभक्ति) associated with this Purāṇa. Rāmānuja, in the 11th century, had, however, ignored it; probably because, it had not been cited by Śaṅkara and had not so much ostensible support to give to his doctrine of “Abhinnanimittopādānavāda”, as the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa*.¹ Taking advantage of this silence of the great Vaiṣṇava philosopher, the note of extreme transcendentalism of that Purāṇa and the general ambiguity of its utterances :

यत्र त्रिसर्गो मृषा (i, 1, 1) तत्त्वं यज्ज्ञानमद्वयम् (i, 2, 11).

पश्यत्यात्मनि चात्मानम् (i, 2, 12).

सत्तामात्रं तु यत्किञ्चित् सदसच्चाविशेषितम् (i, 2, 12).

निर्विकल्पः (i, 4, 4).

समधिगतोऽस्मि विधूतभेदमोहः (i, 9, 49); ii, 1, 31-35;

एकरसम् (x, 87, 19).

एकं परं ज्योतिरनन्यमद्वयम् (x, 94, 18).

एतावानेव वेदार्थः शब्द आस्थाय माभिदाम् ।

मायामात्रमनूद्यन्ते प्रतिषिध्य प्रशाम्यति ॥ (xi, 21, 44).

मनोमात्रम् (xi, 21, 44) अद्वितीयम् (xi, 28, 36).

अमूलम् (xi, 28, 18); केवलम् (xi, 28, 19);

xi, 28, 4; 7; 22; 33; अर्थवादः (xi, 28, 37).

अनृतम् (xi, 29, 22), सर्वं मायेति तर्केण (xi. 18. 27).

many exponents of the Advaita school had written commentaries on it. The commentaries of Citsukha and Puṇyāranya mentioned by Jīvagovāmin, in his *Ṣaṭsandarbha*,² evidently belong to this class. Of these, the commentary of Puṇyāranya is definitely said to have been overthrown by Madhva, in his *B. T.*³ The evidence furnished by Madhva in his *B. T.* shows that he was contending with powerfully established Advaitic commentaries on the Purāṇa. His comments, being as usual, too brief, it is not possible to fix the identity of those assailed by him. That it was *not* Śrīdhara Svāmin is clear from a careful comparison of passages. The Advaitic interpretations of

1. Cf. भूतानि विष्णुर्भुवनानि विष्णुः and other numerous passages cited in the *Śrībhāṣya*.

2. His commentary on the *Bhāgavata*. See iv, 4, 13; iv, 7, 37; and iv, 20, 11 etc.

3. यदेव किल दृष्ट्वा श्रीमद्वाचार्यचरणैर्वैष्णवान्तराणां तच्छिष्यपुण्याख्यादिरीतिकव्याख्याप्रवेशशङ्कया तद्वृत्तात्पर्यान्तरं लिखद्भिः * * * * * (*Ṣaṭsandarbha*, p. 18, with c. of Baladeva)

Śrīdhara, are, for one thing, different from those assailed by Madhva.¹ Secondly, Śrīdhara himself, is not so obdurately monistic in the interpretation of passages, which on Madhva's showing, appear to have been monistically interpreted by certain leading Advaitic commentators : Cf. Śrīdhara on : आ लयम् (i, 1, 3)² परं न यत्पदम् (ii, 9, 9) and Madhva's comments on these. It seems probable that Śrīdhara came some time *after* Madhva and was also to some extent influenced by his views and interpretations, without prejudice to his devotion to Advaita and was even *indebted* to him for one or two of his quotations³ (known to us only through Madhva).

Madhva's *Bhāgavata-Tātparya* (B. T) is a selective commentary in some 3600 granthas. Out of a total of 18,000 verses of the Purāṇa, he has commented upon some 1600. The comments are, as usual with him, very brief and always to the point and augmented by quotations from a variety of sources, particularly from the Saṁhitās of the Pāñcarātra and their subsidiary literature, which are profusely cited by him, in the B. T. His object is to reconcile all the seeming contradictions of the text and bring out the essentially Theistic and transcendental realism of the Purāṇa, that appears, here and there, to be pushed into the background by a monistic note. He does not, therefore, go into all the verses; but only into the "Tātparya" or purport of such crucial passages. The contradictions are perhaps due to an undercurrent of "implicit monism" running through the text emphasizing the transcendent majesty of God, to the exclusion of all else side by side with its basic philosophy of Seśvara-Sāṁkhya thought, emphasizing the reality of the created world and its values and preaching the ethics of Niṣkāma-karma, Jñāna and Bhakti, as means of Salvation. Madhva reconciles all these contradictions with the help of his ideology of Svatantrādvitīya-tattvavāda :

एकात्म्यज्ञानतो याति तमो; भेदात्परं पदम् ।

स्वातन्त्र्यपारतन्त्र्यादिज्ञानं भेददृशिर्भवेत् ॥

इति ब्रह्मदेवर्ते (B. T. x, 4, 19).

The i, ii and iii Skandhas are cursorily treated by Madhva. His attention is mainly directed to the x and xi Skandhas, which strike a strong note of Transcendentalism, verging on a Monism. The chapters on Kṛṣṇa-Uddhava Saṁvāda (xi, 6-29) are particularly tinged with monistic phraseology and ideas, which have been fully exploited by

1. Cf. स्वलक्षणैः (x, 70, 5) विद्यात्मनि भिदाबोधः (xi, 19, 14).

2. Madhva does not expressly interpret the आ here as "inclusive of", though he is definitely in favor of the continuation of Bhakti, in Mokṣa, as Śrīdhara has interpreted here. It may, however, be noted in passing, that the injunction पिबत and the presence of the term भुवि would not favor Śrīdhara's view here.

3. The text आततत्वाच्च मातृत्वादात्मा हि परमो हरिः । quoted by Śrīdhara (*Bhāg.* xi, 2, 22) from "Tantra" (i.e. Pāñcarātra), is the same as that cited by Madhva, in his *VTN* from the *Paramaśruti* of the Pāñcarātra literature (p. 7. Bby. edn. with Jayatirtha's com. Similarly, another text cited by Śrīdhara from *Skānda* (under *Bhāg.* xi, 11, 3) : बन्धको भवपाशेन, is evidently borrowed from Madhva.

monistic commentators. Madhva *tones down* these passages and brings them into line with his Transcendental Theism of Svatantrādvitīya-Brahmavāda, with the help of a large number of texts drawn from the unexplored Pañcarātra literature (some of which seem to have been intimately connected with the thought of the *Bhāgavata* and its interpretation, as may be seen from the close correspondence of thought disclosed by Madhva's citations from them with that of the Purāṇa and also from independent evidence),¹ such as the *Brahmatarka*, *Tantra-Bhāgavata*, *Māyāvaibhava*, *Pādma (tantra)*, *Tattvaviveka*, *Sattattva*, *Pravṛtta* etc. It is possible that like the Purāṇas, the Pañcarātra Samhitās too had "softened and modified" the extreme monism of some of the Upaniṣadic passages and that they also represent or contain at least one important school of ideas regarding the philosophy of the Upaniṣads and the Sūtras. (cf. Dasgupta, *op. cit.* iii, 496). It is interesting to note that Madhva, in his commentary on *Bhāgavata* i, 1, 1, gives an extract from the *Tantra-Bhāgavata*, which is a close Theistic paraphrase of that verse.

The other Skandhas, where controversial points are few and far between, are skipped over by Madhva, in a few pages. His text shows many interesting and important variants from Śrīdhara's vulgate. Some of them² have important bearing on doctrinal issues.

Despite the popularity enjoyed by Advaitic commentaries on the Purāṇa, there is good support for the essential aspects of Madhva's distinctive type of Theism, in it. This is clear from a general view of important passages:

द्रव्य कर्म च कालश्च स्वभावो जीव एव च ।

यदनुग्रहतः सन्ति न सन्ति यदुपेक्षया ॥ (ii, 10, 12).

इदं हि विश्वं भगवानिवेतरो यतो जगत्स्थाननिरोधसंभवः (i, 5, 20).

These two represent the corner-stone of Madhva's philosophy. He cites them often in his works. The first teaches the eternal dependence of 'nityapadārthas' like Prakṛti, Jīvas, Time, etc. on Brahman and shows that their very existence, eternity and other characteristics are metaphysically dependent on the Divine Will. His conception of Brahman as the One Independent Reality in the sense of being सर्वसत्ताप्रतीतिप्रवृत्तिनियामकम् is directly derived from this verse. The other text gives Madhva his clue to the reconciliation of Identity texts (like सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म) with the reality of the world. (See his *B. S. B.* i, 1, 17). There are passages that distinctly recognize the existence of Prakṛti as a distinctive material principle, which is energized by God. These are cited by Madhva to rebut the charge of "Aśabdatvam" brought against Prakṛti, by other commentators on *B. S.* i, 1, 5 :

सदसद्रूपया चासौ गुणमय्यागुणो विभुः (i, 2, 30)

यत्तत्त्रिगुणमव्यक्तं नित्यं सदसदात्मकम् (iii, 27, 11)

1. See f. n. 2. on *Tantrabhāgavata*. P. 131.

2. स्वलक्षणैः (x, 70, 5). सिदाबोधः (xi, 19, 40).

स एव भूयो निजवीर्यचोदितां स्वजीवमायां प्रकृतिं सिसृक्षतीम् (i, 10, 22)

प्रधानं प्रकृतिं प्राहुरविशेषं विशेषवत् ॥ (iii, 27, 11.)

पंचभिः पंचभिर्ब्रह्म चतुर्भिर्दशभिस्तथा ।

एतच्चतुर्विंशतिकं गणं प्राधानिकं विदुः (iii, 27, 12).

त्वं देव शक्त्यां गुणकर्मयोनौ रेतस्त्वजायां कविरादधेऽजः (iii, 6, 28)

There is clear recognition of the view that "Bheda-Jñāna", or realisation of difference between God and souls and the world, constitutes saving knowledge. These texts are cited by Madhva in his *B. S. B.* :

विद्यात्मनि भिदाबोधः (xi, 19, 40) भेददष्ट्याऽभिमानेन (iii, 33, 12). The Brahman is declared to be Saguna; nay, infinite, in its attributes :

कर्तृत्वात्सगुणं ब्रह्म (iii, 33, 12).

मय्यनन्तगुणेऽनन्ते गुणतोऽनन्तविग्रहे (vi, 4, 48)

and expressed by all sacred texts :

नारायणपरा वेदाः (ii, 5, 15).

मां विधत्ते ऽभिधत्ते मां विकल्प्योऽपोह्य इत्यहम् (xi, 21, 43).

Bhakti is the means of redemption :

श्रेयः स्रुतिं भक्तिमुदस्य ये विभो तुष्यन्ति ये केवलबोधलब्धये

तेषामसौ क्लेशल एव शिष्यते * * ॥ (x, 14, 4).

पानेन ते देव कथासुधायाः प्रवृद्धभक्त्या * * (iii, 6, 24).

There is gradation (*tāratamya*) in *Bhakti* and *Mokṣa* :

भक्तिः सिद्धेर्गरीयसी (iii, 25, 33) नैकात्म्यतां मे स्पृहयन्ति केचित् (iii 25, 34) नैकत्वमप्युत दीयमानं न गृह्णन्ति (iii, 29, 13).

Mokṣa is the realization of innate bliss of selfhood :

मुक्तिर्हित्वान्यथारूपं स्वरूपेण व्यवस्थितिः (ii, 10, 6).

Personality persists in Mokṣa :

तस्मै स्वलोकं भगवान्संभाजितः संदर्शयामास परं न यत्पदम्

* * * * करोति मानं बहुधा विभूतिभिः ((ii, 9, 9-13).

The Supreme is Viṣṇu :

सत्त्वं रजस्तम इति प्रकृतेर्गुणास्तैर्युक्तः परः पुरुष एक इहास्य धत्ते ।

सृष्ट्यादिना हरिर्विरचिहरेतिसंज्ञाः श्रेयांसि तत्र खलु सत्त्वतनौ नृणां स्युः (1. 2. 24)

निमित्तमात्रमीशस्य विश्वसर्गनिरोधयोः ।

हिरण्यगर्भः सर्वंश्च कालाख्यारूपिणस्तव ॥ (x, 71, 8)

Only difficult words and obscure passages are explained by Madhva.

In all cases, he supports his interpretations with suitable authorities. Such citations are an outstanding feature of this work. More than *one hundred and ninety five works*, other than the well-known ones, are cited. Where occasion demands, certain fundamental questions of religion and philosophy are raised and discussed with reference to authorities. The bulk of quotations are from the numerous *Samhitās* and other works of the *Pañcarātra*, notably the *Brahmatarka*, *Kāpileya*,¹ the *Tantrabhāgavata*² and the *Mahā (sanatkumāra) Samhitā*.³

1. Schrader, *Introd. to Pañcarātra*, List No. 28.

2. We are told by Jīva Gosvāmī that it was a sort of commentary on the *Bhāgavata* and mentioned as such in the *Hayaśirṣa Pañcarātra* : तस्यैव श्रीमद्भागवतस्य भाष्यभूतं श्रीहयशीर्षपंचरात्रे शास्त्रप्रस्तावे गणितं तन्त्रभागवताभिधं तन्त्रम् ॥ (*Śaṣṣandarbhā*, with c. of Baladeva, p. 17). Madhva's *BT* has numerous quotations from this work, which is *not now available* to us.

3. Schrader, no. 113.

(8) MAHĀBHĀRATA-TĀTPARYA-NIRŪPĀYA

Long before the time of Madhva, the great Epic had attained its present encyclopaedic character and was universally accepted as a great authority on philosophical question, too, Great Vedāntic teachers like Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja had quoted frequently from it. Its essentially Theistic background was considered a great point of strength by Madhva. He therefore went a step further and claimed it as one of the important source-books of his system, next only to the Vedas, in authority :

ऋग्यजुः सामाथर्वश्च भारतं पंचरात्रकम् ।
मूलरामायणं चैव शास्त्रमित्यभिधीयते ॥

(*Skānda*, q. by Madhva, *B. S. B.* i, 1, 1)

The Epic is called the “fifth Veda”. Madhva claims it contains esoteric truths not to be found even in the Vedas. He reads an esoteric and allegorical meaning into the Epic kernel which has important bearing on the theology of his system, on its hierarchical side. His epitome of the Epic may be described as an encyclopaedia of the religious and philosophical tenets of the Dvaita system and its theology.

On the basis of some significant authorities which he brings together in the second chapter of his work, and by virtue of its position as the fifth Veda, Madhva regards the Epic as furnishing the key to the correct interpretation of the theosophy of the Vedaśāstra :

भारतव्यपदेशेन ह्याम्नायार्थश्च दर्शितः (*Bhāg.* i, 5, 28)

The Epic is an illustrative commentary on Vedic philosophy and religion. It provides, under the guise of a historical narrative, a vivid allegory of the incessant conflict between the forces of Theism and Atheism in life and the ultimate triumph of Theism and morality. There is thus a striking parallel to Zoroastrian and Hebraic ideology of Theism vs anti-Theism, in this reading of the esoteric significance of the Epic, by Madhva, with this difference, that to Madhva as a Vedāntin, the reality of the conflict is made the keener by the said forces being not merely symbolized by the gods and their enemies presiding over these forces, but by their being actually worked out by them, in and through their own lives also, as participators in the drama of life, thereby shaping their own destinies and evolving themselves to their fullest stature, as units in the Cosmic evolution and serving as models of good and bad to human beings. The Adhyātmic allegory of the Epic is elucidated by Madhva (*Mbh. T. N.* ii, 144-48) with remarkable critical imagination :

भक्तिज्ञानं सर्वैराग्यं प्रज्ञा मेघा धृतिः स्थितिः ।
योगः प्राणो बलं चैव वृकोदर इति स्मृतः ॥
सर्वविद्या द्रौपदी च यस्मात्सैव सरस्वती ।
अज्ञानादिस्वरूपस्तु कलिर्दुर्योधनः स्मृतः ॥
विपरीतं तु यज्ज्ञानं दुःशासन इतीरितः ।
नास्तिक्यं शकुनिर्नाम सर्वदोषात्मकाः परे
धार्तराष्ट्रास्त्वहंकारो द्रौणी रुद्रात्मको यतः ।
द्रोणाद्या इन्द्रियाण्येव पापान्यन्ये तु सैनिकाः
पाण्डवेयास्तु पुण्यानि येषां विष्णुर्नियामकः ॥

and ii, 66 : तमिममेव सुरासुरसंचये हरिकृतं प्रविशेषमुदीक्षितुम् ।

प्रतिविभज्य च भीमसुयोधनौ स्वपरपक्षभिदा कथिता कथा ॥

According to Madhva, the cosmic purpose of God,—the deliverance of the gods and the damnation of the Āsuric is signified in one of its introductory verses :

सृष्टा ब्रह्मादयो येन निहता येन दानवाः ।

तस्मै देवादिदेवाय नमस्ते शाङ्गपाणये ॥

He holds that the Rāmāyaṇa story being the earlier, the *Mbh.* provides the final opportunity for the gods participating in both in the cosmic purpose of God, to have their own individual accounts of Sādhanaṣ balanced. (II. 46-50).

Bhīma is the chosen instrument of this divine purpose :

भूभारहरणे विष्णोः प्रधानाङ्गं हि मारुतिः ।

The character of Bhīma is therefore idealized and shown to the best advantage, over all the Epic characters, next to Kṛṣṇa,¹ Madhva cites valuable and interesting evidence of the tributes paid to Bhīmasena by Kṛṣṇa,² Yudhiṣṭhira³ and Duryodhana (iv, 28, 16-21),⁴ in the Epic, to show that he is by common consent, regarded as the central hero of the Epic and the chosen instrument of the Lord to carry out His purpose. He has naturally softened incidents like Bhīma's drinking the blood of Duśśāsana (*Mbh. T. N.* xxvii, 146-48) the hitting of Duryodhana below the belt in the *gadāyuddha* (xxviii, 74-87) and the falling off of Bhīma's body in the Mahāprasthānaparva (xxxii, 67-82).

The Epic is, thus, a theistic document in essence : नारायणकथा as it is called therein. The story as such is but the outer vesture. The central thesis is the supremacy of God Viṣṇu (Kṛṣṇa) who is the conductor of the cosmic drama. Madhva devotes the first two chapters of his work to an elucidation of the main principles of his interpretation on these lines and the theological sanctions upon which this ideology rests. The most important tenet is of course, the transcendent majesty of God. He is unique. There is no one like Him among all the gods, nor any equal to Him. As equality itself is an impossible idea, any identity of the human self with the Divine is out of the question. (p. 20-21). God is the Lord of all. The world of matter and souls, is for ever, dependent on Him and is distinct for ever from Him. He is the perfect Being, endowed with all the auspicious attributes. But this theoretical perfection of the Deity is often belied by the weaknesses and imperfections betrayed by the Avatārs of the

1. Cf. Bhaṭṭanārāyaṇa, *Veṇīsamhāra* i, 23. *Mbh. T. N.* 27, 149.

2. यत्किंचात्मनि कल्याणं संभावयसि पाण्डव ॥

सहस्रगुणमप्येतत् त्वयि संभावयाम्यहम् ॥ (v. 75, 3, Critical Edn.)

अस्मिन्युद्धे भीमसेन त्वयि भारः समाहितः ।

धूर्जुनेन वोढव्या वोढव्या इतरे जनाः ॥ (v. 75, 18. Critical Edn.)

3. धर्मश्चार्यश्च कामश्च मोक्षश्चैव यशो ध्रुवम् ।

त्वय्यायत्तमिदं सर्वं सर्वलोकस्य पश्यतः ॥

4. Found in Mss, of Southern Recension of the Epic.

Deity in their earthly careers said to be undertaken for the edification of humanity. The Hindu philosopher, has thus a difficult task of trying to “justify the ways of God to man”,—ways, which, in some cases, human logic and ethical standards find it difficult to reconcile with its ideas of godliness. These difficulties would be seen to create a serious problem in theology and dogmatics. They are not, however, peculiar to Hinduism. Every religion has its own share of them. But a Hindu Theist pledged to the doctrine of Ekavākyatā between the two currents of Hindu religious philosophy,—between the rich Vedic mythologies and the sectarian legends of the Purāṇas, which abound in such difficulties and inconvenient situations,—the problem of “ethicizing” the behavior of the gods, and the dealings of the Avatārs, is a difficult one. Madhva rises equal to the occasion and develops a network of theological technique to solve these contradictions between the actual and the ideal nature of the deities, between the theory and the practical behavior of the Avatārs of God, celebrated in the Epics and Purāṇas and maintain a satisfactory and balanced conception of the Deity. He has been the *only Indian thinker* who has given his special attention to this important problem of Theology and shown the necessary boldness and resourcefulness in tackling it. Of course, the solutions proposed by him rest mostly on *textual sanctions and theodicies*; but within the limits of the texts and traditions of Hindu thought, that have come down to us, it is not possible to adopt a different method or draw a different conclusion.

The historical value of the *Mbh. T. N.*, lies in its being the earliest *datable* running commentary on the Epic, in Sanskrit. It is not, of course, a commentary, in the strict sense of the term. But, in so far as it traverses the entire course of the history of the Kuru-Pāṇḍavas, without omitting any of the major incidents, its importance to the “text-criticism” of the Epic, becomes considerable; all the more so, when we have it from Madhva himself that he had travelled all over the land in search of mss, of the Epic, collected a good number of them of various recensions and then fixed the standard text for himself to follow and comment upon :

देशे देशे तथा ग्रन्थान् दृष्ट्वा चैव पथनिवृत्तान् । (Mbh. T. N. ii, 7).

He even complains in the manner of a modern scholar, that the text of the Epic, had, in most cases, been sadly mutilated beyond recognition or restoration; that numerous interpolations had crept in; and that, therefore, he has had to take all possible care, advice and guidance in establishing the correct and genuine text (*Mbh. T. N. ii, 3.6*) :

क्वचित् ग्रन्थान् प्रक्षिपन्ति क्वचिदन्तरितानपि ।

कुर्युः क्वचिच्च व्यत्यासं प्रमादात्क्वचिदन्यथा ॥

अनुच्छिन्ना अपि ग्रन्था व्याकुला इति सर्वशः ।

उत्सन्नाः प्रायशः सर्वे कोट्यंशोऽपि न वर्तते ॥

कलावेवं व्याकुलिते निर्णयाय प्रचोदितः ।

* * * *

The Editors of the “Critical Edition” of the *Mahābhārata*

(the B.O. R.I.) have really missed much valuable material for their work, in having utterly ignored the existence of such a work as this. It ought to have been consulted at least as one of the Testimonia. (See p. xxv. Prolegomena, Critical Edn.). It should not have been passed over because of its religiophilosophical stand point in epitomizing the Epic.

In the Prolegomena to his epitome, Madhva elaborates his theory of a threefold interpretation of the Epic into (1) historical; (2) allegorical; and (3) metaphysical :

मन्वादि भारतं केचिदास्तिकादि तथापरे ।

तथोपरिचराद्यन्ये भारतं प्रवदन्ति हि¹ ॥ (*Mbh.* i, 1, 50).

The historical (*āstika*) is the one normally associated with the actual Epic setting. The allegorical (*manvādi*) sees in the internecine warfare of the Kuru-Pāṇḍavas the eternal conflict between the forces of good and bad, on the moral plane. The metaphysical (*upari-cara*) attempts an Adhyātmic attunement of the text (*Mbh.* T. N. ii, 43)., drawing its inspiration mainly from those contexts which elaborate the nature of the Supreme.

SUMMARY

The work runs to thirty-two chapters. The first two provide the necessary theosophic background to the author's exposition of the philosophy of the Epic. The work opens with a brief account of primeval creation and goes on to emphasize the supremacy of Viṣṇu besides discussing the relative validity of texts and methods of their harmonized interpretation. Reasons are given for setting aside the Śaiva Purāṇas, when they contradict the Vedaśāstra. The threefold classification of souls, accepted by Madhva, is referred to in i, 87 ff. A hierarchical system like Madhva's has inevitably to make room for varying standards of spiritual fitness and efficiency as well as of means and ends (*Sādhana*), such as Karma, Jñāna, and Bhakti and their fruit. Dāna, Tirtha, Tapas and Yajña are declared to be *inferior* Sādhanas. Unalloyed devotion, alone, qualifies for salvation. Verse i, 86, gives an almost classical definition of Bhakti, what it is and what it is *not* (i, 113). In respect of Sādhanas, Brahmā alone, as the highest of souls, can concentrate on all the infinite attributes of Godhead. Human beings cannot concentrate on more than four fundamental attributes of Divinity : सच्चिदानन्द आत्मेति । The Devas can concentrate on a few more, according to their capacity.²

1. Modern scholars treat this verse as referring to three different "beginnings" of the Epic text. See G. V. Vaidya, *Mahābhārata, A Criticism* 1945, p. 5, f.n. 2 "though there is no śloka beginning with Manu, in the Ādi Parva". Moreover, the Āstika, Manu and Uparicara chapters are not so widely separated from each other in the Epic and it seems pointless to recognise three different beginnings for this reason. The verse seems to have a symbolic meaning as suggested by Madhva. It is interesting to note that the late Dr. V. S. Sukthankar himself, in his *Meaning of the Mahābhārata* (Asiatic Soc. of Bombay) has attempted to probe the "gestalt" of the Epic at what he calls the *mundane, ethical and metaphysical planes*. He has also paid a tribute to M. for giving the lead into the Adhyātmic significance of the Epic.

2. Cf. "There are only two attributes of God of which we, humans, have any knowledge at all. The being of God is *not* however confined within the limits of human experience. Our knowledge of God is real so far as it goes. But reality is beyond us. There are an infinite number of other aspects of the Deity along which we cannot travel since we are restricted to two lines of approach only, viz. mind and matter." W. G. Bond. *Three Things that Matter—Religion, Philosophy and Science*, p. 73, Watts, London.

Chapters iii-ix, are devoted to a critical summary of the *Rāmāyaṇa*. Madhva shows an amount of pious ingenuity in explaining away such episodes as reflect unfavorably on his heroes and heroines. The supremacy of Rāma as Viṣṇu and the divinity of Sītā are zealously and courageously upheld, with many reorientations of "compromising situations", with profuse reference to authorities, and fictions of theodicy.¹ The encounter of Paraśurāma with Rāma and the former's 'defeat' are skilfully explained. Rāvaṇa is made to carry away not the real Sītā but a "Pratikṛti" into which life had been breathed. Rāma is aware of the fact all along; but just 'pretends' to go through all the suffering and privation like a human lover. Madhva relies on *Bhāgavata* (v. 19, 5-6) also, in this connection.

The story of the *Mahābhārata* is elaborately dealt with, following the Epic narrative with "critical" comments on the above lines, wherever called for, from Chapters x to xxxii.² The work concludes with an account of the rise of Buddhistic and Jain schools and the rise of Māyāvāda in the Kali age and the advent of Madhva himself for the rehabilitation of Theism.

Madhva handles a variety of metres with remarkable skill and consistency. There is a ring of Epic dignity about his style. The *Mbh. T. N.* is the biggest metrical work of Madhva and is, by no means, a negligible performance—judged even from the point of view of extent, which is about 6000 granthas. There is no doubt he possessed a natural gift for poetry; but the plan and purpose of his work have made anything more than a few passing flashes of his aptitude in that direction, impossible. It is a Kāvya in a much larger sense than the conventional.

1. In the encounter with Paraśurāma, the demon Atula is introduced (iv). See also episode of *Nāgapāśa*.

2. Chapters xiii and xvi-cvii, are based on the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* story.

DAŚA PRAKARAṆAS

“DAŚA-PRAKARAṆAS” is the name collectively given to ten minor philosophical tracts of Madhva. They are (1) the *Pramāṇa-lakṣaṇa* (PL), (2) the *Kathā-Lakṣaṇa* (KL), (3) the *Upādhikhaṇḍana* (UK), (4) the *Māyāvādakhaṇḍana* (MK), (5) the *Prapañca-Mithyātva-numāna-Khaṇḍana* (PMK), (6) the *Tattvasaṁkhyāna* (TS), (7) the *Tattvaviveka* (TV), (8) the *Tattvodyota* (Td), (9) the *Viṣṇu-Tattva-Nirṇaya* (VTN), and (10) the *Karma-Nirṇaya* (KN). They deal with the various aspects of the Dvaita system, its logic, ontology, theology, theory of knowledge etc. Five of them (nos. 3, 4, 5, 8 and 9) are refutations of the Monistic Idealism of Śaṁkara, from various points of view. Nos. 6-9, may be described as constructive works devoted to the exposition of Madhva’s cosmic scheme, ontological categories and general metaphysics. The language of these Prakaraṇas is throughout tough and terse. But for the lucid commentaries of Jayatīrtha, on them, they would still have remained obscure. Except the VTN., all the others are short works.

(9) PRAMĀṆA LAKṢAṆA

(i) In traditional accounts of systems of Indian thought, it is usual to begin with a statement of the number and nature of Pramāṇas, i.e., sources or guarantors of correct knowledge, recognized by a given system. Max Müller expresses great admiration for this practice of Indian writers, as it removes a good deal of misunderstanding and makes the task of philosophical assessment of a given system easy.

Following this time-honored practice, Madhva indicates in his PL., the number of Pramāṇas admitted by him, their definitions, modes of functioning and the nature of reality apprehended by them. We are told at the end of the work that the exposition follows the *Brahmatarka* of Vyāsa, not now extant.

(ii) The attacks made by the Advaitins, pursuing the dialectic method of inquiry and refutation of the Buddhists, on the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Realism, its categories and thought-measuring devices seem to have been responsible in its turn for the composition of such works as the PL., by Madhva, in an attempt obviously at perfecting his own system and making it proof against similar attacks.¹ He has therefore taken due note of the criticisms of Advaitic dialecticians like Vimuktātman and Ānandabodha,

1. It is significant that one of Vimuktātman’s works bears the title of “Pramāṇa-vṛttanirṇaya” (See his *Iṣṭasiddhi*, p. 37, G. O. S.) Madhva’s dialectic style and method and many turns of expression, often recall the *Iṣṭasiddhi* (which was one of the works studied by him under his Guru). The work seems to have given a powerful incentive to his critical zeal.

against various types of realism and has endeavoured to discard much that was superfluous or illogical, in the older systems of Realism, while improving upon all that was of permanent value and metaphysical merit in them.

(iii) The Naiyāyikas themselves, had, as a result of outside criticism, introduced many new changes in the *minutiae* and methodology of their system. Much of the old looseness of thought and vocabulary had been shed and a new school of logic inaugurated by Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya, with a staggering paraphernalia of technical jargon, had come into being.

(iv) Though a realist himself, Madhva had his own differences with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas.¹ He had therefore to traverse the entire field of realistic logic and metaphysics over again with a newer outlook. A certain measure of constructive exposition of one's own views becomes necessary in such cases from a comparative and critical standpoint. It was to these tasks, then, that Madhva addressed himself in his Prakaraṇas.

A Pramāṇa, as ordinarily understood, is a means or guarantor of valid knowledge : प्रमाणं प्रमाणम्. But to Madhva, it has a wider and a higher denotation *also*, viz., the core of reality itself : यथार्थं प्रमाणम्. Pramāṇa embraces, in its fold, truth, or true knowledge and the means of such knowledge. True knowledge *per se* is 'Kevala-Pramāṇa.' What leads to it is "Anu-Pramāṇa." Sense-perception, Inference and Verbal testimony come under the latter.

Madhva accepts but three Pramāṇas² as fundamental: Pratyakṣa (sense-perception), Anumāna (inference) and Āgama (verbal testimony or Scripture). The additional Pramāṇas recognized by other systems, such as the Upamāna of Gautama and the Arthāpatti of the Mīmāṃsakas are subsumed under Inference. "Anupalabdhi" of the Bhāṭṭas, is subsumed partly under Inference and partly under Perception; and "Sambhava" and "Pariśeṣa" under Inference. The scheme of Pramāṇas is thus considerably simplified and reduced to the barest limits of logical necessity. The subject of fallacies is similarly treated. The number of अवयव terms or members indispensable for an adequate statement of a syllogism is cut down to the barest minimum. Madhva makes no fetish of the exact number of Avayavas that will have to be recognized for a complete syllogism. As a general rule, he is for three : प्रतिज्ञा, हेतु and दृष्टान्त and dispenses with the well-known scheme of five-membered syllogism (पञ्चावयववाक्य) of the Naiyāyikas.³ Even a bare proposition implying a probans (hetu) will do, or even a proposition involving a middle term. The subject of Nigrahasthānas (points for closure of a debate) is also similarly treated. The Nyāya definition of Pramāṇa as सम्यगनुभवसाधनम् is analysed and refuted. The validity of Smṛti (recollection) denied by

1. See Part III. Chap. xx.

2. Like the Sāṃkhyas (cf. *Sāṃkhyakārikā*, 4), the Yogas and Bhāsarvajña among Naiyāyikas.

3. *Nyāyasūtra*. i, 1, 32.

some philosophers, is resolutely maintained.¹ Madhva says, in this connection, that the very edifice of experience would collapse, if the validity of our recollection is impugned : अप्रामाण्याङ्गीकारे, अनुभूतं मयेत्यत्र प्रमाणाभावात् । To try to establish the validity of our past experience through inference involves needless strain and violence to experience. लिङ्गत्वेन प्रामाण्यकल्पने, कल्पनागौरवं, दृष्टहानिश्च । The domain of prameyas is then exhaustively dealt with. The number of granthas in the *PL* is 50.

(10) KATHĀ LAKṢAṆA

This is a metrical monograph in 35 anuṣṭubhs devoted to the exposition of the subject of debate, and the rules and regulations governing its conduct. Here also, the exposition is said to follow the *Brahmatarka*.

Debates and disputations for the purpose of settling doctrinal differences and for the ascertainment of truth were common enough in the intellectual life of the 12th and 13th centuries, in India. In the ancient days, the Buddhists, Jains and Naiyāyikas had been the makers of Logic and the leaders in debate. Between the 10th and 12th centuries, the shield was entirely with the Advaitins. Madhva's object in writing the *Kathā-lakṣaṇa*, must have been to train his disciples to become adepts in the art of debate and be able to carry fire and sword into the enemies' camp. Some of his peculiar views on the different aspects of the subject also called for a suitable medium of presentation.

Madhva insists upon the recognition of three types of debate : वाद, जल्प, and वितण्डा, rejecting the other classifications attempted by the Buddhists, Śrīharṣa and the Naiyāyikas. Vāda, is the purest form of debate carried on solely for the ascertainment of truth. Jalpa is a less exalted form of it, which may be indulged in either as a test of ability or for victory.² Vitaṇḍā is cleansed of much of its bad odour and raised to the rank of an independent kind of disputation, perfectly legitimate and laudable where an honest soul is confronted with a particularly vicious or perverse opponent वितण्डा तु सतामन्यैः । It is an occasion where one refuses to throw pearls before swines. In such extremities, the Siddhāntin merely adopts the Vaitaṇḍika or destructive attitude demolishing the arguments of his adversary and exposing their hollowness without in any way, disclosing his own view : तत्त्वमेषु निगूहितम्. Such a procedure may not be flattering to one's higher ideals of truth-determination; but it takes all sorts of men to make a debate. Vitaṇḍā is the honest man's armour against hypocrisy and falsehood masquerading as goodness and truth. It is a safeguard against unscrupulous argument कण्टकशाखावरणवत् (*Ny. S. iv, 2, 50*).

1. On the validity of Smṛti-cognition, see Umesh Miśra's article in the *Pathak Com. Vol.* pp. 177-86. The vindication of the status of Smṛti as a *valid experience* within the meaning of "यथार्थम्" is one of the distinctive and outstanding contributions of Madhva, to Indian thought. He establishes its right to validity both in the extended sense of प्रमाण as यथार्थम् and in the narrow sense of अनधिगतार्थगन्तु — as admitted by the Bhāṭṭas and the Advaitins. (See *AV iii*, p. 34). See my *Philosophy of Madhvācārya*, pp. 94-95.

2. ख्यातिलाभपूजा etc.

(11) UPĀDHI KHAṆḌANA

This is a short metrical tract in 20 granthas, criticizing the concept of “Upādhi” (pluralising factor or agency) which plays so large and necessary a part in the Brahmajñānavāda of Śaṅkara. The world of plurality is believed by the Advaitin to be the outcome of fontal ignorance playing upon the One Real. The oneness of existence is the truth of things; and all plurality is ascribable to this fontal ignorance (अनाद्यविद्या). Madhva, naturally, opens his attack by pointing out that the very idea of such ne-science descending upon Brahman, is unthinkable, unaccountable and impossible : अज्ञताखिलसंवेत्तुर्घटे न कुतश्चन । If Brahman is the only thing that is, where and whence can Ignorance come in ? If it is to be rendered possible by the intervention of an “Upādhi”, the question naturally arises as to how this Upādhi itself is to be conceived of — whether as a real and essential feature of Brahman or as itself being due to an earlier layer of Ignorance. A real Upādhi spells danger to a Monism. To rely on a previous Ignorance to create a subsequent Upādhi, is to court the double fallacy of a *regressus ad infinitum* and mutual interdependence in reasoning. It is thus impossible to make out any rational and intelligible relation between the Upādhi and Brahman. The function of an ‘Upadhi’ is to place in bold relief an existing difference not readily perceived and *not to create a non-existing difference* : विद्यमानस्य भेदस्य ज्ञापको नैव कारकः (U. Kh.) The progress of Ignorance being thus arrested at the very outset, there is no individual soul resulting therefrom, and no fit subject for metaphysical investigation.¹

A Dualism has no such difficulties. In it, a spiritual aspirant, (not identical with Brahman) knowing something of Brahman and wanting to know *more* is the proper person (Adhikārī) to undertake metaphysical quest, undergo the necessary discipline laid down in the Śāstras and reap the benefit of his labors. Everything is thus intelligible in a Dualism.

(12) PRAPAÑCA-MITHYĀTVĀNUMĀNA KHAṆḌANA

The well-known syllogism of the monist : विमतं मिथ्या, दृश्यत्वात्, जडत्वात्, परिच्छिन्नत्वात् शुक्तिरूप्यवत् intended to establish the unreality of the world, is analysed and refuted in minute detail, in this Prakaraṇa of 29 lines.

The minor term of the syllogism itself is shown to be unestablished in respect of abode (आश्रयासिद्ध). The concept of Anirvacanīya is avowedly irrational² and no inference can be based on it. Criticisms are urged from the point of view of both formal and inductive logic.

1. Cf. G. K. ii, 31. Also : यद्येवं प्रतिबुद्धोऽसि नास्ति कस्यचिदप्रबोधः (Śaṅkara, B. S. B. iv, 1, 3) and यद्यद्वैते न तोषोऽस्ति मुक्त एवासि सर्वदा (Vācaspati on the above).

2. दुर्घटत्वमविद्याया भूषणं न तु दूषणम् ।

कथञ्चित् घटमानत्वेऽविद्यात्वं दुर्घटं भवेत् ॥ (Iṣṭasiddhi i, 140).

(13) MĀYĀVĀDA-KHAṆḌANA

In this Prakaraṇa of twenty granthas, Madhva contends that none of the fourfold traditional requisites of system-building viz.; the Adhikāri. Viśaya etc., can be satisfactorily made out on any kind of Monism, much less on the Nirviśeṣādvaita of Śaṅkara. The identity of Jīva and Brahman, which is the central thesis of Advaita, is shown to be riddled with contradictions. How is this identity to be conceived of? Is it anything other than the Brahman; or *one with it*? If the former, we have a dualism. In the latter case, there is a “Siddhasādhana-tā.” For, Brahman is conceived by the Advaitin as essentially self-revealed (Svaprakāśa) in that it is outside the pale of Pramāṇas and unknowable : अवेद्यत्वे सति, अपरोक्षव्यवहारयोग्यत्वम् । (Citsukha) अनुभूतेरनुभाव्यत्वे, घटादिवत् अननुभूतित्वप्रसंगात् (Iṣṭasiddhi).

If then, the identity that is the thesis (*viśaya*) of Monism were *one with Brahman*, it would, like Brahman itself, be equally self-revealed and outside the pale of any Pramāṇas or Śāstra, such as the Advaita-Vedānta. There would thus be no need or justification for any Śāstra of the Monist. A Pramāṇa, moreover, is (admitted by the Advaitin to be) what makes the unknown known : अनधिगतार्थगन्तु.¹ The Advaita-Śāstra, cannot surely be claimed to be valid (प्रमाणं) in *this sense*. So long as Advaita stands committed to the Nirviśeṣādvaita of Śaṅkara, there is no way out of the difficulty. Since ऐक्य is necessarily characterless, there can be no point in saying that Scripture enables us to know those *aspects* of the Brahman (or Ātman) which are *not already known* : निर्विशेषत्वादात्मनो नानधिगतो विशेषः This disposes of the plea made by Śaṅkara under B. S. i, 1; 1 : तत्पुनर्ब्रह्म प्रसिद्धमप्रसिद्धं वा स्यात् * * * * and his reply to it. One can also raise the question if the identity, preached by the Monist, is *real* or *fictitious*. Neither alternative can be welcome to him. The impossibility of Ignorance affecting Brahman vitiates the whole of Monistic metaphysics : अज्ञानासंभवादेव तन्मतमखिलमपि निरस्तम् । In view of the said identity, there can be no real Adhikāri, entitled to philosophize or undergo spiritual discipline. For this same reason, Mokṣa cannot be the goal of metaphysics; as, on the monistic doctrine, everybody is *free, here and now* and release is not a state to be attained hereafter : स्वरूपत्वान्मोक्षस्य पूर्वमेव सिद्धत्वात् Cf. Śaṅkara : मोक्षस्य अकार्यत्वात् (G. B. iii, 1) अस्माकं तु, न मोक्षः साध्यः । अपि तु, ब्रह्मस्वरूपं, तच्च नित्यमिति (Bhāmatī, ii, 3, 40).

Towards the close of his MK., Madhva refutes briefly the view of Śrīharaṣa that अविद्यानिवृत्ति (cessation of Ignorance) is indistinguishable from the Ātman : आत्मैवाज्ञानहानिः as well as that of Vimuktātman that it belongs entirely to a fifth order of predication (पंचमप्रकार) :

1. This is the Bhāṭṭa definition of Pramāṇa, which is admitted by the Advaitins for all practical purposes : व्यवहारे भट्टनयः । See also Bhāmatī on B S. ii, 1, 14.

2. Cf. न सत्तासन्न सदसन्नचाप्यनुभयरूपकम् ।

चतुष्कोटिविनिर्मुक्तं तत्त्वं माध्यमिका विदुः ॥

(Buddhist Kārikā, q. by Vedānta Deśika, Śatadūṣaṇī, S. S. Mukṭāvali Ser. p. 65).

“न सन्नासन्न सदसन्नानिर्वाच्योऽपि तत्क्षयः ।
यक्षानुरूपो बलिरित्याचार्याः प्रत्यपीपदन् ॥”


(Ānandabodha, *Nyāyamakaranda*).

These defects and pitfalls of Monism force a Dualism on all thinking minds.

(14) TATTVA-SAMKHYĀNA¹

The *Tattvasamkhyāna* (11 granthas) enumerates the categories recognized by Madhva. Here, reality is dichotomized into “Syatantra” (Independent) and “Para-tantra” (Dependent). This is the highest metaphysical and ontological classification in Madhva’s system, whence his system derives its name “Dvaita”. God (Viṣṇu) is the One (Highest) Independent Real. All else is dependent on Him, including the goddess Lakṣmī, the presiding deity of (Acit)-Prakṛti. Dependence does not mean unreality. The finite creation is always dependent on God; but is none the less real, even as *He* is. The ramifications of finite reality are then set forth in detail. Madhva emphasizes that difference and disparity are found everywhere among finite selves in their constitution and equipment which points to a hierarchy (तारतम्य) among gods, demons and men. A detailed cosmic scheme from the Supreme Being down to inanimate creation is then given. Three classes of souls are distinguished among those that are *now in bondage* : Muktiyogyas (salvable), Tamoyogyas (those that will eventually qualify themselves for eternal perdition) and Nityasamsārins (those that will always be subject to transmigration). Those who want to be released from bondage must learn to look upon God as the One Being who is responsible in various ways for the preservation, control, absorption, enlightenment etc. of the world of matter and Souls.

1. Not “Tattva-Samkhyāyana” as in Saletore’s *History of Tuluva*, Poona, 36, p. 441.



(15) TATTVAVIVEKA

This, in 13 granthas (metrical), covers the same ground as the *TS.*, with some additional points regarding the logical and ontological relations between substance and attributes, etc., according as the attributes are coeval with the substances or not.

(16) TATTVODDYOTA

This is one of the fighting works of Madhva, in which he has discussed and refuted some of the leading doctrines and fundamental concepts of the Advaita Vedānta. It is traditionally believed to embody some of the arguments actually employed by Madhva, in his historic debate with

two celebrated Advaitins of his day : Puṇḍarīka Purī¹ and Padma Tīrtha, recorded in the *M. Vij.* xii, 1-54.

(i) Madhva maintains, at the outset, that “Difference” (भेद) is the fundamental concomitant of nature. It persists even in Mokṣa, between Brahman and freed souls and among the latter. The more should it hold good on *this side* of release (संसारवस्था). It is hardly convincing to dismiss it as an unreal projection of the mind. The concept of Anirvacanīya is warranted neither by the facts of life nor by the force of logic. It is a figment of the Monist’s imagination, having no support in the Scriptures, Madhva denies that there is any basis for this idea in the Nāsadiya Sūkta (*R. V.* x, 129). If what is left over (परिशिष्ट) after the denial of “Sat” and “Asat” (in *R. V.* x, 129, 1) were to be viewed as necessarily Anirvacanīya, one would have to characterize Brahman also as “Anirvacanīya; for its existence is affirmed (अनीदवातं स्वधया तदेकम्) immediately after a series of denials नासदासीन्नो सदासीत्तदानीम् earlier.²

(ii) Syllogisms advanced by the Monist in support of the unreality of phenomena (मिथ्यात्व) are shown to be full of fallacies and contradictions : दृश्यत्वाद्यनुमानेऽप्येते एव दोषाः । The minor term and grounds of inductive generalization in these cases, are refuted in great detail. The reality of the world, which is borne in upon us by our own consolidated experience, cannot be suppressed by any amount of specious reasoning. If the verdict of experience is to be set aside, it can only be on the strength of a more powerful and subsequent experience (बाधकानुभव), here and now. And we know only too well that such is not the case, here.

(iii) Long before Madhva, the Advaitins had been suspected of inward sympathies and leanings towards Buddhism.³ Advaita was openly denounced as Buddhism in disguise by such early writers as Bhāskara,⁴ Pārthasārathi Miśra,⁵ Yādavaprakāśa,⁶ and Rāmānuja.⁷ From early days, Advaitins have been vehemently protesting⁸ that theirs was certainly

1. See also Nārāyaṇa Paṇḍita’s own c. *Bhāvaprakāśika* on *M. Vij.* and Jayatīrtha’s com. on Td (end).

2. Cf. “Moreover, it ignores the previously postulated “That” which by its terms, eliminates non-being. The poet, here, unquestionably entangles himself in sham profundity.” Bloomfield, *Religion of the Veda*, 1908, p. 238.

3. Vide *Gauḍapāda Kārikās*, iv, 99 and the remarks of Śaṅkara and Ānandagiri, thereon. See also Chap. IX (*ante*).

4. विगीतं विच्छिन्नमूलं माहायानिकबौद्धगाथितं मायावादं व्यावर्णयन्तो लोकान् व्यामोहयन्ति
(*B. S. B. Chowk. S. S.* 15, p. 85 and 124).

5. तद्वरं मायावादान्माहायानिकम् ।

6. वेदोऽनृतो बुद्धकृतागमोऽनृतः प्रामाण्यमेतस्य च तस्य चानृतम् ।

बोद्धानृतो बुद्धिफले तथानृते यूयं च बौद्धाश्च समानसम्पदः ॥

(Yādavaprakāśa quoted by Deśika in his *Tattvamuktākalāpa*. Medical Hall Press, Benares, 1900, p. 363).

7. *Vedārtha Saṁgraha*, Pandit Rep. p. 86.

8. Vide *G. K.* : नैतत् बुद्धेन भाषितम् (iv, 99) and comm. on it. See *Vivaraṇa*; यस्तु कश्चिज्जल्पति सुगतविज्ञानवादसमानोऽयं वेदान्तवाद इति * * (*Viz. Skt. Ser.* 1892, p. 84) and *Samkṣepaśārīraka*, ii, 25-27.

not a Buddhism. The prejudice and antipathy to Advaita was very strong in Madhva's days. It is not to be wondered if he chose to exploit this prevailing antipathy of his times, to the Advaita, both in learned quarters and among the people¹ to further the interests of his new system. What is *important*, however, is that unlike most of his predecessors, he took it upon himself to substantiate his criticism against Advaita, in this respect, *with chapter and verse*, in his *Tattvodyota* and to a lesser extent, elsewhere. So much so, that academically speaking, we have to look up to Madhva, for a really exhaustive treatment of this question. The charge of 'crypto-Buddhism' was not certainly invented by *Madhva*.² But he shared the general belief of scholars, then as now, that it bore a very strong family resemblance to Buddhism and that for all practical purposes it was but a restatement of Buddhistic ideas in Upaniṣadic and Vedāntic phraseology. Madhva makes this the vantage ground of his attack on the Advaita. He quotes extensively from the standard Buddhistic works current in his days,³ and from well-known Advaitic works like the *Samkṣepa-Śārīraka*⁴ :

1. As reflected in the verses of the *Padma Purāṇa* :

मायावादमसच्छास्त्रं प्रच्छन्नं बौद्धमुच्यते

(Cited by Vijñāna Bhikṣu).

2. Madhva has *not* used the expression "प्रच्छन्नबौद्ध" in any of his works, though he has made it quite clear that in his opinion the Advaita is indistinguishable from Buddhism, in its metaphysics. The term 'प्रच्छन्नबौद्ध' occurs in *M. Vij.* i. 51 and also in the *Śataśūṣaṇi* of Vedānta Deśika, who calls upon the faithful followers of Rāmānuja to gird up their loins and fight the "Pracchanna-Bauddhas" to the finish : प्रच्छन्नबौद्धविजये परितो यतस्वम् ॥ Bratindra Sen Gupta (J. O. I. Baroda, Sep. 1955) seeks to establish that the formulations of the Śaṅkara system are distinct from the Buddhistic enunciations, in respect of the problems of illusion, ultimate reality and Liberation. It is precisely in these vital respects that Madhva and Jayatirtha have shown the fundamental affinity in thought between Buddhism and Advaita (See J.'s remarks on pp. 23 b and 23 Td). Until their arguments are convincingly refuted, no philosophical value could be attached to mere sentimental protests against the equation of Advaita and Buddhism, by ancient or modern scholars.

3. Unfortunately, the names of these Buddhistic works (metrical) from which he has quoted these verses, have not been mentioned by Madhva. It is difficult to trace these to their sources as most of the old Buddhistic works are now lost to us. But I have it on the authority of Prof. Vidhusekhara Bhattacharya, of Shantiniketan, that though the passages cited by Madhva in Td. could not be traced in extant-Buddhistic works, the ideas have many clear parallels in the extant literature of Buddhism. I have also come across many close correspondences, in the course of my own-studies of old Buddhistic texts, for this purpose :

(a) अपरप्रत्ययं शान्तं प्रपंचैरप्रपञ्चितम् ।

निर्विकल्पमनानात्वमेतत् तत्त्वस्य लक्षणम् ॥

Mādhyaṃaka Kārikā 24, p. 372 which may be compared with No. 8 of Madhva. द्वे सत्ये समुपाश्रित्य (*Madhyaṃaka Kārikā*) with No. 1. quoted below.

(b) नैव भावो नवाभावो न पृथक्त्वैकलक्षणम् *Madhyāntavibhāga-Sūtra*, i, 14 (text) and Sthiramati's com. thereon : तत्र लक्षणं भावाभावप्रतिषेधात्मकं शून्यतायाः ।

(C. O. S. 24, p. 38 ab) cf. ver. no. 5 of Madhva.

4. Not from *Murāri Śataka* (of Śaṅkara) as stated by Dr Nagaraja Sarma, *Reign of Realism in I. Phil.* 1937, p. 207.

“अनतजडविरोधिरूपमन्तत्रयमलबन्धनदुःखताविरोधम्” (i, 1) इति च मायावादी ।

Madhva contends¹ that the attributeless Brahman of Advaita can hardly be distinguished from the Śūnya of Buddhistic Nihilism.² Both are अखण्ड beyond thought and word (अवाच्य) and can only be expressed through negatives (व्यावृत्ति=अपोह). The so-called व्यावहारिकसत्य of the Advaitin is nothing but the “संवृतिसत्य” of the Buddhist, writ larger.³ The ideal of Nirvāṇa and the goal of Brahmabhāva, were nearly the same. In view of so much striking affinity of Prameyas (basic doctrines), Madhva asserts that Advaita is indeed Buddhism : न च शून्यवादिनः सकाशाद् वैलक्षण्यं मायावादिनः । The Advaitin’s belief in the Vedas turns out to be a veritable deception when it is remembered that they dismiss the entire Karmakāṇḍa and large slices of the Upaniṣads which teach dualistic views as “not-truth-declaring” (अतत्त्वावेदक).⁴ Madhva, naturally, protests against such high-handed treatment to the Vedas, which is worse than even the Buddhists’ open abjuration of them. The Advaitins’ attitude is, moreover, inconsistent : (नहि कुक्कुट्या एको भागः प्रसवायापरः पाकाय कल्पते !). If one part of Scripture can speak untruth (अतत्त्वम्) what guarantee is there for the other parts alone ? Madhva winds up with the observation that the refutation of

1. There are altogether eight verses quoted by Madhva from Buddhist sources. They are as follows :

सत्यं तु द्विविधं प्रोक्तं सांवृतं पारमार्थिकम् ।
सांवृतं व्यवहार्यं स्यान्नवृत्तौ पारमार्थिकम् ॥ १
विचार्यमाणे नोऽसत्त्वं सत्त्वं चापि प्रतीयते ।
यस्य तत्सांवृतं तत्स्यात् व्यवहारपदं च यत् ॥ २
निर्विशेषं स्वयंभातं निर्लेपमजरामरम् ।
शून्यं तत्त्वमविज्ञेयं मनोवाचामगोचरम् ॥ ३
जाड्यसंवृतिदुःखान्तपूर्वदोषविरोधि यत् ।
नित्यभावनया भातं तद्भावं योगिनं नयेत् ॥ ४
भावार्थप्रतियोगित्वं भावत्वं वा न तत्त्वतः ।
विश्वाकारं च संवृत्या यस्य तत्पदमक्षयम् ॥ ५
नास्य सत्त्वं न वासत्त्वं न दोषो गुण एव वा ।
हेयोपादेयरहितं तच्छून्यं पदमक्षयम् ॥ ६
अवाच्यं सर्वशब्दैस्तल्लक्ष्यते चाखिलैः पदैः ।
अज्ञेयं ज्ञानलक्ष्यं च तच्छून्यं पदमक्षयम् ॥ ७
यदखण्डं पदं लक्ष्यं सर्वैरपि विशेषणैः ।
सर्वविशेषणैर्मुक्तं तच्छून्यं पदमक्षयम् ॥ ८

2. Dasgupta, *op. cit.* i, p. 493-95.

3. द्वे सत्ये समुपाश्रित्य बुद्धानां धर्मदेशना ।

लोके संवृतिसत्यं च सत्यं च परमार्थतः ॥

(*Madhyamaka Kārikās*, xxiv, 492). This is q. by Jayatīrtha in his c. on Td. but the Buddhist verses quoted by Madhva do not appear to be from Nāgārjuna as Dr. R. Nagaraja Sarma (p. 209) thinks. The Advaitic view of “Sattā-traividhya” has also a striking Buddhist parallel. See *Abhidharma Samuccaya* of Asaṅga, p. 35. (ed. J. B. B. R. A. S., 1949).

4. The phrases “तत्त्वावेदक” and “अतत्त्वावेदक” are pretty often used by the *Samkṣepa-sārīraka*, which seems to have been specially referred to (along with the *Iṣṭasiddhi*) by Madhva. See *Samkṣepa-sārīraka* ii, 43; iii, 287.

Buddhistic idealism and Nihilism in the *Vedānta Sūtras* is thus tantamount to a refutation of Advaitism itself :¹ 'नासतो दृष्टत्वात्' । 'नाभाव उपलब्धेः । 'वैधर्म्याच्च न स्वप्नादिवत्' । इत्यादि भगवद्वचनेनापि निरस्ताः । नच शून्यवादिनः सकाशात् वैलक्षण्यं मायावादिनः ।²

(iv) There is a constructive side of the *Td.*, wherein Madhva quotes passages to show that Theism is the only philosophy accepted by the Śāstras. Such texts as have been claimed by the Monist to support अव्यञ्ज्यं (such as "Tat tvam asi") according to which, passages of the Śruti are believed *somehow* to refer to an attributeless Absolute are reinterpreted, in conformity with Theism. The work concludes with a brief criticism of Ekajīvājñānavāda. The *last seven verses do not belong to Madhva*. They are in the nature of tributes paid to him by the admiring witnesses of his debate with Puṇḍarīka Purī and incorporated into the body of his discourse (*Td.*) at the request of his disciples.³

(17) VIṢṆU-TATTVA-NIRṆAYA

This is the biggest (540 granthas) and the most important of the Prakaraṇas and contains an exhaustive refutation of Advaita, a brilliant criticism of Advaitic interpretation of Śrutis and an equally impressive exposition of their interpretation on new lines and a masterly vindication of the concept of "Difference". It has three chapters (Paricchedas). The scope of the work is thus outlined :

सदागमैकविज्ञेयं समतीतक्षराक्षरम् ।
नारायणं सदा वन्दे निर्दोषाशेषसद्गुणम् ॥
विशेषणानि यानीह कथितानि, सदुक्तिभिः ।
साधयिष्यामि तान्येव क्रमात्सज्जनसंविदे ॥

(i) Before establishing the central thesis of his thought that Brahman (Nārāyaṇa) is the highest subject-matter (महातात्पर्यं) of the Veda-śāstra, Madhva discusses the place and importance of Śabda among Pramāṇas and argues a strong case for the infallibility and Apauruṣeyatva of the Vedas. He is the only Vedāntin (after the Mīmāṃsakas) to have given this question serious attention. The Vedas are self-valid (स्वतः प्रमाण) and cannot be ascribed to any known *author*, human or divine.⁴ The eternity of the Vedas rests on the eternity of Śabda.⁵ It is convincingly shown that no system of philosophy can do without some kind of *Apauruṣeyavākya*, for its ultimate validity. Even the Buddhists and the

1. Cf. Bhāskara on B. S. ii, 2, 29; ये तु बौद्धमतावलम्बिनो मायावादिनः तेऽप्यनेनैव न्यायेन सूत्रकारेणैव निरस्ता वेदितव्याः । (p. 124).

2. Some think that Madhva uses the term "मायावादी" with a sting. Far from it. It is merely a description chosen by the Advaitin himself. Madhva was a close student of *Iṣṭasiddhi* which uses the term very often (See pp. 93; 157; 158 etc. (G. O. S.)) He also uses other expressions like "चित् and चेत्य" in the opening verse of *Td.* with which compare चित्चेत्य (*Iṣṭasiddhi*, p. 2) and the use of ऋते with accusative (pp. 151, 153, ii, 19, iii, 58 etc.).

3. See Jayatīrtha's c. on these verses (*Td.*).

4. तत्प्रामाण्यं च स्वत एव सिद्धम् । वेदकर्तृरप्रसिद्धेः ।

5. अत आकाशगुणे शब्दे व्यज्यमाना वर्णद्वयः तत्क्रमात्मको वेदश्च नित्य एवेति सिद्धम् ।

Cārvākas are forced to admit some kind of Śabdapramāṇa, which is incapable of being ascribed to any author.

(ii) Madhva pleads strongly that ineradicable difference between God and man is the purport of the Śāstras : This difference is a corollary of the supremacy of Brahman : अतः सर्वप्रमाणविरुद्धत्वान्नाभेदे तात्पर्यम् । किंतु, विष्णोः सर्वोत्तमत्व एव महातात्पर्यं सर्वागमानाम् ॥ With cogent reasons, he repudiates the Advaitic view that all those Scriptural texts which speak of Difference are to be looked upon as being merely अनुवादक (repetitive) in spirit. Our knowledge of the existence of God is derived solely from Scripture (B. S. i, 1, 3). Such being the case, it will never do for Scripture, to cut its own ground from under its own feet. The monistic texts are considerably weakened by their conflict with the consolidated experience (अबाधितानुभव) of humanity and inference (based on it). Though it is no doubt true, that Āgama has, as a rule, precedence over other means of proof, it cannot be considered valid when it goes against its very prop and support : उपजीव्य viz. those texts that establish Brahman *ex hypothesi* to be Sarvajña etc., in contradistinction from the human soul. It is equally absurd to dismiss the difference between the Jīva and Brahman taught in such Śrutis as द्वा सुपर्णा as an ignorant doctrine. If Śrutis can play false, what guarantee is there that the Monistic texts can be relied upon to speak the truth ? Madhva is honestly surprised how a person, with such a poor opinion of the Śruti can claim to be a Veda-vādin : कथं चैवंवादिनो वेदवादित्वम् ? It is thus extremely unlikely that the identity between Jīva and Brahman can be the ultimate teaching of Scripture. Texts which appear, on a superficial view, to favour such an identity are shown, on closer scrutiny, to emphasize the unutterable majesty of Brahman and the complete metaphysical dependence of all else on It : तद्वशत्वमेवोक्तम् । तद्वशत्वज्ञापनार्थं च “सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीत्...” इत्यादि सृष्टिकथनम् ।

An implicit and ineradicable dualism is shown to underlie all the well-known Upaniṣadic texts paraded by the Monist. Madhva gives a brilliant analysis of the “Tat tvam asi”¹ and “Vācārambhaṇa”² texts, among others here, and lays bare the defects in their Advaitic interpretation. The points raised by him are new and deserve careful attention. Several other passages also are similarly discussed.

(iv) The reality of the world of difference is clearly taught in many Scriptural texts, even as admitted by the Monist. Madhva repudiates the suggestion that this reality is of a *lower order* : न चावान्तरसत्यमिदम् and cites passages to show, that *difference persists even in Mokṣa*. Individual consciousness is inalienable and indestructible in release : अविनाशी वा अयमात्मा अनुच्छित्तिधर्मा (Brh. Up. iv, 5, 14) इति तद्वर्माणामप्यनुच्छित्तेः प्रस्तुतत्वात् ।

(v) The *VTN*. gives the best classical exposition of the concept of Bheda as developed by Madhva. A ‘Pluralistic Universe’ is grounded on the reality of *difference*. The concept of “Bheda” has been vigorously assailed by hosts of Absolutistic writers from the days of Śaṅkara. The

1. See under *Chāndogya-Bhāṣya* of Madhva and Ch. xxix.

2. See under *Chān. Up. Bhāṣya*.

Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Realism had been the chief target of attack of the early Advaitic Dialecticians. The *Iṣṭasiddhi* of Vimuktātman, has a powerful critique of Bheda.¹ Other writers like Ānandabodha,² Śrīharṣa³ and Citsukha, followed suit. Among the philosophers of the 10th-12th, century a heated controversy was raging over the concept. Madhva took note of the criticisms poured forth by the Advaitic dialecticians. He had to draw and defend the concept of 'Difference,' which was so foundational of all reality and on which the entire edifice of his Theistic Realism rested. The Monists had placed many obstacles in the way of a really valid definition of Difference. It was impossible, said they, to give a satisfactory and logically commensurate definition of Difference or demonstrate its reality, in any metaphysical sense. Any attempt to conceive of it in a logical way, is doomed to failure. The idea of difference is thus riddled with all kinds of fallacies and contradictions : अनवस्थादयो दोषाः सत्तां निघ्नन्ति वस्तुनः ।

Difference is *not cognised by itself; but only in relation to its terms* either as qualifying them or as being qualified by them. It may be looked upon as residing in either or both of them. But, in any case, unless the terms are previously grasped, their difference from each other, which is either attributive or is bound up with the cognition of the correlate and the counter-correlate, cannot be. But then, the cognition of the terms, is dependent on that of the difference referred to. There is, thus, mutual interdependence in any attempt to define the concept of difference.

Madhva refutes these contentions by pointing out that difference is *not* an attribute of *both* correlates; but of only *one of them, signalled by the other*. This difference is of the nature of the object itself. To know an object is to know its difference from another. Hence, there is no interdependence here.

It may be objected that an object is cognised independently but *not so its difference from another*. If difference were the same as the object, it should be capable of being perceived *independently of its relata*, which is not the case. Madhva answers this by pointing out that there is no such absolute necessity. The 'thing in itself' may be perceived independently; but its difference from another may yet be cognizable only mediately through the relata. There is nothing illogical in this. The Advaitin himself, recognizes that the cognition of the Self is immediate, but its identity with Brahman, though not essentially different from the Self,⁴ is yet

1. भेदस्य वस्तुनो भेदे, भेदाभेदे च तस्य तस्य, भेदात् वस्तुनश्चान्योन्यो भेद इत्यनवस्थानात् न कश्चिद्भेदो वस्तु संस्पृशेत् । अभेदे तु, एकमेव । तच्च वस्त्वेव; नि भेद एव; वस्त्वभावे तस्याप्यभावात् ॥ (p. 23, G. O. S. lxv. '33).

2. भेदस्य विदारणात्मनो वस्तुस्वरूपत्वे, न किञ्चनैकं वस्तु स्यात् । * * एवं च शून्यतैव तात्त्विकी विश्वस्य स्यात् । (Nyāyamakaranda, p. 45-46).

3. यदि च स्वरूपं भेदः स्यात्, तदा घर्मिणि दृष्टे, स्वरूपं दृष्टमिति क्वचिन्न सन्देहः स्यात् । क्वचिदपि गत्वा, भेदभेदाश्रययोः भेदास्वीकारे च तदैक्यद्वारिका मूलपर्यन्तमेकता धावेत् ॥

(Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā, i, pp. 210, 212).

4. Cf. तच्चाद्वैतम्—'ब्रह्मैवेदं सर्वम्' इति श्रुत्यर्थेन सदैक्यमापन्नं ब्रह्मैव स्यात् ।

(Khaṇḍana, i, p. 220).

Cf. also: एवं ब्रह्मात्मानन्दभेदे भ्रान्तिगृहीते जनैः, तद्व्युदासेन अभेद एवोच्यते न भेदगन्धोपि स्पृश्यते ॥

(Iṣṭasiddhi, i, p. 28).

only mediately realizable through the terms Jiva and Brahman. What applies to identity would hold good in the case of Difference, which is as much a relation as its opposite !

The Advaitin advances a further argument, objecting to Difference as “Dharmi-svarūpa”, that if the ‘thing’ and its difference are one and the same, they must always be cognized *together*. The admission of Viśeṣa, however, helps Madhva to account for the perception of an object without involving a *specific perception* of its difference from another. Difference is only “सविशेषाभिन्न” from its धर्म. Even here, the monist can have no cause for complaint, as he admits that though the Self is established in all cognitions, its identity with Brahman (which is the same as the Self) is *not* : न च धर्मप्रतियोग्यपेक्षया भेदस्यास्वरूपत्वम् । ऐक्यवत् स्वरूपस्येव तथात्वात् । स्वरूपसिद्धावपि तदसिद्धिश्च जीवस्यैक्यं वदतः सिद्धौ (VTN). This is indeed a penetrating argument that confutes the monist with one of his own admissions.

From one point of view, it may be asserted, says Madhva, that when an object is cognized, its difference also from other things, is cognized *in a general way and for the most part*. Otherwise, one may even mistake his own self for any one of the numerous objects around him. None ever falls into such an error. It follows, therefore, that difference is cognized *simultaneously with the perception of the object*. It may be objected that if this were so, all doubts and misapprehensions would be impossible. Since doubts and imperfect cognitions *do* arise, at times, it could not be that difference is part and parcel of the ‘thing in itself’ (धर्म). Madhva answers this by saying that Difference is only *one* in a given thing. But it has innumerable shades (विशेष) such as that of being the counter correlate of X, Y, or Z. Where, in a *particular case*, this *particular shade* of difference is missed with reference to a *particular* (counter)-correlate, on account of such factors as resemblance, doubts arise. The *particular* doubt, however, does *not mean* that Difference *in general* has *not been grasped at all*.

It has been contended that if Difference were of the nature of the object, it would, in effect, abolish its own self or the object; or it may mean that difference is synonymous with the object.¹ Madhva points out that such antinomies are avoided on his view which recognizes only a “Saviśeṣābheda”, (colorful identity) between the object and “difference” conceived as “Dharmisvarūpa”. The *identity* (*abheda*) prevents the possibility of such mutual interdependence in perception as has been threatened; and the “Viśeṣa” guarantees the *existence and reality of both the object and the difference*. Viśeṣa is just the *representative of Difference*, not difference by itself : भेदप्रतिनिधिर्न तु स्वयं भेदः । There are reasons why such Viśeṣas *should* be recognized in all objects commonly regarded as undifferentiated. Even the Advaitin cannot altogether evade or do without them. For, in such texts as “Neti neti”, Brahman is said to be different from all else. This distinction can neither be *different* from the Brahman; *nor partly different and partly identical* with It, as the judgment arising from the sentence, is

1. अभेदे, तु, एकमेव, न भेद एव; वस्त्वभावे तस्याप्यभावात् । (Iṣṭasiddhi, p. 23).

admitted to be in the form of an undifferentiated cognition (अखण्ड). If, therefore, in these circumstances, an absolute and colorless identity were assumed, it would be futile to have a number of terms in the negation as in नेति, नेति; सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म. Just as identity is recognized between Brahman and its attributes : एवमात्मनि भात्यपि, आनन्दोऽभिन्नोऽपि न भाति । (*Iṣṭasiddhi*, p. 27) whether negative or positive to avoid conflict with the नेह नानास्ति text; even so, Viśeṣa must be recognized to prevent overlapping among the things negated and the faults of redundance and synonymy (पर्यायत्व).

It can make no difference to the question of overlapping, whether Brahman is regarded as वाच्य (expressible by words) or as merely लक्ष्य (suggestible). For, *in any case of elimination*, there will be no point in resorting to more than one elimination, if the object thus marked off from its opposite (attributes) does not *gain or assume a new aspect or additional significance every time a fresh elimination is brought about* :

व्यावृत्ते निविशेषे तु, किं व्यावर्त्यबहुत्वतः ?

This argument of Madhva is hard to rebut.

Lastly, when difference is presented to cognition, it cannot be denied altogether on the ground of interdependence : स्थितस्य गतिश्चिन्तनीया. Interdependence, even admitting there is one, cannot annul the reality of things so interdepending¹ : अन्योन्याश्रयस्य प्रमात्वाप्रतिबन्धकत्वात् (Jayatīrtha, c. *VTN*). One must try to *explain* the process of perception of Difference. But failure or inability to do so cannot mean that the thing itself is unreal ! There is, of course, no cause for anxiety or interdependence, if difference is recognized as धर्मिस्वरूप but *yet* सविशेषाभिन्न from it.

Madhva has thus really gone a long way in clarifying the concept of difference and demonstrating its reality. He enunciates the doctrine that Difference is "Dharmi-svarūpa",² part of the 'thing in itself'. It is perceived simultaneously with the perception of an object, a relation or a concept. In one and the same act of perception, the object and its individuality (which is the same as its difference from all else) are both perceived *in a flash as it were*. If it were not so, the question will have to be answered why and where that individuality had been lurking and how it comes to be apprehended later on. Madhva says that because of this flash-like simultaneity of apprehension, there is hardly any time, *at the*

1. The ideas of "father" and "son" are for example intertwined. You cannot know X as "father" unless you know his son Y. But you cannot know Y as son unless you know his father. But no one asserts from this fact that both father and son are unreal unaccountable beings ! Cf. in this connection, the humorous instance of the twin babies named Rām and Lakshman, described interdependently by their mother, in C. V. Joshi's Marāṭhi novel 'Āmcā paṇ Gāv' (Poona, 52).

2. This, coupled with the doctrine of "Viśeṣas" with which the perception of difference is linked in Madhva's epistemology, would be seen to effectively dispose of the difficulties and antinomies raised by Vimuktātman and others in their critique of difference. The Advaitin is purposely perverse in his attitude to Bheda : See Rāma Tīrtha, c. on *Samkṣepasārīraka* p. 59 : भेदस्य वस्तुस्वरूपत्वं वा, तद्धर्मत्वं वा नास्माकं सम्मतं । किन्तु वस्तुस्वरूपातिरिक्तो भेदः प्रामाणिको नास्तीति ॥

moment, to frame linguistic expression for the adequate expression of experience of individuality. When we *know a thing*, we know it *as distinct from everything else, in a general way*. Closer thought and ratiocination reveal further items of difference, light and shade. Otherwise, one may expect to mistake the perceiving self to be something other than what it is : यदि न स्वरूपं भेदः, तदा पदार्थे दृष्टे, प्रायस्तस्य सर्वतो वैलक्षण्यं न ज्ञायेत । अज्ञाते च वैलक्षण्ये, आत्मनि घट इत्यपि संशयः स्यात् । नहि कश्चित्तया संशयं करोति । ज्ञात्वैव प्रायः सर्वतो वैलक्षण्यं, कस्मिंश्चिदेव सदृशे संशयं करोति (VTN). This is a direct rejoinder to Śrīharṣa's : यदि स्वरूपं भेदः * * (Khaṇḍana, i, p. 210).

(vi) Śaṅkara has nowhere given *evidence* in support of his doctrine of "Adhyāsa", beyond a mere assertion that erroneous transference of the qualities of the Ātman to ānātman and *vice versa* (इतरेतराध्यास) is natural in life; and is beginningless and endless : सोऽयमनादिरनन्तो नैसर्गिकोऽयं लोकव्यवहारः । But when one asks for proofs, only excuses are given. Illusions and dream-phenomena have been cited by monistic writers *ad nauseam*. This is most unsatisfactory. Even these illustrations betray certain unmistakable realistic foundations. They are only exceptions to the rule. It is no use saying that because our senses have deceived us once or twice, they must altogether be put down as untrustworthy. In that case, even Scripture would be in no better position; for *some* of its statements *are, according to the Advaitin*, obviously untrustworthy in the last resort.

(vii) No scheme of illusions can be demonstrated *without* the aid of *at least two distinct reals* : भ्रान्तिकल्पितत्वे च जगतः सत्यं जगद्वयमपेक्षितम् । (VTN). As a matter of fact, illusions are *as impossible* without the reality of the proto-type of the आरोप्य (elsewhere) as without that of an Adhiṣṭhāna. The Advaitin is thus guilty of an अर्धजस्तीय, when he grants the necessity of the latter alone and denies the former : आरोप्यस्य प्रतीतिरूपयुज्यते न वस्तुसत्ता (Bhāmāti, 1917 Bby. p. 17). On all occasions of normally constituted perceptions, the subject and the object are grasped distinctly. Madhva denies that there is any proof for the assumption that Adhyāsa is double-edged (इतरेतर). The Ātman has never been mistaken for the not-self, in the wildest of our Adhyāśas : नचात्मन्यनात्मभ्रमः क्वापि दृष्टः । नहि कश्चित् अहं न भवामीति भ्रान्तो दृश्यते (VTN. p. 27). The bottom is thus knocked out of Śaṅkara's sweeping remark : एवमविरुद्धः प्रत्यगात्मन्यप्यनात्माध्यासः ॥ अन्योन्यस्मिन्नन्योन्यात्मकतामन्योन्यधर्माश्चाध्यस्य which is itself inconsistent with his own plea : सर्वोप्यात्मास्तित्वं प्रत्येति न नाहमस्मीति ।

Madhva concludes the I Pariccheda with a criticism of the Ekajīva and Bahu-jīvā-jñānavādas, the concept of मिथ्यात्वम्; उपाधि, औपाधिकभेदवाद and अविद्यादुर्घटत्वम् ।

(vii) The last two Paricchedas deal with Madhva's conception of Godhead. The second Pariccheda emphasizes the lordship of Viṣṇu over the Kṣara (souls) and Akṣara—(Prakṛti) Puruṣas. Passages from the Ṛg Veda, the T. Ā., Bhāllaveya Śruti and other Khilas are cited.

In the last Pariccheda, God is taught to be absolutely free from all taint and imperfections (cf. अपहृतपाप्मा विजरो विमल्युः) He is full of an infinite number of infinite attributes. सत्यसंकल्पः सत्यकामः सर्वस्य वशी सर्वस्येशानेः । The limitations to divinity seen in the Avatārs are explained on the basis

of certain widely accepted theological and Purāṇic fictions and conventions of theodicy.¹

(ix) The question of the exact relation between the personality of God and His moral and metaphysical attributes has always resisted the ingenuity of Theists all the world over. It is an intriguing problem of philosophy also.² *No close student of Madhva can fail to see in him one of the world's foremost thinkers who has successfully tackled the problem of the Divine Personality, its nature and constitution.* God, in Theism, is *ex hypothesi* unlimited by time and space and attributes. He is One; but many are His attributes. This raises the question of how far God is homogeneous in constitution. Is God different from His attributes? If not, what is the basis of the mutual distinction among His various attributes? If there is no such distinction, how is the multiplicity of the attributes to be established? By what law of harmony are these attributes, equally poised and manifested at different times? How does God manage to retain His unity amidst a sea of attributes? These are some of the many questions which confront all Theists and all kinds of Theistic approaches, be they rational, religious, or metaphysical. Madhva has answered them in his own way, with the help of his peculiar theory of Viśeṣas, which he has developed in the last section of the *VTN.*, and elsewhere and his solution is perhaps the best that could be thought of.

Viśeṣa is a distinct thought-category or ontological principle that is entirely self-sufficient and wholly self-determined and self-determining. It comes in handy in many a metaphysical exigency. It is Viśeṣa that bridges the gulf between substance and attributes, Kriyā and Kriyāvat etc. It connects God with His infinite attributes and the attributes mutually. But it is *not different* from the nature of God Himself or distinct from his personality. It is भेदप्रतिनिधि (a representative of Difference) not भेद itself; in short, an intrinsic nuance. It acts as an altogether internal relation capable of working both ways. It is capable of connecting substance and attributes without being external to either. Madhva refuses to recognize any distinction between God and His attributes, activity and will. Absolute identity reigns between God and His innumerable attributes as well as among the attributes themselves. There is not even a semblance of differentiation, no element of heterogeneity in the Deity. He threatens those who set up such barriers between God and His attributes, with the horrors of hell-fire : नेह नानास्ति किञ्चन । मृत्योः स मृत्युमाप्नोति य इह नानेव पश्यति (*Kaṭha Up.*) एवं धर्मान् पृथक् पश्यंस्तानेवानु विधावति The doctrine is known as “Saviśeṣābheda” or “Acintyābheda”; and language secular, scriptural and scientific has many instances of it :

1. Vide *Bhāgavata* xi, 3, 39; v, 19, 3-6; ix, 10, 11.

2. Cf. The views of Maimonids and St Thomas Aquinas (1226-74) on the same problem, in the *History of Philosophy Eastern and Western*, Vol. ii, pp. 153-54. (Govt. of India, Ministry of Education) George Allen Unwin, 1953. Vādirāja, in his *Śrūtī tattvapraśāṅgikā*, (Udipi, 1954) poses the problem in his attractive way.

राहोः शिरः । पुरुषस्य चैतन्यम् । समवायस्यैकत्वम् । सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म । आनन्दं ब्रह्मणो विद्वान् and so on. Madhva defines Viśeṣa as :

भेदहीने त्वपर्यायशब्दान्तरनियामकः ।

विशेषो नाम कथितः सोऽस्ति वस्तुष्वशेषतः ॥ (AV)

He shows that it would be impossible to do justice to such texts as सत्यं ज्ञानं * * . . . without the help of the said Viśeṣas. For fear of synonymy (पर्यायता), even the Advaitin, says Madhva, will have to recognize Viśeṣas.¹ Viśeṣa, in short, is to be a सर्वतन्त्रसिद्धान्त. He has cited passages from the *Brahmatarka* and the *Paramopaniṣad* (Pāñcarātrika), elucidating "Viśeṣas". Apart from the authorities quoted, the concept itself ranks as one of the most important contributions of Madhva to Indian philosophic thought.²

(18) KARMA NIRṆAYA

(i) Next in extent to the *VTN.*, comes the *KN* running to 276 granthas. Tradition has it that this work was composed by Madhva, in reply to a challenge from certain contemporary Pandits to exhibit his proficiency in the ritualistic portions of the Vedas and their exegesis.³ The object of the work is to work out and illustrate the attunement of the Karma-Kāṇḍa too, with Brahman which the avowal of Brahman as the highest and most intimate subject-matter of the Vedas necessitates. The work deals, thus, with the higher interpretation of certain abstruse and complicated sacrificial hymns such as the Mahānāmni (*A. Ā. iv*) verses, to be recited in connection with the Pṛṣṭha Stotra at the Naiṣkevalya Śāstra, consisting of Khaṇḍas 1-4 of the iv Pāñcikā of the xvi Adhyāya of the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* and various groups of Rks to be used in the Śoḍaśī śāstra : R. V. i, 16, 1-3; i, 82, 1-3; 4; viii, 12, 25-27; iii, 44, 1-3; vii, 34, 4; viii, 6, 21; vii, 29, 2; x, 96, 1-3; ii, 22, 1-3; x, 133, 1-3; viii, 58, 1-3; viii, 58, 8-10. Dasgupta is not therefore quite correct in describing this work as "a discussion on the proper reading and order of A. B. iv, 1-4; A. Ā. iv, 1 and the Vedic hymns cited therein" (*op. cit.* iv. 54-55.).

Madhva shows himself fully conversant with the genius of the Vedic language and its idiom. His interpretations have a ring of confidence and originality.

1. Cf. अखण्डवादिनोऽपि स्याद्विशेषोऽनिच्छतोऽप्यसौ ।
व्यावृत्ते निर्विशेषे तु किं व्यावर्त्यबहुत्वतः ?
सन्निदादेरपर्यायसिद्धमर्थं भायिनापि हि ।
अङ्गीकार्यो विशेषोऽयं (AV. p. 37 b).

Cf. also. आनन्दो विषयानुभवश्चेति सन्ति धर्माः अपृथक्त्वेऽपि चैतन्यात् पृथगिवावभासन्ते
(*Pañcapādikā*).

एवमात्मनि भात्यपि, आनन्दोऽभिन्नोऽपि न भाति । (*Iṣṭasiddhi*, p. 27).

2. For further light on the theory of Viśeṣas, see under "Vyāsātirtha".

3. See *M. Vij.* xvi, 42-45. The *KN* was evidently the last of Madhva's works and was probably composed while he was camping at Uccabhūti or Ujre in S. Kanara four miles from modern Dharmasthala.

(ii) Taking his stand on the mystic doctrine enunciated in *A. Ā.* ता वा एताः सर्वा ऋचः सर्वे वेदाः सर्वे घोषा एकैव व्याहृतिः प्राणऋच इत्येव विद्यात् (ii, 2) एतं ह्येव बब्रूचा महत्युक्ते * * * (iii, 2, 3) etc. Madhva insists upon interpreting the whole of the Scripture (not excluding the so-called Karma-Kāṇḍa)¹ directly, as a glorification of the Supreme Being. The Mahānāmīs are but an instance in point, of the possibility of such an interpretation : ताश्च 'विदा मघवन्' इत्याद्याः । Once the general principles of such a higher interpretation are laid down, it would not be difficult to tackle particular hymns or groups of hymns. Let us take *R̥g Veda* viii, 58, 8 for example : (अर्चत प्रार्चत प्रियमेघासोऽर्चत) अर्चनं यज्ञादि । प्रार्चनं ज्ञानध्यानादि । 'श्रेयान्द्रव्यमयाद्यज्ञात् ज्ञानयज्ञः' इति भगवद्वचनात् । प्रियमेघासः प्रियज्ञाना अप्यर्चत । पुत्रका अल्पज्ञाना अप्यर्चत ।² 'न बुद्धिभेदं जनयेत्' इति च उतशब्दात् ज्ञानिनामर्चनं युक्तं स्वाश्रमानुसारेणेति । अद्या ते विष्णो विदुषा चिदर्घ्यः (*RV.* 1. 156. 1) इति श्रुतेः । धृष्णु वासुदेवाख्यं । पुरं देहं नार्चत । प्रत्युद्गमप्रश्रयणाभिवादनं विधीयते साधु मिथः सुमध्यमे । प्राज्ञैः 'परस्मै पुरुषाय वेधसे गुहाशयायैव न देहमानिनः' (*Bhāg.* iv, 3. 22), पुनरर्चतेति तात्पर्यायः ॥

As a preliminary to such a higher interpretation, Madhva vigorously attacks the theory of Nirguṇa Brahman in the opening section of the *KN*. Passages ascribing various attributes to Brahman are cited in profusion. There is good reason to suppose that an Intelligent Creator like Brahman must indeed be Saguṇa: कर्तृत्वात्सगुणं ब्रह्म पुरुषं पुरुषर्षभम् (*Bhāg.* iii, 39, 12). The denial of attributes to Brahman in certain passages of Scripture must be interpreted in terms of the purely Prākṛtic attributes : न च एको देवः * * * । सत्त्वादिगुणाभावोक्तेस्तेन । अन्यथा 'एको देवः सर्वभूतेषु गूढ' इत्यादीनामपि गुणत्वात् स्वोक्तिविरोधः (*KN*).

The conception of "Nirviśeṣa" is then dialectically refuted. The predication of "Nirviśeṣatva" involves a contradiction : निर्विशेषत्वेन विशिष्टं तत् न वेत्युक्ते, यद्यविशिष्टं, न विशेषनिराकरणम् । विशेषवत्वमेव भवति । यदि तेन विशिष्टं स एव विशेष इति व्याहृतिः ॥

It cannot also be a negative elimination : व्यावर्त्यविशेषः तद्व्यावृत्ते ब्रह्मणि विशेषमापादयति चेद्विशिष्टा वाक्यार्थता । न चेन्न ब्रह्मज्ञानार्थिने पदान्तरं वाच्यम्; अजिज्ञासितत्वात् ।

Madhva emphasizes that Karma can never be regarded as the terminus of Scripture, as is contended by the Pūrvamīmāṃsakas. The Veda, by its very nature, stands for the achievement of happiness eternal, by man; and such eternal happiness is obviously and admittedly beyond the power of Karma. In this connection, Madhva repudiates tooth and nail, the Prābhākara doctrine of कार्ये व्युत्पत्तिः. The *KN*. shows Karma its proper place remarking :

ध्यानं त्वखिलकर्मभ्यो ध्यानाच्च ज्ञानमुत्तमम् ।

न ज्ञानसदृशं किञ्चित्पुरुषार्थप्रसिद्धये ॥ इति प्रवृत्ते ॥

दूरेण ह्यवरं कर्म बुद्धियोगात् (*Gītā*, ii, 49).

अशेषकर्मपूगोऽपि न विष्णुध्यानलेशभाक्

तच्च ध्यानं हरेर्ज्ञानकोट्यंशाय न पूर्यते । इति कर्मविवेके ।

तस्माद्विरुद्धवत् प्रतीयमानानि प्रशंसादीनि ज्ञानसहकार्यपेक्षया योजनीयानीति ॥ (*KN*).

Rituals have to be performed in a spirit of devotion, discrimination and detachment : भगवद्भक्तिज्ञानवैराग्यपूर्वकं कर्म कर्तव्यम् ।

The work is concluded with an indication of texts to this effect.

1. Cf. वेदैश्च सर्वैरहमेव वेद्यः (*Gītā*)

वेदा ब्रह्मात्मविषयास्त्रिकाण्डविषयाऽपि (*Bhāg.*)

अवस्वराति गर्गरो * * * (*RV.* viii, 69, 9).

2. Cf. *Manu Smṛiti*, ii, 151.

UPANIṢAD-BHĀṢYAS AND RĠ BHĀṢYA

THE UPANIṢADS had all been interpreted by Śaṅkara and his successors, in a monistic sense. Their writings had left the impression in the minds of people at large, that whatever might be the teaching of the Epics and the Sūtras, the Upaniṣads were unquestionably in favor of an absolute monism which had come to be regarded as the one and only "Aupaniṣadam Darśanam". In the interests of the success of the Theistic reaction led by him, Madhva had then to disillusion the people in this respect by producing fresh commentaries upon all those Upaniṣads that had been commented upon by his predecessors. He had to show that Theism was after all the basic philosophy of the Upaniṣads, despite their occasional indulgence in the language and imagery of Monism, in moments of great mystic fervor. He had to vindicate the claims of a Personal God,¹ the reality of the cosmos and its values and the fundamental difference between the human and the Divine souls, in the philosophy of the Upaniṣads.

He had already set forth the logical and metaphysical bases of his thought and expounded them in his *Daśa-Prakaraṇas*. He had refuted the premises and conclusions of the Advaita system in the *AV* and in the *Prakaraṇas*. The only other task that remained to be accomplished was to settle the kind of systematic interpretation that should be given to the Upaniṣads, in conformity with the requirements of genuine Theism. This was what his commentaries on the major Upaniṣads undertook to do. They (1) draw attention to the full measure of support that the Upaniṣads have to give to Theistic Realism and the impossibility of interpreting such texts in any but their literal and express sense. (2) They also show the ways in which certain other texts, more or less ambiguously or mystically worded and which, on very superficial grounds had been appropriated by Monists, should be reinterpreted consistent with the underlying Theism of the Upaniṣads. (3) They also suggest a variety of standpoints both mystic and philosophical from which the monistically-worded texts could be adequately reconciled with the bulk of texts that propound a radical Realism. (4) In explaining the possibilities of such a reinterpretation of texts, Madhva makes considerable use of linguistic analysis, grammatical and etymological sanctions and of a large body of interpretive and expatiatory literature.² (5) Logical argumentation, too, is not wanting.

Some of Madhva's interpretations are quite happy and unexceptionable and are supported by continuous literary tradition. Some others

1. There is, however, nothing physical about Madhva's conception of God as a Person. See pp. 4; 125-26; 153-54 and 155.

2. See Chap. V.

are logically well-argued and command respect even when they do not compel agreement. Some others are based on linguistic analysis, grammatical considerations and etymological sanctions. In pursuing such methods of textual interpretation, Madhva is merely following the footsteps of his brother commentators in the field. An Indian commentator or system-builder, so long as he is obliged to philosophize within the four corners of given texts, is not at liberty to reject any text however badly, inadequately or even inconveniently worded. Short of rejecting texts, he is given full freedom to cut, quarter or expand the text; read between¹ or *into* the lines or read them *inside out*² and so on, in accordance with the famous dictum : व्याख्यानतो विशेषप्रतिपत्तिर्नहि सन्देहादलक्षणम्. The only plausible justification for such departures from the express sense of passages is the firm conviction of the commentators in question, in the correctness of their fundamental philosophical position. But as this conviction cannot be sustained merely as a matter of personal faith, but must be capable of being justified before the bar of reason and able to impress others, the truth of that philosophical view had, naturally, to be demonstrated in the light of experience, reason and other grounds. Where these reasons were specious or opposed to universal experience, consistency of thought and the permanent values of life, the starting point itself will have to be rejected as a species of false philosophy and distorted metaphysics. But where, as in the case of Madhva, the premises of a realistic philosophy are well supported by reason and ratified by the Sākṣī the basic thought comes to be established on such firm foundations that all other approaches, whether really or apparently different from it, wherever adumbrated in the original texts must, if they cannot be reasonably accommodated, be explained in the only way open to commentators viz., by reinterpreting them mystically or figuratively or else esoterically; but *not* from a duality of standpoints of truth and falsehood : गुणे त्वन्यार्थकल्पना । तत्सिद्धिजातिसारूप्यप्रशंसाभूमलिङ्गसमवायात्

(Mīmāṃsā sūtra i, 4, 23).

The question of the acceptability of the *details* of the particular lines of interpretation of monistic-looking texts worked out by Madhva, is thus of *comparatively less philosophical* importance than their logico-philosophical merits. If these can be convincingly established and if the philosophical bases of monism can be shown to be untenable on equally convincing grounds, a slight verbal change here and there or even a departure from the literal sense in the interpretation of a particular passage cannot be said to constitute a serious metaphysical drawback to the acceptability of that philosophy or philosophical line of interpretation, as a whole. In assessing, therefore, the value and admissibility of the reorientation of Upaniṣadic Monism given by Madhva, these considerations should be *carefully* borne in mind, before pronouncing a verdict on his philosophical approach and achievement.

1. Cf. केवलोऽनिर्गुणश्च (Vādirāja) असंभूति च * * * (Śaṅkara Īśa Up. Bhāṣya 14).

2. Cf. the interpretation of : तद्वैक आहु रसदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीत् । in the *Advaitasiddhi* of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī.

The merit of his new line of interpretation lies in the foundations of his realistic metaphysic which go to the very depths of the intuitional experiences of the Sākṣī and the consequent logico-philosophical necessity for a proper reconciliation of Upaniṣadic monism with the findings of such Upajīvyā-pramāṇa. It also lies in the abiding value of his all-comprehensive metaphysical ideology of "Svatantra" which constitutes the apex of his thought. He attaches the least value to literalism or mere speculative flights of philosophical imagination and its glamour.

(19) ĪŚĀVĀŚYA UPANIṢAD BHĀṢYA

This is a short Upaniṣad of 18 mantras. Madhva interprets it as a valuable document of Theism. The very first verse here touches the twin principles of Theism — the immanence and the transcendence of the Deity. The reality of creation is affirmed *squarely* in : याथातथ्यतोऽर्थान् व्यदधात् शाश्वतीभ्यः समाम्यः (verse 8), which the Advaitin struggles hard to escape.¹ The doctrine of disinterested performance of one's Svadharma (the precursor of the Gītā doctrine) is inculcated in ver. 2. The need for divine grace in realising the highest truth is foreshadowed in ver. 15.

Madhva's commentary is original in many respects. He is direct and pragmatic in explaining : ईशावास्यम् and तेन त्यक्तेन ईशस्यावासयोग्यमीशावास्यम् । तेन ईशेन त्यक्तेन दत्तेन भुञ्जीथाः । His explanation of स पर्यगात् . . . as referring to the human soul placing itself under the protection of the Supreme and thereby casting off all misery is a clear improvement on that of his predecessors²:

एवं सर्वगतं विष्णुं पश्येत्तस्य विजानतः ।

को मोहः कोऽयवा शोकः स विष्णुं पर्यगाद्यतः ।

यो विष्णुः कविर्मनीषी * * शाश्वतीभ्यः समाम्योऽर्थान् व्यदधात् ।

Madhva teaches "as one having authority". There is a strong missionary fervor behind his bold and interesting explanation of अन्धं तमः प्रविशन्ति ये (12) : "Those who are content to revel in ignorance go to perdition. Into greater hell do they sink, that rest content in their own knowledge, without taking the trouble to *denounce false teaching* and propagate the true."³ This is a remarkable interpretation. No Christian missionary could have been more solicitous of the need to propagate what he conceives to be the truth. The 'aggressive' attitude that is supposed to characterize Mādhva writers, is probably traceable to the teaching contained in this interpretation of Īśa 9.

Even more historic is Madhva's explanation of the famous passage : योज्जावसौ पुरुषः सोऽहमस्मि (ver. 17). As the late Śrīś Chandra Vasu pointed out, long ago, this line "contains the great ineffable name of God

1. See *Advaitasiddhi*.

2. See *A Critical Study of the Īśa Up.*, F. O. Schrader, I.A., Ixii, 1933 pp. 206-7, where the Professor construes more or less in the same way as Madhva, dismissing Śaṁkara's rendering as "forced".

3. ततोऽधिकमिव व्यक्तं यान्ति तेषामनिन्दकाः ॥

“I am that I AM” : “SO AHAM ASMI”. In the Zoroastrian faith also this is one of most secret names of the Lord, as shown by the following extract from the Hormuzd Yasht :

“Thus spake Zarathuṣtra—‘Tell them O Pure Ahuramazda, the name which is thy greatest, best, fairest and which is most efficacious for prayer.’ Thus answered Ahuramazda—My first name is Ahmi : I AM * * * * My twentieth name is—‘Ahmi yad Ahmi Mazdo : I am That I AM’ (*Avesta*, xvii, 4-6).

This was also the most secret name of God among the Jews, as one learns from the *Old Testament* :

“And Moses said unto God, ” Behold, when I come unto the children of Israel and shall say unto them ‘The God of your fathers hath sent me unto you; and they shall say to me ‘What is His name’ ? What shall I say unto them ? And God said unto Moses, “I am that I AM and He said : Thou shalt say unto the children of Israel—‘I AM’ has sent me unto you” (*Exodus*, iii, 13-14).¹

Madhva, too, has explained “Aham” and “Asmi” in this Upaniṣad as the two secret (esoteric) names of God² and construes : That Supreme Being (*asau*) which indwells in Asu (the Chief Prāṇa) is the I AM.

(20) KENA OR ṬĀLAVAKĀRA UPANIṢAD BHĀṢYA

This Upaniṣad seeks to demonstrate the supremacy of the Brahman over all presiding deities of phenomenal forces of Nature as well as of the microcosm, by means of an interesting parable of the gods and the “Yakṣa”. The sovereignty of God has thus two aspects “adhidaiva” (celestial) and “adhyātma” (psychical). The so-called ‘Spiritual Agnosticism’ of the *Kena* (Ranade, *op. cit.* p. 177) in 11-12, is nothing more than a plea for the spirit of prayerful devotion to God that is to spring from inner humility of self. While it remains true that none of us can know God in all His fullness and glory,³ the Upaniṣad does *not* seem to negative the possibility of our knowing Him *at all*, each one to the best of his or her capacity. Madhva says well :

नतिवेद्यो न चावेद्यस्तस्मात्स परमेश्वरः⁴

1. The extracts from the *Avesta* and the *Old Testament* are quoted from Śrīś Chandra Vasu’s Introd. to his tr. of the *Iśa Up.* S. B. H. Series, Allahabad, Vol. 1. (3rd. edn).

2. Cf. “अ” इति ब्रह्म तत्रागतमहमिति । (A. Ā. ii, 3, 8) तस्योपनिषदहमिति । (Bṛh. v, 5, 4) उपनिषत्-रहस्यम् (*Bhāmali*) and Madhva’s interpretation of तदात्मानमेवावेदहं ब्रह्मास्मीति (Bṛh. Up. i, 4, 10) and न वा अरे अहमिमं विजानाति (iv, 5, 14).

अहेयत्वात् अहं नामा, अस्म्यनाम्निते : ।

3. Cf. को हि तं वेदितुं शक्तो यो न स्यात्तद्विद्योऽपरः ।

तद्विद्यश्चापरो नास्ति तस्मात्तं वेद स स्वयम् ॥

(q. in *Mbh. T. N.* ii, 74).

4. Cf. “It doth not at all follow that because God is incomprehensible to our finite and narrow understanding, He is utterly inconceivable by it; so that we can’t form any idea of Him at all. For, it is certain that we have not such an adequate and comprehensive knowledge of the essence of any substantial thing so that we can perfectly master and conquer

It is very remarkable indeed that Madhva's comment on नेदं यदिदमुपासते (i, 4, 8) : नेदं जीवस्वरूपं तत् ब्रह्म "This Jīva, who is near to the body, is *not* that Supreme Self", should be endorsed by Hertel who, like Madhva, contends that "the *Kena* wants to fight against the doctrine of the identity of the world-soul and the individual soul" (Die Weisheit der Upaniṣaden, München, 1921, pp. 23-32 ff).¹ For a different interpretation of this text by M. in his *B. S. B.* (iii, 3, 37) see my *BSPC* Vol. III. p. 184.

(21) KATHA UPANIṢAD BHĀṢYA

Is the sovereignty of God over His creatures limited to *this side* of release; or does it continue even on the other side of it? This, according to Madhva, is the theme of this Upaniṣad and the subject-matter of the third boon of Naciketas. The passage : ये यं प्रेते विचिकित्सा मनुष्ये (i, 1, 20), has been accordingly interpreted by him : प्रेते मुक्ते मनुष्ये नियामकत्वेन भगवान्स्तीति ज्ञानिनो वदन्ति नास्तीत्यज्ञाः । तस्य नियामकस्य स्वरूपं यथावत् अहं विद्याम् । Śaṅkara has interpreted the text (i, 1, 20) in terms of the survival of the soul after death. This has been criticized by Rāmānuja in his *Śrībhāṣya*. It seems advisable to refer the text, on the whole, to the condition of the 'great beyond' (Sāmparāye mahati) i.e. release.²

In emphasizing this aspect of God's government of the released state,² Madhva as a true mystic-philosopher, attributes the activities of the individual in the waking and dream planes also to the activity of God. Considered in bold relief, this idea runs through every line and chapter of this Upaniṣad—that the human soul is dependent at all stages and states of its existence on the guidance and control of a Higher Power.⁴

it. Truth is bigger than our minds and we are not the same with it but have a lower participation only of the intellectual nature and are rather apprehenders rather than comprehenders thereof. This is indeed one badge of our creaturely state. * * * * Yet, many rational souls frame certain ideas and conceptions of whatever is in the orb of being, proportionate to their own nature and sufficient for their purpose. Though we can't fully comprehend the Deity, nor exhaust the infiniteness of its perfections, yet may we have an idea of a Being absolutely perfect, such a one as is agreeable and proportionate to our measure and scantling *nostro modulo conformis* as we may approach near to a mountain and touch it with our hands, though we cannot encompass it within our arms." Ralph Cudworth, 'True Intellectual System of the Universe' quoted in *Chamber's Encyclopaedia of English Literature*, Vol. 1, 1894, p. 373. The sentiments expressed by this 17th century 'Platonist' have been fully anticipated and shared by Madhva who, surprisingly enough, has given us the very same analogy of a mountain :

पश्यंतोऽपि न पश्यन्ति मेरो रूपं विपश्चितः (B. S. B. i, 1, 5).

1. Quoted by Ranade, *op. cit.* ii, p. 474 (Notes).

2. "Sāmparāya" is evidently the final release, Cf. यमप्येति भुवनं साम्पराये ॥

(Ghṛta Sūkta).

For a detailed discussion of the issue, see my paper "Śaṅkara's Rendering of *Yeyam Prete*—A Critique", *AUJ.* i, 2. (1933).

3. उत्तामृतत्वस्येशानः

4. Madhva's interpretation of the four forms : Viśva, Taijasa etc. receives full support from :

स विश्वस्तैजसः प्राज्ञस्तुरीय इति वृत्तिभिः ।

अर्थेन्द्रियाशयज्ञानैर्भगवान्परिभाष्यते ॥

(Bhāg. xii, 11, 22)

“Ṛtam pibantau....” (i, 3, 17) is a strong plea for the subordination of the individual to such a Power. In the series of assertions “Etat vai tat..” in the first Vallī of the ii Adhyāya, this dependence is fully brought out. The waking and dream states are there directly ascribed to the Supreme :

येन रूपं रसं गन्धान् शब्दान् ।
एतेनैव विजानति * * * ।
स्वप्नान्तं जागरितान्तं चोभौ येनानुपश्यति
महान्तं विभुमात्मानं * * * ॥

Madhva's interpretation of these in terms of a Supreme Power that enables us to see our dreams is clearly supported by *Brh Up.* iv, 3, 11 where these experiences and dreamless sleep are alike attributed to the superior activity of the Chief Puruṣa (Hamsa) who “covers the soul while asleep and enlightens the sleeping self, Himself remaining awake all along :

स्वप्नेन शरीरमभिप्रहृत्यासुप्तः सुप्तानभिचाकशीति ।

शुक्रमादाय पुनरेति स्थानं हिरण्मयः पुरुष एक हंसः ॥ (*Brh. Up.* iv, 3, 1).

Interpreters of *Kaṭha* have been puzzled by the description in i, 3, 1, of both the individual and the Supreme as “tasting the fruits of action” (*ṛtam pibantau*). Śaṅkara has recourse to the छत्रिन्याय or the analogy of the umbrella-bearers, to save Īśvara. But this is entirely pointless as, in reality, there is no room for the “nyāya” at all; since even the individual, on his view, is not really a bhoktā. Madhva takes the text to refer to the two forms of the Divine Being. See my *BSPC*. Vol. I. pp. 152-61. He has the support of the *Gītā* which ascribes real *bhoktrtva* in the esoteric sense, to God (ix, 24).¹

The gods no less than the forces of Nature, obey the behests of God : यः पूर्वं तपसो जातम्. (ii, 1, 6) and यतश्चोदेति सूर्यो. (ii, 1, 9). This difference between God and Soul is also brought out in the earlier sections pointing the way of realization - i, 2, 7-9; 23-24. We have almost a clear formulation of the doctrine of Grace,² in *Kaṭha* i, 2, 22. God must *choose* the devotee before the latter can hope to attain Him. This confirms what Madhva says in *AV* :

* * * * * इत्यादेर्न हरिं विना ।

ज्ञानस्वभावतोऽपि स्यान्मुक्तिः कस्यापि हि क्वचित् ॥

(22) MUṆḌAKA UPANIṢAD-BHĀṢYA

(i) This contains 120 granthas. Like others, it is also made up, mostly, of quotations from authoritative sources. Madhva's comments are few. He prefers to interpret in the words of older authorities, drawn upon by him.

1. Ranade thinks “the author of the Upaniṣad had not before his mind's eye, a definite conception of the difference between the individual and the Supreme, especially as he describes them both as being obliged to taste the fruits of action, and that is why *Muṇḍ.* iii, 1, 17, corrects the thought and makes only *one* of them taste the fruits of action” (p. 265). But in view of *Gītā* ix, 24, this explanation is hardly acceptable.

2. “It seems that in a rudimentary way at least, the *Kaṭha* knew the uselessness of human endeavour unaided by Divine grace” (Ranade, *op. cit.* ii, p. 269).

(ii) His first contribution to the interpretation of this Upaniṣad is his repudiation of the “invidious distinction” between the Parā (higher) and Aparā (lower) Vidyās in the sense in which these terms are understood by Śaṅkara. The difference between the four Vedas and that by which the Imperishable is known, is one of *outlook, not of status* or parts, according to Madhva. It is a question of intellectual approach rather than one of material classification. As a staunch believer in the supreme authority of the entire Śāstra as a whole to reveal the Supreme, Madhva feels he cannot be a party to any unmerited censure on the Pre-Upaniṣadic literature which its condemnation as Aparā (lower) Vidyā would lead to. He gives a new orientation to the conception of Parā and Aparā Vidyā by which the four Vedas and their connected literature would be designated as Parā and Aparā, according as they are correlated or *not correlated* to the Supreme Being. He bases this interpretation on a text from the *Parama Samhitā*¹ of the Pañcarātra :

ऋगाद्या अपरा विद्या यदा विष्णोर्न वाचकाः ।

ता एव परमा विद्या यदा विष्णोस्तु वाचकाः ॥

(iii) Modern writers on *Muṇḍaka* have made much of the conflict between ritualism and the path of knowledge that is supposed to be in evidence, here. It may be admitted that the claims of rituals have been fully recognized in i, 2, 1-6. Yet it is not oblivious of the limitations of Karma (i, 2, 7-12). One writer remarks that “the yea and nay of Ritualism have rarely been so splendidly exhibited in two short sections, as we have in this Upaniṣad” (Ranade, *op. cit.* p. 279). “We may say, these two parts constitute the thesis and the antithesis of the philosophical argument of this Upaniṣad and the synthesis of the two, if implied, is *not* clearly stated” (*ibid*). In the light of Madhva’s interpretation of Parā and Aparā Vidyās, the synthesis would lie in a shifting of emphasis :

वेदा ब्रह्मात्मविषयास्त्रिकाण्डविषया अपि (*Bhāg.* xi, 21, 35) as explained in his *Gītā Bhāṣya*.

(iv) It has been recognized that the *Muṇḍaka* affirms a Realism,² both psychical and physical (i, 3; i, 1, 7). The distinction between the fruit-eating souls and the unaffected witness (God) has always been an uncomfortable reminder to the Monist. The analogy of the arrow and the target is quite realistic : शरच्चत् तन्मयो भवेत्. And so is the declaration in जुष्टं यदा पश्यत्यन्यमीशम्. The only occasion where a doctrine of impersonal identity is approached is in iii, 2, 7 :

गताः कलाः पञ्चदश * * * * ।

कर्माणि विज्ञानमयश्च आत्मा परेऽव्यये सर्व एकीभवन्ति ॥

1. The verse is not traceable in the *Parama Samhitā* published in the G. O. S. Is the work cited by Madhva a different text of the Pañcarātra, from the one known to Rāmānuja ? Śaṅkara’s restriction of the designation ‘Para-Vidyā’ to the Upaniṣads, is thus criticized by Jayatīrtha : एतेनोपनिषदः परविद्या इति व्याख्यानमपि परास्तम् । ऋगादिग्रहणेन तासामपि गृहीतत्वात् । ब्राह्मणपरिव्राजकन्यायश्चागतिकागतिः । तज्जन्यं ज्ञानं परविद्येत्यपि न युक्तम् । अधिगतिकरणत्वानुपपत्तेः । अनेकार्थताकल्पनापत्तेश्च (*NS.* p. 4). See also my *BSPC* vol. I. pp. 7-9.

2. Ranade, *op. cit.* ii, p. 281-84.

But there is no smooth sailing for Monism here. The mention of liberated souls becoming 'one with the Brahman' *along with their works* (*karmāṇi*) creates a serious difficulty for the Monist, according to whose beliefs, Karma gets *destroyed* (*not unified* with Brahman) at the time of Brahman-realization ! There is no such difficulty for a Realist of the type of Madhva, who recognizes that all good acts performed by an enlightened soul from the moment of his realization (Aparokṣa) of God-vision, are (*not destroyed* but) "credited" so to say, to his account in release : न हास्य कर्म क्षीयते.¹ Since Karma is not thus destroyed, in release, the term एकीभवन्ति (used as a single common predicate of both कर्माणि, and विज्ञानमय आत्मा, can only mean that the souls together with their Jñānottara-Karma² are bound up in the Lord with their different potentialities intact.

(23) ṢATPRAŚNA UPANIṢAD-BHĀṢYA

(i) This Upaniṣad is made up of the answers to the six questions put to sage Pippalāda. Section i, teaches the twin-principles of Rayi and Prāṇa to be the sources of creation. Madhva equates these with Vāyu and Bhāratī of his theosophy. He explains that this divine couple presides over the various principles of life, in different capacities and carries on the work of creation :

भर्तृस्थः स स्वयं वायुभर्यास्था तु सरस्वती ।

* * * एवं जानन् विमच्यते ॥

(ii) The next two sections plead for the supremacy of Prāṇa over the psychic and the physical world. The high and unique place given to Prāṇa in Madhva's theology, derives its support from these sections of this Upaniṣad and others of its kind in the *Chāndogya* etc. "Prāṇa-Vidyā" is indeed one of the favorite topics in the Upaniṣads.

The analysis of dreams made in sec. iv seems to ascribe the endless activity thereof to the powers of the individual. Madhva makes but a slight change in the account here, ascribing these to the Supreme Being in consonance with the famous passage in the *Bṛh. Up.* (iv, 3, 11).

The Upaniṣad leans to the view that the knower (विद्वान्) loses himself in the infinite light of the Deity, like rivers into the Ocean. Utter annihilation of name and form of the individual, is asserted : भिद्येते चासां नामरूपे. But, as we have seen, there is always some vagueness and obscurity in the analogies of the Upaniṣads, which leaves room for doubt and speculation. Madhva contends that भिद्येते नामरूपे cannot mean that names and forms are *destroyed* : but that they "differ" from one another even after

1. Cf. यथा यथा कर्म कुरुते तथा तथाधिको भवति ।

आनन्दो ह्यसतेऽकार्याच्छुभं कृत्वा तु वर्धते ॥ (Madhva, *B. S. B.* iii, 4, 8).

स य आत्मानमेव लोकमुपास्ते न हास्य कर्म क्षीयते । (*ibid.* iv, 1, 16).

ज्ञानोत्तरस्तु धर्मो मुक्तावानन्दोत्कर्षहेतुः (Jayatirtha, *G. B. com.* Introd).

2. स्वरूपैक्याभिप्राये, कर्माणि विज्ञानमयश्चेति न युज्यते । नहि तत्पक्षेऽपि कर्मणां ब्रह्मैक्यं मुक्तावस्ति । निवृत्यभिप्राये च पञ्चदशकलानामपि समत्वात्, अन्यासां कलानां गमनमुक्त्वा, कर्मणां विज्ञानात्मनश्चैकीभाव-कथनं व्यर्थं स्यात् । विशेषाभावात्. (VTN)

mingling with the Sea, in a hundred ways. He quotes the text अनन्तं वै नाम (*Bṛh. Up.* iii, 3, 12). On the analogy of the setting Sun suggested by the phrase अस्तं गच्छन्ति he argues that the dissolution of the rivers in the Sea can only legitimately imply their invisibility to the naked eye thereafter : अस्तं गमनं तु, आदित्यवत् अज्ञानावज्ञेयत्वमेव । Reading “समुद्रे इत्येवं प्रोच्यते” in the locative, he writes further : अज्ञैरनवगतान्यपि समुद्रे स्थितानां, विष्णौ स्थितानां च मुक्तानां, भिन्नान्येव रूपाणि सन्त्येवेत्यर्थः । It is perhaps literalism to insist, as does Madhva, that “भिद्येते” in the first place, is mere “splitting up” into smaller units or parts; but never total annihilation or “niranvayadhvamsa”: न च भेदशब्दो नाशे प्रयुज्यमानः क्वापि दृष्टः । घटादिष्वपि बहुभाव एव भेदशब्दः प्रयुज्यते । नाशस्त्वर्यत एवावगतः । न चात्रार्थतोऽपि नाशोऽवगम्यते । नहि नामानि रूपाणि च कपालवत् बहुधा भूतानि तिष्ठन्ति । अतो “भिद्येते” इति पृथक्त्वमेवोच्यते ॥

(24) MĀNDŪKYA UPANIṢAD-BHĀṢYA

(i) This runs to 127 granthas. The most significant Theistic contribution of Madhva, to the understanding of this Upaniṣad, is the identification of the four forms of the intuiting self with the four Forms of the Deity presiding over the four stages of our psycho-physical and trans-mundane existence : the waking (jāgrat), dream (svapna), deep sleep (suṣupti) and Mokṣa (turya). Modern scholars, following Śaṅkara, have, however, been content with identifying the four forms of the ‘Ātman’ postulated here, with the ego in various states of consciousness. That theirs is a narrow interpretation of the facts of the case would be clear from *Bṛh., Up.* vi, 3, 11, and 21, where the “Taijasa” and “Prājña” are sharply distinguished from the individual Puruṣa :

स्वप्नेन शारीरमभिप्रहृत्यासुप्तः सुप्तानभिचाकशीति (*Bṛh. Up.* iv, 3, 11).

एवमेवायं पुरुषः प्राज्ञेनात्मना संपरिष्वक्तो (*ibid*) and from *B. S.* सुषुप्त्युत्क्रान्त्योर्भेदेन (i, 3, 42).

(ii) Monistic commentators have naturally underlined the acosmic negativism of the text in its description of the Prājña and Taijasa. Madhva has, therefore, taken pains to repudiate the monistic implications of such terms as “Advaita”, “Prapañcopaśama” and “Avyavahārya” :

प्रपञ्चं देहबन्धाख्यं तुरीयः क्षमयेद्यतः ।

प्रपञ्चोपशमस्तेनाप्युक्तः स भगवान् विभुः ॥

By all these Madhva has tried to bring out how the Upaniṣads as dealing with the Adhyātma, in the sense of the immanent Supreme Being, is the true active principle behind all our psychophysical existence and activities. This line of thought that lies buried in the Upaniṣads clearly represents a very old and, in all probability, the correct view intended to be taken by the seers of the oldest period.

(ii) The Māndūkya is divided into 4 short Khaṇḍas. The text, as it has come down to us, is found mixed up with a sort of verse summary of some of its ideas, in 29 Ślokas. This, combined with the fact that the teaching of the Māndūkya had very early inspired the composition of a metrical dissertation on the Advaita-vedānta by Śaṅkara’s Paramaguru, Gauḍapāda, bearing a strong resemblance to the ślokas already referred to, had given rise to a controversy in Vedāntic circles, as to the exact

status of these 29 verses. Madhva commented on them as part of the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*. This has been questioned and criticized by certain commentators and later-day critics owing allegiance to the school of Śaṅkara, holding the opposite view that these constitute the first chapter (Āgama Prakaraṇa) of Gauḍapāda's work of four chapters and as such were composed by him. A large section of modern scholars also which generally follows the Advaitins in such matters of literary tradition, as the one widely current, shares this view. But the issue has been complicated by the fact that (1) some of these disputed Kārikās have been cited by writers (Advaitin and Viśiṣṭādvaitin) both *before*¹ and *after*² Madhva, as Śruti texts, forming part of the *Māṇḍūkya*. The sum of evidence available on the issue establishes beyond doubt that the 'Upaniṣadic theory' of the Kārikās now regarded as forming part of Gauḍapāda's work, is a much older affair than Madhva and that he was not in any case, its originator. Since the publication of my five papers on this subject in the *RPR* and *PO* (between 1931-37) two learned works on Gauḍapāda have appeared in print. They are (1) the *Āgama-Śāstra of Gauḍapāda* by Vidhusekhara Bhattacharya (Calcutta Uni. 1943) and (2) Dr. T. M. P. Mahadevan's *Gauḍapāda, A Study in Early Advaita* (Madras Uni. 1952.) The Upaniṣadic theory of the Āgama Prakaraṇa of Gauḍapāda has naturally been touched upon by both these writers, who have also passed in review the evidences that had been urged by me, in support of it from Advaitic, Viśiṣṭādvaitic and Dvaita sources. Prof. Vidhusekhara Bhattacharya has admitted frankly that the evidence of Rāmānuja, quoted by me, is conclusive and that "there were, in his time, some authoritative teachers according to whom the Kārikās of the I Prakaraṇa of Gauḍapāda were regarded as Śruti and as such they formed part of the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*" (Introd. p. xxxv-vi. *op. cit.*). Dr. Mahadevan has not been so outspoken. He merely opines that "the rival view has been there since a long time" (how long, he does not say); but the earliest to advocate it, so far as we can trace, were *not* the Advaitins." (*op. cit.* p. 44). Now, as Rāmānuja is certainly earlier than Madhva and as it was not obviously to his advantage to have needlessly raised the status of the Kārikās of a rival school to the rank of Śruti, the conclusion is irresistible that Rāmānuja could not help recognizing the disputed Kārikās as Śruti, as they had already come to be so regarded, in the other school. Thus, in fairness to Rāmānuja, Dr. Mahadevan must either admit that some prominent Advaitins *before* Rāmānuja should have done so, in their own interests; or that from the earliest times, such a view was current in Advaitic circles (as pointed out by me on the evidence of the works of Śaṅkara, Sureśvara, Ānandagiri, Brahmayidyābharanākāra etc. Ānandagiri was most probably a contemporary

1. Śaṅkara, Sureśvara, Vimuktātman and Rāmānuja.

2. Ānandagiri, Sāyaṇa, Mādhava, Advaitānanda, Appāyya Dikṣita, Dharmarāja Adhvani, Kṛṣṇānanda Sarasvatī and Upaniṣad Brahman Yogi. I have discussed the problem fully, in *Rev. Phil. and Rel.* Poona ii, 1; iii, 1; iv, 2 and *Poona Orientalist*, i, 2; ii, 1.

of Madhva and his evidence, in his *Bṛhadvārttika* gloss, is clearly in favor of the Upaniṣadic theory. It would involve a serious redundancy of expression to interpret Ānandagiri's introductory remarks in his *Māṇḍūkya* gloss as referring to one and the same set of Kārikās instead of two (one revealed to Gauḍapāda, by Nārāyaṇa i.e. Śruti and another composed by Gauḍapāda himself). This is the view of Upaniṣad Brahma Yogin also.

In his recent edition of *Gauḍapāda Kārikās* (Poona, 1953), R. D. Karmarkar makes a feeble attempt to dismiss the Upaniṣadic theory on the ground that (1) in several mss., of the Upaniṣad, only the mantras are given, as in the Nirnaysagar edn. of the Upaniṣads and that (2) it is only the commentators who seem to regard as the two-forming part of a composite whole (*op. cit.* p. xxix. introd.). He does not seem to have realized that the evidence of his mss., would stand very much circumscribed by the fact that none of them could be possibly older than either Kūranārāyaṇa or Madhva, to mention only two of the commentators who have held them as forming part of a composite whole. Karmarkar has maintained a discreet silence over Rāmānuja's citing G. K. i, 16 (the very one cited by Śaṅkara under B. S. ii. 1, 9) as a Śruti and challenging its interpretation by Śaṅkara, in terms of his Brahmājñānavāda. This cannot be explained away as a "loose" use; Rāmānuja was not a follower of Śaṅkara and his interpretation of the verse is diametrically opposed to Śaṅkara's. Śaṅkara's reference under B. S. ii, 1, 33 to "Āptakāma Śruti", is obviously to the Kārikā : देवस्यैष स्वभावोऽयमाप्तकामस्य का स्मृतिः । (G. K. i, 9). The attempt to explain it away as a reference to Brh. Up. iv, 4, 6, is not convincing; as the reference there, is to the enlightened soul on the eve of release; whereas in B. S. B. ii, 1, 33, Śaṅkara is concerned with the God of creation. It is not also without significance that Appayya Dīkṣita, in his *Parimala*, under this very Sūtra, introduces a discussion on G. K. i, 9, which he definitely treats as a Śruti. No one will dare to accuse Appayya of ignorance of Advaitic tradition ! Lastly, the inconsistencies in thought and expression of some of the disputed Kārikās, with Advaitic positions (pointed out by Jayatīrtha and others) as in स्वप्न-मायासरूपेति सृष्टिरन्यैर्विकल्पिता; the use of the निर्धारणषष्ठी in अद्वैतः सर्वभावानां देवस्तुर्यः । and the difficulty involved in applying the mode of *reductio ad absurdum* argument envisaged in the syllogism प्रपञ्चो यदि विद्येत निवर्तेत are very real difficulties which call for careful consideration, in this context. The absence of any obvious advantage to Realists and Dvaitins in raising the status of these Kārikās, needlessly, is another strong point against making either Rāmānuja or Madhva the originator of this theory. Whether rightly or wrongly, the theory must have originated in Advaitic circles originally, before Rāmānuja and Madhva. They have taken it accordingly, reserving to themselves only the right of reinterpreting them, as in the case of any other Advaitic Śruti. This would be the most sensible view to take of this problem and absolve them both of any responsibility for the Upaniṣadic theory. The whole problem has been re-examined by me in

the light of all that has been said on the subject by Dr. Mahadevan and others, in the *Bhāratiya Vidyā*, Bombay, Vol. xvii, pts. 3-4, (1959) pp. 96-121, to which further attention is invited.

(iv) Verses 7-9 afford material for a Theistic reconstruction. After a review of various theories of creation, theistic and antitheistic, it is said the Deity cannot be supposed to engage in world-creation out of any desire to achieve any unfulfilled desire. Creation is a spontaneous activity : देवस्यैष स्वभावोज्यम् just a welling up of the Divine ecstasy. It is difficult to reconcile such an exalted idea with a purely monistic or acosmic attitude, which treats the Universe as a huge fancy of beginningless ignorance. The use of the term "Deva" to denote the "individual Soul" would also be unconvincing, as Advaitic commentators would have to take it.

Verses 17-18 are also interpreted in the same realistic spirit. At first sight, they seem to be a wholesale repudiation of all realism. But a careful attention to the wording and drift of the argument posed by the verses, obliges us to revise our judgment, says Madhva.

प्रपंचो यदि विद्येत निवर्तते and विकल्पो विनिवर्तते कल्पितो यदि..... । are obviously cast in syllogistic form of a Viparyayaparyavasāna argument. The "tarka" would then be put as follows :

विकल्पः (प्रपंचः) यदि कल्पितः (स्यात् तर्हि) निवर्तते;

न निवर्तते । तस्मान्न कल्पितः (किंतु, सत्य एव) !

[The world, were it a projection of the mind, would disappear sometime; it does not so disappear, therefore, it is *not* a projection of the mind (but a reality) !]

The point is that the Advaitin cannot afford to deny that there is any disappearance of phenomena; because it is "mithyā". Disappearance (nivṛtti) is the necessary presupposition of "mithyātva" (निषेधप्रतियोगित्वम्). Hence, the acceptance of the Viparyayaparyavasāna "na nivartate" (which cannot be avoided, if the *tarka* is applied), would necessarily lead to the conclusion that the world is *not* a mental projection but a reality. Dr. Mahadevan has missed this point in trying to evade the consequence of the "Prasaṅga" necessitated by the argument.

Madhva also points out that as there is no logical concomitance between "existence" (vidyamānatva) and negation (nivṛtti) in the Advaitic sense, the term "vidyeta" in the text should more properly be taken in the sense of "produced" (*utpadyeta*). He thus sees in the proposition here, an argument for the beginningless reality (anādisatyatva) of the Universe :

प्रपंचो यदि विद्येत (=उत्पद्येत) [तर्हि] निवर्तते; न निवर्तते ।

तस्मान्नोत्पद्यते; किंतु अनादिनित्यः ॥

He also draws attention to the use of the "selective genitive" in अद्वैतः सर्वभावानाम् (VTN. p. 10 Bby.) which would imply the existence of other reals (sa-dvitiyatva). If the "Turya" alone were meant to be real (and all other "Bhāvas," unreal), the use of the (*nirbhāraṇa śaṣṭhi*) selective genitive would be out of place. He explains "मायामात्रम्" as "created by God's will and sustained by it", मात्रम् being made up of two roots ($\sqrt{\text{मा}}$ $\sqrt{\text{त्र}}$)

to measure, create and $\sqrt{\text{ज्ञा}}$ to protect). There are precedents in Yāska for deriving words from more than one root at a time. अद्वैतं परमार्थतः is explained by Madhva from the standpoint of his Svatantrādvitīya Brahman.

(25) AITAREYA UPANIṢAD BHĀṢYA

This runs to 1500 granthas. The term "Aitareya Upaniṣad" is generally restricted to that portion of the *A. A.* beginning with आत्मा वा..... (ii, 4, 1) and running up to ii, 7. The second and third Āraṇyakas together are known as "Bahvr̥ca Brāhmaṇa" or "Mahaitareya Upaniṣad". The third book has its own title of "Śamhitopaniṣad". As commented upon by Ānandagiri and as at present available, Śaṅkara's commentary covers only the portion of ii, 4-6. Till recently, Madhva's procedure in having commented on the whole of the ii and iii Āraṇyakas was deemed a *departure*. But the evidence of *mss.*¹ and the testimony of Sāyaṇa, show that like Madhva, Śaṅkara too had commented on the whole of the *Mahaitareya*. The Mādhva textual tradition, in this respect also, is endorsed by the Advaitic commentator Upaniṣad Brahma Yogi, whose commentary has been published by the Adyar Library.

The *Aitareya* is Madhva's favorite Upaniṣad.² Much of the Upaniṣad, however, when *literally interpreted*, appears to be grotesque, unintelligible and bizarre. Madhva's mystic and esoteric explanation of the text in terms of the highest Brahman and its worship and meditation, through all its immanent aspects, should be deemed a revolution in Upaniṣadic interpretation. The intimate connection of this Upaniṣad with the *R̥k Samhitā*, in which mysticism and symbolism play no insignificant part, also lends weight to Madhva's new line of explanation. There is no doubt also that the general trend of the text favors some kind of an allegorical explanation of sacrifice. The aim of ii, 1, 3, is to enable men to acquire concentration of thought by meditating on the accessories of sacrifice. This section deals with the allegorical significance of the Uktha (hymns) also called Niṣkevalya Śāstra, three sets of 80 tristichs in the Gāyatrī, Bṛhatī and Uṣṇik metres, prescribed for recitation at the Mahāvṛata ceremony, on the twenty-fourth day of the Gavāmayana Sattrā. The second part comprises chapters 4-6 and enlarges on the doctrine of the Ātman. The iii Āraṇyaka is taken up with the theories of word-combination and permutation with the mystic meaning of various forms of the *Samhitā* text, its vowels, consonants etc.

Madhva interprets the whole Upaniṣad in a mystic and "Vaiṣṇavite sense",³ on the basis of एतं ह्येव बह्वृचा महत्पुण्ये मीमांसन्ते..... (*A. A.* iii, 2, 3).

1. See Ranade, *op. cit.* ii, p. 477-78 (Note).

2. *M. Vij.* iii, 55; vi, 1-4; xvi, 16; 54.

3. Keith, in his *Aitareya Āraṇyaka* (Oxford, 1909), has confounded Ānandatīrtha (Madhva) with Ānandagiri, glossator on Śaṅkara's Bhāṣya on *Aitareya*. Hence his supposition that Ānandatīrtha "wrote two commentaries on the *Ait.*, first the super-commentary (ṭippani) on Śaṅkara's bhāṣya and second an independent commentary in which he interpreted the Āraṇyaka, in a Vaiṣṇavite sense" (p. 12). His further explanation that "Ānandatīrtha was a Mādhva and so not unlikely to be disposed to adopt a Vaiṣṇavite interpretation" is worse ! Further down are fathered on Madhva other glosses of Ānandagiri on Śaṅkara's bhāṣyas on *Praśna*, *Īśa* etc. The same confusion is betrayed again in the remark that "he (Ānandagiri) is indifferently called Ānandatīrtha and Ānandagiri" !

The Uktha is identified with the Brahman : उत्थापनादुक्थनामा स एव पृथिवीस्थितः. The fivefold hymn (पञ्चविधं उक्थम्) in ii, 3, 1, is explained as the five forms of Viṣṇu, Nārāyaṇa, Saṁkarṣaṇa, Pradyumna and Aniruddha. The meditation on the Saṁhitā text and its constituent parts (*Ait.* iii) is similarly dealt with. There is bound to be considerable difficulty in working out the details of such an interpretation. Madhva is alive to these difficulties. Such esoteric interpretations involve on his part a good deal of "loose and unscientific etymologizing." The interpretations are perhaps "weak, farfetched" and etymological with a vengeance. But all said and done, it has to be recognized that the interpretation of these portions is far from certain or easy. While one may agree that the general tone and wording of Āraṇyakas are in favor of a mystic interpretation of Karma, it is difficult to establish any logical connection with Viṣṇu, in all cases. The supremacy of Prāṇa as the central theme of the Vedas is obvious in ii, 2, 2 and perhaps also in the equation of that Prāṇa with Brahman in *B. S.* i, 1. 29. But not so perhaps the further equation of that Prāṇa with Viṣṇu attempted by Madhva on the strength of णकारो बलं षकारः प्राण आत्मा¹ (*A. Ā.* iii, 2, 6).

Madhva selects four passages from the Āraṇyaka as representing its quintessence and from which he draws his doctrine of "Sarvaśabda-samanvaya" in Brahman (Viṣṇu). This he adopts as the master-key to the interpretation of the *Mahaitareya*. The whole of this Upaniṣad is to him but an exemplification of this thesis :

सर्वैश्च वैदिकपदैरपि लोकशब्दैर्मेघाग्निवारिधितलादिरवैश्च सर्वैः ।

एकोऽभिधेयपरिपूर्णगुणः प्रियोऽलं नारायणो मम सदैव स तुष्टिमेतु ॥

(Concluding Verse of Madhva's Bhāṣya on *Aitareya*).

With a feeling of profound mysticism, he writes that not only the names of the gods and Ṛṣis in the Vedas but even the very music of the spheres, the sounds of the ocean, the thunder of the clouds, and the noise of falling trees voice the majesty of God : एवमृषिशब्देषु च व्यवहियमाणानि सर्वाणि नामानि विष्णोरेव मुख्यतः । किमु देवतानामानि ? 'यो देवानां' (*R. V.* x. 82, 3) 'इन्द्रं मित्रम्' (*i.* 164, 46) 'यमिन्द्रमाहुः' (*T. B.* iii, 7, 9, 3) 'नामानि सर्वाणि' (*Bhāllaveya Śruti*) इत्यादिभ्यः श्रुतिभ्यः न केवलं ऋष्यादीनां नाम भगवतः ; सर्वे वेदा अपि तस्यैव नामानि । किमु च वेदाः ? समुद्रमेघवृक्षपतनभेरीताडनादिसर्वे घोषा अपि तस्यैव नामानि यथायोगं योजनीयानि । उक्तं च बृहत्संहितायाम्—

"हुंकारेण सहैवाब्धिः" * * इति ॥ (*p.* 11, *op. cit.*).

Save for the immediate 'partiality' for "Viṣṇu", which is the result of theological exigencies, these are lofty sentiments of which the greatest

1. Adroit as is Madhva's attempt to correlate the two syllables ष and ण to Viṣṇu in iii, 2, 6, it cannot be deemed convincing to an outsider. Apart from the "Vi" which has to be imported from outside, the transposition of the syllables णा and षा (instead of षा and णा in the order found in "Viṣṇu") is to be satisfactorily accounted for. Bloomfield (*Religion of the Vedas.* p. 168) notes the splitting of Vi-snu on the basis of *Sāma Veda* ii, 1042. The only possible explanation of the transposition of the syllables "षा" and "णा" that could be advanced on behalf of Madhva is the usual mystic motive : "The gods love the cryptic, as it were."

Theists of the world may be proud and to which any Mystic may rise in moments of highest divine ecstasy. When one recalls that "Viṣṇu" stands only for the Highest Being, there is no difficulty in admiring the dizzy heights of mysticism to which Madhva takes us in these contexts.

He has differed on many occasions from the interpretations of Śaṃkara. Until the latter's commentary on the other parts of the *Mahaitareya* is published, nothing definite can be said about the extent of mutual differences between the two. There are instances where Śāyaṇa has indirectly attempted to answer some of the objections raised by Madhva (cf. Śāyaṇa on ii, 3, 3).

Madhva takes the opportunity afforded by the various controversial passages of the text of the *Aitareya* to discuss the points at issue between Dualism and Monism. The doctrine of identity between Jīva and Brahman is refuted in connection with the dialogue between Indra and Viśvāmitra (ii, 2, 3), which is the subject of an adhikaraṇa in *B. S. i, 1, 29*. The doctrine of attributeless Brahman is opposed and gradation (*tāratamya*) and difference of various kinds are shown to exist in *Mokṣa* (pp. 15-16). The monistic interpretation of योज्हं सोऽसौ योज्सी सोऽहम् (ii, 2, 4) यत्र देवाः सर्वे एकं भवन्ति (ii, 3, 8) and others of its kind, are refuted. He points out that except for the phrase "योज्हं सोऽसौ" the other expressions used in the text like अयेति, are inconsistent with identity. If identity were meant to be conveyed, the repetition of "योज्हं सोऽसौ" "योज्सी सोऽहम्" would be unnecessary; whereas on a realistic interpretation, such repetitions in the reverse order would be expressive of *close community of interests* and friendly feeling between the two, as in चैत्रो मैत्रः; मैत्रश्चैवः। He also argues that the terms "Aham" and "Asmi" are used as secret names of God, the entire passage meaning: That which is called "Aham", is in the Asu (Chief Breath) and that which is in the Asu is "Aham" (i.e. "Aheya"). The text चक्षुर्मित्रस्य वरुणस्याग्नेः preceding सूर्य आत्मा जगत्स्तस्युषश्च is sufficient to show that "Ātmā" is used in the sense of inner ruler or guiding principle and that no identity is meant.

(26) TAITTIRĪYA UPANIṢAD-BHĀṢYA

Here too (granthas 250), a *mystic line of interpretation* is adopted. At the very outset (*Śikṣāvalli*), the meditation on Brahman in the six constitutive elements of letter, accent, quality, effort, modulation and combination is insisted upon. The Supreme (Viṣṇu) presides with his five forms over the five spheres of Loka, Jyotiṣa, Vidyā, Prajā and Ātmā.¹ The same Lord again, rules over the five sheaths and indwells among them and is therefore designated by the epithets Annamaya, Prāṇamaya, Manomaya etc. It is worthy of note that Madhva unlike all other commentators

1. This is an interesting and remarkable application of the Vyūha doctrine of Pañcarātra of which another example is seen in Madhva's interpretation of the esoterics of the Pañcāgni Vidyā, in *Chān. Up.* This confirms the point that the Vyūha doctrine was closely connected with the Upāsanāmārga in the Upaniṣads and was not a meaningless accretion.

on the *B. S.* i, 1, 12, regards all the five 'sheath-forms' as Brahman. Śaṅkara dismisses *all of them including Ānandamaya*, as Kośas or Prākṛtic sheaths; while Rāmānuja treats all except Ānandamaya as Kośas. But the ruling of the Sūtrakāra that the suffix *maya* here ought to be taken in the sense of profusion (prācurya) and not of modification (vikāra) and the repetition of the term "Brahma" in connection with Anna, Prāṇa etc., in the Upaniṣad lend greater probability and consistency to Madhva's view that all the five forms of Brahman are meant to be taught here as immanent in the different kośas and therefore designated by those very names for purposes of meditation. The mystic and esoteric correlation of the workings of the psycho-physical world with the immanent activity of Brahman could be brought about properly, only on such a view as Madhva's. He urges strong grounds against accepting the superficial interpretation of his predecessors. (1) The *annam* referred to (as Brahman) is pointedly described as अक्षते अक्षि च भूतानि "that which eats creatures and is eaten" by them. (ii, 2). The description "अक्षि" would be unsuitable for ordinary food (kośa). His own explanation of "*atti bhūtāni*" as that which dissolves everything at the end (pralaya) suits the Brahman well, as also his explanation of "adyatvam" (being eaten by others) as "Upajīvyatvam" (metaphysical dependence). In the same way, Prāṇamaya etc., would signify Mahāprāṇa....etc. The clear statement in the beginning that Bhṛgu approached his father and asked him to teach him Brahman, and the latter's equally clear statements — "Know Annam to be Brahman....and so on, also, render it quite possible that the real teaching right through all the five stages, is about Brahman and nothing but Brahman, clothed in esoteric phraseology of the Antaryāmi aspect. There can be no doubt that this interpretation places the teaching of this Upaniṣad, in an altogether new and edifying perspective, consistent with the highest ideology of Upaniṣadic thought and the principle of "Samanvaya" of Vedāntic texts in Brahman.

The crucial point emphasized in the last *Valli*, according to Madhva, is gradation of bliss in Mokṣa (ānandatāratamya). On the basis of "असौ ज्ञायं गतो भवति" (ii, 7) which points to the state of release, and in view of the significant terms "Śrotriya", "avṛjina" and "akāmahata" used in an identical context in the *Bṛh. Up.* iv, 3, 33, he maintains that the gradation referred to here, has reference to the highest state of release itself: सैषा आनन्दस्य मीमांसा भवति इति मुक्तानन्दो मीमांस्यते । 'श्रोत्रियस्य चाकामहतस्ये'ति सर्वत्र विशेषणात् । न ह्यमुक्तस्य मुख्यं श्रोत्रियत्वं संभवति, नाप्यकामहतत्वम् ॥

While the emphasis laid by him on the context and the parallel passages in *Bṛh. Up.* is pertinent, his explanation of "Śrotriya" as "Prāptaśrutiphala" (i.e. a redeemed soul) though in itself highly suggestive and ingenious, rests on an untraceable text from the Epic. There is, however, one difficulty raised by him against the other explanations which refer the text to the Samsāra-stage, that the description here of Brahmā as श्रोत्रियस्य चाकामहतस्य would be pointless as there can't possibly be a Brahmā "who has read the Vedas" (Śrotriya) and one who has not; which cannot be easily

rebutted. His own explanation, therefore, is that “Śrottriya” should be taken in the specialised sense of : यस्य श्रुतिफलं पूर्णं स श्रोत्रियः ।¹ which would be completely fulfilled, only in Mukti state.

(27) BRHADĀRANYAKA UPANIṢAD-BHĀṢYA

This is the biggest of the Upaniṣad Bhāṣyas (granthas 1860). The heterogeneity of contents of the original renders a connected summary of the Bhāṣya impracticable. A few salient features alone will be brought out here.

Madhva gives, as usual, an esoteric and theological explanation of the ritualistic sections of the Upaniṣad (i, 1-2). The entire “Aśvamedha Brāhmaṇa” is explained in terms of Brahman and its meditation, through nature-symbolism.

He takes the opportunity to discuss monistic texts like Vācārambhaṇam.... “(p. 11) and digresses into multifarious topics (pp. 12-18) such as (i) the persistence of Difference and gradation in Mokṣa; (ii) the lordship of Brahman over released souls; (iii) plurality of released souls; (iv) homogeneity of the Divine Personality (p. 14); (v) nature and grades of Bhakti etc. The doctrine of identity is elaborately refuted (p. 15-16). A full discussion of the thesis of Siddhārthe-Vyutpattiḥ” (that the mechanism of speech has reference to an established order of reality and not to ‘kārya’ as contended by the Prābhākaras is dovetailed into i, 4, 8, and, in its wake, the self-validity of the Āgmas, the characteristics of the three Pramāṇas, the concept of Viśeṣas etc., are touched upon.

Madhva construes the example of the drum and the lute (i, 4, 7-9) as emphasizing the substantial *dependence* of everything on God : बुन्दुभ्यादिदृष्टान्तोऽपि सर्वस्य तदधीनत्वं तत्कारणत्वं च ज्ञापयति. There is no place for a monism in any of these illustrations. : वरुणवत् अपां खातवत् वा, अनन्तोऽपारो भगवान्... समुद्रजलं च एकाश्रयम् (p. 34 b).

In i, 4, 12, the tables are turned upon Śaṅkara by reading Yājñavalkya’s famous declaration : यन्न हि द्वैतमिव भवति... as a *reductio ad absurdum*. The goal of man cannot possibly be a blank unconsciousness : न सर्वाज्ञानं पुरुषार्थः । Yājñavalkya himself, later on, (iv, 5, 14) asserts that the self is verily undying and its attributes are indestructible. The familiar objection of the monist that the subject of all knowledge cannot itself be the object of an experience simply begs the question. The Upaniṣad, at any rate, is not prepared to deny self-consciousness to the Ātman (i, 4, 10).² The attitude taken by Śaṅkara, is in conflict with several texts here and elsewhere (*Chān. Up.* viii, 12, 3; viii, 2, 1-10).

1. Cf. तदा गन्तासि निर्वेदं श्रोतव्यस्य श्रुतस्य च (*Gūā*).

2. “Is it not strange, to find Yājñavalkya, here, confessing that the ultimate Brahman which we might characterize only in negatives, is itself the ultimate knower and intuitor,—marks far too positively characteristic of Brahman to allow merely a negative description of it” ? (Ranade, ii, p. 199-200) Vide also Madhva’s *Ait. Bh.* pp. 15-16 b; VTN. p. 26.

Sections 6 and 7 of the iii Adhyāya greatly reinforce Madhva's Theism. The expression अतोऽज्यदार्तम् (iii, 7, 23) signifies to him that the human souls are subject to misery and have therefore to look up to God, who is free from *ārti* (imperfection), for grace and redemption :

यदि स्वतन्त्रा, नैवैते दुःखिनः स्युः कदाचन ।

अत आर्तिमतामार्तिदाता मुक्तिप्रदश्च सः ।

भगवान् परमो विष्णुः स्वतन्त्रः सर्वदैकराट् ॥ (iii, 7, 23).

Paradoxical as it may seem, the presence of evil and imperfection in the world is a proof of the existence of an Omnipotent God.

As at the conclusion of his Bhāṣyas on the *Aitareya*, *Taittiriya* and *Chāndogya Upaniṣads* and the *B. S.*, Madhva claims, here also to be an Avatār of Vāyu, and calls two sets of passages to witness. These purport to be a paraphrase of the Baḷitthā Sūkta (*R. V.* i, 141) on which he has taken his stand in support of this claim. The first set of passages from हनुमब्दो ज्ञानवाची to इति सूक्तगतं रूपत्रयम् is found quoted from a work called "Sad-bhāva" the source of the other being left unspecified, in the *Chān. Up. Bhāṣya*. But in Trivikrama's *Tattvapradīpa* the two sets of passages have been ascribed to the "Yajussamhitā" (a Post Vedic work) and the *Bhāva-vṛtta* respectively. This claim of identity with Vāyu, is made in eleven out of the thirty-seven works of Madhva.¹

(28) CHĀNDOGYA UPANIṢAD-BHĀṢYA

(i) This runs to 1200 granthas. The opening sections of this Upaniṣad extol the cult of Mukhya Prāṇa (Chief Breath) who occupies in Madhva's theology, a position analogous to that of Christ in Christianity. Mukhya Prāṇa is the Son of God. He is the highest *medium through which* the Udgītha (identified with Viṣṇu as Brahman) is to be worshipped : उद्गीथाख्यस्य विष्णोर्विशिष्टप्रतिमा वायुरेव । for he alone (among the gods) is free from sin : अपहतपाप्मा ह्येषः² and finally leads the Souls to Mokṣa (iv, 15. 5).

(ii) Madhva launches a severe attack on the monistic interpretation of ii, 21, 2-4, (p. 14-15) : तेभ्यो न ज्यायः परमन्यदस्ति । यस्तद्वेद स वेद सर्वं सर्वमस्मीत्युपासीत । The onus of proving the world to be false is on the Monist : दृष्टवस्तुनो मिथ्यात्वाङ्गीकारे च युक्त्यपेक्षा (p. 15). He discusses in this connection the Śrutis : प्रपञ्चो यदि and विकल्पो विनिवर्तेत । His rigorous Monotheism meets us everywhere in his commentaries on the Upaniṣads. He is untiring in his efforts to refer the laudations of the minor gods to Viṣṇu as their one Inner Ruler. What, on a superficial view, may appear to be a sectarian

1. Including the AV, the *Nyāyavivaraṇa*, *Mbh. T. N.*, *Tantrasāra* and *Kṛṣṇāmṛta-mahārṇava*.

2. This idea has profoundly influenced Dvaita theology. The belief that Vāyu is the Jivottama; that he *alone*, among the gods, is untouched by the influence of Kali, and that it is he who finally leads the souls to deliverance (स एनान् ब्रह्म गमयति) as *Brahmā*, are the corollaries of this. For similar treatment of the Prāṇa cult see *A. Ā.* ii, 1, 4; ii, 1, 6; *Bṛh. Up.* i, 3, 23, *Praśna Up.* i, 2, 3. In the *Jaiminiya Brāhmaṇa* (iii, 1, 1-2) Vāyu is declared to be the one "entire deity" that there is—the rest are all half-deities. See also my article on 'Jivottama-tattva' in the Kannada Journal *Jivottama* published from Kumta (N.K.)i, 1958.

fiat, turns out, on calmer scrutiny to be the very crux of Monotheism. His 'partiality' to Viṣṇu, should not blind us to the energy and consistency with which he has carried out the Monotheistic attunement of the Upaniṣads.¹

(iii) It is somewhat surprising that Madhva should have discarded the generally accepted splitting of "तज्जलान् (iii, 14, 1) into तज्जत्वात् तल्लत्वात् तदनत्वात् (सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म). This would not necessarily lead to a Monism. Even a realist may feel that the world is God—not because of any literal identity between them, but because it is His; for He made it.² Qua deriving its very existence and capacity to function, from Him, it is figuratively identified with Him, its source, as in विश्वमेवेदं पुरुषस्तद् विश्वमुपजीवति । As Madhva himself puts it in his GB : सर्वं ब्रह्मेत्युच्यते तदधीनसत्ताप्रवृत्तिमत्वात् । This is practically the interpretation of "Tajjalān...." adopted by the followers of Nimbārka : यथा छान्दोग्ये स्वरूपेण भिन्नानामपि इन्द्रियाणां प्राणाधीनतया प्राणाभिन्नत्वं श्रूयते—'न वै वाचो न चक्षुषि न मन इत्याचक्षते प्राणा इत्येवाचक्षते' (Chān. Up. v. 1, 15) तस्मात् स्वरूपतो भिन्नानामपि तज्जत्वादिना तदभिन्नत्वमाह भगवती श्रुतिः "सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म तज्जलानिति शान्त उपासीत" इति (Śukadeva on Bhāg. iv, 2, 5).

Such is also the idea contained in Bhāg. i, 5, 20 : इदं हि विश्वं भगवानि-वेतरो यतो जगत्स्थाननिरोधसंभवः । Madhva himself is no stranger to this idea, as may be gathered from his comment on the above and from his remarks on Gitā iv, 24.

It would appear, therefore, that he departed from this interpretation, just to give Vaiṣṇavism a footing in Chāndogya, iii, 14, 1, by splitting "Tajjalān" into "Tat" and "Jalān" (jala + √an) i.e. the Being that breathes in the primeval waters. This would signify Viṣṇu breathing in the primeval waters :³

तच्च ब्रह्म जलान्..... योजसौ विष्णुर्जलेऽनिति

अनीदवातमिति यं वेदवागवदत् स्फुटम् (Chān. Bhāṣya iii, 14, 1).

(iv) The sixth chapter of Chāndogya is admittedly the most important one. It is here we have the two most important utterances of Upaniṣadic philosophy : वाचारंभणं विकारो नामधेयं मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यम् (vi, 1, 4) and स आत्मा तत्त्वमसि (vi, 9, 4). These have generally been looked upon as unquestionably monistic. But Madhva shows that this is a baseless assumption. As for vi, 1, 4, the fundamental fallacy in the Advaitic interpretation is that a knowledge of the One (Real) destroys rather than produces the

1. Cf. "The real Monotheist denies that other gods exist or have jurisdiction over the Cosmos. Wherever real Monotheism has flourished, it has been militant and hostile to the worship of any but the true God. It was so in Israel after Amos; in Zoroastrianism; in Christianity and in Islam" (George A. Barton, in his review of *A Study of Religion*, J.A.O. Dec. 1935, p. 481. Madhva, also, as a Monotheist looks upon Viṣṇu as the Real and ultimate doer, in every act. B. S. B. ii, 3, 13. Only, he does not deny the existence of "minor gods".

2. तस्य लोकः स उ लोक एव (Śatapatha, xiv, 7, 2, 17). The text has been explained by Madhva in a different way.

3. See T. Ā. x, 1, 1; Mahānārāyaṇa Up. i, 1.

R. V. x, 129, 2c. Manu, i, 10.

knowledge of the “all” or many. The Advaitin is thus *least justified* in speaking of ‘the unknown becoming *known*; the unheard of becoming heard’.... (vi, 1, 3) “एकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानमपगच्छति” would be a more appropriate description of *his* thesis ! From the words actually used in the text, it does not seem to follow that all effects are *ipso facto false* and *unreal*. There is nothing to justify the twisting of “Vācārambhaṇam” into “vācārambhaṇa-mātram” and “nāmadheyam” into “nāmadheya-mātram” (*merely verbal*) as has been done by Śaṅkara. The presence of the words “eka,” “maṇi” and “piṇḍa” makes it impossible to establish any relation of material cause and effect between the pairs named. How ill-fitting the thesis of Pariṇāma-vāda is, to the context, can be seen from the example of the nail-cutter (*nakhanikrntana*), which can never be the cause of all that is made of lead (एकेन नखनिकृन्तनेन सर्वं काष्णयिसं विज्ञातं). The causal argument breaks down completely in this instance¹ and *partially* in the other two instances where the term “eka” and the terms “piṇḍa” and “maṇi” affixed to “mṛt” and “loha” respectively, render the proposition untenable, as it stands. The Māyāvāda interpretation of एकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानम् is even more inconsistent with the spirit and letter of the text एकेन मूर्तिपण्डेन and its preamble येनाश्रुतं श्रुतं भवति । From the point of view of superimposition (Adhyāsa) of the world of effects on Brahman, it would have been proper to say येन श्रुतमश्रुतं भवति; मतममतं भवति and so on. By knowing Brahman (as the truth) all else that is empirically known, is dissolved (प्रपञ्चस्य प्रविलयः शब्देन प्रतिपाद्यते). The monistic dictum अधिष्ठान-ज्ञानेनाप्यस्तज्ञानं निर्वर्तते would strictly require a reversal and restatement of the thesis in some such way : By knowing the One, the falsity of all is known” Madhva, naturally emphasizes this incompatibility of the Advaitic interpretation with the *wording of the text as we have it* and requirements of logic and pleads that in view of such difficulties, the causal argument whether Pantheistic or superimpositional (Vivarta) has to be abandoned and a purely Theistic line of argument adopted, in terms of the primacy of the Divine knowledge over all other kinds of (lesser) knowledge : ज्ञानानां ज्ञानमुत्तमम् । यज्ज्ञात्वा नेहं भूयोऽन्यत् ज्ञातव्यमवशिष्यते (*Gītā*).

His interpretation is that knowledge of Brahman is the end and aim of all kinds of secular and religious learning. Without such knowledge of the Supreme Being, even the most comprehensive secular knowledge would be futile. The primacy of the knowledge of God over every other kind of knowledge is stressed in तमेवैकं जानय आत्मानमन्या वाचो विमुच्य (*Mund.* ii, 2, 5) नारायणं महाज्ञेयम् (*Puruṣasūkta*). That, when acquired, confers the benefit of all else that is known or worth knowing, by effecting a proper correlation between secular knowledge and divine insight through the subsidiary and dependent character of all worldly knowledge. Śvetaketu, despite his great secular and religious lore, was bereft of such primary knowledge. Hence, his father impressed on him the necessity for its acquisition. It is the crowning point and fulfilment of all other knowledge. The most

1. See under J's *Tdṭ* on this point (Ch. XXI).

comprehensive and up to date knowledge of the world would be a vain and useless burden if not *informed* and permeated by the spiritual knowledge of the Brahman.¹ To know the Brahman as सर्वसत्ताप्रतीतिप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तं is to have derived the true benefit of knowing all that is worth-knowing in the world. The examples of the “mṛt, loha” etc., are simply intended to illustrate how the knowledge of one distinguished specimen is sufficient to confer a *general* knowledge of all others *similar* to it. Madhva takes the declaration वाचारंभणं विकारो... मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यम्² as an *additional example* intended to supplement the thesis of the primacy of knowledge of God over other kinds of knowledge by means of a philological analogy based on the limited currency and sphere of influence of words of Prākṛtic origin (like *miṭṭi. māti*) with the wider and universal currency of their corresponding Samskr̥ta forms like “*mṛttikā*”. The idea is that one who has mastered the classical language or the *lingua franca* of a country, is able to make himself understood in other provinces where a different dialect of it may be spoken. The knowledge of the *greater* includes that of the lesser. By means of a similarity of form, the knowledge of the primary, may make the secondary as good as known : प्रधानज्ञानादप्रधानं ज्ञातप्रायं भवति । God and the world, both being reals, the knowledge of God (the creator as Pradhāna) is sufficient to give a knowledge of the world *as created* and sustained by Him, as depending on Him : सत्यस्य सत्यम्. The knowledge of the father enables one to know the offspring by sight in virtue of similarity of features. Madhva thus tries in various ways to bring out the thesis of the preeminence of Divine knowledge over secular learning and empirical knowledge, as the teaching that this passage is trying to convey.

(v) Now for the “Tat tvam asi” text. It does not necessarily lead to a monism when we are told that man returns to his original abode in God after his vicissitudes on earth. In this he resembles a bird tethered to a post by means of a string, wandering here and there and returning finally to its roost. The trend of this illustration (*Chān.* vi. 8, 2) is that the finite selves after a career of earthly existence, return to their original home in the bosom of the Infinite. There they rest like rivers in the Ocean. There is no “Advaita” in this. The career of transmigration is exclusively for the Jīvas. The Infinite remains unperturbed by the comings and goings of the finite beings or their doings. Rivers may come and rivers may go; the Sea remains the same and as full as ever maintaining its *status quo ante* : स समुद्र एव भवति as Uddālaka tellingly puts it. To all ordinary appearances, the rivers may get mixed up with the Ocean and be *lost*. But they are there, all the same. There is, of course, no realization on the part of the rivers of their differences from the Ocean; but *neither is there any realization on their part, of any identity with it* assuming such identity to exist in reality ! The point, moreover, is that Uddālaka is trying

1. Cf. यस्तं न वेद किमुचा करिष्यति (*R. V.*)

‘स्थाणुरयं भारहृदः किलाभूदधीत्य वेदं न विजानाति योऽर्थम्’ ।

2. सत्यम् = नित्यम् See *Bhāmati* on ‘नित्यानित्यवस्तुविवेकः’ (*B. S.* 1.1.1).

to make his son know and behave *better* than the rivers. If the rivers or the various flower-juices are unable to know that they are *in the Ocean* or in the honey (Cf. सति संपद्य न विदुः सति संपद्यामह इति) there is certainly an obligation on the part of Śvetaketu to know that *he* is here and now in the hands of the Supreme. That loss of individual consciousness is not a desirable goal is proved by the example of the dying man (vi, 15). It is a telling repudiation of identity and the undeserved self-glorification of the finite self in life. That at the time of death the vital forces are surrendered to a more powerful and inexorable agency *must* be conceded. If anything, man realizes his littleness on such a solemn occasion. It cannot be that this instance is given simply to answer a question as to the steps by which a knower of Brahman reaches the goal. In that case, the reply should have simply stopped with indicating these steps : अस्य वाङ्मनसि * * * देवतायाम् and the rest of the 15th *khaṇḍa*, including the reference to the sick-bed, would be out of place. It is clear, therefore, that it is meant to stress the point in the *dārṣṭāntika* that the individual is utterly dependent on a higher power. The example of the blind-folded person brings out the thesis of difference all the more vividly. The kindly traveller who removes the bandage and guides the struggling wayfarer is the Guru in metaphysical parlance. The individual who is enabled to see God by the Guru's *upadeśa*, is thus different from him even as the traveller is from the goal he has to reach. The example of the thief and the impostor is most significant. It brings out the thesis of difference between God and soul very tellingly. A person accused of some offence of robbery is brought before the judges. He is committed to a trial by ordeal and is asked to grasp a piece of red-hot iron. If innocent, he would come out unscathed; if guilty, perish. Shorn of the figure, the example could only be meant to warn the individual against claiming what is *not his* by right viz., the sovereignty of God, by claiming identity with Him. Such would obviously be the suggestion behind the *dārṣṭāntika* pairs conveyed by the significant use of the phrase : 'अपहर्षीत्', 'स्तेयमकर्षीत्', used in the Upaniṣad. As pointed out by Jayatīrtha, the analogy would be utterly inappropriate to a monistic construction. For, from an Advaitic point of view, the Jīva, who has, for some mysterious reason, *forgotten* or forsaken his Brahmanhood, which is his *by right*, cannot, with adequate regard for language or justice to logic, be branded a 'thief' and an 'impostor' (vi, 16, 1) : 'he has taken away another's', 'he has committed theft.' Such a worthy can, at the worst, be deemed a saint or a fool (in giving up what is his own); but not certainly a thief ! It cannot, therefore, be said that Madhva has missed the spirit behind Uddālaka's *upadeśa*, in interpreting the text : स आत्मा तत्त्वमसि as emphasizing the difference between the individual and the Supreme and the utter dependence of the former on the latter, so forcibly expressed in the phrases : सन्मूलाः सोम्य इमाः सर्वाः प्रजाः । सदायतनाः । सत्प्रतिष्ठाः । and accordingly, proposing to adopt the reading : स आत्मा अतत् त्वमसि in conformity with the spirit and drift of the illustrations employed by Uddālaka, which are indisputably in favor of the thesis of difference and quite out of

tune with the doctrine of identity. No doubt, Madhva could have conveyed the same idea of difference and dependence by adhering to the familiar reading "Tattvam asi". It is open to the theist to declare that God is indeed verily all that is or matters; as everything else depends on Him for its very existence, activity etc. :

विश्वमेवेदं पुरुषःतद्विश्वमुपजीवति ।

We come across this idea in his comment on *Chān. Up.* ii. 22 : अद्वैतं नाम यदुच्यते, तत् स्वतन्त्रभगवदपेक्षया । and in his remark : नहि तदधीनं पृथगित्येवोच्यते (*Brh. Up. com.*). From this point of view then, "Tattvam asi" would be no more than an epitomization of "Atat tvam asi". But he chose to put it as "Atat tvam asi", to clear possible misapprehensions about the ultimate point at issue, which the other reading might produce in the unwary. That he himself did not make much of splitting the text this way or that, but looked to the spirit of the passage to decide the *purport* of the *upadeśa* is clear from his adopting both kinds of "padacchedas", in his works, and explaining the reading "Tat tvam asi" in line with :

‘इदं हि विश्वं भगवानिवेतरो यतो जगत्स्थाननिरोधसंभवः ।’ (*Bhāg.* 1, 5, 20). His interpretation of "Aitadātmyam idam sarvam" as "Tattantratvād aitadātmyam", is a clear indication of his willingness to subscribe to the unity of existence of the entire cosmos under the One Source of all existence and activity :

यदधीना यस्य सत्ता तत्तदित्येव भण्यते ।

विद्यमाने विभेदेऽपि मिथो नित्यं स्वरूपतः ।

In his *Gitātālparya*, he adopts "Tattvam asi" as the reading and takes "tat" as a correlate of the earlier phrase — ऐतदात्म्यमिदं सर्वं which is interpreted as "having the Supreme as one's sustainer"¹ एष (ईश्वरः) आत्मा (स्वामी, अन्तर्यामी) यस्य तत् । तस्येदं ऐतदात्म्यम्.

In his *V. T. N.* he makes a special point that none of the illustrations used by Uddālaka has any support to give to the thesis of identity : स्थान-नवकेऽपि भेद एव दृष्टान्ताभिधानात् । This point has been conceded by some of the Advaitic commentators themselves, like Vācaspati² and Madhusūdana Sarasvati,³ which goes to strengthen Madhva's stand. He has also drawn attention to the burden of song of Uddālaka : सन्मूलाः सोम्य इमाः सर्वाः प्रजाः सदायतनाः सत्प्रतिष्ठाः । which refers to Brahman as the source, shelter and support of all creatures, a description which obviously suggests the dependence of all finite existence on an Unseen Power. The idea of all creatures finding solace and ultimate rest in the Supreme finds picturesque mention in *Brh Up.* iv, 3, 19, which mentions the wanderings of a hawk and its finding rest, at last, in its nest. This analogy recurs in the present context of the *Chāndogya*. These instances are clearly incompatible with the thesis of

1. The "taddhita" suffix (ṣyañ) has been explained by Jayatirtha on the basis of the ruling : विचित्रा हि तद्विगतगतिः । (*VTN.* t. p. 65).

2. नदीपाथः परमाणूनां तु, समुद्रपाथः परमाणुभ्यो भेद एव । नाभेदः । एवं, समुद्रादपि तेषां भेद एव । (*Bhāmati*, on *B. S.* ii, 4, 29).

3. स्पष्टभेदाभावाभिप्रायेण * * * (*Advaitasiddhi*).

identity. So great is the difficulty presented by them to the Advaitic interpretation, that even the clever Advaitic dialectician Madhusūdana could not think of any better explanation of them than that analogies do not run on all fours; or that they are indifferent to actual difference and identity and are merely intended to refer to the *absence* of *clear* difference.¹ These are indeed very weak defences. We have already seen that failure to grasp the existing differences between the rivers and the Sea or the honey and the juices, salt and water etc., is *no proof* of the *unreality* of such differences. Taking all these facts into consideration, Madhva has thought it fit to discard the fashionable interpretation of “Tattvam asi”, based on a superficial adherence to the literal sense of the text ‘तत्त्वमसि’ without going deeply into the wording and spirit of the illustrations or the context of the Upadeśa revealed by the keyword : स्तब्ध एयाय ।

It is worthy of note that *Madhva was the first Indian philosopher and critic of Śaṅkara’s interpretation of “Tattvam asi” to draw attention to the inappropriateness of the illustrations used to the thesis of identity.* Quite apart from the new reading “Atat tvam asi” suggested by him, he has made out a strong case for giving a reorientation to the interpretation of the text in terms of the dependence of all finite reality on the One Supreme; in other words, an identity based on Śāstra-dṛṣṭi or the mystic perception of metaphysical dependence of all finite reality on Brahman :

तत्तन्त्रत्वादितदात्म्यम् ।

‘यदधीना यस्य सत्ता तत्तदित्येव भण्यते’ ।

For an exhaustive discussion of M’s exposition of ‘Tattvam asi’ see my *Lectures on Vedānta* (Karnatak Uni. 1973).

In ‘एकमेवाद्वितीयम्’ we have another favorite text of Monism. Here again, it is the appearance that is misleading. The passage (vi, 2, 1) has reference to the precreation stage (*agre*). If, at *that* stage, the Śruti should say that Brahman alone existed *unaided* (अद्वितीयम्) by anything else, the Dvaitin has no reason to be upset by it. Nor would it be difficult to reconcile such a position with the subordinate existence of the Prakṛti etc. The existence of Prakṛti (or Tamas) in Pralaya, is already accepted in the *Nāsadiya Sūkta* : तम आसीत् । Madhva, therefore, interprets “अद्वितीयम्” as without a peer or a superior” (समाधिकरहितम्). The denial of a “second” would more naturally refer to an equal or a rival, rather than to inferior realities.² We have texts to confirm this line of interpretation :

एकः शास्ता न द्वितीयोऽस्ति शास्ता (Mbh. xiv, 27, 1).

न त्वत्समोऽस्त्यभ्यधिकः कुतोऽन्यः । (Gitā, xi, 43).

न तत्समश्चाभ्यधिकश्च दृश्यते । (Śvet. Up. vi, 8).

For a detailed exposition of M’s interpretation of ‘Ekam eva advitīyam’ refer to my article on the subject in *Dharmaprakash Journal*, Madras, 1978.

1. सर्वसाम्यस्य दृष्टान्ततायामतन्त्रत्वात्, स्फुटतरविक्षेपामावेन स्वरूपप्राप्त्युक्तिः । स्पष्टभेदाभावाभिप्रायेण, वास्तवभेदाभेदयोरौदासीन्यात् (op. cit.).

2. Vide the maxim “अस्य गोद्वितीयोऽन्वेष्टव्यः ।” from the *Mahābhāṣya*, cited by Śaṅkara, in his *B. S. B.* i, 2, 11.

(vi) The last chapter of the *Chāndogya* brings further support to Dualism and the view of Mokṣa as a state of active enjoyment of bliss for the released souls. These two sections (viii, 2 and viii, 12) have always been irksome to monistic commentators. Śaṅkara, in his commentary on *B. S.* iv, 4, 6, has tried his best to explain them away as some sort of “arthavādas” or praises of the released and so on.

(29) ṚG (VEDA) BHĀṢYA

(i) It may seem curious that a professed Vedāntin like Madhva should have taken the trouble to write a commentary on the hymns of the *Ṛg Veda*. This is because men have come to believe after a fashion that a Vedāntin has nothing to do with the Vedas ! This is a tragic fallacy. Madhva has no sympathy with such an attitude of lofty indifference or antipathy to the Vedas. To him, there is as much philosophy in the Vedas, as in the Upaniṣads, if only we could see it from the proper point of view. Small wonder, then, that he should have striven to raise their earliest representative, the *Ṛg Veda*, to great philosophical dignity by the side of the other source-books of Indian philosophy, not only by quoting from it, off and on, in his interpretation of the Prasthānatrayī, but also, by writing a separate commentary on a portion of the text, bringing out its hidden philosophical content. By this he raised the *Ṛg Veda* to the rank of a fourth Prasthāna, the *Ṛk Prasthāna*, which is, in a sense, the source and head of all the others. For this remarkable service, his name should be remembered with gratitude by all true lovers of the *Ṛg Veda*.¹

1. In recent times, Madhva's stand on the *Ṛg Veda*, has been vindicated by the distinguished scholar-mystic Aurobindo Ghosh, by his exposition of the mystic thought of the Vedic hymns clothed in symbolic terminology. Prof. Maryla Falk, writing in the *Journal of Psychology* (xviii, pts. 3-4, 1943), has denounced the “time-honored Western methods in wholesale mythological interpretation of any and every text with the astonishingly poor apparatus of a few ever-recurrent naturalistic and ritualistic standards” and shown that “in a large group of hymns, a specific technical terminology and phraseology relating to a set of psycho-physiological and functional hypostases which constitutes the basic data of the earliest Yoga theory”, is elaborated. An orthodox Viśiṣṭādvaita scholar D. T. Tatacharya, in his K. Krishnasvami Rao Endowment Lectures, at the Madras University, (1948) on the subject of “*Ṛg Veda* and Pūrvottara Mīmāṃsā interpretations” has shown great anxiety to give a better philosophical status to the *Ṛg Veda* than has been accorded by the Pūrvā-Mīmāṃsakas and by the Vedāntic schools of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja. He would have been able to establish his thesis conclusively, had he discarded the narrow view of the Vedas taken by Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja and boldly followed the lead of Madhva in this respect. His halting and hesitant remarks show, all the same, that he realizes the importance of the question though he is not bold enough to cut the Gordian knot and follow the lead of Madhva. However that may be, we have, in his concluding remarks, a complete vindication of the principle of (Vedāntic) interpretation applied by Madhva to the hymns of the *Ṛg Veda*—“The *Ṛg Veda* has the idea of Brahman underlying it. *If we apply and I don't know why we should not apply*, to the *Ṛks* and hymns of this *Veda*, the principles of interpretation enunciated and employed by Bādarāyaṇa in determining the passages of the Upaniṣads, as meaning Brahman, we cannot escape the conclusion that this *Veda* is as much concerned with the Brahman as the Upaniṣads” (Italics mine). The full text of Tatacharya's Lecture has been published, it is learnt, in the *Journal of the Venkateśvara Oriental Institute, Tirupati*.

Madhva views the whole of the Ṛg Veda and for that matter, the Vedas as a whole as an essentially theosophic document. He takes the words of the *Gitā* (xv, 15) the *Kaṭha* (i, 2, 15) and the *Bhāgavata* (i, 2, 29; ii, 5, 15; ix, 21, 42-43 and 35) literally and views the entire sacred literature through a pair of Vedāntic spectacles.

(ii) Already, in his commentaries on the Prasthānatrayī, he had maintained the doctrine of threefold interpretation of the Vedas. The Supreme Being is the highest subject-matter of the Vedas. All Scripture, primarily and in the first place, sings the glory of the Supreme (*B. S.* i, 1, 10). The popular view that the Vedas only sing the praises of a plurality of gods (*Devas*) and are mostly made up of hymns to be addressed to them on the occasion of numerous sacrifices is opposed by him. While admitting the popular view that the Vedas *do* serve this purpose,¹ he contends that they have a higher aim also, viz., to convey the knowledge of the One Supreme Being. This latter is, in his view, the highest and most fundamental object of the Vedas, — of all parts of them without exception or distinction. The distinction of Karma and Jñāna Kāṇḍas, is thus, to a large extent, superficial and misleading. Even the Karma-Kāṇḍa is capable of being interpreted in terms of the highest wisdom of Brahman, by the initiate. The popular distinction is one of convenience and adopted for practical and schematic reasons (*Vide* his com. on *B. S.* i, 4, 22). Since all persons are not equally endowed with the highest spiritual light and capacity to rise to the highest sense of Scripture, the distinction of Karma and Jñāna Kāṇḍas has a place in the scheme of things and is adopted as an ordinary working hypothesis. But, it is, in truth, only a means to an end. True wisdom can be attained only when one rises to the level of direct attunement of the entire sacred literature including the Mantra and Brāhmaṇa portions (*B. S.* iii, 1, 1), of course, within the limits of one's capacity, with the Supreme Being after purifying oneself by going through the disciplinary schemes laid down in the Karmakāṇḍa and discharging one's obligations, social and religious, which it entails on him, in a spirit of prayer, devotion and dedication to the Supreme. Such, in a nutshell, is the theosophic teaching of the Vedas, according to Madhva.

(iii) The details of his threefold interpretation of the Veda are worked out by him in the opening section of the work (*granthas* 780). He illustrates his thesis with reference to the first three Adhyāyas of the I Aṣṭaka (*Maṇḍala* i, *Sūktas* 1-40). Ṛks as lauding particular forms of the Supreme like Agni, Mitra are easily susceptible to higher attunement with the One than other parts of the Vedic literature like the Brāhmaṇas. This is one reason why they are selected to demonstrate the thesis, to begin with. The purpose being illustrative, some forty Sūktas of the

1. तद्धि अग्न्यादेरपि वेदादावस्ति—

‘त्वमग्ने इन्द्रो वृषभः सतामसि’ ।

‘विश्वस्मादिन्द्र उत्तरः’ । इत्यादिषु । (*B. S.* i, 1, 10)

I Maṇḍala are chosen for comment. In his commentary on the *Ait. Up.* and in his *K. N.*, he has, similarly, dealt with some representative texts from the Brāhmaṇa and Āraṇyaka portions. His commentaries on the *Sūtras*, the *Gītā* and the Epic apply the same principle to these texts.

(iv) At the outset, Madhva offers some interesting remarks on the evolution of the present text of the R̥g Veda, the scheme of its Ṛ̥sis, its deities and the metres of hymns, a knowledge of all of which is insisted upon in traditional circles.¹ Three redactions of the Saṁhitā text are pre-supposed by Madhva : the first stage of Mūlaveda² when the hymns, were yet in a floating stage. The second is that of Upavedas or Proto-Vedas when the floating materials came to be arranged into three groups : the Proto-R̥k, Proto-Yajus and Proto-Sāman and from these, the text of the four Saṁhitās representing the present texts was constituted by Vyāsa :

ऋचः स ऋच उद्धृत्य ऋग्वेदं कृतवान् प्रभुः ।

यजूंषि निगदाच्चैव तथा सामानि सामतः ॥

(quoted from a Purāṇa, by Madhva)

Modern scholars would be agreeably surprised to hear that besides recognizing these three stages of Vedic redaction, Madhva also considers that certain passages have actually been displaced from their original contexts, while passing through various redactions; while a few have been lost. Examples of both kinds have been cited by him, in his commentary.³

(v) Madhva has an elaborate scheme of Ṛ̥sis, devatās etc., for the hymns, peculiar to himself. Viṣṇu is the chief and the highest of all the Ṛ̥sis यस्य वाक्यं स ऋषिः and it is He that reveals the Vedas to Brahmā at the beginning of creation (*Śvet. Up.* vi, 18). Excluding him, there are four other grades of ṛ̥sis : primary, secondary, tertiary and the fourth. Brahmā is the primary Seer of the entire Veda. Then come in order, Garuḍa and Śeṣa who are the Seers of the Vedas and the Pañcarātras. Among the tertiary, Indra is the Seer of R̥ks, Sūrya of Yajus, Soma of Sāmans and Agni of Atharvan. The fourth are the individual Seers of the various ṛ̥ks and sūktas, whose names are given in the *Anukramanikā* and other works. Some kind of unseen merit attaches to a knowledge of the first three kinds of seers and tangible results (*dr̥ṣṭaphala*) to the last. The 'wives' of the gods take rank as Seers in the order of their husbands. They preside over the metres as follows :

1. यो ह वा अविदितार्षेयः छन्दोऽधीते * * (Kātyāyana, *Anukramanī*, i. 1).

2. This corresponds to the stage वाग्धि अव्याकृतासीत् । तामिन्द्रो मध्येऽवक्रम्य व्याकरोत् (*T. S.* vi, 4, 7, 3).

3. Śunaśśeṣa is credited with the composition of 100 ṛ̥ks in the I Maṇḍala. But we have only 97 ṛ̥ks of his there and the rest are found distributed between iv (two ṛ̥ks : त्वं नो अग्ने वह्णस्य (iv, 1, 4) and v. 2, 7 (शुनश्चिच्छेपं * *). Madhva contends that these were originally in I Maṇḍala. In मा नस्तेनेभ्यो (ii, 23, 16) there is a gap ऊनता दश्यतेऽर्थतः । which is supplied by Madhva, in his *B. S. B.* iii, 4, 49.

| | |
|-------------------------|----------------------------|
| 1. Gāyatrī | Wives of Garuḍa and Brahmā |
| 2. Triṣṭubh | Svāhā |
| 3. Anuṣṭubh and Br̥hati | Tārā |
| 4. Gāyatrī and Jagatī | Vāruṇī and Rohiṇī |
| 5. Pañkti | Śacī |
| 6. Uṣṇik | Saurī |
| 7. Jagatī | Sarvadevastriyaḥ |
| 8. Aticchandās | —do— |
| 9. Virāt | Wives of Mitra and Varuṇa. |

So too, in the case of Devatās of hymns. Next to the Supreme Being. Śrī is the devatā (subject) of all those hymns save those specially applying to Viṣṇu. And so on, down to Indra and the wives of the gods. There are numerous other details of like description set forth by Madhva on the authority of works like the *Ṛk-Samhitā*, *Svādhyāya*, *Vyāsanirukta*, which are obsolete.

(vi) Madhva teaches that salvation can be obtained only by realizing the supremacy of Brahman (Viṣṇu) and his lordship over the gods and by attuning the entire Scripture to Him. These ideas, he says, are clearly indicated in the *R. V.*, and he quotes relevant texts. According to him, the *R. V.*, upholds Viṣṇu (among the adhidaiva-tattvas) as the Supreme Being that is free from all taint and imperfection. The other devatās like Brahmā, Indra etc., are subject to various imperfections like *duḥkha-prāpti* :

जाता परि ता बभूव; अबिभेत् ब्रह्मा; नासीत्¹ इत्यादिकानपि ।

Similar defects are found in Rudra also :

दोषान् रुद्रे च तानेव मिनन्तीति² पूर्वकान्

यं कामये ((x, 125, 5) अस्य देवस्य (vii, 40, 5)

मा शिश्नदेवा अपि गुह्यतं (vii, 21, 5) इत्यपि

घ्नन् शिश्नदेवान् (x, 99, 3) इत्याद्या दोषा बहव ईरिताः ॥

In the same way, the Goddess Lakṣmī is also represented as inferior in many respects :

ततो वितिष्ठे (x, 125, 7) योनिःस (x, 125, 7) एतावती अहं (x, 125, 8) इत्यपि अन्याश्रयत्वं देव्याश्च कथितं बहुशोऽपिहि ॥ (*Ṛg. Bhāṣya*)

The other gods like Brahmā, Rudra, Indra, Maruts, are, in the same *Sūkta*, represented as being under the control of Lakṣmī :

अहं रुद्रेभिर्वसुभिश्चराम्यहमादित्यैरुत विश्वदेवैः । (x, 125).

Passages are cited from the *Suparna* and *Bahvṛca Śrutis* establishing a hierarchy of the gods. The *Tura Śruti* makes Vāyu superior to Indra, Soma, Agni, Sūrya and Indra. The *R. V.* vouches for the supremacy of Viṣṇu over Indra : वि हि सोतोऽसृक्षत (x, 86, 1) न यस्येन्द्रो (ii, 38, 9) and of Indra over Sūrya यः सूर्यं य उषसं जजान (ii, 12, 7) म्रियन्ते पञ्च देवाः () विष्णोर्वातोऽजनिष्ठ () .

(vii) There is thus sufficient evidence in the Vedas, says Madhva,

1. वासुदेवो वा इदमग्र आसीन्न ब्रह्मा न च शंकरः :

2. *R. V.* ii, 38, 9.

for the hierarchy of gods and for the suzerainty of Viṣṇu over all the gods of the Vedic Pantheon. The entire Scripture refers to Him in the first place and not to the individual gods, who do not, moreover, exist during Pralaya. At least to safeguard the eternal validity of the Śruti (which cannot be done unless a Vācyārtha is recognized for them, all the while) during the time of Avāntara-Pralaya, the higher attunement of Scripture in the Brahman must be recognized. Otherwise, the Vedas would be bereft of *vācyārtha* during Pralaya and thus lose their title to eternal validity.

(viii) It is for this reason also that Madhva reiterates the scheme of triple interpretation of Scripture from the historical, the mystic, and the transcendental points of view. The first one is more or less in agreement with that of Sāyaṇa and other Vedic commentators. Such differences as exist are of no vital importance. The mystic interpretation is that by which a hymn or text in praise of a particular deity is made to refer to the particular form of Brahman (Viṣṇu) presiding over the act for which the deity is noted and over the deity also, under the same name (Cf. the case of Nāciketas fire in the *Kaṭha* and Viṣṇu also denoted by the same name).¹ In this case, the names and epithets find their fullest etymological sense only as applied to the Antaryāmin : इन्द्रे हीन्द्रशब्दोऽपि न मुख्यतो वर्तते । परमेश्वर्याभावात् । इन्द्रशब्दोऽपि विष्णावेव वर्तते । स हि परमेश्वरः ॥ (*Ait. Up. Bhāṣya*, ii, 2, p. 13). The historical sense is the “rūḍhārtha”, while the mystic is one of “yoga” or “mahāyoga”, as it is termed by Madhva. It is grounded on the doctrine of “Sarvaśabdāśamanvaya” in Brahman which, we have already noted, in connection with his interpretation of the Sūtras. Even those who would not go to the same length as Madhva in the application of this doctrine must concede that the author of the Sūtras is really insisting on the “yauḡikārtha” of “Ākāśa” in seeking to equate “Ākāśa” referred to in *Chān. Up.* i, 9, 1, with Brahman (*B. S.* ii, 1, 22). A little thought would show that only a doctrine of Samanvaya such as that envisaged by Madhva, based on a dual connotation of words, could give the Samanvayādhyāya of the Sūtras its true explanation and *raison d'être*.

The third or “Adhyātma” line of Vedic interpretation sponsored by Madhva pertains to the metaphysical or philosophical relation between the Jīva and Brahman and centres round it. To illustrate the three lines of interpretation with reference to the opening ṛk.—अग्निमीळे पुरोहितम्. ...

“In the outward sacrifice, Fire is the first to be worshipped. The Supreme Being immanent in fire, is next lauded under the same name of Agni (in its yaugika or mahāyoga sense). Lastly, in the realm of the inward sacrifice of knowledge (ātmajñāna) the Supreme is praised as the author (hotṛ) of the right kind of rapprochement between the senses and one’s external environments, or as the Immanent guide that controls (*agragatvāt agratvāt*) the consuming fire of external reality by the flame of the intellect” :

1. Cf. भूतं, भूताभिमानी च, तद्देहोऽन्तर्नियामकः ।

हरिश्चाकाशशब्दोक्तो; मुख्यतो हरिरेव च ॥ (*AV.*)

इन्द्रियाग्निषु चार्थानां यद्वोताग्निनामकः ।

These and other details of interpretation are worked out on the basis of grammatical and philological sanctions which are elucidated by Jayatīrtha, in his learned commentary on the *Ṛg Bhāṣya*.

(ix) Madhva's Bhāṣya is taken up mostly with the details of the mystic line of interpretation and rarely with the other two. The ordinary (historical) explanation is often passed over as being quite obvious. The Adhyātma-interpretation is here and there elaborated with great skill e.g. the Indra-Vṛttra episode. Scholars are familiar with the 'scientific' explanation of this episode given by Yāska and the modern savants, according to which, the slaying of Vṛttra, by Indra, is but a figurative description of the production of rain. Yāska calls his explanation that of the Etymologists : तत्को वृद्धः ? मेघ इति नैरुक्ताः । He refers also to the views of Traditionalists : त्वाष्ट्रोऽसुर इत्यैतिहासिकाः । Madhva has given us a 'philosophical' explanation, no less suggestive. According to him, Vṛttra represents the concentrated essence of Ajñāna or false teaching of Māyā, figuratively described as a "cloud", a "serpent" (*ahi*) or a "mountain" (*adri*). Indra is the enlightened soul or the Supreme Lord who slays this demon of Ignorance with his weapon of *vajra* or enlightenment (*samyajjñāna*). Ignorance falls vanquished, sundered of its hands and feet (i, 32, 7a) that is to say, put out of court, by reason and revelation. In his Bhāṣya on the *A. Ā.*, Madhva has similarly given a philosophical explanation of the Rātrī Sūkta (*R. V. x*, 127).

We are in an age when Vedic scholarship is taking wonderful strides. Scholars are not wanting who have boldly broken the bonds of language and tradition and discovered in the hymns hidden mysteries of the physical, psychological, biological and psychophysiological cross-sections of reality. Maryla Falk's thought-provoking paper on 'The Oldest Psychology — Terminus *a quo* and Aspects', published in the *Indian Journal of Psychology*, xviii, 3-4, (1943), has brought to light the presence in the hymns of the Ṛg and Atharva Vedas, a well-developed theory and practice of Yoga and of a terminology and phraseology relating to a set of psychophysiological functional hypostases which constitute the basic data of the earliest Yoga theory.¹ Madhva's approach is designed for the satisfaction of the spiritual and mystic thought-needs of humanity. It is broad-based enough to accommodate the purely 'historical' explanations of Sāyaṇa and the modern scholars; but goes far beyond them in certain directions. The older Vedic commentators have themselves, here and there, recognized the presence of "Adhyātma line" of interpretation of the text; though they had not systematically worked them out, in the manner attempted by Madhva. The Monotheistic tradition of Vedic interpretation followed

1. These data are gathered from various texts of the i and x Maṇḍala such as i, 169; 189; 164; x, 177; 189. My thanks are due to my colleague, Dr T. R. Kulkarni, of the Psychology Dept. of the Ruparel College, Bombay, (now Reader in Psychology, Bombay University) for drawing my attention to the above paper.

by Dayānanda Sarasvatī, the founder of the Ārya Samāj, is directly inspired by the lead given, long ago, by Madhva. It is gratifying to note the handsome tributes which have recently been paid to Madhva and his commentators, for their pioneering work in bringing to light the mystic and symbolic meanings of Vedic hymns, in the new edition of the *Ṛg Veda Samhitā* (with a new commentary) published by the Aurobindo Ashram, Pondichery.

The threefold interpretation of Vedic texts elaborated by Madhva has its parallel in the Western tradition, of Scriptural interpretation. Prof. Basil Willey in his "Seventeenth Century Background" points out that the allegorical method of Scriptural interpretation was developed by Philo Judaeus (20 B.C.—45 A.D.). The Jewish Rabbis had of course already evolved a vast apparatus of Scriptural interpretation. The crossing of the Hebrew tradition with Platonic and neo-Platonic speculation produced the allegorical interpretation. It was Origen, however, who formulated the threefold sense of Scripture,—the literal, moral and mystical. The division corresponds to Plato's tripartite division of man into body, soul and spirit. The theory of multiple senses was in itself a remarkable first step towards the science of meaning we are still desiderating at the present day" (*op. cit.* p. 65). Madhva's works are full of valuable materials for the study of the Science of Meaning with reference to the Sanskrit language and its grammatical structure.

Madhva does not expressly quote or criticize the interpretations of earlier Vedic commentators. But there is no doubt that he differed from many of them, in the general interpretation of the hymns too. Traces of such implied criticisms are to be met with in the commentary of Jayatīrtha¹ on the *Ṛg Bhāṣya*.

1. See my paper on "Yatra dvāviva jaghanā (*R. V. i, 28, 2*) in the *Poona Orientalist*, 1950. Cf. also इन्द्रवायू (ii, 8, 3) एकःसहस्राक्ष अपरस्मिन् लक्षणा इति व्याख्यानं, मुख्ये सत्ययुक्तं इत्येवशब्देनाह । (Jayatīrtha, *Ṛgbhāṣyaṭīkā*).

POEMS, STOTRAS AND MISCELLANEOUS WORKS OF MADHVA

BESIDES the commentaries on the *Sūtras*, the *Upaniṣads*, the *Gītā*, etc., in which he dealt with the problems of his metaphysics, Madhva composed a few Stotras and other works of a miscellaneous character, dealing with religious worship, rituals etc. These minor works reflect his deep religious spirit and devotional fervor. Their composition must have taken place late in his life, when he had sufficient leisure after the completion of the arduous task of producing his major works and organizing his philosophical system and strengthening its hold on the people.

(30) YAMAKA-BHĀRATA

This is a short Yamakakāvya in 81 verses, in various metres, dealing with the exploits of Kṛṣṇa and his help to the Pāṇḍavas. It may be pronounced to be a successful work from the point of view of skill in handling a variety of metres and the use of *yamakas* (rhymes), *prāsa*, *anuprāsa* (alliteration) etc. There are verses with four-quarter rhymes and *ekākṣaras* (76, 78). The work appears to have been composed in a gush of ecstatic devotion (Ver. 80).

(31) NARASIMHA-NAKHA-STUTI

This is a short eulogy of the nails of God Nṛsimha, in two Sragdharā verses. They are found prefixed to the *Vāyustuti* of Trivikrama Paṇḍitācārya, one of Madhva's favorite disciples. According to tradition, Madhva composed these two verses and had them prefixed to his disciple's *Vāyustuti*, extolling Madhva in his three 'incarnations,' as he did not approve of the disciple's praising him, exclusively. They are now recited as part of the *Vāyustuti*, at the beginning and at the end.

(32) DVĀDAŚA STOTRA

This Stotra, in twelve short *adhyāyas*, is believed to have been composed by Madhva, at the time of his acquisition of the image of Śrī Kṛṣṇa, which he installed in his Mutt at Uḍipi. There is also another tradition about the origin of this Stotra. There are 126 verses here, in a variety of metres, handled with distinct musical effect and impressiveness. The order and arrangement of verses and chapters as generally current, differs in some respects from the text preserved in the oldest transcript of the "Sarvamūla" reputed to have been left by Madhva's favorite disciple Hṛṣīkeśa Tīrtha, now preserved in the Palimār Mutt, at Uḍipi.

The author has woven many beautiful and profound truths of religion and metaphysics into this short inspiring poem. It may, in a sense,

be said to have given the first impetus to the birth of the great devotional literature of the Haridāsas. It ranks as one of the foremost Stotras in Dvaita Literature, in Sanskrit. Echoes of Jayadeva's *Gita-govinda* could be detected here and there. It is capable of being set to music.

(33) KṚṢṆĀMṚTAMAHĀRṆAVA¹

This is an anthology of 242 verses (including five of a benedictory nature) in praise of Viṣṇu, from various sources. It is mostly in Anuṣṭubh; but other metres also are found. The verses include those attributed to Śiva, Nārada, Pulastya, Dharma, Brahmā, Mārkaṇḍeya, Marīci, Atri, Āṅgiras, Pulaha, Ātreya, Kauśika, Agastya, Sūta, Vyāsa and Rukmāṅgada. A noteworthy fact is that two verses (52 and 66) occur also in the *Mukundamālā*² of Kulaśekhara.

The work emphasizes the efficacy of fasts on Ekādaśī days, gives rules for the correct determination of Ekādaśī and Dvādaśī *tithis*, the worship of Sālagrāva (stones), the wearing of Ūrdhva-puṇḍras etc. (224-30). The author enjoins a complete fast on Ekādaśī (172-94), whose rigorous observance is, even today, kept up among his followers,—even Śrāddhas falling on that day being postponed to the next day, on that account. Verse 10 refers to the worship of Viṣṇu with *bilva* leaves, which is rather uncommon among Vaiṣṇavas.

The author concludes his work with an exhortation to his followers to cultivate love and devotion to God at all times. From the fourteenth year of his or her life, a man or a woman does good or bad deeds which, at the very lowest calculation, entail not less than ten future births! There is thus not the slightest hope of our attaining freedom from trans-migratory career by annihilating Karma and exhausting its effects. Bhakti, then, is the only way to release from the ills of Karma :

जीवश्चतुर्दशादूर्ध्वं पुरुषो नियमेन तु ।

स्त्री वाप्यनूनदशकं देहं मानुषमर्जयेत् ।

दशावराणां देहानां कारणानि करोत्ययम् ।

* * * * *

अतः कर्मक्षयान्मुक्तिः कुत एव भविष्यति ? (Ver. 14-18).

WORKS ON WORSHIP

(34) TANTRA-SĀRA SAṅGRAHA

The rules governing Vaiṣṇava modes of worship and initiation (*dikṣā*) fall under the Tantras. There is a substantial element of Tantric mysticism in Mādhva worship and rituals including nyāsas, mudrās etc. These

1. There is evidence in the *M. Vij.* (xvi, 38-40) that this work was composed at a place called Iḍe-tude (Skt. Saridantara) or of doab between the Kumāradhārā and Netrāvati rivers in S. Kanara, when Madhva was camping there. "Saridantara" is not certainly the name of a "chieftain" as made out by Dr Saletore *History of Tuluva*, i, p. 425).

2. Cf. *Mukundamālā* verses 25 and 14 (ed. Annamalai University Sanskrit Series, no. 1, 1933).

are dealt with in this work. It claims to be an abridgement of a bigger work of that name by Vyāsa (Ver. 77). Madhva's work is metrical in form and is divided into four chapters and contains 442 verses, mostly in Anuṣṭubh.

The first chapter gives in detail, the countless forms of the Lord presiding over the letters of the alphabet, their special characteristics and *mantras* together with the *minutiae* of their meditation, chanting and *nyāsas*.

The second deals with the auxiliaries of Homa and *Kalasaṭpūjā*. The third has many valuable points to record on matters of iconography, temple-architecture, consecration of idols etc. The choice of proper materials for the casting of images,¹ their poses (iii, 2) and standard measurements (iii, 44-46); the choice of the proper site for the erection of temples (52-54); the area required for the purpose (55-56); the nature of the building-materials (xx.57); the construction of domes, spires and gopurās for temples, the number of Prākāras (enclosures); the nature of Sabhās (courtyards), *maṇḍapas*, the religious ceremonies connected with the "Aṅkurārpaṇa," "Pālikāpūjā,"; Bali and other ceremonial, to be gone through are some of the subjects dealt with. Then comes the actual installation of the idol, its bathing in holy water (*abhiṣeka*) amidst recitation of Vedic mantras (104-111) and subsequent festivities connected with the feeding of guests and the final bath (*avabṛtha*) after the rites (iii, 127). The subject of renovating temples fallen into ruins or disrepair is touched upon (132-35). The section ends with a reference to minor deities to be set up and worshipped in a temple. Madhva's exposition has reference primarily to the worship of Viṣṇu and consecration of Vaiṣṇava temples. He also refers (iii, 159b) to other kinds of Tantras (probably Vaikhānasa) prescribing other modes of consecration. He himself would appear to follow the Pāñcarātra Āgama, in his exposition. The last chapter is a *resume* of the special mantras bearing on the entire subject, set forth in the original *Tantrasāra* of Vyāsa (iv, 1).

(35) SADĀCĀRA SMṚTI

This is a small compendium of codes governing a man's daily life and activities drawn up from a strictly orthodox point of view, in keeping with the ancient ideal of Varṇāśrama dharma and an ideal Brahminical life. It gives the routine of duties of various orders and Varṇas, from morn till night. Much of what is said here has no bearing on present-day

1. Madhva speaks of two kinds of wood or stone "the male and the female" and their respective uses (iii, 50) :

स्वरे स्थूलत्वभेदेन पुंस्त्र्याद्या जातितः शिलाः ।

पुंशिला प्रतिमार्थं तु स्त्रीशिला पीठकल्पये ॥

These are confirmed by other standard treatises on the subject : Cf. शिलाश्च त्रिविधाः पुंस्त्रीनपुंसकाश्चेति । घण्टानादसमाः पुंशिलाः । *Vaikhānasāgama* of Marici, Chap. x, p. 34, Trivandrum Skt. Ser. x.

conditions of life. The topics touched upon include Sandhyā, Brahmajājña, Vaiśvadeva, duties of ascetics etc. This work is also said (Ver. 40) to be a short anthology of the precepts of Vyāsa, on religious life. There are 41 verses in all, mostly in Anuṣṭubh. It is known to have been commented upon by Viśvanātha-Vyāsa, father of Taraṅgiṇī-Rāmācārya, (16th cent.).

(36) YATI PRAṆAVA KALPA¹

This is another small handbook in 28 Anuṣṭubhs, explaining the correct mode of adopting Sannyāsa and entering the fourth order of life. The method of initiating the disciple : *mantropadeśa* and administering of the Oath of Asceticism to him are briefly, but forcibly dealt with here. The treatment is, naturally, from the standpoint of the uncompromising Vaiṣṇava Realism of Madhva. The Oath of Loyalty to the Order administered to the new entrant, is most significant:

न विष्णुं वैष्णवांश्चैव ह्युत्सृजेयमिति त्रिशः ।
 न चान्यदेवतासाम्यं तदैक्यमथवा हरेः ॥
 चिन्तयेयं मृतौ वापि, न चाप्येकत्ववादिभिः ।
 समत्ववादिभिश्चाहं संगच्छेयं कदाचन ॥

[Never shall I forswear Viṣṇu and the Vaiṣṇavas. Never shall I deem Viṣṇu to be on a par or identical with the other gods. Never shall I associate with those who hold the doctrine of identity or equality of God and soul.]

The initiated shall spend his time trying to improve his knowledge of the Śāstras. He shall worship the Lord, practise the Praṇava-japa regularly and try to realize God.

(37) [KṚṢṆA] JAYANTĪ NIRṆAYA

This short work in 17 Anuṣṭubh deals with the Kṛṣṇajayantī Vrata (the birth anniversary of Śrī Kṛṣṇa). It would be easy to realize the importance of this day to such ardent Vaiṣṇavas as the following of Madhva. Madhva himself had attached special importance to the worship of Kṛṣṇa and the anniversary of his birth is hailed by him as a Vrata, to be observed with due sense of devotion and austerity. He enjoins on his followers a *complete fast* on that day which is still rigorously observed by them. Special worship is held at midnight (when the incarnation is believed to have taken place) on the eighth day of the dark fortnight of Śrāvaṇa, when arghya is offered welcoming the Lord. The fast is broken the next morning.

[(38) KANDUKA STUTI]

Kṛṣṇastuti, *Kṛṣṇagadya* or *Kandukastuti*, as it is variously called, is a short *stotra* in praise of Kṛṣṇa, in two smart, alliterative verses said to have been composed by Madhva, as a boy. It is not included in the traditional

1. Not "Yatiprāṇakalpa" as in Saletore, *History of Tuluva*, p. 441.

list of his works. The name "Kanduka-stuti" is fancifully taken to mean that it is "generally repeated by Hindu girls at the time of playing with a ball" (M. Rangacharya, Descriptive Catal. of Madras Govt. Oriental Lib. vol, xxvi, no. 14801). There is no warrant for any such surmise. The verses are :

अम्बरगंगाचुम्बितपादः पदतलविदलितगुरुतरशकटः ।
 कालियनागक्ष्वेलनिहन्ता सरसिजदलविकसितनयनः ॥
 कालघनालीकर्बुरकायः शरशतशकलितरिपुशतनिकरः ।
 सन्ततमस्मान् पातु मुरारिः सततगसमजवखगपतिनिरतः ॥

According to Bannanje Govindācharya of Uḍipi, two other minor works of Madhva one on Jyotiś-Śāstra and another on Tithinirṇaya have been discovered. They have not been published so far.

EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF THE MĀDHVA SCHOOL AND ITS INSTITUTIONS

EMERGENCE OF THE AṢṬAMAṬHAS OF UḌIPI AND OTHER MUTTS

TABLES OF MUTTS

(i) TOWARDS the close of his life, Madhva had ordained eight monks¹ for the conduct of worship of Kṛṣṇa, at his Maṭha in Uḍipi (*M. Vij.* xiv, 131 and *Tirthaprabandha* i, 8). These established lines of their own by ordination and these lines of ascetics became the precursors of the Aṣṭamaṭhas of later times.² The early history of these Mutts is still vague and we have no information about the extent of religious and secular influence wielded by them, until much later times. The Svāmīs of the eight Mutts hold office as High Priests of the Kṛṣṇa Maṭha, by turns, for two years each. This biennial change of office is known as "Paryāya", which takes place during Makara. When not in office, the Svāmīs look after the affairs of their own individual Mutts and tour the country for purposes of religious propaganda and obtaining supplies to last them during their next turn of office. We have, thus, at Uḍipi, a unique and well-organized system of religious worship and administration, which reflects great credit upon its organisers, whoever they might have been. The system is generally believed to have been introduced in its present form by Vādirāja Svāmi, one of the celebrated Pontiffs of Uḍipi, in the 16th century.³ There is no evidence that it existed earlier; though certain inscriptions from Uḍipi⁴ (*Insc. Madras*, ii, p. 871, nos. 236 and 241), relating to the Kṛṣṇāpūr Mutt, recording gifts to Vidyā (dhi)-rāja Tīrtha, in 1409 A.D. and (260) to Adamar Mutt in 1443 A.D.) go to show that the Svāmīs had come to be recognised, widely, long before the 16th century.

Besides the eight Mutts above referred to, there are two others tracing descent from Acyutaprajña with Satyatīrtha at their head. These go by the names of Bhaṇḍārkere and Bhīmanakaṭṭe Mutts. Their bifurcation seems to have taken place at the time of the fifth successor of Satyatīrtha. No outstanding contribution to Dvaita Literature seems to have

1. Hṛṣikeśa Tīrtha, Narasimha, Janārdana, Upendra, Vāmana, Viṣṇu, Rāma and Adhokṣaja Tīrthas (*M. Vij.* xv, 128-9).

2. Palimār Adamār, Kṛṣṇāpūr, Puttige, Śīrūr, Sode, Kāṇūr and Pejāvar Mutts.

3. This is confirmed by the *Vādirāja Guruvara Caritāmṛta* (iv, 49), which states that the older system established by Madhva, was a rotation *once in two months*.

4. The donors are Harihara Rāya II (1377-1402) and Deva Rāya Mahārāja I (1406-18).

been made by the Svāmīs of these two Mutts except the illuminating commentary on the *Yuktimalikā* of Vādirāja, by Surottama Tīrtha, the fourteenth in descent on the pīṭha of the Bhaṇḍārkere Mutt. Even as between the “Aṣṭamaṭhas” of Uḍipi and the up-Ghat or “Deśastha-Maṭhas” descended from a group of four itinerant disciples of Madhva, the place of honor for literary activity and spread of Dvaita philosophy should be given to the latter. The Svāmīs of Uḍipi have mostly confined their attention to their own community of Taulavas, devoting themselves for the most part to the worship of Kṛṣṇa at Uḍipi, — one of the purposes for which they were ordained. It would, however, be far from proper to conclude from the circumstance of Madhva’s installation of the image of Sri Kṛṣṇa at his Maṭha in Uḍipi, that the eight monks ordained by him were only intended to officiate as Priests therein. The pen-picture we have of these eight disciples in the *M. Vij.* (xv, 128-31) is decidedly against any such narrow interpretation of their role as envisaged by Madhva. It is, however, the Mutts represented by the other group of four disciples of Madhva, viz., Padmanābha, Narahari, Mādhava and Akṣobhya Tīrthas and continued by Jayatīrtha and his successors that have made the most solid contributions to Dvaita Vedānta and its literature and its propagation in different parts of India. In *this* sense, the appellation “Mūla-Maṭhas” (original Mutts) claimed by them, is fitting. There is, however, no *evidence*, apart from tradition, that Mādhava and Akṣobhya were both personally ordained by Madhva. Nor do the terms “Ācārya-Pīṭha” or “Mūla-Maṭha” appear to have acquired any significance yet, during the lifetime of Madhva or his immediate disciples. The *M. Vij.* gives absolutely no indication of Madhva’s headquarters having been anywhere else than at Uḍipi, where he spent most of his time. It is thus quite misleading till the days of Jayatīrtha to speak of X or Y as having “succeeded” Madhva on the “pīṭha” and “ruled” for so many years. The four (presumably) immediate disciples of Madhva viz., Padmanābha, Narahari, Mādhava, and Akṣobhya Tīrthas, and others like Viṣṇu Tīrtha, may have passed away, one after the other, in the cyclic years recorded for them in the various Mutts. Beyond this we cannot go and represent them as having “occupied” a particular “Pīṭha” (vacated by Madhva or his successor) and “ruled” one after the other, “handing over charge” to the next in order, at the time of his death. This is a popular assumption for which there is no conclusive *evidence*.

The whole question is still vague and complicated. The Uḍipi tradition does not accept the view about the “four *direct* disciples” of Madhva.¹ This, by itself, is not an insurmountable difficulty as the *M. Vij.* itself clearly admits (xv, 127) the existence of *direct disciples* ordained by Madhva, both *before and after* the ordination of Padmanābha and Viṣṇu Tīrtha. Actually, however, the *M. Vij.* refers *by name*, only to Padmanābha and the eight monks of Uḍipi and leaves out Narahari, Mādhava

1. Cf. चक्रे शिष्यान् नवान्नव (Vādirāja, *Sarasabhārati*, vii, 22).

and Akṣobhya. These may be taken to be included among those collectively spoken of as “others” from different parts of the country (x, 127).¹ But Jayatīrtha, in his TP. has paid homage only to Padmanābha and Akṣobhya, ignoring the other two in between them. But that he knew of Narahari Tīrtha is clear from his criticism of some of his interpretations of Madhva. All the same, it seems curious that he should have ignored them, had they been his “predecessors on the Mahāsamsthāna.” The terms in which a later Pontiff Raghūttama Tīrtha clubs together the last three as distinguished from Padmanābha Tīrtha, in an introductory verse of his *Nyāyavivaraṇa*-gloss :

सुगुणरहरिश्च्रीमाधवाक्षोभ्यरूपान् हरिभजननियुक्तान् शुद्धधर्मार्थिकामान् ।

सुजननियमनार्थं यः प्रसाध्यापरोक्षं स भवतु मम भूत्यै पद्मनाभाख्ययोगी ॥ ४ ॥

lends some color to the view that those three were in some way or other particularly and specially connected with him (probably by way of initiation ?). But, then, such a supposition is negatived at least in the case of Narahari Tīrtha whose Śrīkūrmam Inscription shows that he was Madhva’s direct disciple. Another inscription of Narahari establishes that his ordination had taken place in or before 1264 A.D. It is also claimed that Prāṇeśa Viṭhala (a late Dāsa) refers to Akṣobhya Tīrtha as the “करजात” of Mādhava, which term is generally taken to denote direct initiation. *Satyasandhaviḷāsa* (iii, 3) of Śrīnivāsa Kavi, disciple of Satyanātha (d. 1674) (Pub. S. D. V. Bby.), regards Narahari, Mādhava and Akṣobhya as disciples acquired by Padmanābha.

It would thus be clear that there seems to have been a good deal of confusion, vagueness and uncertainty about the floating traditions which had gathered round “the four early (direct) disciples of Madhva.” These do not appear to have been put on an authentic basis and recorded until after the establishment of the three main Maṭhas, about the middle of the 15th century. The *Gurucaryā*, a hagiological work on the Pontiffs of the Uttarādi Mutt (from Madhva down to Satyanidhi Tīrtha) (d. 1648), says that these floating traditions of the Mutt came to be defined and recorded during the days of Śrīpādarāja (c. 1460-86) and Raghunātha Tīrtha² (1444-1502).

This work is of considerable importance from many points of view. It is a fairly ancient work ending, as it does, with the life of Satyanidhi (1638-48). It records, probably for the first time, the tradition about the “four direct disciples” of Madhva and their “succeeding” to his Pīṭha one after the other, as now accepted. It is also of great chronological value, as it gives the cyclic years (*month and tithi*) of the succession and demise of the various Pontiffs (of the Uttarādi Mutt) and records Madhva’s

1. These, naturally, must be different from the eight monks who succeeded to the Aṣṭamaṭhas and who were all of them from the Tuḷu country.

2. *Gurucaryā*, i, 8-10.

date of birth as Kali 4224 corresponding to Śālivāhana 1039¹ and mentions Vilambi and Piṅgala as the year of his birth and disappearance respectively. The first and the second bifurcation of the “Mūlamāṭha” in the days of (1) Vidyādhiraṇja and (2) Rāmacandra Tīrtha are also mentioned here. Ignorance of this tripartition has been responsible for Dasgupta’s rejecting the entire line of Gurus descended from Rājendra Tīrtha, cited by Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa, in his *Prameyaratnāvali* and by Kavikarṇapūra in his *Gauragaṇoddeśadīpikā*, as fictitious, (*His. of I. Phil.* iv. p. 56) under the impression that there is really but one line of Mādhva Gurus viz., that represented by the Uttarādi Mutt, which is not true.

The seniority of the lines of Rājendra Tīrtha and Vibudhendra Tīrtha is also expressly admitted here. This point is of vital importance to the understanding of the true historical order of evolution of the three Mutts. The recognition of seniority in ordination (*āśramajyaisṭhya*) of (1) Rājendra Tīrtha to Kavindra and (2) of Vibudhendra to Vidyānidhi, in this work, is significant and noteworthy, as it is a work written avowedly from the point of view of and dealing mainly with the succession list of the Uttarādi Mutt.

The Uttarādi and Rāghavendra Svāmi Mutts have preserved the succession list of their Gurus in the form of certain “Caramaśloka”² or verses in their memory. These verses are supposed to be composed by each succeeding Pontiff in memory of his immediate predecessor on the Pīṭha and embody the main events in his Pontifical career.

There are, however, serious discrepancies in vital points, affecting the seniority and number of years of rule of Pontiffs, in at least two cases, between these “Carama-śloka” and the statements of the *Gurucaryā*, which cast a legitimate doubt on the genuineness and antiquity of the former. The “Carama-śloka” for Kavindra is :

‘वीन्द्रारूपदासक्तं राजेन्द्रमुनिसेवितम् ।

श्रीकवीन्द्रमुनि वन्दे भजतां चन्द्रसन्निभम् ॥’

This is quite misleading as it is generally admitted on all hands³ and expressly stated in the *Gurucaryā* and in the *Satkathā*,⁴ that Rājendra was the senior disciple ordained by Vidyādhiraṇja. H. K. Vedavyasachar, in his *Gurucarite*,⁵ seems to have been misled by this “Caramaśloka,” into reversing the historical order between the two disciples of Vidyādhiraṇja.

1. This date corresponds to 1117 A.D. which is actually two cycles behind the true historical date acceptable for Madhva on the basis of epigraphic and other data. This gap of 120 years was sought to be filled, later, by uncritically assigning to two Pontiffs Vidyādhiraṇja and Vidyānidhi, a rule of 64 and 68 years respectively, so as to bring the established dates of the later Pontiffs, in line with those of the earlier ones.

2. Those of the Uttarādi Mutt have been published by Kalyani Nagarajacharya, Sarvadhikāri, Uttarādi Mutt, Bangalore, (V. V. Subbiah and Sons, Printers, Bangalore City), 1952. Those of the other Mutt have been published in the annual almanac of the Mutt.

3. And by the Svāmi of the Uttarādi Mutt.

4. Edn. 1931, p. 32.

5. P. 110. Hence also V. Śhingre’s mistake in indicating Rājendra Tīrtha’s line to the right of Kavindra, in his “Genealogical Tables” of the Uttarādi Mutt, Sarvodaya Press, Poona, 1953.

The “Caramaśloka” of the Uttarādi Mutt, assigns sixty-eight years of Pontifical rule to Vidyānidhi¹ which is contradicted by the clear evidence of the *Gurucaryā* which assigns to him but seven years, nine months and thirteen days’ rule. It is also invalidated by the chronological data for the subsequent Pontiffs and cannot therefore be accepted.

The “Caramaśloka” for Jayatīrtha² is suspiciously identical with one of the introductory verses in Vijayīndra Tīrtha’s (1539-95) *Madhvādhvakaṇṭhakoddhāra*. It is difficult to suppose that Vijayīndra who was an author of outstanding merit and has left many fine verses in honor of several other Gurus had borrowed or plagiarized from such “Caramaślokas !”

The truth seems to be the other way about that these “Caramaślokas” are a late patch-work from miscellaneous sources and verses made to order for the occasion and that their claim to be considered authentic verses actually composed immediately after the demise of particular Pontiffs to whom they refer cannot be accepted, in all cases. The ślokas in respect of Jayatīrtha, Kavīndra and Vidyānidhi have, therefore, to be rejected as spurious.

The *M. Vij.*, says that many were the ascetics ordained by Madhva and that these, in their turn, took disciples :

मध्वप्रशिष्या बहवः शिष्या येषां मुहुस्तथा (xv, 132).

The centres of religious propaganda started by these disciples, in various parts of the country, should, in course of time, have crystallized into so many Mutts. Each one of these could naturally be regarded as historically descended from Madhva. But it cannot be held that every one of their seats was actually occupied by Madhva, for some time in his life. As for certain images of God and Sālagrāvas acquired by him during his tours (*M. Vij.* x, 24), these are admitted to have been distributed among several disciples, lay and ascetic. The care and custody of such relics cannot, by itself, then, be regarded as conferring on any particular individual or institution claiming descent from him, any exclusive right to represent his “Pīṭha”. Moreover, it would be impossible to say which of the heirlooms left by Madhva was the most sacred one!

The historical association of the eight Maṭhas of Uḍipi with the care and worship of the image of Śrī Kṛṣṇa, installed by Madhva at his Mutt there (ix, 42), has however given them the unique honor and prestige of being in charge of the historical and spiritual capital of the Mādhva community as a whole, its place of pilgrimage and periodical congregation as well as its perennial source of spiritual inspiration, for centuries.

But it is the Mutts descended from Madhva through Jayatīrtha and his successors that have been in the van of development of Mādhva thought and literature and in securing widespread recognition and acceptance to

1. ‘यद्भक्त्या मूलरामस्य पेटिका त्यक्तभूमिका ।

विद्यानिधिधियं दद्यादष्टषष्ट्यब्दपूजकः ॥’

2. ‘यस्य वाक्कामधेनुर्नः कामितार्थान् प्रयच्छति ।

सेवे तं जययोगीन्द्रं कामबाणच्छिदं सदा ॥’

it, in various parts of India. As a matter of fact, these have taken the lion's share in the task of developing and propagating the philosophy of Madhva. For this reason, they can unhesitatingly be regarded as the intellectual heirs to the legacy of Madhva and Jayatīrtha. They have also fully justified this position by their own monumental services to the cause of Dvaita thought and its literature, through centuries. The history of Dvaita Literature and its philosophical development, to be set forth onwards, from Part III will amply bear this out.

Each one of these has been as great as the others in respect of its services to the system, the beneficial influence exercised on society and the eminence of the Pontiffs who have adorned their seats. The only disparity that may be seen among them is that of worldly wealth, number of disciples under their jurisdiction or the extent of popular allegiance in particular parts of the country. But these are obviously the results of contemporary socio-political and economic conditions in the regions in which these different institutions carried on their work; and should not vitiate our judgment of their true historical origin and relation. Conditions in upper Karnatak and Maharashtra, where the Uttarādi Mutt had its roots, from the beginning, were more propitious to popular response to Dvaita philosophy than in the South, where the other two Mutts came to function. The powerful Smārta and Śrī-Vaiṣṇava communities in the South offered much stout resistance, as will be clear from the history of the heated religious and sectarian controversies in which Mādhva teachers like Vijayīndra and Satyanātha were involved in the South with redoubtable champions of other creeds like Appayya Dīkṣita.¹ It is also significant that none of the Mādhva Mutts in the South was able to establish a community of Tamil-speaking Mādhvas, while it was possible in respect of speakers of other languages like Telugu, Marāṭhī and even Hindi.

The Mutts believed to have been separately established by Padmanābha, Mādhava and Akṣobhya, though now comparatively insignificant, in point of wealth, position, prestige and following are as much historically connected with Madhva as those descended from Jayatīrtha. Later, the phenomenal glory attained by Vyāsatīrtha under the second and third dynasties of Vijayanagar pushed his Mutt into supreme power and prestige in the early XVI century and this position was zealously maintained by his successors. Soon after, the Uttarādi and Rāghavendra Svāmi Mutts rose to fame under the illustrious leadership of Pontiffs like Raghūttama and Vijayīndra. These three Mutts now enjoy the status of "Maṭha-traya" or the three premier Mādhva Maṭhas descended from Jayatīrtha.

But any exclusive claim by any one of them to be accepted as the sole heir and rightful representative of Madhva's Pīṭha has, however, to be rejected as untenable.² Whatever the justification for such claims

1. For details see *infra*. Chaps. XXXI and XXXIV.

2. This would be clear from the judgment of the Madras High Court dated the 20th Nov., 1929, on the 'first-tīrtha' dispute relating to the Śrī Madhva Siddhānta Unnāhirī Sabhā, Tiruchanur, Tirupati.

and controversies based on such claims among these Mutts in the past, they are clearly outmoded in the context of the modern age. If the mutts should survive as useful institutions, now, they should eschew such idle controversies and learn the art of peaceful co-existence.

In the last analysis, then, all controversies regarding “Mūla” and “Biḍi” (stray or subsidiary) Maṭhas turn out to be a distortion of facts for power-politics. There is nothing to support such claims even in the designations of these Mutts. The Uḍipi and other Mutts are named after their (village)—headquarters. The Vyāsarāja and Rāghavendra Svāmi Mutts have been known after their most illustrious Pontiffs from time to time. The Uttarādi Mutt has a territorial designation as its Pontificate has been occupied by Uttara-Karnāṭakas or Uttarādi-Karnāṭakas ever *since* the time of Vidyānidhi Tīrtha, the first Head of the Mutt after the *second* bifurcation of the original Mutt under Rāmacandra Tīrtha, in 1430 A.D. There is, however, no *evidence* or probability of such a designation having been current *in or before the days of Vidyānidhi*, as he himself was admittedly a Taulava;¹ and there were *at least three* non-Uttarādis (i.e. to say Dakṣiṇādi-Karnāṭakas) on the Pīṭha, among the early successors of Madhva and Jayatīrtha, before him. These were Mādhava Tīrtha, Vidyādhirāja, and Vāgīśa Tīrtha.² These facts would suffice to show that the name “Uttarādi Maṭha” must have come into vogue *only* from the time of Raghunātha Tīrtha (1444-1502), as an appropriate name for the Mutt. It is an established fact that from Raghunātha Tīrtha to the present Head of the Uttarādi Mutt (Śrī Satyapramoda Tīrtha), the Pontiffs of the Mutt, have all been chosen, without a single exception, from the (Kannaḍa) Deśasth Brahmin families of Uttara Karnāṭaka (or the districts of Dharwar, Belgaum and Bijapur and beyond in (the former) Bombay-Karnatak and the adjacent Kannaḍa areas of (former) Hyderabad State). This practice has been maintained to this day. We have the relevant details of the personal history of every one of these Svāmis in the *Gurucaryā*, which uses the terms कर्नाटकोत्तरम्; कर्नाटोत्तरम्; कर्नाटोत्तरादिम् regularly in describing them on a regional basis.³

This seems to be the most rational and natural explanation of the term “Uttarādi Maṭha”, assumed by the second line of successors of

1. See *Satkathā* edn. 1896 and 1931 (p. 35). See also *Gurucaryā* ii, 24.

2. The evidence about these three would be found under their lives.

3. (a) समधीतमहाशास्त्रं कर्नाटोत्तरमादरात्
रघुनाथसुतीर्थेति वासयामास सन्निधौ ॥ (ii, 38).
(b) रघुवर्यसुतीर्थोऽपि स्वपूर्वाश्रमगस्वसुः ।
पुत्रं कर्नाटोत्तरादिं आत्माधीतान्यशास्त्रकम् ॥ 35
पट्टाभिषिच्य संभाव्य रघूत्तमसमाह्वयम् ॥ (iii, 36).
(c) कर्नाटमुत्तरादिं च ब्रह्मचर्यस्थितं सदा ।
तस्य चाक्षोभ्यतीर्थेति नाम चक्रे यतीश्वरः ॥
(d) उत्तरादिं माघवाख्यं कर्नाटं शास्त्रिणं मुदा
रामचन्द्राभिघ्नं कृत्वा * * * ॥ (ii, 37).

Rāmacandra Tīrtha and by which it is now generally known.¹ There is no epigraphic or literary evidence of any earlier use of the term.² This disposes of the fanciful and far-fetched connection of the term "Uttara" in "Uttarādi" with उत्तरो गोपतिर्गोप्ता, one of the thousand names of Viṣṇu, attempted by M. S. Katti, in this Kannada booklet entitled 'Śrī Madhva's Mūla Samsthāna' (or *Gurucarite-Vimarśe*).³

Till recently, the Mutts at Uḍipi have not been evincing that much of interest in the spread of Dvaita Literature which was expected of them. Vast collections of Sanskrit manuscripts exist in many of them in a neglected condition. Many have been damaged and thrown away from time to time moth-eaten. It is high time that a consolidated catalogue of all the available mss. material, is published by these Mutts and an attempt made to publish the works themselves.⁴ It is some consolation that one or two of these Mutts have established regular Libraries for the care of their manuscript treasures, notably the Pejāvar and the Palimār Mutts. But others lag behind. A definitive edition of the Sarvamūla based on the Taulava readings of Trivikrama, Vādirāja and others and of the Tulu manuscript of the Sarvamūla believed to have been written by Hṛṣīkeśa Tīrtha, must be undertaken if the important variants in this oldest manuscript source (already in a decaying condition) are not to be lost to the world, for ever.

Many of these readings have been followed in the Kannada translation of the Sarvamūla published by the M. M. S. S. Uḍipi. (1926-69).

Of the group of four disciples entrusted with the task of propagating Dvaita philosophy outside the S. Kanara district, three founded separate Mutts also of their own, which exist to this day. In about 1412 A.D. the line descended from Jayatīrtha branched off into two, the younger of which was again subjected to a further split in or about 1435. These three branches, which now go by the names of (1) the Vyāsarāja Mutt, (2) the Rāghavendra Svāmi Mutt, and (3) the Uttarādi Mutt, occupy a premier position among the Mādhva Maṭhas in the Desh.⁵ Most of the

1. This is confirmed by the passage from Mysore Gazetteer 1927, viii, 321-22 (cited by M. S. Katti, in his book) that "the Uttarādi Mutt is so called because it was presided over by men drawn from the north or Uttaradesh".

2. Even as late as the 18th century, there is evidence of the practice of the Mutt having been designated by the name of the ruling Pontiff (cf. सत्यसन्धमठे * * * * *Gurucaryā*, v).

3. Kelkar Printing Press, Dharwar, 1950, pp. 15-17. Even the late Svāmi Satyadhyanā Tīrtha of the Uttarādi Mutt was satisfied with the simple and rational explanation of the term in a territorial sense. Such breath-taking explanations, as have been attempted by Mr. Katti, do not seem to have occurred to him.

4. The Sode Mutt has already made a beginning in this direction, by publishing some of the works of Vādirāja. It has a valuable collection of mss which is very well kept by the present Head of the Mutt Sri Viśvottama Tīrtha.

5. (Opp. "Koṅkaṇ"). These are appropriately designated as the Deśastha-Maṭhas or the Mutts situated in the Desh. The term signifies the region above (east of) the Western Ghats. The term "Deśastha" though often loosely used in the old Madras and Mysore States to denote a Maharashtrian Brahmin, has nothing to do with language. It has only a geographical significance. In the Maharashtra State, wherefrom the term is borrowed, a "Deśasth" Brahmin may be a speaker of Marāṭhi or Kannaḍa. See *Bombay Gazetteer*, Vol. ii, 1884, pp. 56-88 (Dharwar).

makers of Dvaita Vedānta and its literature who are to be noticed further in this book, have a place either as Pontiffs or as their (lay) disciples in one or the other of these Mutts. It would be helpful then to know the exact places of these Pontiffs in the Succession Lists of their respective Mutts. For the sake of convenience, certain dates (sometimes of inscriptions and sometimes of the demise of the Pontiffs) have been given. The latter are based on the entries in the genea-chronological Tables preserved by (some of) the Mutts. Complete dates are available only for the Rāghavendra Svāmi, Uttarādi and Kundāpūr Mutts; and none for the Uḍipi Mutts. For the Vyāsarāja Mutt, dates are partially calculable. The dates of the Mutt Lists have, however, to be accepted with considerable modifications in many cases, in the light of epigraphic and other data. Many Svāmis of the Uḍipi Mutts also have made important contributions to Dvaita Literature. The Genealogical Tables of all the important Mādhva Maṭhas and particularly those which have made outstanding contributions to Dvaita Literature and philosophy, through their Pontiffs¹ and lay followers, have therefore been given here, for ready reference. Inscriptional dates and dates of demise of Pontiffs as finalised in the light of other data have been given in brackets for the Pontiffs of the “Maṭhatraya”, to which a majority of the authors belong. The dates of individual authors have been discussed in the body of the book. In the Tables following, the ascetic title “Tīrtha” should be read uniformly after the names of all Pontiffs, whether indicated by dots or not.

1. The Tables of the Gokarna and Kāśī Maṭhas of the Gauḍa Sārasvatas and the Bhīmanakatte, Kāṇva and Kundāpūr Mutts have not been included for this reason.

TABLE I

THE AṢṬAMAṬHAS OF UḌIPI

| (1) <i>Palimār Mutt</i> | | (2) <i>Adamār Mutt</i> | |
|-----------------------------|---------|--------------------------------|--------|
| | Tīrtha* | | Tīrtha |
| 1. Hrṣīkeśa | Tīrtha* | 1. Narasimha | Tīrtha |
| 2. Samātmeś (var)a | .. | 2. Kamalekṣaṇa | .. |
| 3. Sambhava | .. | 3. Rāmacandra | .. |
| 4. Aparājita | .. | 4. Vidyādhīśa | .. |
| 5. Vidyāmūrti ¹ | .. | 5. Viśvapati | .. |
| 6. Śrīnidhi | .. | 6. Viśveśa | .. |
| 7. Vidyeśa | .. | 7. Vedanidhi | .. |
| 8. Śrīvallabha | .. | 8. Vedarāja | .. |
| 9. Jagadbhūṣaṇa | .. | 9. Vidyāmūrti | .. |
| 10. Rāmacandra ² | .. | 10. Vaikuṇṭharāja | .. |
| 11. Vidyānidhi | .. | 11. Viśvarāja | .. |
| 12. Sureśa | .. | 12. Vedagarbha | .. |
| 13. Rāghavendra | .. | 13. Hiranyagarbha | .. |
| 14. Raghunandana | .. | 14. Viśvādhīśa | .. |
| 15. Vidyāpati | .. | 15. Viśvavallabha | .. |
| 16. Raghupati | .. | 16. Viśvendra | .. |
| 17. Raghūttama | .. | 17. Vidyāpati | .. |
| 18. Rāmabhadra | .. | 18. Vibudhapati | .. |
| 19. Raghuvarya* | .. | 19. Vedavallabha | .. |
| 20. Raghupuṅgava | .. | 20. Vedavandya | .. |
| 21. Raghuvara | .. | 21. Vidyeśa | .. |
| 22. Raghupravīra | .. | 22. Vibudhavallabha | .. |
| 23. Raghubhūṣaṇa | .. | 23. Vibudhavandya | .. |
| 24. Raghuratna | .. | 24. Vibudhavarya | .. |
| 25. Raghupriya | .. | 25. Vibudhendra | .. |
| 26. Raghumānya | .. | 26. Vibudhādhirāja | .. |
| 27. Raghuvallabha Tīrtha | | 27. Vibudhapriya | .. |
| (abdicated 1969) | | 28. Vibudhamānya (1945) | .. |
| 28. Vidyāmānya T. (Present) | | 29. Vibudheśa Tīrtha (Present) | |
| (Junior) | | Viśvapriya (Junior) | |

* Indicates authors.

1. His disciple Rājarājeśvara (author of *Maṅgalāṣṭakam*) did not succeed to the Pīṭha. But he is mentioned in an inscription dated 1433 (*Pramāḍica*) on a pillar in the Mutt at Kāntāvara, Mūdabidri, Taluk, (*Ins. Madras Presidency* p. 856) of Virapratāpa Devarāya II.

2. According to *Guruparamparāmṛta*, ed. 1904, this Pontiff also ordained Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha, the founder of the Gokarṇa Maṭha of the Gauḍa Sārasvatas in 1476 A.D.

(3) *Kṛṣṇāpūr Mutt*

| | Tīrtha |
|----------------------------------|-----------|
| 1. Janārdana | |
| 2. Śrīvatsāṅka | .. |
| 3. Vāgīsa | .. |
| 4. Lokeśa | .. |
| 5. Lokanātha | .. |
| 6. Lokapriya | .. |
| 7. Vidyā (dhi) rāja ¹ | .. |
| 8. Viśvādhira | .. |
| 9. Viśvādhīsa | .. |
| 10. Viśveśa | .. |
| 11. Viśvavandya | .. |
| 12. Viśvarāja | .. |
| 13. Dharaṇīdhara | .. |
| 14. Dharaḍhara | .. |
| 15. Prājñamūrti | .. |
| 16. Tapomūrti | .. |
| 17. Sureśvara | .. |
| 18. Jagannātha | .. |
| 19. Sureśa | .. |
| 20. Viśvapungava | .. |
| 21. Viśvavallabha | .. |
| 22. Viśvabhūṣaṇa | .. |
| 23. Yādavendra | .. |
| 24. Prājñamūrti | .. |
| 25. Vidyādhira | .. |
| 26. Vidyāmūrti | .. |
| 27. Vidyāvallabha | .. |
| 28. Vidyendra | .. |
| 29. Vidyānidhi | .. |
| 30. Vidyāsamudra | .. |
| 31. Vidyāpati | .. |
| 32. Vidyādhīsa | .. |
| 33. Vidyāpūrṇa | .. |
| 34. Vidyāratna | (d. 1971) |
| 35. Vidyāsāgara T. | (Present) |

(4) *Puttige Mutt*

| | Tīrtha |
|-------------------|-----------|
| 1. Upendra | |
| 2. Kavindra | .. |
| 3. Hamsendra | .. |
| 4. Yādavendra | .. |
| 5. Dharaṇīdhara | .. |
| 6. Dāmodara | .. |
| 7. Raghunātha | .. |
| 8. Śrīvatsāṅka | .. |
| 9. Gopīnātha | .. |
| 10. Raṅganātha | .. |
| 11. Lokanātha | .. |
| 12. Ramānātha | .. |
| 13. Śrīvallabha | .. |
| 14. Śrīnivāsa | .. |
| 15. Śrīnidhi | .. |
| 16. Guṇanidhi | .. |
| 17. Ānandanidhi | .. |
| 18. Taponidhi | .. |
| 19. Yādavendra | .. |
| 20. Kavindra | .. |
| 21. Rāghavendra | .. |
| 22. Vibudhendra | .. |
| 23. Surendra | .. |
| 24. Bhuvanendra | .. |
| 25. Yogīndra | .. |
| 26. Sumatindra | .. |
| 27. Sudhīndra | .. |
| 28. Sujñānendra | .. |
| 29. Sugūṇendra T. | (Present) |

1. Donee of a grant in 1409 A.D. by Devarāya Mahārāya (*Madras Insc.* Vol. ii, p. 871).

| (5) <i>Sirūr Mutt</i> | | (6) <i>Sode Mutt</i> | |
|---------------------------------------|--------|---------------------------|--------|
| | Tirtha | | Tirtha |
| 1. Vāmana | | 1. Viṣṇu | |
| 2. Vāsudeva | .. | 2. Vedavyāsa ¹ | .. |
| 3. Puṇyaśloka | .. | 3. Vedavedya | .. |
| 4. Vedaramya | .. | 4. Vedagarbha | .. |
| 5. Vedavyāsa | .. | 5. Vareśa | .. |
| 6. Vedavedya | .. | 6. Vāmana | .. |
| 7. Maheśa | .. | 7. Vāsudeva | .. |
| 8. Kṛṣṇa | .. | 8. Vedavyāsa | .. |
| 9. Rāghava | .. | 9. Varāha | .. |
| 10. Sureśa | .. | 10. Vedāntātma* | .. |
| 11. Vedabhūṣaṇa | .. | 11. Viśvavandya | .. |
| 12. Śrīnivāsa | .. | 12. Ratnagarbha | .. |
| 13. Vedanidhi | .. | 13. Vedāṅga* | .. |
| 14. Śrīdhara | .. | 14. Vidyāpati | .. |
| 15. Yādavottama | .. | 15. Viśvavandya | .. |
| 16. Lakṣmīnārāyaṇa | .. | 16. Viśva | .. |
| 17. Viśvabhūṣaṇa | .. | 17. Viṭṭhala | .. |
| 18. Trailokyapāvana | .. | 18. Varadarāja | .. |
| 19. Lakṣmīkānta | .. | 19. Vāgīśa | .. |
| 20. Lakṣmīnārāyaṇa | .. | 20. Vādirāja* | .. |
| 21. Lakṣmīpati | .. | 21. Vedavedya* | .. |
| 22. Lakṣmīdhara | .. | 22. Vidyānidhi | .. |
| 23. Lakṣmīramaṇa | .. | 23. Vedanidhi | .. |
| 24. Lakṣmīmanohara | .. | 24. Varadarāja | .. |
| 25. Lakṣmīpriya | .. | 25. Viśvādhīrājendra | .. |
| 26. Lakṣmīvallabha | .. | 26. Vādivandya | .. |
| 27. Lakṣmīsamudra | .. | 27. Viśvaveda | .. |
| 28. Lakṣmīndra (d. 1963) | | 28. Vibudhavarya | .. |
| 29. Lakṣmīmanojña (abdicated 1971) | | 29. Viśvanidhi | .. |
| 30. Lakṣmīvara (Present) | | 30. Viśvādhīśa | .. |
| | | 31. Viśveśa | .. |
| | | 32. Viśvapriya (d. 1865) | |
| | | 33. Viśvādhīśa | .. |
| | | 34. Viśvendra | .. |
| | | 35. Viśvottama | Tirtha |
| | | (Present) | |

1. alias Bādarāyaṇa T. a pet disciple of M. in the younger generation (See *M. Vij.* XV. 117).

* Author.

| (7) <i>Kāṇūr Mutt</i> | | (8) <i>Pejāvar Mutt</i> | |
|-----------------------|-----------|-------------------------------|--------|
| | Tīrtha | | Tīrtha |
| 1. Rāma | | 1. Adhokṣaja | |
| 2. Raghunātha | .. | 2. Kamalākṣa | .. |
| 3. Raghupati | .. | 3. Puṣkarākṣa | .. |
| 4. Raghunandana | .. | 4. Amarendra | .. |
| 5. Yadunandana | .. | 5. Vijaya* | .. |
| 6. Viśvātma | .. | 6. Mahendra | .. |
| 7. Viśvanātha | .. | 7. Vijayadhva* | .. |
| 8. Vedagarbha | .. | 8. Dāmodara | .. |
| 9. Vāgīśa | .. | 9. Vāsudeva | .. |
| 10. Varadapati | .. | 10. Vādindra | .. |
| 11. Viśvapati | .. | 11. Vedagarbha | .. |
| 12. Viśvamūrti | .. | 12. (Aṇu)cāruprajña | .. |
| 13. Vedapati | .. | 13. Viśvaprajña | .. |
| 14. Vedarāja | .. | 14. Viśveśvara* | .. |
| 15. Vidyādhīśa* | .. | 15. Viśvabhūṣaṇa | .. |
| 16. Vibudheśa | .. | 16. Viśvavandya ¹ | .. |
| 17. Vārijākṣa | .. | 17. Vidyādhirāja | .. |
| 18. Viśvendra | .. | 18. Viśvamūrti } ¹ | .. |
| 19. Vibudhavandya | .. | 19. Viśvapati* } | .. |
| 20. Vibudhādhirāja | .. | 20. Viṣvanidhi | .. |
| 21. Vidyārāja | .. | 21. Viśvādhīśa | .. |
| 22. Vibudhapriya | .. | 22. Viśvādhirāja | .. |
| 23. Vidyāsāgara | .. | 23. Viśvabodha | .. |
| 24. Vāsudeva | .. | 24. Viśvavallabha | .. |
| 25. Vidyāpati | .. | 25. Viśvapriya | .. |
| 26. Vāmana | .. | 26. Viśvavarya | .. |
| 27. Vidyānidhi | (d. 1912) | 27. Viśvarāja | .. |
| 28. Vidyāsamudra | (d. 1964) | 28. Viśvamanohara | .. |
| 29. Vidyāvāridhi | Tīrtha | 29. Viśvajña | .. |
| (Present) | | 30. Viśvamānya | .. |
| | | 31. Viśveśa | .. |
| | | (Present) | |
| | | Viśvavijaya (Junior) | |

1. Referred to in the *Koṅkaṇābhyaudaya* of Śāgari Rāmācārya, composed in 1700 A.D.

Bhaṇḍārakere Mutt

| | Tīrtha |
|--|--------|
| [1. Acyutaprajña (Puruṣottama) | |
| 2. Pūrṇaprajña (Śrī Madhvācārya)] | .. |
| 3. Satya | .. |
| 4. Satyavrata | .. |
| 5. Viśvādhiśa | .. |
| 6. Gadādhara | .. |
| 7. Vedānta | .. |
| 8. Vidyādhīśa | .. |
| 9. Viśvamūrti | .. |
| 10. Raghuvēdānta ¹ | .. |
| 11. Raghunātha | .. |
| 12. Hiranyagarbha | .. |
| 13. Raghuvāra ² (g. 1522) | .. |
| 14. Dāmodara (g. 1510) ³ | .. |
| 15. Raghuvallabha | .. |
| 16. Surottama* | .. |
| 17. Viśvottama | .. |
| 18. Rājādhirāja | .. |
| 19. Rāghavendra | .. |
| 20. Raghubhūṣaṇa | .. |
| 21. Raghuvārya* | .. |
| 22. Raghupuṅgava | .. |
| 23. Raghuvārya | .. |
| 24. Raghurāja | .. |
| 25. Rājavandya | .. |
| 26. Vidyārāja | .. |
| 27. Vidyādhirāja | .. |
| 28. Vidyāsāgara | .. |
| 29. Vidyāpati | .. |
| 30. Vidyānidhi | .. |
| 31. Vidyārṇava | .. |
| 32. Vidyāmānya (Present) succeeds to Palimar Mutt Feb. 1969. | |

1. Grant by Harihara in 1439 (Virodhi) to God Viṭṭhala of the Mutt.

2. There is a stone inscription dated Vikāri 1462 (1540 A.D.) of Acyutarāya of Vijayanagar standing before the Mutt, in which it is designated "Bhaṇḍārakeri Maṭha". Other grants in the reign of Kṛṣṇadevarāya are made by (1) Vira Arasu, Chieftain of Bhaṇḍārakere (1515) and (2) Vāsudeva Odeyar, Chieftain of Bārākūr (1519) granting Hudarhaḷḷi.

3. By Kṛṣṇadeva Rāya, for Nandādīpa of God Gopālakṛṣṇa of the "Bhaṇḍārakere Maṭha",

TABLE II

ŚRĪ MADHVĀCĀRYA (1238-1317)

| Padmanābha T. (d. 1324) | Mādhava T. (d. 1350) | Akṣobhya T. (d. 1365) |
|----------------------------|---------------------------------------|--------------------------|
| Lakṣmīdhara | Madhuhari | Trailokyabhūṣaṇa |
| Samkarṣaṇa | Nārāyaṇa | Lokavandita |
| Paraśurāma | Paramjyoti | Sulabha |
| Ādirāja | Maunivarya | Raghupuṅgava |
| Satyavrata | Jagannātha | Raghunātha |
| Svarṇavarṇa | Jñānivarya | Raghuvarya |
| Lakṣmīnārāyaṇa* (alias) | Raghupati | Raghunandana |
| [Śrīpādarāja] | Hayagrīva | Vidyānidhi |
| Hayagrīva | Raghupuṅgava | Raghupati |
| Śrīpati | Raghuvarya | Nārāyaṇa ³ |
| Śrīdhara | | |
| Gopālasvāmi | Raghunandana | Mukunda |
| Rāmacandra | Raghupati | Raghupati |
| Raghunātha | Rāma-Mādhava | Rāmcandra |
| Lakṣmīmanohara | Keśava-Mādhava | Raghurāja ⁴ |
| Lakṣmīpati | Prājña-Mādhava | Rāmcandra |
| Lakṣmīkānta | Dhīra-Mādhava | Raghuvarya |
| Lakṣmīnātha | Yogi-Mādhava | Raghuvalabha |
| Lakṣmīnidhi | Vāsudeva-Mādhava | Raghupriya |
| Śrīkānta | Śrīnivāsa-Mādhava | Raghuvara |
| Śrīnidhi ¹ | Vīramādhava | Raghūttama |
| Tejonidhi | (d. 1958) | |
| | Satya-Mādhava (Present) | |
| | [Majjigehanalli Maṭha] ² | |
| Yoga (yaśo)nidhi | | Raghuśānta |
| [Sugūṇanidhi] | | Raghukānta |
| [Vidyānidhi] | | Raghudānta |
| Jñānanidhi | | [Kūḍli Maṭha] |
| Guṇasāra | | |
| Prājña (nidhi)sāra | | |
| Subodhanidhi | | |

1. c. 1764-72. author of *Śrīpādarājāṣṭaka*.

2. The H. Q of the Mutt is at Tambehalli, Muttur P.O Kolar dt.

3. Donee of a grant in 1527 A.D. by Kṛṣṇadevarāya (Shimoga 84, EC). This Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha is referred to by Somanātha Kavi in his *Vyāsayogicarita*, as the kindly ascetic who introduced him to Vyāsātīrtha.4. Donee of a grant by Keḷadi Somaśekhara Nāyaka in 1659 (Piṅgala) (Vide *Shimoga*, 98).

Vairāgyanidhi
 Sujñānanidhi
 Sugaṇanidhi
 Sudhinidhi
 Medhānidhi
 Dayānidhi (d. 1955)
 Satyanidhi (d. 1979)
 Vijayanidhi (Present)
 [Muḷbāgal Maṭha] ¹

1. The modern name Muḷbāgal is a corruption of the old Kannaḍa name Mūḍa = (Mūla : Muḷa) Vāyiḷ = (Bāgilu) meaning the eastern gateway (to Vijayanagar ?).

TABLE III

ŚRĪ MADHVĀCĀRYA (1238-1317)

| | | | |
|---|--|---|--|
| 1. Padmanābha (d. 1324) | 2. Narahari (d. 1333) | 3. Mādhava (d. 1350) | 4. Akṣobhya (d. 1365) 5. Jayatīrtha (1388) 6. Vidyādhirāja (1402)* |
| 7. Rājendra (1440)* 8. Jayadhvaja (1448)* 9. Puruṣottama (1460)* 10. Brahmanya (1476)* | | | 7. Kavindra (1412)* 8. Vāgīśa (1420)* 9. Rāmacandra (1430)* |
| 11. Vyāsatīrtha (1539) 12. Śrīnivāsa 13. Rāma 14. Lakṣmīkānta 15. Śrīpati | 10. Vibudhendra ¹ (1470)* 11. Jitāmītra (1475)* 12. Raghunandana (1504) 13. Surendra (1539) 14. Vijayindra (1595) 15. Sudhindra (1623) | 10. Vidyānidhi (1444) 11. Raghunātha (1502) 12. Raghuvarya (1557) 13. Raghūttama (1596) 14. Vedavyāsa (1619) 15. Vidyādhīśa (1631) 16. Vedanidhi (1636) 17. Satyavrata (1638) (Satyaprajña + *) | |
| 16. Rāmacandra (g. 1627, 1631) (d. 1635) | | | |
| 17. Lakṣmīvallabha | | | |

| | | |
|--|---|---|
| 18. Lakṣmīnātha (g. 1642, 1663) | 16. Rāghavendra (1671) .. (Yādavendra) + | 18. Satyanidhi (1648) 19. Satyanātha (1674) .. (Satyānanda) + |
| 19. Lakṣmīpati (g. 1690) | 17. Yogindra (g. 1679) | 20. Satyābhinava (1706) Satyādhiśa + (1681) Satyādhirāja + (1704) |
| 20. Lakṣmīnārāyaṇa (1700) | 18. Sūrindra (1692) | 21. Satyapūrṇa (1726) |
| 21. Raghunātha (g. 1709) | 19. Sumatindra (1725) | 22. Satyavijaya (1737) |
| .. (Lakṣminidhi) + | 20. Upendra (1728) | 23. Satyapriya (1744) |
| 22. Jagannātha (1760)* | 21. Vāḍindra (1743)* | 24. Satyabodha (1783) |
| 23. Śrīnātha | 22. Vasudhendra (1761) | 25. Satyasandha (1794) |
| 24. Vidyānātha (g. 1787) | 23. Varadendra (1774) | 26. Satyavara (1797) |
| 25. Vidyāpati (1798) | .. (Dhīrendra) + | 27. Satyadharmā (1830) |
| 26. Vidyāvallabha (g. 1809) | 24. Bhuvanendra (1799) | 28. Satyasamkalpa (1841) |
| 27. Vidyākānta (1827) | 25. Subodhendra (1835) | 29. Satyasamtuṣṭa (1842) |
| 28. Vidyānidhi (g. 1845) | 26. Sujanendra (1836) | 30. Satyaparāyaṇa (1863) |
| 29. Vidyā (śrī) sindhu (g. 1863) | 27. Sujñānendra (1861) | 31. Satyakāma (1870) |
| 30. Vidyapūrṇa | 28. Sudharmendra (1872) | 32. Satyeṣṭa (1872) |
| 31. Vidyādhara (g. 1884) | 29. Sugunendra (1884) | 33. Satyaparākrama (1880) |
| 32. Vidyānivāsa (1890) | 30. Suprajñendra (1903) | 34. Satyavīra (1884) |
| 33. Vidyāsamudra (1906) | 31. Sukṛtindra (1912) | 35. Satyadhīra (1907) |
| 34. Vidyāratnākara (1915) | 32. Suśīlendra (1926) | 36. Satyajñāna (1913) |
| 35. Vidyāvāridhi (1940) | 33. Suvratindra (1933) | 37. Satyadhyāna (1942) |
| 36. Vidyāprasanna (1969) | 34. Suyamindra (1967) | 38. Satyaprajñā (1945) |
| 37. Vidyapayonidhi (Present) | 35. Sujayindra (Present) | 39. Satyābhijñā (1948) |
| [Vyāsārāja Mutt] | [Rāghavendra Svāmī Mutt] | 40. Satyapramoda (Present) |
| +Denotes those who did not occupy the Pīṭha. | | [Uttarādi Mutt] |

*in Table III indicates that the dates mentioned are tentative.

Chronological Note

*Dates in brackets against the names of Pontiffs represent their dates of demise as recorded in the Mutts. Those indicated with an asterisk () * denote dates tentatively fixed or revised in the light of other data. "g" stands for grants made to the Pontiffs in particular years. It will be noticed that for the period between Jayatīrtha and Vyāsātīrtha, the chronology of Pontiffs is uncertain.

1. H. K. Vedavyāsāchar (*Gurucarite*, p. 115) places Vibudhendra's demise in 1490 A.D., on the strength of an alleged grant to him, by Emperor Krishnadeva Rāya, in that year, after his return from the Udayagiri campaign. (*Mys. Arch. Rep.* 1944, p. 71). But he has overlooked the fact that Krishnadeva Rāya's reign was between 1509-30 and that his Udayagiri campaign was undertaken about 1513. For these and some other technical reasons, the Editorial Note in the *Mys. Arch. Rep.*, has raised grave doubts against the genuineness of the grant. Even if the facts of the grant are explained on the basis of a confirmation of a grant made by a previous Ruler, the chronological and other difficulties raised would remain.

I am inclined to place Vibudhendra between 1400-1470 and his Pontifical rule between 1435-70. He is reputed to have been a student of the celebrated Rājendra Tīrtha¹ (1402-40)* and himself a teacher of the great Śrīpādarāja (1460-87)*. He is also reported to have lived for some years during the Pontificate of Raghunātha Tīrtha (1445-1502) of the Uttarādi Mutt and met him.

But it would complicate matters to extend his life upto 1490 as has been done by Vedavyāsāchar. For, Vyāsātīrtha had already come to the Pīṭha by 1478 A.D. and there is no tradition of his having met or studied under so great an authority on Dvaita Vedānta as Vibudhendra, had he been alive then. Instead, Vyāsātīrtha (in Somanātha's biography) is represented as going to Śrīpādarāja, at Mulbagal, at the express advice of his Sannyāsa Guru, Brahmanya Tīrtha, for study of Mādḥvaśāstra. These considerations would show that Vibudhendra could not be pushed up as far as 1490 and that his demise, in all probability, had taken place some years *before* the accession of Vyāsātīrtha to his Pīṭha. We may not be far wrong then, if we place his date of birth in circa 1400 and his Pontifical period as 1430-70.

1. विबुधेन्द्रादिशिष्येभ्यो नवकृत्वः सुघां सुधीः ।

अपाठयत् स राजेन्द्रतीर्थो भूयादधीष्टिदः ॥ (*Caramasloka*)

TAULAVA DISCIPLES, THEIR
LIVES AND WORKS

1. HRṢIKEŚA TĪRTHA (c. 1250-1330)

WE possess some fragmentary details of Hrṣikeśa. He is mentioned in *M. Vij.* xiii, 40, as a favorite disciple of Madhva, who used to read out from the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa*, at the discourses of the Master. He was one of the monks inducted by Madhva at Kaṇvatīrtha (Manjeshwar). He was the founder of the Palimār Mutt and its first Pontiff. In token of his premier position among the disciples of Madhva, he earned the sobriquet of “Aṣṭot-krṣṭa” and his Mutt is popularly regarded as having the place of honor among the Aṣṭamaṭhas of Uḍipi. He wrote *Sampradāya-Paddhati*¹ in 26 verses, dealing with the early life, career and work of Madhva. He refers to the safe depositing of Madhva’s works at Kaṭātala (Setutila),² and the rehabilitation of his faith, by Viṣṇu Tīrtha, at a future date. He gives valuable information about the nativity of Padmanābha Tīrtha, calling him the “Guru of the Karnāṭakas and other good men” :

यः कर्नाटकपूर्वसज्जनगुरुः श्रीपद्मनाभाह्वयः । (18).

which makes it probable that Padmanābha was a native of Karnāṭak³ and spread his system predominantly among the people of that region, who still form the majority among the followers of Madhva, particularly in the region of old Bombay-Karnatak and former Hyderabad States. The *M. Vij* (ix. 13) also refers to his making the first copies of M’s *BSB* at Badarinath.

There is a complete set of palm leaf Mss. of the Sarvamūla in Tuḷu script,⁴ said to be transcribed by Hrṣikeśa in his own hand. This Ms. is in a much-injured condition but is carefully preserved in the Palimār Mutt.⁵ From my examination of it through the kind courtesy of the late Raghumānya Tīrtha, I have found that it contains a number of variant readings of important passages in the works of Madhva, differing from those of the Vulgate text familiarized by the commentaries of Jayatīrtha. The Ms. is contemporaneous with Madhva and is the oldest datable Ms.

1. Sri Krishna Press, Uḍipi, 1912.

2. See my paper ‘Madhva’s Underground Library at Kaṭātala’ *ABORI*, 1935.

3. This interpretation is corroborated by the *Gurucaryā*, which expressly refers to him as an ‘Uttara-Karnāṭaka’. See under “Padmanābha Tīrtha.”

4. The impression that Tuḷu has no script of its own, is incorrect so far as Ms. evidence goes. No doubt, it has close affinity with the Malayalam script. But then there is much in common between Grantha, Tamil and Malayalam scripts also.

5. The Ms. includes also an “*Aṇu-Madhvacaritam*” in 10 verses, presumed to be by Hrṣikeśa himself. It gives the cyclic years of Madhva’s birth and exit as Vilambi and Piṅgala and states that he lived for *seventy-nine years*.

in Tuḷu script (13th century). Its readings have been utilized in the edition of Sarvamūla published by the M. M. S. Sangha, Uḍipi.

2. VIṢṆU TĪRTHA

The only other important person among the early Pontiffs of the Uḍipi Mutts is Viṣṇu Tīrtha, the younger brother of Madhva. He sought initiation from his brother, after the death of his parents and after leading a householder's life for many years (*M. Vij.* xv, 91-96). He is stated to have become a great Yogi and set a high standard of religious austerities and penance. His rigid austerities on the Kumāra Parvata (Western Ghats) have been thrillingly described at length in *M. Vij.* xv. 97-114. He is believed to be still doing penance in the sylvan retreats of Kumāra Parvata, near the Subrahmaṇya Kṣetra, in S. Kanara. Tradition says he will appear again in Kaliyuga, to rehabilitate Madhva philosophy.¹ This is also alluded to by Hṛṣīkeśa Tīrtha, in his *Sampradāya Paddhati* :

तिरोहिते सन्मतेऽस्मिन् विष्णुतीर्थो गुहाचलात् ।
आगत्योद्धृत्य तत्रत्यान् ग्रन्थान् स प्रथयिष्यति ॥
यस्मात्सर्वहृदिस्थसंशयचयं ज्ञात्वा यतीशो मरुत्
सद्धर्माश्च तिलांशतोप्युपदिशेत्याज्ञानिबन्धं व्यधात् ।
तस्मात्सेतुतिलेति लोकगदितं क्षेत्रं सुतीर्थाल्मिकं
स्कन्दाद्रेर्बिलतोऽवतीर्णयतिना संशोध्यते कालतः ॥ (verses 21-22)

and by Vādirāja in his *Sarasabhārati-Vilāsa* :

स्वानुजं विष्णुतीर्थं तु तपसा धृतकल्मषम् ।
प्रेषयिष्यति सत्तत्त्वकथनाय कलौ किल ॥ (vii, 26).

He founded a Mutt of his own at Subrahmaṇya, which exists to this day, presided over by a line of Bālasannyāsin monks. He was also the original founder of the Sode Mutt (of Vādirāja) at Uḍipi.


The only work of Viṣṇu Tīrtha, that is known, is a metrical digest in four chapters (granthas 699) on the duties of Sannyāsins (Yatidharma). The work is called *Sannyāsavidhi*, in the manuscript (Tuḷu) preserved in the Sode Mutt. It was published from Uḍipi in 1931. We have another Ms. of it in the Mysore O. L. The author says that his main sources of information are the Saṁhitās of the Pañcarātra.² The first chapter deals with miscellaneous topics like the importance of Viṣṇubhakti, types of Adhikāris and shows the superiority of the principles of Madhva's Theism to those of Advaita. The author warns his readers to avoid Advaitins as teachers of Brahnavidyā.³ The ii chapter explains the different modes of initiation of Sannyāsins according to the Vedic Śākhās of Ṛk, Yajus and Sāman and their subdivisions: *Talavakāra* and *Chāndogya* (S. V.) *Āpastamba* and *Bodhāyana* (Y. V.). The iii expatiates on the daily routine

1. See also 'Madhva's Underground Library at Kaṭātala' *ABORI*, xvi, pp. 152-54.

2. नत्वा च देवान् यतिकर्म वक्ष्ये सम्यक् मूलादान्तमीशप्रसादात् ।

* * * पंचरात्रोक्तमार्गेण तु संग्रहेण ॥ ५ ॥

3. Śaṅkara is equally intolerant of Dvaitins as teachers of Brahnavidyā. See his comment on *Kaṭha Up.* i, 2, 8a,



Kāvumana, the ancestral house of Trivikrama, Paṇḍita, at Kāvu,
Kāsargoḍ (now in) Kerala State

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of Gr̥hasthas and Sannyāsins pertaining to Śauca, Snāna, Puṇḍra, Japa, Pūja, Naivedya, Fasts and Cāturmāsya Vrata. The last is miscellaneous in contents dealing among other things with the construction of tombs and the burial of ascetics. The treatment of Yatidharmas is far from exhaustive. Passages are cited from the *VTN*, *Bhāgavata*, *Bhārata* and the *Pañcarātra Saṁhitās* quoted by Madhva, in his various works (i, 18).

3. KALYĀṆA DEVĪ I.

To Kalyāṇa Devī, a sister of Madhva (*M. Vij.* ii, 35), are ascribed three minor works (1) a Kṛṣṇa Stotra, in 8 verses (Printed Kumbakonam); (2) an *Aṇu Vāyu Stuti*; and (3) a *Laghutāratamyastotra* dealing with the gradation of the gods. No further details about the later life or descendants of the authoress are known.

4. KALYĀṆA DEVĪ II.

Tradition speaks of another Kalyāṇa Devī, a sister of Trivikrama Paṇḍita, of whom is recorded the curious fact that she remained unmarried. Her only work is a *Laghu Vāyu Stuti*, in six verses (*S. M.* pp. 249-50).¹

5. TRIVIKRAMA PAṆDITĀCĀRYA (c. 1258-1320)

The most outstanding personality among the Taulava disciples of Madhva, was Trivikrama Paṇḍita, the father of Madhva's illustrious biographer Nārāyaṇa Paṇḍita. He seems to have been the Court Pandita of Jayasimha, Ruler of Kumbha and converted to the Vaiṣṇavism of Madhva, in or about 1300. After his conversion, he wrote a learned and animated commentary on Madhva's *Brahma-Sūtra Bhāṣya*, known as *Tattvapradīpa*. His early life and career are fully described by his son in cantos xiii and xv of his *Madhva-vijaya*. This account has been supplemented by me in my paper on the 'Life and Works of Trivikrama Paṇḍita' (*Journal of the Annamalai University*, ii, 2) with information gathered from the descendants of Trivikrama now at Kāvugolī (near Kāsargod, now in Kerala) and from other sources.

LIFE

Trivikrama was by birth a Tuḷu² (Shivalli) Brahmin, like Madhva. He has given his Tulu family surname of "Likuca" (Pejjetāya) in his *Uṣāharāṇa*. The family house still exists in the village Svārāma, Kāvu or Kāvugolī, as it is called, lying about two miles north of the modern town of Kāsargod, the village of his birth. His father, Subrahmaṇya Paṇḍita, belonged to the Āṅgīrasa gotra. He had three sons, the eldest of whom was Trivikrama. While yet in his teens, Trivikrama gave unmistakable proof of his poetic calibre and future greatness, by producing a Sanskrit Kāvya of great beauty : the *Uṣāharāṇa*,

1. *Stotra Mahodadhi*, (a Collection of Mādhva Stotras) Belgaum, 1923.

2. The alleged Nambūdri parentage of Trivikrama (K. R. Pisharoti, *I.H.Q.* Dec. 1929), has been refuted by me in my paper on Trivikrama in the *A. U. J.* ii, 2.

in 9 cantos, treating of the love affairs of Uṣā and Aniruddha. Soon he mastered all the Śāstraic learning of his days and emerged as a great scholar and a master of his faith, the Advaita-Vedānta. But his mind was not at rest with his ancestral creed. It was at this time that news reached him of the growing success of the new system of Vedānta that was being propounded by Madhva. His younger brother Śaṁkarācārya, was already in the employ of Madhva as his Librarian; and through him Trivikrama managed to get hold of copies of some of Madhva's works, particularly his *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*. He felt attracted by the new approach of the new Teacher. When Madhva himself came later, to Viṣṇumaṅgala and camped there, Trivikrama, urged by his curiosity and longing to hear the new Teacher, went and heard his discourses. His heart was stirred to its depths by what he heard. His blood began to boil within him, as he sat there watching the citadel of Monism being razed to the ground, without fear or favor. He rose and offered himself for a debate. Madhva was only too glad to meet such an adversary as Trivikrama, — the scholar who had the proverbial "lakh and a quarter" granthas of the Śaṁkara-Vedānta at his fingers' ends. The debate lasted full 15 days at the end of which Trivikrama felt dazed and completely routed. He owned himself vanquished and begged to be admitted as a disciple. It was done. The profound sincerity and prodigious scholarship of Trivikrama had not escaped Madhva. The Paṇḍita was commissioned to write a commentary on the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* of the new system, which he did under the name of *Tattvapradīpa*. His last days were eventless. He seems to have had three sons, the youngest of whom was Nārāyaṇa Paṇḍita, the author of the *M. Vij.*¹ We may place Trivikrama between c. 1258-1320 A.D.

WORKS

(1) UṢĀHARAṆA (p)²

This is an ornate Kāvya in nine cantos dealing with the *affaire de coeur* between Uṣā, the fair daughter of Bāṇāsura and Aniruddha. The author uses the Pāñcālī style and displays all his mastery of the niceties of the Kāvya style, and makes copious use of śleṣas, yamaka etc. He is a master of *bandhas* and other poetic feats, too. We have *Murajabandha* (viii, 25), *ardhabhramaka* (viii, 57) *gomūtrikā* (viii, 61) and *cakrabandha* (viii, 75). The first canto begins with the birth of Krishna and ends with the slaying of Kāmsa. The 2nd deals with the encounter with Kālayavana and the building of Dvārakā. The 3rd narrates the abduction of Rukmiṇī and the 4th with the love scenes between the divine couple, the birth of Pradyumna and the kidnapping of the baby by Śambara etc., till the return of Pradyumna after slaying the demon and the

1. त्रिविक्रमगुणनिघेः सुशिष्याः सुताः

मतामभिमतास्त्रयो यस्तृतीयोज्ञ नारायणः ।

(Concluding verse in the *M. Vij. Bhāvaprakāśikā*, of the author himself (Uḍipi).

2. Sri Krishna Press, Uḍipi (with commentary).

birth of Aniruddha. The 5th gives an account of the sport of Aniruddha, the dream of Uṣā, the nocturnal abduction of Aniruddha, his secret meeting with her and their love scenes. The 6th ends with the discovery of the clandestine love affair and the imprisonment of Aniruddha. The 7th touches on the arrival of Kṛṣṇa and his army at Śonitapura and the 8th describes the sensational fight between Kṛṣṇa and Śiva and the defeat of both Bāṇa and Śiva. The 9th rounds up the story with the return home of Aniruddha and his marriage with Uṣā.¹

There are sufficient indications that the author intended Kṛṣṇa to be the hero of his Kāvya (i, 5). He handles the Upajāti, Campakamallikā, Mālinī, Rathoddhatā, Praharṣiṇī, Śārdūlavikrīḍita and other metres with grace. Though describing battle scenes and ministerial meetings, he is essentially a love poet (iv, 10-12; ii, 57 and V, 68-76). The work was commented upon, in the 18th century, by Sumatindra Tīrtha.

(2) TATTVAPRADĪPA (p)

Trivikrama's *Tattvapradīpa*, in 5000 granthas, is a lucid commentary on Madhva's *B. S. B.* It is written in a somewhat exuberantly ornate style that is characteristic of the author. It is a swift-moving and discursive commentary on the original—not a close or strictly word for word *tīkā*. Barring the *Sattarkadīpāvali* of Padmanābha Tīrtha, it is the earliest commentary on the *B. S. B.* of Madhva, coming from the pen of one who had the privilege of trying conclusions with Madhva and afterwards sitting at his feet to learn the inmost secrets of his system. There is striking resemblance in style between the *TD* on the one hand and the *Samkṣepaśārīraka* of Sarvajñātman and the *Prakāṣārtha* (on Śaṅkara's *B. S. B.*), on the other, in richness of diction and exuberance of fancy. With all its embellished style, the *TD* was early superseded by the *Tattvaparakāśikā* of Jayatīrtha, a more measured writer. His method of treatment was also fuller, more technical and substantial. A fragment of the *TD* covering the first five *adhikaraṇas*, was published by me² in 1934. The full text has been published in 1958, by the Akhila Bhārata Mādhva Mahāmaṇḍala, Uḍipi.

Trivikrama displays great dialectic ability and erudition in his commentary. He is deeply read in the works of Madhva and comes out often in the course of his commentary with high-flown tributes to the Master.³ He quotes from many of the works of Madhva, including his *A V* and the *Upaniṣad-Bhāṣyas*, as well as from Śaṅkara's *Bhāṣya* on the *B. S.* and from the *Samkṣepaśārīraka* (under i, 2, 12) and mentions by implication Śaṅkara's *bhāṣya* on the *Gītā*.⁴ Some idea of the other portions of the

1. For a full literary appreciation of the work, see my paper on Trivikrama in *AUJ.* ii, 2.

2. Law Journal Press, Madras, 1934.

3. Cf. जगति सुरवरपुरःसरकविजनमनःसरसिजसहस्रकिरणेभ्यो भाष्यकारभट्टारकेभ्य एभ्यः
* * * (Ms.)

4. See p. 80 of my edn. of *TD*.

TD may be gathered from my paper on Trivikrama in the AUJ (ii, 2, p. 224). He gives a rare glimpse into the personality of Madhva as seen by him. He also throws light on some of the 'untraceable' passages cited by Madhva.

His attacks on the Advaita are tinged with bitterness and satire, as are those of the *Prakaṭārtha* on the Realists; but his criticisms are, sound, powerful and difficult to parry.

The two or three other works attributed to him¹ are all *Stotras*. His (3) *Nṛsimhastuti*, comprising 22 verses in Mālinī, has been published in the *S. M.* His (4) *Viṣṇustuti*, in 33 Sragdharās, was printed at Punganūr in 1890. His most popular Stotra is the *Vāyustuti* (p),² in 41 Sragdharā verses lauding the triple incarnations of Vāyu, as Hanumān, Bhīma and Madhva.

6. ŚAMKARĀCĀRYA

He was the younger brother of Trivikrama;³ and was in the employ of Madhva, as his Librarian, even before his brother's encounter with Madhvā. In *M. Vij.* xv, 136, he is clearly mentioned as a disciple of Madhva. That he was free to retain his "Smārta" name is a clear proof of the catholicity of Madhva's temperament.⁴ Śamkara was by no means a mere book-keeper. He was a scholar of some merit. We have a short and somewhat cryptic comment by him on the AV., of which two good Mss. in Devanāgarī, are deposited in the T. P. L. nos. 7877-8. The commentary called *Sambandha-dīpikā*, (m) is an abstract of the adhikaraṇas of the *B. S.*, in something like a code language. It is quoted by Rāghavendra Svāmi, in his *Parimala* and by Raghunātha Tīrtha, in his *Śeṣacandrikā*. The work contains 400 granthas. On p. 6058 of the T. P. L. Cat., (Vol. xiv) the author has been dismissed with a curt remark that "nothing more is known about him" save that his name "is said to have been Śamkara" !

7. NĀRĀYAṆA PAṆDITĀCĀRYA

Trivikrama's third and youngest son,⁵ Nārāyaṇa has earned lasting fame for himself by his great metrical biography of Madhva. Nothing is however known of his brothers. Like his father, he too was a good poet. He has more than established his claims to poesy by his metrical biography of Madhva and other compositions. An ardent Mādhva, the fire

1. The attribution to him of the *Maṇimañjari*, in the *Catalogus Catalogorum* (iii, p. 52) and of the *Nayacandrikā* in the Catalogue of the Mys. O. L. (C-2066) are unfounded, both being the works of his son.

2. There are many editions with or without a C. and one edn. with English Tr. Madras, 1977.

3. See *Bhāvaprakāśikā* on *M. Vij.* xv, 136.

4. Contrast in this connection the absurd and malicious charges of sectarian bigotry, against the followers of Madhva, by Mm. Anantakrishna Sastri, in his *Introd.* to the edn. of the *Advaitasiddhi* etc. (Calcutta Skt. Ser. IX.). For their refutation see *N. I. A.* 1940.

5. Not his brother's son, as in *S. K.* 1931 (p. 173).

of religious zeal seems to have burned in his heart with a steady glow and with all the freshness and vigor of recent converts. Part at least of the sharp language which he, like his father, uses towards the professors of Advaita, must be put down to his passion for his new-found religion.

WORKS¹

Nearly twenty works have been ascribed to him, of which just a dozen have been published. Of the rest, some six are yet to be attested by mss. A few others are known through references in later works.

(1) TATTVA MAÑJARI*

This is not, so far as I am aware, attested by any ms. But a quotation, purporting to be from the *Tattvamañjari* of Nārāyaṇa Paṇḍitācārya, occurs in the *Bhāṣyadīpikā* of Jagannātha Tīrtha (p. 39). Judging from the nature of the reference, the work seems to have been a commentary on the *VTN*.

(2) PRAMĀṆALAKṢAṆA TIPPANĪ**

In the Catal. of the G. V. L. (p. 96) a c. on the *Pramāṇapaddhati* (of Jayatīrtha) has been ascribed to Nārāyaṇa. This is obviously an erroneous entry for the *PL*. The same mistake occurs in the Catal. of the Mys. O. L. (C-2333).

(3) NAYACANDRIKĀ (p)

This c. on the *AV*. is a short one in 2750 granthas. The exposition is clear and spirited and free from digressions and polemical discussions of an elaborate kind such as we have in the *Sanṇyāyaratnāvali* and the *NS*. He quotes the *TD* (p. 5) and the *Sanṇyāyaratnāvali* of Padmanābha, referring to them both with respect :

सन्त्यायरत्नावलयः सन्त्यायामृतबिन्दवः ।

श्रीमत्तत्त्वप्रदीपाश्च सन्तु नः शरणप्रदाः ॥

He also quotes from the *B. T.* of Madhva (p. 34) and is profuse in his admiration and regard for the memory of Madhva and lavish in his praises of him (p. 54). He helps in fixing the source of many of the texts from unspecified sources in the *AV* (see p. 52, lines 9-10; p. 44, lines 4-5).

(4) *Bhāvadīpa** is another work ascribed² to him in the G. V. L. Cat. No Ms. is traceable and nothing can be said about its contents. Glosses

1. The following marks of reference have been used in connection with the works noticed already and those to be noticed :

* placed after the name of the work shows that it is *not* known through any Ms.; *but* is supported by some literary reference.

Double stars ** mean there is neither a ms. known nor a reference, but only tradition in favor of the ascription. (p) means printed and (m) still in manuscripts.

2. There is no basis for the ascription of the *Advaitakālānala* to him, in the *S. K.* (p. 174) and in the *Vij. Sexcent. Vol.* (p. 297) or in Prof. Hanumantarao's approval of it (*Madhvamunidāsa*), Dec. 28 p. 157, f. n. This work will be noticed in Chap. XXXIII.

on (5) *Yamakabhārata*** and (6) *Kṛṣṇāmṛtamahārṇava*** are not traceable. His (7) *Samgraha-Rāmāyaṇa* (p)¹ is a metrical epitome of the Rāmāyaṇa, in six cantos, each divided into Sargas.

(8) MADHVA-VIJAYA (p)B²

The life and achievements of Madhva are narrated here in this Kāvya of 16 cantos. It is the *earliest extant* biography of Madhva, though not the earliest ever composed. The author quotes in his own gloss on it, from another and perhaps a shorter metrical account (Vide his *Bhāva-prakāśikā*, on *M. Vij.* v, 8-12; v, 46; x, 21-22; 50-51; xi, 1; xii, 2; 46; and xiii, 1-3). The details of the life and career of Madhva, as furnished by him, have already been brought together, in an earlier context. The work deserves to be translated into English for the sake of the valuable historical materials in it. The account is, in the main, fairly full, reliable and accurate, even as regards details. Though the theme is religious and hagiological, the author has managed to infuse a genuine poetic feeling into his work and it stands superb as one of the leading Kāvyas in Dvaita Literature and as a good specimen of a Mahākāvya in Sanskrit. Despite his religious outlook, the author was a poet of merit and the son of a gifted poet. Even as a piece of Kāvya, it stands on a much higher level than similar "Vijayas" in the field like the *Śaṅkaravijayas* of Ānandagiri and Mādhavācārya. As Madhva and his biographer were not far removed in time from each other, the work is able to achieve a far greater measure of historical accuracy and wealth of contemporary details, than was possible for the authors of Śaṅkara's biographies, who were removed from their subject by more than five to six centuries and are guilty of many anachronisms.

(9) AṆU MADHVA VIJAYA (p)

This is otherwise called *Prameyanavamālikā*,³ and is a metrical outline of the *M. Vij.* in 32 stanzas. Towards the close of the work reference is made both to the *M. Vij.* and its commentary by himself:

सुमध्वविजयाभिधं व्यधितभावदीपाह्वयं

प्रमेयनवमालिकां पुनरिमां च दक्षां च ताम् ।

सतां श्रवणभूषणं व्यतनुतैष नारायणः ॥ (Madras O. L., D. C. XXI, no. 12144)

(10) MADHVA-VIJAYA-BHĀVAPRAKĀŚIKA, (p)⁴

The object of this short gloss on the *M. Vij.* is to elucidate the obscure

1. Printed, Belgaum.

2. (p) B means printed at Belgaum (Ramatattva Prakāśa Press) and (p) D denotes that the work was printed and published from Dharwar (by G. R. Savanur). The Belgaum edn. of *M. Vij* carries the C. of Chalarī Śeṣācārya. The Pejavar Mutt edn. (1951) carries the C. of Viśvapati T. and my English introduction.

3. Not "*Aprameyamālikā*" as in *Catal. Cat.*, p. 291. The work is also preserved in the India Office Lib. with a com. (KEITH, I. O. C. ii, no. 6062. It has been printed at Uḍipi.

4. Sri Krishna Press, Uḍipi, 1925 (Published by the Svāmi of the Kaṇūr Mutt).

references and passages in the original and provide historical notes and comments, where necessary, to identify the names of places and persons belonging to S. Kanara, appearing in their Sanskritised form (from the original Tuḷu), in the *M. Vij.* This gloss is, thus, of immense value for a historical appreciation of those incidents in the life of Madhva, whose scenes have been laid exclusively in the Tuḷu country.¹ It also helps to throw light on the correct name or identity of certain persons also referred to by other epithets and sobriquets (e.g. Cola-ja : Padmatīrtha and Dvīpi Purī : Puṇḍarikā Purī). With this gloss we can easily reconstruct, fairly accurately, the movements of Madhva, within the Tuḷu country and outside.

As already mentioned, there are references in this gloss to another metrical biography, or may be to more than one such earlier work, on the life of Madhva. That they are different from the *Aṇumadhvavijaya* is obvious. We are unable to say anything more about these earlier 'Lives of Madhva.' The gloss adds considerably to our knowledge of the incidents in the life of Madhva, briefly alluded to in the *M. Vij.*²

The author assures us in the Epilogue, that he has made a conscientious attempt to record all details as accurately as possible. He makes it more or less clear that he was not an eye-witness to *many* of the events narrated by him. This may show that he must have been too young to have a clear personal recollection of his early contacts with Madhva, if not that he had never seen him, in his life. The former hypothesis seems probable in view of certain other hints in his work (xii, 34) and seeing he was the youngest of the three sons of Trivikrama. His main sources are the earlier biographies cited by him, his own father and certain other eye-witnesses mentioned by him (Epilogue, verses 6-8).

(11) MAṆIMANJARĪ (p)^B

This is a Prologue to the *M. Vij.* in 8 cantos, providing a sort of mytho-poetic background to the rise of the Dvaita Vedānta. The first four cantos are a summary of the story of the Rāma and Krishna Avatars. The fifth deals with the persecution of the Buddhists and the stifling of Avedistic beliefs by the activities of the Pūrvamīmāṃsakas. The sixth leads up to the emergence of the Advaita Vedānta, and the seventh with its growing success, victory of Śaṅkara over Maṇḍana and Sureśvara (who are rightly distinguished from each other, unlike in the *Śaṅkaravijayas*) and the campaign of religious persecution set on foot by the followers of Śaṅkara against the forerunners of the Dvaita creed. The eighth continues the story of the persecution and gives a graphic account of it and the steps taken by the disciples of the Dvaita teacher Prājña Tīrtha, in self-defence and for preservation of his line. The account is brought up to the birth of Madhva.

1. Some of these details from the *Bhāvaprakāśikā* have been utilized in my English introd. to the edn. of the *Madhvavijaya*, with the c. of Viśvapati, Uḍipi, 1951.

2. For example of the identity of the Advaitic monk encountered by M. at Kanyākumari as a Taulava monk as different from Vidyāśaṅkara of Śṛṅgeri and the aggressive attacks made on M's party to disturb his Cātur māsyā.

(12) SAṄGRAHA-RĀMĀYAṆA (p) B¹

This is an inspiring condensation of the Rāmāyaṇa story in seven Kāṇḍas of 3512 verses. The narrative follows strictly the outline and spirit of the story, characterization, significance of the incidents described and part played by the different characters, as set forth by M. in his *Mbh. T. N.* (Adhy. III. to IX.). Cf. the treatment of Rāma's encounter with Paraśurāma, the abduction of Sītā's 'Pratikṛti' by Rāvaṇa and the antecedents of Mantharā.

The epic metre of Anuṣṭubh is used for the most part with distinction, ease and grace of diction, alliteration and imagery. The Kāvya is called 'Rāmāṅka' as the word "Rāma" is used in the last verse of each canto. The work has been published with a simple Sanskrit c. of Vidyābhūṣaṇa Yati who has paid homage to Vādirāja and Vedagarbha T. and refers to his Guru's exhortation to him to worship Śrī Kṛṣṇa — a probable indication that he belonged to one of the Uḍipi Mutts, though his name does not occur in any of their succession lists, probably because he did not succeed to any Pīṭha.

His (13) *Śubhodaya* (p) is an allegorical Kāvya in five Kāṇḍas, each divided into Vargas made up of groups of ten verses. Each Varga is in a different metre. The subject-matter is a philosophical allegory depicting the transmigratory career of King Śubha (the individual soul) caught by the blandishments of the temptress Abhikāminī (Prakṛti); and his ultimate emergence (Udaya) from the snares of Prakṛti by the grace of God. The details of the allegory are vividly portrayed. The characters are representations of spiritual values and psycho-physical principles.

The work is obviously a *primitiae* of the author. He displays full mastery over the intricacies of Sanskrit metres and indulges in all kinds of metrical *tours de force* such as bandhas, Ekākṣara, Ekācāka, niroṣṭhya etc. Till recently known only through a solitary reference in Sumatīndra's gloss on the *Uṣāharaṇa*, this poem has recently been published by the Sode Mutt, Uḍipi, with my English introduction (1957).

(14) *Pārijātaharaṇam* (m) is a Kāvya in three cantos, dealing with the story of the 'theft' of the celestial tree, by Kṛṣṇa, at the request of Satyabhāmā. Aufrecht (iii, 62) notes a work of this name, ascribed to Nārāyaṇa Paṇḍita. There is a much-injured palm leaf ms., (Nandināgarī) of this work in the Madras O. L. (D. C. 11860).² The author revels in *yamakas*. The Madras ms., contains also a commentary, probably by the author himself.

(15) His *Yoga-Dīpikā* (p)³ is a work on ritualistic worship (pūjā),

1. Printed at Ramatattva Prakash Press, Belgaum 1890.

2. Glasenapp (*Madhva's Philosophie des Viṣṇu-Glaubens*, p. 85) refers to an edn. of this work from Puṅganur, in 1890, which is not now available.

3. A Devanāgarī ms. in good condition is preserved in the T. P. L. (xiv. no. 8126). The Editor *airily remarks* that the work is "an explanation of the word Yoga in Vedānta-śāstra" (p. 6228) ! The work has been printed and published by the Admār Mutt, Uḍipi, 1956.

in 730 granthas. He bows to his father Trivikrama and gives a complete account of the daily duties of the householder. The work is divided into ten chapters called Paṭalas. Mantradīkṣā by the Guru is described in ch. i.; daily rites in ii; Ekādaśī Vrata, Homa and Pāraṇā in v; and Pratimāpūjā in the last. Details of image-worship (Devapūjā) are given in iii. The meaning and significance of Vedic mantras to be used in the daily worship of Mādhvas are explained in this work, which is sometimes quoted in the commentaries on Madhva's *Tantrasārasaṅgraha*.

MINOR WORKS

His (16) *Śivastuti*, in 13 verses has been printed from Belgaum (S. M. pp. 283-6) with and without a commentary.¹ It is positive proof of the fact that the Mādhvas are *not* bigots opposed to the worship of Śiva. Other Stotras of the author include (17) *Aṇu Vāyustuti*; (18) *Laghutāratamyastotra* and (18) *Nrsimhastuti* in 39 verses (S. M. pp. 125-6). His (19) *Tithitrayanirṇaya* is a tract for the proper ascertainment of the three *tithis* *daśamī*, *ekādaśī* and *dvādaśī*. The *Madhvanamantrārthamañjari* is *not*, as stated in the S. K. (p. 75) a work of this author, as will be clear in Chap. XXXIII. Yet another work ascribed to him is (20) an *Aṃśāmsīnirṇaya* ** of which nothing more is known.

8. "TRAIVIKRAMĀRYADĀSA"

A son (?) and disciple of Nārāyaṇa Paṇḍitācārya,² who describes himself merely as "Traivikramāryadāsa" — a disciple and 'servant' of the son of Trivikrama, wrote a gloss on the *Aṇu-Bhāṣya*, entitled *Ānandamālā*, of which a Devanagarī Ms. is preserved in the Mys. O. L. (C-2088).: The work has been published by the Daśapramati Prakāśana Samiti, Udipi, 1970. A passage from it is quoted in Jagannātha Tīrtha's *Bhāṣyadīpikā* (on iv. 4.19) dismissing the explanation given by Vādirāja (*TPG* p. 177) of the passage : आत्मेत्येव परं देवम् with the remark that his explanation is opposed to that of the *Ānandamālā*. The S. K. (p. 20) wrongly attributes this work to Padmanābha Tīrtha.³ Internal evidence leaves no room for doubt that the author was a disciple of Nārāyaṇa Paṇḍita. He has not, however, chosen to reveal his name.⁴

The commentary which is the earliest known on the *Aṇu Bhāṣya* is full and informing. (See p. 26 Ms : ब्रह्मणेत्यादेरयमर्थः * *) His ornate style bears a family resemblance to that of Trivikrama and his son. In him, too, we meet with the same gushing rhapsodies of admiration for Madhva. The following passage is a typical example :

1. Of Viśvapati Tīrtha (printed, Udipi).

2. Cf. अशेषवेदान्तकृतान्तसारव्याख्याविहारान् हरिभक्तिसिद्धन् ।

त्रिविक्रमायान्परमानुरूपे नारायणार्याश्च गुरुन् नतोस्मि ॥

(Introd. verse 3, *Ānandamālā*)

3. The mistake is repeated in the *Vijayanagar Sexcen.* Vol. (p. 297).

4. In the colophon of the work, he is simply called "Traivikramāryadāsa".

नहि बहुविशेषज्ञचूडामणिं सर्वज्ञभास्करमन्तरेणैव तादृशभाष्यानुभाष्यविरचने चतुरचेताश्चतुर्दशभुवने-
ष्वस्ति । किं पुनरेकेनैव वाक्येन पदेनाक्षरेण वा तत्तदधिकरणार्थसंग्रहभाषणे कुशलमतिर्नास्तीति । यदभिप्रेताभि-
मतमंशांशमपि लेशत एव वक्तुं संप्रति यतामहे । न चास्माकं तत्प्रतिपादनपाटवमपटुधियाम् । यद्यप्यस्मदाचार्या-
श्रयान्मध्वसूर्यसंदर्शितार्थान् तत्प्रसादैकबलमवलंब्य कथंचित् प्रायशः प्रकाशयितुं शक्नुमः । किं तर्हि मनोवागभिमत-
तद्भाष्यभावावर्तनलौल्यादेवायमस्मत्सन्नाहविजृम्भः ।

(p. 6 Ms) Quotations are made from the *B. S. B.* and *AV* of Madhva and reference is made to the *Nayacandrikā*¹ of Nārāyaṇa Paṇḍita.

Two other short works of Traivikramāryadāsa have been made known by Prof. K. T. Pandurangi now Reader at the Bangalore University. They are (2) a gloss (m) on Madhva's *Kenopanīṣad-Bhāṣya*, and (3) another (m) on the *Māṇḍūkya Bhāṣya*. Both are available in complete Devanāgarī mss, with Śrī Gurjālī Srinivasacharya of Malkhed. Their identity of authorship is established by the style, the introductory statements² and the colophon.³

1. तदर्थश्च नयचन्द्रिकायां गुरुभिरेव व्यक्तं विवृतः ।

2. अथेदानीं एतद्भाष्यकारभट्टारकोऽस्मद्गुरूणामपि गुरुत्तमः सुरवरपुरःसरसुजननिकरनिरन्तराराधित-
चरणसरोरुहो * * इति ॥ (*Kena. Up. Bh. gloss*)

3. त्रैविक्रमार्यानुचरकृता समाप्ता । (*op. cit.*).

PRĀCĪNA TĪKĀKĀRAS

1. PADMANĀBHA TĪRTHA (C. 1318-24)¹

PADMANĀBHA Tīrtha was a native of the Kannaḍa country. The reference to him in the *M. Vij.* as “having come from the region of the Godāvārī” (यो गोदाया उपाययौ xv, 120) is not a conclusive evidence for the general presumption of earlier writers that he must have been a Telugu by birth and a native of the Āndhra country. The borders of Karnatak stretched, according to the *Kavirājamārga*, as far as the Godāvārī² and the reference to Padmanābha in the *Sampradāya Paddhati* of Hṛṣīkeśa Tīrtha, as “the teacher of the good folk of Karnataka and others” :

यः कर्नाटकपूर्वसज्जनगुरुः श्रीपद्मनाभाह्वयः ।

raise an equally strong presumption in favor of looking upon him as a native of Uttara-Karnataka. The *Gurucaryā* clinches the matter by clearly stating that he *was* an Uttara-Karnataka :

कर्नाटकोत्तरादेर्हि पद्मनाभमुनेरसौ ।

* * * (ii)

Padmanābha's former name is stated to have been Śobhanabhaṭṭa.³ He was met by Madhva on his way back to Udipi from his first north Indian tour. Śobhanabhaṭṭa was a distinguished scholar of his day and master of all the branches of learning, a good student of the Vedas, Purāṇas and the Epic and an accomplished logician (Tārkikaśikhāmaṇi).⁴ He tried conclusions with Madhva and was worsted by him in disputation. He sought and obtained the favor of admission to the new faith and afterwards became a monk under the name of Padmanābha Tīrtha. The event may be placed about 1265 A.D. He soon became one of the trusted disciples of Madhva. Unstinted praise is lavished upon him,⁵ in the *M. Vij.* xv, 120-26. He was probably the seniormost of the disciples from outside the Tulu country, which probably made it possible for him to be constituted the first “successor” of Madhva on the ‘main’ Pīṭha. He

1. In respect of Pontiffs, the dates in brackets, unless otherwise stated, represent their dates of succession to the Pīṭha and demise. Dates of birth have also been given in some cases, wherever determinable.

2. There is evidence of flourishing settlements of Vaiṣṇavas, presumably Kannaḍa-speaking, even as late as the xvi century in several parts of the Ahmednagar district, such as Jeur, and Puntāmbā, on the Godavari.

3. *M. Vij.* ix, 17a. Bhandarkar (*Collected Works*) gives his name as Ānanda-bhaṭṭāraka. Baladeva, in his c. on Jivagosvāmin's *Tattvasandarbhā*, refers to the great Padmanābha Tīrtha proficient in fourteen branches of learning, having been silenced by Madhva in fourteen seconds.

4. *M. Vij.* ix, 17-19.

5. Cf. वेदान्ताब्धि न यो जातु जहौ विद्वत्तिमिगिलः ॥

was, according to the Mutt lists, Pontiff for seven years and passed away at Navabṛndāvana, near Hampi, on the *Tuṅgabhadṛā*, in 1324. His mortal remains lie entombed there.

WORKS

Nearly fifteen works have been ascribed to him of which only a few have so far been printed. A small fragment of his commentary on the *B. S. B.* has been published by me.¹ All his unpublished works, save three, are preserved in mss.

Padmanābha was the leading commentator of the system in the Pre-Jayatīrtha period. He is even more important to the history of Dvaita Literature than Trivikrama, as he is the earliest known commentator on Madhva's *Daśa-Prakaraṇas*, the *B. S. B.* the *AV.* and the *G. B.*, while Trivikrama had contented himself with writing a commentary on the *B. S. B.* alone. In the wider sense of the term, Padmanābha is the "*Tikā-kāra*" of the system. No wonder, that Jayatīrtha, who is again the next great commentator on a majority of the works of Madhva, eulogizes Padmanābha as the pioneer commentator of the Dvaita system, but for whose guidance the works of Madhva would have presented serious difficulties to posterity and gives him the title of "*Tikā-kāra*" (*N. S.* i, 4, p. 222. Bby) :

स पद्मनाभतीर्थार्यगोणोऽस्तु दृशे मम ।

न तत्त्वमार्गगमनं विना यदुपजीवनम् ॥ (*G. T. Nyāyadīpikā*).

COMMENTARIES ON THE TEN PRAKARAṆAS

Commentaries on all the ten Prakaraṇas have been ascribed to him. But no mss., of his commentaries on the *TS.*, *TV* and *KN.*, are available. His commentaries on the rest of the Prakaraṇas are brief and pointed. He is not discursive like Jayatīrtha and is seldom polemically inclined, here. His lucid and impressive style has been perfected by Jayatīrtha. Most of his commentaries are presupposed by Jayatīrtha in his and laid under contribution and this debt is handsomely acknowledged. As a matter of fact, all the earlier commentaries of Trivikrama, Narahari and Padmanābha have been completely superseded by those of Jayatīrtha. They are no longer studied and have ceased to have any but a historical interest.

A Nāgari Ms. of (4) his c. on the *Td* is preserved in the Mys. O. L. (2974 f. 76-81). That on the *VTN.* (Mys. O. L. 2974 f. 82-108) would seem to go by the name of *Nyāyaratnāvali*. It is quoted by Jagannātha Tīrtha in his *Bhaṣyadīpikā*. Interesting is Padmanābha's explanation of the phrase : Yathārtham. Yathājñeyam. Arthaśabdasya jñeyavācitvāt yathājñeyam pramāṇam ityuktam bhavati. His commentaries on two of the *Khaṇḍanatraya* the *MK* and the *UK* have been published

1. *Sattarkadīpāvali*, on the first four adhikaraṇas only. See edn. of *Catussūtrībhāṣya* of Madhva with comm. of Trivikrama, Padmanābha and Jayatīrtha, Law Journal Press, Madras, 1934.

by that doyen of Mādhva publishers T. R. Krishnacharya (Sri Vidya Press, Kumbakonam, 1929). That on the *PMK* known as *Nyāyaratnāvali* quoted by Śrīnivasa¹ in his c. on the *Kiraṇāvali* on the *G. T. Nyāyadīpikā* of Jayatīrtha (Bby. 1906, p. 60). Mss. of his cc. on the (9) *KL* and (10) *PL* are available both at Mysore (2974) and Madras (3928).

SŪTRA PRASTHĀNA

The c. on the *B. S. B.* is known as (11) *Sattarkadīpāvali* (m).² We have no ms. of it in any of the O. Ls. at Tanjore, Madras or Mysore. I have with me a ms. of this rare c. upto ii, 2. It seems the work was left unfinished by the author as all mss., hitherto available, come to a stop with ii, 2 of *B. S.*, some even earlier. The c. is referred to by name in one of the introductory verses of Satyanātha's *Abhinavacandrikā* and is quoted eight times (from portions anterior to ii, 2) in the *Bhāṣyadīpikā* of Jagannātha. The portion of the work now available runs to 1700 granthas, nearly. The author keeps close to the original. He quotes from the *Dvādaśa-stotra* of Madhva (under i, 3, 8) and mentions the *AV.* by name (i, 4, 27).

(12) *Sannyāyaratnāvali* (p)³, c. on the *AV.* is the biggest of his works (granthas 5304). It is quoted occasionally by Jayatīrtha and often by Vyāsātīrtha in his *Candrikā*, where an attempt is made to reconcile some of the views of Padmanābha and Trivikrama with those of Jayatīrtha. This c. has however been completely superseded by the *NS.* of Jayatīrtha, which is seven times its size. Dignity, elegance, clearness, brevity and avoidance of digressions and controversies mark his style. None of the Pre-Jayatīrtha cc. has however found any subsequent glosses. The *NS.* of Jayatīrtha is much indebted to this work both for manner and matter. The same is the case with the cc. on the *Prakaraṇas*.

(13) Padmanābha's *Gītābhāṣya-Bhāvadīpikā* (m), is not so well-known as his other works. A complete Devanāgarī ms. of it, exists in a private collection at Bangalore.⁴ The number of granthas is 1700. The name of the c. is not given either in the colophon or in the introductory verses.⁴ But the language and style make it clear that it is a work of one of Madhva's direct disciples. There are no references here, to any earlier c. on the *GB.* There are many references to and criticisms of the

1. Pupil of Satyapūrṇa Tīrtha (1707-26) of the Uttarādi Mutt. See his introd. verses 4-5.

2. Not *Sattarkaratnāvali*, as in *Vij. Sexcen. Vol.* p. 298.

3. Since purchased by the Bangalore Press, Bangalore.

4. The opening verse :

गुणगणनिलयं प्रणम्य कृष्णं जगदधदहनं च वासवीसुनुम् ।

मुनिकुलतिलकं सुपूर्णबोधं गुरुमपि विवृणोमि गीतिकाभाष्यम् ॥

bears a strong resemblance to the one in J's c. on *GB.* which is significant, as the latter often models his expressions on those of Padmanābha. Cf. *Sannyāyaratnāvali* ii, p. 18 with *NS.*

interpretations of Śaṅkara.¹ It avoids digressions, as usual. A Nāgarī Ms. of his (14) *Gitātātparya-nirṇaya-Prakāśikā* (p) is preserved in the Mys. O.L. (2969 ff. 35-58). The work has since been published in the SVD. Ser. no. 14. Jayatīrtha, in his c. on the *GT.* (introd. 3) acknowledges his indebtedness to it. The work runs to 900 granthas. The colophon gives the commentator's name as Padmanābha Bhaṭṭāraka. The expositions and criticisms are lucid as in the case of the examination of "Svaprakāśatva". The c. is quoted in the *Kiraṇāvali* of Śrīnivāsa on Jayatīrtha's c. on *GT.* (Bby. 1905, pp. 175, 207).

2. NARAHARI TĪRTHA (1324-33)

Narahari Tīrtha was presumably from Andhra or Orissa. The *M. Vij.* does not mention Narahari by name; but we have clear evidence of his inscriptions at Śrīkūrmam and elsewhere, to show that he was a *direct* disciple of Madhva. There is no reliable information about his early life and career. A short praise in 13 Sragdharās, called *Narahariyatistotra* (*S. M.* pp. 349-52) professes to give full details of his life. But this is legendary and late in date and hence unreliable for historical purposes. Tradition has been persistent, however, that he was, for some-time, Minister in Kalinga. The *Narahariyatistotra* and some other works also,² allude to his ministry which is said to have lasted twelve years. The fact of ministry is confirmed by the evidence of inscriptions³ from the Śrīkūrmam and Simhācalam temples. There areal together *nine* inscriptions of Narahari with whose help we can easily test and verify the information supplied by tradition and the later chronicles. These epigraphs are distributed over a period of thirty years between 1264 and 1294 A.D.

The *Narahariyatistotra* makes out that he went to Kalinga at the orders of his Guru, Ānandatīrtha, to procure the idols of Mūlarāma and Sītā (which had a legendary history behind them and) which happened then, to be in the State treasury of Kalinga. An opportunity presented itself when the Kalinga King died. His ministers, in timehonored fashion, sent out the state-elephant to pick up and bring them a proper regent. By some stroke of luck, the choice of the elephant fell on Narahari and he was placed on the throne. After 12 years when the Prince came of age, he relinquished his office. The King, in gratitude, bade him choose any presents he would like and the monk asked for the idols, for which he had come there and got them. These he presented to Madhva.

1. मयटो विकारार्थ एवार्थान्तरमेव नास्तीति कश्चित् । तं प्रत्याह नहीति (vii, 13). अव्यक्ताक्षर-शब्दाभ्यां निर्गणं ब्रह्मेत्यपव्याख्यानदूषणायाव्यक्तपदं सप्रमाणं व्याचष्टे-उपासनं चेति (xii, p. 46 ms.)

2. Cf. *Rāghavendravidyaya* (ii, 7) of Nārāyaṇa, 17th century (N. S. Press Bby. 1898.)

3. "द्वेषामुत्र तथात्त योजवति जनान् कालिगभूसंभवान्

(Śrīkūrmam Insc. E. I. vi. 263-5). M. Rama Rau (*Journal of Andhra Historical Research*, XI, pts. 2-4, pp. 154-9 and *Purnabodharaśanī*, ii, 1) is precipitate in dismissing the administration of Narahari as a myth. The term : अवति जनान्कालिगभूसंभवान् of the insc. is significant and difficult either to dismiss or to explain away.

Such is the account of the *Stotra*. We are yet far from knowing the real purpose or duration of the ministry. One thing is certain that Narahari was at the zenith of his power in Kalinga in 1281, the year of his Śrīkūrmam insc., which makes a special mention of his rule over Kalinga and his teacher Ānandatīrtha. There is good reason to believe that he was by no means a stranger to Kalinga or to court-life. His own father seems to have held high office in the state, probably as a minister.¹ In that case, it would not be difficult to understand his choice for the office. The episode of the state-elephant is too legendary and antediluvian to have any place in sober history. The fetching of the Mūlarāma idols must thus have been a purely incidental affair in the political life of Narahari.

The earliest epigraph of Narahari is dated 1264 A.D., in which he is already designated by the ascetic title of “Śrīpāda”. His conversion, then, at the hands of Madhva, must have taken place *in or before*² 1264. His former name is said to have been Svāmi Śāstrī.³ The Śrīkūrmam Insc.⁴ refers to his powers as a swordsman. We may assume, then, that he was about forty years old at the time and calculate his date of birth as circa 1241. He might have been about 22 years at the time of his first meeting with Madhva and three years younger than he.

Of a total of nine inscriptions of his, in Kalinga, only *two*⁵ are dated *before* 1281. The rest are all found distributed between 1281-93. The tone and wording of the insc. of 1281, make it clear that he was the virtual overlord of the country in that year and seeing that there are five more grants between 1281-93, the period of office may well be placed between 1279-91 during the period of Narasimha II. In 1324, he “succeeded” Padmanābha Tīrtha⁶ and ‘ruled’ for nine years, as Pontiff. He died in Śrīmukha, 1333 A.D. and was laid to rest at Cakratīrtha, near Hampi (at some distance from the present Viṭhalasvāmi temple).

The Matsya rulers of Oḍḍavāḍi became independent of the Gaṅgas and were converted to Vaiṣṇavism by Narahari. T. Arjuna became Narasimha Vardhana, Annamarāja Gopālavardhana and Muñjāditya Śrī-raṅgavardhana (Viśakhapatnam Gazetteer p. 27). Narahari was also responsible for the conversion of many princely and aristocratic families of Kalinga and Andhra regions to Mādhva fold. The descendants of these families still flourish in the coastal Andhra and adjoining states.

1. The expression : पित्राचारमुपैति सूनुरिति सन्नीतिस्थितो धर्मतः । is significant. The father of the famous Ālaṅkārika, Viśvanātha, was similarly a “Sandhivigrahika” at the Orissa state.

2. Saletore is not right in placing the first meeting as late as 1270 (*His. of Tuluva*, p. 449).

3. C. M. P. Achar : Life and Teachings of Madhva S. K. has it as Śāmā Śāstrī.

4. For full text of the Inscription see Appendix. II.

5. P. P. S. Sastri, (*Mādhva Chronology*, *Kuppusvami Sastri Com. Vol.*, Madras, pp. 167-9) makes a desperate attempt to emend the date of Śrīkūrmam Insc. to 1181, in order to support the date of Mutt lists for Madhva (1119-99). For a refutation of his views see my paper in ABORI, i, xix, 306-9).

6. S. N. Rajapurohit (*Prācīna Kārnātaka*, Dharwar) attempted a revision of the order of succession among the four disciples of Madhva, placing Narahari, last. For a criticism of his views, see my paper : *Date of Madhva and His Immediate Disciples*, *AUJ.* v. 1.

WORKS

No less than fifteen works have been ascribed to Narahari, of which *only two* are available in Mss. (1-10). The only authority for ascribing to him cc. on *all* the ten Prakaraṇas, is the *S. K.* p. 22. Of these, only the cc. on the *VTN* and *KN* are quoted and criticised by Jayatīrtha, in his cc. No mss. of any of these or the others have been traced. Mm. Vasudeva Sastri Abhyankar (edn. *SDS Bby.* p. 567) ascribes a c. on the *B. S. B.* to Narahari, without any specific authority, even naming it “*Bhāvaprakāśikā*.” There is no reference to any such c. in the later works of the system.

His (11) c. on the *Gītābhāṣya* called *Bhāvaprakāśikā* (m) is quoted with approval in Jayatīrtha’s *Prameyadīpikā* on *G. B.* (ii. 50 and by Rāghavendra in his *Vivṛti* ii, 16). A ms. of it is preserved in the library of the Bangalore Press. It breaks off abruptly with viii, 4 and is full of gaps. It contains only 950 granthas. The author avoids digressions and writes an unaffected though sometimes verbose style. A glowing tribute is paid to Padmanābha Tīrtha, in the fourth opening verse. He throws good light on many obscure lines in the *G. B.* In such cases, where his predecessors have thrown sufficient light, Jayatīrtha has naturally cut short his remarks. The interpretations of Śaṅkara and Bhāskara, disapproved of in the *G. B.*, are pursued further and criticized by Narahari. He refers once to Rāmānuja *by name*. The ff. extracts containing references to rival commentaries, would be of interest :

(1) तत्र मायी “किमाश्रयः कामं जह्यादिति, उच्यते” इति श्लोकं (iii, 42)) अवतार्य, सर्वदृश्येभ्यो बुद्ध्यन्तेभ्योऽभ्यन्तरः यं देहिनं कामो मोहयतीत्युक्तं स ‘बुद्धेः पर’ आत्मा इति वर्णयति ।

(2) तदितरस्तु (i.e. *Bhāskara*)) कस्मिन् कामास्तिष्ठन्तीति दर्शयितुं आहेत्यवतार्य ‘बुद्धेः परतस्तु सः’ इति काम एव परामृश्यते; तस्य प्रकृतत्वात् इति । तदुभयं चानेन निरस्तं भवति ।

(3) अन्यस्तु—भगवतोऽप्यात्मन एवानादित्वं वर्णयति । न तु तद्देहस्य । तद्दूषयति । (iv)

(4) अत्र केचिदकर्तारं इति पदभ्रान्ताः सर्ववेदाद्युक्तं भगवतः सर्वकर्तृत्वं मिथ्येति वर्णयन्ति (iv. 13)

(5) न च तयोरेकत्वचिन्तनं होमः । अश्रुतकल्पनाप्रसंगात् ॥

(6) अपाने [जुह्वति (iv. 29) इत्यादिना श्लोकस्य पूरणरेचनकुंभकपरत्वेन यदपव्याख्यानं तन्निराकुर्वन् यथार्थमाचष्टे ।

(7) द्वन्द्वत्याग एवात्र संन्यासः न माय्युक्तप्रकारेण निष्क्रियः परमात्माहं इति ज्ञानेन शास्त्रीयसर्वकर्म प्रहाणं इति भावेनाह—‘संन्यासशब्दार्थस्तु’ इति (v. p. 57).

(8) Other references occur in v. p. 57; vi and vii. p. 70. His (12) *Yamakabhārata-Tīkā* (p)¹ is preserved in the Mys. O. L. (2985) in a Nāgari ms. (f. 8-11). In addition to his attainments in the field of Śāstras, Narahari Tīrtha is regarded by tradition to have been the forerunner of the Vaiṣṇava devotional movement of the Dāsa Kūṭa, in Kannaḍa. His contribution to this branch will be dealt with in Part VII.

3. MĀDHAVA TĪRTHA (1333-50)

He was the third “in succession” to Madhva, on the “Pīṭha” and

is generally regarded as a direct disciple of Madhva. His former name is said to have been Viṣṇu Śāstri. The *Gurucaryā* clearly states that he was a Southern-Karṇāṭaka.¹

ततःकर्नाटकमेति (?) शब्दितं कृष्णशास्त्रिणम् ।
 संन्यस्य सौख्यतीर्थस्तु ब्रह्मचर्यस्थितं सदा ।
 श्रीमन्माधवतीर्थेति * * * * ॥

He is a comparatively obscure figure in the history of his school and no works of his have come down. Jayatīrtha has completely ignored him in his works. He had probably no literary leanings. Yet the *S. K.* ascribes to him cc. on the R̥g, Yajus and Sāma Vedas ! No mss. of any of these have been found. Inquiries have shown that the reports about the existence of Mss. of these works in the Libraries of some foreign countries are unfounded. The same is the case with the ascription of cc. on the three Vedas to Rāghavendra T, no mss. of which have been preserved in his own Mutt or elsewhere. Mādhava Tīrtha died in 1350 A.D. (Vikṛti) after a 'rule' of 17 years. He founded a Mutt of his own which now exists under the name of Majjigenahallī Maṭha, near Mulbāgal. His mortal remains, said to have been laid to rest originally at Hampi, are now believed to be entombed at Maṇūr, on the Bhīmā river (Iṇḍi taluq of the Bijapur district).

4. AKṢOBHYA TĪRTHA (1350-65)

Akṣobhya Tīrtha was the last "in succession" among the disciples of Madhva. The *Gurucaryā* mentions that he was a native of Uttara-Karṇāṭaka. His former name is given as Govinda Śāstri. The *S. K.* attributes to him a *Mādhvatattvasārasaṅgraha*, of which nothing is known. It was probably a manual of Dvaita doctrine, to judge from the title.

Though not distinguished as a writer, Akṣobhya figures as an outstanding personality in the history of his school. He is recognized to have been a contemporary of the great Advaitin scholar and writer Vidyāraṇya (1302-87) (who took a leading part in the foundation of Vijayanagar in 1336) and of the celebrated Viśiṣṭādvaitin polymath of the 14th century : Vedānta Deśika (1268-1388). His chief claim to recognition rests on the incident of his historic disputation with Vidyāraṇya, on the purport of the "Tattvamasi" text, a disputation which is believed to have taken place at Mulbāgal, ten miles from Kolar. It is said to have been referred to Vedānta Deśika for arbitration; and he is reported to have given his verdict in favor of Akṣobhya, in the following verse, oft-quoted in traditional circles :

असिना तत्त्वमसिना परजीवप्रभेदिना ।
 विद्यारण्यमहारण्यमक्षोभ्यमुनिरञ्छिनत् ॥

1. Cf. also the statement in the *M. Vij.* xv, 127 d :

अनन्तबोधस्यानेके यतीन्द्रा बहुदेशजाः ।

This tradition is corroborated¹ by the *Vedāntadeśika-Vaibhavaṇṇāśikā* of Mahācārya (16th century) and by the still earlier (15th cen.) work of Brahmatantra Svatantra Jeer III, accounted to have been the third in spiritual succession from Deśika, at the Parakāla Maṭha, in Mysore. It is also recorded in the *Jayatīrthavijaya* of Vyāsātīrtha (a direct disciple of Jayatīrtha) in canto ii, 54.68; in the *Jayatīrthavijaya* of Chalāri Samkarṣaṇācārya; and in the *Rāghavendravijaya* (17th cen.) and in the Viśiṣṭādvaitic work *Ācārya Vijayacampū*, V. There is also some kind of epigraphic evidence at Mulbāgal, where a commemorative stone pillar of victory has been discovered, though in a grossly mutilated form.² A covert allusion to Akṣobhya's victory is perhaps intended by Jayatīrtha, in one of the introductory verses of his *TP* :

दुर्वादिवारणविदारणदक्षदीक्षमक्षोभ्यतीर्थमृगराजमहं नमामि ॥ ४ ॥

Later, Akṣobhya seems to have moved north to Pandharpur on the Bhīmarathī river. Tradition has it that it was somewhere on the banks of that river that his first meeting with his future disciple, Jayatīrtha, took place. However, it seems that after the latter's initiation, he moved further north to Malkheḍ (or Mānyakheṭa, the historic capital of the Rāṣṭrakūṭas) on the Kāginī river. It was here that he seems to have spent the closing years of his life, devoting himself heart and soul to the training and instruction of his gifted disciple Jayatīrtha, in all the niceties of Dvaita thought. Jayatīrtha's affectionate regard for Akṣobhya comes out in the warm tribute that he has paid him for all the affection and learning which his Guru had lavished upon him. Akṣobhya's mortal remains lie entombed at Malkheḍ.

5. PART PLAYED BY THE EARLY DISCIPLES OF MADHVA

The period of Madhva was one of creative evolution of thought. His philosophy was the outcome of his own cogitation. He had not only to design for the most part his entire system; but also to work out its main details. He had, of course, a large body of texts to draw upon. But their thoughts were far from being connected, coherent or systematic. They were only raw materials to be carefully sifted, sorted and refined before

1. A. V. Gopalacharya first made an irresponsible statement, in his introd. to the *Tādavābhyudaya* (Srirangam, 1907) that the Advaitins claim that the judgment was in their favor, expressed in the following way :

अक्षोभ्यं क्षोभयामास विद्यारण्यो महामुनिः ।

without indicating the source of his information. This opinion has been blindly echoed by certain writers in the *Vijayanagar Sexcentenary* Vol. (pp. 49 and 301) unmindful of the facts that the Viśiṣṭādvaitic tradition (recorded) is emphatically against such a view and that such an emendation of the second line would be palpably inconsistent with the first line which is clinchingly in favor of 'difference' and the metaphor underlying the word "asi" (sword).

2. On the entire question of the historicity of the Akṣobhya-Vidyāranya debate, see my rejoinder to S. N. Rajapurohit, in the *AUJ.*, v. 1. pp. 103-7. The *Jayatīrtha Vijaya* of Vyāsātīrtha also refers to the erection of a stone-pillar to commemorate the victory स्तम्भं प्रतिष्ठाप्य जयाङ्कमश्मनः ।

they could be turned to practical advantage. This was by no means an easy task, having regard to their innumerable contradictions. It needed an expert eye, a deep philosophic insight and keen logical penetration to evolve and build a complete and self-contained system out of them. It is clear from the results achieved by Madhva that he had the requisite ability for this task. The chief merit of his system lay in its groundwork. The foundations of the system of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja had been laid by a number of their distinguished historical predecessors like Gauḍapāda and Bodhāyana. Madhva's thought was exclusively his own. He had no historical predecessor to fall back and draw upon. He was the architect of his own system, in its outlines, as in all its architectonic details. Except in the case of the *Brahmatarka* the materials contained in the original texts drawn upon by him had more to do with questions of theology than with logical and metaphysical problems. Thus, the boldness, originality and distinctiveness of most of the metaphysical concepts and categories of his system and their definition and organization into a system, prove him to be a philosopher of outstanding merit. It was naturally difficult for one in his position, preoccupied with so many aspects of system-building, such as its formulation, organization, exposition and propagation to give whole-time attention to the perfection and elucidation of every one of its minute details and paraphernalia of thought. Much of his exposition of the philosophy of the *Brahmasūtras* and the *Upaniṣads*, thus, *appears to be* piecemeal, insufficiently coordinated, rather dogmatic and authoritarian in its tone and hence wanting in wealth of argument, richness of detail and fulness of exposition. An extraordinary brevity of expression envelops his views in some obscurity. The treatment of topics *seems* scrappy and sketchy and hence diffused and unimpressive. Cf :—

यद्यपि भगवत्पादैरेव प्रमाणलक्षणादिकमभिहितं, तथापि गंभीरया वाचा विक्षिप्य वर्णितं न मन्दैः सुखेन शक्यते बोद्धुम् । (Jayatīrtha PP). 'गंभीरया' गूढाभिप्रायया (Janārdana Sūri). 'विक्षिप्य' —लक्षणविभागादेः स्थलभेदमाश्रित्य (Rāghavendra). 'गंभीरया' अस्पष्टार्थतया (Śrīnivāsa) दुर्निरूपवचनं च पण्डितैः अप्रमेयहृदयम्' (M. Vij. ix, 10).

Hence the limited appreciation of the true merits of his interpretation of texts and his metaphysical system and its misapprehension in many quarters.

Madhva rarely goes into the intricacies of doctrines and their *minutiae* in the manner of other Bhāṣyakāras. He merely outlines his views with a few bold strokes, — be it in constructive exposition of his own Siddhānta¹ or criticism of other theories.² Lengthy and seemingly disconnected quotations from a bewildering variety of sources, extant and other, interspersed with interpretations and logico-philosophical discussions of topics, piecemeal cause distraction of thought and mar unity of appeal. Though an expert logician, he did not think much of the contemporary logic or the fashionable doctrines of the Schoolmen and did not, therefore, pay

1. Cf. His sententious definition of Bādha :

विज्ञातस्यान्यथा सम्यक् विज्ञानं ह्येव तन्मतम् (AV) without entering into details, which are supplied by Jayatīrtha, so as to refute all other Khyātivādas.

2. Cf. न चान्यत् कल्प्यम्; अप्रामाणिकत्वात् । नान्यथा तद्दृष्टेः । न च जीवे समन्वय उक्तः (B. S. B.).

sufficient attention to the defence or demonstration of his views in the light of prevailing modes of thought and their scholastic paraphernalia or presenting them in the familiar moulds and patterns of thought patented by his contemporaries.¹ We have, thus, very little of scholastic legerdemain and technical embellishment of arguments in his works. There are more of crucial ideas than meticulously argued theories. There is no patient working out of the organic methodology of doctrines (Prakriyā).

These *lacunae* in thought, methodology, details of exposition and finesse of Siddhānta had naturally to be made good before the system could attain to a position of equality of technique, with other established systems in the field. This need for such technical reconditioning and rounding off of the system does not appear to have been adequately realized or met till the days of Jayatīrtha.

There were no doubt a few immediate disciples of Madhva, who wrote cc. on his basic works. But they could *not* be said to have made any distinctive *contribution to Mādhva thought or its methodology as such*. Their works merely represent the early stages of the religious and secular expansion of the system in the province of its birth (Tulunāḍ) and outside, by means of founding of Pontifical seats and centres of learning and religious propaganda. The four itinerant disciples made frequent tōurs all over the country — particularly in Karnatak, Maharashtra, Āndhra and Tamil areas, and expounded the new philosophy to the faithful followers and the learned public and engaged the champions of rival schools in public disputations and brought about the *conversion of large numbers of people to the new faith* and sought, in various ways, to cultivate and develop *mass-contacts* for the faith. This period of initial expansion may be called the period of the “Prācīna-Ṭikākāras.”²

It was at this time, that pursuant to the needs of the new faith, biographical accounts of Madhva and other hagiological works came to be composed by other prominent disciples like Trivikrama and his son. Mutts were founded in various parts of the country. Simple cc. and expositions of the works of Madhva came to be undertaken by prominent persons like Trivikrama, Padmanābha, Narahari and Nārāyaṇa Paṇḍita and his son and many others. Their works have already been noticed.

The secular advantages flowing from such local or wide-spread political influence as individual leaders of the school possessed,³ must have been fully utilized for furthering the fortunes of the system. The historic disputation of Akṣobhya with Vidyāraṇya on the moot text at issue between Monism and Dualism : “Tattvam asi” was rightly a turning-point in the history of the new faith. That memorable event and its result

1. Cf. श्रीमदाचार्यैः पूर्वमीमांसाया अनाश्रयणात् । (Abhinavagadā).

2. The expression is first used by Rāghavendra Svāmī, in his gloss on the TP. I have adopted it as a convenient and handy designation.

3. See under Narahari Tirtha. The *Gurucaryā* says that Akṣobhya had some influence at the court of Ikkeri. The Kaṇṇatirtha Maṭha at Manjeshvar was in all probability gifted to M. by his ardent follower Jayasimha, the ruler of Kumbha.

enhanced the prestige of the new school as nothing else could have done and gave it a chartered place in the estimation of all philosophers. Leading philosophers and 'historians of Indian philosophy', were henceforth obliged to take note of the new "Darśana" the "*Pūrṇaprajña Darśana*," — as Mādhavācārya respectfully designates it, in his *Sarvadarśanasamgraha* and reckon with it.

Notwithstanding these many-sided activities of the immediate disciples and the "Prācīna Ṭikākāras", the full worth and philosophical merits of the new system were still obscured by an inadequate presentation of the profound philosophy contained in the original works of Madhva, in all its contours and richness of detail. Its possibilities could only be fully drawn out by a master-mind well-trained in the art of critical analysis of thought, orderly presentation and attractive writing. Despite their *strength of conviction*, remarkable enthusiasm and abilities, the immediate disciples like Trivikrama, Padmanābha and Narahari, were *not so fully born to or cut out for this task*. Their works *as they stand* could never have pushed up the philosophy of Madhva to that status of Śāstraic equality with the Advaita or Viśiṣṭādvaita, which the labors of Jayatīrtha, in the next generation were able to do. They merely spread the message of Madhva to a wider circle of adherents and popularized it in the country. They widened the ambit of its religious, secular and political influence. But no distinctive or seminal contribution to Dvaita *thought or its exposition* was made, till the days of Jayatīrtha.

The period of Madhva and his immediate disciples may therefore, be described as the seed-time of Dvaita thought. The cc. of Padmanābha and others were merely content with a faithful rendering of the originals. They left much to be accomplished still. The exuberant style of Trivikrama, though flashy and fighting, was not suited to a calm, passionless, analysis or logical exposition and evaluation of doctrines. Padmanābha's work was doubtless more restrained; but not copious, measured and classical in its literary effect or doctrinal range and proportions.

On account of the activities of the Prācīna Ṭikākāras, a compact community of the followers of the new school had been brought into existence in different parts of the country. Suitable measures had to be taken for the satisfaction of its religious and hagiological needs. The development of the community-sense among the adherents and an urge for more propaganda and proselytization are revealed by the composition of hagiological works like the *Maṇimañjari*, *Vāyustuti* and *Madhva Vijaya*. Individual disciples like Padmanābha and Akṣobhya and the Taulava ascetics founded separate lines of monks to consolidate the position of the system and speed up its propagation in different parts of the country. These Mutts continue, to this day, to be the nerve-centres of the school and its social, religious and philosophical activities. Narahari's labors as Minister in Kalinga must have given considerable scope for the expansion of the system and its penetration into the Kalinga and Āndhra areas (where even to this day a substantial community of Mādhvas flourishes). The

significant statement of Hṛṣīkeśa Tīrtha, about Padmanābha Tīrtha, proves that he was largely responsible for strengthening and extending the hold of Madhva's system in the areas near the Godavari, and further south and throughout Uttara-Karnāṭaka which was his native region. The crowning point of this period was the historic debate of Akṣobhya with Vidyāraṇya which must have opened the eyes of contemporary philosophers and focused their attention on the new Darśana and forced them to give it an honorable place in the Vedānta. The "Dvaita" had thus not only come to stay; but had also to be reckoned with as a powerful limb of the Vedānta. This was done for the first time in Mādhava's *Sarvadarśanasamgraha*. Madhva's philosophy had, thus, fought its way slowly and steadily to recognition and had, at last, attained a secure place from which it could not be dislodged.

With this historic recognition of its place and merit as an independent "Darśana", towards the close of the 14th century, may be said to begin the second phase of its life under its greatest expositor : Jayatīrtha.

The authoritative acceptance of the system in contemporary circles made it imperative that it should at once be raised to a position of the *highest technical perfection and richness* of detail and expository brilliance, so as to enable it to *hold its position* and compete on equal terms with the established philosophy of the day, the Advaita of Śaṅkara and his followers, perfected by a host of brilliant commentators like Vācaspati and Amalānanda and dialecticians like Ānandabodha, Śrīharṣa, Jñānottama and Citsukha.

It was Akṣobhya's gifted disciple and successor : Jayatīrtha who was destined to make this new contribution to Dvaita thought.

PART III

Standardization of Dvaita Thought Under Jayatīrtha

CHAPTER XX

THE PLACE OF JAYATĪRTHA IN DVAITA THOUGHT

(i) THE period of Jayatīrtha was one of remarkable development in the history of Dvaita thought and its literature. He gave final shape and form to its concepts and categories, standardized their definitions, formulated new ones where none had been given by Madhva, in the light of contemporary logic and philosophy. The commentators preceding him had done but preliminary spade-work and gained a foothold for the system of Madhva, in contemporary estimation. But it required a master-mind to give it not only staying power but also the power to be reckoned with and accepted on a footing of absolute Śāstraic equality with the other systems of thought in the field. Jayatīrtha had the necessary energy and equipment to take up the task which had been left to him by the Prācīna-Ṭikākāras by Divine dispensation. And he accomplished it with remarkable distinction and resounding success by the power of his faith, his brilliant intellect, keen dialectical abilities, his insight into the architectonic beauty and unity of the doctrines of Dvaita philosophy, his expertise in difficult textual exegesis and philosophical analysis of problems, his graceful style and extraordinary genius for amplification and clarification of details. He paid equal attention to the task of critical and constructive exposition of the Siddhānta and to dialectical refutation of hostile views. In the history of the Dvaita Vedānta, he may, therefore, be said to have played the combined role of a Vācaspati and a Citsukha in Advaita, with a thoroughness, ability and erudition equalling theirs, in the Advaita and other systems.

He was also a pioneer of methodology, — in the exposition of categories and concepts (Prakriyā). His methodology of thought and exposition has been followed by all the subsequent writers of the system. He has not also failed to review the Prakriyās of other systems and examine their merits and demerits. As a result of these many-sided labors of Jayatīrtha, the Dvaita system was placed on a completely self-sufficient basis, in every way. Its expository and dialectic aspects were equally enriched and balanced with each other. Under the guise of commenting on the *Prakaraṇas* of Madhva, he gave sumptuous critical and constructive expositions of the logical, epistemological and ontological doctrines and categories of Dvaita, and its thought-measuring devices, in the light of contemporary philosophical theories. (See his *Pramāṇalakṣaṇatīkā*). His cc.

on the *G. B.* and *B. S. B.* and *AV.* drew conspicuous attention to the underlying metaphysical ideology of Madhva-Siddhānta; which, in a later age, came to be overshadowed by the trappings of logical realism. There is no mistaking his eagerness to emphasize the basic and fundamental keynote of Mādhva metaphysics, the ideology of the Svatantra-advitīya-Brahma-vāda. He loses no opportunity to stress this ultimate thesis of Madhva and remind us that the reality of the world and other principles should be assigned no more than its proper place as a doctrine of lesser philosophical value and prominence beside the highest truth of the independence and infinitude of the Supreme Reality :

द्विविधः सत्सिद्धान्तः । परापरभेदात् * * अनेनापरसिद्धान्तान्तरमाह * * उपलक्षणं चैतत् । प्रपञ्चसत्यत्वादिकमपि ग्राह्यम् (*NS.* p. 538 b) Also : परतन्त्रप्रमेयं हि स्वतन्त्रभगवदायत्ततया विदितं निःश्रेयसाय भवति । * * (*TSt.*)

The same note of deep metaphysical insight is to be found in his impassioned statement of the grand synthesis of Upaniṣadic thought-currents converging towards the ideology of the Svatantra :

सर्वाण्यपि हि वेदान्तवाक्यान्संख्येयगुणाकरं सकलदोषगन्धविधुरं एकरूपमेव परं ब्रह्म नारायणाख्यं प्रतिपादयन्ति । किंतु (१) कानिचित् सर्वज्ञत्वसर्वेश्वरत्वसर्वान्तर्यामित्वसौन्दर्योदायगुणविशिष्टतया (२) कानिचित् अपहृतपाप्मत्वनिर्दुःखत्वप्राकृतभौतिकविग्रहरहितत्वाददोषाभावविशिष्टतया (३) कानिचित् अतिगहनताज्ञापनाय * * (Quoted in full on P. 4).

His unerring insight into the true philosophical bearings of the system enables him to pilot it out of sectarian moorings and textual thralldom and launch it on the high seas of open speculation. His essentially philosophical outlook is also revealed by his choice of works of purely logical and philosophical interest from among the 37 works of Madhva, for purposes of comment, leaving out those of a purely religious or didactic appeal and theological value like the *Mbh. T. N.*, *B. T.* etc. Even among the Upaniṣads, he chose only two of the most concise ones, preferring to discuss the interpretation of crucial passages from the rest, *passim*, in his cc. on the *Prakaraṇas* and in his *NS.* He has greatly enriched the system by his graceful style, the scintillating originality of his interpretations and the depth, logical subtlety and invulnerability of his arguments.

For these memorable services to Dvaita Vedānta, he has been esteemed by the followers of Madhva and honored by the *exclusive epithet* and title of “*Tikācārya*” (the Commentator *par excellence*) conferred on him. Vyāsātīrtha pays him a significant tribute :

चित्रैः पदैश्च गंभीरैः वाक्यैर्मनिरखण्डितैः ।

गुरुभावं व्यञ्जयन्ती भाति श्रीजयतीर्थवाक् ॥ (*Nym*)

and Vādirāja enlarges on it, in fine poetic embellishment :

माध्वग्रन्थान् स्वबन्धूनिव सरसहृदालिङ्ग्य विज्ञातभावः

संयोज्यालंकृताभिः स्वसहजमतिसंभूतवाग्भिर्वधूभिः ।

कृत्वान्योक्तीश्च दासीर्बुधहृदयगृहं प्रौढवृत्तीश्च वृत्ती—

दत्त्वान्योन्याभियोगं जयमुनिरसकृद्वीक्ष्य रेमे कृतार्थः ॥

(*Tirthaprabandha*, iii, 18).¹

1. Vādirāja's commemoration of J. in his eastern tour immediately after praising the illustrious Saints of the creed like Padmanābha T. entombed in the island of Tungabhadra at Ānegondi, the ancient capital of Vijayanagar instead of in the Uttaraprabandha of his work raises a ticklish question if, in his days, the mortal remains of Jayatīrtha were enshrined in the environs of Ānegondi itself.

Together with Madhva and Vyāsatīrtha, he constitutes the “*Muni-trayam*” of *Dvaita Vedānta* :

श्रीमध्वः कल्पवृक्षस्तु जयार्थः कामधक् स्मृतः,

चिन्तामणिस्तु व्यासार्थो मुनित्रयमुदाहृतम्. (*Śrīmuṣṇamāhātmya*).

(ii) The main lines of technique of exposition followed by him are, in his own words : स्पष्टीकरणं चानेकविधम्—(१) क्वचिदनुक्तांशस्योक्तिः (२) क्वापि अतिविक्षिप्तस्योपादानम् । (३) क्वचिदतिविस्तृततया बुद्धयनारूढस्य संक्षेपः । (४) क्वापि विक्षिप्तस्यैकीकरणम् । (५) कुत्राप्युक्तस्योपादानम् (६) क्वचिदपव्याख्याननिराकरणेन दृढीकरणमित्यादि ॥ (*NS.* p. 8) and in every one of these directions, he has achieved remarkable success.

For instance, the definition of Bhakti, given by Madhva, in his *Mbh. T. N.* (i, 86) has been given classical form by Jayatīrtha (*NS.* p. 17) : परमेश्वरभक्तिर्नाम निरवधिकानन्तानवद्यकल्याणगुणत्वज्ञानपूर्वकः स्वात्मात्मीयसमस्तवस्तुभ्योऽप्यनन्तगुणाधिकोऽन्तरायसहस्रेणाप्यप्रतिबद्धो निरन्तरप्रेमप्रवाहः ।

Its place in the scheme of spiritual discipline and its relation to Jñāna the nature and kinds of possible karma *after* the dawn of knowledge (*NS.* p. 604 ab) and the fruits of such Karma are all set forth clearly and authoritatively : संसारनिवृत्तिमात्रं केवलेन ज्ञानेन भवति । आनन्दवृद्धिस्तु कर्मसापेक्षेणैव ज्ञानेनेति भगवतः पन्थाः (*NS.* p. 560). The unique place assigned by Madhva to Divine grace (prasāda) as the only ultimate means of release, over and above Jñāna, is very well brought out (*NS.* pp. 521, 526 and 527 b) : अस्मिन् शास्त्रे यत्र यत्र ज्ञानस्य मोक्षसाधनत्वमुच्यते, तत्र तत्र ज्ञानमिति पदेन भक्तिरीर्यते लक्ष्यते, कुतः ? संबन्धात् । ज्ञानस्य भक्तिभागत्वात् । माहात्म्यज्ञानस्नेहसमुदायो हि भक्तिरित्युक्तम् । ततो ज्ञानं भक्तेर्भाग एकदेशः (*NS.* 604). The connotation of the term “Pramāṇa”; the different senses in which it is used; the types of Inference; the nature of “Padaśakti”, in Dvaita philosophy (*PP.* p. 399 Dharwar); the formation of judgments through Anvitābhidhāna (*NS.* p. 520); the principles of exegesis on which the so-called monistic texts could be made consistent with those pledged to the reality of the world and its values (*NS.* 595-6); the Dvaitins’ attitude to the Universal (Jāti); the simplification of the number of fallacies of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika from 22 to 6 and the principles underlying such subsumption; the essence of “Sat-siddhānta” and its constituents (*NS.* 637 b-38) are all clearly and brilliantly dealt with. As already pointed out, he has given a masterly exposition of Madhva’s ideology of how the different thought-currents of Upaniṣadic philosophy converge towards and find their fulfilment in the ultimate truth of “Svatantra-advitīya-Brahman” (p. 124, *NS.* cited on P. 4).

The nature and status of memory and recognition as forms of valid knowledge (*NS.* p. 496 b); the definition of Upamāna and Abhāva (*NS.* 475-6); the examination of the definition of Pramāṇas given by other schools of thought (*NS.* 250); the essential difference between the Mādhva and the Buddhistic theory of Error (*NS.* 46 and 48 b); the place of “Tarka” in the scheme of Inference (*NS.* 477-50) and the application of the principle of Upacāra to cases of superficial identification of body and soul are clearly explained (*NS.* p. 488 ff.). The *raison d’être* of the doctrine of Sākṣī as the ultimate principle of validation of Knowledge; the limitations of the theory of self-validity of knowledge in relation to the

doctrine of Śākṣī; the epistemological necessity to distinguish between two kinds of knowledge : mental perception and judgments of the Śākṣī (NS. 593 b) are fully brought out. It is pointed out, with deep philosophical penetration, that the entire superstructure of Madhva's realism rests on the verdict of the Śākṣī and the infallible validity of its judgments (NS. p. 30). Among other outstanding contributions of Jayatīrtha are his exposition of the doctrines of Truth and Error according to Mādhva thought and of the process of ascertainment of Vyāpti in inference; and an up to date review of the Critique of Difference given by the leading Advaitic dialecticians. He was also the first to discuss, in full, Madhva's doctrine of Error in relation to the "Khyātivādas" of all the other leading schools (NS. pp. 40-57) and bring out the *differentia* of the Dvaita theory and give it a special name of "Abhinavānyathākhyāti".¹ This up to date treatment of the Khyātivādas was intended to bring Madhva's theory of it, into line with contemporary theories and place it in proper perspective. The doctrines of Śākṣī, Svataḥprāmāṇya and Viśeṣa, which lie at the very root of Madhva's metaphysics and which have been tersely outlined by him have been fully drawn out and expounded by Jayatīrtha, with a wealth of arguments.

We are indebted to him for compact and clear-cut definitions of such metaphysical conceptions as "tattvam", Śākṣī, Viśeṣa, Svatantra, Paratantra etc., which play a vital part in the philosophy of Madhva. He was the first to define "tattvam" (reality) as "Anāropitam pramitiṣayaḥ" and explain its significance so as to make it proof against the quibbling criticisms of Śrīharṣa (Vide TS. 1). He elucidates, also, for the first time, the true nature of "Viśayaviśayibhāva" (relation between knowledge and its object) as acceptable to Madhva. (*Vādāvali*, p. 63) He defines "atoms," "Pariṇāma-vāda" and "Svabhāvājñānavāda"; coins a new name for Madhva's theory of Error; and for the operation of Viśeṣas through self-linking.² He was, thus, the earliest to formulate precise definitions of the fundamental categories and concepts of the system and lay down the proper methodology for treatment of topics (Prakriyā).³ He also examines, where necessary, the basic principles and methodological devices of other schools and brings out their inadequacies and shows the necessity of formulating new or different Prakriyās.⁴ His new interpretation of "Tattvam asi" in terms of "Bimbapratibimbabhāva" relation between Jīva and Brahman, accepted in the Dvaita system (See his c. on *Td*) which is itself a corollary of the doctrine of the One Independent,

1. वक्ष्यामो ह्यभिनवान्यथाख्यातिम् । (NS. p. 46).

2. In terms of "Sa-viśeṣābheda" which is a phrase coined by him.

3. Cf. अद्वैता प्रक्रिया NS. p. 468; p. 593; इयमत्र दर्शनपद्धतिः etc.

4. See the doctrine of "Triskandhāvidyā" and its refutation in NS. p. 561-2. Also the *resume* of the entire hierarchy of gods and sages up to the Supreme : पुष्करो नाम सर्वाविरो देवः * * * * * ततो भगवानिति (NS. p. 564). and : न च तथा पराभिमतार्थं किञ्चित् प्रमाणमस्ति । प्रक्रिया तु, मन्दजनमनोहरा निर्मूलत्वादुपेक्ष्या । (VTN t. p. 48 b).

Real, is a very attractive departure from the generally accepted explanation, avoiding altogether the necessity of having to split the *padas* into "Atat", "tvam", as has been done by Madhva in his *VTN.*, and *Chān. Up. Bhāṣya*. This shows Jayatīrtha's boldness and originality to go ahead of Madhva (without prejudice to the Siddhānta) and explore fresh lines of thought and interpretation. The same freshness of outlook is seen in his interpretation of "*Neha nānāsti* (*NS.* p. 29). He also brings the treatment of Advaita Śrutis and Smṛtis, in Dvaita, up to date by discussing several new texts not noticed by Madhva;

अहं हरिः सर्वमिदं जनार्दनः । (*NS.* p. 435).

विभेदजनकेज्ज्ञाने नाशमात्यन्तिकं गते * * (*NS.* p. 435).

आ मुक्तेर्भेद एव स्याज्जीवस्य च परस्य च ।

मुक्तस्य तु न भेदोऽस्ति भेदहेतोरभावतः ॥ (*NS.* p. 508).

यावन्मोक्षस्तु भेदः स्यात् * * * (p. 509).

As a critical expositor, Jayatīrtha displays consummate skill in detecting hidden significances in the all but too brief utterances of Madhva and breathing a soul of wit and depth of meaning into them, capable of demolishing a number of hostile views that may be held on a given issue, at one stroke. Thus, the simple-looking text : प्रत्यक्षवच्च प्रामाण्यं स्वत एवागमस्य तु (*AV*) is made to dispose of *seven* different Pūrvapakṣas and establish the validity of Śabda as an *independent* and distinctive source of knowledge, as against several ingenious objections of the Vaiśeṣikas and the Cārvākas! The astonishing ease with which he wrecks all these powerful objections, on the rock of "*Pratyakṣa (vacca)*" is truly an admirable *feat* of commentatorial ingenuity (*NS.* pp. 76-78), which is absolutely unparalleled in Sanskrit literature. The copulative "*ca*" in "*Pratyakṣavac ca*" is made to *imply* that Śabda is to be accepted as a distinctive Pramāṇa by the Vaiśeṣikas in the same way as Inference is, by them. Another ingenious objection that Śabda, being an attribute of Ākāśa, cannot function as a source of knowledge because of its unintelligent character (*avijñānātma*), is deftly overturned by making the term "*Pratyakṣavat*", a counter-illustration for the Siddhāntin :—अत्र प्रत्यक्षवदिति व्यतिरेकदृष्टान्तः । (*NS.* 77 b). Another text, "वैलक्षण्यं सतश्चापि स्वयं सद्भेदवादिनः (*AV*), is expanded to meet *twelve alternative* explanations of "*Sadasadvailakṣaṇyam*" that might be put forward in the conception of "*Mithyātva*", defined as "*Sadasadvailakṣaṇyam*" by the Advaitin. A third text "*गौरवं कल्पनेऽन्यथा*" (*AV*) is made to refute the different views of the Vaiyākaraṇas and the Mīmāṃsakas, on the formation of linguistic judgments by syntactic combination of words : Sphoṭavāda, Anvitābhidhāna etc. (*NS.* pp. 87-89). All the five "*Khyātivādas*" as well as Rāmānuja's theory of Error are elaborately set forth and refuted in detail (*NS.* p. 40-57). The whole of this critique of Khyātivādas of other schools is cleverly dovetailed into the Siddhānta definition of Bādha (stultification of wrong knowledge) formulated by Madhva, in his concise way :

विज्ञातस्यान्यथा सम्यक् विज्ञानं ह्येव तन्मतम् (*AV*), where the particle "*hi*" is made the starting point of the whole discussion ! Under *BS.* ii, 1. 1. the

term 'Vyabhicārataḥ' is made to overthrow twenty objections. Such consummate ability to put so much dynamic energy into the simple innocent-looking phrases of the original is a marvellous trait, almost unique in the whole range of Sanskrit commentary literature.

In criticizing the doctrines of the Advaita, both on his own initiative and following Madhva, Jayatīrtha takes special note of the divergence of opinion among the leading commentators of the Advaita school, like Vācaspati, Vivaraṇakāra, Amalānanda, Citsukha, and Vijñānaghana, on moot-points of their philosophy and throws considerable light on these differences in doctrine; which we are able to appreciate much better through his account of them. This is one of the rare advantages of approaching a system through the accounts of its eminent critics : who in Indian philosophical literature, could be relied upon for absolute impartiality and faithfulness of presentation. Jayatīrtha is an instance in point. His review of the "Abhinna-nimittopādānavāda" of Rāmānuja under the "Prakṛtyadhikaraṇa" of the *B. S.*, goes to the root of the matter and shows by a penetrating analysis of his position, that Rāmānuja is *not* justified in indulging in such ambiguous terminology; when he does not actually subscribe to the direct transformation of Brahma-caitanya into the world of matter and souls.¹ His exposition of the "Sacchaktyavacchinna-Brahmapariṇāmavāda" and its refutation in the *NS.*, is most instructive and helpful to the understanding of the real metaphysical positions of schools allied to those of Śrīkaṇṭha and Vallabha (who adopt more or less the same views).² As a rule, Jayatīrtha's criticisms of the Sūtra-interpretations of the Advaitic school are directed against the Bhāṣya of Śaṅkara, which is often quoted by him (pp. 190, 295, 560, 653) and the cc. of Vācaspati and Prakāśātman and the *Samkṣepāśārīraka*. The examination of the categories and principles of Advaitic thought are generally directed against the dialectic exposition of those topics found in the *Brahmasiddhi* of Maṇḍana, the *Tattvaṇṇadīpikā* of Citsukha and to some extent in the *Vivaraṇa*. The views of Śrīharṣa are also refuted (*NS.* pp. 242, 381).

Another important contribution of Jayatīrtha is the regular and systematic exposition of the "adhikaraṇaśarīras" of Madhva's interpretation of the *B. S.* These had not been systematically made out in the earlier commentaries of Trivikrama and others, as they had been, in the *Bhāmati* and other commentaries of the Śaṅkara school. By meeting this need, Jayatīrtha brought the Sūtra-interpretation of Madhva in line with the achievements of the other schools.

Of exegetic principles of Mīmāṃsā, Jayatīrtha touches upon "Śabdāntara", in support of Madhva's interpretation of Annamaya etc., in *Taitt. Up.* as forms of Brahman (*NS.* p. 141 b). Doctrines of Advaita, like "Śabdāparokṣa" (p. 62); Jīvanmukti (p. 561-2); Bimbapratibimba (*VTN.* p. 97) *not* discussed by Madhva, are examined by Jayatīrtha,

1. Vide my 'Catussūtribhāṣya of Madhva,' 1934, p. xxii-xxiii.

2. Vide my 'Svatantrādvaita', p. 80.

on his own initiative. The futility of "Prāmāṇyavyavasthā", argued by Śrīharṣa, is similarly controverted (*NS.* ii, p. 242).

Madhva's treatment of the so-called Advaita śrutis was, apparently, piecemeal and uncoordinated; resting on considerations of linguistic data, syntax and etymology and corroborative evidences of a large body of non-extant texts. Disconnected and 'laboured' explanations of texts occur (*Māṇḍ. Up.* 10; and "Tattvam asi" in *G. B.*, *B. S. B.* and *Chān. Up. bhāṣya*). These had not been coordinated to a general or basic theory of Upaniṣadic interpretation and integrated with the ideology of the "Svatantra-advitīya-Brahman", recognized by Madhva. This comprehensive correlation of monistic texts to the metaphysical ideology of "Svatantra-advitīya-tattva", was undertaken by Jayatīrtha, *for the first time*, in the history of the school. He it was that gave the lead as to the direction and points of view from which the grand harmonization of "Advaitic" texts should be effected : सर्वाण्यपि हि वेदान्तवाक्यान्वसंख्येयकल्याणगुणाकरं सकलदोषगन्धविघ्नुरं * * * * (*NS.* p. 124, already cited). It is this harmonization that he has tried to illustrate with reference to his original interpretation of "Tattvam asi" in terms of "Bimbapratibimbabhāva" relation between the Brahman and Jīva, in his c. on the *Td.*

His *Vādāvali* is a short powerful rejoinder to Citsukha's onslaughts on philosophical realism, in so far as they are applicable to Madhva's realism. Jayatīrtha has tried to show in this work, that the familiar criticisms of the Advaitic dialecticians are powerless against the *new type of philosophical realism* propounded by Madhva with the help of certain new devices and improvements designed to meet the deficiencies pointed out by the Advaitins, in the older realisms constructed under the limitations of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrines. Commenting on Śrīharṣa's negative dialectic, Dasgupta writes : Śrīharṣa "did not and could not show that the ways of definitions, which he attempted to refute, were the only ones of defining the different categories and even these could not be bettered or improved by using suitable adjuncts and qualificatory phrases" (*op. cit.* ii, 147). Jayatīrtha's stand is identical : नहि प्रक्रियापरिक्षयो वस्तुपरिक्षयात् गरीयान् (*MKt.* p. 8 b). The doctrines of Sākṣī and Saviśeṣābheda propounded by Madhva, were precisely intended to overcome the difficulties raised by the Advaitic dialecticians against the older Realisms of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika schoolmen. These would be inapplicable to a Realism founded on the new principles of Viśeṣa and Sākṣī. This point is made clear in the *Vādāvali*, where Jayatīrtha shows that the Advaita metaphysics rests on the most shaky foundations of "Mithyātva" which is fully examined and refuted. The Critique of Bheda and the Advaitic interpretation of "Neha nānāsti" are also examined and refuted. The doctrine of "Bhavarūpājñāna" (in Advaita) is shown to be untenable. The reality of difference and the validity of experience are shown to rest on the unimpeachable evidence of Sākṣī-pratyakṣa, and the verdict of *normal perception*; which cannot be discredited by so-called incompatibility of relation between Spirit and matter : dr̥g-dr̥śya

sambandhānupapatti, made out by the Advaitin. The indispensable necessity for a sound practical theory of Pramāṇas for any kind of metaphysical thinking is shown, after exposing the hollowness of the absolutistic scepticism of Śrīharṣa, in this respect. (*NS.* i, pp. 31-34).

Jayatīrtha, thus, stands out not only as the greatest standardizer of Dvaita thought and its categories; but also, as the leading dialectician of the system who led the way for a comprehensive examination of the entire edifice of Advaitism, in the succeeding centuries, by Viṣṇudāsa and Vyāsatīrtha.

He was a master of graceful style, rich in vocabulary and chaste and polished in his expression. A sense of proportion and freedom from empty flourish and verbiage add much to the beauty of his writings and the spontaneity of their appeal. The grace and dignity of his style have greatly enhanced the prestige of the system, among whose makers, there are not many good stylists. The *Vādaratnāvali* pays the following tribute to his expository style :

नो घत्ते जडतां न भंगमयते नीचस्थलं नेहते
स्खलित्यं न च याति नैति कृशतां क्षोभं क्वचिन्नाञ्चते ।
मानं नोज्झति नो जहाति च पदं व्यर्थं न कोकूयते ।

कल्येयं जयतीर्यकोविदवचः कल्लोलिनी सेव्यताम् ॥ (*Pariccheda* ii).

Jayatīrtha can be alluringly alliterative;¹ pithy and sententious;² or cutting and caustic³ in his wit, — as occasions demand. He is a balanced writer; cold and passionless in his logic and thoroughly un-self-conscious.⁴ We could hardly expect so careful a commentator as Jayatīrtha to pass over the many 'lapses' of Madhva from current Pāṇinian grammar and idiom, without proper defence. We have seen that there is almost a tinge of scholarly eccentricity in these peculiarities. Whatever pious followers might feel about them, critics were not likely to regard them with the same feelings of tenderness or reverence; or fail to make capital out of them and attack the system at these vulnerable points.⁵ In the interests, then, of the public estimation of the system, Jayatīrtha addressed himself to the task of "legitimizing" these peculiarities of Madhva and establishing their acceptability in the light of approved canons and usages of

1. अथाविद्यापटलपिहितनयनैरन्यैरन्यथा व्याख्यातानि... (*TP*) इह खलु संसारकान्तारे परि-
खिन्नानामल्पास्थिरमुखस्योत्तिकासु विद्योतमानास्वपि मनःप्रसादमनासादयताम् (*Tdt.*).

2. नहि ते सहस्रेणापि युक्तिशतेन (*NS.* 472) नहि भवति तरक्षोः । * * नहि सिद्धमसिद्धेनोच्य-
मानमसिद्धं भवति । निषिद्धयतां न नो हानिः, अन्यथा परस्यापि कुलीरस्येव (*NS.* 245) को हि ब्रूते रजतं
सदिति ! नहि परांगं दग्धमिति * *

3. नहि ते वणिग्वीर्या * * (*NS.* 645). नहि बाधकस्य शृङ्गमस्ति ! मा त्वरिष्ठाः (74b) तर्हि,
तत एव विशिष्टव्यवहारासिद्धिरिति तूष्णीमास्व (*PMK.t.* 5); *NS.* 645, ab; 646. नायं लौकिको न
परीक्षक इत्युन्मत्तबहुपेक्षणीयः (580) तर्हि वेदोषरा वेदान्ता इति * * अहो पक्षपातो (382.1.4) चक्षुषी
निमील्य तथेति वदतः कः प्रतिमल्लः ? (633); *VTNt.* 81; *NS.* 190, 545, 365 b.

4. न शब्दाब्धौ गाढा न च निगमचर्चासु चतुरा * * (opening verse in *NS.*).

न वैदुष्यभ्रान्त्या * * (concluding verse *NS.* p. 656).

5. Cf. प्रायेणासाधुभिरेव शब्दैर्व्यवहारः । * *

(Appayya Dikṣita, *Madhvamatamukhamardana*)

the Vyākaraṇa Śāstra. He has brought to bear on his task a thorough-going familiarity with the nooks and corners of the Pāṇinian school and the rulings of other schools like Candra. He quotes from Pāṇini, Kātyāyana and Patañjali, providing for such exceptional departures and also cites accepted usages of the learned : *abhiyukta-prayogas*.¹ Some of the peculiarities are justified on grounds of Vedic² or Epic sanction. On the whole, he has made out a strong case for according to these grammatical peculiarities of Madhva, the deference due to those of an 'Abhiyukta'.

Except in a few cases, we do not, however, see Jayatīrtha enlisting the support of the sūtras of Pāṇini or the principles of grammatical science in defence or justification of Madhva's interpretations of the Sūtras or to refute those of rival schools.³ It is only from the times of Viṣṇudāsācārya and Vyāsātīrtha, that it became an established practice among writers of the Mādhva school to seek to augment and justify their interpretations of texts with the help of grammatical sanctions of Pāṇini and the rulings of the *Mahābhāṣya* and its commentaries and with the nyāyas of Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā. We have only a couple of instances of Jayatīrtha's resort to Mīmāṃsānyāyas, in his explanation of the "Neha nānāsti" text (in the *Vādāvali* and *NS*) and in one or two other cases. In both these directions, remarkable results were achieved by Vyāsātīrtha⁴ who *extended the range and scope* of Dvaita polemics with these technical aids to argument from the realm of Vādagranthas (purely dialectical works) to that of the Adhikaraṇa-Prasthāna (constructive works of the system). The whole of his *Candrikā* was so planned and executed.⁵ But this new line of treatment is not to be found in Madhva⁶ or his early commentators including Jayatīrtha.

1. See his remarks on "Vinā vātam" (*NS*. p. 529) "Ya upādhiḥ" (*GB*. 4); *NS*. p. 534b; "mara" (p. 606) and ref. to *Mahābhāṣya* : कोऽसावयमनुमानः in defence of Madhva's" बहवः कर्मकारणा भवन्ति । (*GB*).

2. As विष्णुवि (*AV*) :— स्वस्य परमवैदिकत्वज्ञापनाय विष्णुवीति वैदिकप्रयोगः ।

"यथोर्णनाभिजनितु (*AV*.) : जनितृशब्दं प्रयुजानः स्वग्रन्थस्य मंत्रतुल्यतां दर्शयति भगवानाचार्यः । (*NS*. p. 197). It may be mentioned that विष्णौ is used in the very next line after "विष्णुवि" by Madhva. For the form "विष्णुवि" see *R. V.* viii, 3, 8.

3. Under B. S. i, 4, 24, in his *NS* (pp. 201-202). Jayatīrtha enters into a brilliant discussion over the correct interpretation and implications of the sūtras of Pāṇini : जनिकर्तुः प्रकृतिः । and ह्युवमपायेऽपादानम् (i, 4, 30 : 24.) in the light of the *Mahābhāṣya* : अयमपि योगः शक्योऽवक्तुम् in showing how the sūtra fails to support the Upādānatva-view.

4. Cf. the estimate of his *Candrikā* :

आमूलाग्रनिबद्धतर्कजटिलं शब्दैकजीवातुकं
मीमांसानुनयं च शंकरवचोर्हुंकारभंगप्रदम् ।
शास्त्रं तन्त्रचतुष्टयात्मकमिदं * * ।

5. प्रतिसूत्रं प्रकाशयेते घटनाघटने मया ।

स्वीयान्यपक्षयोः सम्यक् विदांकुर्वन्तु सूरयः ॥ (*Candrikā*)

6. Except in a couple of instances as in : यथा द्वादशाहो * * * (*B. S. B.* iv, 4, 12) यजमानप्रस्तरत्वम् । (*AV*) अंगीकृतं पदानां च (*AV*.)

श्रीमदाचार्यैः पूर्वमीमांसाया अनाश्रयणात् (*Abhinavagadā*).

Jayatīrtha's criticisms and expositions are couched in dignified language, free from all trace of personal animosity or bitterness of feeling towards the followers of Advaita, such as are sometimes discernible in the writings of Trivikrama or his son. Nor does he adopt a dogmatic or authoritarian air,¹ in dealing with his adversaries. Such an attitude was probably inevitable in the earlier days of the system, in the tense atmosphere of mutual wrangle and rivalry between the opposing schools and the occasional manifestation of persecution and intolerance. But Jayatīrtha was above all such petty feelings and never succumbs to their influence. Vyāsātīrtha, who followed him in this respect, was scrupulously fair to the Advaitins (and all others whom he criticized) and set the model of graceful and dignified parliamentary debate. The influence of Jayatīrtha on those who came after him was thus most wholesome and abiding.

As one concerned primarily with the logical and metaphysical expansion of the Dvaita system, Jayatīrtha did not allow himself to be swayed by mere authorities. His general attitude to the numerous authorities cited by Madhva was one of respectful acquiescence; but for his own part, he relies more on extant texts.² He makes due allowance for the views of his opponents and concedes their interpretations, wherever possible.³ He does *not* hesitate to *differ* from the interpretations of *his own school*, given by earlier writers like Narahari and Padmanābha, wherever, in his opinion, they had gone wrong or the spirit of the original had not been fully brought out by their explanations.

His criticisms of the interpretations of other schools is concerned purely with their logical aspects and he does not make much of their verbal defects.⁴ He prefers to leave it to his successors to deal with these minor points and formal defects of the interpretations of hostile schools. The intrepid Vyāsātīrtha takes up Jayatīrtha's directive in this respect :

प्रतिवादिस्खलनं नोपेक्षणीयम् । (NS. p. 464).

सूत्राक्षराणामार्जवानार्जवचिन्ता शिष्यैरेव क्रियताम् ॥ (NS. 880b).

in right earnest and subjects the interpretation of the Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja schools to microscopic analysis and criticism :

प्रतिसूत्रं प्रकाश्यते घटनाघटने मया ।

स्वीयान्यपक्षयोः सम्यक् विदांकुर्वन्तु सूरयः ॥ (TC.)

1. Cf. तथापि विप्रतिपन्नो न तावन्मात्रेण बोधयितुं शक्यः (NS. p. 107b).

2. It is remarkable that in the treatment of Viśeṣas, Jayatīrtha finds support for it (in addition to logical arguments) in the text of *Kaṭha* (एवं धर्मान्) in preference to passages like गुणक्रियादयो विष्णोः cited from a non-extant source, in *VTN*.

3. न वयं भावरूपाज्ञानपरिपन्थिनः । (NS. p. 64).

ये तु, देवतामीमांसाशास्त्रस्वरूपे तदनन्तरमेतत्सूत्रप्रणयने च विप्रतिपद्यन्ते (NS. p. 93b). See J. on (*VTN*) नैषा तर्केण मतिरापनेया and Śaṅkara, *Kaṭha Up. com.* on the same text; Ānandagiri's explanation of "OM" and J's comment on it (NS. p. 14 b) : आप्तेरादिमत्वाद्वा इत्यादि, ओंकारस्य नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तस्वभावं * * * इति ब्रह्मशब्दस्य व्याख्यानं, तन्न व्याख्यानान्तरं दूषितं; अनुमतं च ॥ See also Śaṅkara's explanation of "atha" in terms of नित्यानित्यवस्तुविवेक etc. which is accepted by J. (NS. p. 526) though criticized by Vyāsātīrtha, from the point of view of Advaita, in his *Candrikā*.

4. स्यादेवं कथंचित् शब्ददोषाभावः । प्रमेयदोषस्तु स्यादेव । (*VTN* p. 62) तथा सति, 'आरंभणादिशब्देभ्य' इति स्यात् । अस्तु वा, कथंचिदादिपदोपात्तत्वं तेषां वाक्यानाम् (NS. p. 504).

LIFE AND WORKS OF JAYATĪRTHA

(1365-88)

(i) AFTER Madhva, the next lodestar in the firmament of Dvaita Vedānta and its literature is Jayatīrtha. He is to Madhva even more than what Vācaspati Miśra is to Śaṅkara. Renouncing the world at a very young age, he devoted himself to the service of Madhva's philosophy and within a brief space of twenty-three years he raised it to a position of Śāstraic equality with the Advaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita, by his remarkable industry, depth of scholarship and masterly exposition. For beauty of language and brilliance of style, for proportion, keenness of argument and fairness in reasoning, for refreshing boldness, originality of treatment and fineness of critical acumen, Sanskrit philosophical literature has few equals to place beside him. Though designated by the unassuming title of commentaries, his works are first-rate classics in philosophy, displaying an extreme orderliness, a masterly elaboration and an unchecked progress towards a predetermined effect. But for them, the works of Madhva would never have made headway in the philosophical world. Jayatīrtha is, thus, a name to be conjured with in Dvaita Vedānta and its literature. He stands supremely inimitable and belongs to the class of the great makers of style, especially Sanskrit philosophical prose, — like Śabara, Śaṅkara and Vācaspati. In point of all-round brilliance, there is no one who could successfully hold a candle to him, in Dvaita literature except, perhaps, the great Vyāsātīrtha. Even he lacks the elegant diction that is Jayatīrtha's by right. Small wonder then, that Jayatīrtha has won for himself the honoured title of "Tīkācārya" *par excellence* Vyāsātīrtha pays him a memorable tribute :

चित्रैः पदैश्च गंभीरैर्विक्रियैर्मनिरखण्डितैः ।

गुरुभावं व्यञ्जयन्ती भाति श्रीजयतीर्थवाक् ॥ (Nym. i, 4).

Vādirāja, in his *Tīrthaprabandha* (iii, 18), pays a similar tribute to the services rendered by Jayatīrtha to the cause of Dvaita Vedānta. So complete has been the domination of Jayatīrtha in Dvaita Literature of the post-Madhva period that, barring a few memorable exceptions, the entire course of its subsequent history has been one of commentaries and super-commentaries on the tīkāś of Jayatīrtha ! He has not only dominated the subsequent history of his school; but has also totally eclipsed the *past* and thrown into the shade every one of the works and commentaries of his predecessors on the works of Madhva. By his own sheer brilliance, he has put out of currency the works of Trivikrama Paṇḍita, Padmanābha Tīrtha, Narahari and others and has caused their very names to fade away before his.

LIFE AND CAREER

(ii) Several narratives, in the form of "Vijayas", have come down to us of the life of Jayatīrtha. We have the *Anu-Jayatīrtha-Vijaya*, purporting to be from the pen of an earlier Vyāsātīrtha, who describes himself as a direct disciple of Jayatīrtha and we have also the *Brhad-Jayatīrtha-Vijaya*, from the same hand. There is another *Life of Jayatīrtha* by Chalāri Saṁkarṣaṇācārya (1700 A.D.). The *Satkatha* makes use of some stories from these and other sources. We have no inscriptions or other historical documents relating to Jayatīrtha and it is somewhat curious that so remarkable a personality should have been left historically unrecognized by his contemporaries.

I have already examined in detail and rejected as spurious an alleged epigraph, relating to Jayatīrtha, in the *N. I. A.* vol. i, no. 7, October, 1938. The alleged inscription is a clever patchwork of excerpts from (1) the published c. p. grant of Madanapāla and Govindacandra dated Vikrama Sam. 1166 (1110 A.D.) published in the *I. A.* for 1889, p. 15; (2) a verse embodying chronological data from ch. 64 verse 53 of *Ariṣṭanemipurāṇasaṅgraha* of Jinasena, composed in 783 A.D. altered a bit to suit the date Śaka 1295 given for Jayatīrtha; and (3) some improvised passages in prose and verse giving the details of the place and time of the grant, description of the plot given and personal details about the donee and his attainments. Further attention is therefore invited to the discussion of the epigraph, in the *N. I. A.* (1938).

It is very unfortunate that a reputed Mādhva scholar like Chikerur Govindacharya of Harpanhalli should have misled the readers of his article on Jayatīrtha published in the Centenary Souvenir of the S. M. S. O. Sabha, Chirtanur 1978 (p. 14 Kannada Section) into believing that the commemorative verses beginning with श्रीमन्मध्वमुनीन्द्रचित्तजलरुद्धाम ** describing the attainments of Jayatīrtha quoted by him are actually to be found in Keith's Cat. of Skt. and Pr. Mss. of the India Office Lib. Vol. II. p. 1347. col. 1.

The verses cited by Keith are entirely different and have nothing to do with J. They are from the *Ariṣṭanemipurāṇa-Saṅgraha* of Jinasena who wrote his work in 783 A.D. And Jayatīrtha belongs to the 14th cent. Further comment is unnecessary.

LIFE

(iii) From the various biographical accounts of Jayatīrtha, it would appear that his former name was Dhonḍo Pant Raghunāth.¹ According to the *S. K.*, his native village was Maṅgaḷvedhe, about twelve miles S. E. of Pandharpur. Apart from the *S. K.*, there is no other recorded evidence on this point. The *Jayatīrthavijaya* of Saṁkarṣaṇa and the short work of

1. His *gotra* is believed to have been Vaiśvāmītra. Some others give it as Bhāradvāja. Until the identity of his native village is conclusively established, no value can be attached to the claim of any family at Maṅgaḷvedhe, now, to represent his.

Vyāsatīrtha are silent on this point. The *Gurucaryā*, moreover, makes him a chieftain of Vṛṣṭikhēṭa,¹ — the Sanskritized form of the Kannaḍa “Maḷakhēḍa”, which, again, is a wrong and corrupt *tadbhava* of the original Sanskrit name ‘Mānyakhēṭa’ (the historic capital of the Rāṣṭrakūṭas, famous in Kārnatak history²). If this is accepted, one may have to question the correctness of the prevailing impression among the followers of Madhva that Jayatīrtha came of a Maharashtrian family. If Maḷakhēḍa was his native village, we may have to regard him also as an Uttara Kārnāṭaka. The *Gurucaryā* also places his first meeting with Akṣobhya, at Maḷkhēḍ itself on the bank of the river Kāginī :

सञ्चरित्वाथ मध्यान्हे तृषार्तः कागिनीं गतः ।

** ** *

अपिबतं तथा दृष्ट्वा स्मृत्वा [* *] गिरस्तदा ॥

* * *

(Canto i).

The location of Jayatīrtha’s tomb, also, at Malkhēḍ may lend support to this view. The name ‘Dhoṇḍo Pant’ would however raise a presumption in favor of accepting Maharashtrian descent for him. No definite conclusion, is, however, possible in the present state of our knowledge.³ We may, therefore, leave it an open question, for the present.

According to S. K., Jayatīrtha’s father was a nobleman of military rank and importance,—a “Deshpande”.⁴ Born with the silver spoon in his mouth, young Dhoṇḍo Pant grew into a strong and sturdy youth. He was a keen sportsman, a good rider and an athlete. Early in his life, he was married to two wives.⁵

At twenty came the turning-point in his life, which was charged with so much significance to the cause of Realism in Indian philosophy. It was in the course of one of his riding excursions that the young Dhoṇḍo Pant came, one summer noon, to the bank of the river (Candrabhāgā),⁶ to quench his thirst. He did not even take the trouble to dismount; but rode into the river and bending down from on horse-back, put his mouth to the water and drank. On the other side of the river sat an ascetic

1. वृष्टिखेटाधिपो धोण्डो रघुनाथाभिघः प्रभुः ।

चतुरङ्गबलोपेतो मृगयां प्रचरन् वने ॥ (*Gurucaryā*).

* *

2. Malkhēḍ is now a village in ruins, in the Sedam taluk of the Gulbarga district of the Kārnataka State.

3. It may also be noted that Pandharpur and its neighboring region were originally in Kannaḍa area as borne out by the existence of old Kannaḍa inscriptions there and the reference to Viṭṭhala himself as a deity of the Kārnatakas, in one of the *abhaṅgas* of Jñāneśvara : “कानडा हा विठ्ठलु कर्नाटकु” There are also a number of Kannaḍa-speaking Vaiṣṇava families in the Bijapur, Belgaum and Dharwar districts, with the surname of Maṅgaḷvedhe.

4. This is a common title (now used as a mere surname) current in Maharashtra and Uttara-Kārnataka.

5. कान्तायुग्मे कमलवदने सैव लोके विरक्तिः । (*Samkarṣaṇa*, J. V. iii, 22d).

6. According to *Gurucaryā*, it was the Kāginī itself, in Malkhēḍ.

watching the sight. It was Akṣobhya Tīrtha. He felt drawn to the cavalier, called him to his side and put him certain strange questions; which at once flashed before the youth's mental eye a kaleidoscopic vision of his past life. He was strangely affected and sought to be taken as a disciple. News of his son's resolve reached the father : who came down to demand restoration of his son and took him home. But the attractions of family life failed to turn the youth's mind, once made up.¹ In the end, wiser counsels prevailed and the young man was allowed to go back to his teacher. He was soon ordained a monk under the name of "Jaya Tīrtha"; and started learning the Śāstras under Akṣobhya.²

These seem to be the broad facts. In their desire to embellish it and make the story of J's ordination in his twenties more colorful and sensational than it actually was traditional accounts have made the enraged father forcibly take away the son *after* he had been duly ordained a Sannyāsin and arrange for the consummation of his marriage. The attempt proved futile and in the end he was allowed to return to his Āśramaguru.

Such a sacrilegious move would clearly have been unthinkable and impossible to carry out in the social and religious climate of orthodox Brahmin society in the 14th cent. The social boycott of the parents of Jñānadeva the famous Saint of Maharashtra and ostracism of Jñānadeva and his brother and sister for the sins of their father by the Brahmavrinḍa on account of the father's resumption of Gṛhasthāśrama after having renounced it and become a Sannyasin would have made it clear to J's father that he could not defy the social laws and conventions to that extent or get the cooperation of the priesthood in solemnizing the rites to resettle his son in Gṛhasthāśrama, even if he dared to attempt such a sacrilege. The whole story has, therefore, to be rejected as a stupid invention in bad taste to glorify one who was great in himself. It is still more unfortunate that going one step further, in the same direction, (the late) Prof. P. B. Desai should have discovered a son of the name Śeṣādri, born to J., during this period, in his article on J., published in the prestigious *Kannada Sahitya Pariṣad Patrikā* (June 1941). This shows to what extent foolish and unworthy traditions are apt to be exploited by others. What is still more surprising is that Pt. Pandharinathacarya Galgali's '*Mādhvavāṅgmayatapasvigalu*' which claims to be an orthodox and authentic work should have quoted Dr Desai's article as a source-material (*op. cit.* 1969, p. 248) without a word of protest or disapproval.

We have already seen that Akṣobhya and Vidyāraṇya were contemporaries.³ The *Jayatīrtha-Vijaya* of Saṅkarṣaṇācārya makes Jayatīrtha

1. Cf. his own lofty idea expressed in his *NS* (iii, 1) :

कुपिताहिफणच्छायासमीकृत्यापरं सुखम् ।

सेवन्ते यत्पदं धीरास्तं भजे बल्लभं श्रियः ॥

2. अक्षोभ्यतीर्थगुरुणा शुकवच्छिक्षितस्य मे ।

(J.'s *GB. Prameyadīpikā*)

3. The date of Vidyāraṇya is given as 1302-87. Grants to him have been found dated between 1371-78. If an interval of at least 30 years is assumed between Narahari Tīrtha (d. 1333) and Akṣobhya, we carry the latter as far as 1363, in which case, he could not but have been a contemporary of Vidyāraṇya.

also a contemporary (younger) of Vidyāraṇya and refers to a meeting between them.¹ In that case, it would remain unaccountable why Vidyāraṇya has not made any quotations from any one of the numerous and authoritative commentaries of Jayatīrtha on the works of Madhva, which have been cited by him, in the Pūrṇaprajña-darśana section of his *S. D. S.* (as he has done in the case of Vedānta Deśika, in the section on Rāmānuja's philosophy). The explanation that Vidyāraṇya did not like to quote from one so much younger than he, does not appear to be convincing; as Jayatīrtha was an ascetic. The reference to certain "ṭikās" on the Bhāṣya of Madhva, in the concluding line of the Pūrṇaprajña Darśana chapter of the *Sarvadarśanasamgraha* is, very probably, to Pre-Jayatīrtha commentaries of Trivikrama and Padmanābha Tīrtha. Internal evidence in the works of Jayatīrtha clearly establishes him as having come after Śrīharṣa, Ānandabodha and Citsukha,² whose works have all been quoted and criticized by him.

WORKS OF JAYATĪRTHA

Over twentytwo works have been ascribed to Jayatīrtha, almost all of which have been printed. (1) His *Tattvasamkhyāṇaṭikā* (p) is a short c. in 200 granthas, on the first of the ten Prakaraṇas of Madhva. The contents of the original have already been described earlier; and there is nothing more to be said about the c. The definition of "tattvam" (reality) given by Jayatīrtha, here, is of great philosophical importance and interest: तत्त्वमनारोपितं प्रमितिविषय इति ॥ So also the *rationale* of the classification of reality into "Svatantra" and "Paratantra", in Madhva's philosophy, as expounded by him, in his inimitable way (quoted on P. 3). (2) His *Tattva-vivekaṭikā* (p) is a short c. in 160 granthas and its contents are much the same as (1). The c. on the (3) *Tattvodyota* (p) runs to 1500 granthas and is one of the best-written among the minor works of the author. Under the brilliant exposition of Jayatīrtha, the original assumes a newer light every time. It is a very clever and well-thought out plea for the dualistic interpretation of "Tattvamasi" : 'तत्त्वमसीति' वाक्येन परमात्मसादृश्यविशेषः प्रतिपाद्यते; अभेदस्य प्रमाणबाधितत्वात् । ननु, वक्तव्ययुक्ते शब्दप्रयोगे, कस्मात् गौणप्रयोगः ? अस्त्यत्र प्रयोजनम् । इह हि, महत्वादिगुणवन्तं स्वातन्त्र्येणात्मानं मत्वा स्तब्धं श्वेतकेतुं निमित्तीकृत्य, स्वातन्त्र्याभिमानिनो जीवजातस्याहंकारशान्तये 'तत्त्वमसी' त्युच्यते । तत्र यदि विज्ञानानन्दधनस्त्वमसीति ब्रूयात्, तदा नास्याहङ्कारशान्तिः स्यात् । अभेदोक्तौ तु, मीसांसा जायते—न तावदत्र मुख्यार्थः संभवति, प्रमाणविरोधात् । अतः स इव त्वमसीत्यर्थः । न चायमपि संभवति । अप्रसिद्धप्रतिपत्तये खलु प्रसिद्धमपमानमुपादीयते, 'यथा गौस्तथा गवय' इत्यादौ दृष्टत्वत् । न चैवं प्रकृते । उभयोरप्यप्रसिद्धत्वात् । अतो नास्योपमानमात्रे तात्पर्यमिति पश्यन्, सूर्यसूर्यकयोरिव, ईश्वरस्य

1. VI, 31-48.

2. J. has quoted several passages from the *Tattvapradīpikā* of Citsukha, both in his c. on the *V. T. N.* and the *AV* and in his *Vādāvali*. C. Hayavadana Rao (QJMS., xxiv, 278) places Citsukha between 1220-84, on the basis of a couple of inscriptions from Simhācalam. There are, however, objections to identifying the donee here with the ascetic-dialectician. We have no proof that Narasimha Muni was an *alias* of Cit; even though he was, certainly a devotee of Nṛsiṃha. The Citsukha Somayājīn of the grant, mentioned as a temple-manager, could not, of course, be the ascetic Citsukha. I would, however, accept the date 1220-87 for Cit., apart from the above epigraphs.

मम चास्ति सादृश्यविशेषः इति पश्यन्, अहंकारं त्यजति । प्रतिबिम्बे चात्मनि बिम्बसमानधर्मानविरुद्धान् संभावयतीति । अतो, लाघवेन बहोरर्थस्य प्रतिपत्तये 'तत्त्वमसि' इत्युच्यते । पारतन्त्र्यमात्रोक्तौ, राजपुरुषवदेव प्रतीतिः स्यादिति ॥ (P. 29.) he has given us. Writing about the untenability of Rāmānuja's interpretation of the "Vācārambhaṇa" text, he says well that the example of the nail-scissor entirely gives away the whole case for a Pariṇāmavāda interpretation : इदं तु, सर्वयानुपपन्नम् । मृत्पिण्डादेर्हि मृष्मयादिकं प्रति कारणत्वमात्रमस्त्येव । नखनिकृन्तनस्य तु, स्वयमपि कार्यस्य काष्ण्यासं प्रति तदपि नास्ति ! किमुत एकनखनिकृन्तनविकारः सर्वकाष्ण्यासं न भवतीति ? अतो विज्ञायते नैते दृष्टान्ताः कार्यकारणविवक्षयेति ॥ (p. 35 b).

His (4) *Viṣṇu-tattva-nirṇaya-ṭikā* (p)¹ is the biggest of his commentaries on the Prakaraṇas running to 5120 granthas. He refers to the earlier interpretations of Padmanābha Tīrtha and Narahari (p. 8, lines 16-17), quotes extensively from the *Tattvapradīpikā* of Citsukha and repels his attacks on the concept of Bheda (difference)² and also alludes to certain attempted defences of the Advaitic interpretations in the light of the criticisms of Madhva (pp. 68, line 4; 92, 10). This is important in showing that Madhva's criticisms had gone home and had been taken serious notice of, by some of his critics (5) The *Māyāvāda-khaṇḍana-ṭikā* (p) is a short c. in 175 granthas. The author quotes Śrīharṣa : तच्चाद्वैतं 'ब्रह्मैवेदं सर्वं' इति श्रुत्यर्थेन सहैक्यमापन्नं ब्रह्मैव स्यात् । (*Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khāḍya*, p. 220; Chowk, 1914) इति (p. 12) and from Ānandabodha, the verse :

न सन्नासन्न सदसन्नानिर्वाच्योऽपि तत्क्षयः ।

यक्षानुरूपो बलिरित्याचार्याः प्रत्यपीपदन् ॥

referring to the cessation of Avidyā as belonging to a fifth order of predication (पञ्चमप्रकारता). In (6) the *Prapañcamithyātva-numānakhaṇḍana-ṭikā* (p), in 275 granthas, he explains, at the outset, that it is incumbent on the Realist to expose the untenability of the doctrine of the unreality for the world; for unless the world is shown to be real, the definition of Brahman given in *B. S.* i, 1, 2 as the author etc., of it, would be a travesty. He quotes from Maṇḍana (p. 5 line 10) the famous passage : सर्वप्रत्ययवेद्ये * * * (*Brahmasiddhi*, 20) (7) His c. on the *Upādhikhaṇḍana* (p) in 330 granthas, is otherwise known as "Tattvaparakāśikā".³ It is later than the c. on the *V. T. N.* (See ref. to Bimbapratibimbavāda, pp. 18 and 37 b). In the course of his exposition, J. says that the Advaitin must either give up the idea of Ignorance attacking Brahman or else, account for it in a rational way. It is foolish to take refuge in the "durghaṭatva" of Avidyā. He quotes from the *Nyāyamakaranda* of Ānandabodha (under verse i, of the *UK*) the passage beginning with : ननु, सर्वं हि यो जानाति, स सर्वज्ञः । तिस्रश्चास्य विद्याः संभवन्ति * * * सर्वज्ञत्वमप्यविद्यावत्वमाक्षिपति । न तु प्रतिक्षिपति ॥

1. Nirṇayasagar Press, Bombay, 1898. A new edition has recently been published from Bangalore (1955).

2. Cf. J. p. 48 line 13; p. 49, 2 and Citsukha ii, 164; J. p. 51, 9-10 and 36, 3-4 with Cit. p. 83 (Bombay).

3. एवं समापिततत्त्वप्रकाशिकाव्याख्यो भगवान् टीकाकारः * * * (Vyāsātīrtha, c.).

(8) The *Pramāṇalakṣaṇa Tikā* (p) in 1450 granthas, goes by the name of *Nyāyakalpalatā*. It is a lucid exposition of the original and has however been rendered superfluous by the exhaustive treatment of the same subject in the *Pramāṇapaddhati*. (9) The *Kathālakṣaṇa Tikā* (p) has 354 granthas. The author gives a clear exposition of the subject of Kathā (dialectic disputation) and throws much historical light on various points. He refers at the outset to the three different classifications of Kathā adopted by Śāstrakāras :

(1) एक एव कथामार्ग इति बाह्याः । (i.e. Buddhists).

(2) वादवितण्डे द्वे एवेति श्रीहर्षः ।

(3) वादो, जल्पो, वादवितण्डा, जल्पवितण्डा चेति चतस्रः कथा इति गौडनैय्यायिकाः ।

(10) His c. on the *Karma Nirṇaya* (p) has 920 granthas and was printed in 1900. The most interesting fact here, is that interpretations of the *KN* by Narahari Tīrtha are criticized on three occasions, once at the very beginning of his c. on the opening line : तत्रैके आहुरगुणं ब्रह्मेति । न तत् युक्तम् । श्रुतियुक्तिविरोधात् । युक्तशब्दः शोभनपर्यायः । यथाह भिक्षुः ॥ तथा च, 'युक्तिविरोधान्न युक्तं' इति साध्या-विशिष्टता ॥ and for a second time on p. 3-4 b, on the statement of a syllogism and lastly, in connection with the interpretation of the somewhat ambiguously worded text वेदवाक्यस्य तु वाचनिकार्थं विना नैवान्यो युज्यते ।

SŪTRA-PRASTHĀNA

Except on the *Aṇubhāṣya*, J. has left cc. on all the other works of Madhva, on the *Sūtra-Prasthāna*. Of these, his c. on the *AV* is acknowledgedly his *magnum opus*. Next in importance comes his *Tattvapraṇāśikā*.

(11) The *Tattvapraṇāśikā* is the best known and most universally studied c. on Madhva's *B. S. B.* The extent of the work is nearly 8,000 granthas. It has completely superseded other commentaries on the original, both earlier and later. While the earlier ones fell into oblivion, the *TP* has had the honor of not less than eleven commentaries written on it.

A comparison of the *TP* with the *Sattarkadīpāvali* would show that the former follows very closely, the footsteps of the latter. Jayatīrtha is familiar with the *TD*;¹ but passes over things, explained therein at length.² He keeps strictly to the original avoiding all digressions and criticism of rival interpretations of the *Sūtras* reserved for treatment in his *Nyāya-sudhā*. Occasionally, however, he does notice and refute the interpretations of Śaṅkara, when alluded to in the *Bhāṣya* (Cf. *TP* on *B. S.* i, 1, 3; i, 2, 12; i, 4, 27) and sometimes enters into discussions (i, 1, 3, 11; i, 2, 6 etc.).

The Cat. of the Mysore O. L., (1107 Nagari) ascribes to him a c. on the *Aṇubhāṣya*. That this is by a later writer is clear from one of its opening verses :

प्रणम्य नृहरिं मध्वमुनिं जयमुनिं तथा ।

विवर्ति ह्यणुभाष्यस्य करिष्यामि यथामति ॥

1. See Rāghavendra, *Bhāvadīpa* on *TP* i, 3, 16, p. 112, line 23. Also, under i, 3, 3.

2. See *Bhāvadīpa* i, 1, 4 p. 30, line 21. The *Gautamasāpha* episode is described by Trivikrama at great length which is disposed of by J. and Padmanābha, in one line.

(12) NYĀYA SUDHĀ (p)¹

(i) The *Nyāya Sudhā* (NS) is a first-rate classic, a superb controversial treatise and an illuminating commentary on the AV., all in one. It is more familiarly known to Mādhva scholars by its shorter title of “*Sudhā*” and runs to 24,000 granthas. ‘सुधा वा पठनीया वसुधा वा पालनीया’ is a saying which attests the universal homage paid to it by traditional scholars. Its original name seems to have been “Viṣamapadavākyaṛthavivṛti”, though it is also called by the name of “Nyāyasudhā”,² in the penultimate verse of the last Chapter.

(ii) The views embodied in the Bhāṣyas of Śaṅkara,³ Bhāskara, Rāmānuja⁴ and Yādavaprakāśa⁵ on the Sūtras and in the cc. of Vācaspati,⁶ Padmapāda⁷ Prakāśātman⁸ and Amalānanda (p. 125 b) as well as those of the *Sāmkhyatattvakaumudī*,⁹ the *Tattvabindu*,¹⁰ *Nyāyakusumāñjali*,¹¹ *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā*,¹² the *Citsukhi*,¹³ *Mānamanoharakāra*,¹⁴ the *Nyāyalilāvati*,¹⁵ Gaṅgesa Upādhyāya,¹⁶ Ātreya¹⁷ Sureśa,¹⁸ Bhūṣaṇakāra,¹⁹ Śrīdhara (*Nyāyakandalī*),²⁰ Praśastapāda,²¹ *Nyāyavārtika-Tātparyatikā*,²² and Vyoma Śivācārya,²³ are quoted and refuted where necessary, in the course of the work. The doctrines of the Bhāṭṭa and Prābhākara schools of Mīmāṃsā, relating to the philosophy of propositions and the various views of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Sāmkhya Yoga realists as well as those of the Buddhists, Jains, Pāsupatas and Sāktas, are reviewed and refuted in proper contexts, with a wealth of details. The doctrine of Sphoṭa is criticized in vol. i, p. 87 *et seq.* The passages of the AV are shown to brilliant advantage by making them capable of meeting a variety of objections.²⁴ In this respect, the NS may well be said to be a *marvel at commentary-writing*.

1. The page references here are to the Nirnayasagar Press edn. (Bombay, 1895). The other edn. published by G. R. Savanur, (Dharwar,) contains the original AV and the gloss *Vākyaṛthacandrikā* and its supplement: Both the editions are now out of print.

2. इयं न्यायसुधा भौमैर्दिविजैः सेव्यतां सदा ।
3. Vol. i, p. 294 b; p. 195 b; p. 653; ii, 1, 6 (adh.), p. 295; iv, 1, adh. 2; pp. 616-17.
4. i, 1, 12; i, 4, adh. 6 : p. 197 b; ii, 2, p. 428.
5. iv, 2, adh. 5.
6. Vol. i, p. 190.
7. i, p. 100; 112 b (i, 1, 3).
8. i, 99; 102.
9. ii, 2, p. 316.
10. p. 89.
11. ii, 1 (adh.) 4; p. 289 lines 20-26.
12. i, 210; i, 1, 31 (p.)
13. i, 1, p. 29; pp. 40 and 60 (Bhāvarūpājñāna). Cf. Cit. p. 82. Also cf. i, p. 62 with Cit. pp. 58-60 (Bombay).
14. i, 4, (adh. 6) p. 216.
15. ii, 2, p. 359; ii, 4, p. 215.
16. See. i, 1, p. 96 (*Parimala*).
17. ii, 2, p. 336 line 9.
18. ii, 2, p. 349 (*Parimala*).
19. p. 406.
20. i, 4, p. 214.
21. i, 4, p. 214.
22. ii, 1, p. 251.
23. i, 4, p. 215, line 22.
24. For instance, the phrase “*Pratyakṣavacca prāmāṇyam*” is directed against seven different Pūrvapakṣas (pp. 76-79) and “*Gauravam kalpane anyathā*” disarms five different objections (p. 87-89).

It would be no exaggeration to say that in the whole range of Sanskrit philosophical literature, there is not one other work like the original *AV* or its epoch-making c. the *NS*. "One does not know what to admire most in this work. So remarkably perfect is it, in every way."¹ The style is throughout marvellously sustained. The eloquence is superb yet absolutely unsimulated. There is no straining after effect as one often finds in the *Bhāmati* or other works of Vācaspati. There is moderation in embellishment. The author shows himself to be a perfect master of all the Śāstras. He discourses on the grammatical and linguistic issues called forth by the exigencies of the context in defending the Un-Pāṇinian usages in the *AV* and on more important occasions of Sūtra-interpretation (i, 4, pp. 201-2) and these reveal his penetrating grasp of the subjects dealt with. He has laid *almost all the leading works* of the various systems of thought studied in his days, under contribution. His disquisitions on problems of metaphysics, psychology and theory of knowledge, show a good deal of insight into things and vast powers of analysis and argument. This will be evident from his masterly treatment of the five "Khyātivādas" (i, pp. 41-57 b); the doctrine of Sākṣi (*passim*) pp. 213 ff and 448-50 ; "Difference" or Bheda, (pp. 380-82); and of "Viśeṣas" p. 356.

(iii) It is from the *NS*. that we learn that some of Madhva's interpretations in his *AV* had already been called into question by critics owing allegiance to the system of Śaṅkara. One of these objections, it would appear, had reference to Madhva's attempt at fixing the import of the term Brahman, in the first sūtra, by a process of elimination. Jayatīrtha points out that the critic objects to the roundaboutness involved in this kind of procedure, when the intention of the Sūtrakāra could be settled by a reference to the next sūtra. The critic is, of course, given a suitable reply with reference to Śaṅkara's Bhāṣya itself, on which the objector himself would seem to have taken his stand.²

The rules of Pāṇini are frequently violated in the *AV*. and other works of Madhva. These lapses must have given his critics many vulnerable points of attack. Not only in his *NS* but in his other works also, Jayatīrtha has ably defended his master and justified his oddities against all kinds of criticism.³ The earlier works of Trivikrama, Padmanābha etc., have not paid any attention to these points; presumably because, such criticisms had not been raised by the contemporaries of Madhva.

(iv) It appears from certain references in the *NS*., that there were other commentaries also on the *B. S. B.*⁴ and *AV*,⁵ besides those of Padmanābha, Trivikrama and Nārāyaṇa Paṇḍita. Nothing is, however, known

1. C. M. Padmanabhachar, *Life and Teachings of Madhva* p. 197.

2. On the statement there : अत एव न ब्रह्मशब्दस्य जात्याद्यर्थान्तरमाशङ्कितव्यम् ।

3. See also *NS*. p. 129 b : अत्र केचित् व्यभिचारमुद्भावयन्ति * * * * (i, 1, adh. 6).

4. Under *B. S.* i, 1, 23 (TP) J. refers to the views of a certain "संप्रदायवित्" and the view is quite different from those of Trivikrama, Padmanābha and others, on the point.

5. See *NS*, i, 1, 1 p. 38 line 9 and ii, 2 p. 302, lines 8-9 and *Parimala* i, 4, p. 199 line 22.

about these commentators. Some of them were perhaps direct disciples of Madhva.

(v) As an instance of the lucidity of Jayatīrtha's exposition, attention may be drawn to the following passage in which he has brilliantly expounded the Dvaita view of the philosophical standpoint and *ideology of the Upaniṣads* :— सर्वाण्यपि हि वेदान्तवाक्यानि असंख्येयकल्याणगुणाकारं सकलदोषगन्धविधुरं, एकरूपमेव परं ब्रह्म नारायणाख्यं प्रतिपादयन्ति । किन्तु, (1) कानिचित् सर्वज्ञत्वसर्वेश्वरत्वसर्वान्तर्यामित्व-सोन्दर्यौदार्यादिगुणविशिष्टतया, (2) कानिचित्, अपहृतपाप्मत्वनिर्दुःखत्वप्राकृतभौतिकविग्रहरहितत्वादितोषाभाव-विशिष्टतया, (3) कानिचित् अतिगहनताज्ञापनाय बाङ्मनसागोचरत्वाकारेण (4) कानिचित् सर्वपरित्यागेन तस्यैवोपादानाय अद्वितीयत्वेन, (5) कानिचित् सर्वसत्ताप्रतीतिप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तताप्रतिपत्त्यर्थं सर्वात्मकत्वेन, इत्येवमाद्यनेकप्रकारैः परमपुरुषं बोधयन्ति । ततो व्याकुलबुद्धयो गुरुसंप्रदायविकला अश्रुतवेदव्याख्यातारः सर्वत्राप्येकरूपतामननुसंधाना वेदं छिन्दन्ति ॥ NS. p. 124). This is to be contrasted with Śaṅkara's account of the ideology of the Upaniṣads, expressed in his comment on i, 1, 11 (introductory) : द्विरूपं हि ब्रह्मावगम्यते वेदान्तवाक्येषु—नामरूपविकारोपाधिविशिष्टम्, तद्विपरीतं च सर्वोपाधिविवर्जितम् । 'यत्तु हि द्वैतमिव भवति' 'सर्वाणि रूपाणि विचिंत्य घृरो' इत्येवं सहस्रशो विद्याविद्याविषयभेदेन ब्रह्मणो द्विरूपतां प्रदर्शयन्ति वेदान्तवाक्यानि । तत्रा-विद्यावस्थायां ब्रह्मण उपास्योपासकलक्षणः सर्वो व्यवहारः । तत्र (1) कानिचित् ब्रह्मण उपासनया अभ्युदयार्थानि । (2) कानिचित् क्रममुक्त्यर्थानि (3) कानिचित् कर्मसमृद्धयर्थानि । एवमपेक्षितोपाधिभेदं ब्रह्म, उपास्यत्वेन; निरस्तसमस्तोपाधि तु, ज्ञेयत्वेनोपदिशति ॥

(13) NYĀYA VIVARAṆA TĪKĀ (p)

This is an *incomplete* commentary on the first two pādas of the first chapter of the *NV.*, which was completed by Raghūttama Tīrtha, in the 16th century. Both the commentaries have been printed and published from Uḍipi.

UPANIṢAD-BHĀṢYA-TĪKĀS

The catalogues of the Gopal Vilas Library (Kumbakonam) and the Mysore O. L. (C-40) mention a c. on the *Aitareya Upaniṣad-Bhāṣya*, by J., which is baseless. The existence of a c. on the *Ait. Bhāṣya*, by Vyāsatīrtha, a direct disciple of J. might also be taken to be an indirect proof of the fact that no c. on that Upaniṣad-Bhāṣya, has been left by J. There is, moreover, no reference whatever to any such c. of J. in subsequent literature. However that may be, Mysore C-40, has, on examination, turned out to be nothing more than a ms. of Viśveśvara Tīrtha's c. on the *Aitareya Bhāṣya*.

(14) *Ṣaṭpraśna Upaniṣad Bhāṣya Tīkā* (p) (granthas 500), together with the gloss of Mankāla Ācārya, was printed in 1907. J. gives here, the *akṣara-yojanā* of the text, besides the *Bhāṣya-yojanā* with *Pratīkas*. It is a lucid and entertaining c., quoted by Rāghavendra in his gloss on the *TP* ii, 4, 13 (p. 233 b).

(15) The *Īśa Upaniṣad Bhāṣya Tīkā* (p) is a short c. in 450 granthas, published in 1926, with the gloss of Chalāri Nṛsimhācārya from Kumbakonam. The Advaitic and Viśiṣṭādvaitic interpretations of the text are here severely criticized. Objecting to Śaṅkara's interpretation of the very first verse, J. says that the fact that everything in the world is

“covered” by God, is hardly any reason why a man should be advised to give up his activity. Were it so, it would equally apply to the uninitiated (*ajñāni*). There would then be no point in recommending two different courses of action, in verses 1 and 2. It would be difficult to extract a monism from the passage in question as the *ācchādaka* and the *ācchādya* should obviously be distinct. The use of the root *bhuj* in the *Ātmanepada*, is also against the Advaitic and Viśiṣṭādvaitic interpretations.

The Advaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita explanations of mantras 8-14, in terms of Jñānakarmasamuccaya etc. are criticized at length. The Samuccaya-pakṣa is dismissed as being opposed to the Śruti *Nānyaḥ panthā ayanāya vidyate*. The view, moreover, that the mere knower of God has to suffer a greater state of misery in Samsāra than a mere performer of actions, is both arbitrary and illogical. The (Advaitin's) idea of Devatā-jñāna, introduced into Īśa 11, is alien to the spirit of the Upaniṣads, which are mainly devoted to the science of Ātman. Pointed reference is made to the arbitrary way in which Śaṅkara explains away verse 14, after prefixing a negative particle before “Sambhūti” and turning it into “asambhūti.”¹

(16) In his *Rgbhāṣya Tīkā* (p)² otherwise known as *Sambandhadīpikā* (granthas 3500), Jayatīrtha gives a lucid exposition of the original, not only in the light of the authorities cited by Madhva; but of other standard works as those of Yāska : He discusses the grammatical derivation of many Vedic words, in the light of Pāṇinian grammar, the Uṇādis etc. The work shows his mastery of Vedic grammar, in all its intricacies. He criticizes the interpretations of other commentators on the *Rg Veda*³ (pp. 72b and 76) and explains the details of the Adhyātma interpretation of the hymns.

His (17) *Gītābhāṣya Prameyadīpikā* (p) has been printed twice in S. India and runs to 4,000 granthas. It is indispensable to a proper understanding of the hidden depths of thought and suggestiveness of the original Bhāṣya, whose terseness and brevity are such as to try even the apotheosis of patience among men. Following Madhva and sometimes of his own accord, J. draws attention to the interpretations of Śaṅkara and Bhāskara and criticizes them. These references are very valuable to us, not only for purposes of *Gītā*-interpretation, but also for text-criticism and solving problems connected with authorship and genuineness of the commentaries attributed to these two writers. The Vedāntin Bhāskara is a long-forgotten commentator on the *Gītā*. From the various allusions and references to his commentary in the *Prameyadīpikā*, I drew the attention of scholars, for the first time, fortysix years ago, to ‘Bhāskara a forgotten commentator on the *Gītā*’ (*I. H. Q.* ix, 1933) and gave some definite

1. Those who generally object to Madhva's splitting of “Sa ātmā tattvam asi” into “Sa ātmā atat tvam asi”, may well ponder over this *padaccheda*, which lacks the grammatical sanction which is available for the other.

2. Nirmayasagar Press, Bombay, 1901.

3. See my paper on “*Yatra dvāviva* (i, 28, 2) P.O. 1950.

details about his commentary and his identity. My identification was disputed by Otto Schrader (*I. H. Q.* x, 2,) to which a suitable reply was given (xi, 1935). Indian scholars, however, refused to be drawn out on the issue. Prof. Schrader had, however, informed me in one of his letters to me, at the time, that Dr. Chintamani of the Madras University had come across a manuscript of the work, which failed to support my identification. I am now happy to find that this fragment has been utilized by Dr. Belvalkar, in his edition¹ of the *Gītā* with the c. of Ānanda (vardhana) following the Kashmirian recension, in giving readings from Bhāskara. Dr. Belvalkar has definitely accepted the identification of this Bhāskara with the Bhāṣyakāra of that name on the *B. S.*, first propounded by me in 1933. Only, it is not clear why he has not at all mentioned the fact of his present conclusion having been anticipated and affirmed by me long before ! It is clear from J.'s references to Bhāskara's commentary² that the latter was (1) a sharp critic of Śaṅkara's c. on the *Gītā*; (2) that he had followed at least one distinctive Kashmirian reading (vi, 7),³ not known to his brother-commentators like Śaṅkara and others following the vulgate text; and (3) that he was probably a Trimūrtiyuttīrṇa-Brahma-vādin. Dr. Belvalkar says in f. n. 1, on p. 8 of his Introduction to his edition of Ānanda's commentary, that "it is unfortunate that the existing fragment of Bhāskara's c. *does not cover* vi, 7, where a Bhāskara is *reported to have* changed the reading".⁴ * * * (Italics mine). So, despite the fragment of Bhāskara's c. on the *Gītā* now published, J's references to him still supply more substantial information about the work of this forgotten commentator !

Jayatīrtha's c. illumines many a dark and obscure corner of the text of *Gītā* and draws out the hidden implications and rich suggestiveness of the all but too brief utterances of Madhva's bhāṣya, by breathing into them a soul of wit and a formidable array of details.⁵ He refers to the commentary of Narahari Tīrtha twice. He is ready with suitable defences of the grammatical 'lapses' of Madhva.⁶ (18) His *Gītā Tātparya Nyāya-dīpikā* (p), has 3267 granthas and was published in 1905, with the gloss

1. Bilvakunja Publishing House, Poona, 1941. Sarasvatibhavan Granthamala, No. 94 Varanasi, 1965.

2. For detailed information see my paper in *I.H.Q.* ix, 1933.

3. The information is given for the first time, in Jayatīrtha's c. on Madhva's *G. B.* as was first pointed out by me, in 1933.

4. Dr. Belvalkar *ought to have mentioned* that even for this 'report' we are indebted to Jayatīrtha !

5. See i, 30 (p. 59 Madras Edn.) ii, p. 147. This point has been brought out in my English Introduction to the trans. of the *Gītābhāṣya* of Madhva, into Kannaḍa, published by the M. M. S. Sangha, Udipi, 1954.

6. See on परिपूर्णं गुरुं चान् गोतार्थम् (pp. 9-10)

"कृपालु" (p. 13)

कथं चास्य कर्तुं न शक्यते (p. 30)

आदिराज्ञाम् (iii, 4) and बहवः कर्मकारणा भवन्ति (iii, 36).

of *Kiraṇāvali*.¹ This commentary contains two new references to the c. of Bhāskara (ii, 16 and iii, 17) and clarifies many obscure points.²

ORIGINAL WORKS

(19) The *Vādāvali* (p)³ is an independent controversial tract in 500 granthas. It is also known as *Vedāntavādāvali*. It is the same work designated *Vādamālā* by Aufrecht (i, 119). The author hints that the arguments used by him are a *resume* of those in the *Khaṇḍana-traya*, *Td*⁴ and *V. T. N.*⁴ The work is a dialectic refutation of the illusionistic hypothesis with all its logical and metaphysical paraphernalia. The famous syllogism विमतं मिथ्या, दृश्यत्वात्, जडत्वात्, परिच्छिन्नत्वात्, शुक्तिरूप्यवत् is analysed and refuted in minute detail. The theory of the Monist that our senses always deceive us, being merely appearance-interpreting, is effectively challenged and the fitness of sense-knowledge to reveal objects as they are is vindicated. The following are some of the main topics dealt with :

1. Definition of Avidyā and its refutation.
2. Proofs in support of Avidyā examined.
3. Definition of Mithyātva.
4. दृश्यत्व, जडत्व and परिच्छिन्नत्व *hetus*, refuted.
5. The opposition of Pratyakṣa to the doctrine of Unreality.
6. Opposition of Śruti to the doctrine of Unreality.
7. Self-validity of Pramāṇa.
8. Flaws in the doctrine of Āropa.
9. Reality of Dream-cognitions.
10. सत्यत्वहेतूनां प्रतिकूलतर्कोद्धारः ।
11. Monistic texts reinterpreted : नेह नानास्ति । एकमेवाद्वितीयम् ।
12. भेदस्य प्रत्यक्षाग्राह्यत्वे पूर्वपक्षः । Its refutation.
13. Bheda is धर्मिस्वरूप.
14. Viśeṣas.

The views expressed in the *Tattvapradīpikā* of Citsukha, the *Vivaraṇa*, *Nyāya-kandali* etc., are quoted and criticised. Citsukha is once mentioned by name. (p. 27 Bby. edn.).

J. says well in the course of his work that there is no point in saying that dualistic texts in Scripture are concerned with establishing the phenomenal reality of the world, as no philosopher or layman ever disputes the phenomenal reality : व्यर्थं च प्रपञ्चे व्यावहारिकत्वप्रतिपादनम् । नहि कश्चिल्लौकिको वैदिको वा, व्यावहारिकसत्यतां प्रपञ्चे नाभ्युपैतीति । Even the Buddhist is no exception to this. He also remarks that the censure in असत्यमप्रतिष्ठं (*Gitā* xvi, 8) cannot but recoil on the Advaitin and apply to his view of Mithyātva of the world, as there is no philosopher, worth the name, who believes the world to be

1. The T. P. L. Cat. (xiv, p. 6095) is not correct in saying that this c. has not been published.

2. See the reference to Viṣṇudharmottara on p. 200 (Madras edn.)

3. Bombay; Belgaum 1937 and Adyar 1943 with English transln. & Notes.

4. वाङ्मुखात् वाङ्मुखं भूयात्. . . (last verse. See Rāghavendra's comment on it.)

5. Cf. p. 53 of *Vādāvali* and *VTN*.

totally non-existent:¹ न चात्र असत्यशब्दोज्ज्वलतासत्त्वपरः । अत्यन्तासत्त्वाभ्युपगन्तुर्वादिन एवाभावात्, आहुरित्यस्यायोगात् । Citsukha's argument in respect of "Neha nānāsti" that it cannot be interpreted in terms of "Svagatabhedaniṣedha" (denial of internal distinctions in Brahman) as has been done by the Dvaitins, on account of the absence of "tva-pratyaya" there, is directly repulsed : न च ब्रह्मणि नानात्वं प्रसक्तं यन्निषिद्धयत इति चेत्, हन्त, तर्हि, त्वयापि एकमेवाद्वितीयमित्यादेः नानात्वनिषेधपरत्वमभ्युपगतं कथं स्यात् ? नानाशब्दस्य भावप्रत्ययान्तत्वाभावाच्चेति चेन्न । 'मुक्तोपसृप्यव्यपदेशात् (B. S. i, 3, 2) इत्यादौ भावप्रत्ययाभावेऽपि तदर्थत्वदर्शनात् (p. 66).

The *Vādāvālī* is thus the earliest large-scale polemical tract of the Post-Madhva period, acting, in many ways, as the forerunner of the *Nyāyāmṛta* of Vyāsatīrtha. The *Vādāvālī-Khaṇḍana* (Mys. O. L. C-755) is presumably a reply to it.

(20) PRAMĀṆAPADDHATI (p)^D

This is the biggest (granthas 750) of Jayatīrtha's independent works. It has been published with eight commentaries including those of Vijayīndra Tīrtha, Rāghavendra, Vedeśa Satyanātha etc. from Dharwar. It is the standard work on Dvaita Logic and Epistemology,² and all questions connected with those branches of metaphysics. It deals with the nature, scope and definition of Pramāṇas, their ways of functioning, theories of Truth and Error, the question whether the validity of knowledge is to be viewed as intrinsic to it (svataḥ) or extrinsic (parataḥ) etc. It is modelled on the *Pramāṇa-lakṣaṇa*, but reviews, in addition, the epistemological theories in the six systems of Indian thought, both orthodox and heretical. It is divided into three Paricchedas (chapters) Pratyakṣa, Anumāna and Śabda (or Āgama).

MINOR WORKS

Among his minor works are to be mentioned (21) the *Padyamālā* (p)³ a work on daily worship, in essence a summary of the method of worship enunciated in the *Tantrasārasaṅgraha* of Madhva. It is an elementary work. His (22) *Śatāparādhastotra*, is a Stotra, praying for forgiveness of a hundred sins and delinquencies which a man commits every day. (23) A work of the name of *Adhyātma-Taraṅgiṇī*, is attributed to him in the S. K. (p. 30) and is described as a catechism of the principles of Dvaita philosophy. Nothing more is known about it.

1. The *Abhidharma Samuccaya* of Asaṅga (ed. by V. V. Gokhale, in J. B. B. R. A. S. 1949,) refers on p. 35, very clearly to the doctrine of *three* degrees of reality in Buddhism; which corresponds exactly with the Advaitic theory of Sat-traividhya : Pāramārthika, Vyāvahārika and Prātibhāsika: यदुक्तं वैपुल्ये—'निःस्वभावाः सर्वधर्मा इति । तत्र कोऽभिसंधिः ? स्वयमभावतामुपादाय, स्वेनात्मना अभावतामुपादाय, स्वभावे वानवस्थिततामुपादाय बालग्रहवच्च लक्षणतामुपादाय ।

(1) अपि खलु परिकल्पिते स्वभावे लक्षणनिःस्वभावतामुपादाय, (2) परतन्त्रे उत्पत्तिनिःस्वभावतामुपादाय (3) परिनिष्पन्ने परमार्थनिःस्वभावतामुपादाय * * *

2. A brief study of it by P. Nagaraja Rao has been published as a Bulletin of the Adyar Library, 1958.

3. Belgaum.

JAYATĪRTHA'S DIALECTICS

Jayatīrtha's works disclose a thoroughgoing mastery of the dialectical method of argument adopted by veteran dialecticians like the Vivaraṇa-kāra, Śrīharṣa and Citsukha, for the establishment or refutation of thought-categories. But inasmuch as most of his works are in the form of commentaries on the works of Madhva, he is prevented by the restrictions imposed by the exigencies of the text, from devoting full and unrestricted attention to dialectical treatment of topics. But within the limits of the opportunities afforded by the subject-matter of the original texts, he has given us ample proofs of his dialectical mettle. Dasgupta has paid him a deservedly high tribute as one of the most eminent dialectical thinkers in Indian philosophy. His *NS* and *V. T. N. ṭīkā* discuss numerous topics of interest to logic and philosophy. His *Vādāvali* is a full-fledged dialectical work though of limited range. It is modelled on the *Iṣṭasiddhi* and other works and attempts a close and reasoned refutation of the views of Ānandabodha, Śrīharṣa and Citsukha, on philosophical realism and its concomitant problems of epistemology, and metaphysics. After reading this work, one wishes that Jayatīrtha had given us a work of wider range, on the same lines.¹ Within the ambit of the topics dealt with by him, in this work, he has achieved remarkable effect; and his work set the model for and gave the impetus to the more elaborate and concentrated efforts of Viṣṇudāsācārya and Vyāsatīrtha, in the succeeding centuries. His language is elegant, forceful and animated, without being excessively ornate or artificial. His controversial style is crisp and polished and free from excessive technical phraseology. He combines vast range of knowledge with an ability to synthesize and suit it to his requirements. He has a charm of language rarely excelled in or outside his system. In keenness and subtlety of arguments and minuteness of analysis, he is in no way inferior to the best dialecticians of the Advaita school. The dialectical output and achievements of the great makers of Dvaita Vedānta, such as Jayatīrtha and Vyāsatīrtha are, any day, far ahead of those of the dialecticians of the Viśiṣṭādvaita school. Dasgupta has drawn pointed attention to this indisputable preeminence of the dialecticians of the Dvaita school,² of whom Jayatīrtha is, undoubtedly, the master. Many of his arguments and lines of attack have been substantially incorporated into their works by subsequent authors like Viṣṇudāsa and Vyāsatīrtha, as will be clear later. We may, therefore, look upon Jayatīrtha as the father of the dialectical movement in Dvaita thought. Of course, Madhva himself was

1. The wish is fulfilled by Vyāsatīrtha in his *Nyāyāmṛta*.

2. *History of I. Phil.* vol. III, p. 111, (passage quoted in the Preface).

no mean dialectician, as we have seen. But he was altogether too laconic in his comments and criticisms whether dialectical or expository. Providence has indeed favoured Madhva by harnessing such an all-round genius as Jayatīrtha to the cause of explaining and reinforcing his Sidhānta. It is hardly possible to give even a fair idea of Jayatīrtha's dialectic abilities and contribution within our limited scope. That would easily require a separate volume in itself. I shall, therefore, content myself with a brief summary of his treatment of two important topics alone, to give the reader some idea of his mettle, as a dialectician. For other topics refer to my *Philosophy of Madhvācārya*.

(i) CRITIQUE OF "MITHYĀTVA"

The concept of "Mithyātva" (falsity of the world) based on the familiar syllogism : विमतं मिथ्या, दृश्यत्वात् * * * * * is vigorously assailed by Jayatīrtha. It is not possible to formulate a satisfactory definition of falsity. It cannot be viewed as (1) *anirvacāniya* (indefinable); or (2) as non-existence; or (3) something 'other than real; or (4) not coming within the jurisdiction of proofs; or (6) being produced by Avidyā or its effects; or (7) the nature of being perceived in the same locus along with its own absolute non-existence. None of these alternatives is free from defects. Indefinability has been authoritatively defined by Citsukha as : प्रत्येकं सदसत्त्वानधिकरणत्वम्. But this is not, in any way, detrimental to the position of the Dvaita Vedāntin. For, as a believer in the uniqueness of attributes and as one who does not subscribe to the doctrine of "Anugatasattā" or universals, he would readily admit that a given real (sat) is *ipso facto* not the locus of another reality : सद्भेदवादिनो मम, सतोऽपि सत्त्वान्तरानधिकरणत्वाङ्गीकारात् । (NS. p. 37). As for "Asattvānadhikaraṇatvam", it is readily accepted by the Dvaitin to whom, the world, as a reality, is *ipso facto* Asattvānadhikaraṇa (not the locus of non-existence). The composite definition of Mithyātva combining the two ideas would thus involve a "Siddhasādhana" or establishment of the established, as applied to the Dvaitin's view of the world.

(2) Moreover, "Sadasattvānadhikaraṇatvam" as understood by the Advaitin, would involve a self-contradiction ; in so far as existence and non-existence are logical contradictories. They cannot coexist in the same locus. So too, their respective negations : सदसत्त्वस्यैकत्र विरोधेन, विधिवत् निषेधस्याप्यनुपपत्तेः । (Bauddhadhikkāra). If there is no mutual contradiction between the two, the Advaitin might as well accept the world to be "Sad-asat", instead of going further ! The reason for such non-acceptance is presumably their mutual exclusiveness. Such an opposition would persist as much between "Sat" and "Asat", as between their negations : विरुद्ध-विधिसमुच्चयवत्, विरुद्धनिषेधसमुच्चयस्यापि विरुद्धत्वात् । (J. Mith. kh. ṭikā, p. 8b). If there can be no conflict in निषेधसमुच्चय because it is unreal, why not admit विधिसमुच्चय itself on the same condition and simplify matters and defy logic equally? : तर्हि, विधिसमुच्चय एव अतात्त्विक एवाङ्गीक्रियतां, लाघवात् (Mith. Kh. ṭikā, p. 8b). It is of no use to plead, as does Citsukha, that the conjoining of the

two negations is *not real* : निषेधसमुच्चयस्याप्यतात्त्विकत्वाभ्युपगमात्, न व्याघातः । and that they have been put together merely to bring out the impossibility of defining the true nature of their counter-correlates (*sadasattva*) satisfactorily : तत्तत्प्रतियोगिनो दुनिरूपत्वमात्रप्रकटनाय तत्तद्विलक्षणत्वामिलापः ॥ Jayatīrtha points out that, in that case, the “Sadasadvailakṣaṇya” posited of the world would be essentially undemonstrable and the latter would have to be accepted as purely “sadasat”. If “Sadasadvailakṣaṇya” were not true, “Sadasattva” must be the truth of the matter !

That existence and non-existence are mutually exclusive attributes with reference to one and the same thing (with reference to the same time and place), could be demonstrated with regard to the Ātman himself. We cannot, therefore, overcome a self-contradiction in asserting the world to be “Sadasadvilakṣaṇa” (different from both ‘real’ and ‘unreal’). If it be said that the “existence” found in the Ātman is *not* due to the *absence of non-existence* in him, but to the presence of Ātmanhood, one would have to ask for a proper definition of “Ātmatvam”. It cannot be a class-concept as the Ātman is *ex hypothesi* only one, according to the Advaitin. It would involve the fallacy of “Sādhyāviśiṣṭatā” (sameness of the major term and the reason) if Ātmatva is defined as “reality”. Uncontradictability, also, cannot be deemed a proper definition of the Ātman as according to the Advaita, even the Asat is uncontradictable : ‘नासत्त्वस्यास्ति बाधकम्’. There is difficulty in defining the Ātman as “Jñānatvam” : ज्ञातृज्ञेयशून्यस्य, ज्ञानस्यापि शून्यत्वात्. (*Mith. Kh. Tikā* p. 7). The Ātman cannot be a substratum of knowledge (ज्ञानाधार); but simply consciousness according to Advaita. Other definitions like “Ātmapada-vācyaṭvam”, “tallakṣyaṭvam” etc., are equally inadequate. No doubt, the “Ātman” is admitted by the Dvaita philosophers also. But it could be suitably defined within the limits of the alternatives given, on the Dvaita view. This is not possible for the Advaitin. It must, therefore, be admitted that existence is the logical concomitant of the absence of non-existence and *vice versa*, and that the two are mutually exclusive predicates. Mithyātva, then, in the sense of positing the *coexistence of both their negations, at the same time and with reference to the same locus* is, therefore, most illogical and could never pass muster.

It is not also possible to establish such a category on the strength of a syllogism — that existence and non-existence, *qua* attributes, are capable of residing in one and the same locus as counter-correlates of their absolute negation. The inference is vitiated by the “Upādhi” of “Aviruddhatvam”, inasmuch as only non-contradictory attributes or their essence could be so accommodated together, as the absence of color and taste in air. Since the “thing” (*vastu*) in this context is synonymous with the existent, the syllogism would imply that “Sat” is the counter-correlate of the absolute non-existence residing in it, which is obviously impossible ! There are also many “Kevalānvayī” attributes like ‘knowability’ (*prameyatvam*) whose non-existence is inconceivable in any substratum.

The attempt to establish the category of the *indefinable* (anirvacanīya) : on Arthāpatti argument based on स-चेन्न बाध्येत, असच्चेन्न प्रतीयेत is also beset with difficulties. In the first place, the Monist would have to define—“Sattvam”. Is it something possessing the class-essence of *sattā* (सत्ता-जातिम्); or something that is uncontradictable; or, simply the essence of Brahman (ब्रह्मस्वरूपत्वम्) ? The Advaitin concedes “Sattā-jāti” to the world; but, he is not prepared, on that account, to treat it as uncontradictable. It lands us in a pure “Sādhya-*viśiṣṭatā*” or non-difference of the ‘*hetu*’ and ‘*sādhya*’, to be told that if the world were uncontradictable, it could not be contradicted : यदबाध्यं तदबाध्यम् । It is “Siddhasādhana” or affirming a truism, to say that if objects like silver in shell were of the nature of Brahman, they could not be contradicted. They *are* contradicted and therefore they are *not* of the essence of Brahman. This is endorsed by the Dvaitin.

The concept of Anirvacanīya is first propounded by the Advaitin, with reference to objects of *illusions*, which is sought to be *extended* to the world of *normal perceptions* as well. The Dvaita philosopher is not only opposed to this extension; but is also opposed to the acceptance of a third order of predication between the poles of reality and unreality, existence and non-existence and the invention of a *tertium quid*. The objects of illusions could be legitimately treated as *unreals* appearing as *reals*. There is no need to invent a half-way house between existence and non-existence. The Advaitin, however, interposes a difficulty which is embodied in the second half of his *arthāpatti* argument : असच्चेन्न प्रतीयेत—the non-existent could not be presented as existent. But since objects of illusions are perceived for the nonce and later on liquidated, they should be given an intermediary status. This is refuted by Jayatīrtha.

The category of “Anirvacanīya” is made to rest upon the presumption of the non-presentability of Asat. This assumption is gratuitous and inconsistent with the conviction of Aśad-vailakṣaṇya (*difference from Asat*) which the Advaitin has in respect of the world ! The distinction from Asat could not be known and asserted, unless Asat is capable of being known and presented :

असद्विलक्षणज्ञप्त्यै ज्ञातव्यमसदेव हि ।

तस्मादसत्प्रतीतिश्च कथं तेन निवार्यते ? (AV).

This objection is parried by the Advaitin by trying to explain that he denies only the *immediate* presentation of the non-existent as existent. Jayatīrtha replies that a dispassionate examination of the data of illusions and the verdict of the sublating cognition would fully establish that the object presented in illusions is adjudged to be absolutely non-existent : नास्ति नासीत् न भविष्यति रजतमत्र । असदेव रजतं प्रत्यभात् । After all, experience is the acid test of what is possible and what is not possible : नहि दृष्टेऽनुपपन्नं नाम ।

Apart from the evidence of the “Bādhaka-jñāna,” no illusions could be *explained* without accepting the apprehension of *something non-existent as existent*; or of *something existent as non-existent* :

असतः सत्त्वेन प्रतीतिः सतोऽसत्त्वेन प्रतीतिरित्यन्यथाप्रतीतेरेव भ्रान्तित्वात् ॥

No theory of illusions could do without an element of असतः सत्त्वेनापरोक्षतया प्रतीतिः । or direct perception or presentation of a non-existent as existent. The essence of illusions is that a “given” thing is mistaken for a projected “other”. Let us grant for argument’s sake, that the object of illusions is really Anirvacanīya, as the Advaitin would have it. Can he explain the illusion *without* involving an element of “a non-existent being perceived as existent”? Assuredly not. There can be no illusion *unless and until* the (in his opinion) “Anirvacanīya”-silver is directly apprehended as a *reality* or as *existing*. If it is presented as *Anirvacanīyā* (as it “truly” is, according to the Advaitin), there would be no illusion to speak of! If it were presented as non-existent, there would be no responsive activity on the part of the deluded percipient (Bhrānta). If the anirvacanīya-prātibhāsika is presented as “Vyāvahārika,” the question immediately arises, as to the *status* of this “Vyāvahārika” appearance. Is it also Vyāvahārika or merely Prātibhāsika? In the former case, the silver, the status of whose appearance as Vyāvahārika is a vyāvahārika reality, would also be a Vyāvahārika and not merely Prātibhāsika, as it is regarded in the Advaitic theory. If the status of the appearance as *vyāvahārika* is merely prātibhāsika, the question would then arise, if *that* status is apprehended in the course of the illusion, as “Prātibhāsika”, or as “Vyāvahārika”. It cannot be the first, as there would be no active response, in that case. यद्यत्यन्तासतो अपरोक्षप्रतीतिविषयता न स्यात्, तर्हि, प्रातिभासिकतयार्थक्रियानर्हस्य रजतस्य यदसत्प्रातिभासिक-वैलक्षण्यं तदपरोक्षज्ञानं भ्रान्तस्य नोत्पद्येत, तथा चाप्रवृत्तिः प्रसज्येत इति (J. Td. p. 10.). In the other case, we would have a tacit admission of a “Prātibhāsika” appearing and being presented as what it is *not* — viz., a “vyāvahārika”. This is a clear enough case of “*Asatas satvena aparokṣatayā bhānam*” which cannot be camouflaged. It is clear, then, that there is no escape from an element of “Asatas satvena pratīti”, on any view of illusions. Granting that the object of illusions is, in point of fact, “Anirvacanīya”, the present question is not one of what it is; but of *how it appears or is perceived*! Since we cannot speak of an illusion on any other alternative save of the *Anirvacanīya* appearing as *real and existent* (for the nonce), it is futile and disingenuous to deny the possibility and the fact of “Asat” appearing as “Sat”.

There is no point, then, in Citsukha’s trying to confuse the issue by seeking to explain that it is not the Prātibhāsika silver that is apprehended as the vyāvahārika; but that it is only the vyāvahārika reality of the substratum (adhiṣṭhāna) viz., shell, that is superimposed on the silver, — the nature of which (superimposition) is, however, Anirvacanīya! This is arguing in a vicious circle. Here, again, the Advaitin is employing the concept of Anirvacanīya as if it were an established fact! Jayatīrtha asks, what is meant by all this roundabout explanation! What is the *status* of the apprehension of the vyāvahārika reality of the substratum superimposed on the silver? Is it really vyāvahārika or prātibhāsika? If the former, the silver would be vyāvahārika. In the latter case, is it presented as Prātibhāsika or as vyāvahārika? It could not be the first, for reasons already stated : प्रवृत्त्यनुपपत्तिः । In the second case, it must be definitely

stated if such vyāvahārika appearance is true to its actual being or not. It cannot be true; as, in that case, the superimposed silver could not be dismissed on stultification, as purely imaginary (Prātibhāsika). If then, the vyāvahārika appearance is not true to its nature, it means simply that we are, at last, face to face with असतः सत्त्वेनापरोक्षप्रतीति ! If the Advaitin should *still* desperately continue to assert that the real nature of this second Vyāvahārika is *also* Anirvacanīya and superimposed, one has necessarily to repeat the whole series of questions (vikalpas) *ab ovo* over again : तदा, अनिर्वचनीयमिति कोऽर्थः इत्यादेरावृत्त्या आरोपपरंपरापर्यवसानानुपपत्तिः । यत्रैवारोपपर्यवसानं, तत्रैव प्रवृत्त्यभावो, असतोऽपि सत्त्वेन प्रतीतिर्वा प्रसज्येत ॥ (V. T. N. Tīkā p. 58 b). There is no point in pressing a series of Anirvacanīyas into service when the original and basic one itself is unproved. Where the regressive series of Anirvacanīyas and superimpositions stop, there again the old difficulties would have to be faced.

(ii) REVIEW OF CITSUKHA'S CRITIQUE OF "DIFFERENCE"

Jayatīrtha devotes considerable attention to the refutation of Citsukha's critique of "Difference" and to an exposition of the category of difference according to the Madhva's philosophy. He takes his stand on the perception of difference as a *fait accompli* and asks whether the Advaitin proposes to deny the perception of "difference" *as such*; or whether he questions the fact of its being brought about by unimpeachable factors. Unless Difference is conceded, within the limits of perception, it cannot be logically refuted. The second view may be held on the ground of difference not being an effect; or its being an effect without having an assignable cause; or its being brought about by something which is not its cause. The first one could not be endorsed by the Advaitin who regards the apprehension of difference as an illusion brought about by the flaw of Avidyā. If the perception of Difference is uncaused, it could claim to be free from flaws and therefore valid and real. In the second case, there would be a palpable self-contradiction of thought and the eradication of Difference might be equally adventitious; and one need not have to undergo the hard discipline of Vedic study and reflection in order to eradicate it. It would be absurd to say that difference is produced by something that is not its cause; as cause is that which is actually responsible for an effect coming into being. What are the grounds for supposing that the perception of difference is caused by flaws (doṣajanya) ? Does it rest on mere spurious reasonings; or on the existence of strong stultifying cognition ? In the former case, even mental impress (antaḥkaraṇavṛtti) brought about by a study of Vedāntic texts would be open to the same taint. For, according to the Advaitin, the natural taint that lies at the root of all difference is Avidyā and the same Avidyā lies at the back of "Vedāntavṛtti". This must indeed be so, to prevent the danger to the principle of Monism (Advaita-hāni), in the event of its being a flawless reality. The Advaitin is, therefore, hardly justified in condemning Pratyakṣa, while hugging the Śrutis to his heart. Barring certain flimsy

reasonings based on the contingencies of interdependence, regress etc., there are no solid proofs in the form of stultifying Pratyakṣa which could be cited against the reality of the perception of difference. As for the fallacies of interdependence etc., it would not be difficult to turn the tables upon the notion of "identity" also, by repeating the same dialectical hair-splittings of Citsukha¹ and asking whether the perception of identity manifests a bare identity; or the objects alone which are identical; or both. In the last case, again, does it reveal them simultaneously; or the objects first and then their identity? It cannot reveal mere identity or first the identity and then the correlates or both at once. For, the objects proposed to be identified must be revealed before any identity could be grasped. If there is no identity apart from the Brahman, there is no difference apart from the objects! If the reasonings directed against the notion of 'identity' are invalid on account of their opposition to Śruti, those directed against 'difference' are equally so, on account of their being opposed to perception (and Śruti)!

Assuming that perception of difference is liable to be sublated and therefore unreal, one would have to define precisely, the content (*viṣaya*) of such sublating cognition (*bādhakajñāna*). Would it emphasize (1) an element of difference from the previous perception; or (2) merely establish a "non-difference"; or (3) something neutral to both? The first would ratify the reality of 'difference'. The second would have to be still further clarified. There are only three possible senses in which the negative particle (in '*a-bheda*') could be employed: otherness; opposition; or absence (of difference). Every one of these alternatives would presuppose an element of 'difference', in its denotation. The stultifying cognition, in establishing the *absence of difference* would have to manifest its content as *something different from* its counter-correlate viz., the difference previously cognized: भेदाभावग्राहिणापि, प्रतियोगि (भेद) विलक्षणतया स्वविषयो व्यवस्थाप्यः (*Vādāvalī*).

The *form* of the stultifying cognition also would present similar difficulties to the Monist. There are only three possible alternatives in which it could be put: "This is *not* difference" (नायं भेदः); "there is *no* difference here"; or "something else has been appearing as "difference". Every one of these forms (of the judgment) would have reference to a "difference" which it would cognize directly, as in the judgment "नेदं रजतम्" (this is *not* silver). No stultifying cognition can, thus, fly in the face of the category of difference; or disprove its entity as such. Difference is, thus, a settled fact of life and experience and cannot be allowed to be dismissed, just for fear of supposed difficulties of regress, etc. Such difficulties would have to draw back, when confronted with the presence of difference as a *fait accompli*. A repudiation of the category of difference is, thus, *ultra vires*.

1. प्रत्यक्षं भेदमेव गोचरयत्युत वस्त्वपि? तत्रापि, भेदपूर्वकं तद्गोचरयेत्? तत्पूर्वकं वा भेदं, युगपदेव बोध्यम्? * * * (*Tattvapradīpikā*, p. 165).

At this stage, the Advaitin puts in a plea that he is not opposed to some sort of *provisional* difference (व्यावहारिकभेद) and that his criticisms of the category are directed against the conception of Difference as a *paramārtha* (absolute) reality. Jayatīrtha rejoins that such defences are puerile. By all means let the Advaitin please himself with Vyāvahārikabheda ! But what about the other Pāramārthikabheda which he seeks to overthrow ? Is that revealed by Pratyakṣa and other Pramāṇas; or not ? If it is, how could it be repudiated ? If it is something *not* revealed by the senses or any other *Pramāṇa* (valid source), he is at perfect liberty to repudiate it, as the Dvaitin is in no way affected by the repudiation of such a category that is beyond or outside the Pramāṇas !

The very form of posing the *reductio ad absurdum* and the fallacy of interdependence calculated to gag the perception of difference, — “If there is a perception of Difference, there would be mutual interdependence”; or “if the perception of difference is real, there would be mutual interdependence” : or, “if the perception of difference is bound up with its correlates, there would be interdependence” and so on, would be powerless to aid the Advaitin. The first argument would be met by the counter-proposition that if there is no perception of difference, the monist would be cut off from all kinds of practical life and theoretical interest or activity. In the second case, there is no natural concomitance between reality and interdependence and the *āpādana* (objection) would be misplaced. Moreover, interdependence is no bar to the validity of particular experiences : अन्योन्याश्रयस्य प्रमात्वाप्रतिबन्धकत्वात् । In the second case, according to the laws of *tarka*, only the correlative-*interdependence* would stand negated in the event of “Viparyayaparyavasāna”. But the conception of difference would stand untouched.¹ The argument would have to be posed in some such form : यदि भेददर्शनं धर्मप्रतियोगिसापेक्षं स्यात्, तर्हि, अन्योन्याश्रयादिकं स्यात् । न च तदुक्तम् । अतो, न भेददर्शनं धर्म्यादिसापेक्षम् !!

There is, however, no need to fear that the perception of Difference could not be demonstrated without involving interdependence of correlates. The Dvaita philosophers have shown how it is possible to conceive of Difference without these difficulties. The difficulties would have to be faced and met in an intelligible way; in any case, irrespective of the *status* which one might be inclined to assign to it as Vyāvahārika or Pāramārthika. They could not be liquidated by merely giving a bad name of “Vyāvahārika” to difference and relegating it to a lower order : किं च, अन्योन्याश्रयदृष्टस्य व्यावहारिकत्वमपि कुतः ? नहि मृदवास्तवीत्येतावता, यस्य घटस्य कारणं तत एवोत्पन्ना इत्येतत् परस्यापि मनोगतं भविष्यति ! (V. T. N. p. 52)

Even the “vyāvahārika-prapañca” and its categories are not exempt from the laws of thought and are not erratic whimsicalities :

किं च, स्पष्टदृष्टं भेददर्शनं प्रकारान्तरं कल्पयिष्यति । अस्मिन्नेव वा प्रकारे कमप्यवान्तरविशेषम् । स्वयं तु, न निवर्तते । नहि स्पष्टदृष्टोऽङ्कुरः परिचितचरबीजासंभवमात्रेण स्वयं निवर्तते । अपि तु, बीजान्तरं वा, परिचितेष्वेव जात्यादिविशेषं वा कल्पयतीति लोके दृष्टम् ॥ (V. T. N. p. 52).

1. भेद दर्शनस्य किमायातम् ? (VTN, p. 52).

The Advaitin is not, therefore, justified in repudiating the category of difference, merely on account of these difficulties. Otherwise, he would have to abjure his category of 'Identity' as well; which is *as much in the grip of the same difficulties* as 'Difference', as has been shown already : प्रकारातन्त्रेण निर्बाहकल्पनस्य शक्यत्वेन, प्रतीतेरपह्वायोगात्, अन्यथा, स्वाभिलषितस्याप्यभेदस्यासिद्धेः स्वतत्वात् ॥ (*Vādāvali*, p. 81).

The Siddhānta view of Difference is then briefly explained by Jayatīrtha : इयं चात्र दर्शनस्थितिः * * * (*Vādāvali*, p. 81 seq) :— Difference is *not* the attribute of *both* the correlates; but of only one of them, signaled by the other : एकस्य धर्मोऽपरेण निरूप्यः । The use of the singular in cases like "Anayor bhedaḥ", should therefore be understood in a collective sense (*samudāyārtha*), as in "Anayos svarūpam", where, surely, two things cannot share the same Svarūpa.¹ The very idea of "Svarūpa" is limited to individuality. Even so, in the case of difference. This difference should, however, be accepted as the nature of things, *revealed along with* the perception of objects.² If it were not so, anything known by us would be known as identical with all others and one would have to fall into frequent doubts, even when one's own personality is perceived, whether one is one-self or some one *else* ! That such wild doubts do not arise is due to the simple fact that the difference of an object from all others is revealed *in a general way*, in the very act of its perception. Such general awareness of an object as differenced from the rest of the objective sphere is not to be confused with omniscience ! But, it *cannot be denied* that in knowing a given thing, the Sākṣī has a general awareness of its difference from all others. Without the recognition of such a general awareness of difference, no conviction of the invariable and universal concomitance of hetus and sādhyas could be established; and without such conviction no inference would be possible. But a *specific knowledge of each and every other thing in the Universe* is neither suggested nor necessary for the perception of difference *per se* without reference to *specific countercorrelates*. Doubts about the nature of objects are due, however, to the perception of an object *qua* distinguished from certain things only, coupled with the obscuration of its distinction, for the nonce, from certain *other* objects that bear a close resemblance to it : व्यावृत्तिविशेषाग्रहणादेव संशयोपपत्तेः । Unless some such explanation is adopted, our doubts would be all-embracing (*sarva-koṭyavalambī*), instead of being limited, as they usually are, to two or three alternatives only, in normal experiences.

1. Cf. न ह्येकमनेकस्वभावं नाम । व्याघातात् ॥

(Udayana, *Kusumāñjali*, i).

2. Madhva conceives of a 'vastu' (thing) as having many facets. These various characteristics or 'differences' are however "Sa-viśeṣābhinna" from the "thing" : अतो व्यावृत्तिरेव स्वरूपम् (*Taitt. Bhāṣya*, p. 10). It is *not* then a correct statement of Madhva's position, to say, as does Mm. Vasudeva Shastri Abhyankar, in his gloss on the *Sarvadarśana Samgraha* : वस्तुस्वरूपेति । घटादिवस्तुनः स्वरूपं यत्कंबुग्रीवादिकं स एव भेदः । नान्यः, इति माध्वाः ॥ (p. 1130 second edn., 1951, Poona).

Age of Neo-Dialecticism in Dvaita-Vedānta

CHAPTER XXIII

ṢAD-DARŚANĪVALLABHA VIṢṆUDĀSĀCĀRYA

The example of dialectic criticism of Advaita set by Jayatīrtha was quickly followed by a number of his successors of whom Ṣad-darśanīvallabha Viṣṇudāsācārya, disciple of Rājendra Tīrtha, fifth predecessor of Vyāsātīrtha (See Genealogical Table III.) deserves first mention. He was followed by the great Vyāsātīrtha himself, a century later. The *penchant* for dialectics instilled by Jayatīrtha came to have a powerful hold on the imagination of the followers of Madhva. They came to study the dialectical works and methods of the new school of Logic founded by Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya of Mithilā and his commentators and soon became adepts in the new learning which encouraged them to take the next step of measuring swords with the Advaitic dialecticians and challenge the metaphysical suzerainty of the Advaita. As a result of this new phase of intellectual development in the history of the Dvaita school, a battle royal began to be fought between the great dialecticians of either side. A series of controversial classics of great subtlety of thought and incisive logic came to be exchanged between distinguished champions of these two schools. No others dared to intervene or had the necessary equipment to take part in it. The followers of Rāmānuja who, in an earlier age, had been invited to arbitrate between the two parties, now found themselves completely outstripped and left far behind, by the dialecticians of the Dvaita and Advaita schools. Dasgupta, rightly observes in his estimate of the dialecticians of the Rāmānuja school, that “the Viśiṣṭādvaita philosophy was not a source of perennial inspiration for the development of ever newer shades of thought” and that “the logical and dialectical thinkers of this school were *decidedly inferior to the prominent thinkers of the Śaṅkara and the Mādhva school*. There is hardly anyone in the whole history of the development of the school of Rāmānuja, whose logical acuteness could be compared with that of Śrīharṣa or Citsukha or with that of Jayatīrtha or Vyāsātīrtha” (*Op.cit.* iii, p. 111). [Italics mine.]

The beginnings of dialecticism in Dvaita go back, however, to Madhva himself, whose *Td* and *VTN*. and the three *Khaṇḍanas* are specimens of great dialectical drive. But his dialectics, like his style, were far too condensed in thought and laconic in form, to impress at first sight. Madhva's works had not also dealt with the views of his adversaries in detail; or quoted their *ipsissima verba*. Thirdly, there was no systematic attempt to bring together all the disputed points and arrange them under convenient headings and deal with them topically and exhaustively. The three

Khaṇḍanas gave, no doubt, a sharp dialectical refutation of certain specific doctrines of Advaita like “Mithyātva”, “Upādhi”, “Akhaṇḍārtha”, “Nirguṇatva” etc. But there were numerous other points pertaining to the logic, epistemology, and ontology of Advaita to be dealt with in detail. The corresponding tenets of the Dvaita school had also to be dialectically argued and established, after a review of criticisms likely to be advanced in defence of the Advaitic positions. It was also necessary for the dialectic output of the Dvaita school to be comprehensive, to take note of the up to date advances made by the other schools and discuss them fully and exhaustively. The commentary of Trivikrama had discussed a few important theories of Advaita like Brahmājñānavāda dialectically. But, it was not adequate to the growing needs of the new school.

The way to such an exhaustive and comprehensive analysis and refutation of the doctrines and dogmas of the Advaita school was led by Jayatīrtha, who had discussed many points at issue between the two schools, in his short but spirited dialectical work, the *Vādāvali* and *passim* in his *NS*, *VTN* and other cc. on the works of Madhva, even at the risk of frequent digressions, which were necessitated by his desire to widen the scope of the original texts and draw out their critical potentialities and enrich them, wherever necessary. But as one occupied with the stupendous task of interpreting and systematizing the whole range of Dvaita thought and giving critical and constructive expositions of its tenets and standardizing its concepts and categories, he could not, obviously, devote his full time and attention to this task. He had, nevertheless, given the lead in that direction in his works already noticed.

VIṢṆUDĀSĀCĀRYA (C. 1390-1440)*

This lead given by Jayatīrtha was enthusiastically taken up and his example carried to perfection by his successors. The first to do so was Ṣaḍ-darśanīvallabha Viṣṇudāsācārya, whose *Vādaratnāvali* elaborates the topics dealt with briefly by Jayatīrtha in his *Vādāvali* and other works and adds to them some more. His discussions and criticisms are fuller and more elaborate. The style of his writing is racy and moderately technical. He shows a tendency to verbosity as contrasted with the terseness and measured eloquence and moderation of Jayatīrtha. Many arguments and passages are bodily taken from the *Vādāvali* and other works of Jayatīrtha and incorporated by him into his work, without acknowledgement. The tribute he pays to Jayatīrtha, in the ii Pariccheda (quoted in Ch. XX p. 242) is presumably to be taken as sufficient acknowledgment of his indebtedness to him. His reference to ‘sources’ (आकर) is also, presumably, to the works of Jayatīrtha. But his work is not, on this account, a mere summary or *rechauffe* of the *Vādāvali* or other works of Jayatīrtha. It is a work of distinctive mettle and great dialectic penetration.

We have seen that the principles of interpretation of the Mīmāṃsā and Vyākaraṇa Śāstras had not been harnessed to the constructive exposition of the Dvaita Siddhānta or its refutation of other systems by any of the

Mādhva writers, including Jayatīrtha. *Viṣṇudāsācārya* was the pioneer in this respect. He quotes often from the Sūtras of Jaimini and from the writings of leading Mīmāṃsakas like Kumārila, Bhavanātha and Varadarāja. He was also the first to repudiate Vācaspati Miśra's appeal to the "Apaccheda-nyāya" of the Pūrvamīmāṃsā, in setting aside the primacy of Pratyakṣa, relied upon by Realists (*Pariccheda* ii). He also harnessed the sūtras of Pāṇini and the rulings of the *Mahābhāṣya* and its commentaries, to the explanations and defence of Madhva's interpretation of important "identity-texts", like "*Tat tvamasi*", "*Ekam evādvītiyam*", "*Neha nānāsti kimcana*" etc. Quoting from the *Mahābhāṣya* and Kaiyaṭa, *Padamañjari* and other works, he has worked out *twenty different explanations* of the "*Tat tvam asi*" and *seven* of "*Ekam evādvītiyam*" text in support of the reality of difference between Jīva and Brahman and the reality of the world :

तत्र भेद एव 'तत्त्वमसि' इति वाक्यस्य विशतियोजनाः कथयिष्यन्ते ।

एकमेवाद्वितीयम्' इति श्रुतेस्तु भेद एव सप्त योजनाः सन्तीत्युक्तं खण्डनखण्डने ॥ (VR. ms.)

These new interpretations, propounded by him, have been duly incorporated by Vyāsatīrtha, in his *Nyāyāmṛta*. The Mādhva interpretation of the monistic texts are also fully supported by Viṣṇudāsa by relevant principles of the Pūrvā Mīmāṃsā Śāstra (Vide his discussion under "Nehanānāsti"). The critique of Difference, attempted by Citsukha, and his views on Akhaṇḍārtha, the Vivaraṇakāra's thesis of Bhāvarūpājñāna and Mithyātva, are also exhaustively dealt with. The author wields a clear and spirited style, with a touch of raciness, here and there. There is occasional raillery of his adversaries. His work runs to 1900 granthas and is divided into five *Saras* or *Paricchedas*. There are references in the course of the work to two other works by the same author : (1) the *Vivaraṇaviḍambanam* (presumably a criticism of the *Vivaraṇa* of Prakāśātman) and (2) the *Khaṇḍana-Khaṇḍanam*, which is obviously a refutation of the polemical treatise of Śrīharṣa : the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā*. But no mss. of these two works have yet come to light. Nor have any express citations from them been found, so far, in other works of Dvaita literature. *Their discovery is thus bound to be a formidable asset to the dialectical literature of Dvaita Vedānta*. I have secured a complete ms. of the *Vādaratnāvalī*¹ and quotations in the following pages are from a transcript of this ms. in my possession. Page references, too, are to this transcript.

The scope of the VR. is thus broadly indicated in the introductory verse :

विश्वं सत्यं हरिः कर्ता जीवोज्ज्वलः परमात्मनः ।

वेदः सत्यः प्रमाणं चेत्येवं व्यासमतस्थितिः ॥

The first chapter establishes the reality of the Universe by refuting the doctrine of Illusoriness (mithyātva) in all its ramifications. It is shown at the outset that the text "*Neha nānāsti*" cannot bear the interpretation put upon it by the Advaitin, viz., the utter unreality of the Universe. The

1. Given by (the late) Svāmi Satyadhyāna Tīrtha, of the Uttarādi Mutt, in token of his appreciation of my humble work in the service of Dvaita thought and literature.

wording of the text is carefully examined in the light of important canons of Mīmāṃsā interpretation and shown to be incapable of supporting any such construction. The author suggests two or three alternative explanations of the Śruti, on good authority, upholding the reality of the Universe and consistent with the context.

A critical edn. of the *VR.* with Sanskrit notes and my English introduction and synopses has been published from Udipi by Bannanje Govindacharya. This edn. has ruthlessly pruned off several pages of matter from the Navaratna Ms. lent by me for collation.

DIALECTICS OF VĀDARATNĀVALĪ

1. DEFENCE OF REALISM

The concept of Mithyātvam, is refuted in detail. Eleven possible definitions of falsity are reviewed, including those of Anirvacanīyatvam (*Pañcapādikā*) and स्वात्यन्ताभावसमानाधिकरणत्वम् (Citsukha). The premises of falsity are then analysed and refuted in order : दृश्यत्वम्; जडत्वम्; परिच्छिन्नत्वम्; अनात्मत्वं and अंशित्वम्. Some other syllogisms on the falsity of difference on the premises of “*Bhedatvam*” and “*matatvam*” are set at rest. The question of “*Dṛgdrśya-sambandhānupapatti*”, raised by the *Iṣṭasiddhi* and other works, is then dealt with. This section is largely based on the *Mith. Kh. ṭikā* of Jayatīrtha.

Viṣṇudāsa contends that the difficulties in the way of establishing a suitable *rapprochement* between *dṛk* (consciousness) and *drśya* (its object), whatever they might be, cannot possibly warrant the conclusion of the latter being altogether imaginary ! That would defeat the very purpose of the *Arthāpatti* argument advanced in this connection :

अनुपपद्यमानार्थदर्शनात् तदुपपादके बुद्धिः खल्वर्थापत्तिः ।

नहि दृग्दृश्यसंबन्धस्योपपादकं दृश्यमिथ्यात्वम् ! अपि तु, प्रतिक्षेपकम् ।

(p. 15 Ms)

[The function of *Arthāpatti* is to explain an otherwise inexplicable fact by reference to some thing that is capable of explaining the fact adequately. The unreality of relationship between *dṛk* and *drśya* is, obviously, not an explanation of the fact of their relationship; but a virtual denial of any such relationship subsisting between the two !]

This is a neat little argument that clinches the matter. We cannot *escape* the responsibility for establishing a suitable relation between *dṛk* and *drśya*, by coolly dismissing the entire panorama of creation as a figment of Avidyā. We have to explore the possibilities of new patterns of thought to accommodate so necessary a relation to account for the fact of ‘experience’. The Advaitin asks : “What is the relation between *dṛk* and *drśya* ?”. But what precisely does he wish to know ? Does he want to know (1) the proof of the existence of such a relation; or (2) by what *name* it should be designated; or (3) the specific nature of the relation; or (4) its exact definition; or (5) perhaps under which of the well-known types of relations, like contact, inherence etc., should this one be included ? Here are the answers : (1) The best proof of the existence of such a relation is the dependence of different kinds of behavioristic adjustment on the presence of such a relation. (2) It is possible to accept the existence of such a relation without taking the trouble to give it a specific name or fix a label upon it. If it is, however, incumbent upon us to give it a name, we may call it the subject-object-relation (विषयविषयिभावः संबन्धः) or by some other suitable

name. As for its specific nature, we can only say it is what it is and no other (स एव सः; न त्वन्यः) ! We have, after all, to reckon with the fact that it is given in and attested by experience. The different degrees of sweetness of sugarcane, milk and jaggery have to be conceded, even where they could not be *defined in words*. It may well be that the present case is one of this type, where a direct experience matters more than a hair-splitting inquiry.¹ As regards the question of its classification, Viṣṇu-dāsācārya says that the relation of Dṛgdr̥śya is peculiarly *sui generis* and cannot be squeezed into the straight-jackets of any one of the three types of relations patented by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas. But there is no need to despair on that account. The *Mahābhāṣya* speaks of *over a hundred relations* expressed by the genitive (एकशतं षष्ठ्यर्थाः). The present can easily be accommodated under one of them !

The discussion of Mithyātvam and its connected issues is followed by the citation of texts disparaging the doctrines of falsity and identity and by an examination of Śrutis like “*Nāsad āsit..*” and “*Māyāmātram idam dvaitam*”, which are claimed by the Advaitins to support them. The author goes on to emphasize that mere inference cannot oppose or invalidate the reality of world-experience established by perceptual evidence.

Inference is, by its nature and constitution, dependent on perception and cannot go against its grain (उपजीव्यविरोध). Our perceptions are quite capable of grasping the uncontradicted and uncontradictable reality of experience, even though they may be limited to the present; for, ‘contradiction’, as understood by Advaitins, is not merely the cessation of a thing *after* some time, but a *denial* of its *existence* in the *past, present and future*. Such a denial is not, obviously, possible with regard to things that *do exist* at a *given time and place*, though liable to destruction, later on and not existing *before* production. In the absence of any evidence to *the contrary*, the uncontradicted reality of a thing is established by Perception itself, which is admittedly self-valid, to the satisfaction of the Sākṣī, whose convictions are indisputable.

The reality established by Sākṣī is of the same order as that posited of the Brahman, i.e., absolute : *traikālikabādhābhāvalakṣaṇam*. The plea of ‘*provisional validity*’ of the world, advanced by Advaitins, cannot be accepted as the entire doctrine of degrees of reality has been disproved in the *Vivaraṇaviḍambanam*.

The validity of experience established by perception, and attested by the Sākṣī is thus irrefragable and cannot be upset by baseless reasonings to the contrary. The inference that fire is cold would stand self-condemned when we know from actual experience and tactile perception that it is hot. Even Śruti texts have got to stand back and make way for perceptive evidence, if in conflict with it, in matters within its jurisdiction (cf. यजमानः प्रस्तरः). How then, could Inference, which is always subservient to perception, upset it ? This applies, of course, to valid perception

1. Cf. वयं तत्त्वान्वेषान्मधुकर हतास्त्वं खलु कृती ! (*Śākuntalam*)

only. Cases of defective perception stand otherwise explained. The size of the moon, as we perceive it, from the earth, is distorted by extreme distance, which is a recognized defect.¹ This perception is defective. But there is no mistake in our perceiving the sky to be blue. It is so on account of Pañcīkaraṇa of elements. Reflections of objects (प्रतिबिम्ब) *qua* physical manifestations have been shown to be real in the *Vivaraṇaviḍambana*. There is, thus, no reason to doubt the reality of objects established by perception.

2. VINDICATION OF THE STATUS OF BHEDAŚRUTIS

In the ii Pariccheda, Viṣṇudāsa establishes the Jīvas to be radically different from Brahman and from one another. A number of Śruti texts from the Upaniṣads, implying or emphasizing the persistence of difference in the state of release, are cited and their significance explained. The familiar plea of the Monist that all such Bhedaśrutis are repetitive (*anuvāḍaka*) is quashed on solid grounds. The difference taught in the Śrutis cannot be treated as merely repetitive of what is already established by perception; because (1) there are no indications in the wording of the Bhedaśrutis of such a pedagogic or schematic purpose. (2) The difference that exists in Brahman from the Jīva, is *not* open to ordinary perception or inference, inasmuch as Brahman is cognizable only through Scriptures (according to all Vedāntins). It is, thus, only through Scriptures that we know the Supreme to be distinct from the Jīvas; and the Śrutis, of their own accord, proclaim such a difference. That this teaching of the Śruti is in *casual agreement* with other authorities like the Itihāsa is not sufficient to make it repetitive. (3) There is always an element of *novelty* in the teaching of the Śruti. As Bhavanātha puts it, "It is only in repetitions that depend on a prior knowledge that we have no true judgments; but not in cases of fortuitous recapitulations as in a continuous cognition" (*dhārāvāhikajñāna*)². (4) The identity texts admit of other explanations without any violence to the basic fact of the reality of difference between the Jīva and the Brahman. But the texts which teach their difference from each other are unaccommodative *in any other sense*. (5) There is no conflict of other evidences within their jurisdiction. (6) The Bhedaśrutis constitute the very basis (Upajīvyā) of departure even for the monistic texts. (7) They are more numerous (*bahutva*) than the so-called monistic texts. (8) They are supported by corroborative evidences. They cannot, therefore, be repudiated by mere reasonings or formal syllogisms, however attractively worded. They cannot be stultified by the identity-texts on the strength of the alleged posteriority of the latter : पौर्वापर्ये पूर्वदौर्बल्यं प्रकृतिवत् (Mīmāṃsānyāya). The "Apacchedanyāya" recognizes the validity of either alternative within its own sphere. But the identity and dualistic texts are conceived by Advaitins as mutually exclusive in effect, so that the

1. Cf. अतिदूरात्सामीप्यात् * * * ॥ (*Sāṃkhya-Kārikā*).

2. सापेक्षानुवादे हि न प्रमितिः । न तु देवादानुवादेऽपि । धारावाहिकज्ञानवत् ।

one must necessarily cancel the other. Hence the अपच्छेदन्याय cannot be applied to discredit the validity of experience, as Advaitins have sought to do.

As a matter of fact, however, the Advaitic texts are not capable of bearing the interpretation put upon them by the Monist. His interpretations are opposed to the context and wording of the passages and to all sense of logical propriety. They are capable, says Viṣṇudāsa, of bearing perfectly natural explanations in terms of the reality of the world of matter and of the difference between the Jīvas and Brahman; and he illustrates his position, in full, with reference to two of the most crucial texts at issue between the two schools viz., *Ekam evādvitīyam* and *Tat tvam asi*. Seven different explanations of the first and twenty of the second are offered, with copious grammatical sanctions from the *Mahābhāṣya* and its commentaries and from the *Mīmāṃsā* literature. This is indeed a very remarkable and original contribution of Viṣṇudāsācārya to the corpus of interpretive and controversial literature of the *Dvaita* school, in respect of the treatment of monistic texts. Most of these explanations have been incorporated by Vyāsatīrtha, in his *Nyāyāmṛta* and strengthened with additional points.¹

3. JĪVA-BRAHMA BHEDA ESTABLISHED

These new interpretations apart, Viṣṇudāsa points out that there are serious logical difficulties in regard to the Advaitic interpretation of the identity of Jīva and Brahman. This identity cannot, obviously be a full-blooded one between “tat” and “tvam” which signify two different beings possessed of conflicting attributes. The monist must, therefore, resort to a vague and colorless *nominal* identity of pure consciousness and bare existence (*cinmātraikyam*) between the two, based on the secondary significative power (*lakṣaṇā*) of words, in which the full sense of the terms is completely eschewed and the opposition of the two *contents* is completely sterilized; for, “identity is possible only when difference has been *effaced or negated*” (D. M. Datta, *Six Ways of Knowing*, p. 315). But the difficulty is precisely here. What are the grounds for dropping these differences from either side (of Jīva and Brahman)? Can their differences (of *sarvajñatva* and *alpajñatva* etc.) be got over merely by closing one’s eyes to them or *refusing* to take cognizance of them? Obviously *not*. Differences are bound to persist, whether we like them or not. We cannot identify fire and water, by simply refusing to take cognizance of their mutual difference of attributes ! There are only two other grounds on which we could ignore these differences (1) that they are transitory; or (2) *unreal*. In the first case, the text should have been worded : Thou shalt be It (and not, as we have it,—thou *art* It). Apart from this terminological defect, neither ground is maintainable in the present case. There is clear evidence, in the Scriptures, that the attributes of plurality, dependence and limitation, of the Jīvas and the oneness, independence and omniscience of

1. See Vyāsatīrtha’s interpretations of the “*Tat tvam asi*” text.

Brahman are not passing phenomena, but, their permanent characteristics,¹ persisting even in the state of Mokṣa. It is, therefore, impossible to ignore these distinctions and treat the two as identical in essence. Factual identity of essence, thus, being out of the question, we are justified in resorting to some suitable modification of the *literal* sense of the Śruti, consistent with the continuity of the essential distinctions between them. In doing so, it is sufficient for the Dvaitin to adopt *lakṣaṇāvṛtti* only in respect of *one of the terms* in “*Tat tvam asi*” instead of *both*, as in the case of the Advaitin. The passage would then come to signify Thou art *rooted in* Brahman. Such an interpretation would be in complete accord with the oft-repeated phrase “ऐतदात्म्यमिदं सर्वम् and other introductory pointers: सन्मूलाः सोम्येमाः सर्वाः प्रजाः सदायतनाः सत्प्रतिष्ठाः । सत आगम्य न विदुः :*** । in this context, which emphasize the dependence of everything on Brahman.

The distinction of souls from one another is more easily established on the basis of the uniqueness of the individual experience of pleasure and pain. Such well-defined uniqueness of experience is known as “*Vyavasthā*”, which is something more than a mere difference in external attributes, or appurtenances. This disposes of Gitsukha’s criticism of “*Vyavasthā*” as understood by the Naiyāyikas : न ह्यस्माभिर्धर्मभेदो वा, भिन्नाश्रयधर्मभेदो वा व्यवस्थेत्यङ्गीक्रियते । सुखदुःखाद्यनुसन्धान-भावाभावरूपव्यवस्थाया अङ्गीकृतत्वात् । अनुसन्धानं नाम, अनेन सुखेनाहं सुखी इत्यनुभवः । एतेन एतदपास्तम् यदुक्तं चित्सुखेन—“व्यवस्थाशब्देन धर्मभेदमात्राभिधाने दाहपाकादेरिव धर्मभेदासाधकत्वात् (VR. ii P. 83 MS)

Difference is, thus, an irrefutable fact of experience. It would be suicidal to deny its presence or persistence in the world. We cannot do without it. Both laymen and philosophers have to make use of it—न ह्यद्वैतवादिनापि, स्वसिद्धान्तपरसिद्धान्तयोर्दृष्ट्यदूषकयोजनाज्ञानयोर्विवेको नेष्यते !

If the perception of difference is admitted as a fact of experience, we cannot dismiss it as a phantom arising without an assignable cause. Secondly, it must have a specific content and so far as one could see, the content of such experience has not been stultified within one’s knowledge. Even supposing that a stultification is possible *at a future date*, one must specify the content of *that invalidating cognition*. Would it refer to difference, or absence of difference or nothing at all in particular? In the first case, there is no danger to the validity of difference experienced already. Even “the absence of difference”, as it comes to be cognized by the stultifying cognition, must necessarily be grasped as something “other than” difference ! Else, there would be no *absence of difference* established. After all, difference is a necessary conception, even for the Advaitin, if Brahman is at all to be defined as something that is absolutely *distinguished from* all that is *material, unreal and limited* :

1. Cf. अविनाशी वा अरे ऽयमात्मा अनुच्छित्तिधर्मा (Brh. Up. iv. 5, 14.)

नित्यो नित्यानाम् * * * (Kātha, ii, 2, 13.)

परास्य शक्तिः * * * स्वाभाविकी ज्ञानबलक्रिया च (Śvet vi, 8.)

उतामृतत्वस्येशानः (RV. x, 90, 12.)

जडानृतपरिच्छिन्नव्यावृत्तं ब्रह्म वा न वा ?

भावे तु भेदसिद्धिः स्यादन्त्ये स्याद्व्याहतिः श्रुतेः ॥

असतः प्रतियोगित्वं सम्मतं तावदावयोः ।

अतोऽपि दुस्त्यजो भेदो नेति नेति श्रुतेरपि ॥ (VR).

The chapter closes with a spirited rejoinder to the Critique of Difference attempted by the famous dialecticians of the Advaita school. The arguments are mostly reproduced from the *Vādāvalī*, the *NS* and *VTN* of Jayatīrtha.

4. REFUTATION OF BRAHMĀJÑĀNAVĀDA

The third chapter is a refutation of the doctrine of Nescience enveloping Brahman, advanced by the Advaita. There is no proof of the existence of a universal ignorance enveloping Brahman, as the monists would have us believe. The only ignorance is that present in the *Jīva* in regard to the *Supreme Being* and this has got to be destroyed by the knowledge of the Supreme. All this stands to reason, on the realistic view of difference. But on the monistic theory, everything becomes a misfit.

(i) Is this Ignorance itself, begotten by Ignorance or not? The Advaita philosopher holds everything other than Brahman to be the result of a superimposition. Ignorance, then, *qua* different from Brahman, *should be* the result of a superimposition. If not, it would be a reality and there would be immediate danger to the principle of monism (*advaita-hāni*). If the Ignorance is, in its turn, set up by another, it would lead to ever so many fallacies of reasoning, like self-dependence. For, all superimposition is admitted by the Advaitin to be dependent on ignorance. (ii) There is also the question whether the ignorance, which pluralises the Spirit, is pervasive or limited in space. If it pervades everywhere, it would devour everything in reality and turn out to be eternal like the Ātman itself. If Avidyā has an innate reality of its own, its products also would have the same reality. If it is unreal, it must be due to superimposition on the Ātman. (iii) We may then have to consider if such a superimposition would be a natural phenomenon or one brought about by other causes. If it were natural (*svābhāvika*) there would be no prospect of its cessation and deliverance would be unthinkable. If it has a cause, what could it be—the Ātman himself, or an *earlier ignorance*? It cannot be the Ātman who is singularly free from 'activity'. If, however, the Ātman *could be* the cause of ignorance coming into being, we may as well dispense with ignorance and substitute the Ātman in its place. The recognition of an earlier ignorance to account for a subsequent one, leads to an infinite regress. (iv) There is also another formidable difficulty. Does Avidyā reveal itself or not? It would be a myth, if it does *not*. If it *does*, is that revelation of the *nature* of Avidyā, or of the Brahman, or else its attributes? If Avidyā shines forth by itself, it would be self-luminous like Brahman. And Brahman being eternal, Avidyā, too, would be eternally self-luminous and there could be no hope of deliverance from it! If it were argued that such untenability and inexplicability or irrationality of the concept of

Avidyā and its workings, *is a decoration and a distinction*, why should not the Advaitin concede, in the same way, that even an insentient object could intuit itself or that illusions might be admitted without a necessary witness (Sākṣī) or a real substratum (*niradhiṣṭhānabhrānti*)? Again, (v) Who is to know the Avidyā — the pure Self or the conditioned Self? The former is no knower (*pramātā*) according to the Advaita system. In the latter case, there would be a vicious interdependence, as the act of knowledge itself, is due to Ignorance,¹ whose very existence cannot be established without reference to a knower.

After bringing up many more objections of the same kind, the author proceeds to refute in detail, Citsukha's well-known syllogism, intended to establish Bhāvarūpājñāna. The doctrines of Jīvājñāna and Brahmājñāna sponsored by Vācaspati, and Maṇḍana, respectively, are then fully refuted.

The behavior of Avatārs of God is then cleared of the charges of ignorance and limitations, with the help of authorities from Śrutis and Purāṇas. The Ekajīva and Bahujīvājñānavādas are also criticized. The incompatibility of *adhikāri*, *viśaya* etc., on the Advaita view is fully brought out.

5. REFUTATION OF NIRGUṆATVA

The next chapter (iv), controverts the doctrine of Nirguṇa-Brahman and establishes the view of Brahman as “*Saguṇa*” :

विष्णोः कल्याणधर्माः श्रुतिशतविहिताः सर्वथा नैव बाध्या

नात्रापच्छेदनीतिः सुनियतविषये नो विकल्पावकाशः ।

नित्यान् सत्यांश्च धर्मान् प्रथयति निगमः सादरं मुक्तयेज्जो

वैद्या धर्मा निषेध्या न कथमपि हरेः किंतु हेया निषेध्याः ॥

The Śruti texts—*Neha nānāsti* and *Evam dharmān prthak paśyan*, taken together, are shown to deny *four possible views re. the nature of the attributes of Brahman* and their relation to It, held respectively by the Māyāvādins, the Naiyāyikas, Bhāskara and Rāmānuja. The Advaitin regards Brahman as *essentially* attributeless. The Naiyāyika believes that Īśvara is qualified by attributes which are, however, *different* from His essence. Bhāskara would hold the attributes to be partly different and partly identical with Brahman. The Rāmānujīyas distinguish between two kinds of attributes in Brahman. Some are of the essence of Brahman (*dharmi bhūta*) and yet others are different (*dharmabhūta*). It would be clear that the doctrine of difference of attributes (*nānātva*) from Brahman is opposed to the express terms of the Śruti : *Neha nānāsti kiñcana*. It would be equally clear from the wording of the text: *Evam dharmān prthak paśyan*, that the Śruti affirms the presence of attributes by a significant negation of their separateness (*prthaktva*) on the well-known principles of Mīmāṃsā exegesis: *विशेष्यं नामिद्या गच्छेत् क्षीणशक्तिविशेषणे* and *सविशेषणे हि विधिनिषेधौ विशेषणमुपसंक्रामतः सति विशेष्यबाधे* । The particle *इव* in *नानेव* (*Kaṭha Up*) would most naturally

1. Cf. सर्वज्ञत्वमप्यविद्यावत्वमाक्षिपत्येव; न प्रतिक्षिपति ॥

(Ānandabodha).

suggest a relation that is the nearest compromise with or approach to both—viz., identity-in-difference or “Saviśeṣābheda”.

The Advaitic and Viśiṣṭādvaitic positions stand refuted by two significant terms of the proposition : धर्मान् and पृथक्. The same principle of exegesis : सविशेषणे हि विधि....” applies here. By denying the *separate existence* of the attributes, the Śruti *admits* their presence and reality in Brahman, *by implication*,—the *denial* being *restricted* to their *separateness* (पृथक्त्वनिषेध). The denial of both (attributes and their separateness, by one and the same proposition, would involve “Vākya-bheda” or the fault of sentence-split, involving a double proposition. The existence of attributes without any trace of their difference from the Substance is therefore to be rationalized by the peculiar character or potency of objects which makes such attributive description and talk of adjectival relation possible, where, as a matter of fact, only complete identity of essence persists between them. This peculiar self-linking and self-differentiating power of things is designated as “Viśeṣas”, in Madhva’s metaphysics and has been dealt with elsewhere.¹ The existence of such a thought-category is presumed in the very terms of the affirmation of attributes side by side with the negation of their separateness (from the substance) :

उक्त्वा धर्मान् पृथक् पश्यन्निषेधादत एव हि ।

विशेषो ज्ञायते श्रुत्या * * * ॥ (Madhva, AV.)

Such attributes have been accepted by the Sūtrakāra himself :

अदृश्यत्वादिगुणको धर्मोक्तेः (B.S. i, 2, 21) अन्यभावव्यावृत्तेश्च (i, 3, 12). It follows then that attributes *recognized* and expressly *laid down* by the Śrutis themselves (*vaidha*), cannot be negated; while those that are negated have *not* been authoritatively posited or laid down, in any sense.

6. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE BRAHMAN AS SAGUṆA AND THE SUPERIORITY OF THE SAGUṆA TEXTS OVER “NIRGUṆA-ŚRUTIS”

The author also initiates another discussion to show the superiority of Saguna Vidyā to the “Nirguna” doctrine, on grounds of (1) its priority and precedence over Nirguṇavidyā; (2) by virtue of which precedence it cannot be contradicted by the other doctrine; (3) its flawlessness; (4) the impossibility of explaining it away in other ways; (5) its being the Upajīvyā (basis or prop) of the Nirguṇa texts; (6) and therefore occupying a position of uncontradictable validity; (7) its fitness to stick to its literal sense; and (8) the circumstance of that literal sense having a *specific application* while texts denying attributes have only a *general application* which could be restricted according to necessity and exigencies, to cases of attributes *other than* those expressly laid down. These grounds are elucidated by him with many references to the principals of the Mimāṃsā and Vyākaraṇa Śāstras.

The Saguna teaching has precedence over the Nirguna insofar as it is

1. See under “VYĀSATĪRTHA” and also pp. 153-54 *ante*

prescriptive in form and content; while the other is *proscriptive* and in cases of conflict between the initial and final statements (*upakrama* and *upasamhāra*) as in एको देवः सर्वभूतेषु गूढः * * * निर्गुणश्च, the decision has been taken in the *Vedopakramādhikaraṇa* of the Pūrvamīmāṃsā that the first part shall prevail over the last and determine the scope and meaning of the other. Texts which predicate certain auspicious attributes of the Brahman cannot put up with any but their literal sense (*niravakāśa*) whereas the Nirguṇa texts could be accommodated in the sense of denying material attributes and so find their fulfilment of purpose (*caritārtha*). Viṣṇudāsa proceeds to show that there is no irreconcilable conflict between texts like “*Yas sarvajñaḥ*” and the so-called ‘Nirguṇa text’ “*Kevalo Nirguṇaśca*”.

It would not be possible to establish an absolute negation of any attributes as the very same text, in the first half, lays down certain attributes like oneness (एकत्व), divinity (देवत्व) etc., in Brahman. It is, therefore, necessary to *restrict the scope of the negation to material qualities alone* (*traiguṇya-niṣedha*) just as the prohibition of killing in न हिंस्यात् सर्वा भूतानि is restricted by the Mīmāṃsakas to cases other than those statutorily recognized as in अग्नीषोमीयं पशुमालभेत. If it is contended that the prohibition “न हिंस्यात्” refers only to injuries provoked by human passions ((रागः प्राप्त) and *not* to those enjoined by Vedic injunctions (वैद्य), it may be answered back that in the present case also, the text “Nirguṇaśca” does not negative the attributes duly prescribed by Śrutis, like “यः सर्वज्ञः सर्ववित्” “तस्य नाम महद्यज्ञः” etc., but only *such* as are conceived or advanced by imperfect logic. Absolute and unqualified negation of attributes cannot, therefore, be accepted in any case; since both are statutorily recognized. If (even) statutory provisions could be totally set aside, there would be no need for alternative rulings (*vikalpāśraya*) provided in such cases. The very conception of a Vikalpa (optional rule) is based on the presumption that what is laid down by law, could not be totally repudiated. Viṣṇudāsa clinches the matter by pointing out that the Nirguṇa texts are *general in scope* and cannot negative *special attributes* of Brahman, expressly taught by the Śruti. But *specific negations* like अस्थूलमनन can always be taken at their face value and made to deny material attributes like grossness, that might come to be suggested by spurious reasonings. After all, grossness and others are *not laid down* for Brahman in any Vedic text. Nor are they inherently auspicious attributes; though their opposites might be so.

The Saguṇa texts are logically self-consistent while the Nirguṇa ones bristle with contradictions. If the Nirguṇa Brahman is *endowed with* the necessary attributes which might justify its being dubbed “Nirguṇa”, it would *not* be really and entirely unqualified or attributeless ! If there is no such appellative basis in Brahman, it could not be regarded as “Nirguṇa” in the true sense of the term.

The Saguṇa texts should be regarded as “sustainers” (Upajīvya) of the Nirguṇa. The sustainer, being independent of the sustained, would obviously be more powerful, in the event of a conflict between them. The

latter, then, would have necessarily to submit to the former. This may be illustrated by the example of the inference of fire being cold, which has absolutely no chance of survival against the evidence of tactile perception of its heat.¹ It cannot be argued that the Saguṇa texts like “Yas sarvajñaḥ” are merely sustainers of the Nirguṇa texts *only to the extent of providing a subject for negation* and contradiction and no more : (निषेध्यसमर्पकत्वेनैवोपजीव्यत्वम् ।) There are no texts, so far as we can see, which state that the Brahman is *not Sarvajña, not-Sarvaśaktimat* and so on ! The omniscience of Brahman is, thus, gathered, *solely* on the evidence of Śrutis. Such a valuable truth cannot, therefore, be simply set aside. There is no force in the argument that the Nirguṇa texts depend on the Saguṇa and require their help *only to the extent of requiring a “bare existence” (svarūpa-mātram)* of the thing to be divested of attributes and nothing more ! Such a ‘bare existence’ (*sattvamātram*) could be found in many other things besides the present object; so that the denial of attributes, in such a case, would not necessarily deprive the *Brahman* of its attributes ! It would be futile to argue further that the *attributes of the subject* of a proposition (*uddeśya*) have generally no syntactic value, as in ग्रहं सम्मार्ष्टि; and that, therefore, the omniscience of the *uddeśya* in the present context (viz. Brahman) is *not* to be taken into account. The Mīmāṃsaka interpretation of “यस्योभयं हविरातिमाच्छन्तु” does not support this contention. Even in the Sammārgādhikaraṇa, it is seen that the specific attribute of “grahatvam” plays a decisive part in restricting *sammārjana* (cleaning) to *grahas* (cups) alone as against other vessels like “camasas”, by virtue of the distinctive attribute of “grahatva” which is meant to be taken into syntactic account. It is only the *singular number* of “graha” in ग्रहं सम्मार्ष्टि that is *not* adhered to, by reason of there being not *one* but *many* vessels (*graha*) to be cleaned : दशापवित्रेण ग्रहं सम्मार्ष्टि । with a piece of cloth. But, so far as the distinctive attribute of “grahatva” itself is concerned, it is certainly taken into consideration, lest the injunction (ग्रहं सम्मार्ष्टि) should apply to some other vessels also, used in the sacrifice. That is why Bhavanātha says, “Else, we could not establish the distinctive essence of the *uddeśya*. Once this is achieved, other additional attributes of the *uddeśya* are superfluous and need not be taken into account.”² Applying the same principle of argument to the present case, Viṣṇudāśa points out that Brahman being inconceivable without the attribute of omniscience, only as

1. We need no separate proofs to establish that fire is hot. The proof of its presence is also the proof of its being hot. Fire, then, is said to be established as ‘hot’ by virtue of the proof of its very existence, which is called “Dharmigrāhakapramāṇa”. Inference to the contrary would be baseless in such cases and is bound to collapse automatically, when confronted with “Dharmigrāhakapramāṇa”. In the same way, the Saguṇa texts are the Upajivya (sustainers of the Nirguṇa by virtue of being “dharmigrāhaka,” in respect of Brahman. There is no establishing Brahman ‘without the ‘Saguṇa texts’. The Nirguṇa texts cannot, therefore, negative the attributes which are bound up with the very conception of Brahman and without which Brahman could *not be thought of*.

2. “नो चेदुद्देश्यस्वरूपालाभात् । उद्देश्यस्वरूपे लब्धे, यदधिकं तद्विशेषणं न विवक्षितम् ।” (Bhavanātha)

characterized by that attribute could Brahman become the subject of the proposition, positive or negative. In these circumstances, conflict with the basic evidence of the subject (*dharmigrāhaka-pramāṇa*) is bound to arise if the Nirguṇa texts are taken to deny attributes to the Brahman, *absolutely*.

It would also be proper to hold that texts like “*Satyam jñānam...*” which posit certain attributes in the Brahman should be taken in their *express* sense, which is also their *primary* sense; resort to any laboured explanation of such texts in terms of elimination of the opposites of the qualities named (तद्विरोध्यर्थसन्त्यागः) would naturally entail a sacrificing of the primary sense of the texts. The text, on such a view, would *not* teach that Brahman is possessed of the characteristics of reality, knowledge etc., but that it is *devoid of unreality, ignorance, limitation etc.* The Advaitin is, thus, fighting shy of the positive construction of the text and therefore *avoids the primary sense of the terms* “*Satyam*” *Jñānam*” etc. and runs after roundabout meanings and distant echoes resulting from the primary meanings ! But such roundabout explanations cannot be accepted as the proper, legitimate or *straightforward* meaning of the proposition. Such farfetched meanings *extracted* from the first sense of the words, cannot be the import of a proposition, as pointed out by the Mīmāṃsaka dictum :

यश्चाथार्थार्थो न स चोदनार्थः

Śureśvara himself has admitted that the roundabout explanation of “*Satyam Jñānam...*” adopted by the Advaitin, in terms of the elimination of the opposite sense of the terms employed, is *not* derived from the *actual* expressions used; but from their ‘potential fitness’ :

तद्विरोध्यर्थसन्त्यागः सामर्थ्यात् तु शब्दतः ।

It would thus be seen that the primary sense of the texts “*Satyam Jñānam...*” is maintainable, only on the Sagūṇa view.

Moreover, the Sagūṇa texts, being *specific enunciations*, are far more powerful *in their own right* than the Nirguṇa texts, which only function in a *general way* and tell us that Brahman is ‘attributeless’. But it is open to us to interpret this general statement without prejudice to the specific enunciation of certain attributes like “*Sarvajñatvam*” and hold that the denial has reference to attributes *other than those specifically predicated*. As the *Mahābhāṣya* of Patañjali points out, *exceptions restrict the scope of general principles* : अपवादैस्तसर्गा बाध्यन्ते । The Nirguṇa texts are *general statements* and the Sagūṇa texts are exceptions. The latter have, therefore, the right of *over-riding* the former and laying down the law as to the sense in which they can be restrictively interpreted. This is based on the well-known principle of interpretation : सामान्यविहितस्य निषेधस्य विशेषविधायकेन बाधो युक्तः that a negative proposition in general terms should be modified and interpreted in the light of other categorical statements about the same subject embodying specific predications.

The difficulty of how a prior fact or enunciation could over-ride a subsequent one, is easily met. We have in Pāṇinian grammar, a prior enunciation मृडमृगुघ्न * * * (i, 2, 7) over-riding the subsequent prohibition न क्त्वा सेट् (i, 2, 18). It is clear that mere posteriority

or negativeness of content of one statement as against another is not sufficient to override the other.

There is thus no reason to doubt that Brahman is determinate and qualified (*Sa-viśeṣa*). The author cites a number of texts to show that Brahman is full of auspicious attributes (सन्ति गुणाः) that are eternal (नित्याः), natural (स्वाभाविकाः) and *not* due to superimposition (अनौपाधिकाः) of Māyā (अमायिकाः)—countless (अनन्ताः) and unlimited (निःसीमाः).

7. THEORY OF SAVIŚEṢĀBHEDA OF ATTRIBUTES

The author next meets objections that could be brought against the conception of a qualified Brahman or Brahman conceived as a Saviśeṣa Being (as opposed to the Nirviśeṣa-Brahman of Śaṅkara)—particularly the logical difficulties in defining the relation between Substance and attributes, in terms of identity, difference and so forth.

This question is one of great interest in the philosophy of Substance in relation to its attributes¹ and *the Mādhva philosophers have a distinct contribution to make to the theories on this subject.*

If the 'qualities' are identical with Brahman, the latter would also be pluralized and lose its integrity. *Qua* identical with Brahman, which is One Whole, the qualities themselves would lose their plurality and turn out to be distinctions without a difference and *therefore synonymous in effect.* After all, we must have two things granted separately,—a subject and some attributes if we are to speak of their being brought into relation. A subject cannot become *qualified* without *such attributes* and by itself ! (न हि स्वेनैव तद्वात्).

If the attributes are *the same as* the subject, we cannot avoid the above fallacy. Nor can it be said that Brahman is just a totality of attributes. In that case, it would turn out to be just as impercipient as the qualities themselves. It would also be impossible to maintain the identity of the attributes with the Brahman, side by side with the multiplicity of the attributes. If there is no inconsistency between the two, we may abolish all difference altogether and hold that even objects like jars and tables are one. The acceptance of Viśeṣas, to bridge the gap between substance and attributes, is no solution. The difficulties would still remain, as they were, since Viśeṣas too are as much *attributes of Brahman* as the other qualities, which they are meant to cement !

Viṣṇudāsa disarms these and many other logical objections to the doctrine of Saguna. He points out that the difficulties raised by the critics would crop up *only* if the attributes are taken to be absolutely and colorlessly identical with the Substance. They could not raise their heads on Madhva's theory of the relation between the two, which posits a colorful identity (*Saviśeṣābheda*) between the two. This principle *corresponds* to the Samavāya of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, the Bhedābheda of the Bhāṭṭa and

1. See *History of Philosophy Eastern and Western* ii, pp. 153-54. Govt. of India Publication, 1953. See under Ch. XIV. (17) (ix).

serves the same purpose for which they have been adopted in those schools.¹ The relation of identity then, should be carefully distinguished into two kinds, colorless and colorful (*nirviśeṣābheda* and *saviśeṣābheda*). For example, an absolute and *colorless* identity subsists between two terms like “dhvani” and “dhvāna”. That is why they are accepted as synonymous. Between clay and pot, part and whole, substance and attributes, we have to recognize a “colorful” identity. That is why they will not be accepted as synonymous. This principle of Viśeṣas then, operates as a *representative of difference*. It does duty for difference, *without* obliging us to import an *actual difference* into the bargain. It sustains the plurality of attributes and their distinctions of reference and renders possible the adjectival relation of the attributes to the substance and explains how it is possible for one or more attributes to remain unknown or unnoticed or uncharacterized, when the subject itself is *partially known and characterized*. It is self-governing like the ‘Samavāya’ and contains within itself the advantages of both difference and Samavāya, without the demerits of either taken singly,—to connect the substance and attributes and explain their connection. It cannot be seriously argued either by the Logicians or the Advaitins that there is synonymy of terms between “thisness” and “silver”, in a case of a valid judgment like “this is silver” even though there is the identification (*tādātmya*) between the two. In the same way, then, synonymy of reference may be avoided even where identity may be accepted, between Brahman and its attributes of reality, knowledge and bliss, with the help and through the medium of Viśeṣas. Such a marvellous power is, indeed, the peculiar glory of “Viśeṣas” that they can achieve what others could not. Strange as it may seem, metaphysical or intellectual analysis would reveal that language has a device by means of which it can speak of the “*quality of being* the essence and fundamental nature” (*svarūpatva*). Reference to the bliss of Brahman; the use of the plural number with reference to Its attributes (*Evam dharmān...*); and the use of the singular relatively to the Substance (*Ānandam Brahmanah*); the employment of non-synonymous epithets,—(*satyam, jñānam...*)—in fact, all such linguistic patterns, with which lay, philosophical and scientific humanity is obliged to get on and which it has evolved as a result of age-long experience and adjustments to the demands of its physical, logical, scientific and metaphysical needs, are grounded in Viśeṣas, which are just the power and potency inherent in objects and which alone can bridge the gap between identity and difference ! *This discovery, establishment and logical demonstration of the necessity of this ubiquitous logico-philosophical category and its enthronement in philosophy are the most significant contributions of Mādhva thought to Indian Philosophy,—nay, to all philosophy as such.*

The nature and function of these Viśeṣas are then correctly defined and elucidated by Viṣṇudāsa :

1. But it is not exactly identical with them in scope or content. This is a very important fact to be borne in mind. *Vide* also the treatment of Viśeṣas by Vyāsātirtha.

यत्राभेदश्च भेदव्यवहृतिरुभयं वस्तुनो मानसिद्धं
 तत्र श्रुत्यानुभूत्यास्ति हि गुणगुणिनोर्दीपदीप्त्योर्विशेषः ।
 अंगीकार्यश्च भेदप्रतिनिधिरखिलैरन्ततो दुस्त्यजोऽयं
 नो चेद्वाघोजनवस्था स्ववचनविहतिः स्यात्; स्वनिर्वाहकोऽयम् ॥

The exposition of Viśeṣas leads, naturally, to a criticism of the doctrine of “Akhaṇḍārtha” which is a negation of all specification,¹ determination and Viśeṣas, in Brahman. The Dvaita-Vedāntin is, therefore, obliged to challenge the Akhaṇḍārthavāda, which cuts at the very root of his conception of Brahman as “Saviśeṣa” and as a Being endowed with an infinite number of auspicious attributes.

The grounds on which the doctrine of “non-relational judgments” be they judgments of identity as in ‘*So ’yam Devadattaḥ*’ or judgments by definition or description as in प्रकृष्टप्रकाशश्चन्द्रः are examined and refuted by the *Vādaratnāvalī*, in detail. The arguments are mostly drawn from the *Td-ṭikā* of Jayatīrtha. where the theory has been fully dealt with.

The last chapter of the *VR.*, establishes the validity of the Vedas as against the criticisms of the Buddhists, Cārvākas and others and their “Apauruṣeyatva” as against the Naiyāyikas. The entire exposition of this question is also based on Jayatīrtha’s c. on the *VTN*.

The work closes with a brief exposition of the doctrine of self-validity of Knowledge and the validity of the Sākṣī, as the highest instrument of its ascertainment.

1. Cf. वेदान्तानामखण्डार्थपरत्वान्न ते संसर्गबोधकाः । न तेषां गुणानां, न तेषां अनन्तानामित्याशङ्कते
 * * * * (Nym-Tatāṅgiṇī on Akhaṇḍārthavāda, p. 275, Bby. edn.)

LIFE OF VYĀSATĪRTHA
(1478-1539)

Vyāsatīrtha, Vyāsarāya, or Vyāsarāja Svāmin, as he is variously called, was the disciple of Brahmanya Tīrtha, fourth in descent from Rājendra Tīrtha,¹ the Guru of Viṣṇudāsācārya. Chronologically, after Jayatīrtha, he is the one outstanding personality among the Vaiṣṇava Pontiffs of the school of Madhvācārya. The Vaiṣṇavism of Madhva had patronage in the courts of Kaliṅga, Tulunāḍ and in the Ānegondi of pre-Vidyāranya days; but the influence attained at the court of Vijayanagar by Vyāsatīrtha, eclipsed all earlier and later records and stands by itself, unique in history. It is thus briefly indicated in Vādirāja's *Tīrthaprabandha*:

राजधानी जयति सा गजगह्वरसंज्ञिता ।

यत्र भान्ति गजा माध्वराद्धान्तधरणीधराः ॥

Till the publication of the *Vyāsayogicarita* of poet Somanātha, the world had no idea of the part played by Vyāsatīrtha in the history of the Vijayanagar empire.² Some of the earlier generation of scholars of South Indian history were inclined to laugh at what they imagined to be an exaggerated estimate of him given by Mādhva tradition and dismiss it as a pious fabrication. But it is no longer possible to refuse to be convinced. The contemporary biography of Vyāsatīrtha, by one who did *not* belong to his religious fold, is before them; and its account is, in the main, corroborated by such literary and epigraphic evidences as we are yet lucky to possess. Thanks to these, Vyāsatīrtha is not and need no longer be, a shadowy figure depending for his prestige upon the credulity or propaganda of his followers.

LIFE

The most complete and reliable account of Vyāsatīrtha's life and career is to be found in the biographical account of Somanātha.³ The songs of Purandara Dāsa, a few inscriptions and tradition, yield important particulars. I shall now sketch his life in the light of these sources.

(i) Vyāsatīrtha was born in or about 1460 A.D. in the village of Bannūr,⁴ about six miles north of Sosale, in the Mysore district. His father Rallaṇṇa Sumati,⁵ of the Kaśyapagotra, was the youngest of the six

1. See *Genealogical Table* III.

2. It is a pity that no proper account of the life and achievements of Vyāsatīrtha is found in the *Vij. Sexcen. Com. Vol.*

3. It is not clear, therefore, what is meant by the statement in the *Madras Uni. His. Series*, XI, that "no authentic information is available re. the early life and career of Vyāsa" (p. 322). Nothing has so far been discovered belying the facts given by Somanātha. Tradition speaks of another 'Life of Vyāsarāya' written by his favorite disciple Vijayindra Tīrtha, which has not, so far, been traced.

4. *Vyāsayogicarita*, Bangalore, 1926, p. 13 (text).

5. "Sumati" probably represents a surname and Ballaṇṇa might be deemed to be the colloquial variant for Balarāma.

sons of Rāmācārya. As his first wife was childless for long, he married a second wife Akkamma. By the blessings of Brahmaṇya Tīrtha of Cannapatna, he had three children born to him—a girl and two boys. The youngest was Yatirāja,¹ the future Vyāsatīrtha. At the age of five, Yatirāja was taught the alphabet and at seven, he had his Upanayana. For four years afterwards, he was at his Gurukula, whence he went home at eleven. There he went through a complete course of studies in Kāvya, Nāṭaka, Alamkāra and Grammar, which must have covered at least a period of five years.

Somewhere about this time, Brahmaṇya Tīrtha sent word claiming from Ballaṇṇa Sumati, the fulfilment of the promise made by him and his wife, before the birth of their children that they would make over their second son to him. After some hesitation on the part of the parents, the promise was duly fulfilled. Ballaṇṇa himself took his son to Cannapatna and presented him to Brahmaṇya and returned home.

Brahmaṇya Tīrtha was very much impressed with the superior attainments of his ward and was secretly meditating to ordain him a monk, so as to enlist his genius to the cause of Vaiṣṇava Dharma. Somanātha says that the young Yatirāja divined the intentions of Brahmaṇya and unwilling to commit himself, made a bolt for his freedom, one day. He walked a long way and feeling tired, lay down to rest under a tree. While asleep, he had a beatific vision in his dream in which God Viṣṇu appeared before him and instructed him in his duty. The boy returned to the hermitage, quietly. The incident is important even as throwing some faint light on the probable age of Yatirāja at the time. He could not have been more than sixteen, to judge from the use of the phrase शैशवचापलेन in the text of the *Vyāsayogicarita*. Not long after the incident, Brahmaṇya Tīrtha ordained his ward a monk and gave him the name of Vyāsatīrtha.

Vyāsatīrtha spent some time after his ordination in the company of his Guru. Some time after the great famine of 1475-76, Brahmaṇya died. We may, therefore, assume that Vyāsatīrtha came to the Pīṭha in or about the year 1478 A.D. Assuming that he was about sixteen years old at the time of the demise of his Guru, we may easily fix the date of his birth in or about 1460 A.D.²

It is obvious that Vyāsatīrtha had no time to study anything of Madhva-Śāstra under Brahmaṇya. He was obliged, soon after his succession to the Pīṭha, to go to Kāñcī, the citadel of Śāstraic learning in S. India, in those days, where he is said to have stayed for *many years* studying the six systems of philosophy, under the most eminent Pandits there. It was probably here that Vyāsatīrtha acquired his deep erudition in the systems of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja and the Bhāṭṭa school and Navya-Nyāya, an acquaintance which stood him in such good stead, in writing his

1. Probably so named in honor of Brahmaṇya Tīrtha.

2. S. Srikanṭha Śāstri, (Development of Sanskrit under Vijayanagar. p. 312, *Vij. Sexcen. Vol.*) gives the dates of Vyāsatīrtha's birth and ordination as 1447 and 1455, which are too early.

monumental works,—the *Nyāyāmṛta*, *Tātparya-Candrikā* and *Tarkatāṇḍava*. After the completion of his studies at Kāñci, Vyāsātīrtha went over to the seat of Śrīpādarāja at Muḷbāgal.¹ It was then another great centre of learning like Kāñci. There he spent many years in study and meditation. These studies had reference, evidently, to Dvaita Vedānta, as is clear not only from the fact that Vyāsātīrtha had already mastered the six systems at Kāñci, but also from his own express acknowledgment to the effect at the end of his gloss on the *Upādhikhaṇḍanaṭikā*.²

He is believed to have read under Śrīpādarāja for nearly twelve years.³ This seems to be slightly exaggerated, having regard to the fact that he had taken much less time to dive deep into the Śaḍdarśanas at Kāñci and in view of the fact that he was sent to the court of Sāḷuva Narasimha at Candragiri, by Śrīpādarāja,⁴ just about the time of the usurpation of Vijayanagar by the second dynasty,⁵ which, according to competent historians, happened about 1485-86. We have, therefore, to cut short Vyāsātīrtha's stay and studies at Muḷbāgal, to five or six years, which is reasonable.

The latter part of the IV chapter of the *Vyāsayogicarita* gives a brilliant account of the arrival of Vyāsātīrtha, at the court of Sāḷuva Narasimha at Candragiri, and the grand reception accorded to him there. Here he spent some years, honoured and worshipped by the King, "as Dattātreyā was by Kārtavīrya" (p. 40). Here, he met and vanquished in intellectual tournaments many leading scholars of his day and conducted debates on such standard treatises on Logic as the *Tattvacintāmaṇi* of Gaṅgeśa. There is reason to believe that it was during this period that Vyāsātīrtha was entrusted with the worship of God Śrīnivāsa on the hill at Tirupati.⁶ Tradition says he continued to worship at Tirupati for twelve years (1486-98) His S. Indian tour must have been undertaken during this period, when he

1. The facts that (1) Vyāsātīrtha is nowhere represented (in the biography of Somanātha) to have gone to Kāñci at the bidding of Brahmanya, or (2) visited him on his return from that city, indicate clearly that Brahmanya's demise must have taken place a few years before his pupil's departure to Kāñci.

2. लक्ष्मीनारायणाख्यात् द्वैतिकुलतिलका दधीतमध्वशास्त्रामृतेन व्यासयतिना विरचिता मन्दार-मञ्जरी समाप्ता । (colophon).

3. Such is the view expressed by the late Vidyāratnākara Svāmi of the Vyāsarāja Mutt, quoted in the Introd. to *Vy-carita*, lxxiii.

4. Not by Brahmanya Tīrtha, as stated on pp. 321-22, *Madras Uni. His. Series*, xi.

5. This seems to be indicated by the curious fact that Vyāsātīrtha goes straight to Candragiri though Śrīpādarāja merely advises him to go to "the King's court". The terms in which Vyāsātīrtha commends Sāḷuva Narasimha when he meets him (pp. 49-50 text of *Vy-carita*) also show that the latter's victorious campaign through S. India, had come to a close, by then.

6. Certain special honors shown to the Mutt of Vyāsarāja at Tirupati, such as the right to the Svāmi to go round the prākāras seated in a palanquin and personally worship the deity in the sanctum, the presence of a Vyāsarāja Mutt on the hill with an inscription on its walls as well as allusions in certain songs of Vyāsātīrtha, are adduced as proofs of his having been entrusted with the worship of Śrīnivāsa.

was in the habit of quitting Tirupati for short intervals, entrusting the worship to some disciples.¹

It appears from Somanātha's account that Vyāsātīrtha did not quit Candragiri for a while after 1498. He evidently stuck to Sāluva Immaḍi Narasimha, the son and successor of Sāluva Narasimha, till Narasa became the *de facto* ruler of Vijayanagar soon after the settlement which he concluded with Tamma Rāya, in 1498. (See *Proddattur* 386 of 1904, Madras Insc.), one of the terms of which was perhaps the establishment of Vyāsātīrtha as the Spiritual Adviser and Guardian Angel of the State.² However that may be, Vyāsātīrtha left for Vijayanagar, in or about 1493 A.D. "at the pressing and persistent invitation of Narasa's ministers (p. 54, lines 1-2, text); and made it his permanent residence for the rest of his life. His entry into Vijayanagar and installation as the Guardian Saint of the Kingdom are fittingly described in the fifth chapter of Somanātha's biography. This place of honor given to him was not confirmed without a challenge. Learned men from various parts of India came to challenge him to a public disputation with them. Led by Basava Bhaṭṭa of Kalinga they pinned their challenges (*biruda patras*—text) to the palace pillars. The challenge was promptly accepted and Vyāsātīrtha met the opposing team of scholars and vanquished it completely after a protracted debate lasting for thirty days (P. 61 text).

When Narasa was succeeded by Vīranarasimha, the position of Vyāsātīrtha remained the same at the court. According to Venkobarao, again, (p. lxvii) Nuniz makes a direct reference to Vyāsātīrtha; for the following passage can refer to none but him: "*The King of Bisnaga, every day, hears the preaching of a learned Brahmin who never married nor ever touched a woman*". Somanātha appears to say that it was during the reign of Vīra Narasimha, that Vyāsātīrtha started composing his great works: the *Candrikā*, *Tarkatāṇḍava* and *Nyāyāmṛta*.³

The accession of Kṛṣṇadevarāya in 1509, opened up a new chapter of glory in the life of Vyāsātīrtha, —a chapter far more brilliant than any that

1. See B. Venkoba Rau, Notes to *Vy-carita* p. 18.

2. Such is, at any rate, the interpretation put by B. Venkoba Rau on the words of Nuniz that "after this (settlement) was done, he (Narasa Naque) told the King (Tammarāya) that he desired to go to Bisnaga to do certain things that would tend to the benefit of the Kingdom and the King pleased at that, told him, "So it should be" (Introd. xvii-xviii). He also thinks that simultaneously with Narasa's campaign between 1499-1500. Vyāsātīrtha also, started his reform of installing 732 Hanuman idols in different parts of the Kingdom, beginning with the Yantroddhāraka Hanumān at Hampi (Introd. xiv, ix, xviii). Cf. also a song of Vijaya Dāsa (*Annals BORI* xviii, pt. 2, p. 197; and p. 323, *Madras Uni. His Ser.* xi).

3. This is the order in which Somanātha has named the three great works of Vyāsātīrtha (p. 61-65). But there is indisputable evidence to show that the *Nym.* was written before the *Candrikā* (See pp. 965 and 984 of *Candrikā* (Bby. 1913). The *Tarkatāṇḍava* refers by name to both the *Nym.* and the *Tc* (Mys. edn. vol. iii, p. 302; 280. This shows that the *T. T.* must have been the last of the 'Vyāsatraya'. But then, there is a reference to the *Tarkatāṇḍava*, according to Rāghavendra's gloss, in the *Tc*. (P. 68b) which might be explained as a later insertion, when all the three works were completed.

had gone before it. The Rāya had the greatest regard and respect for Vyāsātīrtha and regarded him as nothing less than his “Kuladevatā.” With thrilling emotion does Somanātha write :

यावन्तो विषया हता, भुजबलं यावत्सपत्ना जिता
यावन्तश्च; वदान्यता करसरोजाताश्रया यावती ।
यावत्यो घनसंपदो; गुणगणो यावांश्च; यावद्यश-
स्तावत्कर्तुमियेष पूजनमसौ श्रीव्यासभिक्षोर्नृपः ॥

(P. 71 text).

Vyāsātīrtha had already obtained by 1500, the honor of a green flag on a camel as a mark of respect from the Sultan of Bijāpūr (p. xv. introd),¹ “In 1511 A.D. he obtained from the King, the village Pūlambākkam in the “Padaivīḍu-rājyam,” for conducting the Āvaṇi festival in his own name, of God Varadarāja at Kāñcī and also the King’s sanction for presenting a Śeṣavāhana of gold, which had to be used as a vehicle for the God on the fourth day of all festivals” (*Madras Epi. Rep.* 1912-20, no. 370 of 1919). In an inscription on the southern wall of the Maṇṭapa in front of the Viṭṭal-svāmi temple, at Hampi, which records a grant to the temple in 1513, by Kṛṣṇadevarāya, Vyāsātīrtha is referred to as *the Guru* without any prefix whatever :

विनियोग नानावर्गद नैवेद्य सह, गुरुगळु व्यासरायरिगे पालु ।

(S. I.I. IV, no. 48 of 1889—Kannāḍa)

It is now conclusively established that Vyāsātīrtha was indeed the Guru of Kṛṣṇadevarāya on the evidence of a clear statement to the effect in a Sanskrit work of the Rāya himself, a palm leaf fragment of which is preserved in the G.O. Mss. Library, Madras (D. C. no. 18299) :

उत्साहं मम वीक्ष्य मदगुरुरथ श्रीव्यासतीर्थो मुनिः
पर्यालोच्य पुराणशास्त्रविविधाम्नायेतिहासादिकान् ।
लब्धास्तत्र कथा हरेः पशुपतेः साम्यं निरस्याधिकं
विष्णुं कीर्तय सर्वथेत्युपदिशन् मह्यं मुदा दत्तवान् ॥

This is sufficient evidence that Kṛṣṇadevarāya regarded Vyāsātīrtha as *his* Guru in the *special sense of the term*. Another inscription in 1514, recording a grant to the Kṛṣṇasvāmi temple at Hampi, remarks *inter alia* that after installing the image of Kṛṣṇa, which he brought from Udayagiri, the Rāya appointed Rāmaṇṇācārya and Muḷbāgal Timmaṇṇācārya as Arcakas. The names are undoubtedly those of Mādhva Brahmins. As Bālakṛṣṇa of Udayagiri was a prized trophy, the choice of Arcakas from Mādhvas becomes significant. Vyāsātīrtha himself in one of his songs (in Kannāḍa) has sung the advent of Bālakṛṣṇa from Udayagiri (See *Vyāsarāyara Kīrtanegaḷu*, Udipi, no. 60). Subsequent to the Rāya’s return from Koṇḍavīḍu, there was another grant to Vyāsātīrtha in 1516.

Paes’s curious report of the *Rāya being washed by a Brahmin whom he held sacred and who was “a great favorite of his [Italics mine] which Sewell*

1. The honor of the green flag and a drum on the back of a camel is kept up to this day in the Maṭha of Vyāsātīrtha at Sosale, by his successors. The *Sāluwābhyudaya* says that Narasimha took the honor of the green umbrella in one of his campaigns against the Sultans, green being the favorite color of Muslims. A camel corps furnished by one of his feudatories, is also mentioned in the same context.

(*Forgotten Empire*, p. 249-50, f.n. 3) finds it difficult to believe, may yet be true, if, as is probable, it has reference to Vyāsatīrtha, who was certainly a favourite of the Rāya and was held sacred by him ! At any rate, we know of no other Brahmin of the time, who could answer to the description of Nuniz, and Paes. As for the washing ceremony, it is, though unknown to every other Brahminical order, yet, in perfect accord with the precepts of Śrī Madhvācārya, in this *Tantrasāra* (ii, 10-11);

* * * कुम्भोदके सुधीः ।
पूर्वोक्तविधिनाभ्यर्च्य प्रतिमां शिष्यमेव वा ।
स्नापयेत्पूर्वमर्चायां जपोऽनूनः सहस्रशः ।
मूलमंत्रस्य चाङ्गानां न्यासः स्नानादनन्तरम् ।
प्रतिमायां सन्निधिक्षु, शिष्ये माहात्म्यकृद्ववेत् ॥ (तन्त्रसार)

This would make it clear that *Madhva teaches that such ceremonial bathing (abhiṣeka) of a disciple, by his teacher, conduces to the glory and spiritual well-being of the former.* The practice would thus appear to be distinctively Mādhva; and none but a follower of Madhva would have adopted it. We have sufficient evidence to show that Kṛṣṇadevarāya looked upon Vyāsatīrtha as his Guru *par excellence* (Vide the terms in which he refers to Vyāsatīrtha in the inscription at the Viṭṭalasvāmi temple at Hampi, quoted above) and that he was a great favorite of the King, as will be clear for Somanātha's account also. Judging then, from all circumstances of the case and the evidences at our disposal, there is every reason to believe that it was Vyāsatīrtha that Paes was alluding to, in his interesting report. There would thus be no difficulty in assuming that it was to him that Nuniz also was alluding in his report about the *King of Bisnaga listening everyday to the preaching of "a learned Brahmin who never married nor (had) touched a woman."* [Italics mine]. The description points unmistakably to a Sannyāsin (of the Ekadāṇḍī order) and so far as available records show, Vyāsatīrtha is the only one wielding such influence over the Rāya and answering to the descriptions of these two foreign travellers. Nuniz's remarks are fully corroborated by Somanātha's biography (pp. 40, 53, 59, 66, 67-68 and 71).

Towards the close of the V chapter, Somanātha describes a significant episode in the life of Vyāsatīrtha. Soon after his return to the capital from the Kalinga war (1516) and his treaty with the Gajapati, Kṛṣṇadevarāya one day, rushed to the presence of Vyāsatīrtha with a work on Advaita Vedānta,¹ sent for criticism, by the Kalinga ruler. He further says that the Kalinga King Vidyādhara Pātra, had sent the work to Kṛṣṇarāya, through his commander-in-chief at the instigation of certain self-conceited Pandits of his court with a haughty challenge that it might be shown to Vyāsatīrtha, inviting him to refute it, if he could.² The

1. This is clear from the nature of the epithets employed :

स्वामिन्, प्रतिभटवादि विजयेषु भगवद्वचोभिः पलायितमिव स्वदेशे गूढं चरन्तं, सच्छास्त्रं सुत्रामजालस्य, प्राणमूर्तं मायामतस्य तत्त्वं व्यामोहकशब्दाभिधेयस्य, भूतिमनृतस्य, दुष्टपक्षं बन्दिग्राहमिव गृहीत्वा * * * *

2. विद्याधरपात्रनामा कलिगाधिपतिः कैश्चिदहंयुर्भविष्यच्चिद्भिः प्रचलितोत्साहः शुक्नाडिकाकारायां पुस्तिकायामाबद्ध्य, भगवते व्यासयोगिने प्रदर्शनीयोऽयं दुस्तरयुस्तिविस्तारितो महान् ग्रन्थ इति स्वसेनापतिकरे मह्यं प्रेषिषत् । तदवश्यं तमेतं कतिपयैरेवाहोभिः दुर्लङ्घ्याभिर्वचोयुक्तिभिः भगवान् शरद्बलाहकमिव झञ्झाभिः शकलीकर्तुमर्हति, इति पुस्तिकां सन्निधौ संदर्शयामास । (P. 70).

challenge of the Kalinga ruler was, in effect, a challenge to the imperial dignity of the Rāya himself and to his Dualistic leanings in philosophy and the prestige of Karnatak in the domain of philosophy so ably upheld in the person and works of Vyāsātīrtha. And, if in trying to defend these, the Rāya ran to Vyāsātīrtha, it only shows how indispensable he was to him and what position he occupied in the estimation of the Rāya.

Unfortunately, Somanātha has not mentioned the name of the work thus despatched to Vyāsātīrtha. Among the works of Vyāsātīrtha, the only one which answers to the requirements of the case is the *Sattarkavilāsa* (See Appendix VI) which has so far remained unknown and of which no Ms has yet been discovered. *Sattarkavilāsa* cannot be another name either for the *Nym.* or the *TT.* There is no reason why Vyāsātīrtha should refer to his own *Nym.* by a different name. As for the *TT.* its subject matter is pure logic while the *Sattarkavilāsa* as it appears from the particular reference given by Vyāsātīrtha himself dealt with topics of vital interest to Advaita like Jīvanmukti, Ajñāna and Avidyānivṛtti. From certain remarks of the celebrated logician Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma at the end of his c. on the *Advaitamakaranda* of Lakṣmīdhara (of which a ms. is noticed by Rajendralal Mitra, in his catalogue) it appears that he lent his willing cooperation to the Gajapati Ruler Kūrma Vidyādhara in devising ways of humiliating Kṛṣṇadevarāya of Vijayanagar :

कण्टिश्चरकुण्णरायनृपतेर्गर्वाग्निनिर्वापिके
अत्र न्यस्तभरोऽभवद् गजपतिः श्रीरुद्रभूमीपतिः ।
तस्य ब्रह्मविचारचारुमनसः श्रीकर्मविद्याधर-
स्यानंदो मकरन्दशुद्धिविधिना सान्द्रो मयायं कृतः ॥

It was evidently some other work of Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma, if not his c. on the *Advaitamakaranda* that formed the subject of challenge referred to by Somanātha. It is worthy of note that the name of Kṛṣṇarāya's rival mentioned by Somanātha, answers more or less closely to the one referred by Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma, in the verse cited above. *Here, then, is interesting light thrown on the historical authenticity of the incidents recorded by Somanātha.* Apparently, the Kalinga King wanted to outshine Kṛṣṇadevarāya, not only in military prowess; but in literary glory too. The reference to Kṛṣṇarāya by Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma, as "Karnāṭeśvara", also establishes that the Vijayanagar Kingdom was universally accepted as a purely Kannaḍa state and its ruling dynasty was also regarded as purely Kannaḍiga and never as a Telugu dynasty at any time, in contemporary records.

Before starting on his Raichur expedition in 1520, the Rāya performed a "ratnābhiṣeka" for Vyāsātīrtha (pp. 71-75 text). In 1526, Vyāsātīrtha received the village of Beṭṭakoṇḍa from the King. This was named "*Vyāsasamudra*", after the big lake which he caused to be dug there.¹ Earlier., there are two other epigraphs, one dated 1523 (Svabhānu)

1. This is referred to by Purandara Dāsa in one of his songs :

देशाधिपगे बन्द क्लेशंगल कळेदु
सिंहासनवनेरि मेरेदि जगवरिय ।

recording the grant of the village of Brahmanyatīrthapura to Vyāsarāya. He, however, gave it away to Brahmins. The grant of 1524 is recorded on a stone in front of the Vyāsarāya Maṭha at Tirupati, showing probably that Vyāsatīrtha was then at Tirupati, praying to God Śrīnivāsa,¹ during the dreaded period of the Kuhuyoga.² It was presumably after the great Kuhuyoga of 1524, that Vyāsasamudra was granted to Vyāsatīrtha.³ It is clear from Somanātha's account that Vyāsatīrtha moved away for sometime to his retreat at Beṭṭakoṇḍa, presumably during the period of "temporary estrangement" from the Rāya, when Aḷiya Rāmarāya was at the helm of affairs. The Rāya seems to have gone on a pilgrimage and returned by 1527 to the capital where he made another grant to Vyāsatīrtha (*Shimoga*, 85) the terms of which imply that Vyāsatīrtha was completely restored to his former position in his estimation :—

निगमागमनिर्णीतिनिर्जराधीशमन्त्रिणे
नृपेन्द्रमुकुटीरत्ननोराजितनिजांघ्रये
निरहंकारचित्ताय नीतिमार्गोपदेशिने ।
शेषाय नरवेषाय शिक्षितान्तरवैरिणे ।
पुराणपुरुषध्यानपुण्यत्पुष्कलमूर्तये ।
मध्वाचार्यमताम्भोजमार्ताण्डायिततेजसे ।
ब्रह्मण्यतीर्थशिष्याय ब्रह्मनिर्मलमूर्तये ।
व्यासतीर्थयतीन्द्राय विद्वदिन्दीवरैन्दवे ॥

(*Epi. Car.*)

Somanātha goes on to say that after the death of Kṛṣṇadevarāya (1530), Acyutarāya continued to honour Vyāsatīrtha for some years. It was in Acyuta's reign that the image of Yogavarada Narasimha was set up by Vyāsatīrtha in the courtyard of the Viṭṭhalasvāmi temple at Hampi, in 1532.

Seven years later, Vyāsatīrtha himself passed away at Vijayanagar on the fourth day of the dark fortnight of Phālguna, in *Vilambi*, corresponding to Saturday, the 8th of March 1539 A.D.⁴ His mortal remains are

व्यासाब्धियन् कटिदसि देशदोळगेल्ल । (Kannada)

(Song no. 20, *Mādhvabhajanamañjari*, K. Bandappa, Dharwar, 1932, p. 16).

1. See song of Vyāsarāya to Śrīnivāsa (no. 53 of Udipi).

2. It was during this 'Kuhuyoga' that tradition says Vyāsarāya himself ascended the throne of Vijayanagar, to save his disciple Kṛṣṇarāya from peril. The appellation "Vyāsarāja" and the custom of "*Divāṭige salām*" which is to this day kept up in the Vyāsarāya Mutt at Sosale, when the Svami seated on his "throne" is hailed at a daily darbar, every evening, as the Lord seated on the "Vijayanagara-Karnāṭaka Vidyāsimhāsana", serve to keep in memory the forgotten past. Purandaradāsa also has recorded Vyāsarāya's occupation of the throne of Vijayanagar in one of his songs already cited.

3. The period between 1524-26 was a gloomy one. Taken ill, the Rāya was probably forced to abdicate in favour of his son Tirumaladevarāya in or about 1524 (*Ep. Car.* Bangalore, Māyadi, 82) and after his death in 1525 to take his brother Acyuta as Regent.

4. The date is given by Purandara Dāsa, in one of his songs, (quoted by Kittel, in his *Nāgavarmana Chandassu* : विलम्बितसरदल्लि विजयनगरदल्लि फाल्गुनबहुलचतुर्थियल्लि स्थिरवारदल्लि । The author of *Madras Uni. His. Ser. XI*, feels, rather vaguely, that Vyāsatīrtha "appears to have breathed his last a little later than 1532" ! [*Italics mine*].

entombed at Nava Bṛndāvana, an island on the Tungabhadra, about half a mile east of Ānegondi. [Face photograph of *Navabṛndāvana* opposite] .

(ii) *Vyāsātīrtha* was almost the second Founder of the system of *Madhva*. In him, the secular and philosophical prestige of the system of *Madhva* reached its highest point of recognition. The strength which he infused into it through his labours and personality has contributed, in no small measure, to its being even today a living and flourishing faith in S. India as a whole. The learned Appayya Dīkṣita is reported to have observed that the great *Vyāsātīrtha* "saved the melon of *Mādhvaism* from bursting, by securing it with three bands" in the form of his three great works—the *Nyāyāmṛta*, *Candrikā* and *Tarkatāṇḍava*. These showed to the philosophical world that the followers of *Madhva* could more than hold their own against the best intellects of India, in the field of logic and metaphysics, *Nyāya*, *Mīmāṃsā*, *Vyākaraṇa* and *Vedānta*. There is a tradition that when the great N. Indian Logician Pakṣadhara Miśra, visited Mulbāgal, he had spoken most appreciatively of *Vyāsātīrtha* :

यदधीतं तदधीतं यदनधीतं तदप्यधीतम् ।

पक्षधरविपक्षो नावेक्षि विना नवीनव्यासेन ॥


With all his erudition, *Vyāsātīrtha* was not a mere doctrinaire. He was a thinker of high order. He was essentially warm-hearted and felt himself as at home on the naked peaks of the intellect and in the unfathomed depths of mystic consciousness and devotion to God. His religion of service, sympathy and effort (*Kirtane* no. 55 of Udipi) was a direct corollary of his philosophy. By its side, the homage of *Madhusūdana Sarasvatī* : वंशीविभूषितकरात् * * * (at the end of his disquisition on *Nirākārabrahmavāda*) turns out to be little more than hollow sentimentalism in one whose highest Brahman is characterless.

(iii) If the Kings of Vijayanagar were models of religious toleration, we have not a little to thank *Vyāsātīrtha* for it. While his influence lasted, he could easily have feathered his own nest and seen to the religious and political ascendancy of the men of his own creed. But he despised such ambitions. He was scrupulously just and fair in his dealings and treatment of others. He treated *Basavabhaṭṭa*, whom he had vanquished in debate, with exemplary kindness and regard.² He could easily have established a monopoly of worship for the men of his faith at Tirupati during his sojourn there; but he did *not*. He was no inciter of hatred against *Śiva* though personally, a staunch *Vaiṣṇava*. He has himself composed a *Stotra* in praise of *Śiva*³ and to this day, a special service is held in the *Vyāsārāja Mutt* at Sosale on the *Mahāśivarātri* s day, when the *Śiva-līṅga*, said to have been presented to *Vyāsātīrtha* by *Basavabhaṭṭa*, is worshipped. He allowed his preachings to take their gentle course of persuasion and disliked proselytization for the sake of numbers. He did not misuse his

1. "Viriṇja Vellirippazhattukku Mūṇu Kaṭṭu Poṭṭār" (Tamil).

2. See *Vy-carita*. p. 61.

3. *Laghu Śiva Stuti*, S. M. Belgaum, 1881.



NAVABṚNDĀVANA an island in the Tuṅgabhadrā river near Ānegondi (Hampi) where we have the Bṛndāvanas (tombs) of the nine famous Mādhva Saints :

1. Padmanābha Tīrtha 2. Kavindra T. 3. Vāgīśa T. 4. Vyāsatīrtha
5. Raghuvarya T. 6. Sudhīndra T. 7. Śrīnivāsa T. 8. Rāma T.
- and 9. Govinda Oḍeyaru

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influence with the Kings to make his faith the State religion. This attitude deserves to be contrasted with that of the Śrīvaiṣṇavas, reported in the *Prapannāmṛta* :

श्रीवैष्णवे विरूपाक्षे प्रशासति महीमिमाम् ।

आसन् श्रीवैष्णवाः सर्वे यथा राजा तथा प्रजाः ॥

विरूपाक्षाभिध्वा मुद्रा * * * * *

But in Vyāsātīrtha days Virūpākṣa was the tutelary deity of the kingdom along with Viṭṭhala and the seal of Virūpākṣa instituted by Vidyāranya, was still in use.. It is thus a very sweeping and unfair estimate of Vyāsātīrtha, that we have in the *Madras University Historical Series*, no.xi, that “in spite of the efforts of Vyāsātīrtha, Mādhvaism did not evoke popular enthusiasm. The *only contribution which it made to religion was to give an exaggerated importance to the worship of Hanumān*. A few Brahmins and fewer nobles accepted the teachings of Madhva” (p. 323). [Italics mine] .

It is now known that Vyāsātīrtha had numerous families owning allegiance to his Mutt in the Uttara-Karnataka areas bordering the Adil Shahi kingdom. Many of these were entrusted with civil and military responsibilities of “Deshpandes.” Descendants of these families owing allegiance to Vyāsarāya’s Mutt are still to be found in large numbers in the Bagalkot, Hungund, Muddebehal and other areas beyond the Tungabhadra. A Telugu ms. in the Govt. O. Mss. Lib.—Madras (Triennial Cat.) mentions Peddarāma of Pippāla Gotra, a powerful chief of the Vijayanagar court as a “Priyaśiṣya” of the great Vyāsātīrtha.” प्रियबन्धुवनचैत्रपिप्पालगोत्र * * * तगमिञ्चु व्यासतीर्थप्रियशिष्य पेद्दरामविभव सुत्राम ।

The message of Vyāsātīrtha was addressed to the thoughtful among men and the really sincere among the people. His mission had two sides: a religious and a philosophical one. And it is sufficient to say that in both these fields, the impression he had made was both profound and lasting and destined to lead to far-reaching consequences. We shall have much to say of his labours in the domain of philosophy, presently. It may be pointed out here that Vyāsātīrtha was a Psalmist in Kannaḍa and had composed many beautiful songs in his mother-tongue, Kannaḍa,—a fact of which only flying mention has been made by the author of *Madras Uni. His. Series. XI*. More than even for his own compositions, his name would have to be invested with special significance as that of the person who gave India, a Purandara Dāsa and a Kanaka Dāsa, both disciples of Vyāsarāya. Those who know anything about the history of the Dāsa Kūṭa and how much Kannaḍa literature is indebted to these great Poet-Saints of Karnaṭak, will have no difficulty in realizing the importance of the service rendered by Vyāsātīrtha to the cause of “popular religion” and cultural revival; for no one can deny that the Dāsa Kūṭa “evoked popular enthusiasm” for the philosophy of Vaiṣṇavism in Karnaṭak. Its influence on the ethical uplift of the masses is too well known to need elaboration here.

Nay, the influence of Vyāsātīrtha was felt far beyond the limits of Karnaṭaka, — in the heart of distant Bengal. It is now fairly well known, though no reference is made to it in *Madras Uni. His. Ser. XI*, that the Bhakti

Movement of Caitanya who flourished wholly within the lifetime of Vyāsātīrtha, owed a great deal of its inspiration to the philosophy of Madhva and its exposition by Vyāsātīrtha. A section of the followers of Caitanya goes so far as to claim that Caitanya himself comes of a line of ascetics from Madhva through Rājendra Tīrtha and Vyāsātīrtha. In his *Gauragaṇod-deśadīpkā*, Caitanya's biographer, Kavikarṇapūra speaks reverently of the three great masterpieces of Vyāsātīrtha as the "Viṣṇu-Samhitā" :

व्यासतीर्थस्तस्य शिष्यो यश्चक्रे विष्णुसंहिताम् ।

If properly viewed, the influence of Vyāsātīrtha would be seen to have brought about a glorious religious renaissance in the XVI century, *simultaneously in the north and in the south of India*.¹ Of his place in the domain of Indian philosophy, we shall say something in the next section. Historical scholarship must indeed be thoroughly blind and bankrupt, if it could discover in Vyāsātīrtha's work and achievement, nothing more substantial or enduring than "an exaggerated importance to the worship of Hanumān" and the erection, presumably, of a few temples to that god !

1. Even the Devotionalism of the Mahārāṣṭra Saints, Tukārām and his predecessors, would appear to be inspired by the Bhakti Movement of the Haridāśas through common devotion to Viṭṭhala. See p. 247. See also the following *Abhaṅga* of Ekanātha (1533-99) referring to the period of Purandara Dāsa and his Viṭṭhala-Sampradāya at Pandharpur :

तीर्थ कानडे देव कानडे । क्षेत्र कानडे पण्ढरिये ।

विठ्ठल कानडे भक्त हे कानडे । पुंडलिकें उघडे उघडे उभे केले ।

एका जनार्दनीं भक्ताचिया चाडा । विठ्ठल कानडा विटेवरी ॥

Q. In B. R. Patwardhan's paper 'Jñāneśvar Kālin Marāṭhī va Kānaḍī, pub. in *Jñāneśvar-Darśan*, Pt. i. Ahmadnagar, 1934, p. 175.

WORKS OF VYĀSATĪRTHA

Vyāsatīrtha wrote nine works in all. The general belief among the followers of M. has been that Vyāsatīrtha wrote only eight works. But I have discovered a reference to a ninth one by name *Sattarkavilāsa* in his own c. on J's *M.Kh.t.* (See Appendix). I believe this was the work Vyāsatīrtha wrote as described by Somanātha in his *Vy-carita*, in reply to an Advaitic work sent by the Kalinga chief Vidyādhara Pātra, challenging Vyāsatīrtha to refute it, if he could. My reasons for suggesting this identification are given in the Appendix. No ms. of this work has however been discovered so far. His major and most important works are three, the *Nyāyāmṛta*, *Tarkatāṇḍava*, and *Candrikā*, collectively called "*Vyāsa-traya*". Among his minor works, the first place is to be given to his *Bhedojjivana*.¹ Next come his recondite and highly technical glosses on the *Khaṇḍanatraya* and the *Tattvaviveka*. A *Granthamālikā Stotra*, giving a list of the 37 works of Mādḥva, is ascribed to him in the catalogue of the T. P. L. and published in the S. M. (pp. 382-3). The oft-quoted verse : श्रीमन्मध्वमते * * * * (q. p. 7) embodying the nine leading tenets of Mādḥva theology and metaphysics, is also traditionally ascribed to him. It is quoted by Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa—in his *Prameyasaratnāvali* as that of an ancient authority (तदुक्तं प्राचा) to which is added a parallel verse of his own : श्रीमध्वः प्राह विष्णुम् * * * All the above-mentioned works of Vyāsatīrtha have been printed.²

(1) NYĀYĀMṚTA (p)

In this, his *magnum opus*, Vyāsatīrtha has undertaken a complete vindication of the philosophical power and prestige of the realistic metaphysics of Ānandatīrtha, together with a discussion of its concomitant problems. The work is divided into four chapters or Paricchedas. The first discusses the central idea of idealism : the unreality of the phenomenal world and goes into the various proofs (pramāṇas) on which it is sought to be based. Such doctrines of Advaita as have a direct bearing on this thesis of the falsity of world-appearance like that of degrees of reality,

1. Wrongly attributed to Vādirāja in RICE'S Catalogue.

2. The Editor of the T. P. L. Cat. is mistaken in his statement that the *Bhedojjivana* and the gloss on the U. K. are yet to be printed. The "Sudhā" is *not* one of the works of Vyāsatīrtha, as we have it on p. 424 of *Madras Uni. His. Ser. XI*. Nor did he "comment on several Upaniṣads such as the *Chān.* and the *Māṇḍūkya*" (*ibid.*). The "Sudhā" is, as we have seen, (p. 252), a work of Jayatīrtha and the cc. on the Upaniṣads were by an earlier Vyāsatīrtha, who was a direct disciple of Jayatīrtha (See under Major Commentators). The author of the *Nym.* generally describes himself as "Vyāsayati" disciple of Brahmanya Tīrtha or of Lakṣminārāyaṇa Tīrtha.

Adhyāsa (*kartṛtvādhyaśa*, *dehātmaikyabhrama*), Anirvacanīya etc., are fully thrashed out. The various definitions of “Mithyātva” (the concept of unreality) propounded by Advaitins are analysed and refuted. The four *hetus* in the familiar “Mithyātvānumāna”, are then criticized. The sanctity of Pratyakṣa and its inviolability by Anumāna and Āgama are upheld. In this connection, Vyāsātīrtha repudiates Vācaspati’s application of the “Apacchedanyāya” of the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā to the controversy of Pratyakṣa vs. Āgama. He points out the अपच्छेदन्याय is restricted to cases of mere sequence of items involving no उपजीव्योपजीवक relation and where there is no mutual conflict between two injunctions or any essential invalidity of one *vis-a-vis* another. Many representative texts of Monism are reinterpreted. The doctrines of “Dṛṣṭi-Śrṣṭi”; “Ekajīvājñānavāda”, “Bhāvarūpājñānavāda” (Citsukha) and the question of its *locus*; the divergent views of the *Bhāmati* and the *Vivaraṇa* on this point are elaborately dealt with.

The II Pariccheda opens with a refutation of “Akhaṇḍārtha” and its application to Upaniṣadic texts (*lakṣaṇavākyas*). Advaitic doctrines, like those of Nirguṇatva, Nirākāratva, Svaprakāśatva and Avācyatva of Brahman, are repudiated and their theistic opposites upheld. “Difference” is shown to be real, cognizable and characterizable, with the help of “Viśeṣas”. Madhva’s scheme of five-fold difference (Pañcabheda) is shown to have the sanction and support of the three Pramāṇas. The idea of the material and efficient causality of Brahman are shown to be devoid of any real sense, on the Advaitic view. The doctrine and concept of identity (*aikya*) are closely examined and shown to be unintelligible,—impossible. The chapter ends with a discourse on the atomicity of the soul (Dvaita view).

The III Chapter is devoted to a critical examination of the place and significance to be assigned to the scriptural injunctions regarding the various means of realization, Śravaṇa, Manana, religious instruction, self-discipline etc., in expediting God-realization.

In the fourth chapter is elucidated the doctrine of Mukti as understood by Madhva. Other views of Mokṣa are criticized with a good grasp of details. The Advaitic view of release as being identical with the cessation of Avidyā is refuted. The prospect of characterless bliss is shown to be utterly devoid of all motive-force for human effort towards salvation. The doctrine of Jīvanmukti is next examined. As against the Viśiṣṭādvaitins, the author maintains that gradation does obtain in Mokṣa and *must do so*, in view of certain logical necessities and scriptural admissions.

(ii) The *Nym.* expands many topics that have been but briefly dealt with by the predecessors of Vyāsātīrtha. The concept of “*Mithyātva*” and its premises have been only succinctly dealt with by Jayatīrtha and Viṣṇudāsa, in their dialectical works. Vyāsātīrtha, therefore, devotes considerable attention to an up to date review and a comprehensive analysis and refutation of every one of the five definitions of falsity postulated by the Advaitic dialecticians and disposes of them all after a full-dress debate.

He examines a number of alternative explanations of “dṛśyatva” “jādatva” etc., advanced by Citsukha, Ānandabodha and others and exposes their material fallacies and the mutual contradictions and conflict with the views of *older writers of their own school*, which such attempted alternative explanations would entail upon the innovators. He deals with the new definition of falsity as “*Jñānatvena Jñānanivartyatvam*”, not noticed by his predecessors. He also raises several crucial and inconvenient objections which are difficult to parry and go to the very crux of things, such as for example, whether (1) the Universe is to be regarded as utterly unreal. (स्वरूपेण निषेधप्रतियोगि) or unreal only in a noumenal sense (पारमार्थिकत्वाकारेण वा). Absolute denial would make the world non-existent *per se* and throw the Advaitin into the arms of the Buddhistic Nihilist. The distinction of reality into phenomenal and noumenal, being as yet unproved, it would be unfair to speak of denying the world in a noumenal sense.

The Advaitin declares roundly that he means to deny the world utterly : मैवम् । स्वरूपेण त्रैकालिकनिषेधप्रतियोगित्वस्य प्रपञ्चे शुक्तिरूप्ये चाङ्गीकारात् ॥ (*Advaitasiddhi*). Vyāsatīrtha rightly points out in anticipation that on *this* view, “Mithyātva” would stand completely unmasked as utter non-existence : स्वरूपेण त्रैकालिकनिषेधप्रतियोगित्वे, अत्यन्तासत्त्वापातात् ॥ The same fate would overtake the Advaitin on the other two definitions also :

“ * * * (1) प्रतीतप्रतिषेध्यता ।

(2) स्वाश्रयेऽत्यन्तविरहः (3) सद्विलक्षणता तथा ।

इति पक्षत्रयेऽत्यन्तासत्त्वं स्यादनिवारितम् ॥

It is pointed out that utter denial of the objective world would conflict with the position of the early Advaitins, that in all cases of illusory cognitions, it is the unreal that is presented and the real that is negated : आभासस्य प्रसक्त्या अनाभासस्य निषेधः । त्रैकालिक-निषेधं प्रति, स्वरूपेणापणस्थं रूप्यं (पारमार्थिकत्वाकारेण प्रातिभासिकं वा रूप्यं) प्रतियोगीति मतहानिः ॥ and it is significant to note that both Madhusūdana and Brahmānanda try to *explain away* this textual contradiction between the older and the later views of the Advaitins.

Raising the question of the status of the falsity of the Universe, Vyāsatīrtha points out that it would *not* involve the fallacy of Nityasamā Jāti, to ask whether Mithyātva is itself stultifiable or not. He quotes the authoritative definition of the fallacy given by the Naiyāyikas and observes that the argument as posed by him is *not* open to the charge, as it does not raise a *reductio ad absurdum* in the shape of “घमिणस्तद्विशिष्टत्वभङ्ग” *both ways*.

He also discusses, dialectically, several doctrines of the Advaita Vedānta not noticed by his predecessors, particularly Viṣṇudāśacārya. e.g. :

- | | |
|--------------------------------|--------------------------|
| 1. प्रतिकर्मव्यवस्था | 2. दृष्टिसृष्टिः |
| 3. कर्तृत्वाध्यासः | 4. देहात्मैक्याध्यासः |
| 5. भ्रमस्य ज्ञानद्वयात्मकत्वम् | 6. सप्ताद्वैविध्यम् |
| 7. आविद्यकरजतोत्पत्तिः | 8. बिम्बप्रतिबिम्बैक्यम् |
| 9. शब्दापरोक्षः | 10. जीवन्मुक्तिः |

11. मुक्तौ परमसाम्यम् (Rāmānuja) and 12. प्रपत्ति doctrine of Rāmānuja. Though making liberal use of the materials furnished by his predecessors like Madhva, Jayatīrtha, and Viṣṇudāśa, Vyāsatīrtha's work is not without a

stamp of originality of approach and distinctive presentation, on every page of it. He has not only covered much wider ground; but has also raised new issues and brought to bear on the treatment new facts and evidences and above all a fresh approach. His claim to have made some *new and original contributions* to Mādhva thought and interpretation is thus perfectly justifiable :

अनुक्तकथनात् कदापि सफलोऽयं श्रमो मम (Nym).¹

He discusses the interpretation of many new Advaitic texts not noticed by the *Vādaratnāvali* : यन्न त्वस्य सर्वम्; इदं सर्वं यदयमात्मा; इन्द्रो मायाभिः; अतोऽन्यदार्तम्; सत्यस्य सत्यम् । His discussion of “Akhaṇḍārtha” and its application to “*Tat tvam asi*”, “*Satyam Jñānam.....*” and other definitive texts, proceed entirely on new lines.

The *Nyāyāmṛta* is thus the *Novum Organum of Dvaita dialectics*. Vyāsatīrtha is not merely the founder of this new dialectic of his school but also the fountain-head of the entire controversial literature of the Dvaita-Advaita schools subsequent to him. His work was the starting point of a series of brilliant dialectical classics, whose composition and study became the chief intellectual occupation of the savants of the next three centuries after him. The challenge thrown out by Vyāsatīrtha was taken up by Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, in his *Advaitasiddhi*. This was, in its turn, criticized by Rāmācārya, in his *Taraṅgiṇi* (beginning of 17th cent.); which again was criticized by Brahmānanda Sarasvatī, who was, in his turn, refuted by Vanamāli Miśra. “It was Vyāsatīrtha, who, *for the first time*, took special pains to collect together, from the vast range of Advaitic literature, all the crucial points for discussion and arrange them on a novel, yet thoroughly scientific and systematic plan.”² He has exhibited in his work, more than a hundred points of departure and has discussed them with a minuteness of observation and mastery over details, rarely to be found even among some of the “Titanic thinkers of the past.”³ A glance at the table of contents of the *Nyāyāmṛta*, would give a sufficient idea of the *stupendousness of the task attempted and achieved by Vyāsatīrtha*.

He has kept himself well within the bounds of the main problems of the contending systems. He is unparalleled in the careful handling of texts, acuteness of scholarship and wide range of study of the works of the various systems of thought. His works show a wider, deeper and more comprehensive knowledge of Advaitic works than what could be said of his critics' knowledge of Dvaita texts and traditions. He has freely laid under contribution the principles of interpretation and dialectics enunciated and

1. notwithstanding the vain wrangling of some later glossators over the term “अनुक्तकथनात्”. It is interesting to note that Vyāsatīrtha's own disciple Vijayindra, in his *Āmoda* on this passage, clinches the matter by observing : “अनुक्तकथनात्” इति यथोक्तमेव साधु । तस्माच्चर्त्तिकचिदेवैतत् ॥ We may safely take it that Vijayindra is reflecting the true sense of the terms as intended by Vyāsatīrtha.

2. Mm. Anantakrishna Sastri, Introd, to *Advaitasiddhi*. Calcutta Oriental Ser. ix., p. 36.

3. *ibid*.

developed in the standard treatises of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṃsā and grammatical schools. The following are some of the important authors and works of other systems, cited by him in his *Nym* :

Nyāya-Kusumāñjali, *Bauddhadhikkāra*, *Padamañjari*,
Bhāratī Tīrtha, Śaṅkara's *Bhāṣya*, on *B. S.*,
 Sureśvara's *Bṛhadvārtika*, *Iṣṭasiddhi*, *Mahābhāṣya*,
Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhāḍya, *Mādhyaṃaka-Kārikās*, *Nyāsa*,
Nayaviveka, Ānandabodha, *Siddhitraya*,
Tūptikā (Kumārila), *Citsukhi*; *Upadeśasāhasrī*;
Vedāntakaumudī; *Vivaraṇa*.

Vyāsatīrtha's work is not a mere summary or adaptation of the works of his predecessors. It is the most stimulating philosophical examination of the premises and conclusions, the bases and super-structures of the Dvaita and Advaita systems from a dialectical angle and giving the final verdict, after due examination, in favour of realistic metaphysics. It represents the highest achievement of the dialectical genius of the Mādhva school. Its scope and range are thus indicated :

विक्षिप्तसंग्रहात् क्वापि क्वाप्युक्तस्योपपादनात् ।

अनुक्तकथनात् क्वापि सफलोऽयं श्रमो मम ॥

In the true spirit of a philosopher, he goes through a long and arduous process of thought-dissection, to show that the thesis of Monism cannot be proved and that there is no philosophical justification for rejecting the reality of the world and its experiences established by all known means of proof and knowledge. In doing all this, he has nowhere exceeded the bounds of strict philosophical calm, dignity and equity. Nowhere has he indulged in digressions; nowhere have his criticisms degenerated into cavil and calumny. In this respect, he has shown himself to be far superior to his critic Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, who has, many a time, fallen a prey to the temptations of the invective rhetoric. Vyāsatīrtha's work acted as a leaven upon all analytic thinking in Vedānta and was directly responsible for the birth of neo-Advaita; and for this no small credit is due to him. No wonder, Dasgupta says "Vyāsatīrtha stands almost unrivalled in the whole field of Indian thought".

(2) TĀTPARYA-CANDRIKĀ (p)¹

The *Tātparyā-Candrikā*,² more familiarly known by its shorter title as "*Candrikā*",³ is a discursive commentary on Jayatīrtha's *TP* and pertains to the Sūtra-Prasthāna of the Dvaita Vedānta. It is later than the *Nym*

1. Published by T. R. Krishnacharya of Kumbakonam with two glosses 1913, (N. S. Press, Bby.) Another edn., with the gloss of Rāghavendra, has been published in 4 parts (incomplete) by the Mysore Govt. O. Ser. 1932-43.

2. Not "Tātparyasaṃgraha" as on p. 238 *Vij. Sexcent. Com. Vol.*

3. These are not two different works as fancied by Rangacharya, (Insc. Madras Pres. Vol. i, p. 308) nor is it known as "Madhva-tātparyacandrikā" as stated on p. 424 of Madras Uni. His Ser. no. xi.

as can be seen from its references to it.¹ Though going by the modest title of a commentary, it is, in reality, a superb contribution to the subject of the philosophy of the *Brahma Sūtras*, in the form of a close, critical and comparative study of the Bhāṣyas of Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja and Madhva, together with the super-commentaries of *Bhāmati*, *Pañcapādikā*, *Vivaraṇa*, and *Kalpataru* of the Advaita school, the *Śrutaprakāśa* and *Adhikaraṇasārāvali* of the Rāmānuja school and the *TP.*, *NS.*, and other commentaries of the Dvaita school.

The author endeavours to show in his work that perfect harmony of spirit and letter of the Sūtras prevails only in the interpretations of Madhva and his school and that the other Bhāṣyas and their cc., are generally not so well attuned and in some cases, not at all, to the Sūtras (ver. 10). There are thus two aspects of the work, constructive exposition of Siddhānta-interpretations and logical and exegetical examination and criticism of the interpretations of other schools. The first is seen in his eloquent defence and vigorous reinforcement of Madhva's interpretations of the various Sūtras and adhikaraṇas with many additional arguments of his own, supported by profuse authorities, precedents and rulings of the Vyākaraṇa and Mīmāṃsā Śāstras. He also harmonizes the views of Madhva's early commentators following different lines of interpretation, occasionally.² He has tried on many occasions, to clear up whatever is obscure in the Sūtras, the Bhāṣya and the cc. :

सूत्रे भाष्येऽनुभाष्ये च सन्नयायविवृतौ तथा ।

टीकासु च यदस्पष्टं तच्च स्पष्टीकरिष्यते ॥

He quotes, where necessary, from the *AV*, *VTN* and *NV*.

As for the critical side of the work, Vyāsātīrtha pursues with relentless energy the interpretations of the other schools, particularly of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja, together with their famous cc. *under each and every adhikaraṇa and sūtra*, and subjects them to a volley of criticisms :

प्रतिसूत्रं प्रकाशयेते घटनाघटने मया ।

स्वीयान्यपक्षयोः सम्यक् विदांकुर्वन्तु सूरयः ॥

As an instance of his powerful critique may be mentioned his remarks on भूमा सम्प्रसादादध्युपदेशात् (B.S. i. 3, 8). A modern critic⁴ finds Madhva's interpretation of this sūtra "not reasonable owing to the absence of *ca*" in the sūtra ! [Italics mine]. Vyāsātīrtha makes out a very strong case, here, for preferring Madhva's interpretation to all others. According to

1. See *Candrikā* (Bby. edn.). ii, 3, adh. 14 (p. 965); p. 18b line 4; p. 50b; and ii, 3, adhi. 19. p. 984.

2. See under ज्योतिरधिकरण (i, 1, adh. 10) and भोक्त्रापत्यधिकरणम् ।

3. The following is a fitting tribute to the *Candrikā* :

“भामूलानिबद्धतर्कजटिलं शब्दैकजीवातुकं
मीमांसानुनयं च शंकरबचोद्भूतभंगप्रदम् ।
शास्त्रं तन्त्रचतुष्टयात्मकमिदं निःस्वप्नतन्त्रान्तरा
व्याख्यास्यन्ति कथं पठन्ति च कथं किंवा कलौ दुष्करम् ॥

(Anonymous)

4. V. S. Ghate, 'The Vedānta' p. 65. I have already given a review of some of Ghate's criticisms of the 'Madhva Bhāṣya' under Madhva's *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*.

Madhva, the terms “*Samprasādāt*” and “*adhyupadeśāt*” constitute two independent reasons to establish the ‘greatness’ (*bhūmatva*) of Brahman. The Brahman is the ‘greatest’ (*bhūmā*) because of its being of the nature of unsurpassed and illimitable bliss (*sam+prasāda*) and on account of its being declared to be above all (सर्वेषामुपर्युपदेशाच्च). The reference is to *Chān. Up.* vii, 23-24, according to all Bhāṣyas. Only, Madhva differs from the others in explaining the terms संप्रसाद and अद्युपदेश as expressing two different reasons. The others, following Śaṅkara, take the whole phrase as constituting a single reason viz., “on account of its being mentioned subsequent to प्राण (vital air).” Vyāsatīrtha points out several defects in such an interpretation. (1) In the first place, the Pūrvapakṣa itself, according to Śaṅkara, that the fivefold vital air is entitled to be regarded as the Bhūmā, is quite unsatisfactory; for, this fivefold vital air, is insentient (jaḍarūpa) and would not fit in with the term “*ātmā*” used in the beginning (upakrama) of the text, or with the reference to bliss.” (भूमैव सुखम्) which is, legitimately, an attribute of “*Cetanas*” only. The Pūrvapakṣa, therefore, should have been in terms of the Prāṇadevatā, as in Madhva, on the basis of the “*Abhimāninyāya*”, and *not* simply in terms of “*Jaḍaprāṇa*”, as made out by Śaṅkara. (2) The conclusion that “*Bhūmā*” is the Nirviśeṣa Brahman, (according to Śaṅkara), is also unsustainable, as there is no room for *bhūmatva* in the sense of the highest qualities, in the Nirviśeṣa. (3) This greatness could not be treated as a superimposed one, as it is taught in all seriousness to the seeker as the ultimate truth. (4) The Upaniṣad also, speaks of sojourning at will in all the heavenly worlds, as the fruit of the knowledge of the Bhūman, which is inconsistent with the goal of Nirviśeṣa, which requires the cessation of all such desires and the disappearance of such worlds, at the dawn of Nirviśeṣajñāna. (5) When “*Samprasāda*” could directly mean “fulness of bliss”, there is no need to resort to a “*Lakṣaṇā*” (secondary sense) in taking it to connote “the Prāṇa that is awake in the state of deep sleep”. Surely, such a *lākṣaṇika* explanation, *even when a direct sense is possible*, is a more serious defect than the alleged absence of a “*ca*”, on the other interpretation ! (6) After all, this “*ca*” could be easily understood from the very *next sūtra* in the *same adhikaraṇa* ! (7) The interpretation of “*Samprasāda*” as पूर्णसुखरूप is only a corollary drawn from the express statement of the Śruti contrasting the bliss of the *bhūmā* with all that is limited (*alpa*) and reflects the true intentions of the Śruti and sūtra that the Bhūmā is Brahman because of such absolute bliss which is not found in the lesser reals (नाल्ये सुखम्). This is really a “reasonable” and *reasoned* interpretation of the term. (8) The obvious advantage in treating “*adhyupadeśāt*” as a separate reason is that it would ensure absolute and unrestricted ‘greatness’ of Brahman, instead of *limiting it* to mere superiority over *Prāṇa*, as in Śaṅkara’s interpretation and virtually circumscribing the “*bhūmatva*” thereby ! On Madhva’s interpretation, however, the Bhūmā is that which is beyond *all* and not merely beyond *Prāṇa alone* ! This is *far* more satisfactory, philosophically also. (9) The mention “beyond

or subsequent to Prāṇa", is no conclusive evidence of the Bhūman being *necessarily* the Brahman; for such "upadeśa" subsequent to Prāṇa is to be found in the context of the Ānandamaya, in regard to the Manomaya, etc., which are *not* Brahman, according to Śaṅkara; and in the present context of *Bhūmavidyā* itself, where subsequent to the upadeśa of Prāṇa, we have upadeśas like "विज्ञानं त्वेव विजिज्ञासितव्यं, मतिस्त्वेव * * * pertaining to Vijñāna, Mati, Śraddhā, Kṛti etc., which are *not* certainly considered to be Brahman or Bhūmā. Hence, it is clear that "being taught subsequent to Prāṇa" (संप्रसादात्=प्राणात् अध्युपदेश) cannot be pressed as a proof of the Brahmatva of Bhūmā. Vyāsātīrtha deals with the impropriety of interpreting the next sūtra in terms of Nirviśeṣa Brahman, similarly.

The *Candrikā* is thus, a very remarkable commentary of the Dvaita school in which the dialectic machinery is applied with equal success and brilliance to the purely interpretive literature on the Sūtras. A beginning in this direction had been made by Madhva himself in his *AV* and by Jayatīrtha, in his *NS*. Vyāsātīrtha carried this task to its logical and technical perfection, even as desired by them : सूत्राक्षराणामार्जवानार्जवचिन्ता शिष्यैरेव क्रियताम् । (*NS*. ii, 2, p. 880 b). The work maintains the highest level of scholarship, thoroughness, accuracy of details and a remarkably unbiassed outlook. It is difficult to find anything comparable to it in range or depth of thought, in Sanskrit philosophical literature. As a critical study of the Brahmasūtras and their leading interpretations, this work stands altogether unsurpassed and unsurpassable for its erudition, acute analysis, penetrating criticism and masterly presentation of the inner dialectic of Bādarāyaṇa's work.

The work terminates, however, with the II Adhyāya of the Sūtras.¹ It was completed (upto the end of the IV Chapter of the Sūtras) by Raghunātha Tīrtha, tenth, Pontifical successor of Vyāsātīrtha. Attention is invited to my study of 'the Brahmasūtras and Their Principal Commentaries' in three volumes, for a complete elucidation of M's interpretation of the Sūtras in all its details and a systematic examination of the interpretations of the S and R. schools carried out in Vyāsātīrtha's *TC* with reference to Adhy.I-II and in Raghunātha Tīrtha's *STC* with reference to Adhy.III-IV.

The total number of granthas in the work, is 3450. It is the earliest commentary on the *TP* that has come down to us. It still remains the most authoritative, critical and constructive exposition of the *TP* and the last word on the *Sūtra-Prasthāna* of Madhva. Every subsequent commentator of the school has been indebted to him or has quoted him with approval and respect, acknowledging the immense and irrepayable debt which post-

1. There is no reason to suppose that Vyāsātīrtha was prevented by circumstances beyond his control, from finishing his work. The stoppage at the end of II Adhyāya was evidently deliberate, as the III and IV chapters of the B. S. do not contain so much controversial matter at issue between the two schools. Whatever points of disagreement are there, have been covered by him, in full, in the III and IV Paricchedas of his *Nym*. Hence, he must have deemed it superfluous to go into them again in his *Candrikā*.

Vyāsatīrtha thought, interpretation and polemics, owe to him. It is for this reason that he has been accredited, with Madhva and Jayatīrtha, as one of the “big three” (Munitrayam) of Madhva-Siddhānta. A very high and perfectly deserved compliment indeed !

(ii) It is an open secret that the rules of Pūrvamīmāṃsā and its adhikaraṇas do not play any active part in the Sūtra-interpretations worked out by Madhva and some of his immediate disciples,¹ as they do, in the case of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja and their commentators. We have seen that Madhva relies, instead, upon the principles of interpretation and exegesis contained in the *Brahmatarka* and other works. The conclusion was apt to be drawn from this apparent indifference of Madhva to the science of Pūrvamīmāṃsā, that its rules were more or less hostile to him and that therefore, he had cleverly evaded them.² Whatever the truth of the matter, Vyāsarāya saw that the time had come for a spirited defence of the interpretations of Madhva, of Śrutis and Sūtras, in the light of the rules and principles of the Pūrvamīmāṃsā. With this end in view, he has endeavoured to demonstrate that Madhva’s interpretations have the warm support of the general and particular principles of the Mīmāṃsakas and that they are not opposed to any principle or principles of theirs, that we know of. This was indeed a bold bid and somewhat of an uphill task; but Vyāsatīrtha has well-nigh accomplished his purpose and proved his case by citing a number of these nyāyas in the body of his exposition³ (in the *Candrikā*) and correlating them to the views of Madhva. A similar procedure is adopted with reference to the rules and sanctions of the Vyākaraṇa Śāstra of Pāṇini and his followers. These two features are common to the *Nym.* also. Most probably, the critics of Madhva had actually begun to make this deficiency of the Dvaitins, their chief plank of attack and Vyāsatīrtha was in duty bound to set his house in order. *The new move made by him, so systematically, represents a new phase of development in Dvaita Vedānta and its literature.* From Vyāsatīrtha onwards, the appeal to Pūrvamīmāṃsā (and Vyākaraṇa) becomes more or less a regular feature in Dvaita Literature. Both in his *Nym.* and the *Candrikā*, Vyāsatīrtha has exhibited a remarkable command over the intricacies of the Mīmāṃsā Śāstra and its literature⁴ and shown to the world of scholars that the system of Madhva had nothing to fear from the Mīmāṃsā Śāstra but could always look it in the face and claim its support in many instances.

1. For stray references to Mīmāṃsā rules, however, see Padmanābha’s *Sannyāyaratnāvali* (p. 6 and *AV loc cit.*).

2. J. too had not felt the necessity for justifying Madhva’s interpretations in the light of Mīmāṃsā. A later commentator Satyanātha, has tried to cut the Gordian knot by declaring boldly that Madhva had not followed the Mīmāṃsā rules : *Abhinavagadā* p. 10.

3. Cf. संमतं चैतन्मीमांसकानामपि—pp. 192 b; 195 b; 640-4; 657; 722 b; 787; 790; p. 188; 463.

4. Quotations from the *Śāstradīpikā*, *Tantrarātna*, *Śabara-Bhāṣya*, Kumārila’s *Vārtikas* (p. 51) etc, appear. These have given ample opportunities to Keśava, Rāghavendra and other commentators on the *Chandrikā* to quote profusely from the standard works of Mīmāṃsā and elucidate the purport of the texts.

The following are some of the *authors and works of other systems of thought*, cited in the course of the *Candrikā* : Bhāskara, Kaiyaṭa, Yādava-prakāśa, *Kalpataru* (Advaita), *Mahābhāṣya*, *Nyāsa*, *Nibandhana*, *Padamañ-jari*, *Pañcapādikā*, *Bhāmati*, *Ṛgvedānukramaṇi*, (Kātyāyana), Śaṅkara (B.S.B.), *Śribhāṣya*, *Tantrasāra* (Mīmāṃsā), *Vivaraṇa*, *Śloka-vārttika*.

(iii) Like the *Nym.* the *Candrikā*, too, gave rise to some amount of controversial literature based on it.¹ But the critics of Vyāsātīrtha, in this case, were neither so powerful as in the other instance; nor commanded such all-India importance and reputation. Nor were their writings of such vital importance and interest to the future of Vedānta philosophy. The history of this controversy and the works under this head, will, however, be dealt with later on.

(3) TARKA-TĀṆḌAVA (p)

(i) While ever ready to make free use of the categories and thought-measuring devices of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, in its fight with Monism, the school of Madhvācārya had its own differences with the former.² These have been made clear by Madhva himself in his *AV.*, and other works and by Jayatīrtha, in his *NS.* In his own inimitable way, Vyāsātīrtha has undertaken a thorough and upto-date examination of the *points d' appui* between his school and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. This examination and exposition are embodied in the *Tarka-Tāṇḍava*. The beautiful title suggests a merciless dance on the swollen head of Scholastic Nyāya and the humbling of its pride, as in the case of Kāliyanāga. A most daring venture indeed ! The work criticizes the views expressed in standard treatises of Nyāya as the *Kusumāñjali*, of Udayana, the *Tattvacintāmaṇi* of Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya and the cc. of Pakṣadhara, Pragalbha, Yajñapati etc.

Tradition has it that contemporary scholars of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika were first loudest in their laudation of Vyāsātīrtha for his famous attack on the Advaita in his *Nyāyāmṛta*; but that they grew restive and silent when he published his *Tarkatāṇḍava*, which was directed against them. They are said to have voiced their indignation and disapprobation, later, through the oft-quoted line :—

न्यायामृतार्जिता कीर्तिस्ताण्डवेन विनाशिता³

1. Raghunātha Śāstri Parvate, from Maharashtra, replied to the criticisms relating to the Advaita school in his *Śaṅkarapādabhūṣaṇam*. The *Tattvamārtāṇḍa* of Śaṭhamarṣaṇakula Śrinivāsa (Madras O. L. X. 4894) meets criticisms on Rāmānuja. Both these critics have been answered by writers from the Dvaita side, the former by my great-grandfather Cochi Raṅgappācārya, (*Candrikābhūṣaṇam*) and the latter by Vijayindra Tīrtha.

2. Such as for instance on the question of (1) the personality of God and its constitution, the nature and number of divine attributes; (2) the eternality of sound; (3) *Prāmāṇya*—whether “Svataḥ” or “Parataḥ”, the eternality and authorlessness (*apauruṣeyatva*) of Vedas, etc. The views of the Bhāṭṭa and Prābhakāra schools of Mīmāṃsā, also, are examined and refuted, incidentally.

3. There is clear evidence in the *Tarkatāṇḍava* to show that it was the last of the three great works of Vyāsātīrtha : विस्तृतं चैतन्न्यायामृते—(*TT.* ii, 79. p. 302); अत एव न्यायामृते तत्पदस्यैव गौणत्वमुक्तमस्माभिः (*TT.* ii, 72); उपक्रमादित उपसंहारादेः प्राबल्य उदाहरणादिकमस्माभिः समन्वयसूत्रे चन्द्रिकायामुक्तं द्रष्टव्यम् (*TT.* *ibid* 280); Also, ii, 80.

Only a part of the work was printed and published from Kumbakonam in 1905. The Mysore Oriental Library has published¹ the complete work with the illuminating commentary of Rāghavendra Svāmin, in four volumes between 1932-43.

The work² is divided into three Paricchedas corresponding to the three Pramāṇas recognized in Madhva's system. Vyāsatīrtha, however, deals with the subject-matter of Anumāna in the last Pariccheda, instead of in the second. He correlates his comments and criticisms to the views formulated in the *VTN* and its *tikā* (J's), the *NS* and the *PP*.

For example, in narrowing down the definition of Vyāpti (concomitance of *hetu* with *sādhya* in inferences) to the essential characteristic of "Upapatti" as formulated by Madhva in defining inference as निर्दोषोपपत्तिः Vyāsatīrtha points out that such a correlation between the *hetu* and *sādhya* is to be determined on the basis of an incompatibility (anupapatti) of the one (*hetu*) without the other (*sādhya*) with reference to a definite space-time setting. He points out further that this relation is sufficiently comprehensive and would hold good in all cases of inference including inferences of a Vyadhikaraṇa type, such as the inference of rain in the upper part of a region from the perceiving of a rise of water in the river in the lower part of the region, where there is no spatial coexistence of the *hetu* and *sādhya*; and which underlies all cases of Arthāpatti and conditions all arguments pointing out fallacies of self-dependence, mutual dependence, arguing in a circle, regress, self-contradiction in reasoning etc. This new conception of Vyāpti in terms of such Anupapatti is a definite improvement on the older conception of Vyāpti formulated by Gaṅgeśa and others in terms of *coexistence* of consequence and reason. But this is *not* an innovation introduced by Vyāsatīrtha as Dasgupta thinks² (*Op. cit.* iv, p. 186). For, the Vyadhikaraṇa type of Vyāpti seen in the inference of the approaching rise of the Rohiṇī star following the rise of the Kṛttikā, referred to by Vyāsatīrtha, in this connection, is *actually cited from Madhva's AV* :

रोहिण्युदय आसन्नः कृत्तिकाभ्युदिता यतः ।

इत्युक्ते साधनं नो किम् ? * * ॥ (*AV.* iii, 2, p. 32b)

The first Pariccheda is divided into six sections entitled : (i) Prāmāṇyavāda; (ii) Vedāpauruṣeyatvavāda; (iii) Īśvaravāda; (iv) Varṇanīyatvavāda; (v) Samavāyavāda and (vi) Nirvikalpakavāda. The

1. Page references here are to this Edition.

2. B. Venkobarao in his introd. to *Vy. carita* observes that the opening verse in the *TT.* addressed to God Aprameya shows that it was presumably composed at Malūr in the Cannapatna dt. (Mysore).

3. His further statement in this connection that "Vyāsatīrtha seems to have benefited by these remarks (of Chalāri-Śeṣācārya in his *Pramāṇacandrikā*) that the invariable coexistence between *hetu* and *sādhya* should only mean the existence of an invariable relation of the reason to the consequence and not merely coexistence in the same place) in defining unfailing relation as being the definite relation of *reductio ad absurdum*" (iv. p. 188) rests altogether on a misapprehension that Vyāsatīrtha is later than Chalāri Śeṣācārya. As a matter of fact, Chalāri Śeṣācārya is at least a hundred years later than Vyāsatīrtha ! [See under Chalāri Śeṣācārya].

first section discusses the various definitions of self-validity of knowledge, Vyāsātīrtha formulating as many as three Siddhānta definitions of it and criticizing those propounded by Gaṅgeśa and his commentator Pakṣadhara Miśra (p.30). According to him Self-validity of knowledge lies in being invariably the object of an intuitive perception by Sākṣi or the principle of apperception which has for its content cognitions which are not associated with such factors as may lead to contradiction of validity (on account of absence of validity or presence of invalidity or concomitance with invalidity connected with absence of validity). Here, the role of Sākṣi corresponds to that of the 'anuvyavasāya' of the Logicians. (ii) It may also be defined as consisting in being fit to be grasped by intuitive perception of Sākṣi which comprehends the particular forms of knowledge whose validity abides in the knowledge in question. The adjunct 'fitness to be grasped by the Sākṣi' is inserted to rule out cases where the intrinsic power of Sākṣi to intuit the validity of a given knowledge is impeded by obstacles. (iii) Or it may be defined as being invariably the object of a knowledge which is other than that sort of knowledge which in the acceptance of other schoolmen is different from that kind of knowledge which does not comprehend invalidity. This condition is fulfilled in M's philosophy by Sākṣi, by the inferential establishment of jñāna in the Bhāṭṭa school, the self-luminosity of knowledge in the Prābhākara view and by the 'anuvyavasāya' of knowledge in Murāri Miśra's view. After adducing syllogistic proofs in support of the Svatastva of Validity, admitted by the Dvaitin, he goes on to refute all the recorded objections to it, offering, in his turn, fresh objections to and criticisms of the doctrine of extraneous validity (Parataḥprāmāṇya) of knowledge, upheld by such writers as Gaṅgeśa, Pakṣadhara, Yajñapati Upādhyāya (Vol. i, pp. 157, 166, 215), Pragalbhācārya (p. 166) alias Śubhāṅkara. The second section reviews several objections to the eternity and authorlessness of the Vedas and criticizes the doctrine of divine authorship (Īśvarakāraṇatva) of the Vedas held by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas. The most important section in Par. I, is the Īśvaravāda, wherein the establishment of God on the basis of pure reason alone, is hotly disputed and shown to be impossible. In this connection, Vyāsātīrtha has cited all the *eight points* of Udayana (raised in chap. V. of the *Kusumañjali*) and has refuted them together with their explanations attempted by Vardhamāna Upādhyāya.¹ The next section seeks to establish the eternality of sound on the basis of perception, inference and revelation and refutes the theory of its non-eternality held by the Naiyāyikas and after that, the concept of Samavāya. The last deals with indeterminate perception, which is similarly treated. It would be easy to see the reason for this unwillingness of the Dvaitins to recognize indeterminate perception, which would spell danger to their radical realism.

The II Pariccheda establishes Śakti, which is one of the 'ten categories' accepted in the Dvaita system, after considering the various

1. A quotation from his *Tattvabodha* on the *Nyāya Sūtras* occurs on p. 279 (TT. ii.).

objections brought forward by the logicians against its recognition as a distinct Padārtha. The other topics dealt with are : (i) Jāti; (ii) the conception of Vidhi (injunctive) and what constitutes its essence; (iii) the concept of Apūrva; (iv) the meaning of the Vedic injunctive; (v) the significatory powers of words; (vi) denotation of compounds and the negative; (vii) consideration of the relative superiority of Tātparyalingas, particularly of Upakrama and Upasamhāra; the definition of Śruti, Liṅga, Vākya and other exegetical pramāṇas as proposed by the Mīmāṃsakas and their refutation from the Mādhva point of view.

The III Pariccheda deals with the subject-matter of Inference. It is divided into seven major sections dealing with (i) Vyāpti, (ii) Pakṣatā; (iii) Upādhi; (iv) Parāmarśa; (v) Tarka; (vi) Classification of Inference and (vii) the subject of flaws and fallacies in reasoning.

The discussion in all Paricchedas is of a very recondite nature. Vyāsatīrtha goes into the inner ramifications and technical details of the various topics as formulated by leading writers of the Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā and Vyākaraṇa schools and after showing their practical and theoretical limitations, emphasizes the comparative superiority and compactness of the positions of his school in regard to them. Where the positions of his own school have been formulated in the works of Madhva and Jayatīrtha, he quotes from them and correlates the discussions to those views. Where no express statement of the Siddhānta positions is to be found in the originals, he takes the responsibility of formulating them. He also shows how some of his own observations have the implicit sanction of Madhva or Jayatīrtha.¹

The most important discussion in Pariccheda II is about the relative superiority between the "Upakrama" (initial statement in a unitary passage) and the "Upasamhāra" (concluding part). Vyāsatīrtha enters into a detailed discussion of this problem, *for the first time in the controversial literature of the Vedānta* and puts up a very learned and spirited defence of the thesis that 'Upasamhāra in virtue of its status as व्याख्यान, is normally and in the absence of reasons to the contrary, superior to the Upakrama : एवं सन्न, लिङ्गाच्छ तेरिव, उपक्रमादुपसंहारस्य उत्सर्गतो बाधकाभावे बलवत्त्वमूहम् ॥ (iii. p. 298).

In this connection, Vyāsatīrtha opposes the stand taken by the commentators of the Mīmāṃsā school like Śabara, Kumārila and others in favor of the unalterable superiority of the Upakrama over the Upasamhāra and shows that their interpretation of the relevant adhikaraṇas like the Aktādhikaraṇa, Vaiśvānarādhikaraṇa, Śyenādhikaraṇa, Aśvapratigraheṣṭyadhikaraṇa, Kapiñjalādhikaraṇa, Vedopakramādhikaraṇa etc., goes against the internal evidence of the Viśayavākyas of those adhikaraṇas and cannot, therefore, be accepted as sound.

For example, he argues that in the Aktādhikaraṇa, in the Vidhi : अन्ताःशर्करा उपदधाति * * * तेजो वै घृतम् । the meaning of the term "akta"

1. Cf. under उपसर्गाणां वाचकत्वसमर्थनम् TT. ii. 59.

शब्दस्याध्याहारसमर्थनम् ii, 78.

is shown to be restricted to smearing with 'ghee' alone (and not with any kind of oily liquid) by the presence of the word "घृतम्" in the Upasamhāra-passage, occurring in the arthavāda portion of the Vidhi in question.¹ The commentators of the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā school, however, seek to maintain here, in the interest of Upakrama-prābalya, that inasmuch as the injunction in, अक्ताः शर्करा उपदधाति is *not explicit* owing to the use of the present tense form of the verb (उपदधाति) instead of the potential form, it has to be *inferred* on the basis of the eulogy of ghee contained in the Upasamhāra. The arthavāda-portion has, therefore, been followed here as furnishing the eulogy on which the knowledge of the injunction has to depend here; and not in its right as bare Upasamhāra (उपसंहारत्वेन).

To this ingenious contention Vyāsātīrtha replies that there is no reason to think that there is no explicit Vidhi in the Upakrama. The verbal form उपदधाति could very well be treated as the subjunctive form (लेट्) and hence carrying an explicit injunction as in वसन्ताय कपिञ्जलानालभते । Since the injunction in respect of smearing the pebbles could be easily established without any reference to the eulogy in the arthavāda portion, the final determination of smearing with ghee alone has necessarily to depend on the superior force of the concluding part. The Mīmāṃsakas raise a further objection to this that even conceding that उपदधाति may be treated as an injunctive form, it may still be argued that the arthavāda is followed 'to complete the sense of the Vidhi' (विधिपर्यवसानार्थम्). For an injunction cannot be deemed to be complete (i.e. able to induce effort on the part of the agent) without reference to an inducement (प्रयोजनम्). Such an inducement capable of completing the sense of the Vidhi is contained in the arthavāda-portion (तेजो वै घृतम्); and it is for *that reason* that the Upakrama follows the Upasamhāra in this case; and not because of any inherent right of superiority of the Upasamhāra *as such*. Vyāsātīrtha replies to this point that if the Upasamhāra is not accepted as प्रबल (superior) and decisive in its own right (as उपसंहार) it would be open to one to argue that the praise of ghee in the arthavāda may itself be treated as a praise of liquid substance in general (with which the pebbles have to be smeared) through praise of a specific kind of liquid (viz. घृतम्) just as the text यदष्टाकपालो भवति has been accepted by the Mīmāṃsakas as not being a "Guṇavidhi" but a praise of द्वादशकपालावयविस्तुति insofar as अष्टाकपाल is only a part of द्वादशकपाल. Moreover, if the Upasamhāra is not accepted as प्रबल in this case, (*as Upasamhāra*), then, in virtue of the ruling of Jaimini that no Vidhi should be explained in a secondary sense (न विधौ परः शब्दार्थः) "अक्ताः शर्करा * * " would stand its ground in a primary sense and the arthavāda-text, being only a subsidiary text the term घृतम् occurring therein would, on the basis of the principle of interpretation : गुणे त्वन्यायकल्पना be treated as signifying, by

1. Cf. 'सदिग्धे तु वाक्यशेषात्' इत्याद्याध्यायचतुर्थपादीयोपान्त्याधिकरणे 'अक्ताः शर्करा उपदधातीत्यत्र, शर्कराणामञ्जनं येन केनचित् तैलादिना द्रवद्रव्येणेति प्राप्ते, तेजो वै घृतम् इत्यर्थवादबलेन घृतेनैवाञ्जनमिति ॥ (TT. Nyāyadīpa, p. ii, p. 281.)

Lakṣaṇā, ghee as well as any other kind of liquid capable of being used for smearing the pebbles with. Hence, unless the deciding voice is given to the arthavādavākya in its capacity as व्याख्यानरूपोपसंहार, the desired result could not be achieved. Nor can it be held that the superiority (prābalya) of the arthavāda is due to its referring to a specific object like “घृत” while the Upakrama contains only a general reference to some liquid fit for smearing. Vyāsatīrtha points out that it could not always be maintained that a विशेषोपसंहार alone could override a सामान्योपक्रम. The reverse also is equally possible and is found in the passage श्येनेनाभिचरन् यजेत * * * यथा वै श्येनो निपत्यादत्ते एवमयं द्विषन्तं * * (in the viṣayavākya of the Tadvyapadeśādhikaraṇa), where the reference is to any fast-flying bird like a hawk and not necessarily to a hawk alone. Other examples like विष्णुशर्मा भोज्यताम्; ब्राह्मणः प्रशस्तः । could be easily cited.

Similarly in respect of the Vedopakramādhikaraṇa. Vyāsatīrtha points out here that it is unnecessary to assume that the terms ऋक्, साम, and यजुस् denote the respective Vedas of those names instead of hymns, Sāmans and prayers (mantras as such) on account of the reference : त्रयो वेदा असृज्यन्त in the Upakrama (opening part). The real reason why the terms ऋक्, साम, यजुस् should be interpreted in the sense of “Vedas” is the presence of the phrase : उच्चैः साम्ना. This उच्चैस्त्वविधि (injunction to utter the Sāmans loudly) would be superfluous if Sāman” meant only Mantras (for the loud utterance of Sāmans, as such, would follow as a matter of course from the rule : ऋच्यध्यूढं साम गायति । Hence “Sāman” has got to be taken in the sense of the “Sāma-Veda” here. Vyāsatīrtha further points out that as a matter of fact, there is, in this context, a repetition of the term “Veda” in the Upakrama (opening) section itself : त्रयो वेदा असृज्यन्त । अग्ने ऋग्वेद वायोर्यजुर्वेद आदित्यात् सामवेदः । and since “अभ्यास” (repetition) as a mark of purport is superior to “Upasamhāra”,¹ it would be quite easy to make it the ground for taking the terms “ऋचा, यजुषा etc., in the concluding part to signify the respective Vedas. Hence, in the Vedopakramādhikaraṇa, it is by the criterion of *abhyāsa* that the decision in favor of taking the terms ऋक्, साम and यजुस् in the Upasamhāravākya, to mean “Vedas” should be deemed to have been taken; and not on the strength of the occurrence of the term “Veda” in the Upakrama. In these circumstances, it is unnecessary to interpret the term “प्राय” in the Sūtra वेदो वा प्रायदर्शनात् । to mean प्रायम्य, or उपक्रम instead of बाहुल्यम् (i. e. *abhyāsa*).

MANDĀRA-MANJARIŚ

“Mandāramañjarī” is the *general title* of Vyāsatīrtha’s glosses on four out of the ten Prakaraṇas of Madhva : the three *Khaṇḍanas* and the *Tattvaviveka*. It is *not* the name or distinctive title of any *one* of them as is presumed on p. 424 of *Studies in the III Dynasty of Vijayanagar* (Madras Uni. His. Ser XI).

1. In virtue of the principle : बहुवारोक्तिरूपत्वादभ्यासस्य एकवारोक्तिरूपादुपसंहारात् प्राबल्यम् ॥

(4) *Māyāvāda-Khaṇḍana-Mandāramañjari* (p.), in 500 granthas, is also known by the name of *Bhāvaprakāśikā*.¹ It is a tough and keenly argumentative gloss, replete with logical niceties and therefore beyond the average student of Sanskrit. The remark applies equally to the other *Mandāramañjaris*. The author himself says, at the outset, that he proposes to concentrate his attention only on the obscure passages of the *Ṭikā*² and digress only where it is absolutely necessary, from the subject-matter :

स्पष्टार्थो य इह ग्रन्थः स न व्याक्रियते मया ।

ग्रन्थगौरवभीरुत्वात् न चोद्ग्रन्थं बहूच्यते ॥

(5) *Upādhikhaṇḍana-Mandāramañjari* (p) is in 1500 granthas and is as terse as the above. The colophon to the gloss gives the information that the author read the classics of "Dvaita" Vedānta, under Lakṣmīnārāyaṇa Tīrtha, *alias* Śrīpādarāja.³

(6) *Prapañca-Mithyātvānumāna-khaṇḍana-Mandāramañjari*. (p) (granthas 600) also goes by the name of *Bhāvaprakāśikā*.⁴ These glosses of Vyāsatīrtha, on the *Khaṇḍanatraya* are the *earliest ones* available to us. Barring Brahmanya Tīrtha and Śrīpādarāja, he is also the earliest commentator, known to fame, on any of the works of Jayatīrtha. But an interesting reference to and quotation from an earlier gloss on the *PMKh. t.* occurs on p. 8, lines 12-15, of Vyāsatīrtha's gloss (Bombay ed. 1896). Nothing is, however, known of this glossator. He has doubtless been eclipsed by Vyāsatīrtha who stands out as the earliest commentator of eminence and authority, on the *ṭikās* of Jayatīrtha. He goes beyond the original in reinforcing Jayatīrtha's statement : सत्त्वात्प्रतीतिरसत्त्वाच्च बाध इति सदसदात्मकत्वेनाप्युपपत्तेः ॥ (p. 8, line 8), with elaborate allusions to certain technicalities of the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas (p. 18, lines 19-23). On p. 10, lines 16-24, he repudiates a certain attempted defence of the Advaitic position as against the criticisms of Madhva. (7) His *Tattvaviveka-Mandāramañjari* (p) has also been printed from Bombay.

(8) BHEDOJJĪVANA (p)

The references to the *Nym*.⁵ and the *Mandāramañjari*,⁶ in the *Bhedojjivana*, show that the latter was undoubtedly the last of the works of Vyāsatīrtha. It is a short Prakaraṇa in 275 granthas and as the name itself suggests, is intended to resuscitate Bheda (Difference) that has been sought to be stifled by the Monist. Its central thesis is that the reality of Difference

1. By which name it is quoted in Rāghavendra's gloss on *Candrikā* p. 71.

2. The *Mandāramañjaris* are glosses on J's *ṭikās* on the originals and are not thus directly connected with the Prakaraṇas in question.

3. लक्ष्मीनारायणाख्यात् द्वैतिकुलतिलका दधीतमध्वशास्त्रामृतेन व्यासयतिना विरचिता मन्दारमञ्जरी समाप्ता ।

An acknowledgment to this affect is also made in introd. ver. 6, of the *Nym*.: लक्ष्मीनारायणमनीन्वन्दे विद्यागुरुन्मम ॥

4. व्यक्तमेतन् मिथ्यात्वानुमानखण्डनभावप्रकाशिकायाम् ।

Rāghavendra gloss on *TP*. p. 24. See also colophon to Vyāsatīrtha's gloss.

5. P. 37, line 7 : p. 30, line 6 (Bby. 1901).

6. P. 28, line 7.

is established by all the three Pramāṇas : Sense-perception, Reason and Revelation. "Within a short compass, he has covered the ground of the entire Monistic literature pushed into contemporary prominence and argued an unexpurgated case for the Realism of Madhva".¹ Most of the arguments here are to be met with, in more finished form, in the *Nym.* which thus renders the *Bhedojjivana* superfluous.

There is no connection, whatever, between the *Bhedojjivana* of Vyāsatīrtha and the *Bhedadhikkāra* of Nṛsimhāśrama. Neither of them is a criticism of the other, though their titles, may at first sight appear to suggest a relation.⁴ The author of the *Bhedadhikkāra* is decidedly later than Vyāsatīrtha, as can be seen from the criticisms he has directed against certain passages in the *Nym.* in his *Advaitadīpikā*.³ There is also evidence to show that one of Nṛsimhāśrama's works : the *Tattvaviveka*, was written in 1558 A.D.⁴ He must, therefore, have been a younger contemporary of Vyāsatīrtha and his literary activities might have begun some years after the demise of the latter.

It is, therefore, surprising to read Dasgupta's comment on the *Bhedojjivana* that its "defence of difference appears to be weak as compared with the refutation of Difference by Citsukha in his *Tattva-pradīpikā*, Nṛsimhāśrama in his *Bhedadhikkāra* and others. Citsukha goes directly into the conception of Difference and all the different possible ways of conceiving of it : स्वरूप; अन्योन्याभाव; पृथक्त्व; वैधर्म्य; भिन्नलक्षणयोगित्वभेद । But Vyāsatīrtha does not make any attempt to squarely meet these arguments" (Op. cit. IV, p. 179-80). This criticism proceeds on a misconception of the true nature of Difference as admitted in the Dvaita system and what it is expected to refute. No doubt, the great Advaitic dialecticians from Maṇḍana to Citsukha had criticized the category of Difference, threadbare. But their criticisms had been urged against the conception of Difference as patented by the Realists of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Sāṃkhya and Mīmāṃsā schools, from the two main points of view of "Dharmabheda-vāda" and "Dharmisvarūpabheda-vāda". The Mādhva philosophers agree with the Advaita that "Dharmabheda-vāda" under which come the conception of Difference as अन्योन्याभाव, वैधर्म्य, पृथक्त्व, etc., is *not* a satisfactory conception. Hence, they do *not* feel called upon to uphold those conceptions: इहापि धर्मपक्षस्य त्वयैव दूषितत्वेन, पृथक्त्वान्योन्याभाववैलक्षण्यभेदादे * * * (*Nym.* p. 559 b).

1. Dr. Nagaraja Sarma, *Reign of Realism in I. Phil.* Madras, 1931, p. 15.

2. The *Bhedadhikkāra* is merely a general defence of the Advaitic position. It does not quote from the *Bhedojjivana*. The scheme of topics dealt with in the two, is entirely different. The *Bhedadhikkāra* refutes "Arthāpatti" as a means of establishing Difference to be real and criticizes the Jiva-vibhūti-pakṣa, both of which are alien to Mādhva thought and the *Bhedojjivana*.

3. The *Advaitadīpikā* of Nṛsimhāśrama, in two vols. Medical Hall Press, Benares, 1919. cf. Pariccheda ii, P. 3-4 तत्र नवीनः with *Nym.* ii, 17 p; p. 567-8 (Bby. edn.); P. 5 with *Nym.* p. 571-2 and 573; P. 9 with p. 574 b and 587; p. 15 with p. 589 and P. 16-18 with *Nym.* p. 589.

4. अन्ते वेदवियद्वसेन्दुगुणिते पोषासितश्रीदिने ।
रक्षोनामनि पूरुषोत्तमपुरे ग्रन्थं मुदाचीकरत् ॥

But the case is other with “Dharmisvarūpabhedavāda” which is accepted by the Dvaita Siddhānta. The criticisms urged by one and all of the Advaitic dialecticians, from Maṇḍana down to Citsukha, against *this* doctrine of Bheda, have all been fully and “squarely” met and answered by Madhva, Jayatīrtha, Viṣṇudāsa and Vyāsatīrtha, in their works, already noticed. As a matter of fact, the Dvaita philosophers have actually gone *beyond* the criticisms of the Advaitic dialecticians like Maṇḍana, Vimuktātman, Śrīharṣa and Citsukha, to show that there is *one more possible way of* rationalizing the concept of Difference and defining it in terms of Dharmisvarūpa, with the help of the new concept of “Viśeṣas”, which is the special contribution of Mādhva thought to the solution of this problem and against which the earlier criticisms of the Advaitins against Difference as “Dharmisvarūpa” are *unavailing*. It is the Advaitic dialecticians like Nṛsimhāśrama who came *after* Vyāsatīrtha, who have observed a discreet silence over the doctrine of Viśeṣas as applied to the conception of Difference¹ as Dharmisvarūpa. As Vyāsatīrtha was *decidedly earlier than* Nṛsimhāśrama, there is no point in Dasgupta’s blaming him for *not* having refuted *his* criticisms against “Dharmabhedavāda” in terms of पृथक्त्व, अन्योन्याभाव, वैलक्षण्य etc. As a matter of academic interest, Vyāsatīrtha’s disciple, Vijayīndra, has actually refuted these criticisms of Nṛsimhāśrama also, point by point, in his *Bhedavidyā-Vilāsa*, which is a close refutation of the *Bhedadhikkāra* (See pp. 46-56 of *Bhedavidyā-Vilāsa*, Nanjangud, 1945).

1. Madhusūdana and Brahmānanda have either misunderstood or deliberately misrepresented the theory of Viśeṣas and do not squarely meet the arguments of Vyāsatīrtha in favor of the reality of difference conceived as “Dharmisvarūpa”, with the help of Viśeṣas.

GLIMPSES OF VYĀSATĪRTHA'S POLEMICAL REVIEW
OF THE BRAHMA-SŪTRA INTERPRETATIONS OF
ŚAMKARA, RĀMĀNUJA AND MADHVA

Vyāsatīrtha was an adept in the scholastic method. This method has much in common with the scholastic method in Western philosophy. Whatever modern historical and critical scholars might feel or say about it, it is, in its own way, thoroughly scientific, in one sense. No doubt, it is largely guided by book knowledge and traditional learning. But it is not uncritically subservient to tradition and authority. It requires the scholastic philosopher to weigh his textual authorities and depend on his own judgment, for criticism and conclusions. It aims at advancing beyond earlier and current opinion, by finding in the contradictions and errors of commission and omission of earlier authorities an incentive to independent thought. Here, the traditional scholar's aim is to master the thought of the earlier generations, accept its conclusions as evidence—, yet not as a finality, in order to reach a higher illumination. Such a scholarly analysis, such comprehending and weighing of all received knowledge should always be reckoned as constituting an important part of research. There is bound to be much formal analysis of the subject-matter, elaboration of details and display of technicalities, in this method.

Some of the points from the *Tātparyā-Candrikā* have already been incorporated in reviewing V.S. Ghate's criticisms on the Madhva-Bhāṣya. I shall, therefore, draw upon some other portions of the *TC.*, in the following pages to introduce the reader, more directly, to Vyāsatīrtha's method of approach to the task he had set before him and to some of the very acute and penetrating comments and criticisms he has given, in his comparative estimate of the interpretations of the three leading Bhāṣyakāras on the B.S. with, particular reference to some important *adhikaraṇas* thereof. It would require a learned and independent work of several hundreds of pages to do justice to Vyāsatīrtha's *TC.* For such a study, See my *BSPC* (Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay, 1971-78). What is attempted here is just an indication (दिङ्मात्रप्रदर्शनम्), of what a masterly analysis of Brahmasūtra-interpretations we have, in this work, which is unfortunately unknown to modern scholarship. By the side of the remarkable achievement of Vyāsatīrtha, in this direction, the results achieved by modern scholars would appear to be definitely mediocre.

While recognizing that good Pūrvapakṣas are necessary for the proper understanding and elucidation of works like the B. S., which follow the method of Vādakathā, Vyāsatīrtha, says that wherever these have not been incorporated in the Sūtras, in clear and unambiguous language (with

iti cen na etc.), they could as well be deemed to be presupposed or implied *ab extra* in the opening Sūtras themselves, of the *adhikaraṇas*, which could then be regarded as *Siddhānta-Sūtras*, straightway. This would release more sūtras for *Siddhāntanirūpaṇa* and enable us to find better meanings and purposes, for those thus released from the necessity of having to be relegated as mere *Pūrvapakṣa-sūtras*. Vyāsātīrtha points out that there are no *Pūrvapakṣasūtras*, as such, in the *Kalpa-Sūtras* or the *Vyākaraṇa-Sūtras* of Pāṇini; that in Jaimini they are confined to the first *pāda* of Adh. I and that even according to Śaṅkara, there are no *Pūrvapakṣa-Sūtras* in the *Samanvayādhyāya*. On the whole, there is much more of *Pūrvapakṣa* and miscellaneous matters in the B.S. than *Siddhānta*, according to Śaṅkara's way of interpreting them. Vyāsātīrtha says that the Advaitins have greatly impoverished the *Vedānta Śāstra* and have emptied the Sūtras of much of their deep content, by baseless assumptions about *Sāropa-Upāsanā*, *Parā* and *Aparā Vidyās*, *Saguṇa* and *Nirguṇa Prakriyā*, *Vyāvahārika* and *Pāramārthika* levels of speaking etc. : सर्वं शास्त्रम्—

पूर्ववादिमतं किञ्चित् किञ्चित्चातत्त्ववेदकम् ।

उपासनापरं किञ्चिदिति कस्माद्विनाश्यते ? ॥

1. VYĀSATĪRTHA'S DISCUSSION OF PĀDA-VYAVASTHĀ IN ADHYĀYA I

According to Madhva, the classification of *pādas* in the opening Adhyāya of the B. S. is as follows :

Pāda i. Samanvaya of अन्यत्रप्रसिद्धनामात्मकशब्दाः

Pāda ii. —do— of अन्यत्रप्रसिद्धलिङ्गात्मकशब्दाः

Pāda iii. —do— of उभयत्र प्रसिद्धनामलिङ्गात्मकशब्दाः

Pāda iv. —do— of अन्यत्रैव प्रसिद्ध—अव्यक्तजीवप्रकृत्यादिशब्दाः ।

He has also expressed his disapproval of the basis of classification adopted by Śaṅkara (and others) in his usual terse manner: नान्यथा तददृष्टेः (It is not otherwise, as there is no evidence of that).

Enlarging on this comment, Vyāsātīrtha subjects the *Pādayavasthā* (scheme of *Pādas*) adopted by Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja (including their commentators) to a very close examination and exposes their untenability. Śaṅkara gives the following arrangement of *Pādas*: Pāda i discusses texts in the Upaniṣads which contain clear and unmistakable indications of Brahman as the subject-matter of the passages in question (स्पष्टब्रह्मलिङ्ग). Pādas ii and iii deal with passages that contain only indefinite marks of Brahman (अस्पष्टब्रह्मलिङ्ग) with this difference between them, that the ii Pāda is concerned with passages referring to *Saviśeṣa*—Brahman (*Saguṇa*), while the iii Pāda discusses those relating to the *Nirviśeṣa* or *Nirguṇa* Brahman. The last Pāda establishes that *Pradhāna* (or *Prakṛti* of the *Sāṃkhyas*) is nowhere recognized in the Śāstras and is, therefore, “foreign” (अशब्दम्) to it.

The main point of Vyāsātīrtha's criticism is that the *Pādayavasthā* adopted by Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja (and others following them) betrays serious overlapping of the (पादोपाधिस) bases of classification of *Pādas*,

in the actual interpretation of many Sūtras and adhikaraṇas, as accepted by them.

Taking Śaṁkara's Bhāṣya, for example, we find in Pāda ii that the Sūtras सर्वत्र प्रसिद्धोपदेशात् (ii, 2,) अत्ता चराचरग्रहणात् (i, 2, 9) अन्तर्याम्यधिदैवादिषु * * * * (i, 2, 18). अदृश्यत्वादिगुणको धर्मोक्तेः (i, 2, 21) show clear and decisive marks of Brahman, though they have been treated as अस्पष्टब्रह्मलिङ्गक by Śaṁkara. Similarly, in Pāda iii, we see clear and distinct attributes of Brahman (स्पष्टब्रह्मलिङ्ग) in दृग्भावाद्ययतनं स्वशब्दात् (i, 3, 1) भूमा संप्रसादात् (i, 3, 8), अक्षरमम्बरान्तधृतेः (i, 3, 10), ईक्षतिकर्मव्यपदेशात् (i, 3, 13). Now, the term "Spaṣṭa-Brahma-liṅga" should either mean (i) such marks as have clearly been proved, in other texts, to pertain to Brahman; or (ii) such as would *not* be compatible with the Jīvas or other entities. It could not possibly mean (i) what is not even *prima facie* applicable to Jīvas or others; or (ii) what is well-established, even in the Viśayavākyas themselves, as marks of Brahman; or (iii) what is entirely devoid of marks suggestive of Jīvas or other entities. For, in any one of the latter alternatives, no Pūrvapakṣa could possibly arise ! Now, in texts like सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म (cited as Viśayavākya in i. 2, 1) we do have marks of Brahman (viz. सार्वत्रिक्य) which are quite distinctive. We should, accordingly, have to consider them under Pāda i instead of Pāda ii, as has been done by Śaṁkara. It cannot be argued here that in the Sūtra सर्वत्र प्रसिद्धोपदेशात् (i, 2, 1), the illustrative passage is मनोमयः प्राणशरीरो भारूपः (Chān. Up. iii, 14, 12), in which the mark of Brahman (ब्रह्मलिङ्ग) is *not clear* and that it is clear only in the passage सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म which occurs however at the head (उपक्रम) of that passage and that for *this reason* this Sūtra is read under Pāda ii. (अस्पष्टब्रह्मलिङ्गक). Vyāsātīrtha points out that such an explanation would give rise to a fresh difficulty. For, in Pāda i which is classified as स्पष्टब्रह्मलिङ्गक there are many sūtras like अन्तस्तद्धर्मोपदेशात् (i, 1, 20) ज्योतिश्चरणाभिधानात् (i, 1, 24) प्राणस्तथानुगमात् (i, 1, 28), where the marks of Brahman are *not* specifically stated in the Udāharaṇa-vākyas. Hence, they too should have been regarded as अस्पष्टब्रह्मलिङ्गक.

On the contrary, in अन्तर उपपत्तेः (i, 2, 13), the marks of Brahman (like *amṛtatva*) are sufficiently clear in the Udāharaṇavākya itself and this Sūtra should therefore have been read in the first Pāda. If the Advaitin should, however, contend that even though the Udāharaṇavākyas of Pādas ii and iii disclose certain Brahmaliṅgas which are fairly clear, yet the *particular marks that are to be attuned to Brahman* (समन्वेतव्यलिङ्गs) are *not clear* in them and that therefore, those Sūtras have been read there and those Pādas have been designated as अस्पष्टब्रह्मलिङ्गक, Vyāsātīrtha rejoins that if it be so, another unexpected difficulty would arise. For, in Pāda i, the marks to be attuned to Brahman such as आदित्यस्थित्वम् (in i, 1, 20) आकाश, (i, 1, 22) and प्राण (i, 1, 23) are not clearly expressive of Brahman. Accordingly, those sūtras would have to be relegated to subsequent Pādas. That they are where they are shows that the basis of Śaṁkara's classification of them is *not correct*.

The distinction between Pādas ii and iii attempted by Śaṁkara on the basis of Śaviśeṣa and Nirviśeṣa Brahman cannot also be sustained,

For, in Pāda ii, in सर्वत्र प्रसिद्धोप० (i, 2, 1) अत्ता० (i, 2, 9), अन्तर० (i, 2, 13) अन्तर्यामी० (i, 2, 18) अदृश्यत्वादि० (i, 2, 21), we have marks like अविद्यादिसर्वभ्रमाधिष्ठानत्व, कालक्षयातीतत्व, पूर्णसुखत्व, जीवतादात्म्य, अदृश्यत्व etc. which are incompatible with the Saguna and are unmistakable marks of Nirguna. Similarly, in Pāda iii, (which is allotted to Nirviśeṣa) there are such obvious marks of “Saguna and Saviśeṣa” as दृश्यत्व, and रूपित्व in शुभ्वाद्यायतनम् (i, 3, 1); सप्रकारकज्ञानविषयत्वम् in भूमा संप्रसादात् (i, 3, 8; 9 in the text : एवं पश्यन् etc.); marks like द्रष्टृत्व, श्रोतृत्व, in अक्षर० (i, 3, 10-12); दृश्यत्व in the text पुरुषमीक्षते under the Sūtra ईक्षतिकर्मव्यपदेशात् (i, 3, 13); and Kāma etc., in the text सत्यकामः सत्यसंकल्पः in the Sūtra दहर (i, 3, 13-14). These are incompatible with the Nirviśeṣa-Brahman. It is of no use the Advaitin’s pleading here that the Nirviśeṣa-Brahman is the Cinmātra only and that Brahman in its capacity as the substratum of world-illusion is practically Sa-viśeṣa and that, therefore, the Brahman dealt with in सर्वत्र प्रसिद्धोप० (i, 2, 1) could be regarded as “Sa-Viśeṣa. For, Vyāsātīrtha points out that on the same line of argument, even शुभ्वाद्यायतनत्वम् (i, 3, 1) could be viewed as compatible with Sagunatva and the Sūtra would have to be placed in Pāda ii. If it is still persisted that the Viśayavākya : यस्मिन् द्यौः (Mund. ii, 2, 5) discussed under शुभ्वाद्यायतनम् (i, 3, 1) is *not* Saviśeṣa-Brahmapara, but Nirviśeṣa-Brahmapara by lakṣaṇāvṛtti, then, by parity of reasoning, even texts like सर्वं खल्विदम् ब्रह्म (under i, 2, 1) should be regarded as indicative of “Cinmātra” by Lakṣaṇā, in the interests of their validity and in that case, Sūtra i, 2, 1, also would have to go to Pāda iii. If it is again argued by the Advaitin that the incompatibility between the Saguna and Nirguna could be got over on the ground that the Saviśeṣa is in reality the same as the Nirviśeṣa and that conversely, the Nirviśeṣa itself might be regarded as Saviśeṣa through “Āropitaviśeṣas” (superimposed determinations), Vyāsātīrtha says that this would be equivalent to saying that both kinds of texts have actually been found to be discussed in both the Pādas, indiscriminately. In that case, there is no point in distinguishing between those pādas or labelling them as Saviśeṣa and Nirviśeṣa-para. That would mean that there is a good case for abandoning so unsatisfactory a classification and going in for a more satisfactory one.

Of course, one can understand and make allowances for stray deviations. But it would appear on Śaṅkara’s classification and interpretation that the deviations are too frequent and numerous to be accepted as mere deviations.

Vyāsātīrtha also notices another attempted explanation of some Advaitic commentators that the distinction between the second and third pādas is based on केवलयोगविषयत्व, and केवलरूढिविषयत्व of terms sought to be attuned to Brahman. He points out that even from this point of view, there is much overlapping; in Pāda iii, there are instances of केवलयोगविषयत्वम् in शुभ्वाद्यायतनत्वम् (i, 3, 1) अभिध्यातव्यत्वम् in ईक्षतिकर्मव्यपदेशात् (i, 3, 13) and अधिष्ठमात्रत्वम् in शब्दादेव प्रमितः (i, 3, 24).

Coming to Pāda iv, Vyāsātīrtha points out that there is *no* single

comprehensive basis of distinction of Pāda (पादोपाधि) such as denial of Śāstraic validity to Prakṛti, as claimed by Śaṁkara, that is *applicable to all the adhikaraṇas* in this Pāda. For, according to Śaṁkara (and Rāmānuja) such refutation is confined to the first three adhikaraṇas of the iv Pāda and the subsequent sūtras and adhikaraṇas discuss a number of disconnected topics like (i) the alleged discrepancy among (सृष्टिवाक्यs) creation texts; (ii) the exclusion of the texts : यस्य चैतत्कर्म and आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः from the Jīvas and so on. Of these, the fourth adhikaraṇa should go to Adhy. ii Pāda 3 or 4 and the other two to earlier pādas. The refutation of the distinction between the efficient and material cause of the world with reference to Brahman in the penultimate adhikaraṇa (of i, 4) is out of place here and relevant to Adhy. II. Thus out of eight adhikaraṇas in pāda iv, only three pertain to the disestablishment of the Śabdatva of Prakṛti. Thus, looked at from any point of view, the way in which the fourth pāda has been interpreted by Śaṁkara could hardly be accepted as being faithful to the intentions of the Sūtrakāra.

Vyāsatīrtha anticipates another line of defence of Śaṁkara's approach to the interpretation of pāda iv, that the first three pādas of Adhy. I are intended to meet objections challenging the propriety of the definition of Brahman as Jagatkāraṇa, in view of such causality belonging rightly to other principles such as Pradhāna and that the iv pāda is meant to answer the remaining objection that Pradhāna of the Sāṁkhyas *also*¹ might be treated as a partial (or joint) source of the world and as such deserving to be regarded as a partial subject-matter of the Vedānta. He places his finger on the fundamental defect in this sort of explanation that the Siddhāntin (i.e. the Advaitin) has *not* made the slightest effort to establish in his turn, the identity of that particular entity represented by such texts as महत्तः परमव्यक्तम्; अजामेकां * * and यस्मिन् पञ्च पञ्चजनाः which the Sāṁkhyas seek to identify with their Prakṛti (and its guṇas) with the Brahman of the Vedānta—its central, one and only subject-matter. The utmost that Śaṁkara and his commentators have done is to equate that principle differently designated as Ajā, Avyakta etc., with the "Avidyā" of monistic metaphysics. But, then, while this equation of the "Avyakta" with Māyā or Avidyā might save the overpervasion of the definition of Brahman given in i, 1, 2, so far as the Sāṁkhya-Prakṛti is concerned, it will create a fresh over-pervasion in Māyā or Avidyā instead; for surely, Māyā or Avidyā is not the same as Brahman ! It matters little where there is overpervasion of the Brahmalaṅkāra, in Avidyā or Prakṛti : There is no advantage either way : Cf. व्याघ्रेणोरणे नीते का हानिः । वृक्षेणोरणे नीते को लाभः ? Thus, the thesis of "Samanvaya" proclaimed by the Sūtrakāra would be a truncated one, so far as the last pāda is concerned. This disposes of the explanation attempted by V.S. Ghate that in the iv. pāda certain words which are apparently interpreted by the Sāṁkhyas as referring to some other principles like Mahat and Pradhāna are here

1. Cf. the अपि in आनुमानिकमपि according to this explanation.

proved to refer to “some other categories connected with the Vedānta” (*Vedānta*, p. 55). Leaving aside the first three adhikaraṇas, the remaining ones of pāda iv, are still more disconnected with the topic of Samanvaya. The term Samanvaya (judging from the majority of instances) evidently means the attunement of themes or entities as *nāma* or *liṅga* through *yoga* or *rūḍhi*, in Brahman. From this standpoint the consideration of inner discrepancies in creation texts (i, 4, 15) would be extremely unwarranted at this stage. If Sūtra i. 4, 15, is therefore to be retained in this Pāda and properly fitted into it and its presence there rationally explained, it can only be done on the line taken by Madhva viz., as establishing the title of Brahman to be viewed as the intermediary Cause also at each stage of the causal process (अवान्तरकारणम्). It is hardly necessary to point out that the supposed denial of distinction between *nimitta* and *upādāna kāraṇatva* in the Prakṛtyadhikaraṇa (according to Śaṅkara) is not connected with Samanvaya in any straight sense of the term. Such a refutation would be in order in Adhyāya II and should be undertaken there.

Vyāsātīrtha raises objections to the *order of the pādas* in Śaṅkara's scheme of interpretation. He points out that if we are to be guided by toughness of subject-matter, “Spaṣṭa-Brahmaliṅgas would *not* deserve precedence over “Aspaṣṭabrahmaliṅgas”, as has actually happened. The discussion of Nirviśeṣa-texts would *not* also have been relegated to the third pāda, then. If, on the other hand, precedence is to be given to the easier subject-matter, the discussion of Nirviśeṣa-Brahman in the Ānandamaya and other adhikaraṇas of Pāda i, would not have led the topic of Samanvaya.

EXAMINATION OF RĀMĀNUJA'S SCHEME OF PĀDAS

According to the Rāmānuja tradition of interpretation, the Sūtra जन्माद्यस्य यतः (i, 1, 2) is charged with a double emphasis (एव) to wit : ब्रह्म कारणमेव and ब्रह्मैव कारणम् । The first sense of insistence of invariable presence (अयोगव्यवच्छेद) rules out the possibility of “Asambhava” (improbability) of the definition by showing that Brahman alone is the cause, in the rest of the adhikaraṇas of Pāda i. The other three pādas refute the objection of “Ati-vyāpti” (over-pervasion) of the definition of Brahman by the force of ruling out the connection of any other principle (अन्ययोगव्यवच्छेद). Rāmānuja also holds that the ii pāda discusses “Aspaṣṭaliṅgas” relating to Jīvas, Prāṇa, Buddhi etc., the iii “Spaṣṭaliṅgas” of the same and that the iv. pāda discusses texts that contain more clearly expressed Pūrvapakṣas relating to Jīva, Prāṇa, Buddhi etc.

Vyāsātīrtha points out that all this is quite unsustainable. For, according to Rāmānuja himself, in the first pāda itself the causality of Pradhāna is refuted in the Īkṣatyadhikaraṇa and that of the Jīva in i, 1, 18; (कामाच्च नानुमानपेक्षा). These are clear examples of ‘removal of over-pervasion’ of the definition of Brahman, which, according to Rāmānuja, is the subject-matter of pādas ii, iii and iv. Here, it might be argued

on R's behalf that if, in the Īkṣatyadhikaraṇa, texts like 'सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीत्', are held to refer to Prakṛti etc., then, since that would be the governing text all others referring to Jagatkāraṇa would have to be reconciled with it, with the result that Prakṛti would become the one Jagatkāraṇa. This would land us in a Pūrvapakṣa that Brahman is not the Jagatkāraṇa. Such a Pūrvapakṣa would thus lead up to an Asambhava-Śaṅkā (objection of improbability) with regard to Brahmalaṅkāna proclaimed in i, 1, 2. Such an Asambhavaśaṅkā is therefore, elaborately refuted in the course of the rest of the first pāda. Replying to the above argument, Vyāsātīrtha says that in the same way, one could argue from the opposite point of view that Brahman being the subject-matter of सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीत् and all other texts pertaining of Kāraṇatva having to be coordinated with it, it would have to be accepted that Pradhāna is not the Jagatkāraṇa and such a view would lead up to the removal of Ativyāpti of the said definition of Brahman. In this way, the first pāda could as well be taken over to the ii, iii, and iv. It would not be difficult either to turn the tables so as to bring about an Asambhavaśaṅkā of the definition of Brahman in the Pūrvapakṣas of the ii, iii and iv pādas as well, in which case, the topics dealt with there could be expected to be raised in the first pāda itself.

Another explanation of the basis of classification of the pādas from the Rāmānuja point of view is that the i pāda establishes Brahman to be the Supreme Being that is the cause of all as distinguished from the Cit and Acit alike. The other three pādas describe Brahman's various attributes. This explanation, too, is unsatisfactory. For, if the 'distinction of Brahman from Cit and Acit is by virtue of its being the cause of Cit and Acit, then in Sūtras like अन्तस्तद्धर्मोपदेशात् (i, 1, 20) and ज्योतिश्चरणाभिधानात् (i, 1, 24) where such attributes as "being present in the Sun" and "being the essence of light", which are both other than being "the cause" are referred to, those sūtras could not have been included in the i pāda. If, on the other hand, the "Cidacit-vilakṣaṇatva" of Brahman taught in pāda i is from the point of view of other attributes also, then, the subject-matter of pādas ii, iii and iv, would be indistinguishable from that of pāda i and so would have been dealt with in the same pāda i.e., i. The other explanation on R's behalf that the ii pāda contains texts which *prima facie* contain certain indistinct (*aspaṣṭa*) marks of Jīvas, Prāṇa, Buddhi etc., cannot also stand scrutiny. For, there are clear and distinct marks of Jīvas, Prāṇa, Buddhi etc. in many texts noticed by R. under pāda ii., such as मनोमयः प्राणशरीरो भारूपः in the *viśayavākya* of सर्वत्र प्रसिद्धोपदेशात् (i, 2, 1) and of अतृत्व of Jīva in अत्ता चराचरग्रहणात् (i, 2, 9) and of कर्मफलभोक्तृत्व of Buddhi and Prāṇa in the same Sūtra. Similarly, in the अन्तर्याम्यधिकरण (i, 2, 18) the Antaryāmitva together with embodiment referred to in 'यस्य पृथिवी शरीरम्' is possible in Jīvas also. These adhikaraṇas should therefore be more properly shifted to Pāda iii. Here an explanation has been offered on behalf of R. that the characteristics of मनोमयत्वम्, अतृत्वम्, कर्मफलभोक्तृत्वम् and शरीरित्वम्, do not signify ordinary physical modifications of the

mind-stuff, in taking of food to satisfy hunger or actual enjoyments of fruits of Karma, having a physical body etc. which are true of Jīvas etc., but altogether different meanings such as 'being comprehensible to a mind duly purified' (शुद्धेन मनसा ग्राह्यत्वम्), all-destroying power, control of the enjoyment of Karmaphala of Jīvas, controlling of Jīvas present in the bodies and so forth; and that in this special and exalted sense, these marks cannot be regarded as "spaṣṭa (Jīva)-liṅgas as they are incompatible with the Jīvas. This explanation is ruled out by Vyāsātīrtha. Does the Viśiṣṭādvaitin mean that the special senses given by him to the terms "Manomaya" etc., are acceptable to the Pūrvapakṣin or are found to be their ordinarily accepted sense; or are those that have to be given from the Siddhānta point of view ! Since the Pūrvapakṣin cannot be expected to accept these specialized senses of the Siddhāntin, at the Pūrvapakṣa stage, there is no harm in regarding the apparent senses as those current in normal usage and therefore quite clearly pointing to the Jīvas, Prāṇa etc. That these special senses of these terms would not fit the Jīvas, Buddhi etc., at the Siddhānta stage goes without saying and proves nothing and constitutes no bar to their pointing to the Jīva etc. clearly, when the Pūrvapakṣa is raised.

Nor can it be said that "Manomaya" does not simply mean 'having contact with the mind', which is insufficient to prove that the person referred to is the Jīva; but that it means 'having the mind as a sensory organ' and as this sense of the term is not quite evident in the passage in question, the mark of Manomayatva *cannot* be looked upon as a Spaṣṭa-Jīvaliṅga, and that therefore, they have been rightly discussed under pāda ii. Vyāsātīrtha disarms this objection by pointing out that 'contact with the mind' (मनःसंबन्ध) would be sufficient in this case, to establish further that the mind is regarded as an instrument of knowledge possessed by the person referred to. It need not therefore require any special mention. When we use the term "Cakṣuṣ-mān", we do as a matter of fact understand a person who possesses the visual organ. We do not generally understand by it the sky which is in contact with the eye. If it is objected that the term "Manomaya" is still not clearly expressive of the Jīva (aspaṣṭa) because, in another text "*Manomayaḥ Prāṇāśarīranetā*" it signifies Brahman, one might answer back that even in the Viśayavākya of बुद्ध्याद्यायतनं * * (i, 3, 1) the mark of बुद्ध्याद्यायतनत्व being well established in Brahman in texts like 'एको दाधार भुवनानि विश्वा' and therefore not specifically denotative of Jīva (i.e. *aspaṣṭa*)—this adhikaraṇa (i, 3, 1) involving a Pūrvapakṣa in regard to the Jīva, according to R., would have to be considered under pāda ii. (aspaṣṭaliṅgaka) according to R.'s scheme. If it is however said that in 'बुद्ध्याद्यायतनम्...' there is the *spaṣṭa-Jīvaliṅga*, viz., of being subject to births (Cf. य एषोऽन्तश्चरते बहुधा जायमानः) and that therefore the discussion is pertinent to pāda iii, and not to pāda ii, Vyāsātīrtha answers that, similarly, in pāda ii also in the *adhikaraṇa* : अर्भकौकस्त्वात् (i, 2, 7) the Jīvaliṅga is *clear* in एष मे आत्मान्तर्हृदयः' and so it should have been shifted to pāda iii. Moreover, it is possible to argue that in pāda iii, the

mark of बुभ्वाद्यायतनत्वं is not as such clearly descriptive of Jīva; and similarly, the other mark mentioned along with it viz., 'अमृतस्यैष सेतुः' is not also clearly descriptive of Jīva because of the proximity to Brahmalīṅga. Similarly, in i, 3, 8, "भूमत्वं" by itself and in contiguity with यत् नान्यत् पश्यति...and other marks of Brahman; and अक्षरत्वं mentioned in proximity with अक्षरस्य प्रशासने सूर्याचन्द्रमसौ विधृतौ तिष्ठतः * * * which is a clear Brahmalīṅga are not clearly and decisively indicative of Jīva (*aspaṣṭa*). Therefore, all these adhikaraṇas, involving such अस्पष्टलिङ्गः should be placed in pāda ii.

Lastly, R's contention that pāda iv discusses texts which share the nature of both स्पष्ट and अस्पष्टलिङ्गः (Cf. तत्तत्प्रतिपादन-छायानुसारित्वम्) is not a satisfactory ground for treating them under a separate pāda (viz., iv). For *ultimately*, such texts should be reducible to any *one* of the two categories (of Spāṣṭa or Aspaṣṭalīṅgas) and as such assignable to Pāda ii or iii as the case may be. But they cannot fall outside the scope of both the Pādas altogether! Vyāsātīrtha also refutes the alternative explanation of तत्तत्प्रतिपादन-छायानुसारित्वम् in the sense of स्पष्टतरपूर्वपक्षहेतुकत्वम्, i.e., texts wherein the reasons in support of the Pūrvapakṣa are far more evident than those in favor of the Siddhānta",—such texts being reserved for discussion in Pāda iv. He points out that this condition is hardly fulfilled in the fourth pāda in respect of आनुमानिकमपि ... (i, 4, 1) ज्योतिरूपक्रमा (i, 4, 9) and न संख्योपसंग्रहात्... (i, 4, 11) where the respective Viśaya-vākyas are : महतः परमव्यक्तम्; 'अजामेकाम्...' and 'यस्मिन् पञ्च पञ्च जनाः'. In these adhikaraṇas, the Pūrvapakṣa, according to Rāmānuja is *not merely that there is* the category of Pradhāna etc., (for, that much is accepted by the Siddhāntin (Rāmānuja) also,) but that the Pradhāna etc., exist *independently of Brahman*. But there is no clear and express reason embodied in any one of the Viśayavākyas of the above adhikaraṇas, in favor of holding the Pradhāna and other categories to exist *independently of Brahman*. Hence, this second interpretation of the phrase : तत्तत्प्रतिपादन-छायानुसारित्वम् cannot be accepted.

It has further been argued on R's behalf that in the third pāda Brahman is established as having the entire Universe for its body (सर्वशरीरम्) and that it is of the nature of all (सर्वात्मकम्); and that in the iv pāda it is established that there is nothing else in the Universe that is not the effect of Brahman (अतत्कार्यत्वाभावः) or its body (अतच्छरीरत्वाभावः). Vyāsātīrtha says that this would be equivalent to saying that each of the pādas ii, iii and iv, propounds but one attribute of Brahman. Since such a result could be accomplished by any individual adhikaraṇa in each of those pādas (e.g. अन्तर्याम्यधिदेवादिषु तद्वर्त्मव्यपदेशात्) wherein the texts : यस्य पृथिवी शरीरं, यस्यात्मा शरीरम् the truth has been established that everything in the Universe is controlled by Brahman and that everything constitutes Brahman's body. Similarly, in pāda iii, in बुभ्वाद्यायतनं * * (i, 3, 1) by the Viśayavākya यस्मिन् द्यौः पृथिवी * * the thesis of सर्वप्रकारित्व and सर्वात्मकत्व of Brahman has been established. Such being the case, the other adhikaraṇas in pādas ii and iii would all become superfluous and unnecessary.

Moreover, in some *adhikaraṇas* in *pāda* ii such as अदृश्यत्वादिगुणको
 * * (i, 2, 21) and in some others in *pāda* iii such as भूमा संप्रसादात्
 (i, 3, 8) the attribute of सर्वशरीरित्व and सर्वात्मत्व are *not* apparent,
 as required on R's view. Further, it would be quite arbitrary and unreason-
 able to impose any artificial restriction on the number of transcendental
 attributes of Brahman that should be dealt with in the *Sūtras* (for one
 who believes the Brahman to be निखिलहेयप्रत्यनीकम् and समस्तकल्याणगुणात्मकम्)
 when the Śrutis and *Sūtras* refer to numerous attributes of Divinity like
 सर्वगत्व, सर्वात्तृत्व, द्युभ्वाद्यायतनत्व, पूर्णत्व etc., and artificially confine the scope of
 each *pāda* to the treatment of one attribute alone !

Lastly, in view of the *Viyad-adhikarāṇa* (ii, 3, 1) which refutes the
 existence of anything not produced by Brahman and in view of the *Antar-*
yāmyadhiḥkaraṇa (i, 2, 18) which refutes the existence of anything that is
 not the 'body' of Brahman, the entire fourth *pāda*, as such, would turn out
 to be redundant, according to Rāmānuja.

For these reasons, we have to reject the criteria upon which Śaṅkara
 and Rāmānuja have tried to base the classification of the four *pādas* of the
 first or *Samanvayādhyāya*. Similar criticisms of the *Pādavyavasthā* of
 these commentators with regard to the second (*Avirodhādhyāya*) also
 have been urged by Vyāsātīrtha, for which see my BSPC. vol. I. pp.
 324-327.

2. GUHĀDHĪKARĀṆA EXPOUNDED

Here, the *Viśayavākya*, according to all the *Bhāṣyakāras*, is *Ṛtam*
pibantau... (*Kaṭha Up.* i, 3, 9). According to Madhva, the *Sūtra* establishes
 the *Samanvaya* of a *Kriyāliṅga* (a mark in the form of an action) viz.,
Karmaphala-bhokṛtva (enjoyment of the fruits of Karma) which is com-
 monly associated with the *Jīvātman*. The occurrence of the dual forms of
 the nouns : *Pibantau*, *Guhām praviṣṭau*, etc., is the first hurdle to be got over.
 The dual is *prima facie* evidence against the *Samanvaya* of the text in
 Brahman which is one (*Ekam eva*). The main issue which arises for con-
 sideration, out of this context is (i) Who are the persons referred to by the
 terms (*ṛtam pibantau*, *guhām praviṣṭau*) etc. ? Are they the *Jīva* and Brah-
 man or is it Brahman alone, referred to under different forms of its own
 being ? The subsidiary issues on which the answer to the main question
 would naturally depend are (ii) whether the 'entry into the cave of heart'
 (*guhā*) spoken of here and the term "Brahman" used in the context are to
 be interpreted in their primary or secondary sense; (iii) whether the mean-
 ing of the substantive '*pibat*'—(enjoyment' or *bhokṛtvam*) would agree
 with Brahman or not; (iv) whether the text denying *bhokṛtva*, found in
 the same context, should be taken in the literal sense or in the secondary
 sense of denying the experience of inauspicious fruits (*aśubha-phala*)¹ and
 (v) above all, whether use of the duals is maintainable or not in regard to
 Brahman. This last point of objection highlights the *Pūrvapakṣa* as dis-
 cussed by Vyāsātīrtha.

1. शुभं पिबत्यसौ नित्यं नाशुभं स हरिः पिबेत् । (*Pādma*).

STATEMENT OF THE PŪRVAPAKṢA

वस्तुत्व attributed to Brahman in the previous *adhikaraṇa* is admissible as the sense of the substantive (*attr*) meaning “all-destroying” (*samhartṛ*) and the singular-termination in *attā* are both consistent with Brahman. But in the present passage, the enjoyment of Karmaphala (Cf. *ṛtam pibantau sukr̥tasya loke*) and the dual number which is the suffix-sense (*pratya-yārtha*) are both incompatible with Brahman. The dual is conclusive evidence of the distinction of the persons or things indicated by it. If due weight is not given to it, the performance of seventeen sacrifices with one *paśu* each, dedicated to Prajāpati could not be justified in connection with the Vedic prescription : सप्तदश प्राजापत्यान् पशूनालभते । by reason of the syntactic force of *samkhyā* (number). In the case of texts relating to the Annamaya etc., dealt with in the Ānandamayādhikaraṇa, the explanation of the plurality of forms has been on other grounds. As texts declare them (Annamaya etc.) to be Brahman : स वा एष पुरुषोऽन्नरसमयः no plurality of Brahman was accepted. Where plurality has been referred to in texts containing Śuddhiprārthanā¹ of Annamaya etc., they have not been recognized as Brahman. There is also no point in the objection that Annamaya etc., should be taken as different entities, on the basis of the ruling of the Samjñādhikaraṇa of the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā. For, it should be noted that these different names are to be understood as predicating different qualities of Brahman like the term दाक्षायणयज्ञ and not simply as predicating them as names of different entities. For this reason, the Pūrvapakṣa in this *adhikaraṇa*, should accordingly be taken to proceed on the acceptance of the view that Annamaya, Prāṇamaya etc. (spoken of in the Ānandamayādhikaraṇa) are all Brahman. Or, it may be taken that in the Ānandamayādhikaraṇa, the point established is that though Annamaya etc., are parts of Brahman, they are still identical with Brahman; while in the present *adhikaraṇa* the point established is that the idea of ‘many-ness’ is not incompatible with Brahman (in an esoteric sense). Hence, the objection that Annamaya etc., are not Brahman because they involve manyness is also to be met by the ruling of the Siddhānta of this *adhikaraṇa*. Hence, there is no harm in conceding that the present Pūrvapakṣa includes a challenge to the position that Annamaya is Brahman. That is why the *NV* phrases the Siddhānta-nyāya there as : There is no contradiction in Brahman being spoken of as part of Ānandamaya. Here, with reference to this *adhikaraṇa*, the siddhāntanyāya has been put there as :— Even the references (to Brahman) in the Śrutis in the dual could not be regarded as incapable of other explanations and therefore conclusive.

Anyway, it would be impossible for the Siddhāntin to explain away the dual form in *pibantau* etc., as (i) a purely formal grammatical ending (indicating correctness of usage) as in दारः (‘wife’); or as an archaism; or (ii) as a secondary attribute of the subject not entitled to any syntactic relation; or (iii) as formally assimilable to the singular form by Ūha; or

1. अन्नमयप्राणमयमनोमयविज्ञानमयानन्दमया मे शुद्धचिन्ताम्’ (Śruti).

(iv) as a variant of the singular form. For, there is no specific grammatical authority for using the dual for the singular in this case. It would be too much to set aside the many dual forms here such as *pibantau*, *praviṣṭau*, without adequate reasons, as mere archaisms or case-syncretisms as in अहल्यायै जारः; वीणायै वाद्यमानायै; for it is quite possible to take them to signify two separate and distinct entities viz., Jīva and Brahman. Nor can we apply the principle of the Sammārgādhikaraṇa of the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā here and argue that the dual here is not to be taken into syntactic account as the singular in "Graham sammārṣṭi". For, there would be no establishment of ऋतपान in Brahman except through the present text; while in the case of the cleaning of the cups (*graha*) that is established by ग्रहैर्यजते which teaches that the cups (*graha*) constitute the subject (*uddeśya*) with reference to the Sammārga-saṁskāra. Moreover, even conceding that the singular ग्रहं in ग्रहं संमाष्टि might be regarded as not to be taken into account with reference to the injunction of cleaning the 'grahas', because of the fear of sentence-split (वाक्यभेद) in that case, there is no denying the fact that there is the distribution of the singular there, actually, in each 'graha' (cup). Hence it could be treated as being given or presupposed by *anuvāda* (repetition) with reference to the injunction of cleaning though not enjoined as an attribute of the subject (उद्देश्यविशेषणम्). But, in the present case, there is no duality at all, in the nature/of Brahman and so, it could not be explained away as restated by way of *anuvāda*. Nor can it be held that the dual suffix is ascribed to the operation of *atideśa* (extension) by Ūha (ऊह) just as in अग्नये जुष्टं निर्वपामि a *mantra* used in offering the *havis* in honor of Agni in Darśapūrṇamāsa-sacrifice, the substantive part in "अग्नये"...is permitted by Ūha to be changed to "सूर्याय" to suit the requirement of *atideśa*. The difficulty in this case would be that 'pibantau' etc., are not *given* in the dual, elsewhere to justify the application of a similar principle of Ūha.

Nor can the dual be explained from the standpoint of the Abhyāsādhikaraṇa-nyāya (of the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā) where the term "समिधः" in समिधो यजति...has been used in the plural, though signifying the name of only *one* of the five Prayājayāgas, because it is accepted as a variant of the *rūḍha* form of "Samidhaḥ". But "पिबन्तौ" here, cannot be explained on this basis, because it is not a *rūḍhaśabda* like "समित्" but a यौगिक one.

There are logical impediments also in identifying पिबन्तौ etc., with 'forms' of Īśvara. There is the mark of छायात्व mentioned in the text, which signifies "Avidyā" and that would be incompatible with Brahman. So, the best thing to do in these circumstances would be to interpret the text "ऋतं पिबन्तौ..."as referring to *two individuals* viz., Jīva and Īśvara. Though of course, Īśvara is not actually an enjoyer of the fruits of Karma, the reference to him as पाता (drinker of *rta*) could be easily explained on the basis of छत्रिन्याय. The characteristic of "गुहाप्रवेश" and the use of the word "Brahma" later on in यः सेतुरीजानानामक्षरं ब्रह्म यत्परम्..., would be applicable to the Jīvas also, without much difficulty.

THE SIDDHĀNTA VIEW

The Siddhānta view is that only Brahman (and *not* Jīva and Īśvara) is the theme of this passage, because of the entry into the cave of the heart, referred to in this connection and the terms “Brahman”, सेतुः, अक्षरम्, पारम् and अभयम् used in the text. Though the mark of being present in the cave of the heart is applicable to the Jīvas also, it is still a prominent characteristic of Brahman (alone) according to a very large number of texts like :

‘यो वेद निहितं गुहायाम्’; ‘गुहाहितं गह्वरेष्ठं पुराणम्’;

‘गुहां प्रविश्य तिष्ठन्तीम्’ etc.,

and therefore, Brahman alone is entitled to be understood by it in the deeper sense of the term. When we speak of Maithila, we do not mean any citizen of Mithilā; but one who is its lord and King. Similarly here. Moreover, in the text which follows (i, 3, 2)

viz., यः सेतुरीजानानामक्षरं ब्रह्म यत्परम् ।

अभयं तितीर्षतां पारम् * * * ॥

Brahman has been called ‘the saving shore.’ That is appropriate only to Brahman. The reference to the “bridge” (सेतुः) in ‘यः सेतुरीजानानाम्’ is also appropriate to Brahman as is seen from : एष भूताधिपतिरेष सेतुर्विधरण एषां लोकानामसंभेदाय (*Bṛh. Up.* iv, 4, 22), where Brahman is clearly referred to as “bridge” (across the ocean of Samsāra).

We *cannot* therefore dismiss the text : ‘ऋतं पिबन्तौ’ (i, 3, 1) which lies between (सन्दृष्ट) the two texts : यस्य ब्रह्म च क्षत्रं च (i, 2, 25) and यः सेतुः (i, 3, 2) as *not* referring to Brahman. The Pūrvapakṣa lays special emphasis on the fact of Brahman not being an enjoyer (*abhokṣṭṛ*) as sufficient ground for rejecting the identification of “Pibantau” with Brahman. But there are Śrutis like: ‘एष हि द्रष्टा स्प्रष्टा श्रोता रसयिता...’ (*Praśna Up.* iv, 9) and smṛtis like ‘I am the enjoyer of all sacrifices and their lord’, “He presides over the function of the senses and mind and enjoys the objects” (*Gītā* xv, 9) which show that Brahman has its own *bhoga* which (of course) must be subtler and of different quality and nature from the gross ones of Jīvas. It cannot be that the *Gītā* text refers to Jīvas only; for in that case, the preceding verse : यच्चाप्युत्क्रामतीश्वरः (x, 8) and the one following : विमूढा नानुपश्यन्ति पश्यन्ति ज्ञानचक्षुषः (x, 10) would be inappropriate. We have therefore to accept Īśvara’s *bhoga* to be of an esoteric kind relating only to what is auspicious. The text : अनश्नन् अन्योऽभिचाकशीति denying enjoyment to Brahman (cited by the Pūrvapakṣin) should be understood as denying inauspicious experiences to Brahman on the evidence of such texts as तस्येदमाहुः पिप्पलं स्वाद्वप्रे (*R.V.i*, 164, 22) which speak of Īśvara having enjoyments which are agreeable to Him. The *Bṛh. Up.* : iv, 2, 3, speaks of Brahman as having a subtler form of ‘enjoyment’ (*āhāra*) than the embodied self : प्रविक्ताहारतर इव भवत्यास्माच्छरीरादात्मनः । The statements in Śrutis that Brahman has no enjoyment only mean that it remains the same (whether in enjoyment or its absence) and that it is always full and conscious of innate bliss and on account of absence of attachment. Thus, we have proper explanations of scriptural texts that

describe Brahman as “*abhoktr*”. They could be taken in the restricted sense of having no inauspicious experiences.

It is only in respect of the Jīva that the expression “*ऋतं*” in *ऋतं पिबन्तो* would offer a difficulty. For “*ṛtam*” according to Śrutis like *ऋतं सत्यं तथा धर्मः* stands for धर्मफल; but Jīvas in Samsāra are enjoyers of अधर्मफल also and therefore, the *qualified description* here as *Ṛtam pibat* would be difficult to explain. In the case of Īśvara, however, it would not offer any difficulty ; for the Śrutis declare of Brahman that “Only auspicious merit goes with Him”.¹

The dual also would not present any difficulty in regard to Īśvara. It could be explained on the basis of Vedic precedents such as the use of the singular for the plural in the injunction : पत्नीं संनह्य (pertaining to ‘tying the wife’) in the case of *mantras* concerning many wives also and in the use of the plural for the singular in ‘अदितिः पाशान् प्रमुमुक्षु’ referring to the noose of the Agniṣomīyapaśu itself. In the former instance, the Mīmāṃsakas have explained that the use of the singular is permitted even in respect of many wives and in the second the use of the plural for the singular is explained from the point of view of the manyness (*bahutva*) of the parts (of the *pāśa*) and the *prayoga* treated as archaic. In the present case too, Brahman though one could be designated in the dual with reference to its other form (*rūpāntara*).² If unity of Prakaraṇa (context) is cited as justification for the accommodation of the plural with reference to आग्नेयं कृष्णग्रीवमालभते * * * * then *Ṛtam pibantau* could also be shown to have such unity of Prakaraṇa with Brahman in view of the texts यः सेतुः and यस्य ब्रह्म च क्षत्रं च between which it occurs.

Though *prima facie* suggestive of difference and duality (of persons) the dual in “Pibantau” must be explained so as to fit in with the oneness of Brahman, because the identity of “Pibantau” with Brahman is conclusively established by the mark of ‘entry into the cave of the heart’ (*guhā-praveśa*) and the texts which *precede* : ‘यस्य ब्रह्म च क्षत्रं च’; मृत्युर्यस्योपसेचनम्; क इत्या वेद यत्र सः ? and *follow* : ‘यः सेतुरीजानानामक्षरं ब्रह्म यत्परम्’ in which the singular is used, which is significant. It is for this reason that in the text: ‘एकादश प्राजापत्यान् पशूनालभते’ the number eleven has been explained by the Mīmāṃsakas to have been made up by the repetition of the Prayājas twice, with the performance of the last Prayāja thrice, thus making the total of eleven, without at the same time violating the fixity of the number of Prayājas as five. Similarly, in the present case, the oneness of Brahman being an established fact, (in view of the texts in the present context and elsewhere) the duality conveyed by the termination in *pibantau* etc., should be otherwise explained in terms of *rūpāntara*. This might be supported by the principle followed in interpreting the sentence : “अतिजगतीषु स्तुवन्ति...”

1. पुण्यमेवामुं गच्छति न ह वै देवान् पापं गच्छति (*Bṛh. Up. i, 5, 20*).

For two different explanations of this text See Rāghavendra on TC. p. 463 b.

2. Cf. ‘आत्मान्तरात्मेति हरिरेक एव द्विधा स्थितः ।

निविष्टो हृदये नित्यं रसं पिबति कर्मजम् ॥’ (*Madhva, B.S.B.*)

relating to the chanting of the Traisoka-sāman on the fourth day of Dvādaśāha (sacrifice). The plural in अतिजगतीषु has been explained by the Mīmāṃsakas to be intended to be understood as requiring the chanting of only one Atijagatī verse : विश्वा पृतन्या अभिभूतम्' *seven times* with two other verses recited in the Bṛhatī metre, the whole constituting the tristich prescribed in the rite and not by dropping the Bṛhatīs and introducing some other Atijagatīs to justify the plural अतिजगतीषु. Similarly here, the same Brahman is invested with an increment of form (*rūpāntara*) and referred to in the dual, for a definite purpose.

Perhaps, a question might be asked : how can Brahman which is one be qualified by a dual suffix and spoken of (in the dual) as if it were two? The answer is that such a way of speaking is not inconceivable. The relation of subject and attribute is met with in one and the same thing e. g. प्रमेयत्वं प्रमेयम्; आनन्दं ब्राह्मणः; भेदो भिन्नः। The Śruti text : *Neha nānāsti* denies only the presence in Brahman of (internal) distinctions of nature; but not of numerical increment (*anekatvasamkhyā*). For, the Śruti :

अयं वै हरयोऽयं वै दश च सहस्राणि बहूनि चानन्तानि च ।

तदेतद्ब्रह्मापूर्वमनपरमन्तरम् (*Bṛh. Up. ii, 5, 19*)

recognizes that there is no conceivable limit to the number of forms of Brahman. The category of Viśeṣas would reconcile the opposition between oneness and manyness in such-cases. Such richness of content must be admitted in Brahman (or Ātman) by both the parties to the controversy. For, if Brahman is pure bliss and *nothing more* (i.e., *not* the blissful one also), there would be no revelation of that Brahman (or Ātman) to itself. If, again, it is just the essence of consciousness and nothing more, it would have no bliss. In either case, Mokṣa would be void of meaning or purpose as a goal of human effort. For, it is accepted by Advaitins also that the *manifestation* of innate bliss of self is the aim of Mokṣa. If then, Brahman (or Ātman) is both of the nature of consciousness and bliss, it is admitting the fact that the one exhibits a twofold nature.

There is nothing illogical in that. In the interpretation of the Vedic text '(आज्ञासानां) मेघपतये मेघं मेघपतिम्यो मेघम् ...,' it has been recognized by the Mīmāṃsakas that in order to reconcile the singular number in मेघपतये to designate the two deities Agni and Soma conveyed by the compound word (मेघपति); the two deities are to be viewed as one *qua* deities because the idea of 'deity' is present in both together and their duality (in मेघपतिम्याम्) is explained from the point of view of their being the substratum of the idea of the "deity" individually. This shows that the Mīmāṃsakas concede the coexistence of the ideas of oneness and duality in this instance. Similarly, in the present case, Brahman could be viewed as "one" in its own essence (*svarūpeṇa*) and "dual" by virtue of a peculiarity of its nature. The coexistence of oneness and manyness in Brahman has been recognized in many Scriptural passages;

'इन्द्रो मायाभिः पुरुरूप ईयते' (*R. V. vi, 47, 18*)

'यदेकमव्यक्तमनन्तरूपम्' (*Yajurveda q. M. G. B. xi, 16*)

'एकं रूपं बहुधा यः करोति' (*Kaṭha Up. v, 12; Brahmap., 15*)

‘एको नैकः स वः कः किम्’ (*Viṣṇusahasranāma*)

‘पश्य मे पार्थ रूपाणि शतशोऽय सहस्रशः’ (*Gītā* xi, 5)

It cannot therefore be said that the dual number used in *Ṛtam pibantau* constitutes an insurmountable objection to our identifying what has been referred to therein with Brahman.

Vyāsātīrtha points out further that the present Sūtra is not rendered superfluous by i, 4, 11. In that Sūtra (न संख्योपसंग्रहात्.) the objection that is set aside is that as Brahman is without any difference in itself, the distinction between supporter and supported (*ādhāra ādheyabhāva*) referred to in ‘यस्मिन् पञ्च पञ्च जना...’ would be untenable. Here, in the present Sūtra (i, 2, 11) on the other hand, the question answered is different—whether manyness is compatible with what is One. Hence there is no redundancy of topics. Or, the compatibility of manyness in One is established there; while here the point established is that *bhoktṛtva* is compatible in one who is essentially free from *karmabandha*. The attribute of छायातपत्वम् applied to Brahman is to be figuratively understood in the sense of being the dispenser of happiness and misery to the good and the evil-natured beings according to their deserts. Since this depends on the divergent nature of the persons to be dealt with, there is no incompatibility in one and the same person exercising those functions according to the fitness of *adhikāris*. Though the terms ऋतं पिबन्तौ should have been prominently mentioned in the Sūtra consistent with the attunement of the mark of ऋतपातृत्वम् in Brahman, precedence has been given to गुहाप्रविष्टत्वम् in order to give prominence to the *Siddhāntayukti* (which is based on it). Further, as the mark ऋतपातृत्वम् is in apposition with गुहाप्रविष्टत्वम् it is included in the latter. Lastly, even though it is possible to take it that the predicate (of the Sūtra) : Brahman automatically follows from the fourth sūtra (as it does in the case of other Sūtras like *Ānandamayo’ bhyāsāt*, yet, a special mention of the predicate (*ātmānau*) has been made in this Sūtra for the sake of iteration and to give the much-needed explanation of the dual in the Śruti. That is why the Sūtrakāra has advisedly used the term *ātman* itself in the dual, expressing two forms of Brahman : *ātmā* and *antarātmā*.

REFUTATION OF ŚAMKARA’S INTERPRETATION

Śamkara makes out the Pūrvapakṣa of this *adhikaraṇa* as follows. The persons referred to as “*Ṛtam pibantau*” are *Buddhi* and *Jīva*, because the characteristic of entry into the cave of the heart is compatible with them and is incompatible with Brahman who is all-pervasive. Even though *Buddhi* is not the enjoyer (*pātr*) of *Karmaphala*, it could be so designated by resort to the छत्रिन्याय.¹

His *Siddhānta* view is : When it is conclusively established by the mark of ऋतपान or the enjoyment of *Karmaphala* that one of the persons

1. When we say “छत्रिणो यान्ति” (persons with umbrellas are going), there is no harm even if one or two in the group have no umbrellas. The term “*Chatrin*” stands for those without umbrellas also, by *lakṣaṇā*. It may be noted that here the *nyāya* is used both by the *Sāṃkhya* and by Śamkara.

intended is the Jīva, the other (second) one of the same class must also be a sentient being—i.e. Paramātmā. It cannot be the Buddhi as it is insentient. When we say that we should get a second for this cow (अस्य गोद्वितीयोऽन्वेष्टव्यः), the second one is obviously an animal of the same species, not a horse or a camel. Similarly, here, as it is established by the mark of ऋतपातृत्व that the *pibantau* should be Jīva and Brahman, the subsequent mark of entry into the cave of the heart could somehow be fitted with Brahman (all-pervasive as it might be). Even though Brahman is *not* the enjoyer (अपातृ) of Karmaphala, still the term “*pibat*” could be applied to it by resort to the छत्रिन्याय.

The Pūrvapakṣa and the Siddhānta as above are both untenable. According to the Advaita philosopher, doership (*karṭṛtva*, *bhokṭṛtva*) etc., really belong to Buddhi and are superimposed on the ātman, like the redness of the *japā* flower on the crystal. Hence it would be impossible to establish by means of the mark of *pāṭṛtva* (referred to) that one of the two mentioned in the Upaniṣadic passage is a sentient being and draw the conclusion that the second one mentioned with it must also be so (by reason of sameness of species or class). If “*bhokṭṛtva*” is defined as arising from a mutual intermingling of the attributes of *cit* and *acit* (*cidacitsamvalana*), the doctrine of *itaretarādhyāsa* (superimposition of mutual attributes) between *cit* and *jaḍa* would have to be given up by the Advaitin. Thus, on the Advaitic view, only Buddhi would be the real “पातृ.” The sense of the substantive (*pibat*) would thus be completely fulfilled only by it. It might then be possible to exclude the Jīva altogether and explain the dual in terms of a distinction between the two aspects of Jñāna and Kriyā Śaktis of Buddhi itself. In this way, Buddhi with Prāṇa could safely be regarded as the “*pibantau*.” If the Advaitin should feel that a mere distinction of the two aspects of Buddhi would not establish a real distinction of individuals as required by the dual, even then the correlate to Buddhi could very well be the Jīva endowed with superimposed पातृत्वम्; but by no means Brahman, which lacks even superimposed पातृत्वम्.

Further, granting that the Jīva might *somehow* be regarded as a पातृ on the Advaitic view, there would still be no real fulfilment of the condition of ‘duality’ (द्वित्वम्) required by the dual number. In the example of “अस्य गोद्वितीयोऽन्वेष्टव्यः” the second animal found was a real and distinct individual of the same species. But in the present case, even by understanding the other to be Brahman, there would be no establishment of true duality as required by the dual number, as the Jīva (according to the Siddhāntin) is non-different from Brahman : Let us for example take an authoritative statement (corresponding to the statement of the Śruti : *Rtam pibantau* or *Asya gor dvitiyo’ nveṣṭavyaḥ*) that ‘the moon is having a second’ (चन्द्रः सद्वितीयः). On hearing such a statement, one would naturally think of some *other luminary* (like a star in the sky) that is *not* superimposed, though it may belong to a *different class* (*nakṣatra*). One would not, in this case, think of an imaginary (second) moon (supposed to be) belonging to the same class. Even so, in the present case, though the Brahman as

Cetana might be “Sajātīya” to Jīva, we could not really think of it here, because the difference between them is admittedly unreal. In these circumstances, we could only think of *Buddhi* as the second (*pibat*) which though not of the same class as Jīva, is nevertheless conditioned by the same order of difference as the Jīva. The point moreover, is that as between duality (*dvitvam*) and sameness of class (*sājātyam*) the former happens to be the verbal sense of the dual termination, while sameness of class (*sājātya*) is not the verbal sense of any of terms used but is only a derivative idea got by the force of implication. Hence, it should not be made to override the śābda sense of duality.

Just as in the sentence : ‘अस्य जरठस्य गोद्वितीयेन बलवता भाव्यम्’ we would set aside the verbal sense of sameness of kind (i.e., weak cow) to preserve the importance of the verbal sense of the last-mentioned word : (*balavatā*), similarly sameness of kind through sentiency suggested by ‘Pāṭṛtva’ might be set aside to preserve the verbal sense of entry into the cave of the heart (which, in its primary sense, would rule out Brahman). After all, on the Advaitic view, “Guhānihitatvam” itself though proclaimed in Brahman by Śruti, (यो वेद निहितं गुहायाम्) cannot be regarded as real, because Śaṅkara himself writes in his commentary on B. S. i, 2, 7, that occupying a limited space (of the cave of the heart) cannot be a real attribute of Brahman.¹

Just as the idea of *Karmaphalabhokṛtṛtvam* implies “Cetanatvam”, it would equally imply the idea of a dependent being (*paratantra*). Now, since *Buddhi* is dependent, it may well be taken to be the second to the Jīva. Though *Cetanatva* need not necessarily be associated with *bhokṛtṛtva*, a *bhoktā* must necessarily be *Cetana*. Similarly, though a *paratantra* need not be a *bhokṛtṛ*, what is *karmaphalabhokṛtṛ* must necessarily be *paratantra*. If this is accepted, it would not be difficult to think of an *aupacārika-prayoga* attributing agency of enjoyment (*bhogakartṛtvpacāra*) to *Buddhi*, just as in the statement ‘the fuel cooks’ (काष्ठानि पचन्ति). In the case of “Gor dvitīyena . . .” as *gotva* happens to be the verbal sense, sameness of class recognised with it must also be from the point of view of *gotvam*. Hence, there is no irresponsible point in this argument. Furthermore, the description “light and shade” would admirably fit *Buddhi* and Jīva as one of them is insentient and the other sentient.

Lastly, both in the *Pūrvapakṣa* and in the *Siddhānta* there is resort to *lakṣaṇā* by *Chatrinyāya*, in respect of *Buddhi* or Brahman; and in both the *Pūrvapakṣa* and *Siddhānta* the only *pāṭṛ*, in point of actual fact, is the Jīva. There is thus no real divergence of doctrine (at issue) between the *Pūrvapakṣa* and the *Siddhānta*. That renders the whole inquiry then, futile and the quarrel with the *Sāṅkhya* an idle quarrel over words.

The interpretation of the next *Sūtra* (विशेषणाच्च) also, according to Śaṅkara, is faulty. Śaṅkara says there that in the sentence following *Ṛtam pibantau . . .* there is the qualification of the Jīva as the mover

1. सर्वगतस्य ब्रह्मणोऽर्भकोक्तत्वं न पारमार्थिकम् ।

(gantr) and of Brahman as the goal to be attained (*gamyā*). This cannot be accepted as correct. For, as the Jīva is referred to as the one seated in the chariot (*rathī*) and as Buddhi is referred to as the driver, later, it is equally possible to make “pibantau” stand for them (from the Pūrvapakṣin’s point of view). Moreover, even though the term “pibantau” has been sought to be connected with Brahman by secondary signification, still, as the reference to Jīva is also accepted by Śamkara, it would involve inconsistency of relation with the theme of the Adhyāya where, in the Sūtras beginning with i, 1, 5, it has been shown that words like “Sat” in “सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीत्”, do not refer to any other thing or person except Brahman. For, it would be improper to establish a roundabout or incidental connection of the *adhikaraṇas* with Brahman when a more direct connection for “pibantau...” understood as forms of Brahman could be secured. This point has been indicated by Madhva, in his remark : न च जीवे समन्वयोऽभिधीयते ॥ disapproving of the interpretations given by Śamkara and Rāmānuja.

RĀMĀNUJA’S INTERPRETATION EXAMINED

Rāmānuja differs from Śamkara in taking Sūtras i, 2, 9-12, to constitute one *adhikaraṇa*. But, in other respects, he agrees with Śamkara’s interpretation of the sūtras, in the main. According to both the Viṣaya-vākya of अत्ता चराचरग्रहणात् (i, 2, 9) is :

यस्य ब्रह्म च क्षत्रं चोभे भवत ओदनः ।

मृत्युर्यस्योपसेचनं क इत्या वेद यत्र सः ॥

from *Kaṭha Up.* (i, 2, 25). According to Madhva, however, the Viṣaya-vākya of i, 2, 9, is *not* from *Kaṭha* but : स इदं सर्वमसृजत । स यद्यदेवासृजत तत्तदत्तु-मघ्नयत । सर्वं वा अतीति तददितेरदितित्वम् । (*Bṛh. Up.* i, 2, 5).

Commenting on this difference in the choice of the Viṣayavākya, Vyāsātīrtha points out that the latter is more appropriate to the actual wording of the Sūtra (अत्ता चराचरग्रहणात्) as it embodies, directly, distinct counterparts to the Pratijñā (probandum) and the Hetu (reason) in the Sūtra; whereas, according to Śamkara’s and Rāmānuja’s way of interpreting the Sūtra, the Pratijñā and Hetu (corresponding to those in the Sūtra) have to be found in the Viṣayavākya with some effort through Upalakṣaṇa and Lakṣaṇā.

The objections raised against Śamkara’s interpretation of Guhām praviṣṭau..... (i, 2, 11) in terms of Jīva and Brahman, apply *mutatis mutandis* to Rāmānuja’s also. Vyāsātīrtha therefore directs special attention to R’s contention of the ऐकाधिकरण्य of the four sūtras (i, 2, 9-12) and rejects it as untenable, after close scrutiny.

R. and his commentators claim that as these four sūtras have for their subject-matter passages relating to the same topic and have also a certain syntactic unity of sense connecting them, in terms of a relation of Upajīvyā-upajīvakabhāva (topical dependence) between the first two and the last two Sūtras, they should be constituted into a single *adhikaraṇa* and that this principle holds good wherever Sūtras so interrelated have not been found to be separated by intervening *adhikaraṇas* or *pādas*,

Vyāsātīrtha replies that this kind of argument would have some force against Śaṅkara, who agrees with R. in looking upon the *Kaṭha Up.* passage : यस्य ब्रह्म च क्षत्रं च... which precedes ऋतं पिबन्तौ as the Viṣayavākya of the Sūtra : अन्ता चराचरग्रहणत् । But, it would *not* apply to Madhva who takes सर्वं वा अन्तीति तददितेरदितित्वम् (*Brh. Up.*i, 2, 5) as the Viṣayavākya, with better justification, as we have seen. Apart from that, Vyāsātīrtha says that it is doubtful if there is any real basis of Upajīvyopajīvakabhāva between the two passages यस्य ब्रह्म च...and ऋतं पिबन्तौ as made out by R. and his commentators on the ground of an undesirable contingency of break of contextual continuity (*prakaraṇaviccheda*) between the passages : महान्तं विभुमात्मानम् and ऋतं पिबन्तौ. For, ऋतं पिबन्तौ does not occur *between* महान्तं विभुमात्मानम् and यस्य ब्रह्म च क्षत्रं च but (only) *follows*. In these circumstances, there is no warrant for the plea of Prakaraṇa-viccheda at all. Such a plea can hardly be advanced by Rāmānuja who has himself admitted under the Sūtra : प्रकरणात् (i, 2, 10) that there is perfect unity of context between नायमात्मा प्रवचनेन... (*Kaṭha. Up.*) referring to Brahman and क इत्या वेद यत्र सः (ibid.) which is the fourth quarter of the verse : यस्य ब्रह्म च क्षत्रं च. To talk of *prakaraṇaviccheda*, then, on the *possibility* of establishing a syntactical unity (*ekavākyatā*) between ऋतं पिबन्तौ and यस्य ब्रह्म च क्षत्रं च on the strength of immediate textual posteriority (*ānantaryakrama*) of ऋतं पिबन्तौ to यस्य ब्रह्म च क्षत्रं च is something that is clearly opposed to the wellknown principle of Mimāṃsā interpretation, viz., the superiority of प्रकरण (context) to स्थान (position). As R. is a champion of the ऐकशास्त्र्य view or unity of the Pūrva and Uttara Mīmāṃsā Sūtras, this principle is to him already well-established in the Pūrva-tantra. It would thus be unwarranted for him to raise the objection, in the present adhikaraṇa, of break of context based on the superiority of Sthāna (Krama).

Secondly, Vyāsātīrtha points out that according to R. himself, the Adṛśyatvādhikaraṇa (i, 2, 21-23) and Dyubhavadhikaraṇa (i, 3, 1-7) are deemed to be two distinct adhikaraṇas though they have for their subject-matter passages relating to the same topic and have also a clear syntactic unity of sense connecting them, by reason of Upajīvyopajīvakabhāva subsisting between them. Why should not the अत्तधिकरण and गुहाधिकरण also be considered separate adhikaraṇas, in the same way? It is no argument that there the two adhikaraṇas are separated by an intervening adhikaraṇa and are also assigned to different *pādas*. For, it would be illogical to interpose any adhikaraṇas between Sūtras that deserve to be treated as constituting one adhikaraṇa by reason of syntactic unity and other factors. If it is however argued on R's behalf that as the अदृश्यत्वाधिकरण (i, 2, 21-23) discusses an "Aspaṣṭajīvādiliṅga" and is *therefore* put in pāda ii while द्युभवादधिकरण (i, 3, 1-7) dealing with a "Spaṣṭajīvādiliṅga" is rightly placed in pāda iii, Vyāsātīrtha replies that in the same manner it could be argued that as the अत्तधिकरण is in pāda ii, it deals with "Aspaṣṭajīvaliṅga"; and as the term "ऋतं" in ऋतं पिबन्तौ *prima facie* denotes Karmaphalabhoktṛtva, which is a "Spaṣṭajīvaliṅga", it should very properly have been related to pāda iii. Thus, we see no

justification for Sūtras i, 2, 9-10 and i, 2, 11-12 to be integrated into one *adhikaraṇa*.

Vyāsātīrtha further points out that there is no harm in passages pertaining to the same topic being discussed in two separate *adhikaraṇas*, if the discussions relate to the earlier and later parts of it. He cites the evidence of the Audumbarādhikaraṇa and the Parnamayyadhikaraṇa of the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā in this connection. Here, Kumārila, in his *Tantravārtika* has clearly stated that the passage : 'यस्य पर्णमयी जुहूर्भवति...' is to be regarded as the Udāharaṇa *not only* in the Parnamayyadhikaraṇa, but also in the Audumbarādhikaraṇa, and similarly, the passage 'ओदुम्बरो यूपो भवति...' is to be regarded as the Udāharaṇa *not only* in the Audumbarādhikaraṇa but in the Parnamayyadhikaraṇa also :

इदं तत्र, तच्चात्र, इत्युभयमुभयतोदाहरणम् ।

Thus, the two *adhikaraṇas* are accepted as distinct and separate ones even though they deal with the earlier and later parts of the same passage; and even though there is the relation of Upajīvyopajīvakabhāva between them. What harm is there, then, if, in the same circumstances अत्रधिकरणं and the गुहाधिकरणम् are also considered to be separate ones? The presence of "Upajīvyopajīvakabhāva" and other factors are not therefore sufficient grounds governing the unity of an *adhikaraṇa*; but other grounds like the applicability of the same Pūrvapakṣa and Siddhāntayuktis, absence of *adhikāśaṅkā* (further doubt not solved by the given *adhikaraṇa*) etc.

3. BHOKTRĀPATYADHIKARAṆAM EXAMINED

This *adhikaraṇa* consists of only one Sūtra : भोक्त्रापत्तेरविभागश्चेत् स्याल्लोकवत् (ii, 1, 13). It is interesting for the variety of interpretations put upon it by the different commentators. V.S. Ghate (*Vedānta*, p. 79) after discussing the various interpretations opines that Rāmānuja's way of taking the word भोक्त्रापत्तेः is "the most natural and the question is also quite in place here". "Madhva," he says, "explains the Sūtra so as to establish his doctrine of absolute difference between Jīva and Brahman; but his way of taking भोक्त्रापत्तेः is far from satisfactory. And moreover, his reference to the released condition of the soul makes the *adhikaraṇa* more appropriate to the Phalādhyāya and Madhva himself, conscious of this, tries to show the propriety of the *adhikaraṇa* in the present pāda which deals with Avirodha or removal of contradiction : फलत्वेऽप्युक्तिविरोधेऽन्तर्भावादत्रोक्तम् ॥"

It would therefore be profitable to turn to Vyāsātīrtha's exposition of this *adhikaraṇa* and his criticisms of the interpretations of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja, to adjudge the merits of the different views. Ghate's remarks on Madhva's interpretation of this Sūtra suffer from an initial misconception on his part about the true purpose of this Sūtra in the present context, according to Madhva. This is due to his failing to understand correctly the significance of the Pādasāṅgati of this *adhikaraṇa* as conceived by Madhva. Ghate's mistake lies in supposing that "Madhva explains this Sūtra so as to *establish* his doctrine of absolute difference between Jīva and

Brahman". This is evidently *not* the *immediate purpose* or aim of this adhi-karaṇa or pāda. There are so many other Sūtras in the I Adhyāya itself, in which the difference between Jīva and Brahman has been conclusively established by the Sūtrakāra; and it would therefore be both needless and out of place to *establish* such difference in the Avirodhādhyāya. What the Sūtrakāra (according to Madhva) has really done in *this pāda* of the Avirodhādhyāya is to *refute logical objections* (*yukativirodha*) that might be brought up against the main points connected with the conception of Brahman as established and developed in the I Adhyāya. One of the most important points connected with that conception is that Brahman is the Jagat-kāraṇa and that such a definition of Brahman is intended to demonstrate the सर्वगुणपूर्णत्व of Brahman from various points of view.

The subject of Avirodha is approached from four different angles. These determine the four pādas of this Chapter. The Pādhavyavasthā, here, as accepted by Madhva is : अत्र, आद्यपादे युक्त्यविरोधः । द्वितीये समयाविरोधः । तृतीये केवलश्रुत्यविरोधः । चतुर्थे सयुक्तिकश्रुत्यविरोधः इति विरोधिनां युक्त्यादीनां चातुर्विध्यात्तन्निरूप्याविरोधोऽपि चतुर्विध इति तत्प्रतिपादकपादभेदः ॥ (TC)

The opening pāda disposes of purely logical objections to the teachings of the I Adhyāya about the nature of Brahman. There are many ways in which purely logical objections or objections on logical grounds could be brought up against Brahman's Jagatkāraṇatva. One such objection would be the factual identity itself, between Jīva and Brahman, in Mokṣa. As Scripture says that souls attain Brahmabhāva in Mokṣa, it would be open to a Pūrvapakṣin to use this as a leverage in bringing down the Jagat-kāraṇatva of Brahman. It would appear from Śaṅkara's comment on ii, 1, 4, that a similar intention behind the Pūrvapakṣa is admitted, as quite in order, in this pāda. The Pūrvapakṣin could adroitly argue that in view of this basic identity of nature with the Jīva (which must hold good in Saṁsāra also), Brahman could not be the Jagatkāraṇa at all, because of its identity with the Jīva, who is obviously and admittedly *not* the Jagat-kāraṇa.¹ An argument such as this could not be dismissed as trivial or farfetched or answered without giving an explanation of how the texts, which appear to teach the identity of the (Mukta) Jīva with Brahman, in release, are to be understood. This is what is done by the present Sūtra (ii, 1, 13). The only way in which the Sūtrakāra could meet the objection, consistent with his definition of Brahman in i, 1, 2, as "Jagat-kāraṇa"—which, by its very terms, excludes the Jīva from the orbit of the definition,—is to knock off the very bottom of the premise—the identity of Jīva with Brahman in release, and thus justify his definition of Brahman and stand by it. This is precisely what Madhva has shown the Sūtrakāra to have done, by means of this Sūtra occurring in the Yuktipāda of the Avirodhādhyāya :

1. Cf. न ब्रह्मणो जगत्कारणत्वं संभवति ।

असर्वकारणेन मुक्तजीवेनात्यन्ताभिन्नत्वात् (NS. p. 293).

मुक्तजीवस्य परमात्मत्वप्राप्तिः श्रूयते । किं चातः ? तेनैव हेतुना मुक्तेश्वरयोरभेदसिद्धिः । यो यथा श्रूयते स तथेति व्याप्तेः । मुक्तावैक्ये संसारेऽप्यैक्यस्याप्यावश्यकत्वात् । न हि भिन्नमभिन्नतां यातीति युक्तम् । अतो जीवाभिन्नत्वादीश्वरस्यैव परमार्थतो जगत्कारणत्वाद्यनुपपन्नम्, इति लक्षणसूत्रं न युक्तमिति भावः ॥ (TP.)

It should, however, be noted that the refutation of the factual identity of Jīva and Brahman in the concluding part of the Sūtra (न) स्याल्लोकवत् is with a view to showing the basic untenability of the logical objection to Brahman's Jagatkāraṇatva that is based on the prospective identity of the Jīva with Brahman, in release. The establishment of the difference between Jīva and Brahman is not, thus, the direct aim or immediate purpose of this Sūtra. Its aim is to make use of the refutation of their identity in silencing the logical objection to Brahman's Jagatkāraṇatva. If this direct purpose of this Sūtra and its function in the present context is kept in mind, it would be easy to see how very misleading and misplaced is Ghate's criticism of the passage from Madhva's Bhāṣya explaining the pādasāṅgati of the Sūtra.

Perhaps, the over-terseness of Madhva's explanation has prevented Ghate from 'seeing his point' fully. Sensing some such difficulty that might arise from this obscurity of expression,¹ Vyāsātīrtha puts the whole point in the clearest terms possible :—

अत एवेह ब्रह्मणो मुक्ताभेदमात्रे न पूर्वपक्षपर्यवसानम् । किन्तु, तदभेदरूपयुक्त्या सर्वकर्तृत्वं विरुद्धम्, इतीयं चिन्ता इहैव पादे सङ्गता; न तु, फलाध्याये इति भाष्य एवोक्तम् ॥ (T. C. p. 868 b). He makes it clear that *the Pūrvapakṣa in this adhikaraṇa does not merely stop with the claim or establishment of identity of Jīva and Brahman in release. Its purpose is wider—viz., to show that Brahman's Jagatkartṛtva is opposed to logic on the ground of the identity of the Mukta Jīvas with Brahman. With such a Pūrvapakṣa, the Siddhānta or thesis to be established by the Sūtra could not be the mere establishment of the difference between them, but the repudiation of the logical impediment to the acceptance of Brahman's Jagatkāraṇatva. It is in this sense that the main point of this adhikaraṇa falls under the purview of yuktivirodha, and is therefore taken up in this Adhyāya and in this pāda, rather than in the fourth Adhyāya, which has only a partial bearing on the precise point at issue here.*

Vyāsātīrtha also points out how the Sūtra *Jagadvyāpāravarjam* (iv, 4, 17), which also supports the difference between Jīva and Brahman is not in any way rendered superfluous by the present one.

SIDDHĀNTA VIEW

According to the Pūrvapakṣa, the identity of Mukta-jīvas and Brahman is taught in कर्माणि विज्ञानमयश्च आत्मा परेऽव्यये सर्व एकीभवन्ति । The Siddhāntin points out that a factual identity of essence between Mukta-jīvas and Brahman cannot be taken to be established by the Śruti as there are serious difficulties in the way of such an interpretation, some of which have been pointed out by Madhva, in his VTN. Secondly, such identity

1. Cf. सूत्रे भाष्येऽनुभाष्ये च सन्न्यायविवृती तथा ।

टीकासु च यदस्पष्टं तच्च स्पष्टीकरिष्यते ॥ (T.C.)

is opposed to the statements of other texts referring to the released state, like यथोदकं शुद्धे शुद्धमासिक्तं तादृगेव भवति ॥ Hence, it should be interpreted in a figurative sense of identity of place (*sthānaikya*) etc. In the Viṣayavākya of the Sūtra :

भोक्तापत्तेरविभागश्चेत् स्याल्लोकवत् ।

the example of rivers mingling with the sea is cited (*Mund.* iii, 2, 8). This illustration would not afford any support to identity of essence. Vyāsātīrtha has some very cogent and convincing arguments, here, exposing the hollow and unscientific nature of the popular assumption of identity of essence in such cases. The *Kaṭha Śruti* says there is no identity of essence when a quantity of water is mixed with another. The expression तादृगेव भवति" (it becomes only *like that*)—note the emphasis on *eva*—and the increase in volume in such cases are sufficient to disprove any identity of essence (*svarūpaikya*). There is evidence of difference in volume, temperature and taste, when waters of different kinds, temperatures, etc., get mixed. This shows there can be no identity of essence in such cases :

शीतोष्णयोः, मधुरोषरयोः संगतसरित्संबन्धजलयोर्मेलने स्पर्शादिभेदो दृश्यते । अन्यथा, हंसेन विविच्यमानयोः क्षीरनीरयोरप्यभेदः स्यात् । द्रुतस्वर्णताम्रयोर्मेलनेनाभेदे, तत्कार्ये पणादौ केवलस्वर्णादिकार्यपणान्मूल्यादिभेदश्च न स्यात् । क्षीरे सिक्ता सुरा क्षीरं स्यात् ॥ (TC. p. 871).

Vyāsātīrtha clinches the matter by a citation from the *Bhāmātī* of Vācaspati Miśra (on Śaṅkara's B.S.B. अवस्थितेरिति काशकृत्स्नः i, 4, 22) in which the popular notion of the identity of the rivers joining the sea with the waters of the sea is categorically repudiated :

का पुनर्नद्यभिमतता आयुष्मतः ? किं पाथःपरमाणव उतैषां संस्थानभेदः, आहोस्वित् तदारब्धोऽवयवी ? तत्र संस्थानभेदस्य वा, अवयविनो वा, समुद्रनिवेशे विनाशात्, कस्य समुद्रेणैकता ? नदीपाथःपरमाणूनां तु, समुद्रपाथःपरमाणुभ्यः पूर्वावस्थिताभ्यो भेद एव । नाभेदः ॥ एवं समुद्रादपि तेषां भेद एव ।

He therefore concludes :

एवंच—माषादिवच्च राश्यादौ सभादौ ब्राह्मणादिवत् ।

जले जलान्तरस्यापि संश्लेषो न त्वभिन्नता ॥

द्रवद्रव्यत्वेन, अन्योन्यं व्यामिश्रणात् भेदाप्रतीतिः इति ॥ (TC. p. 872 b)

The difference though existing is not *easily perceived* owing to close cohesion of parts.

Therefore, as there is no case for identity of essence between the released souls and Brahman, it is impossible for the Pūrvapakṣa resting on such weak foundations to disprove Brahman's authorship of the Universe.

CRITICISM OF ŚAṅKARA'S INTERPRETATION

According to Śaṅkara, the Sūtra भोक्तापत्तेः... raises an objection against the material causality of Brahman (*Jagad-upādānatva*). If Brahman were the material cause of the world, then the *bhoktā* (or enjoying self) viz., the embodied Jīva, would be essentially indistinguishable from the *bhogyā* (objects of enjoyment) like *śabda*, *rūpa*, *rasa*, etc., and the *bhogyas* in their turn, would become the same as the *bhoktā*,—with the result that there would be no clear-cut distinction between them, insofar as

they are both non-different in essence from the primary causal stuff (of them both) viz., Brahman. To this the Sūtra is taken to reply that even though the *bhokta* and *bhogyā* are products of one and the same substance, they might still be mutually differentiated like the waves and foam of the sea of which both are modifications.

Vyāsātīrtha observes that it would be illegitimate to entertain an objection of mutual admixture of nature (*sāṅkaryā*) of cause and effect or between effects, on the Vivarta theory—which is the true Advaitic theory of causation. Moreover, what is the exact nature of *avibhāga* or non-distinction among effects that is envisaged by the Pūrvapakṣin here? Is it the non-distinction of effects into Cetana and Acetana that is sought to be denied by the Pūrvapakṣin's argument? Or, distinction in some unspecified sense? It cannot be the first one. For, since the Cetanas (Jīvas) are unoriginated (*anādi*) it would *not* be an unwelcome proposition to the Advaitin (Siddhāntin), that the Cetanas do not get bifurcated from the Acetanas as *effects*; (for, they are *not* accepted as *effects* at all, in the Siddhānta). Here, the Advaitin may argue that even though the Cetanas are unoriginated in time, still, by reason of their non-difference from Brahman, they are, in a sense, effects of Brahman and since the Jaḍas (acetanas) also, are similarly non-different from Brahman, the Cetanas would, as a matter of course, share the same nature as the Jaḍa which would thus annul their mutual distinction. Here, Vyāsātīrtha points out that Śaṅkara himself has held under the Sūtra दृश्यते तु (ii, 1, 6) in the previous adhikaraṇa, that even though Brahman might be the material cause with reference to Jaḍas, it would, still, not forfeit its characteristic of being a Cetana. This would effectively bar the Jīvas also losing their Cetanatva and becoming (indistinguishable from) Jaḍas, notwithstanding their identity with Brahman. So, the very contingency of *bhoktā* losing his nature and becoming jaḍasvarūpa, would not arise. Secondly, if the point of the Pūrvapakṣa is that any kind of mutual distinction among effects (of the same cause) would be impossible, that would be untenable; for we do clearly observe the mutual distinction among the different effects (products) such as bangles, crowns, etc., made of nuggets of gold. Similarly, it is not impossible that there should be some diversity among various effects of Brahman even as in the case of air, ether, etc. (which are effects of Brahman). If it be argued against this that gold is a substance with parts (*avayava*) and that Brahman has no parts, it should be pointed out that, in that case, the Pūrvapakṣa here should *not* have been in terms of a cause-and-effect relation, taken for granted; but on different lines,—on the lines of what has been said in the Sūtra—कृत्स्नप्रसक्तिनिरवयवत्वशब्दकोपो वा (B. S. ii, 1, 26 according to Śaṅkara) viz., that Brahman which is partless could not be the *upādāna* (material cause) of different substances, simultaneously. The present Pūrvapakṣa that mutual distinction *among effects* cannot be maintained would be beside the point and untenable. Hence, on the Advaitic interpretation, such as we have it under this Sūtra, the *Pūrvapakṣa itself could not legitimately arise, from any point of view.*

The Siddhānta also is unsustainable. For, on the Vivarta view of causation (which is the 'official' Advaitic view), the illustration of foam and waves would be incongruous. Nor could the foam, waves, etc., be considered as effects of a *single Upādāna* or material cause, insofar as they are products of different particles of sea-water.

EXAMINATION OF RĀMĀNUJA'S INTERPRETATION

R. explains the Sūtra as follows. If Brahman is credited with a body (consisting of Cit and Acit—whether in a subtle or in a gross condition) then it would, like the Jīvas, be liable to become an enjoyer and a sufferer of the pleasures and pains of embodied existence and that would obliterate its distinction from the Jīvas. This objection is refuted in this Sūtra.

This is also not a proper interpretation of the Sūtra. For, it involves many needless importations of additional words (*adhyāhāra*) to complete the sense of the Sūtra,—such as ब्रह्मणः शरीरित्वे (if the Brahman were embodied) as the antecedent element (*āpādaka*) and the term दुःखादि (pain etc.) as the consequent (*āpādyā*) and the conversion of the substantival form (*bhoktr*) into an abstract noun (*bhoktr̥tva*),¹ thus necessitating the expansion of the Sūtra into (ब्रह्मणः शरीरित्वे) भोक्तृ (त्व)पत्तेरविभागश्चेत् . . .

As against this, Madhva's way of rendering the Sūtra with much *less* importation : भोक्तुः (ब्रह्मत्व)पत्तेः must be deemed far simpler. Apart from these formal considerations, Rāmānuja's interpretation is open to the more serious defect of repetition of the same idea as has been expressed by him earlier under the Sūtra : संभोगप्राप्तिरिति चेन्न वैशेष्यात् (ii, 1, 8). There, the same objection has been raised and answered by him. V.S. Ghate seems to have been unaware of this point when he compliments R. on his present interpretation and expresses his opinion that "the question he refers to is also quite in place here."

If it be said that there is no redundancy in this interpretation because in i, 2, 8 the objection raised is on the sole ground of Brahman *residing in the body* of the Jīva and therefore becoming liable to pleasure and pain; whereas in the present *adhikaraṇa*, the objection is taken on the ground of Brahman being the controlling *lord of the body*, Vyāsātīrtha points out that R. has advanced more or less the same kind of argument there also that it is not the mere abiding in body that leads to the experience of pleasure, and pain of embodied existence; but being subject to actions—and so, it is not mere residence in the body that leads to the experience of pleasure and pain, of embodied existence, but the being subject to actions and to the merit and demerit resulting therefrom,—such a thing being impossible in Brahman, which is sinless (*apahatapāpmā*) and non-suffering. In the present Sūtra also (ii, 1, 13), R's explanation is the same : "The Jīva's

1. No doubt it is possible to resort to भावप्रधाननिर्देश in Śāstras, even where they are not expressly found. But that is only where the purport of the passages is not in dispute. In the present case, this condition is *not* fulfilled. Hence भावप्रधाननिर्देश cannot be taken for granted.

experiencing pleasure and pain due to the harmony and disharmony of the bodily humours is not entirely due to his having a body; but to the influence of past actions in the form of merits and demerits. But Brahman because it is free from sin is untouched by Karmic contacts even though the entire Universe, be it subtle or gross, constitutes its body". Thus, there is no essential difference between the purport of the two *adhikaraṇas* as explained by Rāmānuja.

If the *Bhoktrāpatyadhikaraṇa* should, however, be explained as an *atideśa* (extension) of the same ruling (i. 2, 8) to cover an analogous point (of applicability to a case of *śarīrasvāmitva* or ruling over a physical body as distinct from residing therein), then, it should have been placed immediately after i, 2, 8.

If it is contended on R's behalf that in i, 2, 8 the objection is raised by conceding the point that pleasure and pain are brought about by the influence of Karma and arguing thereupon that even though Brahman is personally free from pleasure and pain on account of freedom from Karma, still, it might be liable to the suffering and enjoyments experienced by Jīvas because of its proximity (closeness) of residence to them, Vyāsatīrtha asks : What is the kind of liability to *bhoktrtvam* that is thus sought to be imposed on Brahman by such a *Pūrvapakṣa* ? Is it the immediate experience of the pleasurable and painful experiences of the Jīvas as Brahman's own experiences that is meant; or simply, just an external awareness or consciousness that the Jīvas are suffering or enjoying such and such pleasures or suffering in particular ways, at particular times ? It cannot be the liability of the first description; for, not even the individual selves are known or seen to suffer from any such illusion of (mistaking) the pleasure and pain experienced by *others* as *their own* and it would be ridiculous to threaten *Īśvara* with such a predicament. If the liability were a mere awareness of what is happening to others (the souls)—by way of pleasure or pain, such a thing could readily be accepted by the Theist, without demur, as God is all-knowing and it is such a consciousness of what is happening to the world of creatures that is the mark of *Sarvajñatva*¹ and this is accepted by R. also. There is thus no special point covered or answered by this *Sūtra vis-a-vis* i, 2, 8, as explained by R. and it is, therefore, superfluous. The explanation of the earlier part of the *Sūtra* also is open to serious objections, as has already been shown.

THE PLACE OF VYĀSATĪRTHA IN THE DVAITA SYSTEM

Vyāsatīrtha is the Prince of Dialecticians of the Dvaita system. We find in his works a profoundly wide knowledge of ancient and contemporary systems of thought and an astonishingly brilliant intellect coupled with rare clarity and incisiveness of thought and expression. He has the ability to marshal vast quantity of factual material and extraordinary ramifications of thought into half a dozen propositions, couched in terse, vigorous and energetic phrases. His works embody the highest achievements of Dvaita philosophy in the spheres of constructive exposition of the *Siddhānta* and an up to date dialectic review and criticism of the views of all the prominent rival systems, in all their ramifications of thought and interpretation. He carried forward the work of his distinguished predecessors : Madhva, Jayatīrtha and Viṣṇudāsa and *explored and exhausted all the technical and Sāstraic possibilities of making the doctrines and interpretations of his school, impregnable and invulnerable to attacks from any quarter*. For this purpose, he had to undertake a most comprehensive review and reinforcement of the entire realistic metaphysics of Madhva, with his mighty intellect and a searching criticism of the doctrines and dogmas of the Advaita Vedānta as expounded in some of the most brilliant dialectical classics of that mighty school, known and studied in his days. He brought to bear upon this task an accurate and almost encyclopaedic knowledge of and a penetrating insight into the literature and philosophy of all the leading Darśanas of the day. Dasgupta pays him the highest tribute a modern historian of Indian philosophy could pay when he says that “the logical skill and depth of acute dialectical thinking shown by Vyāsatīrtha, stands almost *unrivalled in the whole of Indian thought*”. (p. viii, Preface to vol. IV op. cit.). His extension of dialectics in his *Candrikā* to the critique of the Sūtraprasthāna of the Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja schools, in all their internal ramifications and his minute analysis of the inner differences of doctrine and detail between the *Bhāmati* and *Vivaraṇa*-Prasthānas and his masterly defence and reinforcement of the Madhva interpretation of the Sūtras with the help of the rich technical and exegetical resources of the Nyāya, Vyākaraṇa and Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā systems and other ancillary literature are *monumental achievements* in the history of Indian thought, which cannot be properly appreciated by anyone who has *not* mastered the traditional learning of these systems in all the intricacies of their detail. These distinctive features of his method are indicated in the following tribute to his *Candrikā*, current in traditional circles :

आमूलाग्रनिबद्धतर्कजटिलं शब्दैकजीवातुकं
मीमांसानुनयं च शङ्करवचोदुक्कारभङ्गप्रदम् ।

शास्त्रं तन्त्रचतुष्टयात्मकमिदं निःस्वप्नतन्त्रान्तरा
व्याख्यास्यन्ति कथं पठन्ति च कथं किंवा कलौ दुष्करम् ?

He also carried his dialectics into the realms of pure thought and undertook a close review and criticism of the logical concepts, categories and doctrines of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system which were hostile to or inconsistent with the principles of Madhva Theism, in an independent treatise, the *Tarkatāṇḍava*.

His dialectical masterpiece the *Nym.* is modelled on the *VR.* of Viṣṇudāsa, though considerably recast, improved in technique and covering a much wider ground. The limitations and shortcomings of the older work have been carefully overcome and tactfully eschewed and the plan of the work has been radically altered and made more symmetrical by the addition of two new chapters discussing Sādhana and Phala (Ethics and theory of Salvation) so as to make it a self-contained treatise on realistic metaphysics and Theistic doctrine. The discussion on Vedāpauruṣeyatva, found in the last chapter of the *VR.*, is dropped, as out of place in a work of this kind and separately dealt with as a topic in the *Tarkatāṇḍava*. Many points and arguments are reproduced and expanded from the *VR.* Quotations on moot points are drawn from it or from the sources mentioned therein, though the *VR.* is not specifically mentioned by name. The author gives a consolidated exposition of the Dvaitins' views on many topics like "Bheda", "Viśeṣas", etc. The exuberant style of his model is replaced by Vyāsatīrtha by a terse and trenchant one, suited to a serious treatise on philosophy. He adopts a strictly objective and impersonal attitude to his adversaries and scrupulously avoids unnecessary heat and passion and derisive expressions, in contrast not only with the *VR.* but also with the behaviour of his own critics like Madhusūdana Sarasvatī and Brahmānanda.

He gives a completely 'scholastic' turn to his arguments, criticisms and exposition by adopting the technical and dialectic terminology of the Gaṅgeśa school of Navya-Nyāya *cap a pie*. The marshalling of arguments is as exhaustive and vigorous as their analysis and criticism are minute and merciless. There is a significant change in the very manner of opening the work with a statement of issues (Vipratipatti-pradarśana), in logical and syllogistic pattern, which is a new orientation in the history of Vedānta dialectics,¹ modelled obviously on the methodology of the *Nyāya Kusumāñjali* (Cf. तत्र पञ्चतयी विप्रतिपत्तिः) : इदं च विप्रतिपत्तिप्रदर्शनं तार्किकरीत्या, न वस्तुतः (*Nym.* p. 8).

Vyāsatīrtha considerably improved upon another line of reinforcement of the interpretations of Madhva, by drawing attention to such admissions and interpretations of Advaitic writers as may give their own case away and go to strengthen the stand of the Dvaitins. The lead in this direction had been given by Jayatīrtha : शरीरश्चोभयेऽपि हि (*B. S.* i, 2, 20) इति

1. See the remarks on Vipratipattivicāra in the works of Advaitins and in Ananta-krishna Sastri's preface to *Advaitasiddhi* (C. O. S. ix).

भेदपरमिति त्वयैव भाषितत्वाच्च । (NS. p. 590). It is by way of following up this line of reinforcement that Vyāsātīrtha augments Jayatīrtha's remarks on the physical impossibility of identity between rivers and the ocean (VTN 62b-63) with a reference to an identical view expressed by Vācaspati¹ in his *Bhāmati* under B. S. i, 4, 22.

He also sets the conflicting views of Advaitic writers against one another, in order to expose their weakness. Another polemical device adopted by him is the deftness with which he sometimes turns the tables upon his adversaries by a dexterous transposition of wording of their arguments or a shift in their placing. In this, he may be said to follow in the footsteps of the old Buddhist Logicians and of Śrīharṣa.² The following are telling instances of such quick repartee :

अप्रमेयेऽनुमानस्य प्रवृत्तिर्न कथंचन ।
 प्रमेयस्य त्वनात्मत्वात् तत्र भेदानुमेष्यते ॥ इति निरस्तम् । अन्यथा—
 अप्रमेयेऽनुमानस्य प्रवृत्तिर्न कथंचन ।
 प्रमेयस्य त्वनात्मत्वात् तदैक्यानुमितिः कथम् ?
 इति सुवचत्वेन * * * (Nym. p. 577)
 भेदः स्वरूपं धर्मो वेत्यादिरूपा विभीषिका ।
 अकारमात्रप्रक्षेपे स्यादभेदे विभीषिका (Nym. 542b)
 भेदस्य खण्डनेनैव यद्यभेदः प्रसिद्धयति ।
 अभेदखण्डनेनैव तर्हि भेदोऽपि सिद्धयति ॥ (Nym. 542)
 भेदाभेदभिदा चेत्स्यात् कथं भेदो निवार्यते ?
 भेदाभेदभिदा नो चेत् कथं भेदो निवार्यते ? (Nym. 547)
 'नान्तर्भावितसत्त्वं चेत्कारणं तदसत्ततः ।
 अन्तर्भावितसत्त्वं चेत्कारणं तदसत्ततः ॥' (Khaṇḍana)
 'अन्तर्भावितसत्त्वं चेत्कारणं तदसत्ततः ।
 नान्तर्भावितसत्त्वं चेदनसत्कारणं ततः ॥' (Nym)
 "सापेक्षत्वात्सावधेश्च तत्त्वेऽद्वैतप्रसंगतः ।
 एकाभावादसंदेहान्न रूपं वस्तुनो भिदा" । इति श्लोकः
 सापेक्षत्वात् सावधेश्च तत्त्वे द्वैतप्रसंगतः ।
 नैकाभावादसंदेहान्न रूपं वस्तुनोऽभिदा ॥ इति पठनीयः
 (Nym. 558)

He also follows the example of great dialecticians like Udayana, Śrīharṣa and Citsukha in summing up the discussion of topics at the end of sections, in pithy Saṁgrahaślokaś.

Another feature of his works is the frequency with which he draws upon a plethora of sources consisting of the leading works of the six Darśanas and exegetical works like the Vyākaraṇa, Nirukta, Anukramaṇis and Nibandhas, for purposes of corroborative evidence. In the history of

1. वाचस्पतिनापि 'अवस्थिते'रिति सूत्रे नदीसमुद्राभेदस्य निरस्तत्वात् (Nym. ii, p. 598b); TC p. 872.

2. Cf. the effective use of repartee by Śrīharṣa against Udayana :—

शंका चेदनुमास्त्येव न चेच्छंका ततस्तराम् ।
 व्याघातावधिराशंका तर्कः शंकावधिर्मतः ॥ (Udayana)
 शंका चेन्नानुमास्त्येव न चेच्छंका कुतस्तराम् ?
 व्याघातावधिराशंका तर्कः शंकावधिः कुतः ? (Śrīharṣa)

Vedānta literature, there are few great works of *this school or of others* which display such a wide, accurate and concentrated mastery of contemporary Śāstraic literature and such consummate *ability* to make such apt and judicious use of them, for one's purpose. Vyāsatīrtha has thus enlarged the scope and *vision* of Madhva Śāstra and its ṭikās with the exegetical apparatus of the Nyāya, Vyākaraṇa and Mīmāṃsā Śāstras and expanded the significance of the original texts of his school in the light of their methodology. His application of this method of textual elucidation to the basic texts is as much an "interpretation" of Madhva as any other. Rightly understood then, his role in Dvaita Vedānta and its literature is nothing short of that of an *interpreter*. His exhaustive and topical treatment of subjects in the light of up to date materials was quite a novel method in the history of Dvaita literature and he deserves great credit for having extended its application from the sphere of Vādaprasthāna, where it was first introduced by Viṣṇudāsācārya, to that of the "Adhikaraṇa-Prasthāna" also. The advantages of the application of this new method to the technical perfection of the system were many. It necessitated a systematic study of the Vyākaraṇa, Mīmāṃsā and other Śāstras, among the followers of Madhva, in addition to the study of Nyāya which was already well-developed among them, in order to be able to follow the expositions of Vyāsatīrtha, intelligently and *carrying them forward*. This explains the elaborate elucidation of the rules of Vyākaraṇa and Mīmāṃsā, as and when they occur, in the older commentaries on the *Candrikā*, *Nym.* and other works of Vyāsatīrtha and the special tracts undertaken for the purpose by writers like Vijayīndra, for the benefit of the uninitiated. In this way, Vyāsatīrtha must be said to have revolutionized the interpretational methodology of the Madhva school in particular and of the Vedānta in general, by bringing them under the direct purview of the critical and exegetic apparatus of the Mīmāṃsā, Vyākaraṇa and other systems, *systematically*, for the purpose of constructive exposition and dialectical defence of the Siddhānta and refutation of other views. He also won fresh laurels for his system, by undertaking learned disquisitions on the problems of pure logic, in a standard work specially devoted to the subject (the *Tarkatāṇḍava*), in which he gave a splendid objective analysis and criticism of the logical machinery and the doctrines and categories of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system and refuted most of its cumbersome definitions and its unwarranted assumptions and superfluous categories like Nirvikalpaka, Samavāya Antyaviśeṣas, Parataḥprāmāṇya, etc. This work has challenged "almost every logical definition that appeared in the Gaṅgeśa school which forms the bedrock of the new Nyāya Logic" (Dasgupta, *Op. cit.* iv, Preface viii).

His *Tātparya-Candrikā* is a commentary, only in name; in effect, it is a scintillating, critical and comparative study of the interpretation of the *Brahmasūtras* according to the Bhāṣyas of the three main schools of Vedānta (together with their important commentaries). Its powerful flow of arguments and breathtaking points of criticism are such as to leave the

modern scholar and critic, grappling with the Sūtras and their commentaries, dumb with astonishment at the masterly way in which Vyāsātīrtha has successfully probed the problem of the interpretation of the Sūtras. There is no doubt that when this work of Vyāsātīrtha is properly introduced to modern scholars, it will revolutionize the whole course of their studies in the *Brahmasūtras*. It thus deserves to be authoritatively translated into English, for this reason.

Within the Dvaita system itself, the *Candrikā* gave a new orientation to the fortunes of the Adhikaraṇa Prasthāna of the school by making it most up to date in its outlook and brought it into line with the highest achievements of rival systems, in matter and manner. It was a timely service that raised the *philosophical prestige* of the system to the highest level of contemporary recognition, not attained either before or after Vyāsātīrtha.

Vyāsātīrtha thus stands out as the brightest star in the firmament of Dvaita Vedānta. He is not only the highest authority on the *technicalities* of the system but also its most redoubtable champion. His trinity of works (*Nym.*, *Candrikā* and *Tarkatāṇḍava*) known as -“Vyāsatraya” is described with grim humour as the three eyes of the man-lion of Madhva-siddhānta :

मायातन्त्रामरारिस्मयमपनयतो मध्वसिद्धान्तनाम्नो
नेत्राणीव त्रयोऽपि त्रिजगति नृहरेरिन्दते यत्प्रबन्धाः ॥ (Gurugunastava 6)

Tradition rightly regards him, with Madhva and Jayātīrtha, as constituting the ‘trinity of authorities on Madhva Siddhānta’:

श्रीमध्वः कल्पवृक्षस्तु जयार्यः कामधुक् स्मृतः ।
चिन्तामणिस्तु व्यासार्थो मुनित्रयमुदीरितम् ॥

Not only did Vyāsātīrtha extend the frontiers of Dvaita philosophy and show new ways of drawing out and enriching its philosophical possibilities and interpretational potentialities, for the benefit of his co-religionists; but he also placed the whole thought of Madhva in a *new and virile perspective*, so far as the adherents and admirers of *other systems* were concerned ! He showed to the philosophical world that the system of Madhva was not just an effervescence of Purāṇic Hinduism or a mere revival of the Bhakti cult or a ‘reign of religion in contemporary philosophy,’—but a mighty philosophical movement of thought and a well-laid metaphysical structure that could hold its own against other speculative systems in the field, for richness and depth of thought and fineness of speculative content. His achievement, in short, was that he established Madhva’s place in contemporary thought and guaranteed it for all time, before the bar of reason, by works of unsurpassed merit.

He set an example in *progressive thinking* to his co-religionists and made them come out into the open air of philosophic speculation and make use of the sum total of knowledge and vast store of corroborative materials that could be gathered from contemporary Darśanas. Dvaitins, before the days of Viṣṇudāsa and Vyāsātīrtha, do not seem to have studied the Mīmāṃsā and Vyākaraṇa systems with avidity or cared to harness them to

the service of their doctrines and interpretations, in any substantial manner. By quoting at every step from the classics of the leading systems of the day, like the *Bauddhadhikkāra*, *Nyāyakusumāñjali*, *Brahmasiddhi*, Sureśvara's *Vārttikas*, Kumārila's *Ślokavārttika*, *Citsukhi*, *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā*, *Tuṣṭikā*, *Mahābhāṣya*, *Kaiyaṭa*, *Nyāsa*, etc., Vyāsatīrtha showed to his followers that they must *broaden their outlook and widen the range of their studies and thereby rehabilitate their system, in the light of the critical and comparative study of contemporary thought*, in order not only to defend their own system against possible attacks and criticisms from outside, but also to be able to *appreciate its merits more fully and deeply and propagate its doctrines more effectively*.

By completely eschewing from his works theological issues like the supremacy of Viṣṇu over Śiva, the Śāstraic sanction for Taptamudrādhāraṇa and the like, he showed himself to be a philosopher first and to the last.

At the same time, he provided ample scope for the expression of the religious and emotional life of the followers of Madhva by giving a new impetus to the Dāsa Kūṭa movement and broadening its basis and unreservedly dedicating his own attainments in the field of music and his literary and poetic gifts in the Kannaḍa language to its service, by his own soul-stirring compositions in that language, in praise of God and by inspiring saintly souls like Purandara Dāsa, Kanaka Dāsa and others, to melodious compositions set to music in praise of the Supreme Being and incidentally laying the foundations of the great system of Karnatak Saṅgīta, which was developed further, by another great son of Karnataka—, Veṅkaṭa Makhī.

Vyāsatīrtha's fame spread to the distant province of Bengal, as the most distinguished and illustrious exponent of the pure Vaiṣṇavism of Madhva and made a profound impression upon the followers of Caitanya there and paved the way for the ultimate affiliation of Bengal Vaiṣṇavism to that of Madhva through the spiritual lineage of Vyāsatīrtha himself (See Ch. XL).

The political influence of the Madhva school also rose to its highest level under Vyāsatīrtha. He enjoyed the closest affection, and commanded the highest esteem of the greatest Hindu Emperor of South India,—the immortal Kṛṣṇadeva Rāya.

The age of Vyāsatīrtha was, thus, the most glorious epoch in the history of the Dvaita school and its literature and philosophy and has not been rivalled, either before or after him, for so much all-round distinction, progress and development. It is, therefore, extremely disappointing to find that the Editors of the voluminous *History and Culture of the Indian People* (Bhāratīya Vidyā Bhavan, Bombay), should have forgotten to say anything about the epoch-making contributions of Vyāsatīrtha to Indian philosophical literature, in the Vijayanagar period, in the chapter dealing with, 'Language and Literature under the Delhi Sultanate,' (Vol. VI, ch. xv).

VYĀSATĪRTHA'S DIALECTICS

1. DEFENCE OF THE REALITY OF EXPERIENCE

In beginning his *Nyāyāmṛta* with a complete demolition of the foundations of Mithyātva and building his system of realistic metaphysics on the firm foundations of the validity of experience grounded in the verdict of flawless Sense-perception (pratyakṣa) certified by Śākṣī, Vyāsatīrtha adopts a strictly rationalistic approach to the problem of philosophy. He makes the definition of reality (Sattva-nirukti) the starting point of his metaphysics and addresses himself to the task of philosophizing in the true spirit of a rationalist. He goes beyond Viṣṇudāsa in formulating a concrete logical definition of reality, as against the pure *tu quoque* :

यादृशं ब्रह्मणः सत्त्वं तादृशं स्याज्जगत्पि ।

of his predecessor and devotes a special section of his work to a discussion of this problem. He contends that it is possible to define the reality of the world, in a manner that could be comprehended by the senses (Pratyakṣa-yogya-sattvanirukti) and in terms which would necessarily veto its unreality. The world may be regarded as real, in the same sense in which the Brahman is held to be real, by the Advaitin : तवात्मनि यत्सत्त्वं तदेव मम । उक्तं हि—“यादृशं ब्रह्मणः सत्त्वं तादृशं स्याज्जगत्पि” इति ।

But, he does not leave it there, as does Viṣṇudāsācārya. If the reality of the Brahman were essentially indefinable, the same could be allowed for the world. Indeed, the Brahman is claimed to be *somehow* real even though its reality may not admit of any kind of logical definition. There could be nothing illogical, if the Dvaitin should choose to regard the world as real by virtue of its essential and inalienable reality, even though such reality may not be logically definable : सत्त्वानिर्वचनेऽपि तद्वदेव स्वरूपपारमार्थ्योपपत्तेः । If the reality of Brahman stands for something more than a distinction from unreality, etc., or for unconditioned existence, such a definition could be applied to the world too. It would be futile and pointless to argue that the reality of Brahman means absence of limitations (*aparicchinnatvam*). Such a definition would be too wide of the mark. The superimposed silver in the shell, though *limited*, is not utterly non-existent for the Advaitin. The Void of the Buddhist and the proverbial hare's horn (*tuccha*) though absolutely unlimited, are yet far from being accepted as realities. We are thus obliged to go in for a more practical definition of reality than the so-called freedom from limitations (of time and place). The only rational definition of reality, then, says Vyāsatīrtha, would be :

त्रिकालसर्वदेशीयनिषेधाप्रतियोगिता ।

सत्तोच्यते * * * ॥ i.e., “not being the counter correlate of

negation with reference to *all* the three periods of time and space, the superimposed and non-existent objects, being accepted as obvious counter-correlates of such negation :

* * अद्यस्तुच्छे तु, तं प्रति प्रतियोगिनी ॥

It must be conceded that our perceptions are fully capable of establishing the complete absence of such negation in *all* the three periods of time. If not, the sublatiing perception of "Mithyātva," or falsity of an object of illusion with reference to all the three periods of time, would be *equally beyond the range of perception : in which case, the Advaitin could not hope to establish the falsity of appearances* such as that of silver in nacre, on the *evidence of the subsequent stultifying cognition (bādhakajñāna)*. The point is that at least the Bādhakajñāna must be credited with the power of establishing the complete absence of negation *for all time (traikālika)*. It could not be seriously argued that in cases of such stultifying cognition, our perception merely comprehends non-existence of the object in question *just with reference to the time of stultification* and that the non-existence of the (illusory) object in the *past and future, is grasped by an act of inference*. For, the Advaitin believes that world-appearance is stultified by direct perception of the substratum (*adhiṣṭhānāparokṣa*), i.e. to say of the Ātman, in which inference has absolutely no part to play. If it were *not so*, he would have to resort to inference in order to fully satisfy himself about the unreality of the Universe, *even after the birth of Brahmāparokṣa* ! If he should hold that the falsity of the world consisting in "Traikālikaṇiṣedhapratiyogitvam", is established by the perception of the Sākṣī, the reality of the world may be similarly claimed to be revealed by the Sākṣīpratyakṣa. If the perceptions of the Sākṣī are susceptible to truth and error alike, even the perception of oneness by the Sākṣī would be open to the same kind of uncertainty; in which case, the reality of the world of difference would be automatically reinstated. It could not be said that the perception of oneness (*aikya*) by the Sākṣī is *validated by some other proof*. For, *that* again would stand in need of some other proof and so on *ad infinitum*. If there is some knowledge or stage of perception that is capable of validating itself and others, it would be easier to attribute such capacity to the first and primary perception itself of the Sākṣī, in which case, the reality of the world of experience would stand fully established.

It would be equally unavailing to contend that the reality established by the Sākṣīpratyakṣa is only of a provisional kind *not opposed to unreality in the absolute sense* ! For, provisional reality consisting of practical efficiency (*arthakriyākāritva*) would be inconsistent with such absolute negation of existence for all the three periods of time, as proposed by the Advaitin ! Vyāsatīrtha *corners the Advaitin*, by raising a pertinent question, here, whether the stultifying cognition *negates* the existence of an object of erroneous perception, *even with reference to the particular time at which it was apprehended*; or with reference only to other periods of time, before and after. In the latter case, the denial would hardly affect the reality and existence of the object *at the time of the perception*. In other words, it would only mean that

the object is impermanent, not eternal and does not continue for all time. But, *not existing for all time, is not the same as not existing at definite periods of time* ! “Mithyātva”, in this sense, would be synonymous with “anitya-tvam” (impermanence) which, the Dvaitin is ready to accept, in respect of the world. But, if, as is actually held by the Advaitin, the stultification denies the existence of an object even with reference to the particular time at which it was experienced; यत्कालावच्छेदेन स्वार्थो गृहीतः तत्कालावच्छेदेनैव तन्निषेधाभ्युपगमात् (*Advaitasiddhi*),¹ it is tantamount to saying that the so-called ‘object’ is utterly non-existent in the present, (*atyantāsat*) even with reference to the particular time and place with which it is or was associated in our perception. This means that Mithyātva as conceived by the Advaitin, is, in effect, and in fact, the same as total non-existence, a nemesis which he tries in vain to avert by a technical subterfuge of defining it as ‘प्रतिपन्नोपाधौ त्रैकालिकनिषेधप्रतियोगित्वं’ and seeking to distinguish it from utter non-existence which he defines as क्वचिदप्युपाधौ सत्त्वेनाप्रतीयमानत्वम्. Vyāsātīrtha analyses this position and shows that it is a distinction without a difference.

He enters into a close argument to show that “Mithyātvam”, as conceived by the Advaitin, is, in the last analysis, indistinguishable from utter non-existence. The absolute negation with reference to all the three periods of time, accepted by the Advaitin; सर्वत्र त्रैकालिकनिषेधप्रतियोगित्वं (यद्यपि) तुच्छानिर्वचनीययोः साधारणम् (*Advaitasiddhi*), is *exactly the point of intersection and identity between the two*. Such being the case, it is not possible to make out any effective distinction between them, in essence, in perception, or by definition :

It cannot be held that “Asat” consists in being inconceivable while the conception of “mithyā” is possible. (1) The “asat” is conceived qua “inconceivable” : न च निरूपाख्यत्वमेव तेषामसत्त्वं; निरूपाख्यत्वेनैव व्यायमानत्वात् ॥ (2) Nor can we say that non-existence is what is incapable of presentation. If the “asat” is *unpresentable*, the Advaitin could have no knowledge of the world’s difference from the non-existent (*asadvailakṣanya*) which is a constituent factor of “Mithyātva”. He cannot also deny the possibility of its presentation, if it is so completely beyond the pale of conception or designate it as “asat”. (3) Nor can it be defined as “not being directly perceivable”. For, such direct unperceivability is to be found in eternally supersensuous principles also.² (4) Nor can it be defined as “not being presented in any locus as existent” :

क्वचिदप्युपाधौ सत्त्वेनाप्रतीयमानत्वम् ।

The Buddhist also recognizes a distinction from *such non-existence* in respect of the status he assigns to the world and the objects of illusions like superimposed silver : जगति शक्तिरूप्ये चैतादृशासद्वैलक्ष्ण्यस्य शून्यवादिनामपि सत्त्वात्.³ (5) Nor can it be said that non-existence is devoid of any essence or

1. Sri Vidyā Press edn. p. 352.

2. नित्यातीन्द्रियेऽपि सत्त्वात् ।

3. See the passage from *Abhidharma Samuccaya* of Asaṅga, quoted earlier, under “Jayatīrtha” Ch. XXI. Vide also Radhakrishnan, *I. Phil*, i. p. 368.

character, while the false (*mithyā*) has an imaginary character ! It would be impossible to draw any such distinction, when the false (*mithyābhūta*) is avowedly liable to utter negation with reference to all the three periods of time. One cannot, thus, with any grace or show of reason, speak of the *mithyābhūta* as having any character of its own, when that character or essence is admitted to be *absolutely negated* : मिथ्याभूतस्यापि स्वरूपेणैव त्रैकालिकनिषेध इति पक्षे निःस्वरूपत्वस्य दुर्बलत्वात् । (6) It would be equally impossible to plead that the false characteristic of the false could afford to coexist with an utter negation of the kind, by reason of its very falsity !¹ It would be a mere verbal jugglery to speak of such utter negation of characteristics, if a thing should still preserve its nature, whatever it is, in its own time and place : स्वदेशकालयोः तत्स्वरूपसहिष्णोः तत्स्वरूपप्रतिषेधत्वरूपस्य पारिभाषिकत्वापातात् । Any such capacity could as well be assigned to *tuccha* (the utterly non-existent) also by reason of its indirect presentability : तुच्छेऽपि परोक्षप्रतीत्यन्यथानुपपत्त्या एतादृशस्वरूपस्य सुवचत्वान्च (7) So long as it is an accepted fact that the false is to be utterly and essentially negated, for all time, it would not be possible to speak of the negation of the false as having a counter-correlate (*sapratyogika*) and that of the *tuccha* (utter nonentity) as being devoid of such a possible counter-correlate (निष्प्रतियोगिक); or (8) try to distinguish between the two on the ground of the false being merely always distinguishable from the existent while nonentity is *essentially negated*. (9) The identity of the 'false' with utter nonentity cannot also be challenged on the ground that nonentity cannot be viewed as the counter-correlate of an absolute negation on account of its very fictitiousness : असतोऽस्तत्त्वादेव नात्यन्तिकनिषेधप्रतियोगिता. Vyāsatīrtha rejoins that there is no inherent impossibility in this. If the "asat" could be credited with the attribute of *asattvam* "sad-vailakṣaṇyam" (difference from "sat") or the attribute of "not being the counter-correlate of utter negation for all time," as granted by the Advaitin or the capacity to figure as the content of an indirect awareness or being the correlate of its own difference (असद्वैलक्षण्यं प्रति प्रतियोगित्वम्) and so on; what is logically wrong in making it the counter-correlate of a negation ? निषेधप्रतियोगित्वस्याप्युपपत्तेः । After all, the fact of being a counter-correlate (with reference to some negation) is not on a par with properties like colour, or smell that require a real substance to be correlated to: प्रतियोगित्वस्य च रूपादिवद् धर्मिसत्तानपेक्षत्वाच्च.² That objects not now existing may come into being later is *no answer to this point* : कालान्तरे सत्त्वस्येदानीमनुपयोगात्. It is, thus, impossible to establish any logical or conceptual distinction between the "Mithyābhūta" as conceived by the Advaitin and the utterly non-existent : तस्मात् सर्वत्र त्रैकालिकनिषेधप्रतियोगित्वमेव असत्त्वम् । तदेव च मिथ्यात्वम् ॥

Their distinction, so doggedly sought to be pursued by the Advaitin, is the same as that between tweedledum and tweedledee :

1. मिथ्याभूतं स्वरूपं मिथ्यात्वादेव स्वरूपेण त्रैकालिकनिषेधसामानाधिकरण्याविरोधि ॥

2. Cf. स्वयमसतः प्रतियोगित्वं कथमिति चेत् ? किमिह कथम् ? नहि प्रतियोगित्वं रूपादिवद् धर्मिसत्तासापेक्षम् । अभावज्ञानोपयोगिज्ञानविषयतामात्रस्य प्रतियोगित्वात् ॥ (Jayatīrtha., Td. t. p. 5).

Since Mithyātva or unreality is, thus, in essence त्रैकालिकनिषेधप्रतियोगि, the opposite of it must indeed be 'reality' :

त्रिकालसर्वदेशीयनिषेधाप्रतियोगिता सत्ता ।

whether the object of which it is posited is the world or Brahman. This is precisely what the Dvaitin means to convey when he declares the world to possess the *same kind of reality* as Brahman :

यादृशं ब्रह्मणः सत्त्वं तादृशं स्याज्जगत्पि¹

The world of perception has a right to be regarded as real by virtue of the same kind of reality that is attributed to Brahman and conveyed by the expression "real", which, when applied to it, suffices to repudiate its falsity. Nothing could be gained by seeking to define the reality of Brahman *in some other way*, such as in terms of 'self luminosity' (Svaprakāśatva) or secondlessness (*advitīyatvam*) of existence and so on. Such definitions would, in no way, be opposed to or take away the reality of the Universe, or help to establish its falsity, as desired by the Advaitin. For it is admitted by him that judgments like "everything is knowable", though self-luminous, are yet unreal: The Void of the Buddhist, though "secondless" and self-luminous *to the extent* of being unknowable (*avedyātparūpa-svaprakāśatvayukta*) is, nevertheless, unreal. Moreover, in trying to denounce the world as unreal, the Advaitin must naturally demonstrate that it lacks the basis of reference which entitles Brahman to be designated as "real". Neither self-luminosity nor secondlessness could, for a moment, be accepted as constituting the basis of such a reference. For, in that case, the judgment of falsity of the world, reached by inference (*mithyātvānumāna*) would establish no more than that the world is *not self-luminous* or *not without a second* like Brahman—in other words, that it is "Asvaprakāśa" and "Sa-dvītiya" : Such a conclusion would in no way be discomfiting to the Dvaitin. There is, thus, no escape for the Advaitin from having to define reality as *Traikālikaniṣedhāpratīyogitā*, if Brahman should, at all, be *effectively distinguished* from the unreal (*mithyā*).

1. The precise significance of these words has been well brought out by the *Taraṅgīṭī* यः स्वभावो ब्रह्मणः स एव जगत् इति नार्थः । किंतु, यादृशेन सत्त्वेन मिथ्यात्वप्रतिपक्षभूतेन सत्यशब्दावगतेन ब्रह्मणि मिथ्यात्वाभावसंप्रतिपत्तिः, तादृशेन तेन जगति तत्संप्रत्यय इति ॥ It means simply that the Dvaitin understands the world to be real in the same sense in which the Advaitin regards his Brahman to be "real" and therefore "opposed to unreality". This could never mean that the world has no reality apart from Brahman's or that it has no separate existence of its own : नह्येतावता ब्रह्मसत्त्वमेव जगत्सत्त्वं भवति । When it is asserted that my son is like yours, it is ridiculous to conclude that the two are *identical*. It means simply that they resemble each other in certain ways. Nothing more is intended in the present case, too. As committed to the *uniqueness* of difference, in each case, the Madhva philosophers could not agree to two things possessing *the same nature* or quality (cf. वैलक्षण्यं सतश्चापि स्वयं सद्भेदादिनः (AV.)). In these circumstances, the criticism of the *Advaitasiddhi* that if the world were to have the same reality as Brahman, it would *cease to be real* and would have to quit the field, even as no matrimonial alliance could take place (in the old days) between two parties whose "gotras" happen to be identical, turns out to be a bad joke (छलोत्तरम्) and an idle conceit. The analogy is irrelevant (See *Nym-Kaṇṭhakoddhāra*).

2. VIŚEṢAS

The concept of Viśeṣas, which plays a vital part in Madhva's philosophy, in bridging the gap between substance and attributes and in bringing them together, into an integrated whole, rationalizing their mutual relationship, has been ably expounded by Vyāsatīrtha in his *Nym*.

He begins with a clear statement of the precise relation between Substance and attributes, in terms of identity-in-difference. The relation is best known as "Śaviśeṣābheda." It is shown to possess an obvious advantage over other kinds of relations like *absolute identity*, *absolute difference*, *Samavāya*, *Bhedābheda* and others, posited by other schools of thought, all of which are shown to be defective in one way or the other and *ultimately to fall back upon the mysterious agency of Viśeṣa or its logical counterpart*.

The difference (of a thing from another and from any of its attributes) is "colourfully identical" (*sa-viśeṣābhinna*) with it. This basic identity precludes the possibility of a regress of logical relations, while the recognition of "Viśeṣas" as a peculiar potency of the thing in question operates as a 'representative' of difference and helps to distinguish the attributes effectively from each other *and from* the Substance, without prejudice to the integrity of the whole and also obviates the flaw of synonymy of expression (*paryāyatva*). Viśeṣa is thus, by definition, a peculiar characteristic of things which enables inseparable wholes to keep intact their richness of content from being lost in the underlying unity of essence and preserve variety of *aspects* and attributes, in their rightful places without overlapping of any kind or from usurping or invading each other's place or jurisdiction or function (एकतरपरिशेषाभावादिनिर्वाहकः).¹ It holds the master-key, the "open sesame" to the mystery of 'Substance and attribute'.

The logical grounds in favour of this new category of thought are then discussed in some detail. The Upaniṣadic text "Vijñānam ānandam Brahma" presupposes the conception of Viśeṣas, in its interpretation. The text posits two distinctive attributes of Brahman, knowledge and bliss. The Advaitin, who looks upon the definitive texts of the Upaniṣads as embodying an impartible judgment referring to a single undifferentiated content, could not afford to admit any kind of difference or difference-cum-identity, between the attributes and the subject (Brahman) or between the attributes themselves. In such cases, it would be impossible to avoid the pitfalls of synonymy of terms between "vijñānam" and "ānandam", redundancy of expression and dispensability of either term, *unless*, one has recourse to some kind of logical device by which one could *isolate* the attributes *in thought* and *expression*, from the substance *as and when the exigencies of thought or pragmatic necessities demand it*.

Without such a *deus ex machina* of Viśeṣas, it would be impossible, for the Advaitin, to explain how, for example, it comes about that

1. Cf. भेदहीने त्वपर्यायशब्दान्तरनियामकः ।
विशेषो नाम कथितः सोऽस्ति वस्तुष्वशेषतः ॥ (AV.)

notwithstanding the presentation of the self in the empirical consciousness, the innate bliss of the self, that is essentially identical with it, comes to be *missed* in ordinary experience. Such partial revelations of *certain aspects alone* of the self side by side with the temporary *obscuration of others*, could not be accounted for without the acceptance of *some inner principle of isolation* within the constitution of the Substance. Where the substance is conceived as an essentially indivisible unity of essence without a trace of difference within it (एकध्वानुद्रष्टव्यं नेह नानास्ति किञ्चन), the acceptance of Viśeṣas or something answering to them, *in function*, becomes inevitable, if the practical and pragmatic distinctions drawn by lay and scientific usage are to be justified and rendered intelligible. Not even the Advaitin could shut his eyes to such practical distinctions :—

आनन्दो विषयानुभवो नित्यत्वं चेति सन्ति धर्माः, अपृथक्त्वेऽपि
चैतन्यात् पृथगिवावभासन्ते । (Pañcapādikā).

The Dvaitin submits, then, that these distinctions are not imaginary or meaningless. They constitute the substance *as we know it* and *are present in it* and can be marked off by suitable expression, when and where there is need for it. Viśeṣa is the name of the device or potency of things by which we manage to do all this seemingly impossible task of detecting difference-in-identity and diversity in unity !

Vyāsatīrtha proceeds to illustrate the concept of Viśeṣas in respect of the thesis of identity conveyed by the proposition *Tattvam asi*. If the identity that is the content of the proposition were something different from Brahman, or even partly different and partly identical, it would turn out to be false and unreal, as whatever is *other than Brahman* is *ex hypothesi* false, to the Advaitin. There must indeed be some mysterious potency in the proposition and in the Ātman or Brahman by which the identity alone is kept back and stands obscured in empirical consciousness, even though the self, as pure consciousness, is open to knowledge. We are asked to believe that the perception of the illusion of difference is not inconsistent with the manifestation of the self-luminous Ātman (*svaprakāśacaitanya*). But the identity of selves that is also the same as this self-luminous Ātman is pronounced to be incompatible with any experience of difference ! Things which are equal to the same thing, must indeed be equal to one another. But in the present case, this axiom is modified ! It would be difficult to justify such a state of affairs, without the inscrutable help of “Viśeṣas”.

Take again another aspect of the matter. The concept of identity (*aikyam*), is “relative” to an “other”. But the self-luminosity of the intuiting self (*Svaprakāśacaitanyam*), is *not*. And yet, the identity is not anything different from the Ātman :

तच्चाद्वैतं—‘ब्रह्मैवेदं सर्वम्’ इति श्रुत्यर्थेन सहैक्यमापन्नं ब्रह्मैव स्यात् ।

(*Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā*, i, p. 220). Such inner peculiarities in the constitution of Brahman, would be inexplicable, without the aid of Viśeṣas. It would serve no purpose to attribute such partial manifestations of particular aspects and a corresponding obscuration of others, to the interposition

of Avidyā; for even then, in the absence of an inner principle of isolation and distinction like "Viśeṣa", it would be impossible to account for the obscuration of the identity-aspect *alone*, leaving untouched the other aspect of Cit, particularly when the whole thing is in the grip of a complete identity ! In the familiar example of mother-of-pearl, it would be preposterous to claim that during the temporary ignorance of shell, it is the shell-aspect alone and nothing more or less, that is both revealed and obscured *at the same time* !

The author proceeds to show that on any view of the relation between substance and attributes, be it one of identity or identity-in-difference, or absolute difference, "Viśeṣas" have got to be reckoned with and pressed into service. Let us take the case of identity of subject and attributes. We may and do often perceive a pot without a definite perception or awareness of its colour. If the identity and difference are both to be accepted, Viśeṣas needs must be resorted to, in reconciling the presence of two such opposing forces in a given thing and prevent them from destroying their substratum. Even if absolute difference is posited between substance and attributes, we have willy-nilly to make use of Viśeṣas, in rationalizing such logical judgments and propositions of usual currency as (1) Samavāya is a relation; (2) Sattā is real; (3) Difference is different (from its correlates); (4) the Antyaviśeṣa of the Vaiśeṣikas is self-differentiating; (5) Time exists always; (6) Space is present everywhere, and so on.¹ Again, take the proposition *Abhāvasti*—where, the existence of a negation is not something different from it. If such existence is different from the *abhāva* (negation) it would explode the classification of substances into six. Even if the number of substances is unlimited, we may conceive of yet another existence within the first and so on *ad infinitum*. It would be difficult, in such cases, to establish any subject-object relation between the negative and its existence, which are indistinguishable, without the agency of Viśeṣas. We cannot dismiss the proposition "Sattā is real" (*Sattā satī*) as a mental illusion, as it is as much a valid experience as "San ghaṭaḥ". It cannot be explained away as a mere figurative usage, as we do not, at any time, assert that "Sattā" is *not Satī*, as we do, in respect of Devadatta, that he is *not a lion*, though figuratively so described, sometimes ! It is indeed, open to the Vaiśeṣikas to claim that though there is no other Sattā within Sattā, such propositions are valid, by reason of inner peculiarity of things (svabhāvaviśeṣa) which renders them intelligible. Vyāsatīrtha rejoins that it is precisely this inner peculiarity of things that is proposed to be designated as "Viśeṣas" by Madhva and his followers. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas then, should have no quarrel with the Dvaitins, over the nature of Viśeṣas !

After all, the Samavāya of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, is still in need of such Viśeṣas to be self-linking and self-supporting. The concept of

1. किं च, समवायः संबन्धः; सत्ता सती; भेदो भिन्नः; अन्त्यविशेषो व्यावृत्तः; कालः सदा अस्ति; देशः सर्वत्र, इत्यबाधितव्यवहारार्थं विशेषोऽङ्गीकार्यः । (Nym. p. 564b).

self-support (svanirvāhakatvam) means, *supporting oneself by oneself*. In the absence of "Viśeṣa" or something answering to it, it would be impossible to credit Samavāya with a dual capacity of functioning as both the agent and the object, in one and the same act of relationing. Viśeṣas then, are better suited to play such a role than mere Samavāya. If both are the same, Samavāya turns out to be obviously just another name for Viśeṣas and of the two, "Viśeṣas" would appear to be the more suitable and expressive or commensurate term. The self-sufficiency of Viśeṣas and their uniqueness are established *ex hypothesi* (dharmigrāhakamāṇasiddha). It must, however, be remembered that Viśeṣas are to be admitted *only* in cases of proved identity, where nevertheless, a difference is *permitted*. But it does not give us the right to outlaw all difference and explain differentiation *everywhere* in normal experience, as in respect of any two objects like a pot and a piece of cloth, on the basis of Viśeṣas ! Viśeṣas are just meant to function as a representative of difference (where actual and absolute difference could not be recognized to exist). The prescription of "Pūtikā" plant, as a substitute for Soma, holds good only in the absence or in the event of non-availability of Soma. It is not, certainly, to be used where the original plant could be had or is available for use. Even so, in respect of Viśeṣas and Difference.

These Viśeṣas are also open to perception, in such judgments as "Śuklaḥ paṭaḥ"; "Gajāśvādir eva senā"; "ayam ghaṭaḥ"...The explanation that the judgment of identity that the cloth is white (*śuklaḥ paṭaḥ*) is only a case of suffix-contraction for *śuklavān paṭaḥ* by way of *matuplopa*, could only regularise the linguistic idiom; but would not be able to throw any light on the judgment *as such* (*na tu pratitau*) and would be inexplicable without the aid of Viśeṣas. It is obvious then, that the proposition "Śuklaḥ paṭaḥ", is a true identity-judgment. But such judgments could not be treated as identity-judgments pure and simple, without any shade of difference. In that case, they would be tautological like "Ghaṭaḥ kalaśaḥ". It must therefore be conceded, that they stand for *something more* than *mere* identity. This *extra* something cannot be a *difference*, as we do *not* have any sublating judgment that the cloth is *not* white, at any time. If the extra something were an identity and a difference, one would still have to summon the Viśeṣas to harmonize the two opposites. It follows then, that the additional factor, presupposed in the judgment, is a logical substitute for difference i.e., "Viśeṣa". "Viśeṣa" then, must be accepted as a "Sarvatantrasiddhānta".

3. CONFLICT OF THESIS OF IDENTITY WITH UPAJĪVYA-PRAMĀNAS

In the controversial literature of the Vedānta, the conflict of Bheda and Abheda Śrutis and the manner of its solution are of great philosophical interest. The realistic philosophers like Madhva and Jayatīrtha, have naturally tried to formulate an independent line of interpretation by which the realistic texts would stand their ground and receive full face value while

the seemingly monistic texts would have to yield to a slight depreciation of meaning and be accommodated or negotiated in a number of figurative senses, short of actual identity of *essence*, between the individual and the Supreme Being :

स्वातन्त्र्ये च विशिष्टत्वे स्थानमत्यैक्ययोरपि ।
सादृश्ये चैक्यवाक् सम्यक् सावकाशा यथेष्टतः ॥ (AV).

Neither Madhva nor his commentators have, however, tried to dispose of the problem as a purely textual or interpretational puzzle to be solved by the mere exercise of a certain amount of commentatorial ingenuity and resource. They have treated it as an essentially philosophical problem and have not failed to approach it from a purely philosophical perspective. This is reflected in the way in which they have proceeded to determine which of the two positions is entitled to acceptance on the basis of independent Pramāṇas or grounds of certitude. It is for this reason that Madhva devotes considerable attention to the establishment of the Sākṣī as the highest basis of all Pramāṇas and the ultimate source and guarantor of all proof. Sense-perception, as tested by the Sākṣī, and ratified by it, acquires absolute and infallible certainty. The reality of human experiences of pleasure and pain, of diversity and gradation are all ratified by the Sākṣī, are grounded upon its verdict and are *ipso facto* entitled to the highest validity. If there are any Scriptural texts that seem to deny the reality of the world of human experiences and our deep-rooted convictions in the truth of difference, dependence and other characteristics of the human personality, it is these texts that must be suitably reinterpreted in accordance with the verdict of the Sākṣī in favour of the reality of the world-experience. It is for this reason that Madhva and his commentators emphasise the primacy of Pratyakṣa over other means of proof and expatiate on the supreme significance of Sākṣī-pratyakṣa, as the prop and support of all other Pramāṇas (Upajīvyā).

Not even the Advaitin could afford to ignore ratification of validity, by Sākṣī; for the very faith in the validity of his thesis of identity conveyed by the Advaitic texts, would have to depend, ultimately, on Sākṣī-pratyakṣa for its ratification, without which, it would lose its binding force and sanction. This elevation of experience to a position of greater validity in respect of its uncontradicted reality, than certain apparently contrary statements in the Scriptures themselves, places the whole of Madhva's philosophical approach in a new perspective of empirical realism. He and his commentators are ardent champions of the view of philosophical Realism that our senses are essentially capable of and competent to reveal objective reality as it is and are not merely appearance-interpreting. This interesting question of modern philosophy and its concomitant problems, have been anticipated by Madhva and Jayatīrtha, in their works. These issues are still further elucidated by Vyāsatīrtha in his *Nym.*, with the help of the scholastic logic of his times and the technical paraphernalia of the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā nyāyas. The following are some of the major problems

discussed by him, in this connection :

1. प्रत्यक्षस्य जात्या, उपक्रमादिलिङ्गैः प्राबल्यम् ।
2. प्रत्यक्षस्योपजीव्यत्वेन प्राबल्यम् ।
3. प्रत्यक्षस्यानुमानबाध्यत्वे बाधकविवरणम् ।
4. प्रत्यक्षस्य शब्दबाध्यत्वे बाधकविवरणम् ।
5. प्रत्यक्षस्य भाविबाधकशङ्कानिरसनम् ।
6. प्रत्यक्षस्य पारमार्थिकसत्त्वग्राहकत्वसमर्थनम् ।

After establishing a strong case for according the highest validity to normal life and its most poignant experiences, Vyāsātīrtha seeks to expose the hollowness of the foundations of Advaita by showing its interpretation of the Śāstra, in terms of an absolute denial of the reality of the Universe and the distinction between the individual and Supreme, to be faced with serious impediments in the shape of “Upajīvyapramāṇa-virodha”, or conflict with their own standing ground or basis of argument and the irreducible minimum of facts which the identity propositions themselves would have to grant and proceed upon.

This is the ultimate ground on which the thesis of identity is challenged by Madhva and his commentators, however much some texts, here and there, might appear to approve of it, at first sight (ऐक्यश्रुतेरुपजीव्यप्रमाणबाधः).

The identity between the human spirit and the Supreme, posited by the Advaitin, is not a full-fledged identity between them with all their specific and constituent features intact, as two concrete individuals, possessed of certain specific attributes like universal consciousness on the one hand and individual consciousness and other limited capacities on the other : विशिष्टयोस्तत्त्वंपदवाच्ययोर्नैक्यम् । A complete identity in the fullest sense of the terms between two such distinctive entities is physically impossible and logically unsound.

The Advaitic dialecticians are not unaware of this difficulty. It is, precisely, to overcome it that they have formulated the peculiar theory of judgments known as “Akhaṇḍārtha” according to which such propositions of identity as *Tat tvam asi*, *Aham Brahmasmi* occurring in the Upaniṣads, should be understood in a vague and nebulous sense discounting the determinants pertaining to either terms about which the said identity proposition is moved :

संसर्गसिद्धिसम्यग्धीहेतुता या गिरामियम् ।

उक्ताखण्डार्थता यद्वा तत्प्रातिपदिकार्थता ॥ (Citsukha).

This new device of “non-relational judgments” has been applied by the Advaitins to all scriptural propositions of identity as a result of which a *rarefied identity* of pure being or consciousness (चिन्मात्रैक्यं) is posited as the content of the propositions. The terms brought into relation are thus completely shorn of every one of their determinants and adjuncts. This process of “shearing” of the determinants and the affirmation of a bare *substantial* identity is known as *Viruddha-bhāgatyaṅgena lakṣitayoś cin-mātraikyam*. The Dvaita philosophers have naturally concentrated their criticism on the *raison d’être* for such a wholesale departure from and denudation of attributes from either side, as proposed by the Advaitins.

We are asked by the Monist to surrender the full sense of the terms and "give up" incompatible elements like omniscience and its opposite, belonging to Brahman and the Jīvas, in order to effect an identity between them. But, how are these specific determinants to be got rid of? By simply closing one's eyes to them? Or, refusing to take cognizance of them; or because of their impermanent character; or else because they are false projections and appearances and so *non est* (*mithyābhūta*)? We cannot get rid of the determinants by simply refusing to take any notice of them. The true nature of things could not be hidden or affected by our refusing to take note of their diversity of natures or proposing to identify two different entities of widely different natures. It would be absurd to identify Brahman with Śūnya or with a non-existent thing, on the strength of such Upaniṣadic texts as *Asad vā idam agra āsit* "Sarvaṁ khalvidam Brahma", etc. after agreeing to take *no note* of the opposing determinants like *sattva*, *asattva*, *śūnyatva*, *cittva*, *jaḍatva*, etc., among them. The plea of impermanence of attributes is unsustainable as many texts refer to the attributes of the Jīva and Brahman, as permanent¹.

If the imperfections of the souls are only passing features, subsisting only till release, the proposition should have been worded : तत्त्वं भविष्यसि (Thou wilt be That) and not तत् त्वमसि in the present tense, as it is. The only other way in which the attributes could be dissolved or transcended, is by negating them as unreal. That is the way chosen by the Advaitin. But such summary disposal of the difference between the two, borne out by the testimony of the Sākṣī and the verdict of many other scriptural texts themselves, by stigmatizing them as "unreal", is stoutly opposed by Madhva and his school : निर्दोषश्रुतिसाक्षिसिद्धयोरविरुद्धधर्मयोर्मिथ्यात्वायोगात् । (Nym. 529 b).

In a case like "So'yaṁ Devadattaḥ", there is no incompatibility in judgment. It is not asserted that the subject as determined by one set of attributes is the same as determined by another; but that one and the same subject comes to be differently determined by the application of different determinations : सोऽयं देवदत्त इत्यादौ तु, न तत्तादेस्त्मागः । ऋषेणैकत्र तत्तेदन्तयोरविरोधात् ।

(1) But what exactly do the Advaita Śrutis set out to accomplish? Do they predicate Brahmanhood of the Jīva as established by perceptual evidence; or (2) predicate Jīvahood of the Brahman as we know it through Scriptures; or (3) posit an identity by making both of them the subject of the proposition : उभयानुवादेनाभेदो वा विधेयः । There is gross violence to Upajīvyapramāṇa on any alternative. Experience shows the Jīvas to be limited creatures differing immeasurably from the universal consciousness of Brahman. The Brahman, in its turn, is established by Scriptures as an omniscient, all-powerful Being. We are thus faced with an insurmountable barrier in the proposition of identity between them. It would be opposed to the very nature of these two beings as they stand revealed to us through the respective pramāṇas which bear them out

1. अविनाशी वा अरे अयमात्मा अनुच्छित्तिधर्मा (Brh. Up.)

परास्य शक्तिविविधैव श्रूयते स्वाभाविकी ज्ञानवृत्तक्रिया च ॥ (Śvet. Up.)

(dharmigrāhaka). The very proof of their existence is the proof of their being endowed with such mutually incompatible attributes. An identity pressed in the face of such odds, would be opposed to the very basic proof of their existence and cannot, therefore, be countenanced.

The Jīva and Brahman would have to be put down as Upajīvyā and Upajīvaka, according to the exigencies of the identity proposition moved. Upajīvyā is the logical and ontological ground of all further predications. The nature of this ground or starting point as it is *ex hypothesi* determined, furnishes the basis of all subsequent thought and predication. Any predication that runs counter to the basic character of this ground, as already made out, must be dismissed as untenable. An Upajīvaka, must, in all cases, be subservient to the Upajīvyā and cannot override it. This is known as the principle of Upajīvyopajīvākabhāva. For example, it is admitted on all hands that atoms are partless and that God is omniscient. Atoms are *ex hypothesi* established as partless and God *ex hypothesi* as an Omniscient Being. In these circumstances, any proposition moved to establish that atoms are partible or that God is not omniscient, would be invalid : निरवयवत्वादिना विना, परमाण्वादेः धर्मीकरणमेव न सिद्ध्यति ॥ (Nym).

It would thus be clear that in the event of a conflict between the Upajīvyā and Upajīvaka, both of them could not be held to be true and valid, lest the thing in question should have no character of its own. The Upajīvyā is indisputably the basis of the Upajīvaka and is therefore necessarily superior to it. The latter must, naturally, lose its validity when in conflict with the other. In the present case, then, the Sākṣipratyakṣa and the Śrutis clearly establish the Jīvas to be different from and dependent on the Supreme. No amount of identity texts would thus be able to shake off this vivid realization and induce us to accept the contrary.

The conflict with Upajīvyāpramāṇa would persist even where the existence of the Supreme is sought to be established through Inference, instead of through Scripture. The inference of a Supreme Creator of the Universe involves the assumption of omniscience and almightiness which are sufficient to mark Him off from the human souls. The thesis of identity would thus be opposed to the nature of God, even as inferentially established.

It would be disingenuous to object to the principle of Upajīvyā on the ground that in that case, as compared with the first impression of nacre as "this is silver", which it presupposes, for purposes of negation, even a valid sublating cognition like "this is *not* silver", would be open to Upajīvyāpramāṇavirodha and so lose all its validity ! Vyāsātīrtha points out that by "Upajīvyā" is meant here, *not any kind of prior knowledge* or awareness of a thing presupposed by another, but only such as is capable of revealing the true nature of the subject as it is and manifesting its own validity. The analogy of wrong cognitions is, thus, out of place, in the present discussion. For, the erroneous cognition *idaṁ rajatam*, is *not* the Upajīvyā of the sublating cognition, in any *straight sense of the term*. It is the aspect of "thisness" (इदमंशमात्रम्) alone that constitutes

the *dharmi* or subject of the proposition, in this case, —not “thisness” qualified by “silverness” (नतु रजतत्वविशिष्टम्). Hence, “thisness” alone is the Upajīvyā in the present case, which is at no time contradicted by the sublating cognition : एवंच, यदुपजीव्यं तन्न बाध्यम्; इदमंशस्याबाधात् । यच्च बाध्यं रजतत्वविशिष्टं, न तदुपजीव्यम्; रजतत्वविशिष्टस्याघमित्वात् ॥ (*Nym*). The sublating cognition “नेदं रजतम्” does not, therefore, invalidate the aspect of *thisness*; but denies the qualification (*vaiśiṣṭhya*) of silverness with reference to the substratum. It follows then, that *what is really Upajīvyā is not sublated and what is sublated is not really Upajīvyā*.

The Advaitin cannot argue, on the same line, that only the bare nature of Brahman is Upajīvyā with reference to the thesis of identity and *not* Brahman as qualified by its attributes of omniscience, etc.; so that, there is no likelihood of Upajīvyavirodha in proposing the identity of Jīva and Brahman, in this sense. Vyāsatīrtha points out, by close analysis of thought, that one cannot escape Upajīvyavirodha by such ingenious inanities. The Advaitin would have to define the particular aspect of Brahman in which it is to be made the *subject of the proposition*, with reference to the thesis of identity to be moved. Should it be in its (1) special positive aspect of “being an omniscient Being”; or (2) in its specific but negative aspect of “not being a transmigrating being”; or (3) in its general aspect of sentiency (*cittvam*); or (4) simply in its bare essence (*svarūpeṇaiva*). The first and the second alternatives would be faced with Upajīvyavirodha. In the third alternative, the monist would have established nothing more than the identity of Cit and Jīva—or, in other words, that the human self is a sentient being ! If such is the end and aim of the proposition of identity between Jīva and Brahman, the Dvaitin has no objection to it. It would not help the Advaitin in the least, to make Brahman in its *general character of being* (*sādhāraṇasvarūpa*), the subject of the proposition; for, “being” is not an exclusive feature of Brahman. In any case, the Jīva would be identical with *some kind of being*; but *that* being may or may not be, necessarily of Brahman’s ! Nor can the Advaitin escape the difficulty of Upajīvyavirodha by seeking to derive the subject of his proposition from texts like *Kevalo Nirguṇaś ca*, instead of from texts like *Yas sarvajñaḥ*. For, after all, even the so-called Nirguṇa texts, cannot do away with the attributes posited of Brahman, *ex hypothesi* by texts which are necessary to establish its being in the first instance (*dharmigrāhakaśruti*). Brahman, must, first of all, *be established*, before the Nirguṇa texts could operate and *deny* attributes to it ! Such “Nirguṇa” texts would come to *depend* on those that teach the existence of Brahman. Since these texts already establish Brahman as *ex hypothesi* qualified by certain attributes, Upajīvyavirodha would still be there and could *not* be got over.

It has been shown elsewhere, that the Nirguṇa texts could not annul the attributes already posited of Brahman by a group of texts that *logically precede* them. The principles of Mīmāṃsā interpretation forbid the dismissal of one set of texts as invalid, in matters exclusively within the jurisdiction of Vedic authority. The present issue is one such. The *Nirguṇa*

texts have, therefore, to be otherwise explained, without prejudice to the attributes already predicated of Brahman in such texts as *Yas sarvajñaḥ; Parāśya śaktir vividhaiva śrūyate*

There is no use also in the Advaitin's trying to contend that the subject of this proposition is not Brahman as actually and fully qualified by attributes like omniscience but only as a being qualified *per accidens* (upalakṣita) by such attributes and that on such a view, there could be no possibility of Upajīvyavirodha. Vyāsatīrtha shows that even granting for argument's sake that the attributes of Brahman are merely *Upalakṣaṇa* (accidental), Upajīvyavirodha would still be present, if the accidental determinant of *such a state of being coloured by these accidental qualifications* (उपलक्ष्यतावच्छेदक) happens to be *Brahmanhood as distinguished from the Jīva*. If the "Upalakṣatāvachchedaka" is mere *cittvam* (sentiency), it would not only establish a tautological proposition that *Cit is Cit* which, as has already been shown, is so innocuous and non-committal that it neither helps nor damns anybody : एवं च—

चिता चिदैक्यं सिद्धं नः; सार्वज्ञादिविशिष्टयोः ।

ऐक्यं तु धर्मिग्राहिभ्यां श्रुत्यक्षाभ्यां विरुद्धयते ॥ (Nym).

4. THE INTERPRETATION OF "TAT TVAM ASI"

The conflict of identity texts with Upajīvyāśrutis and Upajīvyapramāṇa being thus insurmountable, there is only one way for traditional philosophers pledged to the authoritativeness of every utterance of Scripture, to try to accommodate the identity-texts as nearly as possible, within the aegis of a realistic metaphysics. In the treatment of a group of Śrutis not apparently to their advantage, the Dvaitins have been much more alive and considerate to the status of Śrutis as the highest authorities on matters beyond empirical knowledge, than the Advaitins have been.¹ The latter have summarily rejected the "Dvaita-Śrutis", as "Atattvā-vedaka" (not truth-declaring), "Vyāvahārikabheda-para", repetitive of what is known through sense-perception (anuvādaka) and so on, which is as good or as bad as saying that they are *invalid*. But the Dvaita philosophers could not pay back the Advaitins, in the same coin. Their faith in the Śrutis as supreme documents of the highest validity and their respect for such authority stand in the way of their adopting so cheap a way out of the problem. They prefer to follow the lead of the principles of Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā exegesis, which alone are competent to guide us in matters of scriptural interpretation. There are sufficient rulings in the Mīmāṃsā literature to show how and in what manner Scriptural texts, that conflict with valid human experience and perceptions and threaten to throw them overboard, are to be interpreted without detriment to the validity of normal experience and its verdicts.

1. Cf. गृष्ट्योमिथो विरोधे हि हत्वैकामपराङ्मुखीम् ।

विरोधशान्ति कः कुर्याद् विना म्लेच्छकुमारकान् ॥ (Vādirāja)

The procedure adopted by the Advaitin to get over the conflict with Upajīvyapratyakṣa, and Bhedaśrutis, *by denying the validity of the latter* has neither sanction nor precedent, in the exegetical principles of the Mīmāṃsā, while the method of overcoming the conflict by adopting Lākṣaṇikārtha or suitable figurative explanations of such texts has the approval and support of many adhikaraṇas of the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā.¹

By a strange irony of fate, the Advaitin himself has had to adopt the same procedure in dealing with the monistic passages. The impossibility of identifying the Jīvas and Brahman *as they are*, with their respective characteristics intact, (viśiṣṭaikyam) has been clearly accepted by him : ऐक्यं तयोर्लक्षितयोर्न वाच्योः । (Vivekacūḍāmaṇi 244). Indeed, it is this logical impediment that gives the “Akhaṇḍārtavāda” and the “Viruddha-bhāgatyāgalakṣaṇā” resorted to by the Advaitic dialecticians, their *raison d'être*. The judgment of an identity of pure consciousness or pure being, (cinmātraikya) that is said to be the purport of the “Tattvam asi” and other identity-texts is obviously the result of an application of a figurative or secondary construction known as “Jahadajahallakṣaṇā”. The Dvaitin too pleads the same justification for resorting to Lakṣaṇā in the interpretation of monistic texts. The device adopted by both is the same but the procedure and direction of the application differs and the conclusion, also, is correspondingly different.

It is for us to examine which of them is the simpler and more straightforward explanation involving less of an interpretational strain and is in closer agreement with the spirit and letter of the illustrative instances given in the texts. Vyāsatīrtha, naturally, points out that the Advaitic interpretation in terms of Cinmātraikya, after depriving the terms “Tat” and “tvam” of their specific denotations, involves a greater strain on language and thought in that it has got to resort to Lakṣaṇā in respect of *both the terms* and devitalize them; whereas, the interpretation proposed by the Dvaitins involves only a single Lakṣaṇā, at a time, on the one or the other of the terms (Tat or Tvam), according to the exigencies of the interpretations proposed. While the double-faced Lakṣaṇā is unprecedented in lay and philosophical usage, there are plenty of instances in life and literature, of the kind of figurative explanation of “Tat tvam asi”, given by the Dvaitins. Vyāsatīrtha follows the lead of Viṣṇudāsācārya in bringing together a large number of instances and rulings from the interpretative literature of the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā and Vyākaraṇa Śāstras and correlates them with the keynotes of Uddālaka's discourse to his son in which the upadeśa “Tat tvam asi” occurs nine times, with nine illustrations, and shows how naturally they harmonize with the (new) line of interpretation sponsored by him and his predecessors, in terms of the reality of difference between the human self and the Supreme Being and the metaphysical dependence of the former on the latter.

1. Cf. तत्सिद्धिजातिसारूप्यप्रशंसाभूमलिङ्गसमवायाः । P.M.S. i, 4, 23.

In arguing his case for rejecting the familiar Advaitic interpretation of "Tat tvam asi", and going in for a new one, that would be consistent with the reality of difference between the Jīva and Brahman, Vyāsātīrtha draws attention to some important points in the light of which the entire problem might be viewed :

(1) The *a priori* grounds on which one could determine the philosophical line or direction in which the import of the texts might be taken to lie. It is for this purpose that he discusses the problem of Upajīvyā-pramāṇas with reference to the thesis of identity.

(2) The extent to which either party could claim to adhere to a literal interpretation of the text. The discussion on this point would make it clear that neither party is prepared or can afford to take the proposition, literally, as it stands :

युष्मदस्मद्विभागज्ञे स्यादर्थवदिदं वचः ।
अनभिज्ञेऽनर्थकं स्याद् बधिरेष्विव गायनम् ॥

(3) The logical necessity to go beyond and behind the denotation of the terms of the proposition, as they stand, or the relation in which they stand to each other, in order to arrive at the true sense of the proposition through a process of secondary signification (lakṣaṇārtha).

(4) The question of the nature and extent of the "lakṣaṇā" to be applied i.e., to say whether it would be enough to apply lakṣaṇā in respect of only one of the terms "Tat" or "tvam", at a time, as the case may be, or whether, both the terms should be simultaneously subjected to a process of rarefaction by "Jahadajahallakṣaṇā"

The resort to Lakṣaṇā being *unavoidable* for both the parties, Vyāsātīrtha brings together as many new lines of explanation of the proposition as could be suggested with the *minimum* amount of logical, grammatical or syntactical liberty to be taken with the terms of the proposition, *as they are placed*.

He propounds five alternative interpretations of "Tat tvam asi", through Lakṣaṇā put upon the first term "Tat" and two explanations through Lakṣaṇā on "Tvam" and a few more *without* recourse to Lakṣaṇā on any of the terms, on the basis of case-syncretism and suffix-elisions, accepted in the Vyākaraṇa Śāstra. All these explanations rest upon the acceptance of the fundamental distinction between the Jīva and Brahman.

(A) EXPLANATIONS BASED ON LAKṢAṆĀ ON THE TERM "TAT"

(1) साहचर्यात् ताच्छब्दम्. Identity based on association is referred to by the author of the *Mahābhāṣya*, as a recognized mode of expression. He cites the example : वसन्त अध्ययनम् under Pāṇini iv, 2, 63, which he justifies on the ground साहचर्यात् ताच्छब्दं भविष्यति वसन्तसहचरितमध्ययनं वसन्त इति । The close association of the Jīva and Brahman is clearly borne out by the Śrutis द्वा सुपर्णा सयुजा सखाया etc.

(2) तदाश्रितत्वात् तदिति व्यपदेशः । Identity by virtue of basic relationship with another is another recognized mode of expression accepted by Patañjali, in his interpretation of Pāṇini's sūtra समर्थः पदविधिः

(ii, 1, 1) where the term “समर्थ” is taken to be used in the sense of “समर्थाश्रितः” through Upacāra. Such identity in the form of *āśrayāśrayibhāva* is implied in the passage—सर्वाः प्रजाः सदायतनाः सत्प्रतिष्ठाः occurring in Uddālaka's discourse.

(3) ततो जातत्वात् तदिति व्यपदेशः । The language of identity is also employed where one thing happens to be the source of another. Cf. the text—ब्राह्मणोऽस्य मुखमासीत् (the Brahmin was His face) by which is meant that the Brahmin was *born of* the face of the Virāt Puruṣa. Such figurative usage is to be met with in—“इग्यणः संप्रसारणम् (Pāṇ. i, 1, 45), where the term “Saṁprasāraṇam” is explained in the *Mahābhāṣya* as vowels *resulting from* a specific kind of vowel-gradation known as Saṁprasāraṇam : संप्रसारणाज्जातो वर्णः संप्रसारणम् just as, in ordinary parlance, we speak of a crow born of another crow or a hawk born of another by the same names : यथा काकाज्जातः काकः, श्येनाज्जातः श्येनः, एवं संप्रसारणाज्जातो वर्णः संप्रसारणः । In the present case, the Jīvas are clearly stated to have originated from the Brahman—सन्मूलाः सोम्येमाः सर्वाः प्रजाः । In this sense then, they might be spoken of as Brahman (Tat) born as they are of Brahman.

(4) तदधीनत्वात् तदिति व्यपदेशः । Identity by reason of dependence is a recognized idiom in Mīmāṃsaka usage. Cf. धान्यमसि, घिनुहि देवान्, where rice is referred to as धान्यम् (grain) by lakṣaṇā because it is *produced from grains* : धान्याधीनोत्पत्तिके तण्डुले धान्यशब्दप्रयोगः । The dependence of the Jīva on Brahman is vividly brought out in the present context in the *Chāndogya* and elsewhere : प्राणबन्धनं हि सोम्य मनः । यथास्मिन् आकाशे श्येनो वा सुपर्णो वा विपरिपत्य श्रान्तः * * * ॥ The declaration “Tat tvam asi” could, therefore, be taken in the figurative sense of तदधीनः त्वमसि through the same kind of lakṣaṇā¹ as in “धान्यमसि”. Such usages are frequently to be met with the Brāhmaṇas and Upaniṣads and in lay and scientific literature and are based on a definite and well-known principle of linguistic reference : यदधीना यस्य सत्ता तत्तदित्येव भण्यते ।

(5) Identity in virtue of resemblance : अतिदेशोऽयम् । तद्वत् त्वमसीत्यर्थः । This principle is embodied in the interpretation of Pāṇini's Sūtra : बहुगणवतुडति संख्या (i, 1, 23). It is pointed out by Patañjali, under this sūtra, that it is not the purpose of the sūtra to *designate bahu, gaṇa* and the suffix *vatup* and *dati* as numerals; for, in that case, numerals like eka, dvi, etc., would not be comprehended by the sūtra संख्यापूर्वो द्विगुः in view of the specific rule of interpretation : कृत्रिमाकृत्रिमयोः कृत्रिमे कार्यसंप्रत्ययः । The difficulty is met by Patañjali by pointing out that the expression “संख्या” in the sūtra i, 1, 23 is not meant to be a *designation*. It is merely used to convey the sense of similitude: बहुगणवतुडतयः संख्यावद् भवन्ति । The expression “संख्या” is thus presumed to be used in the extended sense of “संख्यावत्” though the suffix “वति” expressing similitude, is not used by the Sūtrakāra. This contraction or elision of the suffix is clearly

1. Cf. Śaṅkara on B. S. ii, 4, 17-19 and *Bhāmātī* thereon :

तस्मात् प्राणरूपताभिधानमिन्द्रियाणां प्राणायत्ततया भावतं गमयितव्यम् ।

explained by Patañjali, who says that similarity may be expressed even without the actual employment of a specific suffix like “वति” : अन्तरेणापि वतिमतिदेशोऽवगम्यते । For example, when people refer to one who is not Brahmādatta as Brahmadatta, we take it that they simply mean that he is very much *like* Brahmādatta : अब्रह्मदत्तं ब्रह्मदत्त इत्याह । तेन वयं मन्यामहे ब्रह्मदत्त-सदृशोऽयमिति (*Mahābhāṣya*). Such resemblance between the Jīva and Brahman is undoubtedly there : तद्गुणसारत्वात् तद्वचपदेशः (B. S. ii, 3, 29), since both are of the nature of reality, knowledge and bliss. “Tat tvam asi” then, should be understood to mean—तद्वत् त्वमसि (Thou art *like* It), despite the language of identity. Such identifications by reason of resemblance are provided for in the Mīmāṃsā Sūtra : सारूप्यात् (i, 4, 25) and have been suitably illustrated : आदित्यो यूषः ।

(B) EXPLANATIONS BASED ON LAKṢAṆĀ ON THE TERM “TVAM”

(1) The moon is commonly said to be found among the branches of a tree—शाखासु चन्द्रः by reason of its proximity to them, in popular imagination. This is known as शाखाचन्द्रन्याय. Here the term “शाखा” signifies vicinity of the branches (शाखासदेशः) by *lakṣaṇā*. In the same way, Brahman, which is always close to the Jīva and dwells in his heart (‘य आत्मनि तिष्ठन्’ ईश्वरः सर्वभूतानां हृद्देशे तिष्ठति’), may be designated by the term “Tvam” meaning त्वत्सदेशम्—existing by your side.

(2) Brahman, as the highest sustaining force of the Jīvas, (āśraya) may be referred to as “Tvam” even as the Brahmin is spoken of in the Purāṇas as “all the gods,” in the sense of his being the adhiṣṭhāna or āśraya, of all of them : ताः सर्वा वेदविदि ब्राह्मणे निवसन्ति ।

(3) Brahman, being the source of all, may be identified with the Jīvas (tvam) in the same way as a brush made of darbha-grass (Prastara) is referred to in the Brāhmaṇa texts as the Sacrificer himself : यजमानः प्रस्तरः । in virtue of its being able to accomplish the work of the Yajamāna (sacrificer). Such interpretations have the full support and sanction of the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā Sūtras (i, 4, 23) : तत्सिद्धिजातिसारूप्यप्रशंसाभूमलिङ्गसमवायात् । It would thus be clear that a single Jahallakṣaṇā, at a time, operated by the Dvaitin, involves less strain on the imagination than the process of double-lakṣaṇā, in terms of both the correlates (Tat and tvam) resorted to by the Advaitin. Such Jahad-ajahallakṣaṇā, moreover, is obliged to reintroduce an element in denotation (शक्यैकदेश) which has once been abandoned at the outset, on account of incompatibility of the expressed sense in its entirety whereas Jahallakṣaṇā is free from such a self-contradictory procedure in interpreting *Tat* and *tvam*, in terms of तदधीनत्व, तात्स्थ्य etc.

(C) EXPLANATIONS WITHOUT RECOURSE TO LAKṢAṆĀ

(1) Vyāsatīrtha argues further, that according to the well-known principle of grammatical science, the substantival sense (प्रातिपदिकार्थ) has precedence over the sense of the case-suffix (विभक्त्यर्थ). The

Mīmāṃsakas agree to modify the sense of plurality (*bahutva*) conveyed by the case-suffix in “पाशान्”, in the Vedic text “अदितिः पाशान् प्रमुमोक्तु” and restrict it to the singular number which is part and parcel of the *Prātipadika*.¹ On the strength of Pāṇini (vii, 1, 39) : सुपां सुलुक् * * * the substantival form alone, without the case-suffix or the nominative itself may take the place of any oblique case. As the *Prātipadikārtha* is entitled to precedence over the *vibhaktiyartha*, the term “Tat” may be invested with the full sense of the *Prātipadika* as denoting a being possessed of the distinctive attributes of *sarvajñatva* etc. This distinctive sense of the *Prātipadika* ought to be guaranteed with a suitable adjustment of the case-sense—तेन त्वमसि । तस्य त्वमसि, तस्मिन् त्वमसि etc., in order to make proper sense out of the proposition as it stands. In this explanation, the sense of the oblique cases is overridden by the substantive on the strength of सुपां सुलुक् । ‘सुपां सुलुक्’ इत्यादिना तृतीयाविभक्त्यादेर्लुक् । प्रथमैकवचनादेशो वा (Nym.). The grammatical sanction for making the substantive do duty for the oblique cases is recognized in the *Kāśikā Vṛtti* : ‘सुपां सुलुक्’ इति सूत्रे ‘यत्सुन्वन्ति तत्सामिधेनीरन्वाहुः । यस्मिन् तस्मिन् इति प्राप्ते ॥

The precedence given to the case-sense in “प्रोद्गातृणाम्...” over the *Prātipadikārtha*, is due to the fact that there is no warrant in *Vyākaraṇa* for giving a singular sense to a genitive plural and so considerations of *vibhaktisvārasya* prevail over that of the *Prātipadika*. But in the present case, the replacement of the oblique cases by the substantive form is expressly provided for in the *sūtra* सुपां सुलुक् and it is on the basis of this sanction that the *Dvaitin* contends that the substantive form “tat” in “Tat tvam asi,” should be taken in the sense of the instrumental and other suitable cases, so as to preserve and uphold the full sense of the *Prātipadika* (as a Being endowed with the inalienable attributes of omniscience etc.) which marks it off from the imperfect souls. *Vyāsatīrtha* observes in this connection that the lead given by the *Mīmāṃsakas*, in rendering प्रयाजशेषेण हवींष्यभिघारयति into प्रयाजशेषं हविष्यु क्षारयेत् in order to give the substantive sense the highest syntactical prominence, even though it may necessitate an interference with the case-suffix and its change from the instrumental to the accusative, is sufficient to establish the reasonableness of the position taken up by the *Dvaita Vedāntin* in the interpretation of “Tat” as *tena. tasmāt, tasya* and *tasmin* (‘Tvam asi’), so as to give prominence to the content of the *Prātipadika* and prevent it from being sacrificed or subordinated to consideration of mere apposition of case-forms (विभक्तिसामानाधिकरण्य) in the present proposition, as it stands.

(D) INTERPRETATION WITHOUT LAKṢAṆĀ OR ĀDEŚA AND BASED ON A NEW ANTECEDENT FOR “TAT”

Vyāsatīrtha also quotes another explanation of “Tat tvam asi”, in terms of absolute dependence of everything in the world, on God. This is arrived at without any kind of figurative construction or interference with the wording of the text as it is. According to this explanation,

1. Pāṇ. ii, 3. 46.

“Tat tvam asi” would be a repetition of the predication preceding it viz., ऐतदात्म्यमिदं सर्वम्. Viewed in this syntactic setting, it would mean that (like everything else in the Universe) the human soul too, is as much absolutely dependent on the Supreme Source and Sustainer of all. The form of the proposition would be : इदं सर्वमैतदात्म्यं (एतत्त्वामिकम्) त्वं (अपि) तत् (ऐतदात्म्यम्) असि. The expression “ऐतदात्म्यम्” (being an abstract noun formed out of a compound of *eṣaḥ* and *ātmā*) would convey the idea of dependence by its every formation:—एष चासावात्मा च एतदात्मा तस्येदं ऐतदात्म्यम् i.e., belonging to the Supreme Being. Such an interpretation would have the additional advantage of securing a better and a more natural agreement in gender for the neuter pronoun “Tat” with its antecedent “aitadātmīyam” (also a neuter noun) than with a masculine noun like स आत्मा as in the commonly accepted view. This explanation appears, for the first time, in Madhva’s *GT*. It is quite a natural and happy one, save for the slight difficulty in taking the suffix “व्यञ्” in ऐतदात्म्यम् in a proprietary sense, instead of in the substantive (स्वार्थे) or abstract sense (भावे) in which it is generally prescribed. The difficulty has been overcome by Jayatīrtha¹ (and following him by Vyāsātīrtha),² by bringing the taddhita-formation, here, under the Vyākaraṇa dictum : विचित्रा हि तद्वितगतिः ।

(E) VIŚIṢṬĀDVAITIC EXPLANATION

There is yet another line of explanation of *Tat tvam asi*, adopted by the Viśiṣṭādvaitins according to which “tvam” does not denote the Jīva as such but Brahman that has the Jīva for its body. According to this explanation, the language of identity, used here, should be taken to be grounded in an ultimate relation of body and soul subsisting between the Jīva and Brahman. This interpretation is only a variation of the Dvaita view that the text does not intend to teach any identity of essence between the two.

(F) INTERPRETATION BASED ON A NEW PADACCHEDA—ATAT TVAM ASI

After giving a clear exposition of these lines of interpretation of *Tat tvam asi*, in harmony with the basic idea of dependence of the souls on the Supreme Being, Vyāsātīrtha turns his attention to another alternative explanation of the text on the basis of a new reading *Atat tvam asi*, adopted by Madhva, for the first time in the history of the interpretation of the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*. It is a new departure of Madhva, not known to or accepted by any other school. But it is not to be dismissed from consideration, on that account. Its novelty should be no reason for stigmatizing it as “forced” or artificial. In the traditions of orthodox philosophy,

1. ऐतदात्म्यम् एतत्त्वामिकम् एतदीयमिति सिद्धयति । अथवा, एष चासावात्मा च एतदात्मा । ‘विचित्रा हि तद्वितगतिः’ इति वचनाद् एतदात्मन इदमित्यर्थे तद्वितोऽयमित्युक्तं भवति । Jayatīrtha points out that the use of the suffix in the “भाव” sense is superfluous even for the Advaitin : भावप्रत्ययस्तु परस्यापि व्यर्थः । ततो वैयर्थ्यादियन्तिरग्रहणस्य ज्यायस्वात् (VTNt. p. 65).

2. Nym. p. 596.

in India, the adoption of a new or changed reading is not a matter of such great importance, as it is in modern opinion. In traditional philosophical criticism, it is not so much the choice of this or that reading, but the *reason* justifying its acceptance and the conclusions that follow from it, that matter most. All the intricate discussions of the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā interpretation would be love's labour lost, if a simple or implicit adherence to the literal disposition of texts were the last word on the science of textual or Śāstraic interpretation and the password of entry into the spirit of texts. The original texts of Indian philosophy, like the Upaniṣads, are cast in a peculiar mould and contain so many enigmas that a strict and literal adherence to their wording would lead us nowhere and defeat its very purpose.¹

Indian philosophers have not been sticklers for literal adherence to texts *under all circumstances*. The peculiarity of Indian modes of thought and exposition, are such that one has to get behind the words and try to determine the import of passages and the context of topics, rather than simply follow the letter of the texts in which they happen to be couched : तात्पर्याद् वृत्तिः । न तु वृत्तेस्तात्पर्यम् । (*Advaitasiddhi*). The readings of particular commentators could be challenged in traditional circles only when they could be shown to lead to absurd results or involve serious self-contradictions in thought or conflict with other clearly worded passages in the same text. An old reading is not sacrosanct because of its antiquity or a new one suspect because of its novelty. Readings should be judged on their merits, upon considerations of logical satisfyingness, contextual plausibility and other internal evidences.

The purpose of illustrations, where they are provided, is to *clarify* and not to *confuse* the issue. Where there is a possibility of difference of opinion about the nature of the thesis set forth, illustrations given in the text have a natural and legitimate right to lead the way and point to the correct and proper interpretation of the passage. Where there is ambiguity of expression, the illustrations used, naturally, get probative value as explanatory comments from which position of vantage they could not be dislodged by any amount of special pleading, such as that they are explanatory and not probative; or that they are not sufficiently explicit; or that analogies do not run on all fours or that they are indifferent to both sides of the question² and so on.

It is here that Madhva's interpretation as *Atat tvam asi*, is on firm ground. It is not, therefore, as a desperate remedy or a *pis aller* or even as a *tour de force* that he has adopted the reading. Says Vyāsatīrtha : 'स आत्मा तत्त्वमसी' त्यत्र, यद्यपि द्वेष्टा पदच्छेदः संभवति, तथापि, भिन्नशकुनिसूत्रादिदृष्टान्तैः 'अतत्' इति छेदः ॥ (*Nym.* p. 597). It should, therefore, be noted that Madhva and his commentators have based their reading "Atat tvam asi," on a careful consideration of the wording and drift of the nine illustrative instances given by Uddālaka. It is an obvious and elementary principle of thought

1. Cf. असद्वा इदमग्र आसीत् । यजमानः प्रस्तरः ।
आदित्यो यूपः । प्राणस्त्वम् । त्वं यज्ञः ।

2. Cf. *Advaitasiddhi*, pp. 836-37 (Bby. 1917).

that illustrations given to support a thesis must be appropriate to it and should not suggest a contrary thesis. It is precisely here that the Advaitic interpretation of "Tat tvam asi" fails to give satisfaction and breaks down.

Some of the illustrations used fail not only to support the notion of identity between the *dārṣṭāntikas* cited; but even suggest strongly the existence of a deep-lying difference between them. This underlying incongruity of illustrations with the thesis put forward by him, is felt by the Advaitin; which, in the interest of his *Siddhānta*, he has tried his best to gloss over, in various ways, by pleading some lame excuse or other. These are naturally exposed by the Dvaitin, in strengthening his position.

A careful consideration of the actual wording and trend of the illustrations used would show the justness of the Dvaitins' contention, that they are naturally in favour of the thesis of difference and have no quarter to give to identity. The more obvious illustrations, in this connection, are those of (1) the branches of a tree sustained by the life-giving principle : (जीवेनात्मनानुप्रभूतो मोदमानस्तिष्ठति) (2) the hawk tied to a post, wandering here and there, and finally retiring to rest in its nest (3) a quantity of salt dissolved in water becoming imperceptible afterwards, though the taste of it *persists* in it (4) a traveller losing his way to Gandhāra while passing through a trackless region (5) a thief caught with stolen property on his person, being called upon to establish his innocence by trial by fire ordeal. These are unmistakably in favour of an underlying difference between the *dārṣṭāntikas* (Jīva and Brahman). For, just as the branches of the tree and the tree (or rather the *Vṛkṣajīva* himself) would wither away in the absence of the life-giving principle called "Jīva-ātmā",¹ the "tvam" in the *dārṣṭāntika*, must, likewise be taken to be sustained by the "Tat" which would imply a natural difference between the two. The salt dissolved in water is seen to pervade every jot and tittle of it though remaining imperceptible. Even so, the Supreme Being encompasses the souls (*tvam*) at all times and has penetrated into each and every one of them as their *Antaryāmī* (immanent principle).² We have lost our way on the journey to Heaven and must be instructed by a proper guide. The analogy of theft could have significance only if there is real difference between the Jīva and Brahman. It would be out of place on the Advaitic view, as has already been pointed out.³ There is no point in accusing X of misappropriation or "theft" in claiming what is truly *his* (viz. *Brahmatva*).⁴ A Dualistic teacher could not have hit upon a more graphic analogy than of "apahāra" or laying false claim to identity with the Supreme Overlord of the Universe, which, in his opinion, would deserve the most condign punishment of

1. Madhva has convincingly shown in his *VTN*. that the subject of the analogy here is not a mere "tree" but the "Vṛkṣajīva" who flourishes only insofar as he is energized by an Over-self 'स एष जीवेनात्मनानुप्रभूतः पेयीयमानो मोदमानस्तिष्ठति' इत्यत्रापि जीवशब्देन परमात्माभिहितः । नहि चेतनादन्यस्य मोदभोगादिकं युज्यते ।

2. Cf. 'य आत्मनि तिष्ठन्;' (*Brh. Up.*); *Svet* i, 15-16.

3. See under Madhva's *Chāndogya Bhāṣya*.

4. परकीयब्रह्मत्वाभिमानो हि स्तेनः नतु विद्यमानब्रह्मत्वाज्ञानी ॥ (Jayatirtha)

divine wrath. (त इह व्याघ्रो वा...). The language of 'theft' and 'misappropriation' would still be out of place, even if the point at issue were merely one of the different destinies awaiting the knower and the ignorant, as contended by the Advaitin. The example of the sick man, struggling to recognize and speak with his relatives, on his deathbed, would be pointless if the intention is not to bring out the dependence of the human beings on a higher Power,—but merely to state by what steps the knower reaches Brahman, in which case, there would be no need to introduce a *sick man* or the details of his death pangs !

The other examples of dreamless sleep, the formation of honey from the various fruit juices and the rivers emptying themselves into the Ocean do not establish any identity between the Jīvas and Brahman. There are difficulties of grammar and language in the way of a facile interpretation of the expression अपीत here, in the sense of identity of essence. There is doctrinal misfit in looking upon the state of Suṣupti as one of pure identity between Ātman and Brahman, which would be inconsistent with the views expressed by Śaṅkara himself in his Bhāṣya on सुषुप्त्युत्क्रान्त्योर्भेदेन *B. S. i, 3, 42*, and *Brh. Up. iv, 3, 21* and the dogma of Advaita, that even in dreamless sleep, the difference between Jīva and Brahman persists.

There can be no destruction of individual essence or taste, in the formation of honey by the combination of the juices of different flowers. The taste of honey so formed would suffice to prove that different ingredients have entered into its composition. It is either a mixture or a modification. The former would be different from its constituents and the latter would be a new product. In any case, the drops from different flowers could not be said to divest themselves of their individual potencies¹ or enter into a state of identity with honey that is already in existence, there, as the only reality that exists, as is said to be the case with reference to the Jīvas and Brahman. Prior to the admixture of different juices, there is no honey to speak of, with which individual juices could be said to become identified : नहि नानावृक्षरसा अन्योन्यं भेदत्यागेन प्राक्सिद्धेन मधुना ऐक्यमापद्यन्ते । न वा प्राक् भेदभ्रान्तिविषयाः पश्चात् तदविषयाः । किन्त्वन्योन्यं भिन्ना एव प्राक्सिद्धं मधूत्वादयन्ति । न चेदं दार्ष्टान्तिकानुगुणम् ॥ (*Nym. p. 597*).

The analogy of rivers merging in the Ocean is equally inadequate as a proof of identity. There are only three conceivable ways in which rivers could be said to become identical with the Sea (1) by the two wholes or totalities, hitherto going under the names of river and ocean, getting themselves disintegrated into their atomic constituents and forming or re-forming a new whole again; or (2) the totalities becoming identical straightway as they are; or (3) the aqueous atoms of both becoming identical. None of these possibilities could be applied to the dārṣṭāntikas in the present case (Jīva and Brahman). The first one would be blasphemous and un-Vedāntic. It is out of question for one totality (अवयवी) to become another and as for their constituent elements, they would always remain

1. See *Tattvamuktāvalī* of Gauḍa Pūrṇānanda, 81-83.

different. The popular notion of rivers becoming identical with the Sea is ridiculed and dismissed as unsound by Vācaspati Miśra, in his *Bhāmati* on Śaṅkara's *bhāṣya* on B. S. i, 4, 22 : का पुनर्नद्यभिमतता आयुष्मतः ? किं पाथः परमाणवः ? उत्तैषां संस्थानभेदः ? आहोस्वित् तदारब्धोऽवयवी ? तत्र संस्थानभेदस्य वा अवयविनो वा समुद्रनिवेशे विनाशात् कस्य समुद्रेणैकता ? नवीपाथः परमाणूनां तु, समुद्रपाथः परमाणुभ्यः पूर्वावस्थिताभ्यो भेद एव नाभेदः । एवं समुद्रादपि तेषां भेद एव । Furthermore, there is an undeniable increase in volume when a quantity of water is mixed with another, which proves that the two Avayavīs have *not* been and could not be reduced to a single entity : मिथ्यैतदन्यद् द्रव्यं हि नैति तद्द्रव्यतां यतः । (*Viṣṇu Purāṇa*). The individual traits are not destroyed by mixing up of waters, either. This is clear from the persistence of some of their distinctive features even afterwards: पूतापूतयोः सितासितयोर्मधुरलवणयोर्जलयोर्मेलने उभयगुणदर्शनाच्च ॥ (*Nym.* p. 598 b). These two illustrations, of the juices of flowers and rivers, should therefore be taken to draw attention to the fundamental distinction between Jīvas and Brahman of which man has been rendered oblivious by the clouding of his vision through Avidyā and egotism. It is to eradicate this ignorance and egotism which engender in us a false sense of independence, that Uddālaka seeks, in various ways, to bring home to his son, the truth of the absolute dependence of all, upon the Supreme Being, by such telling analogies as those of the mighty Nyagrodha tree being sustained by the imperceptible and inscrutable power hidden within the infinitesimal seeds and the inability of any organism to thrive or survive when the sustaining force of that Unseen Power (of God) is withdrawn; or the still more graphic example of the utter helplessness of man on his deathbed and his absolute dependence for the supply and continuation of his life-force upon that Supreme Power. The phenomenon of death is so universal that it makes reflecting minds see in it a deep and intimate relationship between the finite and the infinite. The phenomena of Suṣupti and death chosen by the Upaniṣad are the most significant in this connection, inasmuch as man is face to face with his littleness there and is no longer obsessed with the notion of egotism and independence by which he is at *other times* assailed and misled :

आद्यखण्डे, स्वातंत्र्यशंकानास्पदसुषुप्तिनिदर्शनेन, चतुर्थे चान्वयव्यतिरेकोक्त्या, अष्टमे च स्वातंत्र्य-शंकानास्पदमरणनिवर्शनेनच, ईश्वराधीनत्वस्योक्तत्वात्, 'अतत्' इत्येव छेदो युक्तः ॥ (*Nym.*).

In view of these considerations, Vyāsātīrtha points out that a natural and primary interpretation of Uddālaka's teaching could be found in terms of the underlying difference between the human souls and God and the utter dependence of the souls on Him, by agreeing to read the text as "Atat tvam asi", rather than as "Tat tvam asi". In doing so, he points out that there is no violence to any rules of Sanskrit grammar. It would be a simple case of "Savarṇadīrgha-sandhi" or lengthening of the vowel due to coalescence of the final and initials of the two words *ātmā* and *atat*. Such a direct interpretation would also obviate the necessity for any kind of Lakṣaṇā, whether partial or complete, *jahat* or *ajahat*, which would be a great gain :

वाक्यशेषानुसारेण मुख्यार्थस्यैव संभवे ।

तद्विरुद्धानेकपदलक्षणा नैव युज्यते ॥

It is no argument against Madhva's interpretation of the text that none of his predecessors had split the text as *Atat tvam asi*. There is no logical or metaphysical necessity that he should do exactly as others had done. There can be no hope of philosophical progress if one should blindly follow one's predecessors and be satisfied with slavishly echoing their views and repeating their interpretations. It is true that Madhva's interpretation is a new one and stands alone without support or acceptance from any other school, ancient or modern. That simply means that he has given fresh thought to the question and has been bold enough to express dissatisfaction with the received interpretations. He is *the first to draw attention to the glaring inconsistency of the illustrative instances used in the text, with the thesis of identity supposed to be conveyed by Uddālaka*. This, by itself, is a remarkable achievement and discovery of Madhva, for which he deserves credit, even if we do not accept his new *padaccheda* : *Atat tvam asi*. It is not with a view to escaping the accepted reading of "Tat tvam asi", that Madhva has suggested the new reading "Atat tvam asi". He has himself adopted the familiar reading, in some of his works and explained the text in terms of the dependence of the Jīvas on Brahman and their fundamental difference from It. But he seems to have felt that the other *Padaccheda* would be more *clearly and directly expressive* of the *natural trend of the illustrations* of Uddālaka which indisputably favour the idea of the reality of the difference between the Jīvas and Brahman, and bring it out *more prominently* than the other reading, from which it has to be elicited by interpretation. As this new reading is not open to any grammatical or contextual objections, it must be carefully considered by all, irrespective of its novelty. It would be uncritical for ancient and modern scholars alike, to reject it simply because it is not "traditional"¹ or *fashionable* ! Another point to be noted, says Vyāsatīrtha, is that the spirit of Madhva's interpretation remains the same, whichever reading is adopted. It is to emphasise this point that he has expounded over a score of interpretations of Uddālaka's *upadeśa* in the light of the doctrine of Jīva-Brahma-bheda, with the reading "Tat tvam asi" itself, and dealt with Madhva's new interpretation in terms of "Atat tvam asi", as the twentyfirst explanation of the said *Upadeśa*. The details of *anyataralakṣaṇā* on "Tat" and "tvam" and the other explanations based on सुपां सुलुक्... (Pāṇ. vii, 1, 39) set forth by him, are sufficient to show that the Dvaita Vedāntins have not tried to run away from the accepted reading "Tat tvam asi" or fight shy of it. The reading "Atat tvam asi" put forward by Madhva, is thus an alternative one, suggested in all sincerity and seriousness, as his own distinctive contribution to the interpretation of the famous *Upadeśa* of Uddālaka. After discussing

1. It may be mentioned that Madhva has cited the authority of certain Post-Upaniṣadic interpretative sources like the *Sāma-Saṁhitā*, in his *Chāndogya-Bhāṣya*, in support of his new *padaccheda* as *Atat tvam asi*.

different interpretations based on the reading “*Tat tvam asi*”, in favour of the Dvaitins’ case, Vyāsatīrtha discusses equally exhaustively the interpretation based on “*Atat tvam asi*” and shows that it is also equally well-grounded and unassailable. It may therefore be safely asserted that the Dvaitin has no special preference or partiality for any particular reading : *Tat tvam asi* or *Atat tvam asi*, so far as the interpretation of the famous Upadeśa of Uddālaka is concerned.

DIALECTIC SEQUEL TO THE NYĀYĀMṚTA

1. THE CHALLENGE OF MADHUSŪDANA SARASVATĪ

The *Nyāyāmṛta* was the highest dialectic achievement of Dvaita philosophy and still remains the last word on Dvaita-Advaita polemics. It was a splendid attempt at focussing controversial attention on the basic principles and dogmas of Advaita Vedānta and drawing attention to their untenability. The campaign opened by Vyāsatīrtha, with all the resources of the dialectical machinery of Navya-Nyāya, the Vyākaraṇa and the Mīmāṃsā Śāstras, not to speak of his close and penetrating criticisms of the Sūtra-interpretations of Śaṅkara and his school, in his *Tātparyā-Candrikā*, seems early to have had the intended effect of shaking the self-complacency of the Advaita thinkers and spurring them to fresh lines of thought and activity. But, for some time in the beginning, no complete or systematic rejoinder to the *Nym.* as a whole or the entire ground of metaphysical system-building covered by it, had been attempted from the Advaitic side. There were only a few partial and sporadic attempts at repulsing some of the general criticisms of Vyāsatīrtha, notably by Nṛsiṃhāśrama and Appayya Dikṣita. But these criticisms were obviously inadequate. The refutations contained in the *Advaitadīpikā* and *Bhedadhikkāra* of Nṛsiṃhāśrama had touched but the fringe of the problem; while Appayya Dikṣita, unfortunately, side-tracked the issue into *theological channels*. These critics were, however, promptly met on their own ground and repulsed by Vyāsatīrtha's gifted pupil Vijayīndra Tīrtha. A complete and systematic vindication of Advaita metaphysics from purely logical and philosophical points of view, against the consolidated criticisms of the Dvaita school, contained in the *Nym.*, was yet to come. It was Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, the great logician of Bengal, that ultimately came to the rescue of the Advaita school and took up the challenge thrown by Vyāsatīrtha, in full.

Certain facts connected with the history of the Nyāyāmṛta-Advaita-siddhi polemics oblige us to date Madhusūdana between c. 1540-1600. The dates proposed for him by Cinnasvāmi Śāstri (viz., 1575-1640) and Kuppusvāmi Śāstri (viz., 1625-1700) are not tenable. For, the *Advaita-siddhi* was criticised by (1) Rāmācārya, a disciple of Raghūttama Tīrtha (1557-95), probably about 1590 and (2) by Ānandabhaṭṭāraka, father of Vidyādhīśa Tīrtha (1619-31). Ānandabhaṭṭāraka's work presupposes the *Taraṅgiṇī* of Rāmācārya. We learn from the *Vidyādhīśa Vijaya* that it was after the death of his father, Ānandabhaṭṭāraka, that Vidyādhīśa (then Narasiṃhācārya) left his native village and migrated to Paithan and other places and was finally ordained by Raghūttama's successor in or about 1616 A.D. We cannot, therefore, assign the *Nym-Kaṇṭhakoddhāra* of Ānandabhaṭṭāraka to a date beyond 1595. These facts go to show that

the *Advaitasiddhi* of Madhusūdana must have come into existence by about 1585 and that its challenge was promptly accepted and answered by two eminent Dvaita scholars Rāmācārya and Ānandabhaṭṭāraka, within a few years of its appearance.

The *Advaitasiddhi* was a clever and learned attempt at parrying the objections brought forward by Vyāsātīrtha against the soundness and acceptability of the Advaitic metaphysics. It strove to take complete stock of the situation and set the house in order by repairing the breaches and closing up internal cleavages of opinion and blocking all possible loopholes in its defence, so as to present a strong and united front.

Its author was well-equipped for this task by his mastery over the details of his system, his up to date training in the Śāstraic learning of his day and his great debating skill. But, with all his abilities and equipment, he could not successfully establish his thesis of monism : ब्रह्म सत्यं जगन्मिथ्या जीवो ब्रह्मैव नापरः । in the light of reason, revelation and experience. He grappled with his task with great skill, energy and enthusiasm. But his ultimate failure to establish his position was due not so much to intellectual inferiority (मतिदौर्बल्यम्) as to the inherent weakness and limitations of his thesis (मतदौर्बल्यम्). This battle of wits and brisk exchange of criticism between the two schools brought to the forefront not only the irreconcilable points of difference between them; but also the natural limitations of either system of thought. Vyāsātīrtha's penetrating analysis of all the possible alternatives in which particular concepts of Advaita could be defined makes it clear that the limitations of thought pointed out by him could not be overcome by any amount of ingenious tinkering at or manipulation of its definitions and concepts or by other verbal juggleries.

No amount of artificial distinction between Asat and Mithyā, on the basis of क्वचिदप्युपाधौ सत्त्वेन प्रतीयनर्हत्वम् and प्रतिपन्नोपाधौ त्रैकालिकनिषेधप्रतियोगित्वम् could really disguise the fact that the "Anirvacanīya" or "Mithyā" of the Advaita is, in the last analysis, indistinguishable from Asat, so long as it is frankly admitted that the Anirvacanīya object is absolutely stultified:

अनिर्वचनीयस्यापि स्वरूपेण त्रैकालिकनिषेधे, असतः अनिर्वचनीयादन्यतासिद्धेः (Nym.)

As a matter of fact, even the Buddhist Nihilist cannot do without a *tertium quid* which is akin to the Prātibhāsikasatya or Mithyābhūta of the Advaita, as the Śūnya must, of necessity, appear to be other than what it is, if the world-experience is to be viewed as illusory, even on the Buddhist view. It is indisputable that the Mithyābhūta agrees with the Asat, in one *fundamental* respect of being स्वरूपेण त्रैकालिकनिषेधप्रतियोगि, whatever other features it may have of its own; and that is enough for the present issue.

The critique of Difference attempted by the *Advaitasiddhi* is equally *mystifying* :

न वयं भेदप्रतीतेः स्वरूपं कारणं वापलपामः । किंतु, बाधितविषयत्वं ब्रूमः । भेदखण्डनयुक्तीनां तत्त्वतो भेदनिवारकत्वेऽपि व्यावहारिकभेदस्यानिराकरणात् । (*Advaitasiddhi*)

Such specious defences had been exposed by Jayātīrtha and others. The difficulties of logical interdependence etc., would have to be squarely faced

by one and all, irrespective of one's metaphysical predilections in respect of the *status* of difference. They cannot be liquidated by waving the magic wand of 'falsity' and pretending that all perception of difference is imaginary. For, there is a method even in madness and even appearances have to be properly accounted for. The difficulties in the way of rationalizing the concept of Difference are by no means laughed out of existence, by Dvaitins. All that they say is that their presence does not warrant the summary disposal of the conception of difference itself as something chimerical and indefinable. As Udayana¹ says, "Blue does not become unknowable or uncharacterizable, simply because a congenitally blind man could neither see it nor describe it." The difficulties involved in the conception of Difference could have nothing to do with its status, one way or the other. One may ask how a concept that is said to be riddled with so many contradictions could be invested with any kind of "Vyāvahāric reality" such as is patronizingly conceded to it, by the Advaitin :

न ह्यन्योन्याश्रयादिदृष्टस्य व्यावहारिकतापि दृष्टचरी (Nym. p. 547)

It is a pity, says Vyāsatīrtha, that instead of facing the issue honestly and squarely, the Advaitic dialecticians should have merely burked it by relegating Difference to the level of a magical show whereof no questions need be asked or could be answered :

परस्पराश्रितमपीन्द्रजालादिवत् दर्शयिष्यति ।

नहि मायायामसंभावनीयं नाम (Advaitasiddhi p. 790).

The same confusion of thought and shifting of ground are to be seen in his attempted criticism of the concept of Viśeṣas, as propounded by the Dvaita philosophers, in rationalizing the concept of Difference, as will be clear, later.

The treatment of texts, which clearly support the doctrine of the reality of Difference between Jīva and Brahman, is extremely evasive, as will be clear from Madhusūdana's remarks on :

1. द्वा सुपर्णा 2. याथातथ्यतोऽर्थान् व्यदधात * * * 3. जुष्टं यदा पश्यत्यन्यमीशम् 4. जक्षत् क्रीडन् * * 5. सन्मूलाः सोम्येमाः सर्वाः प्रजाः 6. स यथा शकुनिः सूत्रेण * * 7. प्राज्ञेनात्मना संपरिष्वक्तो 8. नद्यः प्राच्यः * *

The way in which these Śrutis are disposed of by him, leaves the impression that he was at his wit's end to find a new excuse every time a Bheda-Śruti was advanced or an irreducible measure of difference shown to underly an identity-text in dispute. The result is a medley of special pleading and shifting of standpoints : तात्पर्याद् वृत्तिर्नतु वृत्तेस्तात्पर्यम् (p. 832) भूतपूर्वगत्या संभवात् (580) देहेन्द्रियादिविलक्षणात्मपरत्वेन जीवेशपरत्वाभावात् (p. 825) भेदस्यापदार्थत्वादवाक्यार्थत्वाच्च (822) कल्पितभेदेनाप्युपपत्तेः (822, 829) स्फुटतरविक्षेपो नास्तीत्यभिप्रायेण स्वरूपप्राप्त्युक्तेः (836)

स्पष्टभेदाभावाभिप्रायेण वास्तवभेदाभेदयोरोदासीन्यात्

सर्वसाम्यस्य दृष्टान्ततायामन्तत्वात् (p. 836)

प्रजाशब्दस्य प्रजायमानवाचकत्वेन जीवस्य नित्यस्या-

प्रतिपादनात् (p. 832)

1. नहि जात्यन्धेन नीलं द्रष्टुं वक्तुं च न शक्यमिति, अज्ञेयमनिर्वचनीयमेव तत् ! नहि लक्षणापरिज्ञानमात्रेण स्पष्टदृष्टमपि लक्ष्यमपह्नोतुं शक्यते; अपरिज्ञानस्य दुरवगाहत्वेनाप्युपपत्तेः ! (Bauddhadhikkāra).

The author of the *Advaitasiddhi* has, thus, tried to make the best of a bad bargain and make a show of refuting the views of his adversary. His arguments are vitiated by tortuous tricks,¹ specious reasonings,² parodies,³ desperate remedies, half-hearted admissions, quibbles,⁴ *obiter dicta*,⁵ glaring misrepresentations and misunderstandings⁶ of the views of his adversaries and serious departure from the views of earlier writers of his own school.⁷ His contemptuous⁸ bearing towards his critics is in sharp contrast with the uniformly courteous attitude of the authors of the *Nyāyāmṛta* and the *Taraṅgiṇi*.

But with all its obvious limitations, of thought and manner, the *Advaitasiddhi* came to be recognized as a powerful work of the Advaita system and very early superseded the older Vādagranthas in the field. For, thanks to the historic challenge thrown by Vyāsātīrtha, this new dialectic work of the Advaita school had a rare opportunity of traversing the whole range of metaphysical system-building and arguing a case for Monism with a good deal of persuasive eloquence, debating skill and technical resources. The adherents of the Dvaita were thus, in their turn, obliged to take note of so learned, comprehensive and spectacular a work of the other school, written by an eminent Northerner and give it a suitable reply.

2. "VYĀSA"—RĀMĀCĀRYA AND HIS *TARAṅGIṆĪ*

(C. 1550-1620)

The most powerful refutation of the *Advaitasiddhi* came from "Vyāsa"—Rāmācārya, who wrote his *Taraṅgiṇi*, in complete refutation of Madhusūdana's work. This was, in turn, bitterly criticized by Brahmānanda Sarasvatī in his voluminous work, the *Gurucandrikā* (in addition to his *Laghucandrikā* on the same subject), which, in its turn, was refuted by Vana-mālī Miśra.

The author of the *Taraṅgiṇi* gives us adequate information about himself and his family. We learn from his introductory verses that he belonged

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1. Cf. (a) 'सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीत्' इत्यर्थस्याभाव एव नञा प्रतिपाद्यते । नत्वसतः सत्त्वम् ।
(b) 'शुद्धं स्वप्रकाशम्' इत्यस्य 'अशुद्धमस्वप्रकाशत्वव्यापकम्' इत्यर्थः ।
 2. प्रजाशब्दस्य प्रजायमानवाचकत्वेन, नित्यस्य जीवस्थाप्रतिपादनात् ।
 3. नूनं विवाहसमये कन्यायाः पित्रा निजगोत्रं पृष्टेन यदेव भवतां गोत्रं तदेव ममापीति वदतो वरस्य भ्राता भवान् । * * * p. 334.
 4. किं चोदयनाचार्यैः * * * *Brahmānandīya* p. 228.
अस्याचार्यवचसः * * * p. 123-24.
 5. आश्रयत्वादेः प्रस्थानान्तरत्वात् ।
 6. जगद्ब्रह्माणोरेकसत्त्वे जगतोऽसत्त्वमेव स्यात् p. 335.
 7. Vide remarks on सर्वप्रत्ययवेद्ये * * * (Maṇḍana) and comments of *Taraṅgiṇi* thereon (p. 305).
 8. तस्मात् वृथा रोदिषि मन्दबुद्धे (p. 709) इह कुमतिरतत्त्वे तत्त्ववादी वराकः प्रलपति यदकाण्डे
* * * See also Brahmānanda on (concluding verse) 'न तौ पशौ' (p. 724. *Advaita Siddhi* with *Brahmānandīya* NS. Press Bby.).

to the Upamanyu gotra and that his family name was "Vyāsa".¹ He mentions Ambāpurī, on the banks of the Godāvarī, as his native village (ii, p. 356). This is to be identified with the famous village of Puntāmbā in the present Ahmadnagar district of the Maharashtra State. His father's name is given as Viśvanātha (Vyāsa), and that of his grandfather as Murāri (Vyāsa). His father is said to have written a commentary on Madhva's *Sadācāra Smṛti*. Rāmācārya's elder brother, Nārāyaṇa,² is referred to as a distinguished scholar in Nyāya, Vyākaraṇa, Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta Śāstras (ver. 6).

Rāmācārya claims to have studied the Vyākaraṇa and other Śāstras under his elder brother and finished his study of Madhva Śāstra under the celebrated Madhva Saint, Raghūttama Tīrtha (1557-96) of the Uttarādi Mutt³ (ver. 4). Despite the unusual name of Viśvanātha borne by his father, there is no reason to doubt that the members of his family were ardent followers of Madhva.⁴ We have seen already that his father had commented upon Madhva's *Sadācāra Smṛti*.

Rāmācārya writes a clear and forcible style and reviews the criticisms and defences of the *Advaitasiddhi* in very close detail and brings out the invulnerability of the positions taken up by Vyāsatīrtha, under each topic. He describes his work, happily, as a glorious stream of Dualistic logic surging forth in full spate from the great mountain of Vyāsatīrtha :

व्यासाद्विसृततर्काम्बुपूरैः पक्षयुगंयुजि ।

न्यायामृततरङ्गिण्यां * * ।

He never indulges in personal abuse or sectarian passions even in the face of provocation by the *Advaitasiddhi*. It must be said to the lasting credit of Vyāsatīrtha and his eminent commentator that in this respect, they have shown themselves far superior to their respective critics, in not deigning to substitute abuse for arguments.⁵

'Atra vadanti' is how he always begins to quote from the *Advaitasiddhi*.

Rāmācārya also draws attention to the fallacies and futilities of the Advaitic positions and brings out the inner limitations which lie at the back of some of the metaphysical causistries and special pleading of the

1. "Vyāsa" as a surname is to be found even to this day among Brahmin families in Gujarat and Maharashtra. Rāmācārya might, in all probability, have hailed from a Maharashtrian family. See Ch. XL.

2. Not the same as the author of *Advaitakālānala* who is later than Vidyādhiśa (1619-31). See Ch. XXXIII

3. मनोजजित्यां मनसां हि पत्या रघूत्तमाख्यं स्वगुरुं नमामि ॥

4. The needless confusion of Anantakrishna Sastri in this respect (Introd. to *Advaitasiddhi* C. O. S. ix) has been set at rest in my paper on Rāmācārya in *N. I. A.* (ii, 1940).

5. Cf. यत्तु—"न तो पशौ" * * * तन्न । शुक्लशारिकावद् ऊहापोहाक्षमस्य यथाकर्णितं वदतस्तथैवं वक्तुं युक्तत्वात् । सर्वतन्त्रस्वतन्त्रैर्भामतीकार * * * । न चैतत् सर्वं त्वादृशेन वराकेणापलपितुं शक्यम् । अथैवं वार्तिककारादिभिः किमिति नोक्तमिति चेत् । शृणु, रे मूढ * * * न त्वादृशानां परोपदेशमात्रगर्तशरणानां भीरुफेरूणां * * * (*Brahmānandīya*, p. 724.)

Advaitasiddhi. He opposes the desperate mutilation of the Upaniṣadic text : असदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीत् । resorted to by Madhusūdana : 'सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीत्' इत्यर्थस्याभाव एव नञा प्रतिपाद्यते नत्वसतः सत्त्वम् विरोधात् (चतुर्थमिथ्यात्वम्) in order to escape the possibility of Asat appearing as Sat (असतः सत्त्वेन प्रतीतिः), with a view to distinguishing between Asat conceived as क्वचिदप्युपाधौ सत्त्वेन प्रतीत्यनर्हत्वम् and 'falsity' (mithyātvam) conceived as प्रतिपन्नोपाधौ त्रैकालिक-निषेधप्रतियोगित्वम् । Rāmācārya demolishes the distinction by pointing out that the nullification of the sense of the Śruti *Sad evedam agra āsit*, being equivalent to a non-existence, it would again land us in some kind of acceptance of "असतः सत्त्वेन प्रतीतिः (which is heroically sought to be denied by the Advaitin) :

सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीदिति श्रुत्यर्थाभावस्य असत्त्वेन, असतः सत्त्वेन प्रतीत्यनिवारणात् (p. 11) सदेवेत्यस्य ब्रह्मसत्त्वमर्थः, तदभावश्चात्यन्तासन्नेव ॥ नहि ब्रह्मसत्त्वाभावः क्वचित् देशे काले वास्ति इति (p. 23)

The plea of the *Siddhivyākhyā* here, that such nullification of the meaning of the Śruti, is not a simple non-existence, but is itself an undefinable something : तादृशाभावस्यानिर्वचनीयतया तस्यैव सत्त्वेन प्रतीतेः । is quite unwarranted inasmuch as the Anirvacanīya is still an unproved category.

As a controversialist, Rāmācārya is scrupulously loyal to the *texts and traditions of the schools of thought he draws upon*, be they hostile or friendly. He does not twist evidence¹ or play tricks with them. He shows himself to be an accurate scholar of the Advaita system in all its important shades of thought and brings to light many old viewpoints which are otherwise likely to be forgotten. His knowledge of Advaita literature is wider and more accurate than Brahmānanda's knowledge of Dvaita doctrines or literature.²

RĀMĀCĀRYA'S DIALECTIC CONTRIBUTION

The evidence of the *Taraṅgiṇī* is conclusive that Rāmācārya was a profound scholar of Nyāya, Vyākaraṇa, Mīmāṃsā and Advaita systems and many other branches of learning, including Madhva philosophy. He elucidates the exegetic principles of the Mīmāṃsā and the Nyāya and the Vyākaraṇa Śāstras, with a marvellous grasp of their technicalities as presented in the leading works of those schools. He is quite at home with their methodological devices and details (Prakriyā)³ and makes effective use of them.

He keeps close to the recorded views of these schools with scrupulous loyalty and never twists texts to suit his positions or read his own ideas into them or impose upon them interpretations favourable to his needs. The discussion on the definition of "Jadātvam" as "ajñānatvam" furnishes

1. See Brahmānanda's remarks on Udayanācārya's view of Īśvarajñāna as pramā (valid knowledge), dismissing it as प्रौढिवाद (*Gurucandrikā*, Mysore edn. p. 162).

2. See *Brahmānandīya*, pp. 584, 893 and 898 (Bombay edn.).

3. Cf. *Taraṅgiṇī* p. 99 (Bby. edn.) where quoting Pāṇini इत्थंभूतलक्षणे * * * he argues that qualifications and adjuncts must necessarily confer some attributes on the qualified—उपलक्ष्ये कञ्चिद्धर्ममादधत एवोपलक्षणत्वम् । अत एव—'इत्थंभूतलक्षणे तृतीया' कञ्चित् प्रकारं प्राप्त इत्थंभूतः तस्य लक्षणे ज्ञापने तृतीयेति ॥

an instance in point. It has been argued by Vyāsātīrtha that if, in the syllogism विश्वं मिथ्या जडत्वात् the premise. *jaḍatvam* is understood in the sense of अज्ञानत्वम् even the Ātmacaitanya would have to be regarded as unreal (*mithyā*), inasmuch as according to the Advaitin, the term “jñāna”, could be applied only when the Caitanya gets suffused by the *antaḥkaraṇavṛtti*. But the *vṛtti* by itself and mere Caitanya as such, are *not jñāna* ! Granting that the pure self can somehow be regarded as jñāna, the Advaitin would have to define whether Ātman *qua* jñāna, falls under the category of valid or invalid knowledge. If knowledge viewed as self were valid, the objects of its perception would be valid too and hence realities ! Nor can ātmajñāna be taken to be a species of invalid knowledge, as it is not brought about by any defects (*doṣa*). A knowledge then, that cannot be defined either way, is no knowledge at all.

This objection is sought to be rebutted by Madhusūdana by contending that the Self can be regarded as knowledge, even if it does not fall under the category of Pramā or Bhrama ! He cites the case of *God's knowledge* and *indeterminate perception* in Nyāya philosophy, as falling outside the scope of both valid and invalid knowledge alike.¹ This is disputed by the author of the *Taraṅgiṇi* who says that there is no warrant for the view expressed by Madhusūdana, in the texts and traditions of the Nyāya school and clinches the matter with a quotation from the *Tattvacintāmaṇi* of Gaṅgeśa : प्रमामात्रे नानुगतो गुणः wherein it is clearly stated that each type of valid knowledge, perceptual, inferential, etc., has a distinctive determining factor or *guṇa* of its own that establishes validity and that there is no single *guṇa* that is common to all of them or could be attributed to valid knowledge *per se* (pramāmātre). Such being the case, God's knowledge could still be designated as valid knowledge, even though it may not be *brought about* by such distinctive factors (*guṇājanya*) as are operative elsewhere. Rāmācārya points out further that leading Naiyāyikas like Udayana, refer to God as “प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणम्” in the sense of being the locus of valid knowledge partaking of the nature of an eternal and intuitive perception² : नित्यसाक्षात्कारिप्रमाया आश्रयत्वेन ईश्वरः प्रमाणम् । This is sufficient to prove that the Naiyāyikas are *not against* recognizing God's knowledge as Pramā (valid knowledge). Indeed, the epistemological axiom of the Naiyāyikas that everything is knowable (सर्वं प्रमेयम्) could only be sustained on the hypothesis that everything is open to Divine knowledge, which would necessitate the further presumption that Divine knowledge is *always valid*.

As regards indeterminate perception, the *Taraṅgiṇi* is right in pointing out that the definition of Pramā in terms of “तद्वति तत्प्रकारकत्वम्” is a pragmatic one, where knowledge issues in effective practical activity

1. तार्किकेश्वरज्ञानवद् घटादिनिर्विकल्पकवच्च स्वभावत उभयवैलक्षण्येनाप्युपपत्तेः (A *Siddhi*).

2. अत्र ब्रूमः—न तावत् तार्किकमते गुणजन्यतानवच्छेदकमपि प्रमात्वं गुणजन्यत्वप्रयुक्तम् । * * * किंतु, तत्तत्प्रमात्वमेव । अत एव चोक्तं मणिकृता ‘प्रमामात्रे नानुगतो गुण’ इति । तथाच, गुणाजन्यमपीश्वरज्ञानं दोषाजन्यत्वात्प्रमेवेति, न तस्योभयबहिर्भावः । अत एव च, नित्यसाक्षात्कारिप्रमाया आश्रयत्वेन ईश्वरः प्रत्यक्ष-प्रमाणमित्युक्तमृदयनाचार्यैः ॥ (*Taraṅgiṇi* p. 45).

(Cf. प्रवृत्तिसामर्थ्यदिवत् प्रमाणम्) and that since indeterminate knowledge as understood by the Naiyāyikas, does not issue in such activity, it is treated as outside the scope of this *pragmatic definition* of Pramā. The wider and absolute definition of validity viz. यथार्थानुभवत्वम् would, however, apply to all cases of valid perception, both determinate and indeterminate.

The *Taraṅgiṇī* remains the most scholarly, dignified and conclusive refutation of the *Advaitasiddhi*. It represents also the highest level of Madhva scholarship in Śāstras attained in the Post-Vyāsatīrtha period. It reveals a profound knowledge of the niceties of the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā, Vyākaraṇa and Nyāya Śāstras, and the ramifications of the Advaitavāda, rarely to be met with among contemporary writers. *Madhva philosophical literature can be justifiably proud of this gem of a polemical treatise, written in the most objective manner of philosophical controversy.* The fact also that this masterly vindication of the *Nym.* came from a distinguished pupil of Raghūttama Tīrtha of the Uttarādi Mutt, is sufficient to establish the acknowledged *pre-eminence of Vyāsatīrtha in the domain of Madhva thought*, to the reinforcement and exposition of whose *magnum opus* the entire Madhva world pledged itself as one man, *irrespective of regional or other affiliations and loyalties.*

3. ĀNANDABHAṬṬĀRAKA, HIS LIFE, PLACE AND CONTRIBUTION TO DVAITA THOUGHT (C. 1535-1605)

Another early refutation of the *Advaitasiddhi*, though not so restrained or classical a performance as the *Taraṅgiṇī*, that has come down to us, is the *Nyāyāmṛta-Kaṇṭakoddhāra*¹ of Ānandabhaṭṭāraka. He was the father of the celebrated Vidyādhiśa Tīrtha (1619-31) of the Uttarādi Mutt. Unlike the *Taraṅgiṇī* which is only partly a commentary on the original, this work follows the original closely and comments on its passages in detail and also examines the arguments of the *Advaitasiddhi*, wherever necessary. Though not *apparently* so well-versed in the Mīmāṃsā or Vyākaraṇa systems or not caring to enter into their technical details, so frequently as the other work, Ānandabhaṭṭāraka is nevertheless a ruthless critic and is particularly keen on logical analysis of the arguments of the adversaries and spotting their formal and material fallacies. Besides the views of the Siddhikāra, he reviews and replies to some of the arguments of earlier critics of Vyāsatīrtha like Nṛsiṃhāśrama. His criticisms are, as a rule, racy, vigorous and pungent. He anticipates a number of possible defences of the *Advaitasiddhi's* arguments and demolishes them all. He does not rest content with urging a few strong points in vindication or reinforcement

1. Published in part by Mm. Anantakrishna Śāstri, C. O. S. IX, along with many other cc. on the *Nym. A-Siddhi*. But the editor and publisher have wrongly attributed the work to Vijayīndra Tīrtha. For a refutation of this ascription see my paper on the subject in *N. I. A.* (1940). There is no reason, save obstinacy, for Mm. Śāstri's still sticking to this untenable position in the Introduction to his edn. of the *Nyāyacandrikā* of Ānandapūrṇa (Madras G.O.S., Cliv, 1959).

of the views of the *Nym.*, but collects a number of fresh objections that could be marshalled against a particular interpretation or defence of the *Advaitasiddhi*. See for example under :

नूनं कन्यापित्रा निजगोत्रं पृष्टस्य * * * (*Nym.-K.* p. 218)

यच्चाचार्यवचनाभिप्रायकल्पनम् (318)

कारणात्मनावस्थिति * * * (567)

We also meet here with a number of *fresh and powerful points not found in the Taraṅgiṇi*. Not only does the author go far beyond the *Taraṅgiṇi*, on occasions, but also criticizes some of its interpretations of certain passages of the *Nym.* The *Nyāyāmṛta-Āmoda* of Vijayīndra Tīrtha (1539-95) is also criticized in a few places.¹ This is enough to disprove Mm. Anantakrishna Śāstri's ascription of the *Nym.—Kaṇṭakoddhāra* to Vijayīndra. As the *Kaṇṭakoddhāra* makes no reference to the work of Brahmānanda, it may be presumed to have preceded it. But there is no reply or attempt at replying to the volley of criticisms urged by the *Kaṇṭakoddhāra* against the *Advaitasiddhi*, in Brahmānanda's work. Some of the arguments contained in the *Nym.—K.* are sufficient to overcome the objections subsequently raised by Brahmānanda.

Controverting the *A—Siddhi's* definition of non-existence as क्वचिदप्युपाधौ सत्त्वेनाप्रतीयमानत्वम्, the *Nym.—K.* adduces several reasons to show that such an artificial definition would be both futile and uncalled for. For, in the first place, (1) the Buddhist does not posit such a non-existence for the world. His view of the world would thus be the same as that of the Advaitin in which case, the first part of the definition of Mithyātva असद्विभक्तत्वे सति (सद्विविक्तत्वम्) would be superfluous with reference to the Buddhist. (2) If the world should, in any way, be distinguished from Brahman, which is a reality, "Asattva" must naturally be defined as the contradictory of "Sattvam", claimed for Brahman. As Brahman is claimed to be "Sat" in the sense of being त्रैकालिकाबाध्यम् its logical contradictory त्रैकालिकबाध्यत्वम् would seem to be the natural definition of Asat-tvam. Such a characteristic, being shared by "tuccha" and "mithyātva" alike, the two conceptions must be recognized to be identical in essence. (3) If non-existence is to be defined as सत्त्वेन प्रतीयनर्हत्त्वम् the epistemological dogma of Advaita असत्त्वेन प्रतीयेत that plays so vital a part in establishing the concept of Anirvacanīya, would become tautologous : सत्त्वेन प्रतीयनर्हं चेन्न प्रतीयेत । (4) If the Advaitin should rule out the possibility of the apprehension of Asat, he should logically be prepared to define Sat as that which is perceived as Sat. He would then land himself in a self-contradiction, if he should deny "Sattvam" to the world in the second half of the proposition (असद्विलक्षणत्वे सति) सद्विविक्तत्वम् । The definition of Asat as क्वचिदप्युपाधौ सत्त्वेन प्रतीयनर्हत्त्वम् is thus untenable. (5) Even on this view, "asattvam" would have to be pervaded by "sattvābhāva", in which case, the negation of *asattva* would, in turn, be pervaded by the presence of *sattvam*; so that, the co-existence of both *Asadvilakṣaṇatvam*

1. For evidence see my paper in *N. I. A.* ii, 10 (1940).

and *Sadvilakṣaṇatvam* (as recognized by the Advaitin) would still be impossible. "Mithyātvam" as conceived by the Monist, would thus be undemonstrable in respect of the world.

The *Kaṇṭakoddhāra* also often supplements the arguments of the *Taraṅgiṇī*, with additional ones of its own. It points out, for example, that the Siddhikāra is *not* right in making the Ātman *qua* jñāna neutral to Pramā and Bhrama alike, on the supposed analogy of Divine knowledge, in Nyāya philosophy. It is pointed out that the analogy is entirely misplaced and illegitimate and not acceptable to either party to the controversy (Dvaitins and Advaitins), as knowledge according to the Nyāya system is validated by external factors (*guṇa*), whereas to both Dvaita and Advaita philosophers, it is self-validated and not necessarily dependent on external factors (*guṇa*) for validity. There would thus be nothing illogical for a Vedāntin to admit knowledge to be valid even if it is not brought about by *guṇas*. (2) Even according to the Nyāya philosophers, there is no coordinating factor that governs all cases of Pramā. It cannot, therefore, be asserted that the absence of *guṇas* is proof of the absence of validity. Though *not* Guṇajanya, God's knowledge can still be recognized as valid (Pramārūpa) if it satisfies the other condition of validity, of being distinguishable from erroneous knowledge :

विशेष्यावृत्त्यप्रकारकभ्रमभिन्नज्ञानत्वादिरूपप्रमात्वस्य

ईश्वरनिर्विकल्पकज्ञानयोः संभवाच्च ।

Ānandabhaṭṭāraka shows also by reference to express statements of other Advaitin writers that the explanation of the statement : त्रैकालिकनिषेधं प्रति स्वरूपेणापणस्थं रूपं प्रतियोगि adopted by Madhusūdana would have to be rejected as a *tour de force* that is clearly opposed to other unambiguous utterances to the contrary, in the standard works of the system : यच्चाचार्य-वचनाभिप्रायकल्पनं, तदसत् । अस्पष्टस्य ह्यभिप्रायो वर्णनीयः । स्पष्टं हि भवदाचार्या बहुषु स्थलेषु वदन्ति— 'आभासस्य प्रसक्त्या अनाभासं निषिध्यते' इति । लौकिकपारमार्थिकत्वरूपेण निषिध्यत इति च ॥ (p. 218).

The criticism of the third *definition of falsity* : ज्ञानत्वेन ज्ञाननिवर्त्यत्वं is a striking example of his incisive logic and penetrating analysis. The original definition ज्ञानत्वेन ज्ञाननिवर्त्यम् is rightly enlarged by Madhusūdana so as to overcome certain difficulties pointed out by Vyāsātīrtha. The enlarged definition reads :

ज्ञानप्रयुक्तावस्थितिसामान्यविरहप्रतियोगित्वम् ।

The *Nym.—K.* points out that even this definition is faulty in respect of non-existence as an effect (कार्यात्मनावस्थितिविरह), which is obviously *not* brought about by an act of knowledge, in cases like the destruction of a pot; so that the enlarged definition of Mithyātvā would not apply to such cases :

कार्यात्मनावस्थितिविशेषविरहस्य ज्ञानत्वप्रयोज्यत्वाभावेन

कार्यात्मनावस्थितिसामान्यविरहस्य ज्ञानत्वप्रयोज्यत्वाभावेन

घटादावव्याप्तितादवस्थ्यात् ।

He then goes into details of the issue and analyses the significance of the term "viraha" (in the definition put forward by Madhusūdana) and lays bare the insuperable difficulties in conceiving of Viraha in terms of any one of the three conceivable alternatives of *Prāgabhāva*, *atyantābhāva*, and *dhvaṁsa* :

(1) *Avasthiti-prāgabhāva* being a beginningless entity, could not be deemed to be ज्ञानप्रयोज्य. (2) *Avasthityatyantābhāva*, being not only beginningless, but also *eternal*, could not also be Jñānaprayojya. (3) Destruction (*dhvamsa*) without any trace (*niranvaya*) being unheard of, cannot also be viewed as a case of *avasthitisāmānyaviraha*. Even supposing that such utter destruction is conceivable, the definition ज्ञानत्वप्रयोज्यावस्थितिव्यवस्थितियोगित्वम् would be inapplicable to the familiar शुक्तिरूप्य (silver in the shell) which, in all our experience, is never spoken of as being *destroyed* by knowledge. The correct form of experience in respect of Śukṭirūpya is this that not शुक्तिरूप्यम् as such, but our erroneous knowledge to that effect (शुक्तिरूप्यात्मकमज्ञानं) that has been destroyed by correct knowledge. The definition then : ज्ञानप्रयुक्तावस्थितिसामान्यविरहप्रतियोगित्वम् would apply not so much to शुक्तिरूप्य as such but to the misapprehension thereof, which are two different things. Moreover, शुक्तिरूप्य having no actual existence, its destruction could not be said to be brought about by ज्ञान. If some sort of existence should be conceded for it, in order to account for the fact of its presentation as a reality for the nonce, such existence could be claimed for sheer nonentities like the hare's horn, which are equally *conceivable*; in which case, the definition of *mithyātva* would hold good in their case also and would thereby annul the distinction between the *mithyā* and the *tuccha* that is so jealously sought to be maintained by the Advaitin. (4) Moreover Jñānatva in ātman being neutral to both Pramā and Bhrama, (in the opinion of Advaitin), it cannot necessarily be viewed as *nivṛttiprayojaka* or destructive of ignorance in effect. If an avowedly neutral thing like that could cause destruction, there is no reason why even bare substantiality (*vastutvam*) could not be invested with such a capacity (*nivṛttiprayojakatva*). The entire definition, then, of Mithyātva as ज्ञानत्वप्रयुक्तावस्थितिसामान्यविरहप्रतियोगित्वम् is, thus, untenable.

Ānandabhaṭṭāraka gives us a spicy refutation of Madhusūdana's criticism of Vyāsātīrtha's statement :

यादृशं ब्रह्मणः सत्त्वं तादृशं स्याज्जगत्पि

and his introduction of a matrimonial analogy into the criticism : नूनं विवाहसमये कन्यायाः पित्रा निजगोत्रं पृष्टस्य यदेव भवतां गोत्रं तदेव ममापीति वदतो वरस्य भ्राता भवान् ! यतो जामातृश्वशुरयोरेकगोत्रत्वे विवाहानुपपत्तिवत् जगद्ब्रह्मणोरेकसत्त्वे जगतोऽसत्त्वमेव स्यात् ! (Advaitasiddhi). He retorts : It is difficult to see how the world could forfeit its reality even if it should possess the same reality as Brahman, even assuming there is a common reality underlying both (अनुगतसत्ता). Granting that the groom and the bride's father belong to the same *gotra*, we cannot deny their separate existence or conclude that one of them has *no gotra* ! or that it is an unreal one. There is no logical absurdity if two Brahmins are said to have the same class-essence of Brahminhood (एकब्राह्मण्याश्रय). The matrimonial analogy is irrelevant to the present context where no such alliance is contemplated between the world and Brahman. What is claimed is that each is real like the other and there is nothing to

forbid *that*. Or again, if one of them should forfeit its reality, why should it be the world and not Brahman itself? :

न वयं ब्रह्मसत्त्वमेव जगत्सत्त्वम् इति ब्रूमः, किंतु, यादृशं
ब्रह्मणः सत्त्वं निरूप्यते, तादृशमेवास्माभिः प्रपञ्चे निरूप्यत इति ।
न ह्येतावता ब्रह्म सत्त्वमेव जगत्सत्त्वं भवति ।
न हि त्वत्पुत्रसदृशो मत्पुत्र इत्युक्ते, पुत्रैक्यम्; किन्तु * * * ॥
गुणसाम्यमेव । एवं प्रकृते, सत्त्वनिर्वचनप्रकारसाम्यमेवायाति ।

These and other arguments of the *Nym.—K.* have not been met by Brahmānanda or by any other Advaitic writer.

4. VANAMĀLĪ MĪSRA (C. 1650-1720)

His Life, Date, Works and Contribution to Polemics

Vanamālī Mīśra appeared on the scene of Dvaita-Advaita polemics of the 16th and 17th centuries, as the last great champion on the Dvaita side. From the very beginning, the issue raised by Vyāsatīrtha was destined to attain an all-India importance, to which were attracted the best brains from all parts and provinces of the land. Vanamālī Mīśra was *not* a South Indian.¹ He tells us both in his *Śrutisiddhāntaprakāśa* and *Madhvamukhālaṅkāra*, that he was descended from a family of Brahmins belonging to the Bhāradvāja gotra and settled at the village of Triyugapura, in the vicinity of Br̥ndāvan (Mathura). Tradition makes him a Hīndi-speaking Brahmin of Bihar, presumably of Gayā or its neighbourhood, where the surname Mīśra is common. It may be pointed out in this connection that the system of Madhva had already been propagated in Gayā and its neighbourhood at the time of Vidyādhīśa (1619-31). The Gayā-wālas, as the Brahmins of the place are called, are disciples of the Uttarādi Mutt. It is possible that Vanamālī Mīśra belonged to one of these families. Dasgupta is definitely misinformed in treating him as a follower of Nimbārka (op. cit. iii, p. 440). The summary of his doctrines from the *Śrutisiddhāntasamgraha*, given by Dasgupta, shows complete agreement with Madhva doctrines. The biographical details given by Dasgupta agree with the information furnished by Vanamālī in his *Mārutamaṇḍana* and other works, which establish beyond doubt that he was a staunch follower of the Madhva school. He should therefore have been treated in the IV Volume of Dasgupta's *History of Indian Philosophy*.

Vanamālī was a life-celibate as stated by him in his *Śrutisiddhāntasamgraha* :

श्रीगोविन्दविहारभूषितभुवो बृंदावनात्प्राग्दिशि
क्रोशान्तात् त्रियुगे पुरे मुनिभरद्वाजीयवंशोद्भवाः ।
श्रीसन्नाहमुचो वसन्ति विबुधा वणी ह्यभूत्तत्कुले
संपूर्णः श्रुतिसंग्रहो विरचितोऽयं तेन कृष्णेच्छया

Beyond these meagre details we know nothing about his life and career. A ms. of his *Mārutamaṇḍanam* (Deccan College Coll. XV, of 1882-3) is found dated Samvat 1741 (A.D. 1685). This gives us the *terminus ad quem*

1. In the notice of the *Nyāyaratnākara* (Madras O. L. R. No. 1615) of unknown authorship, he is made a descendant of the family of Rāmācārya. This is incorrect, as the latter belonged to the Upamanyu gotra. (Vide *Taraṅgiṇī* p. 376 Bombay).

of his date. We may therefore place him approximately between 1650-1720 and his literary activities between 1680-1710.

Vanamālī was an able theologian and a trained logician. He has left us works of either description. His *Taraṅgiṇī-Saurabha* (Mys. 522) would appear to be a criticism of the *Gurucandrikā* of Brahmānanda and his *Nyāyāmṛta-Saugandhya* (p),¹ a refutation of the *Laghucandrikā* of the same author. Besides these two monumental works, there is said to be in existence, another powerful polemical work of his, the *Caṇḍamāruta*,² which is reported to be a refutation of some unidentified Advaitic works :

मायावाद्यद्विप्रध्वंस्युत्थापितो वनमालिना ।

यश्चण्डमारुतस्तस्य परिच्छेदोऽयमादिमः ॥

Besides these dialectical works, we have from him a critical defence of the Adhikaraṇaprasthāna of the Dvaita system, in his *Madhvamukhā-lamkāra* or *Mārutamaṇḍana*, which has been published by Gopinath Kaviraj, in the Sarasvati Bhavan Skt. Texts, no. 68. This is a spirited defence of Madhva's interpretation of the *Brahma Sūtras* in general and of the first five adhikaraṇas thereof in particular, against the attacks of Appayya Dīkṣita in his *Madhvatavīdhvaṁsana* and its c. *Madhvatamukhabhaṅga* (*mardana*) by himself. Vanamālī's work closely follows the lead of Vijayīndra Tīrtha in his *Madhvādhvakaṇṭhakoddhāra* and many of the arguments are reproduced from it without acknowledgment. Of the two works, Vanamālī's is the more facile and readable. It is divided into seven sections. (1) Introductory: Sadasacchāstrapravartakanirṇaya (2-6) discussions of the first five adhikaraṇas, in order and (7) Śeṣabrahmamīmāṃsātātparyavarnanam (general review of interpretation of the rest of the B. S.). Appayya's younger contemporary Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita is also known to have adversely criticized the *Sūtra Bhāṣya* of Madhva, in his *Tattvakaustubha*³ with special reference to the Un-Pāṇinian forms used by Madhva and this is reputed to have been refuted by Kuṇḍalagiri Sūri in his *Bhaṭṭoji-Kuṭṭanam*.⁴ Bhaṭṭoji's brother, Rangoji Bhaṭṭa, had an encounter with Ānanda-bhaṭṭāraka's son Vidyādhiśa Tīrtha. In these circumstances, interest in the Madhva system was bound to spread in the north of India also, where it had already come to have some definite following. It was natural then that it should have found able *champions and advocates in the north*, like Vanamālī Miśra, Gauḍapūrṇānanda, Rādhādāmodara (of Kanouj) and Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa. The efforts of successive Advaitic dialecticians and theologians, mentioned already, to denounce the Dvaita system

1. Included in the C. O. S. edn. (ix) of the *Nym. Advaitasiddhi* and connected works, ed. by Anantakrishna Śāstri.

2. Mentioned by R. Nagaraja Sarma, *Reign of Realism in I. Phil.* 1937, p. 557. I have not been able to trace any mss. of this work in any of the well-known Oriental Mss. Libraries.

3. Published in the Journal of the Śaṅkaragurukula (Srirangam).

4. The *Tattvadīpikā* (Mys. C-2371) is another anonymous work criticizing Bhaṭṭoji's work. (See Appendix III). The *Bhāvadīpa* of Rāghavendra Tīrtha, also answers some of the objections found in Bhaṭṭoji's *Tattvakaustubha*.

and overthrow its criticisms of the Advaita, were a clear indication that the criticisms of the Dvaita philosophers like Vyāsatīrtha had gone home.

The philosophical issue of Monism vs. Dualism, raised by Vyāsatīrtha with all the dialectical paraphernalia of a normative Darśana, acquired an all-India significance and importance, in his own lifetime and continued to exercise the imagination of the Indian philosophical world, for two or three centuries afterwards. This protracted battle of wits made it clear to the intellectual world that the Dvaita Vedāntins were the only thinkers who could meet the Advaitic dialecticians on their own ground and equal them in logical acumen and philosophical subtlety. The rest of the intellectual world looked on with admiration and respect at the great spectacle of Dvaita-Advaita polemics of two centuries and more. And Vanamālī was the last in this band of veterans, to wind up the polemics.

VANAMĀLĪ'S DIALECTICS

In his own telling way, Vanamālī focuses attention on the basic points at issue between the two schools, in each context and exhibits the unbroken continuity of thought between his own work and those of his two predecessors (Vyāsatīrtha and Rāmācārya). In the discussion of many a moot point, he has shown, by clear analysis, that the arguments of Vyāsatīrtha have not been properly understood or effectively met by the *Advaitasiddhi* and that the additional arguments of the *Taraṅgiṇi* in support of the *Nym.* have not also been convincingly refuted by Brahmānanda, despite the dust and din of controversy raised by him and the amount of fire and fury breathed by him in the course of his work. No dispassionate student of the *Taraṅgiṇi* and the *Brahmānandiya*, side by side, could, he says, escape the feeling that most of the latter's criticisms are *laboured, unconvincing and disingenuous*. They show nothing but empty *verbiage* and *irrelevant digressions* and these defects are accentuated by his *extremely disdainful attitude* to his adversaries and his use of bad language, to cover up the deficiencies in argument.¹

For example, in seeking to confirm the charge of Nityasamā Jāti (fallacy) in the *Nyāyāmṛta*, in the event of the Advaitin being forced to define the exact metaphysical status of falsity of the Universe, Brahmānanda simply evades the point at issue and tries to bamboozle his adversary into a fallacy, by a sheer travesty of argument. It is clear from the definition of the fallacy of Nityasamā quoted by Vyāsatīrtha :

धर्मस्य तदतद्रूपविकल्पानुपपत्तिः ।

धर्मिणस्तद्विशिष्टत्वभंगो नित्यसमो मतः ॥

that it could be made out only where both horns of the dilemma could be shown to lead to a dispossession of the subject in question of its proposed attributes (धर्मिणस्तद्विशिष्टत्वभंगः). But the Dvaitins have *not* confronted their adversaries with such a nemesis on *both the alternatives* of admitting the reality or otherness of Mithyātva predicated of the world, but only on

1. See *Brahmānandiya*, p. 808.

one alternative. As per definition then, there is no fear of Nityasamā here. The *Nym.* has merely pointed out that if the falsity of the Universe were to be regarded as a real fact, there would be two realities in effect and, hence, the principle of Monism would be in danger. If falsity were *not* true, the world would no longer be false, but real :

मिथ्यात्वं यद्यबाध्यं स्यात् सदद्वैतमतक्षतिः ।

मिथ्यात्वं यदि बाध्यं स्याद् जगत्सत्यत्वमापतेत् ॥

It is not as if Brahmānanda could not understand this simple point and recognize that there is no room for Nityasamā Jāti in the argument as posed by the Dvaitin. Instead, he deliberately twists the issue and tries to make out the fallacy of Nityasamā, even on *one* alternative :

मिथ्यात्वस्य मिथ्यात्वे, प्रपञ्चसत्यतापत्तिद्वारा तस्य मिथ्यात्ववैशिष्ट्यभंगः ।

This is hardly warranted by the definition of Nityasamā for which it is essential that the nemesis of धर्मिणस्तद्विशिष्टत्वभंग should result as much on one alternative as on the other. But in the present case, there is no absence of mithyātva in the case of the dharmī (the world) where such falsity is admitted to be real and true : मिथ्यात्वस्य सत्यत्वे, जगतो मिथ्यात्ववैशिष्ट्यमेव, न तु तद्भङ्गः ।

मिथ्यात्ववैशिष्ट्यभंग would thus arise only on one alternative of such falsity being “false” (मिथ्यात्वस्य मिथ्यात्वे) but not on the other alternative of its being true :

मिथ्यात्वस्य सत्यत्वे, सद्व्याङ्गीकारादद्वैतहानिरेव ।

The application of the fallacy in respect of one alternative alone, is therefore *ultra vires*. It is also difficult to see how the Advaitin could escape “Advaitahāni”, as Brahmānanda says he could, in the event of the falsity of Mithyātva :

अन्यथा, मिथ्यात्वकोटिमात्रस्य अस्माभिराश्रयणे,

अद्वैतहानिदोषस्याप्यभावात् । (Brahmānandiya)

If the falsity of the world should be *not true* (mithyā), the world would have to be regarded as real, in which case, the principle of Monism would certainly be violated : मिथ्यात्वस्य मिथ्यात्वे, प्रपञ्चसत्यतापत्तिद्वारा अद्वैतहानिः । In fact, “Advaitahāni” would result in both the alternatives :

मिथ्यात्वस्य मिथ्यात्वे प्रपञ्चतात्त्विकतापत्तिकद्वारा अद्वैतहानिः ।

मिथ्यात्वस्य सत्यत्वे, सदद्वैतक्षतिरूपा अद्वैतहानिः ।

एवम् उभयथाप्यद्वैतहानिः ॥

As for Brahmānanda's plea : किञ्च, मिथ्यात्वस्यापि मिथ्यात्वधर्मित्वेन, तस्य सत्यत्वे, मिथ्यात्ववैशिष्ट्यभङ्गेन (मिथ्यात्वकोटेरिव) सत्यत्वकोटेरपि तद्वैशिष्ट्यभङ्गप्रयोजकत्वमावश्यकम्, it is not only far-fetched, but beside the point. For, in the present case, the subject of the proposition (dharmī) is the world and not its mithyātva : प्रपञ्चस्यैव प्रकृतधर्मित्वेन, साध्यभूतस्य तन्मिथ्यात्वस्यैव विकल्पत्वात् । तन्मिथ्यात्वस्य च धर्मित्वाभावात् तत्सत्यानृतत्वविकल्पस्यानवकाशात् ॥ It is obvious that Brahmānanda is trying to mislead the unwary into believing that there would be मिथ्यात्ववैशिष्ट्यभङ्ग on both the alternatives, applied from an irrelevant standpoint.

We have already referred to the interesting discussion initiated by the *Taraṅgiṇī* on the claims of God's knowledge to be characterized as valid knowledge, according to the Naiyāyikas. Here, again, Brahmānanda tries his best to restrict the scope of the text प्रमामात्रे नानुगतो गुणः । cited by the *Taraṅgiṇī* from Gaṅgeśa, in support of the view that अनुगतगुणजन्यत्व not

being a necessary precondition of validity *per se*. God's knowledge may yet be entitled to be recognized as valid knowledge even though it is गुणजन्य (not brought about by determining factors such as are found elsewhere). Brahmānanda seeks to restrict the text from the *Maṇi*, to cases of "Janyapratyakṣa" alone, so that Īśvarajñāna may stand ruled out of consideration here : 'प्रमामात्रे'—* * इत्यादि मणिवाक्यं प्रत्यक्षानुमित्यादिसाधारणघटादिप्रमात्वं न गुणजन्यतावच्छेदकम्, इत्येतत्परम् ॥

But this is by no means obligatory. There is no harm in accepting the statement of the *Maṇi* in its widest application so as to include God's knowledge also, which, according to the received doctrines of the Naiyāyikas, is as much a valid knowledge as our individual perceptions. The evidence furnished by the *Taraṅgiṇi* on this point is irrefragable :

(i) अत एव, नित्यसाक्षात्कारिप्रमाया आश्रयत्वेन, ईश्वरः प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणमित्युक्तमुदयनाचार्यैः ।

(ii) अत एव ईश्वरप्रमाया अनुगतत्वात् तद्विषयत्वरूपं प्रमेयत्वमनुगतमित्याहुर्मणिकृतः ॥

If the text of the *Maṇi*—प्रमामात्रे नानुगतो गुणः has reference only to "janyapratyakṣa", as held by Brahmānanda, it could hardly touch the question whether or not Īśvarajñāna *qua not* "janya" and therefore *not* of the same category as human knowledge, could be regarded as Pramā or not. So long as even the Advaitins do not dispute the view that God's knowledge is "ajanya", there is no point in labouring to explain away a general statement of the *Maṇi* : प्रमामात्रे नानुगतो गुणः किंतु, तत्तत्प्रमायां तत्तत् * * * ॥ so as to purposely rule out Īśvarapratyakṣa from the universe of discourse and keep only human knowledge in view. This is nothing more than trying to wriggle out of a difficulty by sheer bluster and bravado, of which there are other instances also, in Brahmānanda.¹

Anyway, the question whether God's knowledge is Pramā or not according to the Nyāya philosophers, is best answered in the words of Udayana :

मितिः सम्यक् परिच्छित्तिः तद्वत्ता च प्रमातृता ।

तदयोगव्यवच्छेदः प्रामाण्यं गौतमे मते ॥ (*Kusumāñjali*)

समीचीनो ह्यनुभवः प्रमेति व्यवस्थितम् । तदाश्रयस्य तु, प्रमातृत्वमेतदेव यत्तत्समवायः । प्रमासमवायो हि प्रमातृत्वव्यवहारनिमित्तम् । प्रमेयात्वयोगव्यवच्छेदेन संबन्धः प्रामाण्यव्यवहारनिमित्तत्वम् । तदुभयं चेश्वरे ॥ (Udayana, *Kusumāñjali*, iv). It is astounding that even this unequivocal statement of Udayana is coolly explained away by Brahmānanda as a *coup de theatre* : तत्प्रौढिमात्रम् । (*Gurucandrikā*, Mys. 1933, vol. 1, p. 162). In the light of the clear acceptance by the Maṇikāra, of the universality of Prameyatvam from the standpoint of God's knowledge encompassing all : ईश्वरप्रमाया अनुगतत्वात् तद्विषयत्वरूपं प्रमेयत्वमनुगतम्, these laboured and desperate tricks of Brahmānanda would be of no avail in denying validity to God's knowledge from the standpoint of the doctrine of the Nyāya philosophers.

1. Cf. his remarks in disposing of an objection raised by the *Taraṅgiṇi* in the interpretation of the text "न तौ पशौ" (p. 303, *Taraṅgiṇi*, Nirguṇatvabhāṅga), that the interpretation of these topics as given by the authors of his school should be deemed weightier than those of the traditionally accepted commentators of the Mīmāṃsā school. *Brahmānandīya*, (p. 724. Bby). This is rather strange for those swearing by the traditions of the Mīmāṃsakas ; व्यवहारे भट्टनयः ॥

In these and other contexts, Vanamālī Miśra has examined the attempted defences of the *Advaitasiddhi* and the additional arguments of Brahmānanda and shown how the original positions taken up by the *Nym.* are impregnable and how the *Taraṅgiṇi* has succeeded in establishing an irrefragable case for Realism, by its scholarly defence and reinforcement of the positions taken up by Vyāsatīrtha.

OTHER WORKS

Among other works of Vanamālī, may be mentioned (4) his *Vedāntasiddhāntamuktāvali* preserved in the Mysore O. L. (A-447) and (5) *Śrutisiddhāntaprakāśa* (Mys. C-346) consisting of two chapters. His (6) *Viṣṇutattvaparakāśa* (Mys. C-350) is a tract in 600 granthas establishing the supremacy of Viṣṇu as the Supreme Being, on the basis of the Śrutis and Smṛtis. The claims of Śiva to paramountcy are repudiated. (7) His *Bhaktiratnākara* (m), is preserved with a c. by an unknown author, in the Deccan College Coll. (no. 710 of XV of 1882-3). It is divided into nine Prakaraṇas and runs to about 650 granthas. (8) His *Mārutamaṇḍanam* and *Madhvamukhālaṁkāra* are one and the same work and has been printed in the Sarasvati Bhavan Texts.

Four more works of Vanamālī are mentioned by name by Gopinath Kaviraj in his Preface to the *Madhvamukhālaṁkāra*. (9) His *Jiveśvarābhedadhikkāra* is presumably a reply to the *Bhedadhikkāra* of Nṛsiṁhāśrama. (10) *Pramāṇasaṁgraha* (Benares Skt. Coll. Library) (11) *Abhinavaparimala* (Ben. Skt. Coll. Lib.) are others referred to by Gopinath Kaviraj. (12) The *Advaitasiddhikhaṇḍana* (Bh. 1882, p. 102) mentioned by him, is presumably the same as the *Taraṅgiṇi-Saurabha* or some other work connected with the *Nym.* already mentioned.

His commentary on the Gītā is preserved in the B.O.R.I. Poona (no. 292 of 1895-98). It follows faithfully the lead of M's bhāṣya (See iii.38).

Part V

Theological Controversies and Reinforcement of Siddhānta

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

We now turn to another type of polemics in Dvaita Literature, unrelated to the *Nym.*, though nevertheless inspired by the historic lead given by it. The literary activities of Vyāsatīrtha had caused a profound stir and a great upheaval in philosophical circles. His three memorable works: the *Nym.*, *Candrikā* and *Tarkatāṇḍava* constituted a mighty monument of logico-philosophical profundity and richness of thought and came to be held in very high estimation in learned circles. His fame as an original thinker and a powerful writer of his age had reached far beyond the confines of S. India and had forced the great scholars of the North to take note of his mighty contributions to the Vedānta and his criticisms of the Advaita system. His *Nym.* had become the battling ground for some of the most eminent polemical writers of the two leading schools of the Vedānta and gave rise to the composition of a series of rival dialectical masterpieces of utmost intellectual penetration and logical erudition, mustering all the resources of the two systems at war.

His *Tātparya-Candrikā*, in the same way, had boldly invaded the enemies' domain and carried the fight into the heart of the literature of the Adhikaraṇa-Prasthāna of the Advaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita schools, challenging the entire superstructure of their interpretation of the Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa.¹

In his *Tarkatāṇḍava*, Vyāsatīrtha had reached the crowning point of his fame and erudition, as a consummate Logician who could discuss questions of pure logic and epistemology on a very high level of abstract thought and intellectual vigour.

As a result of these mighty labours of his, in so many directions, Dvaita Siddhānta attained an unassailable position of philosophical dignity, maturity and competence. No wonder, the Bengal school of Vaiṣṇavism, in the next century, came to rely on his masterpieces as the highest authority on Vaiṣṇavism, designating them as "Viṣṇu-Saṁhitā."

Such growing reputation and far-reaching conquests of Vyāsatīrtha and his system were naturally bound to evoke strong opposition and resentment and counteraction and resistance from hostile quarters. His *Tātparya-Candrikā* soon brought a hornet's nest about his ears. By way of

1. प्रतिसूत्रं प्रकाश्येते घटनाघटने मया ।

स्वीयान्यपक्षयोः सम्यग्विदांकुर्वन्तु सूरयः ॥

retaliation and counter propaganda, violent criticisms of the Sūtra-interpretations of the Madhva school and some of its main tenets came to be poured forth simultaneously by a number of Advaitic and Viśiṣṭādvaitic writers, in the latter half of the 16th century and in the next, such as (1) Nṛsiṃhāśrama (2) Appayya Dīkṣita (3) Raṅgojibhaṭṭa (4) Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita on the one hand and (5) Kumbakonam Tātācārya (6) Mahācārya and others, on the other. These critics and detractors of the Madhva system had to be disarmed once for all, if the acceptability of the system in respect of its logical foundations and textual bases were to be demonstrated to the satisfaction of the public. Apart from this immediate need for a theological and polemical rehabilitation of Madhva's Siddhānta, there was the general need for a more popular and easy exposition of the doctrines and texts of the school in a less technical garb and more colourful form than had been done so far. A number of eminent writers came forward to meet these new requirements of theological reinforcement and general rehabilitation of the Siddhānta, in the Post-Vyāsatīrtha period. The representatives of this new phase in the history of Dvaita thought and literature, were Vijayīndra, Vādirāja, and Nārāyaṇācārya. Their period in the history of the school may be described as the Tractarian period.

VIJAYĪNDRA TĪRTHA (1514—95)

HIS PLACE IN DVAITA LITERATURE, DATE,
LIFE AND WORKS

After Vyāsātīrtha, the mantle of Defender of the Faith fell upon the shoulders of his worthy and favourite disciple Vijayīndra Tīrtha, who became the most powerful champion and active exponent of Madhva Siddhānta against the onslaughts of its relentless critics. He was a *trenchant writer*, an enthusiastic defender of the creed and an unsparing critic of the Advaita, Śaiva and Viśiṣṭādvaita revivals of his times,¹ particularly in the Chola Country, to which the intellectual, religious and cultural life of the Vijayanagar Kingdom had naturally moved in the declining years of the Empire. He was the bulwark of Madhva school in the South during the age of Nāyaka rule in the Tamil country. But for his timely service in defence of the system against the combined onslaughts of powerful Advaitic, Viśiṣṭādvaitic and Śaiva Revivalists, the Mādhva school would have been practically wiped out of existence in Tamilnadu. The Arivilimangalam Plates make pointed reference to his historic controversies with the champions of Advaita. But his personal relations with them were friendly and he distributed his patronage and gifts freely among all. He was fond of logic-chopping (See his *Bhedavidyāvilāsa*) and was good at *tu quoque*. He was well-versed in several branches of learning besides, such as Kāvya, Nāṭaka and Rhetorics, and raised the prestige of his school by his literary activities in various directions. He is credited with *one hundred and four works* in all, which include some interesting dramas and some treatises explaining the principles of the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā Śāstra. He is also credited with a work on Alamkāra, a criticism of Appayya's *Citramimāṃsā*. He was thus the Dualistic polymath of the 16th century, who played a decisive role in the cultural and religious history of Tamilnadu as the Guardian Saint of Vaiṣṇavaism in general and of Madhva-faith in particular and as a redoubtable champion of philosophical Realism.

He dealt mostly with the interpretations of the Sūtra-Prasthāna and theological aspects of the system of Madhva, which were then receiving the attention of adverse critics of the system. His main activities lay in (1) vindicating the power and prestige of the philosophical system of Madhva and his interpretation of the Sūtras, against the reckless criticisms of Appayya Dikṣita and others; (2) in stemming the tide of Śivādvaita Movement which was gaining ground under the leadership and advocacy of Appayya himself and certain Vīra-Śaiva Ācāryas like Emme Basava;

1. अद्वैतशैवासहिष्णुः (*Gurugunastava*, 7).

and (3) upholding the Dvaita doctrine and interpretations against the attacks of Viśiṣṭādvaitic critics. He had thus to engage in a *triangular fight* with the forces of three established sects of his times and try to extend the religious and secular influence of his creed. His works on the Dvaita were intended to widen the grasp of his followers of the intricacies of its thought and make them keep abreast of the times, with a view to enriching its literature. As his literary career seems to have come to a close by about 1580, it seems unlikely that he took any active part in the Dvaita-Advaita dialectics connected with the *Advaitasiddhi*, which was in all probability composed in or about 1585. He did however comment on the *Nym.*; but his commentary does not embody any refutations of the *Advaitasiddhi*. This commentary, moreover, is criticized in a few places, by the subsequent one of Ānandabhaṭṭāraka who was directly concerned with refuting the *Advaitasiddhi*. Evidence is thus lacking for the view held in some quarters that Vijayīndra also entered the arena in the *Nyāyāmṛta-Advaitasiddhi* dialectics. It is best to suspend judgment on this point until his *Gurvāmōda* (commentary on *Nym.*) in which he is supposed to have actually criticised the *Advaitasiddhi*, is definitely discovered or brought to light.

Vijayīndra was the *most prolific writer of his school*. But with all that, he is not so well-known to the followers of Madhva as he deserves to be. It is difficult to account for this, especially when we recall the significant part played by him in repelling the concentrated attacks on the system of Madhva made from three different directions, by his contemporary critics. Of the hundred and four works traditionally ascribed to him, on sound authority, even the names of half the number are lost. Of the other fifty, not more than thirty are attested by mss.; or by cross-references in other works. Having served the purpose for which they were intended, very well, his controversial works, presumably lost their fascination and interest, while his commentaries and glosses have been superseded and thrown into the shade by the simpler and clearer ones of his successors including Rāghavendra. The works of Vijayīndra are not therefore “living” in any sense, in Dvaita literature, today. But on the attention of students of the history of Dvaita thought and its literature, he has special claims, as a *doughty champion of the reign of Realism in Indian philosophy, in the Post-Vyāsatīrtha period*.

Many of the introductory verses in his works show excellent poetic merit. But his prose style is rather dry and abstruse. This might be one reason for his works not having achieved lasting popularity. Some of his works like the *Upasamhāra-Vijaya*, *Paratattvaparakāśikā*, *Bhedavidyāvilāsa* and *Madhvādhvakaṇṭhakodhāra* still retain their claims to distinction and to our attention.

LIFE

Tradition affirms that Vijayīndra was originally a disciple of Vyāsatīrtha and read under him. This is confirmed by Vijayīndra himself, who

in some of his works,¹ acknowledges Vyāsātīrtha as his Guru and by a statement in the *Śrīpādarājāṣṭakam* counting both Vijayīndra and Vādirāja among the pupils of Vyāsātīrtha,² as well as by references in the (Kannāḍa) songs of Purandara Dāsa, Vijayadāsa and Srīda-Viṭhala.³ His original name is said to have been “Viṭhalācārya”. H. K. Vedavyāsācārya (*Gurucarite*, p. 137) claims, on the authority of a *Vijayīndra Vijaya* by Madhvakavi, disciple of Vādirāja, that Vijayīndra was originally ordained a Monk, by Vyāsātīrtha under the name of “Viṣṇu Tīrtha” and that this name was subsequently changed into Vijayīndra, when he came over to the Maṭha of Surendra and succeeded him.

Vijayīndra was evidently a (Southern) Karnāṭaka Brahmin. He was a great favourite with Vyāsātīrtha and would, in all probability, have succeeded him on his Pīṭha, had not Surendra Tīrtha, the then Pontiff of the Vibudhendra Maṭha, requested Vyāsātīrtha to give him a competent disciple to succeed him. The latter is said to have generously “gifted” Vijayīndra on the occasion. This was how Vijayīndra came over to the Maṭha of Surendra Tīrtha and eventually succeeded him on the Pīṭha. This tradition is confirmed by the following *Sulādi*⁴ of Purandara Dāsa⁵:

श्रीसुरेन्द्रनु पुत्रभिक्षव बेडे
विजयीन्द्रन्नु करुणिसि मठवन्मुद्रिसिदकारण
गुरुव्यासरायरे परमगुरुगच्छु
पुरन्दरविठलने परदेव काणिरो (Kannāḍa)

There is no authentic biography of Vijayīndra, such as we have for Vyāsātīrtha. There are a few sketches of his life in the form of Stotras in Sanskrit by later-day devotees. But they are of negligible historical value. A good many floating traditions have gathered round his name and personality.⁶ These have been kept alive for the most part with the help of the memory of relics in his Maṭha at Kumbakonam and the privileges enjoyed by the successors of Vijayīndra. Such of the works of Vijayīndra as are yet available, a couple of inscriptions, the *Rāghavendra Vijaya* of Nārāyaṇa and the *Gurugunastava* of Vādirāja (seventh in succession

1. See introd. verses 4 and 8 of his *Madhvādhvakaṇṭhakoddhāra* and of *Upasāṃhāra-Vijaya* and *Candrikodāhrtanyāyavivarāṇa* (T.P.L.).

2. iii, 6 (*S. M.* p. 317).

3. Cited in my paper on Date of Vādirāja, A. B. O. R. I. XVIII, 2. pp. 191 and 197.

4. But H. K. Vedavyāsācārya (*Gurucarite*, p. 137) has unfortunately turned the true significance of this incident by omitting the keywords of this *Sulādi* (contained in the first line) and conveying the wrong impression that the gift was more in the nature of an obligation sought by Vyāsātīrtha rather than in response to a request made by Surendra. But the keywords of Purandara Dāsa's *Sulādi* पुत्रभिक्षव बेडे and करुणिसि establish clearly on which side the obligation really lay.

5. For which I am indebted to the late Vidyāvāridhi Tīrtha, Svāmiji of the Vyāsātīrtha Mutt.

6. A series of these interesting anecdotes based on some unpublished materials have been brought together under the caption *Ajeya Vijayīndrarū*, in the Kannāḍa monthly Journal *Parimala*, 1959-60, published from Nanjangūd, since published in book form. (1974)

from Vijayīndra) supply more solid information. The account of tradition is more than corroborated by these sources. I have *not* had access to the *Vijayīndra Vijaya* of Madhva Kavi, mentioned in the *Gurucarite*, in any Ms. Library.

DATE

According to the Mutt lists, Vijayīndra succeeded Surendra Tīrtha, in or about 1539 A.D. and remained on the Pīṭha till 1595 (Manmatha). The fact that he was a student of the advanced classics of the Dvaita system under Vyāsatīrtha¹ would indicate at least a few years stay with the latter. We can therefore assume that he was about fifteen years old when he first came under the care of Vyāsatīrtha and not less than 25 at the time of his teacher's demise in 1539. This would give 1514 or thereabout as the probable date of his birth.

According to H. K. Vedavyāsācārya, Surendra Tīrtha died in 1575 and Vijayīndra in 1614. These dates cannot bear scrutiny. Vedavyāsācārya contradicts himself in referring to the grant of two villages Nāvalūr and Pudukkuḍi in the Tanjore district, in Yuva 1577 A.D. to Surendra (*Mys. Arch. Rep.* 1944, p. 78). This is evidently to be interpreted as a grant made actually to Vijayīndra himself but conferred in the name of his Guru at his wish to that effect. For, we have the famous Ariviliman-galam grant of Sevappa Nāyaka to Vijayīndra in 1577 A.D. Bhimachar Vaḍavi in his *Rāghavendra Guru Kathāṃ,ta* (Kannaḍa),² also places Surendra's demise in 1539 A.D. (Vikāri) in the Succession list of Pontiffs given by him. Moreover, according to H. K. Vedavyāsācārya's estimate, Vijayīndra's total period of Pontifical rule would be only 39 years (1575-1614). This is contradicted by himself on p. 61 of his own work where he says that Vij. adorned the Pontifical seat *for more than half a century*. This is true enough and confirmed by Pandit-tradition at Kumbakonam where Vij. spent most of his life as Pontiff of his Mutt and passed away there at a ripe old age of eighty, or so. The cyclic year of his demise is also recorded as Manmatha which corresponds to 1595 A.D. As a student of Vyāsa-tīrtha and as one ordained by him, he must at least have been 25 years old at the time of the passing away of Vyāsatīrtha in 1539. We thus arrive at 1514 or so as the most probable date of his birth and if he had lived as long as 1614, as H. K. Vedavyāsācārya would have it, he would have lived for a century, of which there is no tradition at all in his Mutt at Kumbakonam.

The supposed grant to Vijayīndra in 1614 on which presumably H. K. Vedavyāsācārya bases his calculation, is either a spurious one or has

1. षड्वारं व्यासराजेन्दुमुखाच्छ्रुत्वा विशेषतः ।
मध्वशास्त्रार्थसारं तु व्याचक्षाणं निजान् प्रति ॥
नवकृत्वो न्यायसुधां व्यासतीर्थपयोनिधेः ।
उद्धृत्य पीतवन्तं च नाकीन्द्रमिव सन्नतम् ॥

(*Vijayīndrastotra*, of Setumādhava Sūri, *S. M.* p. 292)

2. Published 1930.

to be explained as made to his successor Sudhīndra, in the name of his Guru. Lastly, we would be forced to cut down Sudhīndra's Pontifical rule to barely nine years on H. K. Vedavyāsācārya's theory that Vijayīndra ruled till 1614. This is manifestly wrong, as tradition ascribes to Sudhīndra also, a fairly long period of Pontifical rule of twentyeight years, nearly thrice the period allowed by H. K. Vedavyāsācārya. We have therefore to reject these views of his and adopt 1539-95, as the correct period of Pontifical rule for Vijayīndra. This would give him fiftysix years on the Pīṭha, which agrees with the traditional estimate recorded by Vedavyāsācārya himself.¹ Nothing, however, is known about Vijayīndra's family history.

CAREER

Madhva tradition has been persistently maintaining that Vijayīndra was a *close contemporary and critic* of the Advaitic polymath of the 16th century, *Appayya Dikṣita*, who was a great champion of the Śaiva and Advaita revivals of his days, in S. India. Vijayīndra is said to have tried conclusions with him on many occasions and written many works repelling the latter's attacks on the system of Madhva and its principles and interpretation of the B. S. The criticisms of Appayya were obviously the reactions from the Monistic side to the challenges thrown by Vyāsātīrtha, earlier, in his works, and his devastating criticisms of the Advaita system and its interpretation of the Sūtras.

Vijayīndra spent most of his time at Kumbakonam, where he had good following. There are extensive properties belonging to his Mutt, even to this day, there. There is also a Mutt in a good state of preservation there, where his mortal remains rest. The *Rāghavendravijaya* says that he was honoured with a "ratnābhiṣeka" by Rāmarāja (1542-65) of Vijayanagar. Vijayīndra was, moreover, honoured by Sevappa Nāyaka of Tanjore, from whom he obtained the village of Arivilimangalam in 1577 A.D. It is clear from the terms of this grant (See Arivilimangalam Plates of Sevappa Nāyaka, ed. by T. A. Gopinatha Rao, *Ep. Indica*, XII) that Vijayīndra's reputation as a scholar and as a Defender of the Faith of Madhva against Māyāvādins, was already well-established by 1577 :

पदवाक्यप्रमाणज्ञशेमुषीजितवादिने
मध्वाचार्यमतोद्यानसंचरत्तरबहिणे ।
मायावादमतोच्छेदकोलाहलभरोक्तये ॥

* * *

This must indeed have been so, for he was a student of Vyāsātīrtha who died in 1539. The *Mysore Arch. Rep.* for 1917, mentions another grant to him by Sevappa in 1580 A.D. In the course of this record, it is stated that "like the three sacred fires, (a) the Lord of ascetics Vijayīndra Tīrtha (b) the leader of the Vaiṣṇavas, proficient in all Śāstras : Tātācārya and (c) the sole emperor of Śaiva and Advaita thought, Appayya Dikṣita, used to meet at his (Sevappa's) court and establish the doctrines of their

1. *Gurucarite*, p. 61.

respective schools of philosophy” :

“त्रेताग्नय इव स्पष्टं विजयीन्द्रयतीश्वरः ।
ताताचार्यो वैष्णवाग्रयो सर्वशास्त्रविशारदः ॥
शैवाद्वैतैकसाम्राज्यः श्रीमानप्यय्यदीक्षितः ।
यत्सभायां मतं स्वं स्वं स्थापयन्तः स्थितास्त्रयः ॥”

[Text by the kind courtesy of (the late) M. H. Krishna, Asst. Director of Archaeology, Mysore.]

This epigraph furnishes indisputable proof that Vijayīndra was a very close contemporary indeed of the celebrated Appayya Dīkṣita, whose stone inscription dated Śaka 1504 (A.D. 1582), on one of the walls of the temple of Kālakaṇṭheśvara, built by himself in his native village of Aḍayappālayam (near Vellore)¹ gives clear indication of the fact that the Dīkṣita too had more or less completed his life's work by 1582 A.D.²

Vijayīndra was an all-round scholar, a prolific writer and a great Yogī. He is credited by Vādīndra Tīrtha, with proficiency in all the sixty-four *kalās* (arts) and the epithet “Sārvatantrasvatantra” is found applied to him in many of his works.³ That this was no empty boast is clear from a few of his works bearing on the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā, Nyāya and Kāvya literature.⁴ The *Gurugunastava* distinctly says that he wrote one hundred and four works (presumably to rival the one hundred of Appayya) and that he was a relentless critic of Śaiva and Advaita systems—

चातुर्यैकाकृतियश्चतुरधिकशतग्रन्थरत्नप्रणेता
धूतारातिप्रबन्धस्फुटविदितचतुःषष्टिविद्याविशेषः ।
सोऽयं नः श्रीसुरेन्द्रव्रतिवरतनयोऽद्वैतशैवासहिष्णुः
पुष्पातु श्रीजयीन्द्रस्त्रिभुवनविदितः सर्वतन्त्रस्वतन्त्रः ॥

Tradition has it that he had once a disputation with the Vīra-Śaiva Guru residing at Kumbakonam. The condition under which the disputation was held was that “if the Śaiva Guru won, Vij. should join his Maṭha, but if on other hand, the latter triumphed, the former should make over all his properties to his victor. The discussion lasted for 11 days at the end of which the Śaiva Guru was worsted. Consequently, Vij. entered into possession of the Śaiva Maṭha at Kumbakonam” (Heras, *Āraṇiḍu Dynasty of Vijayanagar*, p. 532 and p. 346, *Ep. Ind.* XIII).⁵

1. No. 395 of 1911. For remarks see Y. Mahalinga Sastri's paper on the Date of Appayya Dīkṣita, *J. O. R. Madras*, 1929, pp. 140-60.

2. This disposes of Anantakrishna Sastri's desperate attempts in his *Introd.* to the edn. of *Nym-Ad-Siddhi* (C. O. S. ix, p. 64) to show that “Appayya was already old when Vij. began to flourish” and that Vij. criticized the Dīkṣita, only after the latter's demise. These contentions of Sastri have been dealt with by me in my paper on “the Truth about Vijayīndra and Rāmācārya” *N. I. A.* ii, 10, 1940.

3. See his *Nyāyamauktikamālā* (introd. verses).

4. Yet the author of *Madras Uni. His. Ser. XI*, deplores that it is “nowhere stated what these works of Vijayīndra are” ! (p. 425).

5. The Śaiva Mutt referred to is the one facing the Kumbheśvara temple (southern gate) at Kumbakonam. It is now the property of the Mutt of Vijayīndra. His own Maṭha is on the southern bank of the *Kāveri*, half a mile north. In commemoration of this victory, the street in which the Śaiva Maṭha was, was renamed “Vijayīndrasvāmi Mutt Street, which still survives in the Municipal records. The Śaiva Mutt however is in a dilapidated state. It should be repaired and preserved as a relic by the Pontiffs of the Mutt.

In the same manner, the Maṭha of Vijayīndra to this day, enjoys the special honour of taking out and entertaining on its premises the presiding deity of the Viṣṇu temple of Śārngapāṇi at Kumbakonam, on the second day of Brahmotsava in Caitra. The origin of this privilege is to be sought in certain timely services rendered by Vijayīndra to the interests of Śrīvaiṣṇavas of the temple in a dispute with the authorities of the local Śiva temple over the right of ownership of the great tank situated between the two temples.

Special honour is accorded to his memory during the Iyarpāśāttumurai on the last day of Ālvārmokṣam on the 21st day of Dhanuṣ (Mārgazhi). Vijayīndra's Mutt enjoys priority over the local Śaṅkarācārya Mutt on the 2nd day of the Māśimagam festival at the Kumbheśvara temple, the first day being reserved for the temple 'maṇḍapapaḍi'.

The *Koṅkaṇābhyaudaya* and some other sources of the Gauḍa-Sārasvata community refer to the notable part played by Vijayīndra and his successor Sudhīndra in promoting and consolidating closer ties between the community and its religious Heads and institutions with the rest of the Madhva community. But no corroboration of any of these accounts is forthcoming from the records or hagiological works of the Vijayīndra Mutt or the Uttarādi Mutt. (See Appendix IV).

WORKS OF VIJAYĪNDRA

(1-10) Glosses on all the ten Prakaraṇas have been ascribed to him. But so far mss. have been brought to light of only two of them on *TS* and *Td*. The former is preserved in the Pejavar Mutt at Udipi (Tulu, palm-leaf) and the latter at Mysore O. L. (C-1888) and Madras (R. No. 3412). The name of the latter is given as *Gūḍhabhāvaṇṇaprakāśikā*. The Mysore ms. has 1950 granthas. The author refers herein to his c. on the *Nym*. :

प्रपञ्चितं चैतत् न्यायामृतेऽस्मत्कृतटीकायां च (p. 48 b).

(11-15) His works under the Sūtra Prasthāna include glosses on the B. S. B. of Madhva, the *NV*, *AV* and *TP*,¹ and *Aṇu Bhāṣya*. Those on *AV* and *Aṇubhāṣya* are not attested by mss. The gloss on B. S. B. entitled *Tattvamaṇimāṇikyapeṭikā*, is probably the one referred to by Rāghavendra in the beginning of his *Tantradipikā* :

गुरुपादकृतोऽप्यस्ति संग्रहो हृदयंगमः ।

प्रस्थानभेदप्रोक्तार्थसंग्रहो बाध्यं मम ॥

His *Tattvaprakāśikā-Tippaṇi* (m) is preserved in the Madras O. L. (R. No. 1432). The author says his work is in the nature of a summary of the views set forth in earlier cc. on the TP. He has summarized the story of गौतमशाप as given in the *Tattvaprādīpa* and clarifies the term "अन्यैः" at the beginning of the TP as a reference to twentyone "falsche commentare" as does Vādirāja (*Gurvarthadipikā*). (16) His *Madhvatāntra-Nayamañjari* (m) is preserved in a much damaged Nagari ms. in the Madras O. L. (D. C.

1. There is no evidence of any c. on the *NS*. by Vij. as reported by Glasenapp (op. cit. p. 60).

No. 4834 vol. X). It is a short argumentative work dealing with the Sūtra-Prasthāna and written in defence of the Sūtra-interpretation of Madhva. The adhikaraṇa-śarīras of the *Bhāmati* and the *Vivaraṇa* are quoted and criticized. The work is confined to the first five adhikaraṇas of the B. S.

(17-26) Commentaries on the ten Upaniṣad-Bhāṣyas, though traditionally ascribed to him, have not been brought to light. The same is the case with (27-28) glosses on the *Prameyadīpikā* and *Nyāyadīpikā* (Gitā-Prasthāna) attributed to him.¹

(29-31) GLOSSES ON VYĀSA-TRAYA

Vijayīndra's famous commentary on the *Nym.* entitled (*Laghu*) *Āmoda*,² is preserved in the Mysore and Tanjore O. L. The T. P. L. ms. (no. 8108) containing 2650 granthas, is incomplete and covers only Paricchedas ii and iii of the original. It is a short c. on the *Nym.* free from digressions or quotations from the *Advaitasiddhi*. According to R. Nagaraja Sarma, reference is made in the course of this gloss to a bigger c. on the *Nym.* by the same author (*Gurvāmōda*). I have not come across any such reference. The c. called *Nym.-Kaṇṭhakoddhāra*, published by Ananta-krishna Sastri (C. O. S. IX) is not by Vijayīndra, as has already been stated. His gloss on the *Candrikā* known as *Nyāyamauktikamālā*,³ is said to explain some of the stiff passages in the original and criticize the views embodied in the Bhāṣyas of Śaṅkara and Śrīkaṇṭha and in the *Śivārka-maṇidīpikā* and *Nyāyarakṣāmaṇi* of Appayya Dīkṣita. The scope of the work is thus both constructive and destructive :

सर्वतंत्रस्वतंत्रेण विजयीन्द्राख्यभिक्षुणा ।

तन्यते ब्रह्ममीमांसान्यायमौक्तिकमालिका ॥

परोक्ते दूष्य एवांशो मितैः शब्दैरनूद्यते ।

दूष्यते च स एवांशः सिद्धान्तश्च समर्थ्यते ॥

Vijayīndra's attempt here may be regarded as the forerunner of the *Śeṣa-candrikā* which was a complement to the *Candrikā*. The author of the *Candrikā* has confined his attention to the leading cc. of the Advaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita schools alone, with stray references to Bhāskara and Vṛttikāra. He had not noticed the Śaiva interpretations of the Sūtras attempted by Śrīkaṇṭha which were merely a *rechauffe* of the *Śrībhāṣya*. But the *Śrīkaṇṭha Bhāṣya* had been pushed into prominence by the talented Appayya Dīkṣita, who headed the Śivādvaita (or more properly Śaiva-Viśiṣṭādvaita) revival in the 16th century and written his *Śivārka-maṇidīpikā* and other works in support of it. Vij. wrote his *Nyāyamauktikamālā*, so as to bring the

1. Pejavar 291, mentions a c. on the *Nyāyadīpikā* by name *Bhāvadīpa*, possibly by Rāghavendra.

2. Referred to in the *Bhedavidyāvilāsa*, p. 24.

3. My information is based on the account in R. Nagaraja Sarma's *Reign of Realism* in *I. Phil.* p. 19. He seems to be aware of the existence of a ms. The *Nyāyamauktikamālā* (Mys. O. L. A-44) in 650 granthas, is a tract dealing with the supremacy of Viṣṇu and refuting the claims of Śiva and the Śaiva interpretation of the Puruṣasūkta. It is attributed to Vij.

Dvaitins' criticism of the Sūtra interpretations of rival school, up to date, by bringing the Bhāṣya of Śrīkaṇṭha together with its c. by Appayya, under his purview. He thus represents a logical advance in the line of critical and comparative study of the literature on the B. S. attempted by the Dvaitins. We learn from Rāghavendra's remarks,¹ that Vijayīndra had, in this work, dealt with the objection of some contemporary critics that the syllable *Om* does not form part of the first sūtra of Bādarāyaṇa, as asserted by Madhva-sampradāya. Vijayīndra's c. on the *Tarkatāṇḍava* is known as *Yuktirāṇākara* (m) of which a fragment is found in the Mys. O. L. (A-286). It is referred to by Rāghavendra in his own c. on the same original,² as well as in one of his introductory verses there :

गुरुपादकृतार्थस्ति टीका सात्यन्तविस्तरा ।

व्याख्येयं मन्दबोधाय क्रियतेऽशेषगोचरा ॥

The ms. runs to 3400 granthas and covers 1-11 of the original upto the discussion of "Prāmāṇya". It has been suggested that Vijayīndra wrote only upto the end of स्वतःप्रामाण्यज्ञप्तिवाद. The c. is full of technicalities and besides the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, the Bhāṭṭas, Prabhākaras and the logician Narahari (p. 14) are criticized.

(32) The *Pramāṇapaddhati-Vyākhyā* (p)^D, in 800 granthas, is a short and tough one. The author comments only on those passages of the original which are not quite clear. It was perhaps for this reason that his successor Rāghavendra wrote a more extensive gloss. Vijayīndra's comments have, in some places, been severely criticized by Vedeśa Bhikṣu,³ in his gloss. No attempt has been made by Rāghavendra to answer them.

ORIGINAL WORKS.

We have nearly eighteen works of Vijayīndra, of a more or less polemical character, dealing with doctrinal and interpretational issues. Most of these are available in mss. (33) *Adhikaraṇamālā* * * is supposed to be a work explaining the Mīmāṃsā rules of interpretation utilized in the *Nym*. (34) *Candrikodāhrtanyāyavivaraṇam* (m) is an exposition of the principles and adhikaraṇas of the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā made use of in the *Candrikā* of Vyāsatīrtha, in support of Madhva's interpretation of the Sūtras. The necessity for writing such a work lay in the loud complaints made by Appayya Dīkṣita and other hostile critics of Dvaita, that Madhva and his followers had flouted the Mīmāṃsā nyāyas and often ignored them in their interpretation of the Sūtras.⁴ Such complaints had been met by Vyāsatīrtha

1. यदत्र केनचित् प्रलपितम्—“ओंकारस्यादित्वे, सूत्रावयवत्वे, गुणपूर्त्यर्थत्वे, ‘स्रवत्यनोक्तं * *’ ” इत्यत्र ब्रह्मपदेन सूत्रग्रहणे च मानं नेत्यादि, तत्सर्वस्य खण्डनं गुरुपादकृतन्यायमौक्तिकमालायां द्रष्टव्यम् ॥ (*Candrikā-Prakāśa*, Mysore, p. 110).

2. अत्र स्वतःप्रामाण्यज्ञप्तिवादपर्यन्तम् विस्तरस्तु गुरुपादकृतयुक्तिरत्नाकरे द्रष्टव्यः ॥ (Mysore G. O. L. edn. 74. vol. i. p. 4).

3. See under Vedeśa.

4. क्वचिदाश्रिता अपि पूर्वमीमांसकमर्यादा अप्यसामंजस्येनैव नीताः ।

in his *TC.*, *TT.*, and *Nym.* wherein he had drawn upon several nyāyas and adhikaraṇas of the Mīmāṃsā in elucidating or substantiating the interpretations of Madhva and shown that the charge of misrepresentation of and hostility to the Mīmāṃsā, was unfounded. But the complaints and taunts and sarcastic denunciations of the Advaitins, continued with unabated vigour. The leader of the crusade against Madhva system in the 16th century, Appayya Dīkṣita, claimed to speak with special authority on the Mīmāṃsā. Khaṇḍadeva, the celebrated Mīmāṃsaka of the north, had great respect for him whom he styled a veteran Mīmāṃsaka (मीमांसकमूर्धन्य). The prestige of Madhva and his commentators was thus at stake in these circumstances and Vijayīndra had therefore to uphold it by repudiating the strictures of Appayya, then and there. The *Candrikodāhrtanyāyavivarāṇa* (T. P. L. 7854) is one such work in which Vijayīndra expounds, for the benefit of both the critics and the followers of Madhva, the adhikaraṇas of the Mīmāṃsā pressed into service in the *Candrikā*,¹ showing in detail, the subject-matter, the Pūrvapakṣa, Siddhānta etc., in each case. The exposition is, in another sense, a very good commentary on the adhikaraṇas in question. The work comes to a stop with B. S. i, 1, 4 after explaining the sentence समतं चैतन्मीमांसकानामपि thereunder. Among the nyāyas dealt with are (1) रथकार (2) अपच्छेद (3) वेदोपक्रमाधिकरण etc. (35) *Appayya-Kapola-Capeṭikā*^(m) as indicated by its aggressive title, is a rejoinder to the multifarious charges against Madhva and his works, made by Appayya. Aufrecht mentions a ms. of it on p. 23 of *Cat. Catal.* (p. 23) and Fr. Heras refers to it in his *Aravidu Dynasty* (p. 522). I have seen a ms. of it in a private library at Kumbakonam. (36) *Madhvādhva-Kaṇṭakoddhāra*^(p)² also known as *Madhvatāntramukhabhūṣaṇam* is a reply to the *Madhvatāntramukhabhaṅga* of Appayya Dīkṣita and its c. by him. The Dīkṣita has, in his work, criticized Madhva's interpretation and adhikaraṇa-śārīras of the first five adhikaraṇas of the B. S. for a sample. His point is that the dualistic interpretation of Madhva lacks cogency, and that his *adhikaraṇaśārīras* are unsatisfactory. The critic levels a number of other minor allegations also such as that (1) he has freely fabricated Śrutis and Smṛtis in support of his own far-fetched ideas and interpretations, (2) that his Bhāṣya has nothing in common with others in the field and stands severely alone, in method and outlook, (3) that he has nowhere been anxious to keep abreast of Mīmāṃsā rules of interpretation, (4) that he and his commentators have often flagrantly violated them and at times failed to understand the *A. B. C.* of that Śāstra and its technicalities,³ (5) that Madhva has had the audacity to pose as an avatāra of Vāyu and invent false authority for such a claim and

1. ये न्यायाः पूर्वतन्त्रीयाश्चन्द्रिकायामुदाहृताः ।

गुरुपादैः क्रमात्तेषां विषयाद्यङ्गपूर्वकम् ।

शरीरं विजयीन्द्राख्यभिक्षुणेह प्रदर्श्यते ॥

2. Part of the work upto the first adhikaraṇa has been published from Dharwar by G. R. Savanur.

3. क्वचिदाश्रिताः पूर्वमीमांसाभ्यांदा अप्यसामंजस्येनैव नीताः ।

(6) that he is a clumsy and ill-equipped writer, whose grammar and idiom suffer from serious flaws.

To all these charges Vijayīndra has given crushing replies. He points out that (1) quotations from unknown and untraceable sources are not wanting in the Bhāṣyas of Śaṅkara,¹ Rāmānuja² and Śrīkaṇṭha³ and that the charge against Madhva alone, savours of nothing but prejudice. The authors of *Kalpa Sūtras*, too have quoted from many non-extant sources. (2) It is pointed out by Vijayīndra that we have in Madhva a philosopher who has boldly refused to follow the beaten track of the majority and has not been afraid to think for himself and speak out his convictions, without fear or favour. Difference in method and outlook is what distinguishes one system from another and the wonder of it would be when it is *absent*,—not when it is *present* ! (3) Subsequent commentators on Madhva have more than made amends for his seeming indifference to the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā. Vijayīndra says, the critic's cry of 'Mīmāṃsā in danger', could deceive nobody. He takes up a number of instances of alleged breach of Mīmāṃsā rules and technicalities and shows that such is not the case. (4) Either one believes in Avatāras or not. It is not a matter for argument. As for authorities, they are there. (5) Style and linguistic embellishments are a matter of taste and are not the test of the soundness or *rationale* of one's metaphysical views.⁴ They really have no place in the discussion. The proper attitude to deliberate use of archaism in the writings of great men is to treat them as not meant to be taken for current ones.⁵ Vijayīndra quotes from the *Candrikā*, the *NS*, *AV*, the *Tantraratna* of Varadarāja, etc. The adhikaraṇaśārīras of the first five adhikaraṇas are then systematically vindicated. (37) *Caṅkra-Mīmāṃsā* is a tract (Mys. O. L. 4746 Nagari, 90 ff.) in which Vijayīndra establishes the Śāstraic character of the practice of branding (तप्तमुद्राङ्कन) the body with the symbols sacred to Viṣṇu, accepted by Vaiṣṇavas, on the basis of Vedic texts (both extant and Khilas), Pañcarātra and Paurāṇic sources.⁶ Unlike some other works of the author, this is written in a clear and persuasive style. (38) *Bhedavidyāvilāsa* (p),⁷ is an important controversial work of his in 1400 granthas; devoted to the establishment of the reality of Difference in its fivefold aspect. It is a close and clear criticism of the *Bhedadhik-kāra* of Nṛsiṃhāśrama and quotes passages from it, point by point and refutes them, in detail. The work has four Paricchedas: The first three deal with the reality of difference between Jīva and Brahman on the basis of perception, inference and Āgama. The last is devoted to a defence of

1. under iii, 2, 18.

2. under i, 1, 26.

3. यश्चण्डालः शिव इति वाचं वदेत् * * * ॥

4. यस्मिन् प्रतिश्लोकमबद्धवत्यपि (*Bhāg.* i, 5, 11).

5. लोकदृष्ट्या तथाव्यवहारस्याचार्यैरकृतत्वात् ।

6. यद्यपि तप्तमुद्रादिधारणं श्रुतिस्मृतीतिहासपुराणसदाचारादिसिद्धम् * * * ।

7. Parimala Pub. House, Nanjangud, 1947.

the conception of Difference as *dharmisvarūpa*, as accepted in the system of Madhva, and replies to several objections to the conception of Differences on logical grounds. Objections to the doctrine of difference as an attribute of things, are also met. A synopsis of its arguments has been given by me in the *Notes* to the edition of the text. (39) *Nyāya-Mukura*^(m) is preserved in the Rāghavendra Svāmi Mutt, Nanjangud (Mys. Arch. Rep. 1917, p. 17). It is the same work as has been wrongly entered as *Nayamukura* in the *G. V. L. Catal.*, Kumbakonam, in the S. K. (1896) and on p. 317 of *Vij. Sex. Com. Vol. I* have not had access to the ms. (40) *Paratattva-prakāśikā*^(m) (Mys. O. L. C-939 Dev. 49 ff.) is a criticism of the *Śivatattva-viveka*¹ of Appayya Dīkṣita, who seeks to establish Śiva as the supreme Brahman of the Śāstras. Appayya's thesis is directed against the beliefs of the followers of Rāmānuja and Madhva. As a counterblast to this, Vijayīndra wrote the present work upholding the view that in the hierarchy of Vedic and Vedāntic gods, the highest place is due to Viṣṇu. The parties to the controversy are agreed that there *are* different gods possessing different names and powers and want to find out and identify the chief among them. The issue cannot, therefore, be cheaply dismissed from an "Advaitic point of view." On any Theistic view, the true identity of *the One God* is bound to engage serious attention and give trouble to earnest seekers. Vijayīndra patiently wades through the theological literature available in his days and, after a prolonged discussion of the texts, declares ultimately in favour of the supremacy of Viṣṇu. The work has two sections devoted to the statement of the Pūrvapakṣa and its refutation. (41) [*Brahmasūtra*] — *Nyāyasamgraha* (Mys. O. L. C-2274) is a short metrical tract giving the gist of the Adhikaraṇas of the B. S. as interpreted by Madhva, after the manner of the *Anubhāṣya*. The following verse would serve as an example :

जीवान्यद् ब्रह्म जिज्ञास्यं सृष्ट्यद्यष्टविधायि यत् ।

शास्त्रैकगम्यं तद्ब्रह्मोपक्रमदिसमन्वयात् ॥

(42) *Siddhānta Sārāsāra-Viveka* I. (m) Two mss. of this work exist, one at Mys. (O. L. A-88) and the other at Madras (R. No. 1293). The fragment preserved at Madras contains only ten chapters refuting the system of Rāmānuja.² The author dismisses the classification of the categories into six adopted by the Viśiṣṭādvaitins as defective and argues a case for accepting *andhakāra* as a separate category (p. 5 Madras Ms.). He denies to Nityavibhūti the status of a *dravya* and criticizes the doctrine of Prapatti. (p. 32), and Brahmopādānatva. The *Vijayindra-Parājaya* of Kumbakonam Tātācārya (Madras X 4994) is a direct refutation³ of this

1. Sri Vidya Press, Kumbakonam, 1895.

2. Published with my English introd. by the Rāghavendra Swami Mutt, Mantralaya 1977. It quotes from Deśika's *Tattvamuktākalāpa*, *Sankalpasūryodaya* and *Adhikaraṇasārāvali*.

3. यतिना परकालेन विजयीन्द्रः पराजितः ॥

रामानुजमतेऽप्येवमसारत्वोक्तिगवितः ॥ (end)

R. D. Karmarkar (Ed. *Śribhāṣya-Catussūtri*, Poona, 1959) is wrong in assigning this author (in his Introd.) to 1390 A.D. He must be placed *two centuries later*.

work. (43) *Siddhānta-Sārāsāra-Viveka* II (m) is a work of similar nature, directed against the *Śivādvaita* of Śrīkaṇṭha, reported from Mysore (C-2331) according to a list of uncatalogued books in the Mysore O. L. sent to the office of the *New Catalogus Catalogorum*.¹ (44) *Ānandatāratamyavādārtha* (m). This is another short controversial tract (Catal. Cat. 570 and Oppert II, 9806) directed against the Rāmānuja school. The subject is the grāda-tion of bliss in Mokṣa among released souls. As even the Rāmānujīyas are agreed that the released souls are barred from participating in the cosmic activities of the Brahman, (B. S. iv, 4, 17) and are still subject to the Lord and to such limitations as are irrevocable, Vijayīndra finds it easy to argue that the bliss of released souls who are finite and that of the Lord cannot be the same. There must be some wide difference as the human souls have attained deliverance by His Grace.

In his *Nym.* and *Candrikā*, Vyāsātīrtha had passed severe strictures on some of the pet theories, doctrines and sūtra interpretations of the Viśiṣṭādvaitins. The thesis of Paramasāmya was refuted by him in the closing section of the *Nym.* These criticisms were naturally resented by the Rāmānujīyas. The evidence of mss. shows that close on the heels of Vyāsātīrtha came a number of Viśiṣṭādvaitins who strove to repudiate the attacks made by him on their system. The names of (1) Śrīnivāsācārya of the Śaṭhamarṣaṇa Kula (2) Kumbakonam Tātācārya and (3) Mahācārya of Sholinghur require special mention, in this connection. The *Tattvamārtanḍa*² of the first (Madras O. L. X. 4894) is a refutation of those portions of the *Candrikā* which are specially directed against the *Śrībhāṣya* and its commentary :

वासुदेवकथायां हि पौण्ड्रकस्य कथा यथा ।

व्यासाचार्यकथायां हि व्यासरायकथा तथा ॥

इति स्वप्नोपदिष्टेन देशिकानुग्रहेण च ।

चन्द्रिकोदीरिता दोषा न लग्ना इति साधये ॥

साध्यते ब्रह्मसूत्राणां सङ्गतासंगतार्थता ।

राद्धान्तयोः स्वपरयोः श्रीनिवासकृपावशात् ॥

दुरुक्तिभिर्दोषगवेषणाशया

गुरुक्तिषु भ्रान्तिमुपेयुषा रूपा ।

महाविषाशीविषपेटिकाभि-

र्दोषकान् हन्त विदन्ति मूषकान् ॥ (D. C. Madras, X, No. 4894 end).

The same writer also wrote a *Prāṇavadarpaṇa* or *Om̐kāravādārtha* (Madras X. 4871) dismissing the belief of the Madhvas that the syllable "Om" should be read as part of the first sūtra of Bādarāyaṇa :

इह केचिदतिसाहसिनः प्रथमं 'अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा' इति ब्रह्ममीमांसासूत्रे सकलैः पठ्यमानमोकारं तदवयवमभिदधति । तदेतत् प्रमाणपथानुवर्तिनो नानुमन्यन्ते । तथाहि—* * *

1. I am indebted to my friend Dr. V. Raghavan, of the Madras University, for this information. An examination of the ms. has shown that C-2331, of Mys., is, in reality, a different work.

2. The *Tattvamārtanḍa* has been printed and published from Mysore by the

The *Pārāśarya-Vijaya* of Mahācārya also, similarly, criticizes the Sūtra-interpretation of Madhva.

A scrutiny of the controversial tracts of Vijayīndra against the doctrines of the Viśiṣṭādvaitins¹ shows that they were themselves reactions from his side to the attempted criticism of the *Candrikā* by them. It would thus be clear that Vijayīndra had to carry on a *triangular fight* with (1) Advaitins (2) the Vīra Śaiva schoolmen including the followers of Śrīkaṇṭha and (3) the Vīra-Vaiṣṇavas (Rāmānujīyas). Some idea of the fury with which the Viśiṣṭādvaitins came to defend their system against the attacks of Vyāsātīrtha and Vijayīndra could be gathered from the title of one of the works of this period, the *Vijayīndra-Parājaya*² of Kumbakonam Tātācārya and the invective rhetoric employed by him,³ which is conspicuous by its absence in the replies of Vijayīndra.⁴ This Tātācārya describes himself as a native of Kumbakonam. He was presumably a younger contemporary of Vijayīndra. From certain remarks let fall by him towards the close of his work, it appears that Vijayīndra was yet alive then, though probably *too old*. It was probably the same Tātācārya that figures in Sevappa Nāyaka's grant to Vijayīndra in 1580. We cannot say if Vijayīndra again replied to the criticisms of Tātācārya,⁵ most of which, however, have been anticipated by him in his *Siddhānta-sārāsāra-viveka* I. And the thesis of Ānandatāratamya has been sufficiently well-established in his *Ānandatāratamyavādārtha*, under notice. (45) *Nyāyā-dhavadīpikā* (m) is a manual of the general principles of the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā, written from the standpoint of Madhva's system and presumably for the benefit of students approaching the subject, through Madhva's system :

न्यायाध्वगामिनां मध्वदर्शनाद्गतिसिद्धये ।

तन्वते विजयीन्द्रेण तन्वी न्यायाध्वदीपिका ॥

Besides giving a fair and clear exposition of the orthodox Mīmāṃsaka doctrines as presented by the leading commentators of that school, the work aims at harmonizing them with those of Madhva and his followers. The author says that though there are works like the *Śāstradīpikā* briefly explaining the views of the Mīmāṃsakas, his work would be welcomed by all, especially those who are not equal to the stiff treatment there. The publication

Parakāla Maṭha. Śrī Vidyāmānya T. of Palimar Mutt, Uḍipi, has published his criticism of the first four adh-s of this work (1975).

1. The Viśiṣṭādvaitins must have greatly resented the attacks from Vyāsātīrtha, all the more so, because the great Vedānta Deśika had called the Madhvas his nearest friends :

तत्सन्निकृष्टमपि वा मतमाश्रयध्वम् । (*Śatadūṣaṇī*).

2. This work deals with nearly 22 topics of special interest in Dvaita and criticizes them all. These include (1) Guṇaguṇyabheda, (2) Ānandatāratamya, (3) Viśeṣas, (4) Avyākṛtākāśa, (5) Denial of Brahman's material causality and (6) the inefficacy of Prapatti.

3. व्यतानीच्छ्रीनिवासो नयमणिमालिकां ध्वान्तदोषटयहन्त्रीम् ।

तस्मादप्रामाणिकं ध्वान्तमतानुवर्तिनामवयवत्वकथनमिति ॥

4. See his introd. to the *Pranavadarpanakhaṇḍanam*.

5. Some of his criticisms have, however, been answered by Rāghavendra, in his gloss *Bhāvadīpa* on the *TP*.

of this work had been announced years ago by the Mysore O. L. But so far nothing has been done about it. (46) *Śrutitātparyakaumudī** is mentioned by Rāghavendra, in his c. on the *Candrikā* (i, 3, vol. 4, Mysore edn.) as well as in his *Bhāvadīpa* on the TP (p. 101, line 12) :

अत्र विस्तरस्तु गुरुप्रादकृतश्रुतितात्पर्यकौमुद्यां ज्ञेयः ॥

No further information is available about this work and its contents and no ms. of it has been traced. (47) *Upasamhāra-Vijaya*^(p)¹, is another leading work of Vijayīndra on Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā thought. It is in the nature of a rejoinder to the *Upakrama-Parākrama* of Appayya Dīkṣita (Benares, 1904), who in his work pleads for the superiority of the *upakrama* (initial statement in a textual totality) over the concluding part thereof, in the settlement of the import of the whole, in case of any difficulty. Vijayīndra's work is a plea for the soundness of the reverse procedure advocated by Madhva and which has been ridiculed by Appayya Dīkṣita.² The attempt to defend the thesis of "Upasamhāra-prābalya" of Madhva was first made by Vyāsātīrtha, in his *Tarkatāṇḍava* and in the *Candrikā*, in the light of some admissions and implications in the Mīmāṃsā Sūtras and in the commentaries thereon. It was carried out still further by his eminent disciple Vijayīndra in such of his works as the *Candrikodāhṛtanyāyavivarana* and, above all, in this work :

गुरुपादोक्तिभिर्न्यायिरूपक्रमपराक्रमम् ।

निराकृत्योपसंहारविजयोऽयं प्रकाशयते ॥

A complete Telugu ms. of it is preserved in the T. P. L. (8086) in 1270 granthas. Two other mss. are found in the Mys. O. L. Vijayīndra emphasizes in this work certain broad principles in support of Madhva's stand :

(i) The *Upasamhāra* stands in the relation of a "Vyākhyāna" (explanation) to the "Upakrama," which is to be viewed as the *Vyākhyeya* (what is to be explained).

(ii) व्याख्येयस्य निश्चितप्रामाण्यव्याख्यानानुसारेणैवार्थनिर्णयो युक्तः ।

A text whose precise import is to be fixed, has naturally, to be interpreted in consistency with that whose sense and validity are established (viz., "Vyākhyāna").

(iii) The part of the text that interprets an earlier one, in a given whole, is syntactically to be viewed as logically subsequent to the other (व्याख्यानस्य पश्चात्तन्व नियमात्).

(iv) The syntactic relation of "Vyākhyānavyākhyeyabhāva" cannot be reversed at will. It needs must be based on certain criteria. This criterion, in Vedic texts, must be the "Upakrama" which is *prima facie* "given" in traditional recitation :

उपक्रम एव व्याख्येयत्वेन स्वीकार्यः । विहिताध्ययनदशायां तस्यैव नियमेन प्रथमोपस्थितत्वात् ।

(v) Though the Vedic texts are not *Pauruṣeya* and cannot be deemed to have an intentional sequence of "Vyākhyāna" and "Vyākhyeya", as in

1. Published by the Rāghavendra Svāmi Mutt, Nanjangud, 1956, with my English Introduction.

2. यवनगुरुरूपदिष्टशौचप्रक्षालनपौर्वापर्यव्यत्यासवदुपेक्षणीयः ॥

human utterances, the same principle of inner harmony that justifies the presence of the imperative in Vedic injunctions may be deemed to account for the natural order of “Vyākhyānavyākhyeyabhāva” in their statements.

(vi) Even in respect of non-Scriptural texts, where the order of “Vyākhyānavyākhyeyabhāva” is whimsical, there is such a thing as the senseorder” (*arthakrama*) which is more binding and has precedence over the word-order (*pāṭhakrama*), which could easily decide the nature of “Vyākhyānavyākhyeyabhāva”, in cases of doubt.

(vii) The only difference between Vedic and secular texts is that while in the former, the text-order, as given, is purely governed by unseen merit (*adr̥ṣṭārtha*), in the latter it is optional (*aicchika*). But this makes no difference to the principle of regulating the “Vyākhyānavyākhyeyabhāva” and its implications.

(viii) What is of doubtful import (*sandigdghārtha*) and “given” at first (*niyamena prathamopasthita*) must thus be accepted as the “Vyākhyeya” (to be clarified) in the light of what follows. The “Upakrama” satisfies this criterion and is to be invariably treated as the “Vyākhyeya” (to be interpreted). There is clear possibility of Sandigdghārthatva or room for doubt about the precise import, in the case of terms like “Veda”, “Svām devatām” and “Śyena” in the texts that constitute the subject-matter of the Vedopakramādhikaraṇa, Aśvapratigraheṣṭyadhikaraṇa, and the Śyenādhikaraṇa in which the Upakramanyāya has been pressed into service, by others.

Vijayīndra shows that the counter-thesis of “Upakrama-prābalya” is really a shallow one, resting on the mere accident of “priority” of enunciation, which is not necessarily a logical consideration. The contention that *at the stage of* the Upakrama (when the eye does not see the Upasamhāra) there is or can be no conflict with the Upakrama and that, *therefore*, the Upakrama could be vested with precedence and primacy to the extent of imposing a secondary sense (*lākṣaṇikārtha*) on the Upasamhāra is, to say the least, trivial. To vest the Upakrama, simply because it is the Upakrama (and on no other criterion) with a primary sense (*मुख्यार्थ*) and apply a secondary sense to the Upasamhāra, in order to square it up with the Upakrama does *not* rest on any valid material or logical grounds at all and cannot therefore be taken seriously. The relation of “Vyākhyānavyākhyeyabhāva” which the Dvaita philosophers have made out, on the other hand, between the Upasamhāra and the Upakrama (upon which they base their thesis of Upasamhāra-prābalya and the logical ascendancy of the “Vyākhyāna” over the “Vyākhyeya” are both substantial principles of thought and interpretation which have a greater binding force and claim to our acceptance, in the solution of this question. Vijayīndra incidentally clarifies another point that what is meant by saying that the Upasamhāra “overrides” the Upakrama is that the latter would be subjected to a slight depreciation of meaning स्वार्थानां क्षितमुद्धार्यादुपक्रमं प्रच्याव्य, तदाकांक्षितार्थे तद्वचनस्यापनम् । and not certainly to utter negation as in “Bādha” (sublation). He points out that “Bādha” has been explained

by the Mīmāṃsakas in various ways, consistent with the self-validity of the Vedas.

Another important contribution made by Vijayīndra is to prick the bubble of “Upakramanyāya” having been applied at all in respect of the well-known adhikaraṇas of the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā like the (1) Vedopakramādhikaraṇa, Aśvapratigraheṣṭyadhikaraṇa, etc. The discussions carried out by him here should really be an eye-opener to many a Pūrva-Mīmāṃsaka and Advaitin who assumes that it is on the strength of the Upakramaprābalya-nyāya that the ruling has been given in these adhikaraṇas. Vijayīndra contends that there is no evidence in these two adhikaraṇas as such of the Upakramanyāya, as such, having been applied, to arrive at a decision of the import. This contention should not be misunderstood as denying that the net result of the two adhikaraṇas is that the Upakrama prevails over the Upasamhāra. What Vijayīndra insists upon is that this conclusion is reached *not on the ground of Upakramaprābalya as against Upasamhāra as such*, as contended by the Advaitins and some Mīmāṃsakas, *but on entirely different grounds*, which he explains in this work. The interesting point is that the result attained in the two adhikaraṇas is the same viz. that Upakrama is to be accepted as stronger, but this decision is reached, not through Upakramaprābalya. Vijayīndra has argued this point with great force and a convincing array of reasons. He points out that the relevant “nyāyas”—(other than Upakramaprābalya) are such as “Abhyāsa”, “Karmāṅgatva” etc., which are applicable and are shown to have been applied as a matter of fact, in these cases. He also cites, following Vyāsatīrtha, authoritative Mīmāṃsaka works like the *Tantraratna*, *Vārttika* and yājñika practices in support of his exposition. He also reinforces his position with reference to the Aktādhikaraṇa, Apacchedādhikaraṇa, etc., and shows in passing (p. 26 text) the limitations of Appayya’s knowledge of “Yājñikācāras.” Vijayīndra quotes *in extenso* from Appayya’s work and replies to it at length. (48) A ms., of his *Naya-Pañcaka-Mālā*¹ is preserved in the Rāghavendra Svāmi Mutt, Nanjangud. Its ascription in the *Mys. Arch. Rep.* for 1917 (p. 17) to Sujanaendra Tīrtha, twelfth in succession from Vijayīndra, is a mistake. The *S. K.* (1896 p. 41) ascribes it, rightly, to Vijayīndra. (49) *Vāgvaikhari*^(m) is a short tract in 1900 granthas, of a miscellaneous character, dealing among other things with the validity of the Vedas and the scope and purpose of Bheda-Śrutis. The author seeks to establish God as a person full of auspicious attributes and combats the doctrine of Nirguṇatva and Avācyaṭva of Brahman. A Devanagari ms. of the work is to be found in the Mys. O. L. (C-2397). The (50) *Nārāyaṇaśabdārthanirvacanam*^(m) (Mysore-4025) is one of the tracts dealing with the etymology of the word “Nārāyaṇa” as applied to Viṣṇu and refuting the contention of Śaivite writers like Appayya who have endeavoured to correlate it to Śiva. The learned Dikṣita is said to have given up the attempt, in the end, with the significant remark that the

1. Not “Nayacampakamālā” as named in *Vij. Sex. Cen.* Vol. p. 317.

cerebral n presents an insuperable difficulty to the Śaivite attunement (*ṇatvam bādhikkiradu*—Tamil). A complete ms. of (51) *Pranavadarpaṇa-Khaṇḍanam*^(m) is preserved in the Madras O. L. (D. C. X, 4798). It is a reply to the contention of Śrīnivāsācārya Śaṭhamarṣaṇa in his *Pranavadarpaṇa*, that the syllable om̐ has no right to be read as part of the opening Sūtra. Vijayīndra quotes passages from Śrīnivāsa and replies to them in more dignified language than his adversary has chosen to present the case of the Dvaitin :

अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा 'इति न्यायग्रथनात्मकब्रह्ममीमांसाशास्त्रस्यादिम-
सूत्रस्योकार एतत्सूत्रावयवो नवेति विप्रतिपत्तिः । नेत्यन्ये ।
भवत्येवेति व्यासमतानुसारिणः । तत्रान्येषामयमभिसन्धिः ॥

(52) *Piṣṭapaśu-Mīmāṃsā* is attributed to him by R. Nagaraja Sarma on p. 23 of his *Reign of Realism in I. Phil* (1931). The Catalogues of the various Mss. Libraries examined by me do not mention any such work. The subject dealt with is the propriety of substituting flour-made paśus for living animals, in Vedic sacrifices, which is followed by the adherents of Madhva. It is known that the system of Piṣṭapaśuyajñas is as old as the Uparicara Vasu episode in the Mokṣadharmā section of the *Māhābhārata*¹. Advaitins and Viśiṣṭādvaitins on the other hand, are advocates of the actual slaughter of animals in sacrifice. Vijayīndra's arguments are said to be based not merely on humanitarian grounds, but the difficulty of procuring duly qualified ṛtviks to officiate at such yajñas, in a degenerate age like Kali. To minimize the risk, Piṣṭapaśus have to be substituted. Such substitution is sanctioned by the Mīmāṃsakas and followed by all Vaidikas in respect of rites like Sautrāmaṇi. According also to the law that a man shall offer to the gods what he himself is allowed to eat, actual slaughter of animals would seem to be out of the question at least in the case of Brahmins. Texts from *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* are quoted.

(53) *Kucodyakuṭhāra*^(m) is said to be another tract dealing with the Sūtra-interpretation and defending the particular arrangement of its subject-matter adopted by Madhva, against later day critics like Appayya. It is described at some length by R. Nagaraja Sarma in his article on Vijayīndra in the *Indian Express*, Madras, (10th July, 1937). It is presumably the same work as is described in Mys. O. L. C-970 and wrongly presumed to be a c. on *Candrikā*. Vijayīndra is reported to refer, in this work, to the *Candrikā* saying that all frivolous objections of Monists have been silenced there :

चन्द्रिकादौ व्यक्तत्वाच्च कुचोद्यावकाशः ॥

(54) *Advaita-Sikṣā*^(m) is a spirited controversial work of Vijayīndra, preserved in the Library of the Sanskrit College, Udipi. It is a general

1. According to *Skanda Purāṇa* (ii, 29, 7, 29; 9, 13-14) Piṣṭapaśus have always been the Vedic law and the actual slaughter of animals is due to a misunderstanding of Scripture in later times. The Ārya Samājists hold the somewhat improbable view that in Vedic sacrifices the animals were never meant to be killed, but only "touched". (*alambhana*).

chastisement of Advaita theory and a rejoinder to the *Advaitadīpikā* of Nṛsiṃhāśrama and modelled on the *Bhedojjivana*. It is also referred to by name in his *Nyāyamauktikamālā* (Mys.A-44): प्रपञ्चितं चैतदस्माभिरद्वैतशिक्षायां श्रुत्यर्थ-सारादिष्वपीत्यलम् ॥ The opening verse indicates the scope of the work in a fine and impressive way:

धीरश्रीविजयीन्द्रमस्करिमणिः श्रीशङ्करां शासिता
तदास्यैकबलान्वितो विदितषट्त्तन्त्रार्थजातः सुधीः ।
प्रत्यक्षश्रुतियुक्तिनिश्चितमपि श्रीशास्त्रभेदं वृथा
धिक्कृत्यात्मनि तद्विषयं विदधतः शिक्षां विधास्येज्जसा ॥

It is also referred to twice in the *Bhedavidyāvilāsa* of Vijayīndra himself (pp. 27 and 39). The *Nyāyamauktikamālā* refers to another work of Vijayīndra (55) *Śrutyarthasāra* * of which no ms. has been brought to light, so far. (56) *Śaivasarvasvakhaṇḍanam* (p)¹ is a short tract in 300 granthas, discussing eleven Puraṇic legends touching the supremacy of Śiva as against Viṣṇu, such as (1) the legend of Viṣṇu going in search of the foot of the Liṅga form of Śiva (liṅgamūlānveṣaṇa); (2) his running away from the scene when the poison Halāhala emerged from the milky ocean; (3) his serving as a weapon of Śiva in the subjugation of the Tripura Asuras; (4) the destruction of the Nṛsiṃha form of Viṣṇu by the Śarabha form of Śiva and so on. All these eleven issues, resting on Śaivite legends in the Kūrma, Liṅga, Varāha, Skanda and Śaiva Purāṇas, have been refuted by Vijayīndra who quotes authorities from the Sāttvika Purāṇas and Śrutis from the *T. A. R. V.*, etc., explaining the true state of affairs. The *Liṅgamūlānveṣaṇakhaṇḍana* is not therefore a separate work; but one of the eleven issues dealt with here.

BELLES LETTRES

Besides being a powerful controversialist and a renowned commentator, Vijayīndra was a notable poet and dramatist too. His known works in this field are three. (57) *Subhadrā-Dhanañjaya*, (m) a Sanskrit drama, dealing with the interesting story of the love marriage of Arjuna and Subhadrā. We have a very badly damaged Nandināgari ms. of this rare work in the Madras O. L. (D. S. XXI, 12728). It is very difficult to make out the writing in the Ms. (58) *Ubhayagrastarāhūdaya* (m) an allegorical drama written as a counterblast to the *Prabodhacandrodaya* and the *Samkalpa-sūryodaya*. Aufrecht notices a Ms. of this work (Cat. Catal p. 69) from Jy. Oppert 2504. It is referred to in the *Sāhitya Sāmrājya* of Sudhīndra, as a drama with the sentiment of Śānta predominating.² Reference has already been made to his (59) *Citramimāṃsākhaṇḍanam*.

1. Parimala Publishing House, Nanjangud, 1945.

2. I am indebted to my friend Raja Gururajacharya, Dewan of the Śrī Raghavendra Svāmi Mutt, for this information from his *Kavisārvabhaumakavitākaṇḍalā*, dealing with the works of Sudhīndra.

VĀDIRĀJA TĪRTHA (C. 1480-1600)

(A) HIS DATE, LITERARY AND OTHER MERITS,
LIFE AND WORKS

Vādirāja was another eminent successor of Vyāsatīrtha who carried forward the work of theological polemics and critical reinforcement and defence of the Dvaita system. He is believed to have been a disciple of Vyāsatīrtha and studied under him. This is confirmed by the Uḍipi tradition also, though a different reason is given for this fact.¹ But unlike Vijayīndra, he does *not acknowledge* Vyāsatīrtha as his teacher, anywhere in his major works.² Tradition and certain extraneous evidences in the songs of some of the Dāsas, like Purandara Dāsa, Vijaya Dāsa, Timmaṇṇa Dāsa and Śrīda Viṭhala go to show that Vādirāja *was* a student of Vyāsatīrtha along with Vijayīndra.

It is difficult to accept the alleged reference to Vyāsatīrtha as his Guru by Vādirāja in his *Prameyamālā*, according to a note on the work by a writer in the *Kannāḍa Tattvavāda* Nov. 1965. The work attributed to Vādirāja is otherwise unknown. The grammatical blunder in the very passage quoted from that work : वादिराजकृपादेव साधितं दुर्लभं मया is enough to disprove Vādirāja's authorship of it.

This makes it clear that he should have flourished in the 16th century. But the late Prof. P. P. S. Sastri, following Bhandarkar, had argued in his Introduction to Vol. III of his edn. of the *Southern Recension of the Mahābhārata*, that Vādirāja died in 1339 A.D. This has been exploded by me and P. K. Gode, in the *A. B. O. R. I.* (Vol. xviii, pts. 2-3) on the basis of literary and epigraphic evidences. There are inscriptions relating to Vādirāja, in the years 1571,³ 1582⁴ and 1593.⁵ Seeing that he was a pupil

1. *Vādirājaguruvarācaritāmṛta* of Rāmacandra iv, 21 (Uḍipi, 1954).

2. The only reference is in the *Śrīpādarājāṣṭakam* attributed to him. See my paper on Date of Vādirāja., *A. B. O. R. I.* xviii, 2, p. 194. Vādirāja has *neither commented* on any of the works of Vyāsatīrtha *nor quoted* from them in any of his famous works and commentaries. *This is a fact* : though his silence is rather surprising and unaccountable, if not discourteous to so eminent an authority on the Dvaita system. His divergence of view from the TP and the *Candrikā* in the alignment and number of adhikaraṇas in B. S. ii, 3. (See *TP Gurvarthadīpikā*, p. 89) is also a strong point that raises a real difficulty in the matter of their Guru-śiṣyabhāva. It cannot, however, be denied that his *Yuktimalikā* is *much influenced and inspired by the Nym. and the Candrikā*. It is also surprising that in his *Tīrthaprabandha*, he makes only a covert reference to Vyāsatīrtha along with seven other ascetics entombed at Ānegondi. His exact relationship towards Vyāsatīrtha, so far as could be made out from his major works in Sanskrit, is thus, somewhat intriguing.

3. *Ep. Car.* vii, Sb. 55. p. 10.

4. Year of consecration of temple of Trivikrama, erected by him at Sode (N. Kanara).

5. Year of grant by Arasappa Nāyaka, Chief of Sode, to him.

of Vyāsātīrtha, who died in 1539, it seems proper to place him entirely in the 16th century. This agrees with the “Carama Śloka” for him preserved in the Sode Mutt at Uḍipi :

स्वस्ति श्रीजयशालिवाहनशके सार्धात्सहस्रात्परं
द्वाविंशे शरदां गते प्रभवति श्रीशार्वरीवत्सरे ।
मासे फाल्गुनके सितेतरतृतीयायां तिथौ विद्दिने
स्वातीहर्षणसंयुते हरिपदं श्रीवादिराजो ह्यगात् ॥

which gives us Śārvarī 1600 A.D., as the year of his demise.¹

LIFE

Vādirāja was a native of the village of Hūvinakere,² near Kuṁbhāsi, in the Kundāpur taluk of the S. Kanara district. He is stated to have been a Tulu (Shivalli) Brahmin³ by birth and son of Rāmācārya, follower of Sāmaveda and his wife Gaurī (Sarasvatī). The couple had two sons by the grace of Vāgīśa Tīrtha. The elder was Varāhācārya, who was presented to Vāgīśa, according to previous arrangement. He was ordained a monk at the age of eight and placed under the care of Vidyānidhi Tīrtha,⁴ a senior disciple of Vāgīśa, who however died after a few years, whereupon Vādirāja continued his studies under Vāgīśa himself and later succeeded him as Pontiff of his Mutt. *A life of 120 years is traditionally ascribed to him.* There is no doubt he enjoyed a long life and presided over the Mutt at Sode (13 miles from Sirsi, N. Kanara—the “Sonda” of the *Gazetteers* and Buchanan) established by him, for a number of years. He seems to have had two headquarters—one at Uḍipi and the other at Sode, where he passed away.

PLACE OF VĀDIRĀJA AND HIS MERITS

Vādirāja is the most facile writer in Dvaita literature. His fine poetic faculty and human touch, the quick flashes of his wit and humour, his apt analogies from life and literature, and his racy way of putting things have made him the most popular and enthusiastically applauded writer in

1. This verse is also found in the *Vādirājaguruvaracaritāmṛta*, vi, 72. It also gives his exact date of birth as 12th day of Śārvarī 1480 A.D. (Māgha Śukla).

2. It was granted by Vira Venkaṭapatiṛāya, to Vādirāja's successor Vedavedya in 1614 A.D. (*Insc. Madras Pres.* ii, pp. 870-71), as a benefice.

3. Others claim him to have been a Smārta by birth with sympathies towards Śaṅkara's system. In his *Yuktimallikā* (i, 20) he says that he became profoundly dissatisfied with Māyāvāda and renounced it and became a follower of “Tattvavāda” (of Madhva). This is a strong indication that he was not originally a Mādhva. Succession to the Aṣṭama-ṭhas of Uḍipi has always been confined to Shivalli Brahmins. The *Vṛttaratnasamgraha* and *Vādirājaguruvaracaritāmṛta*, also, state that he was a Taulava by birth. There is still a small minority among the “Shivalli” Brahmins remaining outside the fold of Madhva Sampradāya. Possibly, Vādirāja's family might have belonged to this group.

4. Mentioned in one of the opening verses of the *Yuktimallikā*. This Vidyānidhi must be distinguished from the one who established the Uttaradi Mutt in 1444 A.D.

Dvaita literature. He *thinks in poetry and argues in it*, with all the richness and irresistibility of its appeal :

सविनोदं सादृष्टासं सस्मितं सुन्दरान्वितम् ।

सरहस्यं सप्रमाणं वादिराजवचोऽमृतम् ।

निर्दुष्टं रसवत्स्पष्टं नानन्दयति कं जनम् ? (*Vṛttaratnasamgraha*, i, x. 48-52)

He had a well-stored mind and a rare gift of ready expression on which he could draw for substance, variety and vivacity, alluring analogies and telling expression. His works show an intense personal fervour and passionate faith in the religious and metaphysical satisfyingness and superiority of Madhva Siddhānta :

विस्तरस्त्वस्य सर्वस्य मूलशास्त्रमहार्णवे ।

द्रष्टव्यस्तत्तदस्थानुमणिसंग्राहिणो वयम् ॥ (*Yuktimalikā*, i, 492; iii, 209)

He pays deep homage and unstinting tribute to the memory of Madhva and modestly disclaims all originality for his views. His spiritual life and magnetic personality, coupled with his alluring poetic flair and directness of approach to the problems of philosophy and interpretation, endeared him to one and all and made it easy for him to spread the message of Madhva, far and wide and to establish personal contacts with the masses which brought welcome acquisition of numbers to the creed, in his time. It is worthy to note that he freely admitted to his fold many classes of people that stood in need of spiritual uplift. Tradition records his reclamation of the Maṭṭu Koteśvara Brahmins of S. Kanara. The *Vādirāja-GVCA* refers (iv. 74) to his conversion of the "Svarṇakāra" (goldsmith) community of S. Kanara.¹ The *Vṛttasamgraha* refers to his winning many converts in Gujarat and other places. It is widely believed that he cooperated fully with Jivottama Tīrtha,² the spiritual Head of the Koṅkaṇī (Gauḍa-Sārasvata) Brahmin community of the West Coast,³ in furthering the interests of Madhva faith among them and strengthening the bonds of doctrinal affinity born of common allegiance to one Founder, which bound it already to the rest of Madhva world.

Vādirāja was a many-sided personality. He was a sound scholar, a great controversialist, a successful organizer and a gifted religious poet, both in Sanskrit and Kannaḍa. Tradition invests him with great spiritual powers. He is believed to have held under his occult powers, a mysterious

1. Among the members of this (Daivajña) community professing allegiance to the Sode Mutt are speakers of Koṅkaṇī and Tulu.

2. The Editorial f.n. on p. 24 of the Kannaḍa quarterly *Jivottama* (Vol. i, no. 1) questioning the contemporaneity of Vādirāja and Jivottama, is not based on a correct appraisal of evidences.

3. The Gokaṇṇa Maṭha of the Gauḍa Sārasvatas, was founded in 1476, by Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha, a disciple of Rāmacandra Tīrtha tenth in succession on the Palimār Maṭha of Uḍipi. For further information re. the history of this Mutt and the works of its Pontiffs refer *Guruparamparāmṛta*, by Narasimha Pauranik, of Bhatkal, ed. by Kumta Narayanacharya, Khanapur, 1904. See also Appendices IV and VIII.

goblin (Bhūtarāja) with whose aid he is said to have performed many miracles and overcome many obstacles that were placed in his way by his religious persecutors. This Bhūtarāja has a separate temple assigned to him now at the Vādirāja Maṭha, Sode. The system of "Paryāyas", now obtaining in Uḍipi, is believed to have been inaugurated by him. There is no doubt that Vādirāja, by dint of his great influence over neighbouring chiefs and by his outstanding attainments as a scholar, was able to rehabilitate the interests of the spiritual descendants of Madhva at Uḍipi and their following there to a considerable extent.¹ He is said to have made considerable improvements to the Kṛṣṇa Maṭha (temple) at Uḍipi, rebuilt it on an extended scale, erected the eight Maṭhas around it and secured endowments for them and brought the temples of Ananteśvara and Candramaulīśvara, facing the Kṛṣṇa Maṭha, under the control and management of his own co-religionists, after evicting the Smārtas in ascendancy there and made the ascetics of the Kṛṣṇa temple a power to be felt in the country around.²

He seems to have encountered severe opposition to his religious propaganda from three powerful quarters in South and North Kanara,—the Jainas, Smārtas (Advaitins) and Śaivas (Liṅgāyatas). The influence of the Jainas was particularly strong in S. Kanara, in the 15th and 16th centuries.³ Vādirāja was evidently thrown into heated encounters with the scholars of the famous Bastis of Karkal and Mūḍabidri and had a tough time of it. His trenchant criticisms of the Jainas in his *Pāṣaṇḍakhaṇḍanam* and other works, show this.

The encounters with the Advaitins and Śaivas were equally sharp and protracted. There are certain covert allusions in his *Yuktimalikā* to the difficulty of obtaining recognition and patronage for the faith of Madhva from neighbouring chiefs :

अधुना विधुना रुद्धं मधु नासीन्मधुव्रत

उदिते मुदितेऽब्जे स्याददितेविदिते सुते ।

तार्णे बौकसी पार्णे वा तापसो भूप सोऽवसत् ।

तिथौ तेऽतिथिरेतद्विद्वान् क्वागण्यपुण्यदः ? (i, 26-27)

1. Tradition says it was during Vādirāja's Paryāya that Acyutarāya visited Uḍipi and rebuilt the tank (Madhvasarovara) adjoining the Kṛṣṇa temple. Vādirāja was most probably the "Pracaṇḍa Madhva Muni" (famous Madhva ascetic) spoken of in the *Grāma Paddhati*, to whom is ascribed the reclamation of the Koṭeśvara Brahmins. Vide Saletore, *History of Tuluva*, pp. 444-49. The Koṭeśvara and Maṭṭu Brahmins are now disciples of Vādirāja's Mutt.

2. It was evidently in virtue of these services that he came to be looked upon as a "reincarnation" of Madhva, which soon gave rise to the view that he was one of the Rju-Gaṇas (a class of souls destined to hold the office of Brahmā) and identical with the god (deva) Lātavya, who is to be the future Vāyu and Brahmā (Bhāvi-Samiraṇa). See Nārāyaṇa Paṇḍitācārya's *Nayacandrikā*, p. 58, line 5. This has led to a schism among the followers of Madhva dividing them into rival groups on the question of the "Rjutva" of Vādirāja. See *Vādirāja-GVCA* viii.

3. The famous statue of Gomaṭa at Kārkal was set up in 1432 A.D. Another was set up at Veṇūr, in 1603.

The commentator Surottama Tīrtha (brother of the author) remarks under the second verse : जैनाद्यागमदुराग्रहगृहीतराजपीडायां तं प्रति वक्तव्यं पद्यमाह— Vādirāja was a contemporary of the Keḷadi Kings: Sadāśiva Nāyaka and Doḍḍa Saṅkaṇṇa Nāyaka and of Arasappa Nāyaka of Sode (1555-98). In later years, the Keḷadi rulers were ardent upholders of Śaivism. Venkaṭappa Nāyaka (1606-29) was the author of a c. on the *Śivagitā* (Madras O. L. 1879), in whose colophon he is styled विशुद्धाद्वैतसिद्धान्तप्रतिष्ठा-पनैकघुरंधर । And Basavappa, the last of the Keḷadi chiefs wrote a monumental work, the *Śivatattvaratnākara*.¹ But the grant of Hūvinakere, by Keḷadi Venkaṭappa Nāyaka, to Vādirāja's successor Vedavedya, in 1614, is a clear indication that Vādirāja had already established his reputation as a Defender of the Faith of Madhva and gained a footing at the Court of Venkaṭappa's father. The *Vādirāja-GVCA* (vi) vividly describes the hold of Liṅgāyata (Vīraśaiva) Gurus over the territory of Sode and Vādirāja's encounter with the Liṅgāyata Guru and his defeating him in disputation and reclaiming the ruler Arasappa Nāyaka to the Brahminical faith. Vādirāja built and consecrated a temple to Trivikrama at Sode, the capital, in 1582, at the request of Arasappa himself, who in 1593, made liberal grants for its upkeep (*Bombay Gazetteer*, Vol. xiv, pt. 2, Kanara, pp. 345-48 and Buchanan : *Travels*).

Tradition says that Vādirāja encountered Appayya Dīkṣita, the great champion of Śivādvaita doctrine, in a debate. The *Vādirājavijaya* (*Vṛttaratnasamgraha*),² of Raghunāthācārya, (i, 56 ab) S. M. pp. 320-46, says that he had many disciples and followers in Gujarat and other provinces:³

गुर्जरादिषु देशेषु स्वशिष्यान् कृपया युतः ।

तत्तत्यानेव कृतवान् विष्णुदीक्षाप्रवतकान् ॥

WORKS OF VĀDIRĀJA

Vādirāja was a prolific writer and more than a hundred and five works stand to his credit.⁴ Of these, however, nearly half are in the nature of minor Stotras and of no great importance. His major works are about twenty in number, of which more than a dozen can be designated as original works. The rest are cc. on the earlier classics of the system, very few of which have, however, been printed. Of his original works, six are available in print, including his *magnum opus*, the *Yuktimalikā*.

1. Vepery, Madras, 1927.

2. Same as the "*Ratnasamgraha*" noticed by KEITH, in the *India Office Catalogue* (no. 6051) which is rather loosely described as "an anthology of the views of Vādirāja, by Raghunātha". Raghunātha's date is uncertain. It is interesting to note that he regards Vādirāja (i, 11 ab) as a Taulava by birth.

3. This allusion to "others" (Gurjarādi) is perhaps intended to cover the Gauda-Sārasvata or Koṅkaṇi Brahmins of Goa and N. Kanara who are also to be found in large numbers in S. Kanara, Cochin and Travancore and follow the system of Madhva.

4. The *Vādirāja-GVCA* (iii, 66) speaks of over a hundred works of Vādirāja.

COMMENTARIES ON DAŚA-PRAKARANAS

Commentaries on the *Khaṇḍana-traya* known by the general title of *Upanyāsaratnamālā* have been attributed to him.¹ No mss. of any of these have however been brought to light. (1) The *Upanyāsaratnamālā* (Mys. O. L. C-1859) is however a different work, a sermon on the threefold classification of souls, having for its text the verse करणपालनशील न ते स्थितिम् of the author's *Rukmiṇīśavijaya* (xvii, 12).

Under Sūtra-Prasthāna, two of Vādirāja's cc. entitled *Gurvartha-Dīpikā*s, on the *Nyāya-Sudhā* and the *TP.* of Jayatīrtha, have recently been published from Uḍipi (by the Vādirāja-Grantha-Prakāśana-Samiti). They are important cc. deserving attention. (2) *Tattvapraśāṅgikā-Gurvartha-dīpikā* (p), in 3500 granthas, is not a systematic c. on the *TP.*, but a short critical gloss on knotty points connected with the text of the Sūtra, the Bhāṣya, the Tīkā and the Viśayavākyaś :
 सूत्रे भाष्ये च टीकायां सूत्रोक्तश्रौतवाचि च ।
 यथाशक्ति विमर्शेन * * * (Epil. ver. 2).

It is quoted and criticized on two occasions in the *Bhāṣyadīpikā* of Jagannātha Tīrtha.² The author displays his characteristic fondness and originality for diving into the special significance of the expressions used in the Sūtras, Bhāṣya and the *TP.* (such as for example प्राज्ञवत् । अम्बुवत् । (वि)चरण । Though not differing *openly* from Jayatīrtha, he does not hesitate to venture his own alternative explanations, in a few cases, with the remark—"वस्तुतस्तु" which, at least in a few cases, strikes a note of disapproval. (pp. 35, 88 and 89). What he tries to dispose of as plausible alternative explanations of the Tīkā-kāra, appear to be the more appropriate ones.³ His explanation of "वदपदवत्" in *TP.* ii, 3, 51, is certainly original and attractive. His deep knowledge of the doctrinal intricacies of the system is shown by his explanation on p. 106 where the role of "Svarūpa-yogyatā" as the ultimate cause of natural gradation of Jīvas, is well brought out, and on p. 135 where he explains the intricacies of the nature of स्वरूपसुख and दुःख of different types of souls in Laya, Supti, etc. The diversity of nature and potencies of souls as reflections of the same "Bimba" is ably illustrated by him with the aid of telling examples of Kastūrī, Jalasūrya and Sūryakānta (stone). His flair for originality and suggestive interpretation is seen on two occasions : "मायामात्रं" (B. S. iii, 2, 3) being rendered as माया+अमात्रम् (pp. 132-33) and by his criticism of Śaṅkara's interpretation of that Sūtra. He shows with great adroitness, that the Sūtras iii, 2, 3 et seq., give a better support for a realistic interpretation of dreams. His criticism of the distinction of Pādas on the basis of "स्पष्टब्रह्मलिङ्ग and अस्पष्टब्रह्मलिङ्ग in Śaṅkara" is really

1. M. M. Sangha List.

2. See *Bhāṣyadīpikā* pp. 177 and 1037. Jagannātha's criticism of Vādirāja's interpretation of "samantā" (R. V. x, 114, 1) has the support of the Padapāṭha and the TD.

3. विज्ञानादिपदमेव पूर्णत्वाभिधायीति भावष्टीकाकारस्य । वस्तुतस्तु * * * इत्येवार्थो भाष्यकृतो-
 ऽभिप्रेतः । अतः संभवदर्शान्तरमेव टीकाकृतोक्तमिति ज्ञेयम् (p. 35). तस्मान्महत्वाविरोधित्वादिदमधिकरणद्वय-
 मेकैकस्मिन्निति गृहीतं टीकाकृता * * * वस्तुतस्तु भाष्यमर्यादया सूत्रमर्यादया च * * * ॥ (p. 89).

penetrating. His definition of Aparokṣajñāna attained by the mind is a marvel of clarity. His (3) *Nyāyasudhā-Gurvarthadīpikā* (p) in 6000 granthas, is a brief critical gloss on the *NS* dealing only with a few difficult passages of that voluminous work. Though it does not help in going into the subtleties of the *NS*., this gloss has its own importance in throwing light on a few minor points. According to Vādirāja, for instance, “om” and “atha” in the opening Sūtra are to be viewed as “āgamika” i.e., more or less as quotations made by Sūtrakāra. (p. 2). The justification for reading “Om” in the beginning and at the end of each Sūtra throughout the work (p. 7) is ably made out. Reference is made to *Viśvakośa* (p. 36) to show that “अर” in “नारायण” has the sense of “दोष” on one explanation. His explanation of violence to accent (स्वरतोऽपराध) in “इन्द्रशत्रु” is quite original. (pp. 48-49). He goes beyond the *NS*. in giving additional explanation of the text “जनितो विष्णोः” (R. V. X, 96, 5) in terms of Vāyu and gives eight different and original explanations of “एको रुद्रो न द्वितीयो तस्यौ ।” He quotes Trivikrama Paṇḍita (*Vāyustuti*) and Kālidāsa (pp. 46 and 50) as “Abhiyuktas”. He quotes his own *Yuktimallikā* twice (pp. 30, 140); but *not* from the *Nyāyāmṛta* of Vyāsatīrtha, which is highly surprising. He shows his knowledge of the Vyākaraṇaśāstra in explaining the sūtras of Pāṇini and the Uṇādis cited in the *NS*. He does not, however, touch upon the textual difficulties discussed by subsequent glossators as in regard to अदिभूम्यां डुतच् (Uṇādi) or अंगीकृतत्वादपि तैः । (AV). He tries to confound the Śaivite adversary with a passage from the *Nṛsiṃhakarāvalambanastotra* attributed to Śaṅkara. Though normally a careful gloss, it seems to err at least on a couple of occasions in identifying the views discussed in the *NS*., unless we treat the passages appearing in the printed text as wrong explanations that have somehow got in and have not been detected by the Editors. Of other glosses of his, we have one on *Īśa Upaniṣad* (Mysore O. L. C-2277). Nothing is known of the (5) gloss on G. B. attributed to him. His glosses on the *Īśa* (6) *Kena* and (7) *Taitt. Ups.* (the last incomplete) have been published by the Vādirāja Grantha Prakāśana Samiti, Uḍipi.

ORIGINAL WORKS

About a dozen original works have been written by him, of which two are yet to be attested by Mss. (8) *Ekona-Pañcapādikā* * is presumably a criticism of the *Pañcapādikā* of Padmapāda, on the B. S. B. of Śaṅkara. No ms. of this interesting work has been known. It is however alluded to in one of the introductory verses of the author's *Vivaraṇavaraṇam*.¹ (9) The *Vivaraṇavaraṇam*² (p) is an elaborate adverse criticism of the *Vivaraṇa* of

1. तत्त्वदीपनमेकोनपादिकां पञ्चपादिकाम् (Ver. 9). This reference is not conclusive. The lines beginning with कुर्वे विवरणं तीव्रव्रणम् * * * (next f.n.) may simply mean that the criticism of the *Vivaraṇa* disposes of its original and its c. It seems unlikely that Vādirāja would have bothered to criticize the *Pañcapādikā* again having dealt with the *Vivaraṇa* in full.

2. वादिराजो यतिः सोहमद्वैतागमकर्ममे । गच्छन्त्यथि क्षिप्तपदः तच्छुद्धये स्पृहयन्मुहुः ॥ कुर्वे विवरणं तीव्रव्रणं दुस्तत्त्वदीपनं । तत्त्वदीपनमेकोनपादिकां पञ्चपादिकाम् ॥ (ver. 8-9). यच्चोक्तं विवरणे—साधनचतुष्टयसंपन्नस्य * * * (p. 5b) यच्चोक्तं परेण-वृक्षस्य स्वगतोभेदः ... (p. 78b).

Prakāśātman. A Devanagari ms. of it is found in Mysore O. L. (C-1845). The work is referred to by name in the *Yuktimallikā* and runs to 2000 granthas, written in a forcible and somewhat epigrammatical style, peculiar to Vādirāja. He quotes passages from both the *Vivaraṇa* and its c. *Tattvadīpana*,¹ and passes severe strictures upon them, not sparing even the benedictory stanza of the *Vivaraṇa* (पालने विमलसत्त्ववृत्तये etc.). Commenting on the verse 'वृक्षस्य स्वगतो भेदः' of the *Vivaraṇa* explaining the text: Ekam eva advitīyam, Vādirāja objects to its contention that the particle 'eva-' is intended to negate difference from all others of the same class (*sajātīyabheda*) viz. Jīvas, from B. He argues that the only authentic sense of 'eva' is emphasis and not difference as such much less 'sajātīyabheda.' As this emphatic particle has to be connected with the viśeṣya ('Sat' in the opening sentence, it would signify that only Sat or B. is One, while the rest are many or that only B. is without a second (equal) while the rest have their equals (seconds). Such a meaning will not be favourable to the Monist. When we say Arjuna alone is an archer, the intention is not to deny the existence of other archers in the world but to emphasize Arjuna's pre-eminence in archery. Such pre-eminence would make sense only where other archers exist and their difference from Arjuna is accepted. Even if 'eva' is syntactically connected with the adjective 'eka' or 'advitīyam' in the same sentence, as for e.g. in Śamkhaḥ pāṇḍura eva' it would only serve to emphasise that B. is always ONE without a peer. Such a proposition can by no means negate 'sajātīyabheda' at all. Vādirāja also points out the flaw of 'yatibhaṅga' in the third quarter of the verse. His (10) *Pāṣaṇḍakhaṇḍanam*^(m)² is a tract in 127 verses, criticising the religious and metaphysical views of Buddhism and Jainism. The author, ridiculing the Ahimsā doctrine, asks how Jainas permit slow torture of the flesh and suicide by degrees :

केशानां लुण्ठनं शोकप्रदं कस्मात्प्रवर्तितम् ?

and why, if putting down of one's enemies could be regarded as the proper duty of Kings, the same thing could not be said of Vedic sacrifices :

राज्ञां शत्रुवधो धर्मो यदि तर्ह्यर्गतः पथि ।

वैधौ हिंसा च विप्राणां धर्म इत्येव गृह्यताम् ॥

He expatiates on the somewhat uncanny doctrine that like a surgeon whose methods are painful at the outset but give relief from suffering at the end, the sacrificer also, is, in fact, a benefactor of the victim !

अग्नेऽहितकृदन्ते सुखदोऽर्ज्यो यथा भिषक् ।

तथा पशोः स्वर्गदानात् कथं पूज्यो न याज्ञिकः ?

There is possibly not much force in the argument :

प्राणिनं च वृथा हन्तुं किं मूढाः पूर्वसूरयः ?

1. या च तत्त्वदीपने शास्त्रार्थश्च तत्त्वपद. . . (p. 7).

2. Also designated "*Pāṣaṇḍa-mata-khaṇḍanam*" but not as "*Pāṣaṇḍamalakhaṇḍanam*" as in Vij. Sex. Com. Vol. (p. 316). This work has been printed and published from Belgaum.

The work winds up with a criticism of the Jaina doctrine that the soul is of the size of the body it tenants and of Apavarga as a never-ending movement upwards (सदोर्ध्वगमनम्).

(11) *YUKTIMALLIKĀ* (p)

This is Vādirāja's *magnum opus*, running to 5379 ślokas. It is a monumental work in defence of the Dvaita system, divided into five chapters called Saurabhas : Guṇa, Śuddhi, Bheda, Viśva and Phala. It was commented upon by the author's brother,¹ Surottama Tīrtha,² who sums up the scope of the work, thus : अधुना, शिष्यमनःसमाधानाय परमतनिराकरणात्मकसमन्वय-पादोक्तमपि समन्वयाधिकरणं पृथक् प्रस्ताव्य, (1) पुनःसमन्वयाध्यायप्रतिपाद्यं सर्वगुणपूर्णत्वं गुणसौरभ-सर्वस्वे मनःप्रियं कुर्वन् (2) तदनन्तरं अविरोधाध्यायप्रतिपाद्यं निर्दोषत्वं शब्दिसौरभसर्वस्वेन रंजयन् (3) पुन-रेतदध्यायद्वयेऽपि सूत्रे सूत्रे प्रतिपादितं जीवेश्वरभेदं भेदसौरभसर्वस्वेन प्रतिपादयन्, (4) तदनु 'जन्माद्यस्य यत्' इति सूत्रेण प्रतिपादितं जगज्जन्मादिकारणत्वलक्षणपरीक्षणाय विश्वसौरभसर्वस्वेन जगतः सत्यत्वं स्थापयन् (5) पुनः साधनफलाध्यायप्रतिपाद्यं साधनं फलं च फलसौरभसर्वस्वेन संगृह्णन्, प्रमाणाधीना प्रमेयसिद्धिरिति न्यायेन, पञ्चसौरभोक्तप्रमेयानां च प्रमाणसापेक्षत्वात्, प्रमाणेषु च प्रबलप्रमाणभूतस्य वेदस्य 'नविलक्षणत्वादिसूत्रे नित्यतया प्रतिपादितं स्वतःप्रामाण्यं समर्थयितुं वेदापीरूपेयत्वं तावत् आदौ साधयितुमुपक्रमते—(p. i. 33 b). This work combines great erudition with an incredibly simple yet poetically charming style characteristic of Vādirāja, full of puns, alliteration and wit and analogies from life. No wonder, he obtained the title of "Prasangābharāṇa" for his surging eloquence.

The works of Jayatīrtha and Vyāsātīrtha were too learned and stiff to be of use to general readers. It was Vādirāja who first brought the wisdom of his predecessors within the reach of all. *In this respect, his work marks a new and necessary phase in the history of Dvaita Literature and breathes the spirit of a new age which produced other popular exponents of Madhva-Siddhānta, both in Sanskrit and in Kannaḍa.* Vādirāja too, took part in popularising the tenets of Madhva in Kannaḍa, by translating the *Mbh. T. N.* into Kannaḍa and joining the Dāsa Kūṭa.³

Vādirāja professes the greatest admiration for Madhva and pays him his homage a number of times in the course of his *Yuktimalikā* (iii, 210; iv, 793; V, 653). The views expressed by Śaṅkara⁴ in his *Bhāṣya* on B. S. and those of Ānandabodha, Śrīharṣa⁵ and the *Tattvadīpana*⁶ are quoted and refuted. Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa and Madhva's *Bhāṣya* on them, are quoted off and on, to show how naturally the authorities cited by Madhva, support⁷ his views. The author's originality is seen in the many new topics for discussion⁸ introduced by him, the originality of his criticisms on Monistic interpretations⁹ and his own novel and original explanations

1. *Vṛttaratnasamgraha*, iii, 28.

2. He was Pontiff of the Bhaṇḍārakere Mutt.

3. For his contributions to the Dāsa Literature, see Ch. XXXVIII.

4. iii, 121.

5. ii, 126.

6. iii, 1097-1100.

7. iii, 121, 209; iii, 227-46.

8. iii, 168-69; V, 1331-79; V, 1398-1401, 1555 and 380-94.

9. iii, 130-31; ii, 218; iii, 107-8, 138, 580; V, 1285-86, 771-77.

of texts from Scriptures¹ and citations from new sources² not utilized by his predecessors.

The last chapter of the *Yuktimallikā* is specially important for the fulness of theological information about the Dvaitins' view of Mokṣa, its treatment of the question of Madhva being an avatāra of Vāyu and its vindication of the Śāstraic character of 'branding' the body (*taptamudrāṅkana*) with the symbols sacred to Vaiṣṇavism. The author refers, in this connection, to a separate work of his entitled *Sudarśana-Mīmāṃsā*, dealing with this question. This is available in ms. in the Mysore O. L. (C-723) and has been published in the *S. M.* pp. 212-21 under the name of *Cakrastuti*.

In essence, the *Yuktimallikā* is an elaboration of the teachings of the B. S. as deduced by Madhva. The author has given a complete rationalistic turn to his treatment and deserves credit for many happy and original arguments and interpretations *not* found elsewhere in the other works of the system. Chapters I and II establish the twin-principles of Madhva's Theism that the Brahman is ever full of attributes and free from any kind of imperfection. The III establishes that the Jīva and Brahman can never be identical. IV vindicates the reality of the cosmos, refuting, incidentally, the doctrine of Māyā. The last chapter is an epitome of chapters III and IV of the *Brahmasūtras* as interpreted by Madhva.

(B) THE ARGUMENT OF THE *YUKTIMALLIKĀ*

The work is brimming with the freshness and originality of approach and ideas of Vādirāja. His arguments have a distinctive flavour of wit and piquancy of their own. It is not so much the depth of thought or weight of the matter that interests or impresses us here, as the effective and epigrammatic way of putting forth the points. His work is *not* on that account, a *rechauffe* of those of his predecessors. It was indeed rather surprising that he had ventured on a controversial work like this, with the *Nyāyāmṛta* already before him. But he has happily struck a *new form and line of handling the materials* and covering the ground. He is, however, *clearly influenced by and indebted to the Nyāyāmṛta and Candrikā* for many logical arguments and details. His exposition of the "Tat tvam asi", "Neha nānāsti" and other texts and references to certain Mīmāṃsā nyāyas used by Vyāsatīrtha, establish this point, beyond doubt. We also meet with purely logical arguments and discussions, in his work. But his *outstanding feature* is what may be termed a "common-sense approach" to philosophy. He is a master of the art of clever and sustained use of popular analogies redolent of life and literature, in its varied aspects, to drive home his points and establish the superiority of the Dvaita views and expose the weakness of the Advaitic positions. Arguments of a practical nature, instead of logical niceties, that could be comprehended by all and sundry, are thus his *forte*

1. i, 567, 794, iii, 227, 925, 1040.

2. i, 632 (*Padma*); V, 451-52, 628, 638-39, 639-50.

and some of his hits in this direction are really masterpieces of wit and wisdom. He *claims* to adopt a purely rationalistic approach :

न स्नेहान्न च विस्नेहात् युक्त्याकृष्टेन केवलम् ।

in judging the relative merits of the two systems and casting his vote ultimately in favour of Madhva's system :

तत्पूर्वसर्वराद्धान्तसिद्धार्थानां निषेद्धरि ।

परे च तत्त्ववादेऽस्मिन् गरीयसि भरो मम ।

तत् (i) परत्वात् (ii) निषेधदृत्वात् (iii) अन्ते सिद्धेः (iv) प्रभुस्तुतेः ।

अन्ते सिद्धस्तु सिद्धान्तो मध्वस्यागम एव हि ॥ .

The use of pithy saṁgrahaśloka, summing up the points at the end of sections, recalls the lead of the *Nym*.

Vādirāja was the earliest to realise the tremendous possibilities of the opening line of the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* : अग्निर्वै देवानामवमो विष्णुः परमः in favour of the doctrine of Devatātāratamya or gradation of gods, sponsored by Madhva. He kills two birds at a shot by remarking that the same text disposes of the identity of Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Śiva, preached by some, on the authority of certain Purāṇas :

अतस्त्रिदैवतैक्यं स्यान्न पुराणशतैरपि ।

He devotes considerable space to establish Viṣṇu as the Supreme Brahman and brings together several texts from the *Bhāgavata* and other Purāṇas, *not cited by his predecessors*. His concern with such purely theological issues is symptomatic of prevailing tension of sects in S. India in the 16th century, when the Vaiṣṇava theology of Madhva was on trial and had to be defended against insidious attacks of adversaries. This task fell to the two eminent disciples of Vyāsātīrtha—Vijayīndra and Vādirāja who successfully fought their way through all opposition and placed the Vaiṣṇavism of Madhva on an unshakable basis, by disarming the opposition of Śaiva, Advaitic and other forces, in their respective regions.

Turning to philosophical issues, Vādirāja attacks the concept of Nirguṇa Brahman, as impossible and un-Śāstraic:

बोद्धव्यं चेन्निर्गुणत्वं स्यात्, निर्गुणत्वं न सिद्ध्यति ।

न बोद्धव्यं निर्गुणत्वं चेन्निर्गुणत्वं न सिद्ध्यति ॥

The *Bhāgavata* and other texts attribute infinitude (anantya) to the "Saguna" Brahman :

‘इमे चान्ये च भगवन्नित्या यत्र महागुणाः ।

मय्यनन्तगुणेऽनन्ते गुणतोऽनन्तविग्रहे ॥ (vi, 4, 48).

If the "Saguna" Brahman (of Advaita) were thus unlimited in time and space, *where* could the "Nirguṇa" be? Banished from all time and space, it would have to hide between the proverbial hare's horns! This is a typical example of Vādirāja's combination of humour and logic :

सर्वेभ्यो देशकालेभ्यः प्रायस्तत्तु बहिष्कृतम् ।

लज्जया शशशृङ्गस्य मध्ये लीनमभूत्सदा ॥

He makes a cute suggestion that the Nirguṇa Śruti may be restricted to the denial of the three Prākṛitic attributes (त्रैगुण्यराहित्यम्) in conformity with the principle of the Kapiñjalādhikaraṇa¹ of the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā. He also

1. This interpretation has been anticipated by Vyāsātīrtha in his *Nyāyāmṛta*.

points out that the epistemological dogma of Monism, that the Self could not be the object of its own knowledge, is clearly opposed to the verdict of the Śrutis and Smṛtis and experience :

यत्तदात्मानमेवावेदित्यप्युपनिषज्जगौ ।
स्वयमेवात्मनात्मानं वेत्थ त्वं पुरुषोत्तम ।
इति गीताविरोधश्च स्वावेद्यत्वमते भवेत् ।
श्रुतिस्मृतेः कुतो बाधः क्रियतेऽनुभवस्य च ॥

There is *biting sarcasm* in his remark that the Advaitin may just consider how his anguished wife would cry over his deathbed, beating her breasts, if the subject could never be an object in the same act :

न चेदेवमसंबद्धं वदतो मरणे कथम् ।
विलपेत्पट्टमहिषी स्वोरस्ताडनपूर्वकम् ?

He also shows clearly that the Sūtrakāra has given an unmistakable lead as to how best the apparently monistic texts could be reconciled with the fundamental reality of Dvaita. The Sūtra अध्यात्मसंबन्धभूमा (i, 1, 29) is sufficient indication, says he, that such seemingly monistic utterances must be figuratively interpreted :

स्वस्मिन्नध्यात्मसंबन्धभूयस्त्वादेव केवलम् ।
प्राणोऽहमिति शक्रोक्तम् * * *
इत्यैक्यवचसां सूत्रे लक्षणा गतिरीरिता

This is confirmed by another Sūtra : तद्गुणसारत्वात् तद्व्यपदेशः (ii, 3, 29) :

• तद्गुणत्वात् तत्त्वोक्तिरित्यन्यत्र प्रलम्बिनाम्
तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्यानां गौणीं गतिमसूत्रयत् ।

It is obvious the Advaitic texts teach something that runs counter to all experience. Such 'fantastic' utterances as यजमानः प्रस्तरः । अन्धो मणिमविन्दत् । have been specifically explained in the Śāstras, in a manner compatible with experience, which shows that we should not be misled by the literal sense of these passages. It is ridiculous for man who calls piteously to Heaven's aid, in illness and misery, to arrogate Divinity to himself, in moments of elation and ease :

शिवोऽहंभावधीर्भोगे, रोगे मृत्युंजयार्चकः !

If the teaching of Scriptures is to be accepted without demur, why does not the Advaitin assert the identity of Brahman with insentient matter also, following the Śruti—सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म ? Why does he stop short of Jīveśvaraikya and not go ahead with Jāḍādvaita ? If he cannot do that, let him leave Jīva, Jāḍa and Īśvara as they are (p. 308 b). The so-called *identity of pure consciousness* is an artificial identity that can have no legs to stand upon :

चिन्मात्रैक्ये * * * कार्यं द्विपदशिक्षणम् ।
खञ्जवद्वा चरेत् स्वार्थे * * *
विच्छद्य सिंहपुच्छादि पुरुषस्य करादि च ।
तयोरैक्यं वदन्तः के * * * ?

After all, a bare identity of pure consciousness is in no way opposed to the reality or persistence of Difference :

चित् चिदित्येव चोक्तं स्यात् कस्यैक्यं तेन सिद्ध्यति ?¹

1. Cf. 'चिता चिदैक्यं सिद्धं नः' (Nym.)

Even in identity-judgments like “So’yam Devadattaḥ” there is something more than bare identity of essence (स्वरूपैक्य) viz., a spatio-temporal determination. If this is denied, it would deprive recognition and all judgments affirming an identity of any pragmatic value and make them all tautologous :

चिन्विदित्येव चोक्तं स्यात्कस्यैक्यं तेन साध्यते?
 सोऽहमित्यत्र चोक्तं स्यात्प्राक् कालाद्यविवक्षणे
 देवदत्तो देवदत्तो घटो घट इति स्फुटम्
 एवं च प्रत्यभिज्ञा न स्वरूपैक्यस्य भञ्जनात्
 स्वैर्यासिद्धिः पदार्थानां प्राप्ता च पुनरुक्तता ॥

So long as orthodox Advaita is pledged to the dictum : ‘अप्राप्ते हि शास्त्र-मर्थवत्,’ it would be impossible to escape the flaw of tautology, in saying, as does a modern scholar on the subject, that “a judgment neither adds anything to reality nor takes away anything from it and that metaphysically considered, *there is no novelty in a judgment*” (D. M. Datta, *Six Ways of Knowing*, pp. 316-17).

Vādirāja points out that there is an element of basic difference underlying everyone of the nine examples illustrating the doctrine of “*Tattva-masi*”. In the example of rivers, mixing with the Ocean, difference is universally recognised to exist,¹ as when people speak of the special benefits arising from a bath at their confluence :

* * * * सङ्गमे द्विगुणं फलम्
 सर्वे च संगमं ब्रूयुस्त्वं ब्रूषे कथमेकताम् ?
 सितासिते च नद्यौ द्वे प्रयागे संगते * * *

In the example of various juices going to make honey, the presence of diversity of tastes and quantitative increase, are sufficient evidence of the persistence of difference :

नानारससमाहारो मधुन्यप्येकतां किल ।
 वृद्धिश्च रसवैचित्र्यं नो चेत्तत्र कुतो वद ॥

Things utterly different in themselves cannot be identified by the mere fiat of our will. The conflict of Bheda and Abheda Śrutis should, therefore, be made up *otherwise than* by divesting the terms “Tat” and “tvam” of their respective senses or by denying the reality of the Bhedaśrutis which is tantamount to *mangling* the Śruti. Such a brutal disposal of the conflict would be barbarous in the extreme :

गृष्टयोर्मियो विरोधे हि हत्वैकामपराङ्मुखीम् ।
 विरोधशान्तिं कः कुर्यात् विना स्लेच्छकुमारकान् ?

Since all Vedic texts are traditionally regarded as eternal, and beginningless, it would be futile to try to distinguish between the “prior” and “posterior”

1. Vyāsatīrtha has shown in his *Nym.* how the popular view of identity between rivers and the Ocean, by mixing, has been rejected by the *Bhāmātī* itself (*B. S.* i, 4, 22). See under Chap. XXVII.

2. Commentator Surottama cites a śruti in praise of Prayāga :

‘सितासिते सरिते यत्र संगते तत्राप्लुतासौ दिवमुत्पतन्ति’ (*Rg Veda-Khila*, x, 75, 1 a).

See also *Raghuvamśa*, xiii, 58.

(*pūrva* and *para*) among them and put down the Bhedaśrutis as prior ones to be superseded by the Abhedaśrutis, deemed as posterior to them. The principle of a prescription being superseded by a countermanding injunction fails to apply even in well-known cases like : अग्नीषोमीयं पशुमालभेत. The principle of the posterior superseding the prior, if accepted, would spell ruin to Advaita :

परस्मात्पूर्वबाधश्चेत् स्मृत्या च श्रुतिबाधनम् ।
परस्माज्जगतः पूर्वं ब्रह्म बाध्यं च ते भवेत् !
निषेधाद्विधिबाधश्चेत् बौद्धोक्त्या धर्मबाधनम् ।
तथा शून्यत्वकथया ब्रह्म बाध्यं भवेत्तव ॥

It would result in a serious disturbance of domestic harmony of the Monist :

परया भार्यया कार्यनिषेधपरया तव ।
पतिस्त्वं गृहकृत्यानां विधाता हन्त बाध्यसे !

Moreover, identity being conceived by the Advaitin as “*tādātmya*” and difference being conceived as “*anyonyābhāva*,” by the Dvaitin, the latter, insofar as it is a direct negation of the former, would naturally put an end to it, if the two were pitted against each other :

किञ्च पूर्वं निषेध्यं च तादात्म्यमभवत्तव ।
भेदः परो निषेधो मेऽन्योन्याभावरूपकः ।
अतस्त्वन्त्याय एवायं चित्रं मत्कार्यकारकः ॥

If the dualistic texts could not establish the reality of Difference, because they are, in effect, repetitive of what is already established by perceptual evidence, one might retort that the Advaitic Brahman, being already known, by virtue of its self-luminosity, Upaniṣadic texts like “अस्ति ब्रह्म” would be *superfluous*. There is no evidence other than the pious belief of the Monist that the dualistic texts merely refer to the difference already cognized by perception, with a view to negating it elsewhere. The wording of the monistic texts has nothing to support such a view. A negation, to be sensible, ought to be found in the same work wherein its corresponding affirmation is made :

* * * दूष्यं दूषणं चैकवाक्यम् ।

But in the present case, the identity text occurs in the *Chāndogya* (Tat tvam asi) while the dualistic text “Dvā suparṇā” occurs elsewhere in the Vāmana Sūkta of the *Rg Veda* and in the *Muṇḍaka*.

सूक्तेऽस्मिन् नास्ति दूषणम् ।

It would be a misnomer to dub it a “Sūkta”, if it should teach what is *not true*. There is, after all, no direct conflict between “Dvā suparṇā” and “Tat tvam asi.” There is no literal contradiction between them such as there would be between saying “Dvā suparṇā” and going back on it in the very next breath by saying “Na dvā suparṇā !” Indeed, even where such obvious contradictions are met with as in “उदिते जुहोति” and “अनुदिते जुहोति,” the *validity* of the texts is hardly disputed. As for finding a suitable explanation of “Tat tvam asi”, on the dualistic view, it is not only possible, but has been done. Moreover, no convincing reasons have been given to dismiss the Bhedaśrutis as “merely” repetitive (*anuvādaka*). The exigencies of Monism are no excuse at all, as the very thesis of Monism has yet to be proved !

Though generally following Madhva's interpretation of the Śruti texts Vādirāja has tried to find new explanations of some of the texts at issue between the two schools. One or two of these are rather far-fetched, as for example :

केवलोऽनिर्गुणश्च (p. 86) माया-ज्मात्रमिदं द्वैतम् * *

But there are others which do him credit and disclose his resourcefulness. Cf. his explanation of : 'यत्र द्वैतमिव भवति....'

- (1) यत्र वस्तु द्वैतमिव द्वित्रलग्नं मनो भवेत्
तत्रैतरः पुमान् पश्येदितरार्थानपि स्फुटम् ।
यत्र त्वेकाग्रमनसः * * *
आत्मैवाभूत्तत्र केन ततोऽन्यं कं स पश्यति ?
येनेदमखिलं वेद पश्येद्वा केन तं गुरुम् ?
इत्यात्मरतमस्तौद्वा यत्रत्वस्येति वागियम्
- (2) अक्षासक्तः किमश्रौषीन्मातुर्मृतिमुदीरिताम् ?
किं पश्येत्पश्यतोऽपि स्वं घटस्थहृदया नटी ?
शरकृत्केन कं विध्येत् किं जानीयात्कमीक्षते ?
मुक्ताः स्वात्मरता जिघ्रन्तीक्षन्ते कं विजानते ?
सेनामन्यमनाः सेनां नाज्ञासीदिति लौकिकम् ।
आत्मैकासक्तचित्तोऽपि तथेति किमलौकिकम् ?
- (3) अप्राकृतप्राकृताभ्यां द्वाभ्यां हीतो द्वितो भवेत्
द्वीताः संसारिणस्तस्मात् तत्संबन्धि वपुस्त्विदम्
बाह्यं द्वैतमिति प्रोक्तं यदा भवति तन्तृणाम् ।
तदात्वितरशब्दोक्तो बाह्येन्द्रियगुणोप्ययम् ।
पश्येत्स्वरूपादितरमर्थं देहं घटादिकम् ।
यत्र त्वात्मात्मकं सर्वं अभूद्देहेन्द्रियादिकम् ।
तत्र मुक्तौ केन बाह्येनाक्षणा बाह्यार्थमीक्षते ?
कं जिघ्रेत्कं विजानीयादित्यर्थो वा श्रुतेर्भवेत् ॥

“When the mind is inwardly directed, as in Mokṣa, there is no possibility of our paying attention to external objects of the world. When the attention is concentrated on a particular subject, it is not possible to think of another. A gamester lost in the game of dice, hears not even the tidings of the death of his own mother ! A village belle, absorbed in filling her pail of water at the village well, hardly notices the hungry looks of the passer-by, at her. The dancer balancing the pot on her head and her thoughts concentrated on it looks not at her admirers in the hall whose eyes are riveted on her graceful movements and contours. All of us, in life, are “Dvītas”, in the sense of having two gateways of knowledge, the material and the spiritual. The physical body connected with these “Dvītas”, is Dvaita. It is possible for us human selves to contact external reality only through the physical frame. But there is no physical body in release. The released soul has no body or sense organs that can be distinguished from its essence. In these circumstances, there is no possibility of their having knowledge of external reality and reacting to the stimuli through external senses. Whatever sense organs the released souls have are, thus, spiritually constituted and, hence, part and parcel of their being.

They have no body or sense organs in the physical sense of the term in which we use them. They are "bodies" only in a very special sense. The nearest example is the so-called "heavenly voice" (*aśarirā vāk*) referred to in the Purāṇas :

अलौकिकशरीरे तु दृश्यते त्वशरीरता ।

यथादृश्यशरीरोत्था देवी वागशरीरवाक् ॥ (ii, 401)

It is in *this* sense that the Śruti denies sensory knowledge to the released.

(12) *Nyāyaratnāvali* (p),¹ is another metrical work of Vādirāja, criticizing the doctrines of Advaita and driving home those of the Dvaita. It has 901 anuṣṭubhs, arranged in five Saras (chapters). The style is as usual with him alliterative and epigrammatical. He tries to flabbergast his opponents by a clever and judicious mixture of theology and metaphysics. His homely analogies and persuasive rhetoric make an instantaneous appeal to the reader and therein lies his strength and popularity.

At the outset, he draws a vivid contrast between the limited self of man and the infinite Lord of all creation and asks how the two can ever be identical. The doctrines of (1) phenomenal reality; (2) identity on the analogy of Bimbapratibimba; (3) Adhyāsa; (4) temporary validity of Scriptures etc., are overthrown in the I Sara. Vādirāja argues that simply because there happens to be a text like "*Tat tvam asi*", one cannot literally swallow its meaning, however absurd it might be and has a fling at the Monist with the aid of texts like : तस्मात्पुत्रो मातरं स्वसारं वा अधिरोहति (A. B. vii, 13, 12). The Ekajīvājñāna and the Bahujīvājñānavādas come in for criticism in II Sara. No identification is possible unless there are two things to be identified and such duality is necessarily opposed to Monism (Sara III). The fourth seeks to confound the Monist with his own texts. As interpreted by the Advaitin, the text "*Ekam evādvītiyam*", does away with souls and there can be no further talk of this identity. The theory that by worshipping the Saguna one reaches the Nirguna is ridiculed. Chapter V pursues the subject of identity still further and concludes with a plea for the superiority and supremacy of Dvaita.

(13) *Mādhvavāgvajrāvali* * *, meaning the "Thunderbolt of the Words of Madhva," is not attested by any ms. It is probably an attack on the framework of Monism. (14) *Cakra-Mimāṃsā* (p) is a small tract in 72 anuṣṭubhs, published in the S. M. and a ms. is preserved in the Mys. O. L. (C-723). The authorship is confirmed by the *Yuktimallikā* (V, 649) and by Nārāyaṇa's c. on the *Tirthaprabandha* :

यश्चक्रे चक्रमीमांसां यश्चक्रे युक्तिमल्लिकाम् ।

मुकुन्दलीलां यश्चक्रे तस्मै काव्यकृते नमः ॥

It deals with the question of "Taptamudrāṅkana" and cites texts from the Padma, Garuḍa and other Purāṇas.² Vādirāja makes the interesting remark that the practice is current among the followers of Nimbārka, Viṣṇu-svāmin and Rāmānuja, as well as among a certain section of Śaṅkara-Advaitins :

1. Printed at the Prabhākara Press, Uḍipi, 1935.

2. पाद्मगरुडमुख्यासु सत्यस्माकं सहस्रशः (31).

निम्बादित्यानुगैः प्राज्ञैर्मयावाद्येकदेशिभिः ।

विष्णुस्वामिमतेश्चैव रामानुजमताश्रयैः ।

तत्त्ववादिजनाचारैः शिष्टश्रेष्ठैरनुष्ठिते ॥ (Ver. 5)

(15) *Br̥ndāvanākhyāna* (p.),¹ is an anonymous work of unknown date and traditionally believed to have been revealed to a disciple by Vādirāja himself, in a dream-seance. It deals with the question of Vādirāja's identity with one of the Ṛju-gaṇas and is looked upon as an authority by those who hold him to one of the Ṛju-gaṇa devas.² It is said to have been commented upon by Vyāsācārya, son of Līngeri Śrīnivāsa (*Vij. Sex. Com.* Vol. p. 318). The style bears an unmistakable affinity to Vādirāja's, though the posthumous character of the work might be felt to detract from its probative value. (16) *Śrutitattvapraṇāsa* (p)³ deals, in 507 anuṣṭubh verses, with the dualistic interpretation of five of the great "monistic texts" नेह नानास्ति । अहं ब्रह्मास्मि । एकमेवाद्वितीयं । तत्त्वमसि । केवलो निर्गुणश्च । The first is elaborately discussed and the fourth at some length. The rest are briefly disposed of. Though following Madhva, Jayatīrtha and Vyāsātīrtha, the author gives some new touches and turns to the spirit and letter of these texts and the details of their interpretation, showing how the Dvaita interpretations alone do justice to the context, spirit and letter of the texts. Of "Tat tvam asi", he has seven or eight explanations, some three or four of which are quite new and highly suggestive, based on interrogative sense (काकु), treating it as elliptical and so on. (17) [*Haribhakti*] *Kalpalatā* (m), is preserved in Mys. O. L. (C-725). It is mentioned by Surottama in his c. on *Yuktīmālikā*, i, 46, under the name of "Kalpalatā". It is a prose work in four chapters (Prasūnamālā) dealing with the question of the proofs of knowledge, and devoted, in the main, to the establishment of the Apauruṣeyatva of the Vedas. It is not so clear as the other works of Vādirāja in exposition and is somewhat abstruse and wandering. A good deal of space is taken up with the refutation of the doctrine of the Jainas, their objections to the validity of Śabdapramāṇa. Their view of Jīvaparamāṇa, is adversely criticized here. (p. 24).

MAHĀBHĀRATA PRASTHĀNA

The Epic *Mahābhārata* occupies, as we have seen, a position of great authority in matters of religion and philosophy and has consequently been placed in the forefront of Śabdapramāṇas (next only to the Vedas), by Madhva, who had shown the importance he attached to it by writing an epitome of it, bringing into relief its esoteric sense, as he had conceived of it. But no regular commentary on the Epic was written by the Madhva scholars till the days of Vādirāja. He was the first to have conceived such an idea and execute so stupendous a task as writing a regular commentary on the entire Epic, from the point of view of Madhva. Apart from the inherent

1. Belgaum.

2. For proofs on the Ṛjutva of Vādirāja, see *Vādirāja-GVCA* chap. 8.

3. Printed, Uḍipi, 1954 (with my English introduction).

value of this admittedly learned commentary, to the system of Madhva, it holds a special attraction to historical students of the Epic. Those interested in the laborious task of reconstituting the *textus simplicior* of the Epic or of sifting matter for a genuinely S. Indian Recension of the Epic would find the "Pratīkas" culled by Vādirāja, of great value.¹ In addition to his c. on the Epic, Vādirāja wrote another c. on Madhva's *Mbh. T. N.* His c. on the Epic notices elaborately the *Sanat-sujātiya*² and Viṣṇusahasra-nāma sections, which are sometimes treated as separate works. (18) *Lakṣālaṃkāra* or *Lakṣābharaṇam* as Vādirāja's c. on the Epic is called, has been published in two parts.³ It is an erudite c. full of references to and quotations from ancient lexicons. A complete edition has been published recently by the Vādirāja Grantha Prakāśana Samiti, Uḍipi. (19) the c. on the *Mbh. T. N.* known as *Bhāvaprakāśikā*, is available in mss. both at Madras and Mysore (O. L. C-1867).

BELLES-LETTRES

Vādirāja was gifted with real poetic talent, but unfortunately he could not give free reins to them and try his skill in poetry for its own sake. Whatever abilities he had in poesy had been dedicated to the cause of his creed. The result is he has been able to leave us only a couple of religious Kāvya, cast in the mould of strict orthodoxy. They nevertheless contain many passages of enduring beauty. His position is thus analogous to that of Vedānta Deśika in Rāmānuja's system. (20) *Rukmiṇīśavijaya*(p) is the most important religious Kāvya of the author in 19 cantos, clothed in the gorgeous apparel of Kāvya style and having for its theme, the abduction of Rukmiṇī by Kṛṣṇa and his marriage with her. It is given the rank of a "Mahākāvya" in traditional circles. The descriptions are effective and natural. The style is deeply alliterative. Sense and sound match well and the imagery is fine and lofty. The author revels in *double entendre*, *Citrabandhas*, *ekākṣara* and *yamakas* both partial and complete. (21) The *Sarasabhārati-Vilāsa*(p) is a metrical work of 696 granthas, in 12 *Vilāsas*, establishing the hierarchic position of 'Śrī, Brahmā, Vāṇī, Prāṇa, and Bhārati, as the chief trinity (परशुक्लत्रयम्) of Mādhva theology, in the light of numerous authorities and arguments (Belgaum 1882).

(22) *Tirtha Prabandha*(p) is a unique metrical work in Sanskrit giving an account of the various Hindu temples and places of pilgrimage (including holy rivers and *tirthas*) visited by Vādirāja during his grand tour through India. Much historical interest therefore attaches to this work. The work is thus similar in a sense, to the Devāram and Prabandha works in Tamil. The descriptions show great poetic charm and felicity of expression.

1. See P. P. S. Sastri's edn. of Southern Recension of Mahābhārata, where he rightly appraises the value of this c. though in his anxiety to claim the authority of Vādirāja to his recension, he has antedated him by three centuries. (Vol. iii, p. xi).

2. See G. H. Khare's remarks on pp. 194-95 of *Vij. Sex. Cen.* Vol. It should therefore have been mentioned on p. 316 of the same work.

3. The c. on *Sabhā Parva* has been published by P. P. S. Sastri.

The work is divided into four sections—northern tour, eastern, southern and western. Starting from Uḍipi on the west coast, the tour covers Madhyatāla, Cintāmaṇi Narasiṃha, R. *Netrāvati*, *Kumārādhārā*, Subrahmaṇya, *Payasvini*, *Suvarṇā*, Kumbhāsi, the Sahyādri range, Harihar, temples of Someśvara and Aśvattha-Nārāyaṇa at Bidrūr, Baṅkāpur, R. *Varadā*, Banavāsī, temples of Madhuliṅga, Sode, Gokaṇṇa (Eṇabhairava), Kolhapur, the rivers *Tāpti* and *Narmadā*, Prabhāsa, Dvārakā, *Gomati*, and Puṣkar (Ajmer).

The northern tour embraces visits to *Kṛṣṇaveṇi*, Pandharpur (Viṭhala), *Godāvari*, *Yamunā*, Allahabad, Banaras, temples of Bindu Mādhava and Viśvanātha there, Gayā (Gadādhara and Viṣṇupāda), Mathura, Br̥ndāvana, Ayodhyā, Naimiśa forest, Delhi, Kurukṣetra, the six Prayāgas and Badarī.

The eastern includes Jagannātha (Purī), Ahobala Nṛsiṃha, Nivṛtti-saṅgama, *Tuṅgabhadṛā*, Vijayanagar, (temples of Viṭhala, and Virūpākṣa there), Pampā, Ānegondi, Tirupati, Kāñcī, (Ekāmranātha, Kāmākṣī and Varadarāja temples) Tiruvaṇṇāmalai, Tirukoilur (Trivikrama temple), Vṛddhācalam, Śrīmuṣṇam and Kumbakonam.

The southern covers Srirangam, Darbhaśayanam, Rameśvaram, Dhanushkoṭi, *Tāmraparṇi*, Cape Comorin, Sucīndram, and Trivandrum, whence Vādirāja moves to his native land.

STOTRAS

More than seventy of Stotras by Vādirāja exist. The most popular of these is the *Daśāvatāra Stotra*, celebrating the ten Avatāras of Viṣṇu, in 41 verses in the *Aśvadhāṭi* (horse-trot) metre. The alliteration reaches its galloping climax here.

The others (23-96) include *Brāhmasūtranibaddhādhikaraṇanāmāvali*, *Naivedyasamarpaṇaprakāra*, *Maṅgalāṣṭaka*¹ *Vāyustuti* (S. M. pp. 250-54) *Nava-grahastotra*, *Śrīpādarājāṣṭakam*, *Vaikuṇṭhavarṇanam*, *Hayagrivapañcaka*, *Keśavādicaturvīmśati-mūrti-lakṣaṇastuti*, *Trivikramastotra*, *Āpādistotra*, *Kṛṣṇastuti*, *Śrī-saṅgādarpaṇa*, *Veṅkaṭeśamangalāṣṭaka*, *Prārthanādaśaka*, *Raupyapiṭhapura-Kṛṣṇa-stuti*, *Praśnāvali*, *Haribhaktisāra*, *Stotramālā*, etc. (97) His works on worship include a c. on *Tantrasārasaṁgraha*² and a (98) *Dinatrayanirṇaya* (on the three tithis).

His Kannaḍa works are eight in number (99-106) *Vaikuṇṭhavarṇane*, *Guṇḍakriye*, *Sulādi*, *Kirtanegalu* (many songs), *Lakṣmīsobhana*, *Svapnagadya*, *Bhramaragite* and *Samkirtanagite*. He also composed a *Daśāvatārastuti* and many 'Pādaṇas' in the Tuḷu of the masses.

1. Ascribed by Uḍipi tradition to Rājarājeśvara, a Pontiff of the Palimār Mutt, another of whose works is the *Rāmasaṁdeśa*, a khaṇḍakāvya, printed at Uḍipi.

2. Mentioned on p. 316 of *Vij. Sex. Cen. Com. Vol.*

NĀRĀYAṆĀCĀRYA (C. 1600-1660)

HIS LIFE AND WORKS

NĀRĀYAṆĀCĀRYA was one of the fiery¹ champions of the Dvaita school, that rose to defend it against the slashing attacks of Appayya Dīkṣita and others. He has left us three works in all (1) the *Advaitakālānala*, (2) *Madhva-mantrārthamañjari* and (3) *Viṣṇutattvaviveka*, which is referred to in his first work, as a refutation of the *Śivatattvaviveka* of Appayya.² The first two have been printed. No ms. of the last has yet been brought to light.

Nothing is known about the personal history of this author. His quotations from the *Yuktimalikā* of Vādirāja (1480-1600) and salutation to Vidyādhiśa (1619-1631) serve to fix him about 1640. He was probably an Uttara-Karnataka.

In the sixth introductory verse of his *Madhva-mantrārthamañjari*, he mentions his "Guru" Vedavyāsa Tīrtha (1595-1619) of the Uttarādi Mutt. But he has *not* given us his own Gotra or his family surname. The only information he gives about himself is that he is "Vaiśvanāthiḥ" the son of Viśvanātha. This, by itself, is not sufficient to justify his identification with an elder brother of Taraṅgiṇī-Rāmācārya, bearing the same name of Nārāyaṇācārya, as proposed by Gauḍageri Gopālakrishnacharya and supported by V. Prabhanjan in the Dec. and Jan. issues of the *Tattvavada* (1979-1980).

Taraṅgiṇī Rāmācārya has given us ample information about himself, about his father's name (Viśvanātha), his Gotra (Upamanyu) and his family surname ("Vyāsa") besides mentioning that he had an elder brother Nārāyaṇācārya who was a veteran scholar in Vyākaraṇa and other Śāstras and that he had his scholastic training under him (*Adhyaiṣi Tattvavaiśārādīm yato'ham*).

In the absence of any definite information from the author of the *Advaitakālānala* and *Madhva-mantrārthamañjari* about his own Gotra and family surname, it is purely conjectural to identify the two Nārāyaṇācāryas on the sole basis of their fathers' name having been the same, which may be a sheer coincidence.

The identification is open to question on other grounds also besides the absence of confirmatory evidence of the identity of their Gotra and family surname, which alone can be decisive. It is clear from the terms of reference to his elder brother by Rāmācārya in his *Taraṅgiṇī* that

1. मायावादमहाटवीप्रलयकृत्यद्वैतकालानले । प्रादुर्भावमगात् समुज्ज्वलतरः प्रज्वाल इत्यादिमः ॥ (*Advaitakālānala* i, 32).

2. यच्च, "पुराणानां बलाबलविचारेण परस्य न प्रत्याशेत्युपपादितमस्माभिः शिवतत्त्वविवेक इत्युक्तं," तच्च सपरिकरमस्माभिः खण्डितं विष्णुतत्त्वविवेके ॥ (p. 219).

Nārāyaṇācārya was much senior to him in age. Secondly, Rāmācārya pays homage to Raghūttama Tīrtha (1557-1596) of the Uttarādi Mutt as his "own Guru". Now, Raghūttama was on the Pīṭha for a long period of 39 years, and was succeeded by Vedavyāsa Tīrtha (1596-1618). Even supposing that Rāmācārya may have lived for some years in the Pontifical period of Raghūttama's successor Vedavyāsa, it is hardly possible that his elder brother Nārāyaṇa (if he were the same as the author of the *Advaitakālānala*) could have survived into the Pontifical period of Raghūttama's successor's successor Vidyādhiśa, to whom also the author of *Advaitakālānala* pays his respects. This is in glaring contrast with the absence of any reference to Raghūttama's two successors by Taraṅgiṇī Rāmācārya. There is no reason why the younger brother should have ignored these two Gurus to whom his own elder brother had paid respects, in his works.

There is also another important point which militates against the attempted identification of the two Nārāyaṇācāryas. Rāmācārya's *Taraṅgiṇī* has been criticized by Ānandabhaṭṭāraka, the father of Vidyādhiśa, in his *Nym-Kaṇṭhakoddhāra*. This makes it clear that Rāmācārya must have been an elder contemporary of Ānandabhaṭṭāraka himself. An elder brother of Rāmācārya under whom he had studied the Śāstras must certainly have been *still anterior to Ānandabhaṭṭāraka himself and more so to his son Vidyādhiśa* who was Pontiff between 1619-1631.

It is thus chronologically impossible for an elder brother of Taraṅgiṇī Rāmācārya to have lived down to the period of Raghūttama's successor's successor and paid homage to him while his supposed younger brother shows no knowledge of these two Pontiffs.

I see no reason then to modify the position taken by me (on p. 378, f.n. 2) that the *two Nārāyaṇācāryas must be held to be different persons*.

Among other works ascribed to the author of *Advaitakālānala* are a gloss of PP. (m), a *Vādirāja-kavaca* and a gloss on *Nṛsiṃha Stuti* of Trivikrama Pandita. (*Tattvavāda* Dec., 79).

The *Advaitakālānala* (p), as may be gathered from its title, is a scathing criticism of the *Madhvatāntramukhamardanam* of Appayya. The carping criticisms and bitter personal attacks of the Dīkṣita¹ are vigorously returned by Nārāyaṇa. He loses no opportunity to pay the critic in his own coin and with compound interest. The tone of the work is thus retaliatory and biting sarcasm. It is divided into five "Jvālās" (flames) and runs to about 8000 granthas. The metrical portion of Appayya's work and his own prose commentary on it are quoted *verbatim* and criticised in full. The leading ideas of the refutation are put in verses of different metres, chiefly Sragdharā, a rather difficult metre to handle and these are followed by detailed discussions and arguments in prose. The author's wide knowledge of Mīmāṃsā, Vyākaraṇa and Alamkāra Śāstras and of general Kāvya literature is fully brought out by these discussions. *The work could be pronounced to be a thoroughgoing and final refutation of the Dīkṣita's work.*

1. iii, 9-15. Cf. Appayya : श्रुत्यन्तानां निरूप्यं स यदि जडमते ... ॥

He writes a vigorous and animated style, full of repartees,¹ spicy anecdotes and colourful analogies.² He rallies the Advaitin for his misrepresentations (ii, 2) and parodies of Madhva doctrines and the nemesis which they entail upon the Advaitin.

POLEMICS OF THE ADVAITAKĀLĀNALA

The first chapter of the work deals with certain initial defects of Advaita metaphysics such as its distrust of Pramāṇas and non-acceptance of any fundamental criteria of validity and truth-determination upon which the conduct of practical life is based; (2) its arbitrary distinction of reality into absolute, phenomenal and apparent and the mutual divergence of views among the authorities of the school, on many crucial points of doctrine and detail.

The second chapter is a spirited reply to certain miscellaneous allegations of Appayya against the trustworthiness and acceptability of Madhva's interpretations of the Sūtras such as (i) his indifference to and misrepresentation of the principles of Vedic interpretation and Mīmāṃsā exegesis; (ii) his fondness for untraceable Śrutis and Smṛtis in support of his peculiar interpretations; and (iii) his glaring metrical flaws and lapses from correct grammar and usage of words. Nārāyaṇa refutes these charges with a *solid array of facts and figures*, vindicating the correctness of Madhva's interpretations and their loyalty to the genuine traditions of Vedic interpretation. The authenticity of the metrical forms and soundness of the grammatical forms impugned by the critic are upheld.

The next two chapters are devoted to the justification of the Pūrvapakṣa of the opening Adhikaraṇa of the B. S. as developed by Madhva and his commentators against the refutations attempted by the critic. The Pūrvapakṣa as developed by the Advaitin, is, in turn, criticized and shown to be untenable :

तस्मात् त्वत्कृतस्वकीयपूर्वपक्षभूषणमस्मदीयपूर्वपक्षदूषणं च निर्बीजं स्वव्याहतं च । (p. 83)

The author takes the opportunity of elucidating the nature of Viśeṣas as conceived in the system of Madhva and points out the absurdities to which the deliberate perversion and misapplication of that thought-category leads the Advaitin.

The last chapter deals with the criticisms on the 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th adhikaraṇas of the B. S. and is wound up with a general review of the criticisms on the rest of the B. S. B.

It may be said that the author has successfully repelled the criticisms of Appayya and shown them to be quite shallow and sentimental and based on irrelevant considerations. He has tried to put up an unexpurgated case for the soundness and acceptability of Madhva's interpretations of the

1. अथ प्रपंचो ब्रह्मज्ञानबाध्यः, रजतज्ञानं तु तदन्यज्ञानबाध्यमिति । किमतः ? फलेऽविशेषात् । तदिदमाहुः 'व्याघ्रेणोरणे नीते का हानिर्वृकेणोरणे नीते को लाभ' इति ॥

2. See his references to अन्धगर्दभन्याय (p. 71) कण्टकारिन्याय (p. 52) दशरामशरान्याय (p. 52). दर्भपवित्रन्याय (p. 173) मूर्खभार्यान्विषणन्याय (p. 177) शूद्रोदकस्पर्शनाशकिश्रोत्रियतीर्थयानन्याय (p. 32).

Sūtras. His intimate knowledge of several branches of learning and familiarity with the literature of the Advaita and the mutual differences of views among its exponents enables him to corner the critic at inconvenient angles and show that the criticisms levelled against Madhva's interpretations have no more than a "nuisance value" and are powerless to cause any permanent damage to their structure.

(1) SAMANVAYA IN VIṢṆU

He points out for example that the distinguishing feature of Madhva's interpretation of the Samanvayādhyaḥ, in making Viṣṇu the Supreme Brahman of the Vedānta, is not a theological stunt without any philosophical significance or sanction. The conflict of claims to sovereignty among the different deities of the Vedic Pantheon cannot be resolved by the facile application of the interpretational device of "Nahi nindā" nyāya of the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā, as Appayya would have us believe.

शिवं वा विष्णुं वा यदभिदधति शास्त्रस्य विषयं
विरोधो नातीवास्माकं स्फुरति नहिनिन्दानयविदाम् ।

Nārāyaṇa points out that the application of this principle would be out of place in a case like this. It is intended to be applied to adjust conflict of observances arising from contrary injunctions with regard to the performance of particular rites as in उदिते जुहोति and "अनुदिते जुहोति". But in these cases, both prescriptions have the same amount of textual sanction and binding force of validity as Śāstric injunctions; though considered to apply *optionally* to different persons. But, in the present case, the adherents of Śaivism and Vaiṣṇavism do not concede the parity of Śāstric status of each other's Deity ! (2) It is not also possible to explain away all cases of derogatory references (निन्दार्थवादाः) with the aid of "Nahinindānyāya"; but only such as are connected with Vidhis. Indictments occurring in the neighbourhood of Niṣedhas have necessarily to be taken at their full face value, if the spirit of disapproval or dispraise conveyed by such Artha-vādas is to be preserved. A prohibitory text like "न ग्राह्यं शिवनिर्माल्यं", occurring in the vicinity of the story of Bhṛgu's curse on Śiva, is an indication of the comparative inferiority of status of that god and cannot be explained away with the help of नहिनिन्दान्याय. (3) Even the नहिनिन्दान्याय must put up with some modicum of defect or inferiority of status in the person or thing adversely commented upon, if the complimentary reference to the other one is to have any real significance. Of course, there may not actually be *so great an imperfection* or inferiority as the reference might suggest. But there must needs be a *certain amount* of defect or imperfection, if the laudatory proposition should have any real force or significance, at all. Detractory references to Śiva in cases like श्वपचादपि कष्टत्वं ब्रह्मेशानादयः सुराः must therefore be deemed to have *some basis* in point of fact and cannot be dismissed as mere examples of "Nahi nindānyāya." (4) If the critic has so much faith in it, he should be prepared to accept the soundness and absolute validity of the theories of Saguṇa Brahman and the reality of Difference *side by side with his faith in his own theories of identity of selves,*

Nirguṇa Brahman etc. ! It would then be impossible for him to put down these theories as half-truths (*atattvāvedaka*) :

मीमांसायाः प्रवृत्तौ प्रथमचरमयोः पक्षयोः सेव्यमानौ
द्वावप्यर्थौ विरुद्धावपि मलिनमते, तथ्यभूतौ भवेताम् ।
द्वैताद्वैते च सत्ये हरिहरजगदीशत्ववत्तत्र चोद्वे
दोषाणां सन्निरोधानपि कुरु नहिनिन्दानयस्याश्रयेण ॥ (ii, 19)

The “Nahinindānyāya” has thus its *obvious limitations* and cannot be stretched beyond its jurisdiction as a sort of panacea for curing all kinds of logical contradictions and reconciling honest and fundamental differences of opinion. Otherwise, the entire task of trying to ascertain the true teaching of the Brahmasūtras through a careful investigation of the meanings of texts or a reconciliation of their conflicting trends of thought, with the aid of various interpretational devices, would be a waste of time and energy, as all contradictions could be resolved at once, by waving the magic wand of Nahinindānyāya ! Opposing tenets re. the nature of God, man and the world, put forth by different philosophers, could be allowed to pass muster and none of them need be dismissed as absurd or untenable. The Buddhist, Sāṃkhya and Vedāntic views should all of them be accepted as true, their mutual criticism and refutations of others being explained away as just self-complimentary (*Nahinindā*) :

मतं सांख्यादीनां समयचरणे निन्दितमपि
प्रधानप्राधान्यादिकमुपगतं तैः स्वनिगमे ।
उपेयं वैयासं मतमपि परब्रह्मविषयं
हरीशादीशत्वाद्यमिव नहिनिन्दानयविदा । (i, 14)

It would be inexplicable that, with such unbounded faith in the efficacy of Nahinindānyāya, the critic should at all nurse any real grievance against the system of interpretation of *Madhva alone*. In the light of his own guiding principle of Nahinindā, his criticisms against Madhva could not be taken seriously !

The conflict of claims of Śiva and Viṣṇu is not, therefore, one that could be resolved by a pious allusion to Nahinindā. It is obvious that there cannot be two independent Lords of the Universe. The Supreme can only be One. The followers of each system are firmly persuaded that theirs is the only True Lord of all Time and Space. In such a case, the conflict between them could not be ended except by cutting the Gordian knot in favour of one. We cannot hope to get over the difficulty by identifying the rival deities, unless such identity is conceded by the parties to the controversy. An identity, trotted out by an outsider, is no solution. If such identity were true, the quarrel between the two would be simply one over names, which is hardly conceivable :

द्वयोर्न स्वातन्त्र्यं भवति न च देशाद्यवधृते-
विकल्पोऽसंमत्या नहि तदभिदायां मतभिदा ।
विवादो नो नामन्युचित इति लीलातनुमतं
मतं तेषां नातः स्फुरति न विरोधस्तत्र कथम् ? (ii, 6).

The question of the *identity of the Supreme Being* is, therefore, of paramount importance as a philosophical hypothesis and Madhva cannot be blamed for having raised it in the interpretation of the Vedānta.

2. PROBLEM OF UNTRACEABLE TEXTS

(1) Nārāyaṇācārya pleads for a calm and unbiased consideration of the problem of untraceable texts cited by Madhva, raised by Appayya. It would be impossible to fix any specific criteria of traceability or define its limits, where traditional texts are concerned. The extent of traceability would naturally become wider as the range of our knowledge and facilities for research expand. We cannot flatter ourselves that we have reached the limits of knowledge in any department of study. New materials are sure to be discovered with the advance of knowledge or the discovery of new facts. Patañjali refers to the vast range of sacred and secular literature in Sanskrit and his remarks apply *mutatis mutandis* to the present case.

(2) There is no harm in accepting the genuineness of untraceable texts, where their teachings happen to be in unison with those of the traceable ones. Where they disagree, they would stand automatically ruled out. Madhva is fully alive to this procedure of testing the *bona fides* of his citations and we cannot, therefore, expect him to have had any save the most honourable intentions in supporting his explanations with a number of texts that were current in his days or had been accessible to him. The only point to be settled with regard to those texts whose teachings could thus be corroborated by other extant sources would then be this,—whether the untraceable texts in question are Śruti texts *per se*; or whether they simply embody the teachings of the Śrutis, like ordinary Smṛti passages. In any case, *the inherent validity of the ideas conveyed by such texts could not be impugned*. There is no reason why the Advaitin should complain, even if these texts could not be traced, after the best of efforts. They have *not* been cited by Madhva, to convince *him* or for establishing disputed points to his satisfaction. Such texts have been cited for the information of his *followers* and for the elucidation of certain inner details of his Siddhānta and its esoteric aspects. Such texts are *not* meant for the acceptance of *outsiders*. It should be definitely understood that as against the Advaitin, only well-known and readily accessible texts are cited to establish points of difference between the two schools, such as the reality of the Universe; or the difference between the Jīva and Brahman. These tenets have been supported by well-known and unambiguous texts like “Dvā suparṇā” and “Viśvam satyam” from the Ṛg Veda and the Upaniṣads, and the so-called Advaitic texts have been shown to find a more reasonable explanation than that proposed by Monists, in conformity with other Pramāṇas. In such cases, untraceable Śrutis have *not* been appealed to anywhere, as *deciding factors*. Even where they have been cited to reinforce an inner detail of doctrine or dogma, as in उमा वै वाक् to explain “वाङ् मनसि संपद्यते. . .” (*Chān. Up.*) the interpretation could be shown to be in full accord with the principles of interpretation embodied in the Abhimānyadhikaraṇa of the B. S. (ii, 1, 6-7) and accepted by the Advaitins too. There are enough traceable texts to support the Dvaita position and put the Advaitic interpretations in general, out of court. So far, then, as the citation of

untraceable Śrutis is concerned, Nārāyaṇa says that the Advaitin is at perfect liberty to play the sceptic and refuse to recognize their validity or allow himself to be swayed by them. In disputing with the Buddhist, the Śrutis of the Vedānta will be of no avail. In such cases, the appeal would naturally have to be made to purely logical arguments. But it would not follow from that that the Śrutis that might be relied upon by the Siddhāntin, for his own personal satisfaction and that of his followers are invalid. So far as sceptics are concerned, only traceable śrutis should be taken to have been cited, with reference to them. The untraceable ones are not intended to carry conviction to them and may therefore be ignored by them, if they choose to do so. Nārāyaṇa thus places the whole question of untraceable texts in Madhva, in a new and clear perspective, free from any sort of sentimental predilections.¹

(3) AGREEMENT WITH MĪMĀṂSAKA-MARYĀDĀS

In reply to another charge of violating the principles of Mīmāṃsā interpretations, Nārāyaṇa points out that this, too, is a sweeping allegation. There are certain *general* principles of Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā exegesis, which have universal application and binding force : दृश्यन्ते हि मीमांसकानां न्यायाः केचित् कुलघर्मप्रायाः यथा ग्रहैकत्वादेरुद्देश्यविशेषणस्य अविवक्षितत्वम् (p. 42) and these have been accepted by Madhva and his commentators. But there are other pet theories of theirs like the denial of bodies to the gods and many other mistaken views,² which could not be slavishly endorsed by believers in Vedic Siddhānta. Dogmas of Mīmāṃsakas like : वेदोषरा वेदान्ताः । आम्नायस्य क्रियार्थत्वादानर्थक्यमतदर्शानाम् have not certainly been accepted by the Advaitins ! Nor have they endorsed the Mīmāṃsaka view of “ज्ञातता” or the inferential character of knowledge; though professing great admiration for them and claiming to follow them in all matters of formal logic and exegesis : व्यवहारे भट्टनयः । If such professed admirers and followers of the Mīmāṃsakas, as the Advaitins, could have the freedom to *accept some* of their rules and *reject others* which are inconsistent with their views,³ the Dvaita philosophers have a greater right to differ from the Mīmāṃsakas, wherever the exigencies of their system demand it. They are not bond-slaves of Mīmāṃsakas :

नहि वयं पूर्वमीमांसकानां किंकराः । यत् तन्मर्यादयैव वर्तमहि ।

Whatever, then, is just and reasonable in their principles of interpretation etc., is accepted by the Dvaitin : किन्तु—युक्तियुक्तमुपादेयं वचनं बालकादपि । अन्यत् तृणमिव त्याज्यमप्युक्तं पद्मजन्मना । इति न्यायात् यदुपपन्नं तदङ्गीकुर्मः ॥ Whatever is not supported by reason is rejected : यदनुपपन्नं उपक्रमादिलिङ्गानां उत्तरोत्तरदौर्बल्यादिकं तत्परित्यजामः (p. 42). Such difference in methodology is a genuine mark of independence of

1. See also Ch. XI, under Problem of Madhva's Sources.

2. “ऐन्द्री सुब्रह्मण्या भवति” इति विध्युद्देशे, इन्द्रपरतयावगतस्य निगदस्य सूर्यपरत्वं कथं पूर्वोत्तरविमर्श-बैकल्येन कृतम् ? जीवात्मनां व्यापकत्वोपपादने भारतविरोधमाशङ्क्य यत्किञ्चित् प्रलपितं भट्टकुमारिलेन, “यत्वारण्यके पर्वणि ‘अंगुष्ठमात्रं पुरुषं निश्चकर्ष यमो बलात्’ इति तत्तु काव्यशोभामात्रं” इति (p. 47 *ibid*).

3. अभ्यासः कर्मभेदक इति तेषां घण्टाघोषेऽपि * * * * अग्निहोत्रादिकर्मनिधित्तजडोन्मत्तबधिरान्ध-पङ्कवाद्यधिकारिकत्वेनोक्तस्य सन्यासस्य त्वदाचार्यस्वीकृतस्य त्वयाभ्युपगतत्वात् ॥ (p. 148).

thought and system-building and there is nothing to be ashamed of in it:

तत् भूषणमेव नतु दूषणं स्वतन्त्रतन्त्रप्रवर्तकानाम् ॥¹

The Advaitin has set his face resolutely against the realism of the Mīmāṃsaka by propounding such fantastic theories as the doctrine of one self, an indeterminate Brahman and a false Universe. He cannot afford to throw stones at the Dvaitins, himself residing in a glass house.² The utmost that could be expected of a reasonable man is acceptance of what is just and reasonable and rejection of whatever is unsound, wherever they might be found or by whomsoever taught : एतावद्धि प्रामाणिकानां कर्तव्यं, यत्परमतमित्येव नयने निमील्य प्रद्वेषेणैव यथाकथंचित् छलजात्याद्युत्तरधूलीप्रक्षेपेण न दूषणीयम् । यथा भवादृशेन । किंतु, उपपन्नमुपादेयम् । अनुपपन्नं हेयमित्येव ॥ (p. 149)

There is nothing sacrosanct about everything the Mīmāṃsakas have uttered; nor is there any unwritten law of the land that all philosophers must kotow to the Mīmāṃsakas. Why not the Mīmāṃsakas accept what most other philosophers are agreed upon, such as the creation and dissolution of the world? Simply because one is a realist, one is not under any obligation to dance to the tunes of the Mīmāṃsaka ! All realists are *not* obliged to subscribe to the views of Cārvākas. So too, in regard to the Mīmāṃsakas. The Madhva philosophers have accepted what is sound and sensible in the doctrines of the Mīmāṃsakas, as for example the proposition that in respect of Sattrā sacrifices, all participators are deemed Sacrificers (सर्वे यजमानाः) insofar as the fruit of the sacrifice accrues to all of them. But even there, there is a certain amount of gradation in the accruing merit as between the Gṛhapati and the other R̥tviks. This is clearly admitted by the Mīmāṃsakas and it is just to bring out this crucial point that Madhva speaks in his B. S. B. of the R̥tviks in a Sattrā as “अयजमानाः” from the point of view of “मुख्यामुख्यन्याय”. There is no violation of the substance of the Mīmāṃsā view in this description. Indeed, it is a dextrous way of emphasising a subtle point of doctrinal detail of the Mīmāṃsā (p. 147) and Madhva deserves praise, instead of disparagement, for such *insight* into the deeper truths of the Mīmāṃsā.

Nārāyaṇa examines some more instances of alleged misconstruction of Mīmāṃsā technique in Madhva and Jayatīrtha and vindicates their stand with force and clarity (pp. 149-54). The statement : ज्योतिषां स्तोमो हि ज्योतिष्टोमः in Jayatīrtha's work, is not intended to be taken to give the component parts of a compound word “Jyotiṣtoma”. It is to be taken to bring out the generic sense of the term even as the phrase : धर्माय जिज्ञासा in Śabara's Bhāṣya on the Mīmāṃsā Sūtra is taken to be a mere paraphrase of धर्मजिज्ञासा and not at all intended to embody the correct vigrahavākya which is of course : धर्मस्य जिज्ञासा । It would be clear to any unbiased scholar that Jayatīrtha has used the term ज्योतिषां in the collective sense of त्रिवृत्यं दशसप्तदशैकविंशरूपस्तोत्रसमूहः ॥

1. अन्यथा, समवायानंगीकारात् काणादादिमर्यादोल्लंघनं, प्रकृतिप्राधान्यानंगीकारात् सांख्यमर्यादोल्लंघनमित्याद्यपि दूषणं किमिति नाभिदध्याः ?

2. प्रत्युत, सकलवाचनभिमतं आत्मैकत्वं, अखण्डं ब्रह्म विश्वमिध्यात्वं, वेदस्यातत्त्वावेदकत्वमभ्युपगतवतः तदैव शून्यवाद्यतिरिक्तसर्वतान्त्रिकमर्यादोल्लंघनं, शून्यवादमतप्रवेशश्चेति कथं न निश्चालयसे ? (p. 42).

There is thus no point in the criticism. The author then goes into the technicalities of the Mīmāṃsā doctrine of "Vākyabheda", with reference to different types of Bhāvanās and quotes from several original works of the system, in support of Madhva's statement :

अंगीकृतत्वादपि तैः पदानां तु पृथक् पृथक् ।

क्रियापदेनान्वयस्य वाक्यभेदाद्धि दूषणम् ॥

(4) LINGUISTIC AND METRICAL PECULIARITIES OF MADHVA

Cases of defective versification and solecisms of language are more easily met. It is true, there occur in Madhva's works many anomalous forms, at variance with Pāṇini. But it would be preposterous to conclude from these rare cases that his knowledge of the elementary principles and paradigms of the Sanskrit grammar were worse than a tyro's ! The irregularities have been redeemed from criticism on suitable grammatical authority and sanctions by commentators like Jayatīrtha. Occasional echoes of Vedic and Epic idiom are to be put down to the influence of Vedic and Epic styles. Such usages are not intended to be accepted as current coin¹ or used as such either wilfully or by mistake,—much less, for want of better words. Take for example such queer forms as विष्णवि (AV); पतिना (Mbh. T. N. i, 4, 8 b); त्रियाव्यवात्मिकम् etc. It would be ridiculous to assume from these that Madhva was really ignorant of "विष्णौ" being the correct Pāṇinian locative singular of "विष्णु" or of "पत्या" being the instrumental singular of "पति" even though he has used the R̥g Vedic form "विष्णवि"² and the Epic "पतिना", in one solitary instance, for reasons metrical. That such usages are not certainly due to ignorance of correct forms is clear from his using the standard forms themselves almost in the very next line :

वासुदेवश्रुतिश्चाह नैव विष्णावमङ्गलम् । (AV. i, 4, 8 d).

There are, moreover, other systems of grammar than Pāṇini's and forms not sanctioned by him are accepted by others, as for example, the use of "ṛte" with accusative in Madhva (नारायणप्रसादमृते) (B. S. B.) ज्ञानसूर्यमृते (AV) which is legitimized by *Candra*, ii, i, 84.

Cases of syntactic and metrical irregularities are similarly to be explained, on the basis of influence of Vedic and Epic models. There are numerous verses in the Epics which do not fit in with the definitions of metres given in the standard works on the subject, available to us. Ancient poets like Vālmiki and Vyāsa are the makers of language and metres and they should not be judged by the rules of writers on Poetics and Metrics, that came long after them. It is the latter that are indebted to the former, for the foundations of their systems. There is nothing wrong in a celebrated

1. Cf. श्रुतिस्मृतिपुराणाभ्यासपाटवेनाचार्यैस्तथा व्यवहृततया तथा व्यवहारस्य श्रुतिस्मृतिपुराणगत-छान्दसशब्दानुकरणत्वेनादोषात् । लोकदृष्ट्या तथा व्यवहारस्याचार्यैरकृतत्वात् । 'त्रियंबकं संयमिनं ददर्शत्यादिषु कालिदासादेरपि तथा व्यवहारदर्शनात् ॥ (Vijayindra, *Madhvādhva-Kaṇṭhakodhāra*, p. 9.)

2. The use of ऋते with the accusative is met with in Udayana, Vimuktātman and Sureśvara. Cf. other such irregularities as छागा for छागी in Śaṅkara's B.S.B.i, 4, 8, and the elision of the intervocalic "r" in "*Gauṇamithyātmano* (r) *asattve*," in the ancient Kārikā cited by Śaṅkara under B. S. B. i, 1, 4. *Vide* also p. 85.

system-builder like Madhva, electing to follow the lead of these older writers and model his works on theirs : भगवान् भाष्यकारो हि तच्छालायामेव व्युत्पन्नः (p. 49). It would be easy enough to rebut the contention that any Tom, Dick or Harry might indulge in such monstrosities and get away under a cloak of greatness. Nārāyaṇa says it would be easy enough to estimate the worth of persons resorting to such usages, with reference to their other credentials. One cannot say, for instance, that Pāṇini has been guilty of violating his own rule : तृजकाभ्यां कर्तरि (ii, 2, 15) in writing जनिकर्तुः प्रकृतिः (i, 4, 30). The Vedic text आहवनीये जुहोति though twice cited by Śabara in his c. on the Mīmāṃsā Sūtras as a Śruti text, is *not traceable* anywhere, in extant Vedic literature. Irregular metres are often to be met with in the Epics : अनेकबाहूदरवक्त्रनेत्रं पश्यामि त्वां दीप्तहुताशवक्त्रं (Gītā) where the transposition of short and long syllables is seen. Numerous internal variations of Gāyatrī and other metres have been recognized in the work of Halāyudha and in the *Vṛttaratnākara* and nearly 4096 varieties of the Jagatī have been spoken of in standard treatises on the subject though only a few have been defined and illustrated. It is not necessary that we should have the same type of metrical foot in all the four quarters of a given verse. In Madhva's *Nṛsiṃha-nakhaṣṭuti*, the first hemistich : पान्त्वस्मान् पुरुहूतवैरि * * * is in Śārdūlavikrīḍita and the second half is in Sragdharā, which is typified in the *Rāmāyaṇa* :

रामं लक्ष्मणपूर्वजं रघुवरं सीतापतिं सुन्दरं
काकुत्स्थं करुणार्णवं गुणनिधिं विप्रप्रियं धार्मिकम् ।
राजेन्द्रं सत्यसन्धं दशरथतनयं श्यामलं शान्तमूर्तिं
वन्दे लोकाभिरामं रघुकुलतिलकं राघवं रावणारिम् ॥

In these circumstances, it would be betraying one's ignorance of ancient models to find fault with Madhva for his alleged mishandling of metres and so on : आदिकविसंप्रदायप्राप्तं व्यवहारं कुर्वतः सर्वज्ञशिरोमणेराचार्यस्य मूर्खैरज्ञानमाधाय परिहसननाटनं कृतं : तत्तु हंसबकीयन्यायमनुसरति ॥ (p. 51).

Prudence is the better part of valour, in cases where one is not acquainted with the texts and traditions of one's rivals. The consequences of a misguided *coup d'état* are always fatal. Appayya is found to rate Madhva for his citation of untraceable Śrutis like "Catura-Śruti". But we don't meet with any text under that title anywhere in Madhva's works. We have only a "Tura-Śruti" cited by him, which the Dīkṣita has mistaken for "Catura-Śruti" (misled by the particle "ca" immediately preceding it in the citation). But the critic is not aware of the fact that the same text is elsewhere (in the AV) cited by Madhva without the "ca" preceding : इत्याह तुरश्रुतिश्च (AV) which gives us the clue to the correct name of the Śruti. Nārāyaṇa naturally pokes fun at the Dīkṣita for this egregious blunder and counsels him to shed his pride of scholarship and approach the works of Madhva with due deference and humility and try to understand before rushing to criticize him :

संप्रदायमवमत्य गर्वतः सर्वतः स्वरसनां निवेशयन् ।
कण्टकारिदशरामशरादिन्यायतः स परिहास्यते बुधैः ॥

(5) PŪRVAPAKṢA-SAMARTHANAM

The high-sounding criticism of the Dikṣita that the form of the Pūrvapakṣa against the pursuit of Brahmajijñāsā, as stated by the Dvaitin, would be damaging to the interests of his system, insofar as it implies an acceptance of the Śāstric validity of the Monistic thesis :

आत्मा ब्रह्मेत्यधीतः श्रुतिशिखरगणैर्निविशेषैश्च सर्वैः

किं तत्र स्वप्रकाशे गुणलवरहिते वस्तु शास्त्रेण चिन्त्यम् ।

इत्याक्षेपो गुरुणां नतिशतविषये स्वाप्रणम्यत्ववादः

श्रुत्यन्तानां निरूप्यः स यदि जडमते केन शास्त्रस्य न स्यात् ?

is dismissed with a number of trenchant arguments. The Dikṣita is under a great delusion here, in thinking that the Dvaitins have made the identity of Jīva and Brahman, that is claimed to be the subject-matter of the entire Vedānta by the Advaitins, the ground of their Pūrvapakṣa. It is under this mistaken notion that he has ridiculed them with the analogy of “गुरुणां नतिविषये स्वाप्रणम्यत्ववादः” or refusing to pay homage to a person entitled to the regard of one’s own Guru ! But the actual Pūrvapakṣa as developed by Madhva and his commentators is from a different standpoint altogether. The wording of the Pūrvapakṣa in Jayatīrtha’s *Tattvapraṇāśikā* is प्रमाणाभावेन जीवव्यतिरिक्तब्रह्मणोऽभावात् । In the NS. the Pūrvapakṣa is : जीवस्य चाहमिति स्वप्रकाशतया वा, स्वप्रकाशज्ञानाश्रयतया वा, मानसप्रत्यक्षवेद्यतया वा सिद्धत्वेन, न जिज्ञासाविषयत्वम्. There is no basis for the assumption in any of these statements of the Dvaitin’s Pūrvapakṣa, that the Jīva is conceived by the Dvaitin (even at the Pūrvapakṣa level) as an abstraction of pure consciousness as in the Advaita :

न चैवंविधग्रन्थपर्यालोचनायां निविशेषजीवस्वरूपमात्रपरत्वादिति त्वदनूदितोऽर्थोऽवगम्यते (p. 63). न हि त्वदभिमतमखण्डं सुखदुःखकर्तृत्वाहंत्वादिधर्मशून्यं वेदान्तवेद्यं इत्यभिप्रायेण पूर्वपक्षप्रवृत्तिः ॥

The Dikṣita has thus grievously misunderstood the nature and drift of the Dvaitic Pūrvapakṣa and has been pursuing a ghost of his own hallucination : स्पष्टं पूर्वपक्षे सत्यपि तददर्शनेन, अविषये र्थात्किञ्चिद्दूषणाभिधानं अन्धगर्दभलताप्रहारन्यायमनुकरोति.¹

The author then proceeds to clarify the true nature and drift of the Dvaitin’s Pūrvapakṣa :

शास्त्रानारभ्यतोक्ता विषयविरहतः सा द्विधा भाष्यरीत्या

प्रेक्षावद्ग्राह्यताया विरह इति सुधायां त्वकर्तव्यतेति ।

आद्ये तत्स्वप्रकाशत्ववचनविधया मेयताया निरासा-

दाब्रह्मास्तम्बमन्त्ये विरचितपरिशेषेण सर्वापहारात् ॥ (iii, 5)

The sort of cheap criticism of “Gurunativīṣaye svāpraṇamyatvavādaḥ” trotted out by the Dikṣita could be re-directed against any and every Śāstrakāra. For, it is an established procedure, with all Śāstrakāras, to initiate discussions into their Śāstra by a *prima facie* objection that the particular subject need not be investigated (अनारम्भणीयम्) or is not at all worth any exposition. Such is the case with the introductory portion of Yāska’s *Nirukta* and Sāyaṇa’s bhāṣya on the *Rg Veda* and it would be absurd to

1. अन्धगर्दभः किलारण्ये तूणादिकं चरन्, पुनःपुनः स्वस्य धरणार्थं कश्चिदागतः किं न स्यादिति संभावनया, सर्वतो दिक्षु व्योम्नि लताप्रहारं कुरुते तादृक् तत् । न हि त्वदभिमतं अखण्डं सुखदुःखकर्तृत्वाहंत्वादिधर्मशून्यं वेदान्त-वेद्यमित्यभिप्रायेण पूर्वपक्षप्रवृत्तिः (p. 71).

contend that those Pūrvapakṣas are open to the charge of गुरुणां नतिविषये स्वा-
प्रणम्यत्ववादः :—

किं चैवं वेदभाष्यादिषु निगमनिरुक्त्यादिसद्ग्रन्थजाते-
ष्वप्याक्षेपस्त्वदुद्भावितनियमबलतः स्यात्प्रतिक्षेपणीयः ।
आनर्थक्याद्विरोधादधिगतविषयत्वाच्च नारंभणीया
तद्व्याख्येति ह्यवोचन्ननु बत कुमते तान्प्रतीत्यं भषेथाः ॥

It would not be difficult to show too, that this sort of cheap criticism would recoil on the Advaitapūrvapakṣa also, with equal, if not better, force:

ऐक्यं जीवेशयोस्तत्त्वमसि मुखरवैरुच्यमानं विरोधात्
सिद्धत्वात्प्रत्यगात्माप्यविषय इति नो शास्त्रमारंभणीयम् ।
इत्याक्षेपे स्वकीये गुरुनतिविषये स्वाप्रणम्यत्ववादं
स्वीकृत्यास्मान् प्रतीत्यं भषसि जडमते व्याहतिः स्यान्न किं ते ॥ (iii, 9)

The critic is therefore liable to the charge of misrepresentation and other fallacies of argument :

तस्मात्ते जनुभाषणं निरनुयोज्यानुप्रयोगश्छलं
व्याघातः परियोगयोग्यविषयस्योपेक्षणं पञ्चमम् ।
एतैर्निष्कृतिवर्जितैरिह महादोषैः स्फुटं पंचभि-
र्ग्रन्थोक्तैः समुपेक्ष्य एव हि सतां सोऽप्येदीक्षापरः ॥ (iii, 15)

The author goes on to show that the acceptance of the validity of *Brahmatarka* as a pre-requisite of *Brahma-Mīmāṃsā*, by the Dvaitin, does not invalidate the Pūrvapakṣa against the validity of the Śāstras, that is negatived in the opening *adhikaraṇa* : न ह्यधीतब्रह्मतर्क एवात्र पूर्वपक्षी इत्युक्तमेव (p. 68). (1) 'न चैकं प्रति शिष्यते' इति न्यायात् अनधीतब्रह्मतर्कस्य, तटस्थस्य वा, 'गृहभक्षणशीलस्य कपाटं पर्पटायते' इति न्यायात्, ब्रह्ममीमांसोच्छेदाय प्रवृत्तस्य तत्प्रकरणीभूततर्क, दाक्षिण्याभावेन, तत्संभवात् (2) त्वया एवमेव शङ्कनीयमिति निरंकुशप्रवृत्तेनियमायोगात् । तर्हि यत्किञ्चित् वदन्तपि पूर्वपक्षी स्यादिति चेत् । सुखेन स्यात् । तादृशस्याभावे व्याघातोऽसंगतिश्चेत्यादिदूषणानां निविषयत्वापत्तेः । तस्मात् नानामार्गेषु धावन् वन्यमत्तगज इव पूर्वपक्षी समर्थेन सिद्धान्तिना तत्तन्मार्गप्रतिरोधेनैकस्मिन्नन्धौ निपातनीयः । तत्र च चेष्टितुम-
शक्नुवानतया निर्व्यापारीकर्तव्यः । न तु मदीयदूषणानुकूलमेव शङ्केथा इति पर्यनुयोज्यः इति सूचिता
चोपपत्तिर्वेदप्रामाण्यस्य ॥ (p. 63).

(2) MADHVAMANTRĀRTHA-MANĪJARI (म)¹

This is a work devoted to the interpretation of such passages in the Rg Veda as could be and have been cited in support of the traditional belief in Madhva's being an Avatāra of Vāyu. It is referred to by name in the *Advaitakālānala* itself, as another work of the author, which disposes of its erroneous ascription, in some quarters, to the author of the *Madhva-vijaya*. The author quotes from the *M. Vij.* (pp. 16, 79 and 198), from Jayatīrtha (p. 163) and from the *Bhāgavataṭīkā* of Vijayadhvaṇa (p. 168).

It brings together more than a score of ṛks from R. V. to establish the identity of Madhva with Vāyu and interpret them in terms of all the three incarnations Hanumat, Bhīma and Madhva.² It runs to 2400 granthas. The texts cited in this connection are R. V. i, 140-43; vii, 104, 3; i, 85, 7;

1. यथा चात्र निगमनिरुक्तव्याकरणसर्वानुक्रमण्यादिविरोधो नास्ति, तथास्माभिः सपरिकरमुपपादितं मध्वमन्त्रार्थमंजरीम् ॥ (*Advaitakālānala*, p. 41).

2. अथ वायुपक्षे * * * हनुमत्पक्षे (73) भीमपक्षे, मध्वपक्षे च (p. 57 and 82).

vii, 57, 1; x, 543; i, 3-4; x, 5, 1. Some of these have been cited by Madhva himself in his *Mbh. T. N.* Nārāyaṇa rejects the views of “modern commentators” (आधुनिकभाष्यकाराः) like Sāyaṇa, (who is quoted under the name of Mādhava) and Vidyāraṇya on pp. 48, 93, 100, 136, 193-94, 224, 186, 296 and 29 (Mādhava) that these hymns have reference to Agni and his triple manifestations and plunges with skill and confidence into a labyrinth of grammatical and pseudo-grammatical explanations (प्रक्रियाः) *a la* Yāska’s अप्यक्षरसामान्यान्निर्भूयात् in trying to equate each of these texts with the three avatāras of Vāyu and with Vāyu himself in his Mūlarūpa. As an example of his performance may be cited :


वेदिषदे * * (R. V. i, 140, 1a) वेदिनो ज्ञानिनः देवान् ऋषीन्वा स्यन्ति वेदिषदो राक्षसाः तान् द्यति खण्डयतीति वेदिषदाः तस्मै ॥ ‘दोऽवखण्डन’ इत्यस्मात् क्विप् । ‘उपदेशेऽज्’ इत्यात्वचतुर्थ्येकवचने । ‘आतो’ रित्यल्लोपः ॥ It is interesting to note that he quotes passages from the *Skanda* and *Vāmana* Purāṇas (Venkaṭādrimāhātmya),¹ in support of the Avatāra-theory of Madhva, which have been cited also by Vijayīndra, in his *Madhvādhvakaṇṭhakoddhāra*. Commenting on R. V. i, 140, 2 ab, he works out some fanciful data for placing the date of birth of Madhva in Kali 4320 (i.e. 1219 A.D.) : ‘अभि द्विजन्मा त्रिवदन्नमृज्यते । संवत्सरे वावृधे जग्धमी पुनः’ ॥ मनुष्याब्दं हि देवानां दिनं । ततश्च दिव्याब्दस्य मनुष्यमानेन षष्ट्यधिकत्रिंशती तस्या द्वादशगुणनायां (360 × 12 = 4320) विंशत्यधिकत्रिंशत्वारिंशत्या द्वादशाब्दावसानं । तन्मध्येऽस्य जन्मेत्युक्तम् । * *

The Ms. in the *Mysore* O. L. bears the call number C. 365 (Devanagari) and that in the *TPL*. B. 6132. D. 8125.

1. सुवर्णमुखरीतीरे * * * * ॥

SATYANĀTHA YATI (1648-1674)

SATYANĀTHA was sixth in succession from Raghūttama Tīrtha (1558-1596) of the Uttarādi Mutt and the immediate predecessor of Satyābhinava (1674-1706). The latter was the Guru of Chalāri Saṁkarṣaṇācārya, grandson of Chalāri Nṛsiṁha, who wrote one of his works in 1661 A.D. The tutorial and chronological relation between Satyanātha and his successor to the Chalāri family, may be exhibited as follows ;



The (newly discovered) *Koṅkaṇābhyudaya*, also speaks of Satyanātha as a contemporary of the Keḷadi Queen Cannamāmbā (1672-1698).

LIFE

Satyanātha was a memorable personality in many ways. He was a fiery and prolific writer and very ambitious of the glory of Mādhvaism and the secular and spiritual ascendancy of his Mutt. His former name is given in the *S. K.* as Raghunāthācārya. He is reported to have been a contemporary of Lakṣmīnārāyaṇa Tīrtha of the Vyāsātīrtha Mutt. He was also a contemporary of Aurangazeb. According to the account in the *Koṅkaṇābhyudaya*, he visited Banaras at a time when the Moghul Emperor was harassing the Hindus there. Satyanātha himself seems to have suffered persecution and to have been helped out of a difficult situation by the High Priest of the Gauḍa-Sārasvata Brahmins. It was presumably at this time that he visited Gayā and strengthened the hold of his Mutt over the Gayāpālas, who had been converted to Mādhvaism by his predecessor Vidyādhīśa. His victorious career formed the subject of eulogy by Chalāri Saṁkarṣaṇa, in his *Satyanātha-Māhātmyaratnākara*, of which two mss. are noticed by Aufrecht. From this work the *Koṅkaṇābhyudaya* (VI, 400-33) quotes passages relating to the incident at Banaras. This biography of Satyanātha is not well-known in traditional circles and deserves publication at an early date, as a good deal of historical information could be gathered from it.

At least three of Satyanātha's works are reminiscent of the Vyāsatraya. His energy and determination to crush out the rivalry of Monism is reflected even in the choice of the titles of some of his works, four of which go by the name of Paraśu (the Axe).

Satyanātha holds the memory of Vyāsatīrtha in warm admiration and refers to him reverentially as "Vyāsatīrthaśrīmaccaraṇāh". The title of two of his works is modelled on those of Vyāsatīrtha. His determination to crush the rivalry of Monism is reflected in choice of titles of two of his works called 'Paraśus' (the axe). His *Abhinavagadā* is a devastating criticism of Appayya's *Madhvatamatamukhamardanam*. He takes a bold stand on several points regarding the interpretation of the original texts he is commenting and anticipates fresh objections against the originals and knocks them down. See his view of the Adṛṣṭānīyamādhi. (B. S. ii, 3, 51-53). He is fond of detecting what he calls "interpolations" and "corruptions" in the texts and suggests his own emendations and justifies them with gusto. For one of his mettle and flair for controversy, it is indeed surprising that he has chosen to sidestep the controversy over the proper interpretation of the 'Asadadhikaraṇa' in the BSB. of M. between Raghūttama in his *Bhāvabodha* and Rāghavendra's *TCP* (which follows the *Candrikā*). Satyanātha makes a non-committal suggestion that the divergent interpretations may be accepted as 'Varṇakāntara' (*op. cit.* ii.p. 287). See my *BSPC* I. p. 341. He strikes a bold and independent path in interpreting some of the passages in the *TP* and discusses grammar points there and in the *TC* by going into the further ramifications of the topic with much originality and resourcefulness (See his discussion of the example of 'Naganākadi' cited by J. He makes a rather bold pronouncement that women and Śūdras are eligible for 'Aparokṣajñāna' exclusively through śravaṇa of 'Tantra' (p. 4). His dextrous way of explaining the example of 'Ahikuṇḍala' by construing the term 'viśeṣa' used by J. in the *TP*. in its twin senses of 'viśeṣa' and 'bheda' is a masterstroke of resourcefulness.

WORKS

Twelve works are known to have been written by Satyanātha, of which only eight have so far been attested by mss. They include glosses on the *Khaṇḍanatraya*, the *K. N.* and the *Rgbhāṣya*, a couple of original works and glosses again on the *Pramāṇa-Paddhati* and the *N. S.*, and a Stotra. Of (1-3) glosses on the *Khaṇḍanatraya*, only that on the *Māyāvāda-Khaṇḍana*, called *Paraśu*, is said to be available in ms.¹ (4) His gloss on *K. N. tīkā* known as *Karmaprakāśikā*, is reported both from the T. P. L. and Mysore O. L. The number of granthas is 1500. (5) No trace of his c. on the *N. S.* (also called *Paraśu*) is to be found. (6) His *Abhinava-Candrikā*^(p) (T. P. L. 7842) is a super-commentary on the *TP* of Jayatīrtha. It runs to 12600 granthas and is undoubtedly the author's *magnum opus*. It is not

1. The late G. R. Savanur of Dharwar had a ms. in his possession.

a continuation of the *Candrikā* but an independent gloss, covering also portions (Ch. I-II) commented upon by Vyāsatīrtha. The author refers in one of the introductory verses (no. 4) to the *Sattarkadīpāvali* of Padmanābha Tīrtha. The work has been printed in 1945. Its plan is not the same as that of *Candrikā*. Satyanātha sets forth the Pūrvapakṣa and Siddhānta views under each adhikaraṇa, and offers criticisms on the former in accordance with the views of his teacher Satyanidhi (Tanjore ms. p. 10). He quotes from the *Tattvapradīpa*, *Candrikā* and *Bhāvabodha* (on TP). The passages of the TP are commented upon as in the *Candrikā*. Under B. S. iii, 2, adh. 8, p. 22, he takes note of a series of "interpolations" in the text of Jayatīrtha's c. He is fond of detecting such "interpolations" in his other cc. also. The adhikaraṇaśarīras as made out in the *Vivaraṇa* and *Bhāmati* are systematically assailed. (7) (In his *R̥g-Bhāṣya-Tippaṇi*^(m), (Mys. O. L. 1903) the author is frequently on guard against what he terms "corruptions and interpolations", in the text of Jayatīrtha's c. on the *R̥gbhāṣya* (Mys. O. L. pp. 7, 10, 24 etc). He carries on elaborate discussions on the grammatical form, etymology etc., of various Vedic forms to be found in the text and refutes certain criticisms against the Bhāṣya (p. 11). His (8) *Abhinavā-mṛta*^(p)^D is a gloss on the *Pramāṇa-Paddhati* of Jayatīrtha in 1400 granthas. It is fairly lucid and follows the c. of Śrīnivāsa (Tīrtha) in the main, which it, nevertheless, criticizes on occasions : (cf. p. 51 line 28 and Śrī- 53-26 same edn; and p. 54, 15 of Śrī-with p. 52, 4 of Satyanātha).

ABHINAVA-GADĀ^(p)

Like the earlier works of Vijayīndra, and Nārāyaṇa, this is also a refutation of Appayya Dīkṣita's criticism of Madhva Siddhānta and Sūtra-interpretation, from a slightly different angle from theirs. It runs to 4750 granthas and was published by the late Svami Satyadhyāna Tīrtha of the Uttarādi Mutt.¹ The work has five chapters designated "Yuddhas" (battles) with an obvious allusion to the Gadā-yuddha between Bhīma and Suyodhana. The intensely bellicose attitude of the author is reflected even in the opening verse :

सदापेये दीक्षितस्य मृधे दुरभिमानिनः ।

पातयामि शिरस्यद्य गुर्वीमभिनवां गदाम् ॥

Unlike Vijayīndra, the author tries to silence the criticisms of Appayya, without reference, as a rule, to the opinions expressed by Jayatīrtha and Vyāsatīrtha, in their works. He isolates Madhva from his commentators and so confounds the critic, suggesting sometimes that the Bhāṣyākāra is not to be blamed for the views of his commentators. Vijayīndra, on the other hand, has throughout tried to treat the works of the Bhāṣyākāra and those of his commentators, as a homogeneous whole and make them withstand the criticisms of the Dīkṣita, as a united body of texts. Satyanātha's retort to the alleged flouting of Mīmāṃsā rules in Madhva's

1. I have 168 pages of the printed work with me. It is not known if the work has been published in full.

works is characteristic of his line of reply : श्रीमदाचार्यैः पूर्वमीमांसाया अनाश्रयणात् । टीकाकारैः पूर्वमीमांसा आश्रितेति चेन्न । श्रीमदाचार्यदूषणाय प्रवृत्तेन त्वया, दूष्यत्वेनान्यवाक्यस्यानुदाहर्तव्यत्वात् । वस्तुतस्तु टीकाकारवचनेऽपि दोषो नास्तीति वक्ष्यामः ॥ (p. 10)

ABHINAVA-TARKATĀṆḌAVA^(p)

This (T. P. L. 8098-101) is another voluminous original work of Satyanātha which is a dialectical classic, expounding the nature and constitution of the logical and epistemological categories of the Dvaita system and refuting those of rival systems especially those of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, on the same lines as the original *Tarka-Tāṇḍava* of Vyāsātīrtha. The work runs to 11367 granthas. The views of Raghunātha Śīromaṇi and Rucidatta, commentators on Gaṅgeśa, those of the Prābhākaras, Rāmānuja and the Vaiśeṣikas are, here, quoted and refuted in detail.

Like the original *Tarkatāṇḍava*, this work is also divided into three Paricchedas. Maṅgalavāda, the self-validity of knowledge, Sannikarṣa-Samavāya, the relation between the subject and its attributes, the invisibility of Vāyu, the Pārthivatva of gold, and Udayana's view of it, the validity of Smṛti (recollection); the definition of Inference, Vyāpti and the criticism of the second Vyāpti-lakṣaṇa formulated by the *Maṇi*, the definition of Upādhi, Pakṣatā, Avayava-lakṣaṇa (p. 103), Hetvābhāsa, the subsumption of other Pramāṇas like Upamāna within the three, the validity of Śabda, its fitness to be recognized as an independent Pramāṇa, the definitions of Ākāṅkṣā, Yogyatā, and Āsatti, and the examination of Gaṅgeśa's views on these, the Apauruṣeyatva of Vedas, the eternity of sound, criticism of the Mīmāṃsaka view that Veda is *nityānumeya*, (p. 43), the import of Injunctions (p. 47), the refutation of the Prābhākara view of Karyatā-jñāna, as the pivot of activity, Apūrva, the physical existence of the gods (p. 76), Śaktivāda, Samāsa-śakti, the import of the Negative, (126-28) etc., are some of the topics raised and discussed in the course of the work. Besides Gaṅgeśa,¹ the author refers also to the views of Śīromaṇi (i.e. Raghunātha),² and Rucidatta.³ In this sense, Satyanātha's work makes a distinctive contribution to the advancement of studies in Navya-Nyāya and its assessment by the Dvaita thinkers.

(11) VIJAYAMĀLĀ^(m)

This (Mys. O. L. C-2042) is a short tract in 350 granthas, reviewing a number of disconnected topics of general and special interest. Barring a few like प्रमाणलक्षण, श्येनाग्नीषोमीयवैषम्यभंगः, तार्किकोक्तविध्यर्थपरीक्षा, the rest are adverse comments on certain doctrines and dogmas of the Dvaita system and on certain passages in the *B. S. B.*, *M. Kh. t.*, *Mbh. T. N.* and *Nym.* The author merely indicates certain minor textual objections

1. i, 27; 103; ii, 37; iii, 2; 9; 80.

2. ii, 54; 63; 103; iii, 130.

3. iii, 3.

and difficulties that could be raised against these texts as interpreted by the Siddhāntin, without answering them in his work. His only object in composing such a work seems to be to confront those followers of Madhva that pride themselves on having mastered the different texts, with such knotty points and annoy and discomfit them and humble their pride.¹ It has thus no great inherent value.

1. Cf. यः कश्चिन्मध्वशास्त्राभिज्ञत्वाभिमानः स चेन्मानखण्डनयोग्यः * * यः कश्चित् व्यास-
राजनिर्मितग्रन्थेष्वहं चतुर इत्यहंकारं कुर्यात् स चेन्मानखण्डनयोग्यः तदा वक्तव्यः etc. ।
मायावादखण्डनटीकायां 'नहि ब्रह्मात्मैक्यस्य याथार्थ्यं तत्पक्षे' इति मूलमवतारितम् । तच्चायुक्तम् ।
* * * * * ॥

GAUḌA PŪRṆĀNANDA CAKRAVARTIN
(circa 17th cent.)

PŪRṆĀNANDA CAKRAVARTĪ was a native of Bengal (Gauḍa).¹ Nothing is known about his date or life. He describes himself as a disciple of Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa.² He may, without difficulty, be placed in the 17th century or even later, when the influence of Mādhva philosophy was strongest in Bengal.

His most famous work is the *Tattvamuktāvali*, otherwise known as *Māyāvāda-Śatadūṣaṇi*,—a metrical work in 120 beautifully turned out verses, vigorously attacking the cherished views of Advaita. It is quoted by Śrīnivāsa Sūrī, in his commentary on the *Bhāgavata* (X, 87, 31).³ It was edited and translated by Cowell in the *J. R. A. S.* (New Series) XV, pp. 137-173 of 1883.

The *Tattvamuktāvali* is a very elegant performance, almost *unique in the history of Dvaita Literature*. There are, of course, some earlier works of this nature, such as the *Nyāyaratnāvali* of Vādirāja (which is a more erudite work). The burden of the song in the work is that the identity of Jīva and Brahman, claimed by Monists is a metaphysical impossibility. It is fraught with serious and terrible consequences on the moral and religious life of man (verses 88, 89, 91-94). Pūrṇānanda pleads that “Aham Brahmāsmi”, should be interpreted only figuratively :

अग्नि माणवकं वदन्ति कवयः पूर्णेन्दुबिम्बं मुखं

नीलेन्दोवरमीक्षणं कुचतटीं मेहं करं पल्लवम् ॥

He draws a graphic picture *a la* Vādirāja, of the limitations of man and the infinitude of God and queries with mystic naivete how two beings so widely different in essence could ever be equated with each other (12-17). He observes that there are insurmountable difficulties in the way of a monistic interpretation of *Tat tvam asi* text, as Brahman, in the Advaitavedānta, is avowedly beyond the sphere of utterance and no *lakṣaṇā* can operate in such a case (20-22). He, therefore, thinks that texts like *Aham Brahmāsmi* should be viewed as having been prescribed for purposes of Upāsana (ver. 65) and that *Tat tvam asi* should be interpreted as implying the elision of the genitive case termination : Thou art His (Servant). In the illustration of the several fruit-juices, there is no case for the disappearance of individuality; for, the very fact that the essence resulting from their mixture is able to cure one's bodily disorders arising from the disturbance of the humours is proof of their persistence in honey (81-83). The two other works attributed to him by Aufrecht (p. 344) are *not* his.

1. He is called “Gauḍa” Pūrṇānanda in the colophon to his work.

2. Verse 117 of *Tattvamuktāvali*.

3. Bṛndāvan Edn. p. 1105,

Non-Polemical Literature

CHAPTER XXXVI

MAJOR COMMENTATORS

1. VIDYĀDHIRĀJA TĪRTHA (1388-1412)*

VIDYĀDHIRĀJA was the immediate disciple and successor of Jayatīrtha on the Pīṭha. The *S. K.* gives his former name as Kṛṣṇabhaṭṭa. But the *Gurucaryā* gives it as Nṛsiṃha Śāstri and informs us that he belonged to the “Baḍaganāḍu Karnāṭaka”¹ group of S. India and was admitted to the fourth order, directly, from Brahmacyāśrama and that he was very learned in the Śāstras :

गुरुर्बडगनाडाख्यकर्नाटं शास्त्रकोविदम् ।

नृसिंहशास्त्रिणं ब्रह्मचर्यश्रमगतं पुनः ।

सन्यस्य * * * *

He is assigned a ‘rule’ of sixty-four years in the Mutt lists,² which does not seem to be justifiable and could not be accepted, without upsetting the otherwise settled chronology of his later successors. We have seen that these Mutt lists have pushed back the date of Madhva by two cycles to adjust which they have been obliged to assign over sixty years ‘rule’ to one or two Pontiffs to fill the gap that would otherwise result between the earlier and later Pontiffs. The Mutt lists are reliable only as regards the cyclic year of demise or succession of Pontiffs; though even there, there is room for doubt in a few cases (as of Vyāsatīrtha, Brahmaṇya and Vidyādhirāja, Vāgīśa, Rāmacandra, etc). The cyclic year of Vidyādhirāja’s demise is given as *Āṅgīrasa* which would correspond to 1392. But it is not possible to hold that he ‘ruled’ only for four years; though both the *Gurucaryā*³ and the *Gurucarita*⁴ and following them both, Mr. M. V. Shingre, assign him only a rule of *three years, nine months and thirteen days*. The *Caramaśloka* of the Mutts is silent about the number of years of his ‘rule’. But his career of ceaseless disputation with Advaitins is specially mentioned⁵ and he is the author of at least three learned works. His literary and other activities must, therefore, have taken more of his time than barely three or four years

1. See under Ch. XVII, p. 195, f.n. 1.

2. Consistent with the old date of 1040 Śaka for Madhva’s birth, which is faithfully adopted by the *S. K.*

3. त्रयोदशाहसंयुक्तं नवमासाधिकं पुनः ।

वर्षत्रयमितं कालं मूलराममपूजयत् ॥ (iii)

4. p. 110.

5. माद्यदद्वैत्यन्धकारप्रद्योतनमहर्निशम् ।

विद्याधिराजं सुगुरुं ध्यायामि कर्षणाकरम् ॥ (*Caramaśloka*)

as Pontiff. The *Gurucaryā* also refers to his having ordained his *first disciple* Rājendra Tīrtha “after many years (बहुतिथे काले)”. Taking all these points into consideration, it seems reasonable to assign him at least some twenty-four years of Pontifical rule. He might have been about forty at the time of his ordination by Jayatīrtha, which took place, according to the *Gurucaryā*, one year before Jayatīrtha’s demise. I have therefore thought it fit to revise his Pontifical date as 1388-1412 A.D.

The period of Vidyādhirāja is important for the *first bifurcation of Mutts* that occurred in his time. Tradition explains that he had first ordained Rājendra Tīrtha in *Hevilambi*. Subsequently, when he got seriously ill and sent word to Rājendra, he did not return from his tours in time and so he was obliged to ordain another disciple—Kavīndra. It is not possible to ascertain now what precisely was the reason for the second ordination. The reason of the disciple’s absence during the Guru’s illness given for the bifurcation is *not convincing*. An interim arrangement could well have been made, even as reported during the second bifurcation, similarly, under Rāmacandra T. The true reason was probably to satisfy growing regional needs and expectations. The branches resulting therefrom have come to stay and have contributed much to the development and glory of Dvaita literature and philosophy. The first line of Rājendra Tīrtha is now represented by the Maṭha of Vyāsātīrtha at Sosale. The second disciple ordained by Vidyādhirāja, was the common ancestor of what now go by the names of the Rāghavendra Svāmi and Uttarādi Mutts, which are believed to have separated, under similar circumstances, at the time of Rāmacandra Tīrtha, the second in succession from Kavīndra. The seniority of Rājendra to Kavīndra is an established and *accepted fact*.¹ The wording in the *Caramaśloka*, pertaining to Kavīndra,² (current in the two Mutts descended from him) tending to upset this historical fact, is unfortunate and *unreliable* as has already been made clear.³ Vidyādhirāja died at Ergoḷa,⁴ where his mortal remains lie entombed. There are at present only two tombs of Rāmacandra T. and Vidyānidhi on the embankment of a lake at Ergoḷa. However, during my visit to the place which is some four miles from Nālvār (on the Wadi-Raichur section) on 28-2-1975 I found that the old town of Ergoḷa was situated within the old fort now in ruins. The tombs of Vidyādhirāja (Rājendra and some others) may have been in the old town now in ruins.

WORKS

The *S. K.* throws no light on the literary activities of Vidyādhirāja. But they are alluded to by Raghūttama Tīrtha in introductory verse no. 6 of

1. See *S. K.* edn. 1931, p. 32 and *Pūrṇabodhakathākalpataru*, vii. and *Gurucaryā*.
2. वीन्द्रारूपदासक्तं राजेन्द्रमुनिसेवितम् ।
श्रीकवीन्द्रमुनिं वन्दे भजतां चंद्रसन्निभम् ॥
3. See Ch. XVII, p. 195.
4. Near Malkhed.

his c. on *Nyāyavivaraṇa* :

मध्वोक्तिद्युनदीजयार्यशुभवाक्सूर्यात्मजासंगमे
व्याख्यास्तानमहो विधाय नृहरेः प्राप्य प्रसादं परम् ।
प्रापुर्मे कृतकृत्यतां गतमला विद्याधिराजादयो
* * * *

We gather from other sources that he wrote some three works, two of which are preserved in mss. The third is known only through what appears to be a reference to it. (1) *Chāndogya-Bhāṣya-Tīkā* is known to us through the following allusion in Śrīnivāsa Ācārya's c. on *Taittiriya-Upaniṣad-Bhāṣya* :

विद्याधिराजादिमुनीस्तथा वेदेशयोगिनः ।
छान्दोग्यभाष्यसट्टीकाकतृन्वन्दे निरन्तरम् ॥

It is possible, however, that the term "छान्दोग्यभाष्यसट्टीकाकतृन्" refers *only* to Vedeśa (in view of the term *ādi* attached to Vidyādhirāja), in which case, no c. on the *Chāndogya-Bhāṣya* need be admitted for him. But the G. V. L. Cat. alludes to such a work by him. (2) *Gitā-Vivṛti* is however attested by two mss. preserved in the Mysore O.L. (C-1343 Devanagari and 2982 Nagari). The former, examined by me, is in a decaying condition and is rather badly damaged. It is indifferently styled a *Tīkā* and a *Vivṛti*. The author adheres closely to the *G. B.* of Madhva; but while the latter passes over all those verses which are philosophically unimportant, Vidyādhirāja generally supplies a brief comment to the less important verses too. He has incorporated the additional explanations of *Gitā* verses, found in Madhva's *G. T.* also. But for his own distinctive style and manner of treatment, this c. is little more than a *rechauffe* of the *G. B.* of Madhva (Cf. Vidyādhirāja and Madhva on *G. B.* and *G. T.* ii. 45). His style bears a strong family resemblance to that of Jayatīrtha, in simplicity and directness : ज्ञानिनो मोक्षनियमः । तथापि शुभकर्मणा आनन्दवृद्धिश्च । किंच, कुतः कर्म न कर्तव्यम् ? कर्माकरणस्यैव मोक्षसाधनत्वादिति चेत् । तत्किं मोक्षो नैष्कर्म्यशब्दवाच्य इत्येवमुच्यते ? उत कर्माकरणे कर्ममूलः संसारो न भवतीति । अत्र दूषयति—न कर्मणाम् इति (iii, 4). This c. is mentioned by Dasgupta in his *History of Indian Philosophy* (ii, 443). (3) *Viṣṇu-Sahasranāma-Bhāṣya*^(m). A well-written Devanagari ms. of this is to be found in the Mysore O. L. (C-137) running to nearly 1650 granthas. The author's name is given at the end :

एवं विद्याधिराजेन प्रीत्यै माधवमध्वयोः ।
विष्णुनामसहस्रस्य निरुक्तिः संप्रकीर्तिता ॥

Its importance rests on two considerations (1) that the *Viṣṇusahasranāma* is held in very high esteem by Madhva¹ and (2) that Vidyādhirāja happens to be the earliest Dvaita commentator on it. There are other cc. by subsequent Dvaita writers on it, but they cannot be said to come up to its level in range or completeness. It most probably represents a sort of Dualistic reaction against Advaitic commentaries in the field, the earliest known of which is the one attributed to Śaṅkara, which some scholars are inclined to attribute to a later writer, probably of the 13th century or later.

1. तच्चोक्तं—भारतं सर्वशास्त्रेषु भारते गीतिका वरा ।

विष्णोर्नामसहस्रं च ज्ञेयं पाठ्यं च तद्द्वयम् ॥ (*G. B.* introd.).

The c. opens with an invocation to Viṣṇu, Vyāsa and Madhva, Sarasvatī and the preceptors of the author. The efficacy of the thousand names of the Lord is emphasised with the help of a quotation from the *G. T.* : शास्त्रेषु भारतं सारं तत्र नामसहस्रकम् । The author repeats the well-known observation of Madhva that each of the thousand names is capable of a hundred explanations :

तत्प्रसादाद्यथाशक्तिं शतार्थस्य निरन्तरम् ।

विष्णुनामसहस्रस्य निरुक्तिः संप्रकाशयते ॥

He does not, however, presume to give all of them for each or even a few of them. He contents himself with indicating as many explanations as can conveniently be attempted by him or digested by the readers, at a time. His venture is merely illustrative, not exhaustive. He leaves it to the ingenuity of the learned to work out for themselves more explanations on the same lines : दिङ्मात्रप्रतिपत्तये कानिचिन्निर्वचनान्युक्तानि । विद्वद्वैरन्यान्यप्युहितुं शक्तानीति ग्रन्थगौरव-भयान्न लिख्यन्ते ॥

He has given only the necessary etymological explanations, leaving out all learned and abstruse applications of rules of grammar and etymology involved in the process: एवं निर्वचनमात्रमत्र क्रियते । प्रकृतिप्रत्ययावशेषस्तु प्रसिद्धव्याकरणेभ्यो-ज्वगन्तव्यः ॥

Quotations are made from the AV, the Śrutis cited by Madhva, the *Ekāk-ṣara-Nighaṇṭu*, *G. B.*, *Brahmatarka* and *Mbh. T. N.* A noteworthy feature of this c. is that it brings together a variety of explanations of epithets of the Lord lying scattered in the works of Madhva. Nearly a dozen derivations of the first holy name “Viśvam” are given. The c. is a very attractive one on the whole and deserves publication.

2. VYĀSA TĪRTHA (C. 1370-1400)*¹

(i) This Vyāsa Tīrtha ought to be distinguished from his name-sake and successor who flourished in the heydays of the Vijayanagar period. Aufrecht,² P. P. S. Sastri,³ Vāsudeva Shastri Abhyankar⁴ and others,⁵ have confounded the two Vyāsa Tīrthas and ascribed to the latter, works really written by the former. Aufrecht is again wrong (i, p. 619) in making Vyāsa Tīrtha, “the founder of the Vyāsarāya-Maṭha”,—a Guru of Vedeśa Bhikṣu.⁶ It would be well therefore to adopt for the later Vyāsatīrtha, the name of Vyāsarāya, as I have done, with its variants Vyāsarāja and Vyāsa Yati, by which he is more widely known in Mādhva circles.

1. The *S. K.* places him about 1220 Śaka, which is inadmissible.

2. *Catal. Cat.* i, p. 619.

3. *T. P. L. Cat.* XIV, p. 6225.

4. *Edn. Sarvadarśanasamgraha*, Bby., p. 517.

5. *Madras Uni. His. Ser.* XI, p. 424.

6. This confusion is common to P. P. S. Sastri also (*T. P. L. XIV*, introd. p. xvii). Vedeśa's real Guru was Vedavyāsa Tīrtha, of the Uttarādi Mutt.

The earlier Vyāsa Tīrtha was avowedly a direct disciple of Jayatīrtha.¹ He was not a Pontiff of any Mutt and was what is called in Kannada a “Biḍi-Sanyāsi” (stray disciple).

(ii) Vyāsa Tīrtha appears to have contributed glosses to eight out of the ten Upaniṣads commented upon by Madhva, leaving out the *Īśa* and *Praśna*, commented upon by Jayatīrtha. A c. on the *Mbh. T. N.* and two Lives of Jayatīrtha, one bigger and the other a short one, are all the works written by him. The ascription of such polemical works as the *Candrikā* and *Nym.* to him, by Aufrecht and others, has to be rejected, even on grounds of style. His cc. on the Upaniṣads are mentioned by Raghūttama,² and quotations from them occur in the *Bhāṣyadīpikā* of Jagannātha.³

(1) *Aitareya-Upaniṣad-Bhāṣya-Vyākhyā*.^{*} No ms. of this c. has been found. The only textual allusion to it is to be found in an introductory verse in the gloss of a late and more or less unknown commentator Kṛṣṇācārya, of which a ms. exists in the T. P. L. (iii, 1592) :

महैतरेयखण्डार्थो व्यासतीर्थादिभिर्लेख्यः ।

संगृहीतः स एवार्थो विस्तराल्लिख्यते मया ॥

(2) His c. on the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Bhāṣya*^(m) is a voluminous one running to 3500 granthas. Mss. of it are preserved in the Baroda O. L. (AC 3914), Mysore (C-948) and Tanjore (iii, 1650). It is quoted by Jagannātha Tīrtha and mentioned by Raghūttama at the beginning of his gloss. (3) His *Taittiriya-Bhāṣya-Vyākhyā*^(p),⁴ is a short and crisp one in 400 granthas. His (4) *Chāndogya-Bhāṣya-Vyākhyā*^(m) is available in mss. both at Mysore and Tanjore (1618) complete in eight Adhyāyas, in 2500 granthas. It is quoted on p. 428 of the *Bhāṣyadīpikā*. (5) The *Kena* or *Talavakāropaniṣad-Bhāṣya-Vyākhyā*, was published in 1905. It is also quoted in the *Bhāṣyadīpikā*. That on *Muṇḍaka*^(p) runs to 350 granthas and the one on *Māṇḍūkya*^(p) to 360. The Bhāṣyārtha and the Khaṇḍārtha for the original are concurrently given. (9) A ms. of his c. on *Mbh. T. N.* is reported from Mysore (5063). His (10) *Jayatīrtha-Vijaya*⁵ is a metrical life of Jayatīrtha in 5 cantos, of various metres. The first two are taken up with the doings of Madhva and his four disciples, notably Narahari (ver. 4-28) and Akṣobhya (31-68). The latter's encounter with Vidyāraṇya (ver. 43) and the arbitration of Vedānta Deśika (64) are referred to. The iii canto closes with the early life and marriage of Jayatīrtha whose (former) name is given as “Dhoṇḍu” (ver. 5). The iv sketches his meeting with Akṣobhya and the last with his conversion or ordination. No account is given of the Pontifical activities of Jayatīrtha, except his devotion to

1. See colophon to *Aṇu-Jayatīrtha Vijaya* (Madras R. No. 1447-a). Vedeśa also refers to him as जयराजनिषेवकान् (*Chān. Up. Com.*). That this refers to the earlier Vyāsa Tīrtha, is clear from the subsequent reference to the author of the *Nym.* and *Candrikā*.

2. येन वेदान्तभाष्याणि व्याख्यातानि महात्मना ।

तं वन्दे व्यासतीर्थार्यं वेदान्तार्थप्रसिद्धये ॥

3. ii, 1, 18; p. 268 etc.

4. Published by T. R. Krishnacharya, Kumbakonam.

5. Jayālaya Press, Mysore.

Sarasvatī (v. 8-11). This work is clearly different from a similar work of Chalāri Saṁkarṣaṇa, as is clear from the difference in contents. The latter places the meeting of Akṣobhya with Jayatīrtha in canto iii, whereas in the present work it is given in iv. Saṁkarṣaṇa's work gives an account of the Pontifical activities of Jayatīrtha (ch. V) which is not done here. (11) The *Aṇu-Jayatīrtha-Vijaya*^(p) attributed to Vyāsa is a shorter metrical life of Jayatīrtha in 34 Sragdharā verses. Some legendary details are given about Jayatīrtha. Here too, he is represented as an incarnation of Indra and to have been miraculously favoured by the Goddess Durgā (ver. 16). It contains nothing of historical value or worth and its artificial uninspired account makes it difficult to believe that it was really a work of a direct disciple of Jayatīrtha. It also refers to Jayatīrtha's meeting and disputation with another Advaitin monk Vādindra (ver. 20-22) who is otherwise unknown and enumerates the works of Jayatīrtha (18-19) and visits to Banaras, Prayāga (32) and ordination of Vidyādhirāja (33). But certain defects of diction as in verses 5 and 6 and the reference to the "Gurus" from whom the author has received his information about the exploits of Jayatīrtha (ver. 34) make it doubtful if it could really be regarded as an authentic work of Vyāsa Tīrtha.

(iii) Vyāsa Tīrtha is the earliest Mādhva glossator on the Upaniṣads. He may, in a sense, be even said to be the first *regular* commentator of his school, on the Upaniṣads; for, the ten Upaniṣad Bhāṣyas of Madhva, were but partial commentaries on the originals. They did not give any word for word meaning of the passages (Khaṇḍārtha) such as is to be found in the Bhāṣyas of Śaṁkara or others. Such commentaries from the Dvaita point of view were a desideratum and Vyāsa Tīrtha addressed himself to the task. He also commented on the Bhāṣyas of Madhva at the same time. The clarity of his explanations and simplicity of language are alike remarkable. His commentaries have naturally been adopted as models of authentic exposition, by other subsequent commentators following him, such as Vedeśa, Viśveśvara, and Rāghavendra, who have written their Khaṇḍārthas on these lines and are much indebted to him.

3. VIJAYADHVAJA TĪRTHA (c. 1410-50)

From the genealogical tables of the Pejāvar Mutt of Uḍipi, given on p. 204, col. 2, it will be seen that Vijayadhvaaja Tīrtha was the seventh Pontifical successor of Madhva, on the Pīṭha of his Mutt. The story in the *Sat Kathā*, that he was a disciple of Jayatīrtha, seems to be due merely to a confusion between the names of Jaya-Tīrtha and Vijaya-Tīrtha, the grand-preceptor (परमगुरु) of Vijayadhvaaja. Both as the seventh successor of Madhva and as belonging to an order of Bālasanyāsins, Vijayadhvaaja must have undoubtedly come *after* Jayatīrtha, who was fifth in succession from Madhva, in a different line.

The stone inscription in the Durga temple at Chitrapur (Sūratkal) purporting to show that it was erected by Vijayadhvaaja in 1336 A.D. does not seem to be genuine, as it reduces the interval between the date of

departure of M. and the date of this inscription of his seventh successor to 19 years which is untenable. The Pejāvar Mutt lists again place Vijayadhva's demise in Parābhava (1427). The interval between the Chitrapur inscription and this date is 91 years which in its turn would necessitate our assigning a life of more than a hundred years to Vijayadhva which is not supported by other sources.

On the basis of a grant to Vidyā(dhi)rāja Tīrtha of the Kṛṣṇāpur Mutt of Uḍipi, in the reign of Harihara II (1377-1402) and a gift of land to the same Svāmi¹ in the year 1409 A.D. by Devarāya Mahārāya (1406-18), we may be permitted to work out an *average* of nearly fifteen years rule for each Pontiff, in which case, Vijayadhva would naturally fall between c. 1415 and 1440 A.D. He could not, therefore, have flourished "about the same time" as Vyāsātīrtha, as airily remarked by a writer on p. 313 of *Vij. Sex. Cent. Com. Vol.* This calculation has also the support of other dated inscriptions from Uḍipi relating to the Monks of the Kāṇur² and Sode³ Mutts.

The story in the *Sat Kathā* (edn. 1896, p. 23) about the alleged ostracism of Vijayadhva by Raghunātha Tīrtha of Uttarādi Mutt, Śrīpadarāja and Vyāsātīrtha, for the sin of having crossed the sea in a vessel, to visit Dvārakā and of his having been commissioned to write a commentary on *Bhāgavata* as an atonement for it, by these three Pontiffs, is a *malicious and stupid invention* inasmuch as Vijayadhva was at least half a century earlier than the Pontiffs mentioned. His commentary on the *Bhāgavata*, is a labour of love and spontaneous devotion. Nothing is, however, known about his early life and career. He was an indefatigable writer and a sincere soul. His mortal remains lie at Kaṇvatīrtha near Mañjeshwar, ten miles south of Mangalore.

WORKS

Vijayadhva is best known to the followers of Madhva by his *voluminous commentary on the Bhāgavata Purāṇa*, called *Padaratnāvali*. It was printed at Belgaum in 1892 and is one of the representative commentaries included in the Variorum Edn., of the Purāṇa, published from Brindavan, in 1905.

The *Padaratnāvali* is the *earliest, complete and standard* c. of the Dvaita school on the *Bhāgavata*. There have been many subsequent cc. on the *Bhāgavata* by writers of the same school, like Yadupati, Satyadharma, etc.; but none of them has come up to the level of Vijayadhva's epoch-making

1. See *Madras Insc.* ii, p. 871, nos. 236 and 241. The Svāmi was the seventh Pontiff of the Mutt.

2. *Madras Insc.* no. 113 of 1901 mentions a grant made in 1614 to Vidyādhiśa and Vibudheśa Tīrthas of Kāṇur Mutt, the fifteenth and sixteenth Svāmis of the Mutt. This Vidyādhiśa ought not to be confused with his namesake in the Uttarādi Mutt, as has been done by Prof. V. Rangacharya.

3. Vide inscriptions relating to Vādirāja and his pupil, in my *Date of Vādirāja*, ABORI, xviii. 2, pp. 195-96.

commentary, in stylistic grandeur, expository brilliance and comprehensive grasp of subject-matter or erudition. *It is as luminous as it is voluminous*, running to over 35,000 granthas. It is *one of the distinguished contributions of the Uḍipi Mutts to the output of Dvaita Literature*. The text of Vijayadhvaṣa shows important variations from the readings known to Jayatīrtha, of passages quoted in the works of Madhva.¹

The *Padaratnāvalī*, is a word for word c. on the entire Bhāgavata unlike the *B. T.* of Madhva, which is just a partial comment on some of the crucial verses or parts of verses of the Purāṇa. Vijayadhvaṣa is, indeed, very much indebted to the *B. T.* in the writing of his c. as can be seen from the numerous and extensive quotations and extracts he gives from it. It appears further, from one of his introductory verses, that he had before him, another c. on the Purāṇa, written by his own Paramaguru Vijaya Tīrtha² :

आनन्दतीर्थविजयतीर्थौ प्रणम्य मस्करिवरवन्द्यौ ।

तयोः कृतिमुपजीव्य प्रवक्षि भागवतं पुराणम् ॥ (Verse 11)

Vijayadhvaṣa's object in writing his c. seems to have been to supplement the *B. T.* of Madhva and *defend* it, where necessary, against contemporary criticisms. (See his remarks under iii, 10, 9; 40; X, 75, 52; 10; 12; 72; XI, 13, 7.) Both Madhva and Vijayadhvaṣa are found to criticize certain powerfully established Advaitic interpretations of the Purāṇa. The former's references and criticisms, being, as usual, very brief and enigmatic, in the absence of a good commentary, Vijayadhvaṣa has ably supplied this want : i, 2, 12; 22, 24; i, 3, 3; 34; iv, 22, 40; vi, 9, 28; vii, 3, 34; vii, 9, 10; xi, 7, 51; xi, 21, 43; iv, 29, 10; iv, 33, 16; iii, 5, 10; xi, 10, 3; xi, 15, 6; xi, 12, 20; iv, 24, 29 and vi, 4, 27. Besides making clear the nature and drift of Madhva's criticisms of these Advaitic interpretations, he has many independent criticisms to offer against Advaitic commentators on the Purāṇa : i, 1, 1; i, 2, 2; i, 9, 49; vi, 15, 7; vii, 3, 34; i, 3, 32; i, 5, 10; i, 7, 37; i, 9, 49. He gives copious extracts from certain of these cc. but in the present state of our knowledge, it is not possible to fix the identity of the commentator or commentators, censured by him. It would be time to say when the earlier cc. of Citsukha and Puṇyāranya come to be published and studied closely, if the views embodied in them tally with those censured by Vijayadhvaṣa. There is no truth in the statement made by S. K. Venkataramanacharya in the P. B. Desai Com. Vol. Dharwar 1971 in his article on Vijayadhvaṣa that he quotes Citsukha under Bhāg. iv. 14, 35. There is no quotation from Citsukha's c. on Bhāg. as such; but only a mention of Citsukha and Padmapāda as Advaitic authors. As for Śrīdhara's commentary, there *are* a couple of indications that Vijayadhvaṣa *was* acquainted with it : Cf. the two on ज्ञान and विज्ञान in ii, 9, 31. It must, however, be added that there are more than fifteen places in the *Padaratnāvalī*

1. For instance, in XI, 21, 43, Vij. reads "लोके" which he interprets as विद्वज्जनमध्ये but Jayatīrtha in his TP on i, 1, 4 has "साक्षात्". The interpretations too are at times different Cf. J. on G. B. ii, 24 and Vij. on Bhāg. ii, 7, 42 and iii, 5, 39.

2. Possibly Vijaya Tīrtha's c. was on the *B. T.*

where Advaitic interpretations of verses are quoted and severely criticised. But only in two or three stray cases do these quotations agree even remotely with Śrīdhara's interpretations of those verses. In most cases, he differs fundamentally in spirit¹ and letter,² from the Advaitic interpretations referred to by Vijayadhvaṇa. Where he agrees with them, the occasions are of trivial account, having no textual or metaphysical significance in themselves,—agreements so to say, of an ordinary and inevitable kind : iii, 1, 23; iii, 5, 10; i, 2, 3; i, 10, 4; vi, 9, 28; vii, 9, 10; i, 3, 8; ii, 2, 16. On more vital occasions, he is frankly dualistic in his interpretations, even where a monistic one could be thought of (i, 18, 14; vii, 3, 34). He is even anti-monistic³ at times : XI, 12, 20; admits the reality of "श्रीविग्रह" and the continuation of Bhakti in Mokṣa. With all that, Śrīdhara, was a staunch Advaitin (i, 5, 20) and there is much more than a casual agreement between his interpretation of vii, 9, 10 and its criticism at the hands of Vijayadhvaṇa. The latter refers to two different explanations of the term "द्विषद्गुण" here, the first of which is to be found in Śrīdhara's ṭikā. In ii, 2, 16, there is a marked resemblance in wording and interpretation between Śrīdhara and the Advaitic view criticised by Vijayadhvaṇa. At the same time, there is nothing to show that Śrīdhara himself could not, in these cases, have gone back to the earlier commentators of his own school. The *Gauragaṇoddeśadīpikā* of Kavikarṇapūra, makes Viṣṇu Purī a disciple of Jayadhvaṇa *alias* Jayadharma Tīrtha (1434-48).^{*} Since Viṣṇu Purī quotes Śrīdhara,⁴ we may take the latter to have been a contemporary of Jayadhvaṇa himself. And since Jayadhvaṇa himself is not far removed from Vijayadhvaṇa, it may be assumed that Śrīdhara Svāmin was more or less a contemporary of Vijayadhvaṇa.

Following strictly in the footsteps of Madhva, Vijayadhvaṇa does, on occasions, give additional interpretations of verses, not given by him, which he nevertheless believes could be brought within the range of his master's explanations : i, 1, 3 : अत्र पिबतिर्भक्षणार्थः । अनेकार्थत्वाद्वातूनाम् । न चायमर्थ आचार्योक्तार्थो नेत्यश्रद्धेयम् * * * * ॥

We have *two valuable references* in Vijayadhvaṇa under iv, 22, 31-34 and xi, 15, 6, to the commentary of a certain Śuka-Tīrtha.⁵ *But we know*

1. i, 1, 4; ii, 9, 15; ii, 8, 14.

2. ii, 8, 14; iv, 29, 20 where the reading "व्यवच्छिद्यते" is unknown to Śrīdhara; iv, 33, 16; i, 2, 12; 22; 24; i, 3, 3; 34; i, 5, 10; i, 7, 37; vi, 4, 27; vi, 15, 7; vii, 3, 34; xi, 3, 34; xi, 12, 20.

3. जीवयतीति जीवः परमात्मा cf. with this Madhva : 'जीव इति भगवतोऽनिरुद्धस्याख्या' (VTN) and जीवयति जीवं करोतीति जीवः । न तु स्वयं जीवः (*Caitanyacandrodaya*. Bib. Ind. p. 156 and Śrīdhara on *Bhāg.* xi, 24, 27; iii, 35, 31; iii, 9, 3; i, 1, 3 and आत्मारामाश्च मुनयः (i, 7, 10) etc.

4. अत्र श्रीधरसत्तमोक्तिलिखने न्यूनाधिकं यद्भवेत् * * * *
(*Bhaktiratnāvali*, Ind. Office Cat. VI, 2535, p. 1272, col. 2.)

5. इति समाख्यास्मृतिसद्भावात् अयमेवार्थो न शुकतीर्थद्विक्ता अर्था ग्राह्याः ।

nothing about this commentator from any other source.¹ His title "Tīrtha" however suggests a Sannyāsin of the Ekadaṇḍī order, though not necessarily a Mādhva ascetic. He was probably an Advaitin.

OTHER WORKS

Tradition ascribes to Vijayadhvaja a c. also on the *B. T.* though no ms. of any such work has been brought to light. It seems unlikely also that he would have troubled to write a c. on the *B. T.* when he had already dealt with its original elaborately and quoted copiously from it. Most probably it was Vijaya Tīrtha, who had commented on the *B.T.* Among other works of his are (2) a c. on the *Yamakabhārata*² (3) *Daśāvatāra-Harigāthā-Stotra* (p)³, in praise of Avatāras of Viṣṇu and set to music and a *Kṛṣṇāṣṭakam*.

4. BRAHMAṆYA TĪRTHA (C. 1460-76)*

Brahmaṇya Tīrtha was third in descent from Rājendra, in the senior line of disciples descended from Vidyādhiraṇḍa. The Mutt lists give his date of demise as 1467 A.D. This was accepted by B. Venkobarao, in his introduction to the *Vy-carita*. It is however open to many objections. In the first place, it gives his disciple Vyāsātīrtha a Pontifical sway of over 70 years, which is too long. It also bestows on the latter a life of over 90 years which is not corroborated by other evidences. Venkobarao himself refers (pp. cxiv-cxv) to a tradition according to which Brahmaṇya died soon after a great famine. On page 100 of his *Forgotten Empire*, Sewell says that "about the 1475, there was a terrible famine in the Deccan and in the country of the Telugus, which lasted for two years."⁴ Venkobarao himself refers to *two* such famines which broke out in the years 1423-25 and 1472-74.⁵ The second one, it will be seen, synchronizes with the date mentioned by Sewell. It is manifestly impossible that Brahmaṇya could have died in the first famine. The date is too early for him. We have therefore to assume that it was after the famine of 1475-76, that he died. The event, thus, cannot be placed earlier than 1476.

It was to the blessings of Brahmaṇya Tīrtha that the parents of Vyāsātīrtha (his disciple) owed the birth of their children,—notably of Vyāsātīrtha himself. He lived mostly at Cannapatna or Abbūr (in Karnataka State) which is mentioned in the *Vy-carita*⁶ as his permanent residence. There he had a Mutt of his own, which was entrusted to his disciple (probably senior) Śrīdhara Tīrtha.⁷ His other disciple was the famous Vyāsātīrtha.

1. Jivagosvāmin, in his *Ṣaṣṭandarbhā* mentions Śukahr̥daya among a dozen standard commentaries on the Bhāg. It is doubtful however if its author was really the Śukātīrtha mentioned by Vijayadhvaja. Jiva professes great respect for Vijayadhvaja :

दक्षिणादिदेशविख्यातविजयध्वज * * वेदवेदार्थविद्वद्भिराणाम् * * (pp. 21-22).

2. M. M. Sangha List.

3. Published from Uḍipi along with the *Caturdaśastotra* of the same author.

4. Also *Ferishta*, C. Scott edn. i, 162, S. I. I, p. 227.

5. *Dharwar Gazetteer*, pp. 404-06.

6. p. 26 (Text).

7. This Mutt, which survives to this day, is variously known as the Kundāpūr Mutt, Abbūr or Cannapatna Mutt and so on. It has no direct connection with Vyāsātīrtha

Only one work is traditionally ascribed to Brahmanya and that is a gloss on the TP of Jayatīrtha. No ms. of it has, however, come down; nor has it been mentioned by his disciple Vyāsātīrtha, in his celebrated c. on the TP. The ascription does not, therefore, seem to be well-founded.

5. ŚRĪPĀDARĀJA ALIAS LAKṢMĪNĀRĀYAṆA TĪRTHA (C. 1420-87)

Lakṣmīnārāyaṇa Tīrtha, more widely known as Śrīpādarāja,¹ was Pontiff of the Mutt of Padmanābha Tīrtha at Mulbagal. He was the seventh in descent from Padmanābha and the disciple and successor of Svarnavarṇa Tīrtha, whose Br̥ndāvana, has been discovered at Śrīraṅgam. According to a tradition, recorded in the *Brahmanya Tīrtha Vijaya*,² the mothers of Brahmanya and Śrīpādarāja were uterine sisters. The cousins were probably of the same age. It is remarkable that both should have renounced the world and devoted themselves to the cause of their faith and played a conspicuous part in the spiritual development of their gifted disciple Vyāsātīrtha. Śrīpādarāja's demise may be placed definitely *after* 1457 in which year, we have a grant issued in the name of his Guru Svarnavarṇa Tīrtha, by Vijaya Venkaṭapati, son of Virūpākṣa (*Ep. Car.* IX, Mulbagal, 1).

Śrīpādarāja is further stated to have been a contemporary of Raghunātha Tīrtha of the Uttarādi Mutt, who came into power in 1444 and died in 1502. The *Śrīpādarājāṣṭakam* mentions their joint pilgrimage to Banaras.³ From the same source, we gather that the former wielded considerable influence over Sāluva Narasiṃha I and was specially honoured by him after his return from the Kalinga campaign (1476 A.D.).⁴ The fact also that it was at the instance of Śrīpādarāja that his disciple Vyāsātīrtha went to the court of Sāluva Narasiṃha at Candragiri⁵ in or about 1484-85, attests the position of influence which he wielded at the court of Candragiri. He must, therefore, have died some time after the departure of Vyāsātīrtha to Candragiri, about the year 1486-87.

though in recent years a claim has been brought forward on its behalf that it is also directly descended from Vyāsātīrtha and entitled to the appellation "Vyāsātīrtha Mutt", which is denied by the other Mutt at Sosale which claims and is universally acknowledged to be the lawful successor Mutt of Vyāsātīrtha. The Mysore High Court in its judgment on an Appeal in a civil suit on this question, No. 45 of 1937-38 dated 28-6-1940 has dismissed the claim of this Mutt to be the main Mutt of Vyāsātīrtha. There are misfits both in the genealogical Table and the epigraphs cited by the Kundāpūr Mutt. Nor do its Svamis appear to have made any contribution to Dvaita Literature. We shall, therefore, leave it out of further consideration here.

1. This title is said to have been conferred on him by Raghunātha Tīrtha of the Uttarādi Mutt. The variant "Śrīpādarāya" is commonly used in Kannaḍa.

2. तं व्यासतीयं विद्यार्थं स्वमातुर्भगिनीसुतम्
श्रीपादराजनामानं प्रापयत् गुरुपुंगवः ॥

(Quoted by Venkobarao p. lxxiii of his *Introd.* to *Vy-carita*.)

3. iii, 4 (S. M.)

4. p. 40 *Vy-carita* (text).

5. *Vide* p. 67.

The only work ascribed to him is a c. on the NS. called *Vāgvajra* or *Nyāyasudhohanyāsa-Vāgvajra*, (p) of which a Devanagari ms. is available in the Mys. O. L. (C-1560). It is a lucid and attractive commentary in 3500 granthas. The exposition is exhaustive¹ and the style graceful. The author has, in many places, incorporated passages wholesale,² from the original NS. In spite of its many attractive features, it has not made much headway, in traditional circles. Even doubts have been expressed in some quarters, touching its traditional ascription to Śrīpādarāja.

6. SOMANĀTHA KAVI (C. 1480-1540)

The memory of Somanātha, author of the sumptuous biography of Vyāsātīrtha, in Campū form, was first brought to the notice of the world by the late B. Venkobarao, in his article in the *Q. J. M. S.*, for 1924. The work itself was published two years later. It has been a first class literary and historical discovery. For, besides being a contemporary account of the life and doings of one of the foremost thinkers of S. India during the early 16th century, the *Vyāsayogicarita* commands the admiration of all true Sahṛdayas as a Campū Kāvya of great literary merit.³ As a historical work, its value is even *greater*. For, not only does it add to the literary glory of the Vijayanagar period in general and its ablest sovereign Kṛṣṇadevarāya in particular, but throws a new light on the extent of patronage accorded to the religion and philosophy of Madhvācārya and its exponents, by the Kings of the II and III Dynasties of Vijayanagar.

DATE

Somanātha says of himself that he was introduced to Vyāsātīrtha in the reign of Acyutarāya, by Nārāyaṇa Yati. This Nārāyaṇa Yati (of the Akṣobhya Tīrtha Maṭha, Kūḍli) figures in an inscription of Kṛṣṇadevarāya, dated 1527 A.D. It is clear, therefore, that both Nārāyaṇa Yati and his *protege* lived at least for some years into the reign of Acyuta. The *Vy-carita* was probably completed about 1535. It may safely be assumed that Somanātha flourished in the former half of the 16th century.

LIFE

As his name and those of his ancestors indicate, Somanātha was a Smārta Brahmin (i.e. a follower of Śaṅkara). His work and the spirit underlying it put one in mind of the c. of Appayya Dikṣita on the *Yādavābhyudaya* of Vedānta Deśika. It certainly is an outstanding proof of the winsome personality of Vyāsātīrtha, to have been able to secure so notable a biographer as Poet Somanātha, who did *not* belong to the Mādhva school.

Somanātha gives us sufficient information about his personal history. We learn that he hailed from the village of Govindatīrthapura, in the

1. *Vide* p. 67.

2. Cf. p. 69 (Mys. ms.) and *VTNt.* of Jayatīrtha.

3. Curiously enough, it has *not even been mentioned*, in the chapter on 'Literature and Art' in *Madras Uni. His. Ser. XI*, or even in the *Vij. Sex. Cent. Com. Vol.*

Tuṇḍīramaṇḍala, near Kāñcī (p. 84). Tradition and certain resemblances in style have led B. Venkobarao,¹ to believe that he was, on his mother's side, a nephew of Anantabhaṭṭa, the renowned author of the *Bhārata-Campū*.² His genealogy is :

1. Yajva Bhāskara
2. Devarāja Somapīthi
3. Bhaṭṭa Gayāmukti Bhāskara
4. (Father)
5. Somanātha

On his maternal side, he seems to have been connected with a certain Kālamēghādhvarī.³ His grandfather Gayāmukti Bhāskara was honoured by several sovereigns including Bukka and Harihara II.

Somanātha's work is divided into eight *ullāsas* (chapters) and contains a little over 1,000 granthas. It is written in the standard Campū style, full of puns, alliteration and other literary embellishments. The author has a perfect command of language and his expressions have all the naturalness of creative art. He does not strain after effect. He is an elegant writer commanding ease, felicity and rhythm.

He says in his Epilogue, that he had his work read out publicly in an open assembly of scholars presided over by Vyāsātīrtha, himself, by two good readers and had it duly approved. The salient points of the historical kernel of the biography have already been brought together under VYĀSATĪRTHA.

7. RAGHŪTTAMA TĪRTHA (1557-96)

Raghūttama is one of the honoured Saints of the Mādhva Calendar. Nothing is known about his parentage or early life, save that he was admitted to the Sannyāsāśrama directly from Brahmācārya (*Gurucaryā*, iv, 35). He was the nephew of Raghuvārya Tīrtha⁴ and succeeded his maternal uncle on the Pontificate of the Uttarādi Mutt in 1557-58, which he occupied, with remarkable distinction, for thirty-nine years, till his demise in the cyclic year of *Manmatha*. He was thus a close contemporary of Vijayīndra Tīrtha. He was a Kannaḍa-speaking Deśastha⁵ Brahmin of Uttara-

1. Introd. to *Vyāsayogicarita*, Bangalore Press, Bangalore, 1926.

2. The evidence on this point has been discussed by Venkobarao in the Introd. pp. xlv-xlviii. This identification, we find, has been accepted in the 'History and Culture of the Indian People', Vol. vi, p. 473. (Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan).

3. A poet Kālamēgha is said to "have been a *protege* of Sāluva Gopa Tippa, one of Devarāja's officers governing a part of the Tamil country. (*Madras Uni. His. Ser. xi*, p. 246.)

4. रघुवर्यसुतीर्थोऽपि स्वपूर्वाश्रमगस्वसुः ।

पुत्रं कर्नाटोत्तरादि आत्माधीतान्यशास्त्रकम् ।

सन्यस्य ब्रह्मचर्येण सुखसंवत्सरे गुरुः ।

पट्टाभिषिच्य संस्थाप्य रघूत्तमसमाह्वयम् ॥ (*Gurucaryā* IV, 35-36).

5. I use the term "Deśastha" in its true, original and only correct sense of an inhabitant of the "Desh" (region above and east of the Western Ghats, as distinguished from "Kōṇkan" (below the Ghats),—in which sense it is invariably used and understood in the

Karnataka¹ and very probably, a native of Maṇūr, on the Bhīmā river, in the Inḍi taluk of the Bijāpūr district.

Raghūttama is said to have studied for some years after his ordination, under a learned Pandit Varadarājācārya of Maṇūr. The Pandit's treatment of his ascetic-disciple seems to have terminated the studies rather early. The traditions recorded in the *Gurucaryā* and *Ānandatīrtha-Kathākalpataru* ascribe certain innovations in the Mutt routine and additions to Pontifical paraphernalia and display of retinue. He seems to have spent the latter part of his life at his Mutt at Tirukoilur, on the S. Peṇṇār river, in the S. Arcot district, where he passed away and where his mortal remains lie entombed. To this day, special reverence is paid to his memory and hundreds visit his tomb there, irrespective of caste or creed. He was a scholar of great weight and taught many disciples, among whom were (1) the celebrated Vyāsa-Rāmācārya of Taraṅgiṇi-fame and (2) Vedeśa Bhikṣu, a prolific commentator.

WORKS

Raghūttama's works are seven in number. They are all of them extant though only five have been printed so far. They are all in the nature of commentaries on the earlier works of the system. "Bhāva-bodha" is the general title of a majority of his works and Raghūttama himself is usually called "Bhāvabodhakāra" or "Bhāvabodhācārya".

(1) *Viṣṇu Tattva Nirṇaya-Ṭikā-Bhāvabodha* (p). This (Mysore O. L. C-1906) is a gloss on the *VTNṭ.* of Jayatīrtha, in about 1200 granthas. The author quotes from the *PP* and culls *Pratīkas*, regularly from the *ṭikā* of Jayatīrtha. (2) *TP-Bhāvabodha* (p) is a super-commentary on the *TP* of Jayatīrtha which has been published by the Madras Govt. Oriental Library (1956).

It is a voluminous gloss running to nearly 8100 granthas. It is quoted and criticized by Jagannātha Tīrtha in his *Bhāṣyadīpikā*,² three or four times and by Rāghavendra once in his *TCP* (p. 859). Like the *TC* he sets forth the 'Tadarthacintā' of adhi-s and takes note of *Peṭikās* of

(Bombay) Maharashtra State, wherefrom it migrated to the South. See *Bombay Gazetteer*, Dharwar, Vol. xxii, 1884, pp. 56-58. It has absolutely no linguistic denotation. There is therefore no justification whatever for the loose and misleading use of the term in old Madras State and parts of former Mysore State to denote only a Marathi-speaking Brahmin. Its restriction in this sense, among Mādhva Brahmins of the South who now speak a form of Marathi, is the result of a misconception. There is reason to believe further that many Deśastha families from Uttara-Karnataka (whose mother tongue was Kannaḍa) migrated to and settled down in various parts of Tamil Nadu which were under Maratha administration, and many of them gradually changed over to Marathi as their mother tongue due to environmental reasons or for the sake of political advantages. The original Kannaḍa affiliations of many of these families could be easily established even now, with the help of their surnames which are still current in Uttara-Karnataka among the Kannaḍigas there and have no counterpart in the surnames and place-names current among Maharashtra proper.

1. See f.n. 4, p. 463.

2. See *Bhāṣyadīpikā* p. 237 and *Bhāvabodha* i, 1, 3, and p. 438 with ii, 1, 18.

Pādas and subject matter of adhi-s at the end of Pādas instead of at the beginning as in the *TC*. He holds independent views on some points of doctrine and interpretation as on the question of Bimbopāsanā (iii.3.53). His language is simple and precise. He makes his points forcefully. He quotes often from certain unipentified sources not cited by any other commentator. But he takes no notice of the Sūtra interpretations of the other schools. The author quotes also the passages of the *NV* commented upon by Jayatīrtha in his *TP* without introducing the actual words thereof and from the *Candrikā*¹ (3) *Nyāyavivaraṇa-Tīkā* (p) is a direct commentary on the *NV* of Madhva, in continuation of Jayatīrtha's c. on the same, from B. S. i, 3, 1, onwards and has been printed and published from Uḍipi. (4) *Nyāyaratna-Sambandhadīpikā* (p) is preserved in the Mysore O. L. (C-1557). It runs to some 1200 granthas and is in the nature of a c. on the *AV* showing at the same time, the inter-connection between the words of Madhva and the Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa. It also indicates the Pūrvapakṣa and Siddhānta-nyāyas involved at each step. The scope of the work is thus indicated :

अनुव्याख्योक्तयुक्तीनां भाष्याधिकरणेष्वलम् ।

जडमुन्युक्तमाश्रित्य वक्ष्ये श्रुतिसमुद्गमम् ॥

(5) *Vivaraṇoddhāra*(m) is a gloss on those passages in the *Nyāya-Vivaraṇa* which have been commented upon by Jayatīrtha in his *TP* without actually introducing the words thereof, into the body of his text.² A ms. is preserved in the T. P. L. xiv, 7841. (6) *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad-Bhāṣya-Bhāvabodha*³ is Raghūttama's *magnum opus*, in 9000 granthas. It gives both the Khaṇḍārtha and the Bhāṣyārtha of the Upaniṣad. The most striking feature of the c. is the large number of quotations from the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Bhāṣya* of Śaṅkara, intended to contrast the interpretations of the Mādhva School with those of Śaṅkara, which are often criticised by Raghūttama in his work :

Bhāvabodha

Śaṅkara's Bhāṣya in *Bṛh. Up.*
(Ānandāśrama edn.)

| | |
|-------|-------|
| P. 7 | P. 20 |
| 10 | 33 |
| 12 b | 35 |
| 12 | 36 |
| 14 | 37 |
| 35 b | 127 |
| 35 b | 129 |
| 36 b | 145 |
| 36 b | 148 |
| 207 | 479 |
| 274 b | 630 |

1. See i, 2, p. 48 b (ms).

2. See the colophon; इति श्रीमज्जयतीर्थचरणप्रदर्शिततत्त्वप्रकाशिकागतन्यायविवरणोद्धारः । Vide also the remarks of Rāghavendra in his *TP*.—*Bhāvadīpa*, p. 25, lines 22–23 : ii, 4, 13 p. 223 (Bombay). The Editor of T. P. L. Catal., has not rightly understood the scope of this work of Raghūttama.

3. Printed, N. S. Press, Bombay, 1907.

He has incorporated into his work passages from the commentaries of Jayatīrtha on *Kathālakṣaṇa* (See Raghūttama, pp. 199-200), AV See Raghūttama, p. 308 and NS 115, and the *Īśa Up.* (see Raghūttama, p. 348). He makes an interesting reference to the views of his teacher Raghuvarya on the interpretation of the term “गोष्ठ” (Brh. Up. iii, 1, p. 166 line 17) : गोष्ठ यज्ञवाटसमीप इति स्वामिनः ॥¹ (7) *G. B. Prameyadīpikā-Bhāva-bodha*^(m) is his gloss on Jayatīrtha’s c. on Madhva’s *Gītābhāṣya*. It is preserved in the Mys. O.L.C. no. 1106, Nāgarī and extracts from it have been given in T.R. Krishnācārya’s edn. of the *G. B. Bhāvaratnakosa* of Sumatīndra.

8. YADUPATI ĀCĀRYA (C. 1580—1630)

Yadupati, *alias* Yādavācārya, was a distinguished pupil of Vedeśa Bhikṣu.² He wrote several commentaries on the earlier works of his school, the chief of which is the one on the NS called *Yādupatiya*, after its author. This c. is very popular in Pandit circles.

Yadupati was an Uttara-Karnataka Brahmin of the village of Yekkunḍi, in the Saundatti taluk of the Belgaum district. His descendants are said to be still living. The *S. K.* gives his father’s name as Yādappayya (p. 182) and states that his brother Rāmappa received Sannyāsa from Vedavyāsa Tīrtha and that he subsequently became his brother’s teacher in Vedānta. This was presumably the same as Vedeśa Bhikṣu, the distinguished commentator and acknowledged Guru of Yadupati. Yadupati was thus a senior contemporary of the celebrated Vidyādhīśa Tīrtha of the Uttarādi Mutt.

Not only was Yadupati a distinguished scholar and glossator himself, but a trainer of able disciples. Among his famous pupils are to be mentioned (1) Bidarahallī Śrīnivāsa Ācārya (2) Śarkarā Śrīnivāsa and Umarji Tirumalācārya, who have all made lasting contributions to Dvaita literature. This shows how the Mutts in the old days radiated spiritual learning as Universities and each pupil who received instruction under celebrated teachers, lived up to the tradition of learning and scholarship preached by the Upaniṣads.

WORKS

Nine works of Yadupati are available, two of which have been printed. (1) His gloss on TS in 300 granthas is preserved at the T. P. L. while that on (2) *Td.* is available at Mysore (C-7). His *Nyāyasudhā-Tippaṇi* (p)^D is the most important of his works. It is an adequate c. on the text of the NS bearing the stamp of deep learning and originality on every page.

1. This confirms the statement in the *Gurucaryā* that Raghūttama had already read other Śāstras under Raghuvarya and had his ordination from him about 1543, continuing his studies still further.

2. Cf. इति श्रीमद्वेदेशतीर्थपूज्यपादशिष्येण यदुपतिना विरचितायां सुधाटिप्पण्यां... (colophon) वेदेशतीर्थगुरुमानसकंजसंस्थम् (gloss on TS). In his c. on NS. Yadupati mentions the gloss of his teacher Vedeśa on the pp : शिष्टं अस्मदाराध्यश्रीवेदेशगुरुकृतायां पद्धतिव्याख्यायां द्रष्टव्यम् ॥ (iii, 2, p. 292 b).

The author shows himself deeply versed in the grammatical learning of his days which he enlists in the support of the interpretations of his school. His gloss is distinctly *anterior* to that of Rāghavendra and perhaps also to that of Vidyādhīśa. He tries to overthrow the objection raised by a critic (presumably Appayya Dikṣita) alleging misrepresentation of the Mīmāṃsaka view in AV i, 1, 4, by pointing out that the view referred to by Madhva, here, is that of the Prābhākaras who do hold the view attributed to them, and not that of the Bhāṭṭas, as presumed by the critic : अत्र कश्चिदाह—“भावनाभेदेनैव वाक्यभेदस्य दृष्टत्वात्, प्रकृते च वाक्यभावनाया एकत्वान्नावान्तरवाक्यभेदोऽङ्गीकृत” इति । तत्तुच्छम् । नहीदं भाट्टान् प्रत्यापाद्यते । किंतु प्राभाकरान् । तैरन्वये भिन्ने, वाक्यं भिद्यत एवेत्यङ्गीकारात् । यथाहुः—“अन्वितपदात्मकं हि वाक्यं तत्र कथं नान्वये भिन्ने भिद्येतेति” ॥ अतो न कश्चित् क्षुद्रोपद्रव इति (i, 1.1, p.71).

He quotes also from a number of earlier commentators on the *NS.* (i, 1, 1 p. 79; i, 1, 1, p. 7; i, 4, p. 152 and i, 1, p. 37 and 43) as well as from a commentary on *Samkṣepasāriraka* (p. 40). As an instance of his alertness may be mentioned his interesting remarks on the *Uṇādi Sūtra* : अदिभूम्यां डुतच् (V, 1) quoted by Jayatīrtha in his *NS.* (i, 4 p. 228. Bombay), in support of Madhva's interpretation of “मायामात्रम्” which is sought to be derived from two roots माङ् and द्रैङ्. The point is that अदिभूवो डुतच् is the reading generally accepted and found in the printed texts of the *Uṇādi Sūtras*. Yadupati is aware of this, for he quotes from one of the commentaries on the *Uṇādis*, presumably Śvetavana's (Madras Un. Skt. Ser. vii, pt. i, p. 210 text B); but points out at the same time that the reading given by Jayatīrtha is the older and more genuine one, being found in some mss. and certain commentaries also. It is however not known to both Śvetavana and Nārāyaṇa and probably also to Ujjvaladatta. It is, however, very unlikely that the reading quoted by Jayatīrtha is baseless, for he is a scrupulous writer in such matters. Yadupati's remarks are faithfully echoed by Keśavācārya.

Yadupati wrote two works on the *Bhāgavata* (4) a c. on the *B. T.* of Madhva of which mss. are preserved at Udipi and Mysore (O. L. B. 194-200) covering first five Skandhas. (5) His c. on Chapters I-IX of the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa*, has been printed and published from Dharwar. The Mys. O. L. (C-1886) has a ms. of his c. on (6) *Yamakabhārata*. His minor works are four : (7) a c. on *Sadācāra Smṛti* and three Stotras (8-10) *Viṣṇu Stotra*, *Vedavyāsa-Gadya* and *Karāvalambana Stotra* in 30 verses (*S. M.* p. 104-12).

9. KAMBĀLU RĀMACANDRA TĪRTHA (C. 1575-1635)

Rāmacandra Tīrtha was a distinguished Pontiff of the Vyāsarāja Maṭha and fifth in succession from Vyāsatīrtha. He was a zealous Vaiṣṇava (अक्षोभ्यवैष्णव), a great scholar and author and a good debater. He is said to have belonged to the Kambālu-group of Southern Karnātak Brahmins (the same to which, according to *Gurucaryā*, belonged the famous Vibudhendra Tīrtha also). His ancestors are said to have belonged to the village of Kāvīlippālayam in the Satyamaṅgalam taluk of the Coimbatore district. His father's name is given as Kuppācār and that of his

grandfather as Muṣṭiparimita-Svarṇamālālaṅkṛta Veṅkaṭanarasimhācārya. He was the eldest son of his father and the descendants of his younger brother Rāmacandrācārya¹ are reported to be still living.

DATE

(1) Rāmacandra Tīrtha tells us in one of the introductory stanzas to his gloss on the NS. that he was a student of Vijayīndra Tīrtha (1539-1595) :

पदवाक्यप्रमाणज्ञानं सौशील्याद्युपशोभितान् ।

विजयीन्द्रयतोन्द्राख्यानं सेवे विद्यागुरुन्मम ॥ (Ms. I.O.L.C. p. 652. cols. 1-2).

Assuming that he was about twenty-five at the time of the demise of his Guru, we may easily fix 1575 or so as the probable date of his birth. (2) In Śaka 1549 (1627 A.D.) he received a copperplate grant from Immaḍi Kempe Gauḍa.² (3) Vidyādhīśa Tīrtha (1619-1631) of the Uttarādi Mutt, has a passage in his c. on the NS,³ criticizing the interpretation adopted by Rāmacandra⁴ for a certain passage in the original. These facts enable us to fix Rāmacandra's date between C. 1575-1635.

The successors of Vyāsātīrtha seem to have followed closely the fortunes of the Vijayanagar Empire. Rāmacandra Tīrtha lies buried along with his Guru Śrīpati Tīrtha at Vellore, which was the capital of Rāma (deva) II (1616-1630).

The most outstanding event in the Pontifical life of Rāmacandra was the (mass) conversion to Mādhva faith of a number of Karnāṭak Brahmin families of his own native district.⁵ This conversion is said to have taken place at Pennāttuūr, at some distance from Vellore, where Rāmacandra was staying, then, for his Cāturmāsya. The converts, who adopted the name of the village at which they were converted, as their group-name, still flourish in the Coimbatore district.⁶

The *Gurucaryā* (Mauktika 5) and the S. K. (1931, pp. 57-58) refer to some clashes between Rāmacandra Tīrtha and the Svāmis Vidyādhīśa and his successor Vedanidhi, of the Uttarādi Mutt, at Śrīmuṣṇam, Tanjore and other places. Apart from differences of opinion over the interpretation of certain texts between Rāmacandra and Vidyādhīśa, it would seem, from these accounts, that the former had to face a good deal of opposition to his prestige and popularity in the South from those two Pontiffs.⁷

1. He too is said to have become a Monk and succeeded his brother. For my information re. Rāmacandra Tīrtha's ancestry, I am indebted to my student S. Vyāsācār at the Annamalai University (1934-1938) who claims descent from him.

2. *Ep. Car. Supple.* iii-iv.

3. Vide his *Vākyārthacandrikā*, p. 268 b.

4. Cf. his *Sudhātippaṇi* p. 79 (Dharwar).

5. This conversion was the outcome of a series of disputations at which the leading Pandits of the district are said to have engaged Rāmacandra Tīrtha.

6. My ancestors belonged to one such family.

7. Cf. * * * कर्नाटे किल भिक्षुकः ।

कंबालूरपदो रामचन्द्रतीर्थस्त्वनेकधा ।

दुर्मार्गं संचरत्यद्धा तद्दर्पशमनं कुरु ॥ (*Gurucaryā* v).

According to *Ānandatīrthagurukathākālpataru*, the discord began even at the time of Vedavyāsātīrtha (1596–1619).

WORKS

Rāmacandra's works include (1) a lucid and instructive gloss on the *Nyāyasudhā* (published at Dharwar) and (2) another on the *Rg-Bhāṣyaṭikā* of Jayatīrtha, the first two chapters of which are preserved in the Mys. O. L. (B 122 and B 127). Of his other works may be mentioned (3) his c. on the *Aitareya-Bhāṣya*¹ and (4) another on the *Tattvaviveka ṭikā*.²

The gloss on the *Rgbhāṣya-ṭikā* is full of grammatical disquisitions (p. 108) and passages are quoted from the *Mahābhāṣya*, *Kāśikā-Vṛtti*, *Uṇādi Sūtras* (p. 300) *Kavikalpadruma* (p. 335). The work runs to 4000 granthas. In this as well as in his gloss on the NS,³ the author describes his Guru Śrīpati Tīrtha as the "grandson" (spiritual) of Vyāsātīrtha.⁴ This is somewhat curious, as Śrīpati, according to the tables of the Vyāsarāja Mutt, was fourth in succession from Vyāsātīrtha. But his teacher Lakṣmīkānta is believed to have been a student of Vyāsātīrtha, in which case, the term "पौत्र" may be justified.

The gloss on NS. is a learned work and has been quoted and criticized, as already noted, by Vidyādhīśa. One of Rāmacandra's pupils, Vātivāla Narasiṃha, son of Upendra Bhaṭṭa, wrote a c. on the TP of which we have a fragment in the Madras O. L. (T. C. ii, 1a, 806). Another disciple of his, Ratnagarbha Odeyar, is credited with glosses on *M. Vij.*, *Mbh. T. N.*, *Bhāgavata*, *B. S.*, and *Gītā*.

10. SUDHĪNDRA TĪRTHA (1596–1623)

In Sudhīndra Tīrtha, disciple and successor of Vijayīndra, we have a different personality altogether, from those to whom attention has been paid so far. For one in his position, Sudhīndra was a person of peculiar tastes and equipment. He is one of the few writers in Dvaita Literature who have cared to look beyond their noses into realms other than those of theology and metaphysics. Kāvya, Alankāra and Nāṭaka seem to have been his *forte* in which he has left us works of real merit, which stand out like oases in the dreary desert of theological writings. The Dvaitins have often been accused of a lack of interest in anything but their own faith and nothing proves the truth of this accusation so well as the fact that they have allowed to sink into oblivion even the few works of literary interest left by writers like Trivikrama, Vijayīndra, Sudhīndra and Sumatīndra.

1. M. M. Sangha List.

2. *Tātparyadīpikā*, Ms. Pejavar Mutt 295, Tulu Palmleaf.

3. as well as in the colophon to his works.

4. इति श्रीमत्सर्वतंत्रस्वतंत्रश्रीमद्ब्यासतीर्थमुनिवर्यपौत्रश्रीपतिपूज्यपादानां
शिष्येण रामचन्द्रभिक्षुणा विरचितायाम् * * * *

(colophon to gloss on NS).

DATE

Sudhīndra was the successor of Vijayīndra and the Guru of Rāghavendra, on the Pīṭha of his Mutt. The *Rāghavendra Vijaya* of Nārāyaṇa speaks of him as having been honoured with a *ratnābhiṣeka* by the Vijayanagar ruler Veṅkaṭapati-rāya.¹ He is also reported to have enjoyed the patronage of Raghunātha Nāyaka of Tanjore (1614-1633), in the same work. He died in 1623 at Āṇegondi, on the banks of the *Tuṅgabhadra*. His mortal remains lie entombed there at Navabṛndāvana, near the tomb of Vyāsatīrtha.

WORKS

Besides two works on Alamkāra and a drama, tradition ascribes to him a c. on the *Tarkatāṇḍava*, entitled *Sadyuktiratnākara*² or *Yuktiratnākara*. This is corroborated by Nārāyaṇa who mentions in his biography of Rāghavendra (vii, 49-50) the following works of Sudhīndra (1) a c. on *Tarkatāṇḍava*, (2) a c. on Skandhas II and XI of the *Bhāgavata* and a drama, probably the same as *Subhadra-Dhanañjaya* :

व्याख्याव्याजात्तर्कनृत्यस्य मह्यं रंगस्थानं निर्ममे श्रीसुधीन्द्रः ।

व्यासेनोक्तं व्याकरोद्यद्द्वितीयस्कन्धं प्रायो दुर्गमैकादशं च

* * * * नाटकं चित्रगद्यम् ॥

3. ALAMKĀRA-MANĪJARĪ^(m)

This is a manual of Alamkāras or figures of speech, of which the portion dealing with Śabdālamkāras is preserved in the T.P.L. (5129-5130)³. The portion covering Arthālamkāras is available at the Rāghavendrasvāmī Mutt, Nanjangud. One of the later successors of Sudhīndra, Sumatīndra wrote a c. on the whole work. The c. is known as *Madhudhārā* (or *Alamkāramañjari-Vyākhyā*). Both the original and its c. covering the Śabdālamkāras, are preserved at the T. P. L. But the Editor of the Descriptive Catalogue of the T.P.L. has, in ascribing the *Alamkāramañjari-Vyākhyā*, to Sudhīndra, confounded the author of the original with the commentator. The latter himself refers to Sudhīndra as the author of the original and speaks of himself as the author of the commentary on it :

श्रीमत्सुमतीन्द्रयतीन्द्रो व्यतनोदनीयसीमसीमगुणाम् ।

व्याख्यां मधुधाराख्यां विवृतालंकारमञ्जरीहृदयाम् ॥

* * * * अथेदानीं सुधीन्द्र इति कवीन्द्रो

* * * मंगलमाचरित (T. P. L. Cat. p. 2972).

1. Vide *Gurugunastava*, 8.

2. The *Gurucarita* (p. 162) cites the following introductory verse from the *Yuktiratnākara* :

शिष्यः श्रीविजयीन्द्रसंयमिमणेः षड्दर्शनीदर्शन-

स्तत्कारुण्यसमेधिताखिलकलोत्कर्षः सुधीन्द्रो यतिः ।

निर्मत्सर्यगुणोल्लसत्सुमनसां मोदाय लक्ष्मीपतेः

प्रीत्यै मध्वमुनीशितुर्वितनुते सद्युक्तिरत्नाकरम् ॥

3. Palmleaf. * * * इति * * * शब्दालङ्कारमञ्जरीव्याख्यानं समाप्तम् ॥ (colophon).

In the section on Śabdālamkāras, Sudhīndra deals with Bandhas etc. and many passages are quoted from this work by Sumatīndra in his c. on the *Uṣāharaṇa*. It would appear from these quotations that Sudhīndra's illustrative verses were in commemoration of the greatness of his Guru Vijayīndra.¹ An express statement to this effect is also made by Sudhīndra, in one of his introductory verses :

अधिकृत्यास्मदाचार्यान्विजयीन्द्रयतीश्वरान् ।
प्रवृत्तेयमनुग्राह्या मूर्त्तलंकारमंजरी ॥

In this respect, the work follows the model of Vidyānātha's *Pratāparudriya*. In the case of Arthālamkāras² too, the same procedure is followed :

उल्लेखो बहुधैकेनानेकैर्वल्लेखनं द्विधा ।
गिरिर्धृतौ गुरुर्वाचि जयीन्द्रो भाति भास्करः ।
अर्थप्रत्ययिषिष्याणां स्वर्दः कालफणीश्वरः ॥

He displays admirable skill in evolving a variety of *alamkāras* with one familiar statement, cast in different moulds :

- (1) वक्त्रं पद्ममिवेत्यसावुपमितिः सोऽनन्वयो वक्त्रवद्
वक्त्रं; पद्ममिवास्यमास्यमिवाब्जं सोपमेयोपमा ।
अब्जेन स्मृतमाननं स्मृतिरिदं वक्त्रं किमम्भोरुहं
सन्देहो वदनेऽलयोऽम्बुजधियोपायन्त्यसौ भ्रान्तिमान् ॥
- (2) पद्मं वक्त्रमिव प्रतीपमवभात्यस्याम्बुजं रूपकं
वक्त्राब्जं विकसत्यसौ परिणतिर्नास्यं परं त्वम्बुजम् ।
एषापह्नुतिरब्जमित्यधिरहं मन्ये त्वदास्यं तदि-
त्युल्लेखो मुखमम्बुजं च शरदुल्लासीति तद्दीपकम् ॥
- (3) उत्प्रेक्षा ध्रुवमब्जमित्यतिशयोक्तिः पद्ममेतत्परं
भ्राजत्यत्र च भाति नेत्रयुगमित्यावृत्तिदीपं; जिते ।
चन्द्राब्जे इति तुल्ययोगि सलिले पद्मम्भुवि त्वन्मुखं
दृष्टान्तोऽथ; निदर्शनं मुखमिदं धत्तेऽब्जलक्ष्मीमिति ॥

(4) ALAMKĀRA-NIKAṢA (m)³

This is another work of Sudhīndra, on the same subject, composed probably as a set off to the *Kuvalayānanda* of Appayya. The author is called "Kavikaṇṭhīrava" in the title page of the ms. The work runs to 2706 granthas and contains verses and prose explanations. The author wields a fine alliterative style. He says that the work is meant for the use of earnest students of Alamkāraśāstra : अलंकारशास्त्राभ्यासेच्छूनामत्यन्तोपकाराय सुधीन्द्रयोगिविरचितालंकारनिकषाख्योऽयं ग्रन्थः ॥

1. यथा 'विजयीन्द्रवर्य * * * ' इत्यलंकारमंजर्याम् । एतदर्थस्तु मदीयमधुधारायां द्रष्टव्यः (p. 324, Uḍipi edn.).

2. For extracts and information about this section and from the *Sāhityasāmrajya* and *Subhadrādhanañjaya*, I am indebted to my friend Śrī Rāja Gururājāchārya, Dewan of Śrī Rāghavendrasvāmi Mutt, who has so kindly lent me his work : *Sārvabhaumakavitākaṣala*, in ms. for reference.

3. Madras O. L. R. No. 129776 (Grantha Ms). It is the same work as has been wrongly entered as "Alamkāra-Nikaṣa" of *Sudhendra* by OPPERT (Cat. 4797).

(5) SĀHITYA-SĀMRĀJYA^(m)

Aufrecht mentions a ms. of this work (Rice 288) which is however wrongly ascribed there to Sumatindra. Another ms. is reported from the Rāghavendrasvāmi Mutt Library at Nanjangud, in Mys. Arch. Rep. 1917, p. 17 also wrongly ascribed to Sujanendra. The *Gurucarita* (p. 165) gives correct information about the work for the first time. The work is quoted by Sumatindra, in his c. on *Alaṅkāramañjari*, in the definition of Yamakas.

The work is, in many respects, unique in Dvaita Literature. In the first place, it is a commentary on a treatise on Poetics by a distinguished Alaṅkārika of the Tanjore Court, under the later Nāyakas and one *who was not a Mādhva* : Kṛṣṇa Yajvan. The original is noticed by Aufrecht (i, 486) and in Madras T. C. 659 d. Kṛṣṇa Yajvan (or Dīkṣita) was the court Poet of Raghunātha Nāyaka (1614-33) of Tanjore. His work, in 1560 granthas, is a panegyric on his patron and a dissertation on Poetics, on the model of Vidyānātha's work : रघुनाथभूपालस्य शौर्योदायगाभीर्यादिरमणीयगुणगण-प्रतिपादनपरं काव्यमीमांसारूपं रघुनाथभूपालीयं नामालंकारशास्त्रं चिकीर्षुः कृष्णाध्वरीन्द्राभिधानो मनीषी * * * *

(*Sāhityasāmrājya*, c. of Sudhīndra).

What is most significant here is that a Mādhva ascetic and Pontiff of Sudhīndra's standing, should have come forward to comment on the work of a layman and a Smārta, laying aside all considerations of Pontifical prestige and religious difference. This shows a shining example of catholicity of outlook, inherited doubtless from his Guru Vijayīndra and his preceptor the great Vyāsatīrtha himself. We have a parallel to this in Appayya Dīkṣita's c. on the *Yādavābhyudaya* of Vedānta Deśika. But the example set by Sudhīndra is even *more significant*. It is rare indeed for a Pontiff of a Sampradāya to comment on the work of a layman of a different religious faith. Sudhīndra has thus added a feather to the cap of the Mādhvas by his remarkable work.

The *Sāhitya-Sāmrājya* contains eight Vilāsas and runs to 11740 granthas, seven times the length of its original. It surveys the highways and byways of literary criticism and Poetics and goes beyond the panegyric scope of the original. The first page is reported to be missing in the Nanjangud ms. The c. opens with a fine alliterative prose passage, indicating the scope of the work. We have also a high flown description of the King in whose honour the original was composed :

इह खलु धरणीमण्डल इव कविमण्डलेऽपि सकले साम्राज्यपदवीमुपारूढस्य चक्रवालाचलपश्चार्धकटक-
निकटवापिकैरवणिकानिकायसौखशायनिकायमानयशश्चन्द्रिकाधवलितेनिखिलदिगन्तरालस्य दिव्यचन्द्रमहीपाल-
पुण्यपुञ्जायिताच्युतावनीपतिरत्नाकरसुधाकरस्य निरंतरहृदन्तरमंदिरमहिरघुनन्दनपदारविन्दस्य सन्तत-
समभिनंदितधरणीवृन्दारकवृन्दस्य रघुनाथभूवरस्य * * *

Sudhīndra says that he wrote his c. at the special request of the King himself :

तेन श्रीरघुनाथभूमिपतिना संप्रार्थितस्तन्मुदे
तत्तादृग्विजयोन्द्रसयमिमणेः षड्दर्शनीदर्शिनः ।
शिष्यो व्याकुस्ते सुधीन्द्रयतिराट् कृष्णाध्वरीन्द्रोदितं
ग्रन्थं तद्गुणबन्धुरं रसगुणालंकाररत्नङ्कारिणीम् ॥

As the work embodies an up to date critique of various theories on Poetics from the earliest times to the *Rasagāṅgādhara*, its publication would be a valuable addition to *Alaṁkāra* literature. The simplicity and grace of style is also a point of attraction in this work. It deals exhaustively with the subject of definition of *Kāvya*, and with the theory of *Rasa* and the doctrines of *Rīti*, *Anumāna*, *Aucitya* and *Dhvani*, in Poetics, discussing the definitions and views of representative writers and giving its own considered views on all those points.

My friend Dr. C. B. Hanumantarao of Dharapuram had a few months before his premature demise submitted a learned thesis on this work for his Ph.D. degree to the Annamalai University, giving the full text of the work in Sanskrit with his systematic exposition of its contents in English. He took up the subject at my suggestion. Unfortunately, he did not live to receive his doctorate from his Alma Mater.

6. *SUBHADRĀ-DHANANĪJAYA* (म)

A damaged fragment of this drama ascribed to Sudhīndra, is preserved in the Madras O. L. (Vol. XXI, D. C. no. 12729). The ms. which is in Nandināgarī, runs to 124 pages of 6 lines each and contains some two Acts. A complete ms. is preserved at the Rāghavendrasvāmi Mutt Library, Nanjangud from which extracts have been furnished to me by Raja Gururājāchārya. It is clear from these extracts that the work of Sudhīndra is a full-fledged drama in six acts. The dramatist has given a new orientation to the Epic story by completely cutting out the incident of Arjuna's disguising himself as a Tridaṇḍi Sannyāsi, and coming to Dvārakā to woo Subhadrā. Instead, he has managed with admirable skill to arrange for an open meeting of Subhadrā and Arjuna on the occasion of a tournament arranged as part of the Vasantotsava in Dvārakā, to which Arjuna is specially invited and at which Subhadrā is made to give a *Viṇā* recital. It is in the course of this unexpected meeting that Subhadrā falls in love with the distinguished visitor, whom she subsequently learns to be no other than Arjuna. Arjuna also is smitten with love at first sight and pays a glowing tribute to her beautiful pose and musical skill, in an aside to the *Vidūṣaka* :

सखे, इदानीमपीयं समञ्चितपञ्चमप्रपञ्चितविपचिकाकुञ्चितलोचनप्राञ्चलमनतिचञ्चलकनीनिकम्, आचपलकुचलिकुचमुन्नमित* * * * * मामकमपहरति मानसमानताङ्गी * अपिच, कुचकुहनसुमेरुतुङ्गशृङ्गद्वयान्तःश्रमजलसुरसिन्धौ मज्जती मीनकेतोः * * * * * चिकलयिषति वाचां चारुतां वल्लकीयम् ।

The play opens with a fine alliterative *Daṇḍaka* in praise of Vijayīndra Tīrtha : अस्ति खलु जगति वन्दनरतिकन्दलदतिबन्धुरमसिन्धुरपतिमन्थरगतिसिन्धुरधुरंधरगन्धिलगण्डस्थलनिष्यन्ददमन्दमद * * * * * विजयीन्द्रो नाम संयमीन्द्रः ॥

The name of the drama is deftly worked out in a *Cakrabandhapadya*. The ii Act describes Arjuna's love-lorn state and closes with a reference to an unexpected development and complication — that Balarāma has extended an invitation to Duryodhana to come and marry Subhadrā. This induces the hatching of a plot by Arjuna to elope with Subhadrā, with the connivance of Kṛṣṇa. It is however discovered and foiled. The disappointed Subhadrā has a dream which is interpreted by the *Vidūṣaka*,

disguised as an astrologer, (iii). The iv Act introduces a battle between the hosts of Indra and Duryodhana, who is forbidden by Indra to go to Dvārakā and marry Subhadrā. Kṛṣṇa picks a feigned quarrel with his brother over his resolve to give away Subhadrā to Duryodhana. Attempting suicide, Subhadrā faints and is rescued and goes to witness Arjuna's fight with Duryodhana. In Act v, Duryodhana tries to avenge his defeat by abducting Subhadrā through a demon. Arjuna learns this from Madhura-vāṇī the Ceṭi and rushes to the rescue, finds her and brings her back to Dvārakā and takes this opportunity (Act vi) to make love to her leisurely and in an elated mood. We have a very delicate scene here recalling the deft touches of the *Śākuntala* (act iii). The lovers are welcomed by the relatives and Subhadrā is formally married to Arjuna by her parents. Kṛṣṇa blesses the couple and the gods shower flowers and the curtain falls.

Five more works ascribed to Sudhīndra are noted by H. K. Veda-vyāsācāra (*Gurucarita*) but without any reference to the availability of mss. These are (7) *Vyāsarājābhyaudaya*, or life of Vyāsatīrtha, (8) *Amṛtāharaṇa* (a drama), (9) *Dayālu-Śataka*, (10) *Vairāgya-Taraṅga* and (11) *Āpastamba-Śulba-Sūtra-Pradīpa*.

11. VIDYĀDHĪŚA TĪRTHA (1619-1631)

The most celebrated Pontiff of the Uttarādi Mutt, after Raghūttama, was Vidyādhīśa. The Mutt list places his Pontifical rule between 1619-31. This is corroborated by such evidences as could be gathered from his own works as well as from external sources :

(1) He criticizes Appayya Dīkṣita¹ and Vijayīndra Tīrtha² in his c. on the NS. He is therefore much later than these two writers. (2) His criticism extends also to Vijayīndra's pupil Kambālu Rāmacandra Tīrtha,³ who, as we have seen, figures in an inscription of 1627 A.D. and was a contemporary of both Vidyādhīśa and his successor Vedanidhi (1631-1636). (3) Koṇḍubhaṭṭa, in his *Vaiyākaraṇa-Bhūṣaṇasāra*, claims that his father Raṅgoji Bhaṭṭa, defeated Vidyādhīśa⁴ in a debate, which took place in the court of Veṅkaṭappa Nāyaka of Keladi (1582-1629)⁵

1. *Vākyārthacandrikā*, p. 236 (Cf. *Madhvamukhavidhvamsana*).

2. *ibid.* p. 236 where Vidyādhīśa rejects a particular defence of the position of Madhva, attempted by Vijayīndra, in his *Madhvādhvakaṇṭhakoddhāra*, pp. 43-44 as roundabout.

3. *op. cit.* p. 263 b.

4. P. K. Gode (*Brahmavidyā*, Adyar Lib. Bulletin, xviii, 3-4, Dec. 54) is wrong in taking "Oderu" in the verse, to be a proper name and in identifying the ascetic (see his f. n.) with a Pontiff of the Vaiṣṇava Maṭha of the Sārasvata Brahmins at Partagali in the Concon dt. of Goa. "Oder" is just a Kannaḍa honorific title, meaning 'master', "Svāmi", applied to Mādhva ascetics, and not a proper name. The Vidyādhīśa Oderu referred to in this verse, is really the Pontiff of the Uttarādi Mutt, whose biography makes a distinct reference to his disputation with Raṅgojibhaṭṭa, details of which are preserved in a ms. of a tract entitled *Raṅgojibhaṭṭadhikkāra*. There is no Pontiff of the name of Vidyādhīśa in the Succession list of the Gokaṇṇa Maṭha of the Sārasvata Brahmins.

5. *Ep. Car.* vii, p. 43 (1902).

and obtained from the ruler, the honor of the present of a palanquin in token of his victory¹:

विद्याधीशवडेहसंज्ञकयति² श्रीमाध्वभट्टारकं
जित्वा केलदि³ वेङ्कटय्य⁴ सविधेऽप्यादोलिकां प्राप्तवान् ।
यश्चक्रे मुनिवर्यसूत्रविवृतिं सिद्धान्तभङ्गं तथा
माधवानां, तमहं गुरूपमगुरुं रङ्गोजिभट्टं भजे ॥

The *Sat Kathā* (1896 p. 36) and other Mādhva sources, on the other hand, state that the victory was on the side of Vidyādhīśa. There can be no doubt that there was a meeting between the two.

Raṅgoji Bhaṭṭa was the brother of Bhaṭṭoji Dikṣita,⁵ who composed one of his works in 1635 and who was consistently opposed by the famous Ālamkārika Jagannātha Paṇḍita, a protege of Dārā Shikoh, who was in power between 1637–1659. It may be assumed that Vidyādhīśa's encounter with Raṅgoji took place about the year 1629 when he was probably fifty and his opponent about the same age.

LIFE

We have a full and informative account of Vidyādhīśa's life in the *Vidyādhīśa-Vijaya*⁶ of Janārdana Sūri. The author claims to have been a contemporary of Vidyādhīśa and his successor Vedanidhi (1631–1636) and brings up his account to the succession of Satyanidhi (1638). The commentary on the work is also claimed to be his own (See verse 7 in the c.). But this is doubtful as he misinterprets the reference to a certain ascetic Vādīndra who is referred to in the original (vi, 47-48),⁷ as having been vanquished by Vidyādhīśa in debate, as referring to Vādīndra Tīrtha a later successor of Sudhīndra Tīrtha.⁸ In another place (xi, 55) the commentator is anxious to proclaim his identity with the author of the original.⁹ These render his claim suspicious and untenable. We may therefore treat the

1. The short tract *Raṅgojibhaṭṭadhikkāra* (ms. with Professor, K. T. Pandurangi, Bangalor University) gives some details re. the points raised in the disputation. The S. K. places the meeting at Bidrūr or Bednur (Veṇupura) in the Keladi territory. The *Gurucaryā* also does the same:

स्वं ततो बिदरुराख्यपुरं गत्वा च तत्र हि ।
* * * रङ्गोजिभट्टेन प्रसंगं सुमहत्तरम् । (v)

2. As in the T. P. L. ms. (X, 5837). The printed text in Banaras Skt. Series, 1900, pp. 325, misreads मति for यति. The India Office Cat. pt. ii, p. 188 (no. 708) reads पति.

3. This is also misread in the printed texts as केवल. The Tanjore ms. has केलति for केलदि.

4. I. O. Cat. has more precisely वेङ्कटय्य (no. 708).

5. भट्टोजिदीक्षितमहं पितृव्यं नौमि सिद्धये (Koṇḍubhaṭṭa, *Bhūṣaṇasāra*). *Indian Culture*, Jan, 38, pp. 321–22, gives Bhaṭṭoji's date as 1575–1650 and Aufrecht (p. 395) points out that Bhaṭṭoji is quoted by Vatsarāja who wrote in 1641 A.D.

6. L. B. Kohati, Hanuman Press, Poona, 1926.

7. वादीन्द्रनामा यतिरेत्य दुराग्रहेण तं जातु कश्चन जगद्गुरुसार्वभौमम् । वादे जितः * * *

8. वादीन्द्रनामा यतिः सुधीन्द्रतीर्थमठीयो वैष्णवयतिः (p. 66)

9. जनार्दनाचार्य इति विद्याधीशविज्ञयाद्यनेकप्रबन्धकवयिता ।
एतदटीकापि तत्कृतेत्यवधेयम् ॥ (p. 119)

commentator as a much later person, than the author of the original biography.

The original is quite an informative and impressive work on the life, career and achievements of Vidyādhīśa, in eleven cantos. We learn from this work, that Vidyādhīśa's ancestors originally belonged to the village of Puntāmbā on the Godāvarī (in the Ahmadnagar dt.) which was a famous settlement of Vaiṣṇava Brahmins, professing the Madhva-Sampradāya.¹

His father, Ānandācārya or Ānandabhaṭṭāraka, belonged to Vasiṣṭha gotra and was a follower of the Āpastamba Sūtra. The evidence of his Śākhā which is more commonly found among Karnatak Brahmins and the readiness with which his son was later chosen for succession to the Uttarādi Mutt, which was, by general convention, restricted to Kannaḍiga Brahmins, render it very likely that this family also was a Kannaḍa-speaking one. Ānandabhaṭṭāraka was an erudite scholar in Nyāya, Vedānta, Mīmāṃsā and Vyākaraṇa. He was the author of the *Nym-Kaṇṭakoddhāra* already referred to. He had two sons, Śrīnivāsa and Narasimha. The younger was the future Vidyādhīśa.

Narasimhācārya received all his instruction in Vyākaraṇa, Nyāya and other branches of learning and in Madhvaśāstra, under his own father. He was married early and settled down at Puntāmbā, to teaching. He is reported to have defeated many learned scholars of his village like Tāmābhaṭṭa, Golīṅga Sivabhaṭṭa, Viśva Paṇḍita and others in Tarka and Vyākaraṇa. After his father's death, he moved off to Nasik and Tryambak on account of fear of Moslem depredations over his town. Most of the Vaiṣṇava families in and around the area must have migrated south and to other safer places at this time. Narasimha lived for eight years at Sangamner and Paiṭhan and thence moved down to Pandharpur and then to Bijapur where he defeated Narasa Paṇḍita. His learning and achievements attracted the notice of Vedavyāsa Tīrtha (1597-1619) of the Uttarādi Mutt, who honoured him with presents and invited him to Maṇūr on the Bhīmā river, where he was persuaded to take orders and was ordained a monk under the name of Vidyādhīśa.

The main incidents in Vidyādhīśa's Pontifical career were his disputation with Raṅgoji Bhaṭṭa and his tour of the South and North of India. He visited Dhanuṣkoṭi, Madurai, Srirangam, Trichinopoly, Tanjore, Kumbakonam, Kāñcī, Dharmapurī, and Uḍipī, in the south. His northern tour included Banaras, and Gayā where he converted the whole community of Gayāwālas, (xi, 12) to the religion of Madhva. This great historic event has given the school of Madhvācārya followers from among an important section of Hindi-speaking Brahmins of the North. The Gayāpālas (or Gayāwālas as they are called) have ever since remained staunch followers of Madhva, owing allegiance to the Uttarādi Mutt. The *Gurucaryā* places this event in 1630 :

1. The family of Taraṅgiṇī-Rāmācārya also hailed from this village, as already pointed out. Owing to vicissitudes of migration, we find that some branches of the Pāṇḍuraṅgi family have adopted Marathi and some Telugu, while the main line representing the Tumbinakatte family, of Dharwar district, has stuck to its original Kannaḍa.

स्वं ततो बिदरुराख्यपुरं गत्वा च तत्र हि ।

* * रंगोजिभट्टेन प्रसंगं सुमहत्तरम् ॥

ततः परं प्रमोदूतवत्सरे * * * (1630)

काशीं गत्वा गयां चापि * * * (v)

Later, he visited Badari and on his way back from there, passed away, in 1631 (*Prajotpatti*), at Ekacakranagara, in the Ganga-Yamuna doab (xi, 36) where his tomb was consecrated by his successor. The descendants of Vidyādhīśa's family have subsequently installed his image at Tumbinkaṭṭe, near Rañebennūr (Dharwar Dt.) where they celebrate his anniversary, every year, as the original Bṛndāvana of Ekacakranagara could not be located.

Vidyādhīśa taught many disciples the most prominent of whom were (1) Keśavācārya, who completed his master's gloss on the NS (2) Timmaṇṇācārya author of *Candrikodāhṛtanyāyavivarana* (T. P. L. XIV, no. 7350) and (3) Narasimha Yati who wrote *Khaṇḍārthas* on the *Ait. Ā.* (ii-iii) preserved in T. P. L. iii, 1590, *Taitt. Up.* (T. P. L. 1591) and *Muṇḍaka* (T. P. L. iii, 1673). The *Vidyādhīśavijaya* mentions (ix, 31-32) among his senior contemporaries who adorned his Mutt, Yadupati, Roṭṭi Veṅkaṭabhaṭṭa etc.

WORKS

Some ten works are attributed to Vidyādhīśa, the most important of which is his gloss on the first five adhikaraṇas of the NS. (2) His gloss on the *Pramāṇalakṣaṇatikā* in 32 granthas, has been published from Dharwar.¹ His glosses on the (3) *VTNṭikā*,² *K. L-ṭikā*³ and (5) *Talavakārabhāṣya*,⁴ are yet to be attested by mss. The same is the case with his (6) *Dvītvavādārtha* (a tract devoted to the discussion of the concept of "dvītvā" in *Dvaitasāstra*). His other minor works are (7) *Janmāṣṭaminirṇaya*, and (8) *Viṣṇupañcakavratānirṇaya*. (9) His *Tithitrayānirṇaya* is noticed in Bhandarkar's Report 1882. In Madras T. C. ii, lb. no. 1432, an (10) *Omkāravādārtha*⁵ is attributed to him. (11) A small tract entitled *Raṅgojibhaṭṭadhikkāra* mentioning a few points raised at the debate with him, and attributed to Vidyādhīśa himself, is available in the collection of mss. made by my friend K. T. Pandurangi of Dharwar.

Vidyādhīśa's gloss on the NS. is a critical and scholarly exposition of the original. The way in which he has accomplished his task, makes one wish that he had completed his labour of love. It was however left to his favourite disciple Keśavācārya, to complete the work in a manner worthy of his Guru. Vidyādhīśa professes very great respect for Vyāsātīrtha and quotes often from his *Candrikā*, which is declared to have been

1. Karnatak Press, Dharwar.

2. S. K. p. 55.

3. M. M. Sangha List.

4. G. V. L. Cat.

5. Similar to the *Praṇavadarpaṇakhaṇḍana* of Vijayindra.

his *forte* by Keśava.¹ He also quotes from the *Nym.*, the *Nayavithi*² (pp. 146-47) the *Takkurā* (p. 149 b.), the *Vivarāṇa* and other standard works of the various systems of philosophy. He shows himself quite at home in grammatical subtleties. His knowledge of Mīmāṃsā is evident from his reply to the criticism of Appayya Dīkṣita that Madhva and his commentators have misunderstood and mis-represented the Mīmāṃsā attitude to “Vākyabheda” in the proposition :

अरुण्या एकहायन्या * * * गवा सोमं क्रीणाति ॥

Vidyādhīśa says that the viewpoint referred to by Madhva is actually to be found in certain Mīmāṃsā works³ (we are not told in which particular work it is found). In this connection, he rejects as roundabout, a particular defence of Madhva put up by Vijayīndra Tīrtha, in his *Madhvādhvakaṇṭhakoddhāra*.⁴ Though of limited compass, his only major work, the gloss on the NS, is a work of high quality. Unfortunately, his Pontifical term was rather a short one, crowded with polemical, proselytising and other activities and tours, which probably had left him little time to undertake extensive or substantial literary work or even to carry his excellent gloss on the NS. to the very end. Though his contribution to Dvaita literature does not, for this reason, stand comparison with that of some of his own contemporaries, in bulk, variety or range, he is, nevertheless, to be ranked as of equal calibre with most of them.

12. VIŚVEŚVARA TĪRTHA (C. 1580-1640)

There is reason to identify Viśveśvara Tīrtha, the author of a commentary on the *Aitareya Bhāṣya* of Madhva, with the fourteenth Pontiff of the Pejavar Mutt of Uḍipi. He was presumably a contemporary and disciple of Vādirāja Tīrtha.⁵ That he was considerably later than Jayatīrtha is proved not only by the existence of an epitome of the latter's *Nyāyasudhā* by Viśveśvara (Pejavar Mutt Mss. no. 330 Palmleaf Nāgarī), but also by the striking resemblance which the fourth introductory verse of his c. on the *Ait. Bhāṣya* (Mysore O. L. C-1048) bears to the second one of Jayatīrtha's NS :

1. विद्याधीशं चन्द्रिकाब्धिविक्रीडनविशारदम् ।
विद्यागुरुं कुलगुरुं नौमि तं मे जगद्गुरुम् ॥

(*Candrikāprakāśa*, introd. 7).

2. Another name for the 4th. chap. of the *Prakaraṇapañcikā* of Śālikanātha.

3. ननु, मीमांसकैरन्वयभेदाङ्गीकारेऽपि क्रीणातिपदार्थभूतक्रयभावनाया एकत्वेन पदैकवाक्यताया एव स्वीकृतत्वात्, वाक्यभेदस्य च भावनाभेदनिबन्धनत्वात्, न वाक्यभेदापत्तिरित्यतः क्रियाभेदस्यापि क्रियान्वयभेदद्वारैव वाक्यभेदप्रयोजकत्वात् * * * इत्याह—ततश्चेति । एवं च, यत् ‘कस्यचिन्मतमित्यन्यथानुवाद’ इति वल्गनं तदेवान्यथावादरूपमिति बोध्यम् । तस्य च तद्ग्रन्थपर्यालोचनायां स्पष्टत्वात् ॥

4. एतेनैव च, एतद्दोषपरिजिहीर्षया ‘अभ्युपगतम्’ इत्येतदभ्युपगमनीयम्’ इति व्याख्याय * * * *
केषाञ्चित्समाधानं निरस्तम् ॥ (p. 236) Cf. with this Vijayīndra's remarks in his *Madhvādhvakaṇṭhakoddhāra*, (p. 43.44).

5. This is supported by one of the scribe's verses in a manuscript of Vādirāja's *Gurvarthadīpikā* (Mys. C-1057) :

यद्वादिराजयतिवर्यमुसं प्रसन्न * * * हयास्यसुशिष्यसंघे ।
तस्याङ्घ्रिपङ्कजपरागविचित्रितश्रीविश्वेशतीर्थयतिराङ् भवतु प्रसन्नः ॥

‘नाम्नायार्थविचारणे कुशलिनो नो शब्दावारां निधौ
 स्नाता न्यायविचारदूरमतयः शिक्षानिष्कृतातिगाः ।
 अप्येवं सुरवर्यदैशिकमहाचार्यप्रसादान्मुदा
 भाष्यार्थग्रहणाय भाष्यविवृतौ यत्नं वयं कुर्महे¹ ॥ (Viśveśvara)
 ‘न शब्दाब्धौ गाढा न च निगमचर्चासु चतुरा
 न च न्याये प्रौढा न च विदितवेद्या अपि वयम् (NS).

Viśveśvara does not refer to any earlier c. on the *Ait. Bhāṣya*. He wields a clear and forcible style and his explanations are always to the point. His commentary is, therefore, eminently readable and most engaging. But, for some inscrutable reason, it has fallen into oblivion. More than three mss. of it are available in the T.P.L. It deserves to be published.

A ms. of his *Bhāgavadgītārthavivaraṇa* is deposited in the Anup Library, Bikaner (no. 1366) as reported in *Viśvajyoti*, V.V.R.I. Hoshiarpur, 1964, p. 32.

13. RĀGHAVENDRA TĪRTHA (1623–1671)

Rāghavendra Tirtha ranks as one of the memorable Saints of the Mādhva Calendar. After Vijayāndra Tirtha, he is the most influential commentator and authoritative exponent of the school of Madhvācārya. To this day, his memory is loved and cherished with deep reverence by the followers of Madhva, to which-ever Mutt they belong.

(1) For a full and contemporary account of his life and career, we are indebted to his nephew Nārāyaṇācārya whose *Rāghavendra Vijaya*,² is a fine poetic account in ten cantos, packed with historical information. (2) The *Gurugūṇastava* of Vādīndra, throws much welcome light on the contemporaries of Rāghavendra in the realm of letters as well as on his literary activities. (3) This is supplemented by valuable references to writers of other schools, in the works of Rāghavendra himself.

DATE

According to the Mutt lists, Rāghavendra was on the Pīṭha from 1624–1671. His predecessor Sudhīndra was a contemporary of Raghunātha Nāyaka³ (1614–1633) of Tanjore. Rāghavendra himself was a contemporary of the last of the Nāyaks of Tanjore: Vijayarāghava Nāyaka (1633–1673).

(1) Nārāyaṇa tells us in his biography that early in his life, i.e. before he became a Pontiff, Rāghavendra (then Veṅkaṭanātha) did, on one occasion, win the admiration of the famous scholar Yajñanārāyaṇa

1. Needless to say KEITH (Introd. to *A. Ā.*, Oxford, p. 12) is wrong in making Viśveśvara a contemporary and immediate disciple of Madhva himself. Viśveśvara also echoes Jayatīrtha's phrase :

अन्यैरन्यथा व्याख्यातानि (TP)

2. Ed. by S. Subbarao, Nirnayasagar Press, Bombay, 1898.

3. *Rāghavendra Vijaya*, ii, 53.

Dikṣita,¹ of the Tanjore court, when he came out successful in a disputation with a celebrated scholar of the Court who had commented on the *Śulba Sūtras* and again, later, when he vanquished opponents in a disputation over the term काकतालीय and the question of “तप्तमुद्रांकन” Two verses relating to these incidents have been cited from Nārāyaṇa’s work, in the *Sources of Vijayanagar History* :

तंजापुर्यामन्यदा शुल्बसूत्रं व्याख्यातारं यायजूकं यजन्तम् ।
राज्ञो विद्वान् यज्ञनारायणेज्याशीलोत्तंसः तं ननन्दातिमात्रम् ॥
कालेनास्मिन् काकतालीयशब्दे जेतारं तं वावदूकान् कवीन्द्रान् ।
तस्यां पुर्यां तप्तमुद्रांकने च प्रौढं मेने यज्ञनारायणस्तम् ॥ (vi, 16–17)

Of these, the first is grammatically faulty involving redundancy between the two epithets “यायजूकम्” and “यजन्तम्”. The English rendering of the verses as on p. 253 of the *Sources of Vijayanagar History* :

“At Tanjore, the great Yajñanārāyaṇa Dikṣita, who had performed sacrifices and who had commented on the *Śulbasūtras*, respected Veṅkaṭanātha (later Rāghavendra Tīrtha) very much . . . (and) underwent Mudrāṅkana by him” is very wide of the mark. It will be seen that if literally construed, the first two lines would convey that *not* Yajñanārāyaṇa, but Rāghavendra himself was the sacrificer (यायजूक) and commentator on the *Śulbasūtras* ! The accusatives यायजूकं, यजन्तं, शुल्बसूत्रव्याख्यातारम् cannot at all be connected with Yajñanārāyaṇa, as has been done by the author of *Sources of Vijayanagar History*. Nor is there independent evidence to show that Veṅkaṭanātha had ever performed any sacrifices or had commented on the *Śulbasūtras*. “यायजूक” would also mean a “habitual sacrificer”, which we know, Veṅkaṭanātha was *not*. The correct reading of the first verse should therefore be :

तंजापुर्यामन्यदा शुल्बसूत्रव्याख्यातारं यायजूकं जयन्तम्² ।
राज्ञो विद्वान् यज्ञनारायणेज्याशीलोत्तंसः तं ननन्दातिमात्रम् ॥

which would mean that Veṅkaṭanātha, had occasion to meet and vanquish in a disputation, a celebrated scholar of the Tanjore court, who had commented on the *Śulbasūtras* and who was a habitual sacrificer.

The commentator on the *Śulbasūtras* must have been a famous personage of his times; so much so that Nārāyaṇa has not thought it necessary to mention his name. That he was not the same as Yajñanārāyaṇa himself is obvious from the tenor of the verse itself, defective as it is in the quotation. Nor is it likely that he would have deemed it wise or politic to enter the lists himself. On the actual identity of this commentator, light is thrown by Rājacūḍāmaṇi Dikṣita, who tells us in one of the introductory verses to his *Tantraśikhāmaṇi* (T. P. L. XII, 6841) that his teacher Veṅkaṭeśvara Dikṣita, son of the celebrated Govinda Dikṣita (minister of two of the Nāyak

1. He was the son of Govinda Dikṣita who was minister to Acyutappa and Raghunātha Nāyaka and translated the *Pañcanadamāhātmyam* (pertaining to the legends connected with the Kṣetra of Tiruvaivāru) in 1605. He might be taken to have flourished between 1580–1645. He was the author of *Sāhityamīmāṃsā*.

2. The correct reading, I am happy to find, has been given in the new edn. of the *Rāghavendra-Vijaya*, published by Raja S. Gururajacharya, Nanjangud, 1958.

Rulers of Tanjore) wrote four works in all, including a commentary on the *Śulba Sūtras*¹ entitled *Śulba-Mimāṃsā* :

येनेष्टं साग्निचित्याप्तवाजपेयादिभिर्मखैः ।

कृतं साहित्यसाम्राज्यं नाम काव्यमनुत्तमम् ॥

व्यतानि शुल्बमीमांसा तथा कर्मान्तवार्त्तिकम् ।

टुप्टीकायाः कृता टीका वार्त्तिकाभरणाभिधा ॥

Here then is most plausible evidence to believe that the commentator on the *Śulbasūtras* mentioned by Nārāyaṇa was no other than Veṅkaṭeśvara Dīkṣita, son of Govinda Dīkṣita and brother of Yajñanārāyaṇa Dīkṣita himself. Needless to point out that in the light of the information supplied by Rājacūḍāmaṇi Dīkṣita about his teacher, the term “यायजूक” used by Nārāyaṇa would most admirably suit him who was a full-fledged “Dīkṣita” who had performed “Vājapeya” and other yajñas. Rājacūḍāmaṇi Dīkṣita’s *Tantraśikhāmaṇi* was composed in 1637. The meeting between his teacher Veṅkaṭeśvara Dīkṣita and Veṅkaṭanātha might have therefore taken place about 1620 A.D. in the reign of Raghunātha Nāyaka.

It is therefore impossible to accept the translation of the second half of the second verse in *Sources of Vijayanagar History*, that “the scholar Yajñanārāyaṇa himself underwent Mudrāṅkana (branding of the body with the symbols of Vaiṣṇavism) by him (Veṅkaṭanātha)”. (p. 253), for the simple reason that the latter was not yet a Sannyāsin (Yati) at the time, who alone has the right to administer the rite according to the religious laws of the Mādhyas. Here again the fact of the matter seems to have been simply this that Veṅkaṭanātha came out successful in a debate on the issue of the Śāstraic character of Taptamudrāṅkana, with some scholars at the court and that his arguments in defence of it were appreciated and admitted as conclusive, by Yajñanārāyaṇa Dīkṣita, in whose presence the discussion was conducted. This is all that Nārāyaṇa intends to convey : काकतालीयशब्दे तप्तमुद्राङ्कने च (विषये) वावदूकान् कवीन्द्रान् जेतारं तं (वेङ्कटनाथं) यज्ञनारायणः प्रौढमेने ॥ The evidence of manuscripts shows that Bhāskara Dīkṣita, disciple of Umāmaheśvara Dīkṣita (who in turn was a pupil of the redoubtable Nṛsiṃhāśrama,) wrote a work called *Taptamudrāvidrāvaṇam*, in which he condemned the practice of Taptamudrāṅkana advocated by the followers of Rāmānuja and Madhva, probably as a counterblast to Vijayīndra Tīrtha’s work in defence of it. A ms. of this work of Bhāskara Dīkṣita is preserved at the T.P.L. (xiii, 7523) and is dated in the reign of Shahaji (1684-1710). The author himself might probably be pushed half a century earlier and assigned to the period of Raghunātha Nāyaka (1614-1633) and Vijayarāghava. It was probably the same writer or some other equally determined opponent of the practice that engaged Veṅkaṭanātha in disputation over the issue. It is interesting

1. No manuscript of the work has been preserved at the T.P.L. But there is one at the Library of the Asiatic Society of Bengal. Commenting on the *Śulbasūtras* was a little unusual and Nārāyaṇa very probably thought and rightly too, that to mention the fact would suffice to give a clue to the identity of the person meant, without giving open offence to the great minister, whose brother it was that was engaged in disputation by Veṅkaṭanātha.

to notice that Bhāskara Dikṣita's grandpreceptor and Veṅkaṭanātha's grandpreceptor (Vijayīndra) were both contemporaries and the contemporaneity of the grand disciples is by no means an unsound deduction. Needless to stress that great is the historical value of Nārāyaṇa's biography of his uncle.

(2) The *Guruguṇastava* tells that Rāghavendra's commentary on the *Mīmāṃsā Sūtras*, was greatly admired by Nīlakaṇṭha Dikṣita, the great scholar Yājñika and Minister of Tirumala Nāyaka of Madura (1623-1659) who showed his regard by placing the work on the state-elephant and taking it round the city.¹

(3) In his gloss on the TP of Jayatīrtha, Rāghavendra refutes the criticisms of the Viśiṣṭādvaitin Mahācārya on the Dvaita-interpretation of the B. S. urged in his *Pārāśarya-Vijaya*.² This Mahācārya figures as the donee of a land grant in the village of Śīṅgareḍḍipalli, in the Nellore district from Vāḍa Pedda Veṅkaṭādri Nāyaningāru,³ in 1653.

(4) Rāghavendra seems to have spent the major part of his life in the southern districts of the Madras State, chiefly at Tanjore and Kumbakonam. Towards the latter part of his life, however, he seems to have moved to Mysore territory. In 1663 (Śobhakṛt) we see him receiving a grant of the village of Nallūru, surnamed Devarājapura, from Doḍḍa-Devarāja Wodeyar (1659-1672)⁴ of Mysore⁵ and a few years later, the village of Mantrālaya from an officer of the Governor of Adoni (1662-1687).

The date assigned to him in the Mutt list viz. 1624-1671, is thus corroborated by the above facts.⁶

LIFE

Rāghavendra's ancestors were of the Gautama gotra. His great-grandfather Kṛṣṇabhaṭṭa was tutor to Emperor Kṛṣṇadevarāya, in Viṇā. His grandfather was Kanakācalabhaṭṭa. His father Timmaṇṇācārya was also a good scholar and an artist in music. After the fall of Vijayanagar (1565), Timmaṇṇācārya migrated to Tuṇḍīramaṇḍala, (Kāñcī) and settled down at the town of Paṭṭaṇa (Sadras?) with his wife Gopikāmbā. They had three children : Gururāja, Veṅkaṭāmbā⁷ and Veṅkaṭanātha

1. मन्त्रिन्नीलकण्ठाभिधमखिमणिना भट्टतन्त्रानुबन्धे
ग्रन्थे तावत् त्वदीये करिणि गुणविदा रोपितेऽभ्यर्हणाय ॥ (Ver. 34).

Nilakaṇṭha is known to have arbitrated at a Śaiva-Vaiṣṇava dispute over the digging of a tank at Madura in 1626 : TAYLOR *His. Mss.* vol. ii, p. 149. His *Nilakaṇṭhaviṇayacampū* was composed in 1637-38. See Mm. Kuppusvami Sastri's Introd. to the edn. of the work.

2. See under TP—*Bhāvadīpa* of Rāghavendra.

3. Rangacharya, *Madras Insc.* ii, p. 1151. Venugopal and Butterworth, Nellore, 1905, p. 61.

4. Burgess, *Chronology of Modern India*.

5. Mysore Arch. Rep. 1917, pp. 58-59.

6. According to S. Srikantha Sastri, "Sanskrit Literature under Vijayanagar Kings (Vij Sex. Cen. C. Vol. p. 317) Rāghavendra was a contemporary of Bhallavipuri Bhairavabhaṭṭa and Virabhadra Paṇḍita. Vide also *Rāgh. Vij.* viii, 4.

7. Her son Nārāyaṇa was the biographer of Rāghavendra.

(the future Rāghavendra). Early in his life, Veṅkaṭanātha lost his father. His elder brother Gururāja took charge of him and had him educated under his brother-in-law Lakṣmīnārasimhācārya (of Madura) and got him married, when he came of age.

It was about this time that Veṅkaṭanātha came to be attached to the Mutt of Sudhīnpra Tīrtha at Kumbakonam, where his scholarship soon attracted the attention of the Svāmi.¹ It was probably at this time that he made his literary debut, as already referred to, at the Tanjore court. The more Sudhīndra saw of Veṅkaṭanātha, the greater grew his desire to make him succeed him as Pontiff of his Mutt. He, accordingly, communicated his wish to the young scholar but met with stout resistance. Veṅkaṭanātha pleaded that he was yet young and in no mood for renunciation, that he had not yet finished tasting and testing the pleasures of life, that his wife was still young² and his boy not yet initiated into Gurukula.³ But Sudhīndra would not take a refusal. He continued his pleading and persuasions and finally succeeded in convincing the young scholar of the vanity and evanescence of worldly attachments, telling him of the great destiny that was in store for him. Under these repeated importunities, the higher aspirations of Veṅkaṭanātha warmed up and began to thaw. He was however, thrown into restless cogitations for some time. One day, a vision appeared before him and that practically settled his future. The ordination was arranged to take place at Tanjore,⁴ to avoid trouble from the young wife. In or about 1621 A.D.⁵ Veṅkaṭanātha was duly ordained a monk under the name of Rāghavendra Tīrtha. Two years later, Sudhīndra Tīrtha died at Ānegondi and Rāghavendra became the Head⁶ of his Mutt.

Rāghavendra's literary activities date from his coming to the Pīṭha. After a short stay at Kumbakonam, he seems to have gone on a pilgrimage

1. It is not possible to agree with R. Nagaraja Sarma, (*Hindu*, Madras, Aug. 4, 1936 p. 9, col. 1) that Rāghavendra was for sometime a student under Vijayindra and studied partly under him and partly under Sudhīndra. The *Rāghavendrāvijaya* is quite clear on the point that it was only under Sudhīndra that Rāghavendra studied Dvaita Vedānta, and also advanced works on Grammar and other Śāstras. The portrait of Rāghavendra referred to by Dr. Nagaraja Sarma, preserved in the Mutt at Kumbakonam does not represent R. in his pre-ordination days, as a pupil engaged in study, but as an ascetic in worship. For further remarks on this question vide my paper in *N.I.A.* 11, no. 12, March 1940.

2. बाला भार्या बालको नोपनीतो बालश्चाहं नाश्रमे भेज्मि वाञ्छा । (*Rāgh. Vij.* vi. 29).

3. His name is stated to have been Lakṣmīnārāyaṇa, who is credited with a c. on *Rgbhāṣyaṭikā* (*Gurugunastava*, 27) of which we have a Nāgarī ms. (Mys. 2981).

4. On the banks of the Vaḍavār.

5. The evidence on this point is furnished by Nārāyaṇa (vi. 52) :

जानीहि त्वं वेङ्कटार्यं त्वदार्ये वासो यन्मे वत्सरद्वन्द्वमेव ॥

in a speech put into the mouth of Sarasvatī. This disposes of the contention of Nagaraja Sarma about R's having been a student under Vijayindra, as dates would make this impossible.

6. Tradition refers to a senior disciple of Sudhīndra, Yādavendra, whose claims to the succession are said to have been set aside by the Ruler of Tanjore, in favour of Rāghavendra. This Yādavendra passed away at Yadugiri (on R. Kṛṣṇā) and was probably the Guru of Lakṣmīnātha Tīrtha of the Vyāsarāya Mutt.

tour, visiting Ramesvaram, Ramnad, Śrīraṅgam and Madura.¹ Then he moved westwards to Uḍipi and Subrahmaṇya and thence to Pandharpur², Kolhapur and Bījāpur. At Kolhapur, he is said to have made a long stay³ and at Bījāpur, he made many converts.⁴ He returned ultimately to Kumbakonam, passing through Tirupati, Kāñcī, Vṛddhācalam and Śrīmuṣṇam.⁵ His frequent tours, up and down, do not seem to have interfered with his literary activities in the least. He wrote his works at intervals of his tours, as well as on the move. A good pen-picture of Rāghavendra, during the latter half of his life at Kumbakonam, is given by Nārāyaṇa.⁶

By 1663, he left for Mysore where he received a grant from Doḍḍa Devarāya Odeyar. He seems to have moved further north after a time and finally settled down at Mantrālaya, a village on the Tuṅgabhadra river in the Ādoni taluk of the present Āndhra State, (12 KMs from the Mantrālayam Road Railway station). It appears from the Mackenzie Mss. that the village was granted to him rent-free, by Veṅkaṇṇa-Pant, Dewan of Sidi Masanad Khan, Governor of Ādoni (1662-1687). *Vide Madras Dt. Gazette* Reprint 1916, Ch. XV ADONI TALUK, p. 213. There, on the banks of the sacred river, he passed away, in 1671, (Virodhikṛt) and his mortal remains, which lie enshrined there, attract thousands of pilgrims of all communities, all the year round.

WORKS

Over forty works have been attributed to Rāghavendra. Most of these are cc. on the works of Madhva, Jayatīrtha and Vyāsartīrtha, the three great luminaries of the Dvaita-system. The rest include a couple of original works and direct commentaries on the Upaniṣads and other works. “Bhāvadīpa” is the general title of a majority of his works. His writings are characterized by remarkable clarity of thought, simplicity of expression and compactness. Through his singularly unassuming commentaries, he has brought the depth of thought of even the most abstruse works of the Dvaita system within the understanding of the student of average equipment in Śāstras and therein lies the secret of his success and fame and the universal popularity of his works. Though chronologically the last among the major non-polemical commentators of the school, his works cover the *widest range and variety of texts comprising the most important works of all the three main authorities on the Dvaita system*: Madhva, Jayatīrtha and Vyāsartīrtha as well as direct expositions of some of the basic texts themselves

1. *Rāgh. Vij.* viii, 47.

2. *Op. cit.* viii, 67.

3. *ibid.*

4. Viii, 89. The Mutt of Rāghavendra, to this day, has a large following in the Bāgalkot and other talukas of the Bījāpur district and elsewhere in Uttara-Karnataka.

5. viii, 73.

6. It is clear from Nārāyaṇa that R's permanent residence was in the Śaiva Maṭha facing the southern gate of the Kumbheśvara temple, at Kumbakonam, which had passed into the hands of Vijayindra, after his disputation with Śaiva Guru there. See *op. cit.* ix, 37-39.

like the Ṛgveda (adhyāyas i-iii), the Upaniṣads, Gītā, B. S. not to speak of an independent commentary on the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā Sūtras. The volume of his output is, accordingly, greater. And he brings to bear on the exposition of these texts a profound learning in different Śāstras, a clear and simple style and a very lucid way of presenting even the most technical points of Śāstras. He is therefore entitled to be regarded as the foremost among the major nonpolemical writers of the Post Vyāsatīrtha period.

(1-6) DAŚA PRAKARAṆAS

His glosses on six out of the ten Prakaraṇas of Madhva, elucidate the respective cc. of Jayatīrtha, omitting only the four already commented upon by Vyāsatīrtha. Excepting that on the *KN*. (Aufrecht p. 83) all the other glosses of his have been printed. The gloss on the *VTN* is the biggest of them, in 3700 granthas. Next comes that on *Td-t* in 1450 granthas (Bombay, 1898). He keeps the needs of the critical student in mind in selecting passages for his elucidation from the original. A notable example of this is to be found in the cryptic comment of J. in his c. on *Td* : *Ādhārā-dheyabhāvābhāvāt* while referring to one of the three alternative ways in which the Advaita philosopher may interpret the phrase 'tadākāra' in describing the manner in which the psychosis produced by the study of Vedantic texts may take the 'form of the Ātman' and remove ignorance about the true nature of Ātman without however making the Ātman the object of such knowledge (*tadviṣaya*). The discussion arises on the basis of M's criticism that the probans of 'dṛśyatvam' relied upon by the Monist to establish the 'mithyātva' of the universe is 'anaikāntika' as it extends to the Ātman also as it must necessarily be an object of knowledge, if knowledge of Ātman derived from study of Vedānta should be able to remove ignorance of its true nature. Discussing the issue, J. points out that there are only three ways in which the concept of 'tadākāratva' of the psychosis in question can be defined,—the last one being 'Sa ākāro yasya'. After explaining the difficulties which beset the first two alternatives, J. goes on to point out that the last one is also untenable as there is no 'ādhārādheyabhāva' relation between Ātman and its 'form' (*ākāra*) to justify the claim of 'tadākāratva' of the vṛtti. The glosses of Vedeśa and Śrīnivāsa have not brought out the full significance of J's criticism. Rāghavendra gives us a lucid explanation of the whole point as follows: As a rule, the ādhāra of the form (*ākāra*) is the possessor of the form. If then, Ātman is to be conceived as the ākārin (possessor of the form of the psychosis), the latter will have to be regarded as the ādhāra (container) and the Ātman as the contained (*ādheya*) of the psychosis. But this is impossible; for according to Monist philosophy, Ātman is unlimited' (*aparicchinna*) and cannot be 'contained' in anything like the psychosis which is 'limited' (*paricchinna*). The relation 'of ādhārādheyabhāva' between the 'ākārin' and the 'ākāra' viz. the Ātman and its psychosis is thus unsustainable. This makes the whole point of J's criticism crystal clear. See Ragh.'s gloss. on *Td-t*).

(7-12) SŪTRA PRASTHĀNA

There are altogether six works of Rāghavendra on the Sūtra-Prasthāna. One of them the *Nyāyamuktāvali* (P) is a brief exposition of the adhikaraṇaśārīras of the B. S. His *Tantradīpikā* (referred to in *NS-Pari-mala*, pp. 208 and 286) is a learned Vṛtti on the Sūtras, directly, in 3000 granthas, bringing together, where necessary, the explanations of earlier works and cc. like the *NS. Candrikā*, *TD*, *Nayacandrikā* and a few (minor) commentaries also. It does not attempt any criticism of the interpretations of other schools, as the purpose of the work is purely constructive. The coordination of sense of different adhikaraṇas and cross-references to internal evidence of sūtras is also impressively done. Among the Post-Vyāsārāya cc. referred to, is one by Vijayīndra.¹ The work is a very useful compendium of Mādhva interpretation of the B.S. and has been printed. His (9) *Bhāvadīpa*² on the TP. of Jayatīrtha, is a voluminous work in 12300 granthas. It refers to both the *Tantradīpikā*³ and the *Prakāśa*⁴ on the *Candrikā*. The scope of the work is both critical⁵ and expository. One of the new works cited and criticized here, is the *Pārāśaryavijaya* of Mahācārya,⁶ whose strictures on the Sūtra-interpretation of Madhva, are examined here. (i, 1, 27, p. 64 lines 10-24; i, 1, 6, p. 39). Certain criticisms of Appayya Dīkṣita, too, have been dealt with (iii, 3, 61, p. 341 b; p. 29 lines 18-23; p. 19, 4-6). Certain alleged grammatical inaccuracies in the expressions used even by Jayatīrtha, raised by Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita, in his *Tattvakaustubha*, are also defended on good authority, precedents and sanction. The *Tattvapradīpa* is quoted over fifty times and these quotations are valuable in fixing the text of it, in cases of difficulty. There are references to several other glosses on the TP. (i, 2, 17, p. 84-85; iii, 3, 27 p. 318 b) including the *Candrikā*.

(10) The commentary on the *Tātparyā-Candrikā* of Vyāsartīrtha called *Prakāśa*, (P) is another lengthy work in 18000 granthas. It is eulogized by Vādīndra in *Guruguṇastava* (ver. 7) and seems to have preceded the author's c. on the TP, in which it is referred to.⁷ The views embodied in *Nayaviveka*, *Nibandhana*, *Tantracūḍāmaṇi* (Mīmāṃsā), the *Śrīkaṇṭha-Bhāṣya*⁸ and its c. *Śivārkamaṇidīpikā* by Appayya Dīkṣita, as well

1. cf. गुरुपादकृतोप्यस्ति संग्रहो हृदयंगमः (Ver. 2) Cf. also a quotation from it under iii, 3, 37 dismissing Appayya's objection that Madhva's interpretation of "kratu" there, is opposed to Mīmāṃsaka tradition.

2. Nirnayasagar Press, Bombay, 1902.

3. i, 3, p. 42; 239 b; P. 31, 7; P. 64, 4; 70, 12.

4. ii. p. 39; 122 b.

5. नूतनैरुहिता ये तु दोषास्तेषामलग्नताम् ।

संप्रदर्शयितुं चातः प्रसन्नाः सन्तु सज्जनाः ॥

6. Śāstramuktāvali Ser. 43, Conjeeveram, 1912.

7. P. 30, line 7 (Bby.). But the *Prakāśa* itself (i, 4, adh. 7, p. 842 b) refers to the TP—*Bhāvadīpa*.

8. This Bhāṣya is not noticed by Vyāsartīrtha in his *Candrikā*. The omission is made good by Rāghavendra, who by quoting both from the *Śivārkamaṇidīpikā* (p. 413, 842 b) and the *Nyāyarakṣāmaṇi* of Appayya, has brought the critical literature of his school up to date. He has also criticized Mahācārya's views expressed in the *Pārāśaryavijaya*, here, (pp. 792, 818, 842 etc.).

as those in his *Madhvamataviḍhvāṁsana* are quoted and criticised. Mention is made of (a) the *Upasamhāra Vijaya*, (b) *Kaṇṭakoddhāra* and (c) *Paratattva-Prakāśikā*¹ of Vijayīndra. The author gives ample proofs of his profound knowledge of the doctrinal and interpretational niceties of the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* and *Vyākaraṇa Śāstras* by discussing a great many of their *adhikaraṇas* and *sūtras* referred to in the *Candrikā*. So numerous are these occasions that it would be difficult to cite examples. (See pp. 550, 590-92 etc.). The *Śrutaprakāśikā* on the *Śribhāṣya* (pp. 543, 554, 610 b), the *Nayacandrikā* of Nārāyaṇa Paṇḍita (756 b) and certain earlier cc. on the *Candrikā* (pp. 604, 670 b) are quoted in the course of the work. There are references also to the *Kalpataru-Parimala* of Appayya (p. 770 b) and to certain critics of Madhva's *Bhāṣya* (829) and to the *Siddhāntakaumudī* of Bhaṭṭoji (p. 12, line 6).

His *Tattvamañjari* is a detailed exposition of the *Aṇubhāṣya* in 1900 granthas. It does not mention any earlier commentaries on the original.

The *Nyāyasudhā-Parimala*¹ is one of the most popular and substantial commentaries on the NS. Tradition has shown its appreciation of this learned work by conferring the epithet of "Parimalācārya" on the author. It runs to 19300 granthas. The author quotes a number of earlier cc. on the text (i, 1, p. 30 b; i, 1, 38; ii, 1, 221 b; and 232) including that of Yadupati (i, 4, p. 199) which he criticizes; iv, 2, p. 20; i, 1, 15 and i, 1, 49 b). He also quotes from *Nayacandrikā* (i, 1, 14 b) and *Sannyāyaratnāvalī* (i, 1, 129 b). He makes a passing allusion (i, 4, adh. 6, p. 199-2, 3) to the view of some that the śloka "प्रपञ्चो यदि विद्येत etc., are no part of the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*, but are really part of the *Kārikās* of Gauḍapāda".²

As it refers to several of his other major works such as the *Tantra-dīpikā*, *Ny.—Muktāvalī*, *Tattvamañjari* and to his cc. on the *Tarkatāṇḍava* we and *Candrikā* (p. 320) have to dismiss the story of its having been written in his student days (before his ordination) as an absurd invention.

ṚG AND UPANIṢAD-PRASTHĀNAS

The works under this head include (13) a commentary on the first three *Adhyāyas* (40 *Sūktas*) of the *Ṛgveda* (the same portion as is covered by Madhva's *Ṛg Bhāṣya*), known as *Mantrārthamañjari* (P) and (14-22) lucid expositions (called *Khaṇḍārthas*) of nine out of the ten *Upaniṣads* commented upon by Madhva (excepting the *Aitareya*).³ His c. on the *Kena* (i, 4) refers to an earlier c. In *Muṇḍaka*, i. 5, his exposition of "Parā" and "Aparā" *Vidyās*, as aspects of the same thing, on the analogy of

1. Bombay. A gloss on the *Parimala* has been added to the T. P. L.

2. The "Upaniṣadic Theory" of the disputed *Kārikās* of Gauḍapāda, has already been dealt with on pp. 165-167.

3. All these glosses have been published from Bombay. A new edn. has been published from Dharwar in the thirties. The gloss on *Ait. Up.* included in these edns. is not by Rāghavendra but a later writer who describes himself as a disciple of Bhāṛakari Veṅkaṭavarāhācārya.

Pravṛtta and Nivṛtta Karmas, as defined by Madhva, is original and attractive. He does not fight shy of the obvious drift of *Muṇḍaka* v, 8; and acknowledges his indebtedness to the c. of Vyāsa Tīrtha, in writing his gloss on the *Taitt.* (granthas 885). He has also given a clear lead in the interpretation of the somewhat intriguing text न वा अरे पत्युः * * वीणायै वाद्यमानायै (Brh. Up.) The *Brh. Up.* gloss is the biggest of his commentaries on the Upaniṣads running to 3300 granthas. That on the *Chān. Up.* termed-‘a new discovery’ in the Baroda O. L. Cat. (XV), has been printed along with the rest of his glosses, many years ago. We have also a ms. of it at the T. P. L. (iii, 1620). Rāghavendra’s cc. on the Upaniṣads, were evidently the reactions from the Dvaitic side to the Upaniṣad-Vyākhyās of Raṅgarāmānuja, who is anterior to 1707.

GĪTĀ-PRASTHĀNA

We have altogether three works of Rāghavendra on the Gītā Prasthāna, not to speak of a *Gītārthamañjari* attributed to him. (24) His c. on *GB-Prameyadīpikā* is referred to by Vādīndra in his *Gurugunastava*, is preserved at the Mysore O. L. (C-340 Dev.)¹. That on (25) *G. T.-Nyāyadīpikā* is known only through Vādīndra’s reference (ver. 26) : गीतातात्पर्यटीका-विवरणमकरोत् ।

His *Gītārthasaṅgraha*, more popularly known as *Gītā-Vivṛti*, is a lucid original c. on the Gītā printed several times in India.² Its apt and convincing explanations have won the admiration of followers of other schools of thought also. It runs to 3700 granthas. The author has made judicious use of the *G. B.* and *G. T.* of Madhva and of the ṭīkāś of Jayatīrtha.

OTHER WORKS

The other works of Rāghavendra include cc. on (26) the *Pramāṇa-Paddhati*³ and (27) *Vādāvali*⁴ of Jayatīrtha and (28) a recondite c. on the *Tarkatāṇḍava* of Vyāsarāya (entitled *Nyāyadīpa*), a c. on the *Mbh. T. N.* known as *Bhāvasaṅgraha*⁵ and (30) a complete and fascinating c. on the entire Mīmāṃsā Sūtras of Jaimini, following the Bhāṭṭa school and termed *Bhāṭṭasaṅgraha*.^(m) The c. on the *Tarkatāṇḍava* running to about 8000 granthas, has been published in full, by the Govt. O. L. Mysore. It is the most illuminating c. on the original, very helpful in identifying and clarifying the quotations from the *Mañi* and its cc. occurring in Vyāsartīrtha’s work. Rāghavendra quotes Rucidatta (i, 52) and Narahari (181). The work dives deep into logical subtleties with admirable ease and felicity. The *Bhāṭṭasaṅgraha*⁶ is a remarkable work, valuable not only by reason of

1. A Tulu Ms. (palm leaf) no. 291, is reported from the Pejavar Mutt.

2. It is one of the representative commentaries included in the Gujarati Press Edn., Bby. 1908.

3. Called *Bhāvadīpa*. Printed Dharwar.

4. Printed at Bombay.

5. M. M. Sangha List and p. 317 Vij. Sex. cen. Com. Vol. IOL p. 604.

6. Mysore O. L. (A 421 and 416).

its inherent worth but also as one of the very few works written by Dvaitins on other systems of thought. Under each adhikaraṇa, the Pūrvapakṣa and the Siddhānta are summed up. The work is written in the best style of the author and is based on a critical study of the Śābara Bhāṣya, the works of Kumārila and others :

भाष्यवार्तिकटीकादिनानाग्रन्थावमशिना ।

राघवन्द्रेण यतिना कृतोज्यं भाट्टसंग्रहः ॥

The full text of *Bhāṭṭasamgraha* has been published in two vols. (1974 and 1977) by the Raghavendra Svami Brindavan Office, Mantralaya (A. P.)

Vyāsatīrtha was the first to harness the principles of Mīmāṃsā exegesis to the reinforcement of M's interpretation of the B. S. in his *TC*. His disciple Vijayīndra explained many of these nyāyas in a separate work. He also wrote another work on the general principles of Mīmāṃsā for the benefit of the followers of M., among whom the study of Pūrvamīmāṃsā was sadly neglected. Vyāsarāja's *TC* and other works had however made a good knowledge of Mīmāṃsā indispensable for a proper understanding and intelligent appreciation of his exposition of M's thought and of the Pūrvapakṣa and Siddhānta positions of the Brahmanmīmāṃsā as expounded by him. There was therefore a real need for a brief but complete and authoritative c. on the entire Sūtras of Jaimini, in the light of their Bhāṣya, Vārttika and ṭikā written by an expert Mīmāṃsaka from within the Mādhva school itself to rouse and sustain active interest in the study of Mīmāṃsā among the followers of M. so as to enable them to be in line with scholars from other schools of Vedānta well-equipped in Mīmāṃsā. Rāghavendra was fully equipped for this task having mastered the study of Pūrvamīmāṃsā and Karmakāṇḍa of Vedas in his early days in the famous centres of Śāstraic learning such as Madurai and Kumbakonam in Tamilnadu which were the home of veterans in several Śāstras in the 16th and 17th centuries.

He adopts a distinctive method of exposition of the Mīmāṃsā Sūtras in this work modelled on J's method in dealing with the adhi-s of the B. S. It eschews all verbiage and digression and gives a brief, clear and compact interpretation of the Sūtras in bold relief explaining all the organic details of the adhi-s such as their saṅgati, viśaya, doubt, Pūrvapakṣa, its arguments and vantage and the Siddhānta, its arguments and vantage. So clear, precise and authentic is Rāghavendra's handling of the subject that even seasoned Mīmāṃsakas will find its study refreshingly illuminating and rewarding in many ways.

(31-37) MISCELLANEOUS WORKS

Besides the above-mentioned works, tradition ascribes to Rāghavendra cc. on the Ṛg, Yajus and Sāma Vedas and short glosses on certain Sūktas like the *Puruṣasūkta*,^(p) *Gharma*, *Samudra*, *Pavamāna*, *Hiranyagarbha* and *Āmbhṛṇi*. These have been collectively referred to in the *Guruguṇastava* (ver. 28).

The cc. on the *Ṛgveda* is probably the same as the *Mantrārthamañjarī*. Those on the other two Vedas are not extant though mentioned in the *Guruguṇastava* (ver. 30).

Besides these, tradition speaks of four minor Stotras of his (38) *Rāmāmṛtamañjarī*, very probably the same as the work in *Sragdharā*, referred to by Nārāyaṇa, in his biography : (i, 12), *Kṛṣṇacaritamañjarī* and *Prātas-saṁkalpagadya* (p). His c. on *Aṇu-Madhvavijaya* is said to have been composed before his ordination.

1. VIDYĀNIDHI TĪRTHA (1430-1444)*

AS already pointed out, it was in the time of Rāmacandra Tīrtha, that the bifurcation of what now go by the names of Rāghavendrasvāmi and Uttarādi Mutts took place. There are conflicting traditions about the actual reasons and circumstances that led to this bifurcation. These have strained the relations between these Mutts which have been further embittered over an age-long controversy about the inheritance and present possession of the idol of Mūlarāma, believed to have been got by Madhva from the Kalinga treasury, through Narahari Tīrtha, and inherited by his successors along the line of Kavindra Tīrtha.

According to the traditions of the Uttarādi Mutt, Vidyānidhi was the *second disciple* ordained by Rāmacandra Tīrtha. The *Gurucaryā* states (ii, 23-24 seq.) that he was a Tuḷuva and had come to study under Rāmacandra Tīrtha and had won his regard by his devotion and intelligence.¹ It is *not* however clear from the account in the *Gurucaryā*, if he had already been *ordained by Rāmacandra*. H. K. Vedavyāsācāra (*Gurucarite*) has denied it and advanced his own theory as to how he came to found the Uttarādi Mutt. These contentions have been repudiated by M. S. Katti, in his booklet *Gurucaritevimarśe* (Dharwar, 1950).

It seems to be a more or less undisputed fact that Vidyānidhi was a Tuḷu Brahmin. This is recognized by the *Satkathā* (1896 edn. and 1931 edn. p. 35), and by the *Gurucaryā* (ii, 24), and acquiesced in by M. S. Katti, in his book. He is assigned a *Pontifical rule of sixtyeight years* in the Caramaśloka of the Uttarādi Mutt :

यद्भक्त्या मूलरामाचपिटिका त्यक्तभूमिका ।

विद्यानिधिर्धियं दद्यात् अष्टषष्ट्यब्दपूजकः ॥

This is clearly untenable. This anomaly is due to the pushing back of Madhva's date by two cycles, in the old Mutt date of 1040-1117 Śaka. This is utterly inconsistent with the date of birth of Madhva indicated in his own *Mbh. T. N.* and has to be rejected on so many other grounds also. It is interesting to note that in the Genea-chronological Table of the Uttarādi Mutt published by M. V. Shingre, Poona (1953), presumably with the approval of the Svami of the Mutt, the Pontifical period of Vidyānidhi has been *cut down to thirtyone years*, three months and fifteen days, with a view to fitting it in with the otherwise settled chronology of the later Pontiffs. The *Gurucaryā* (ii, 40) assigns to Vidyānidhi *seven years*, nine months and

1. तदास्मन्निकटे ग्रन्थव्यासंगार्थं समागतः ।

सदाचारादिसम्पन्नः तुलुवो बुद्धिमानपि ।

विश्वासवानयं विद्यानिधिः संस्थानमर्हति ॥ (ii, 24).

thirteen days of Pontifical rule.¹ These different estimates only confirm the suspicion that the chronology of Mādhva Pontiffs, for the interim period between Jayatīrtha and Vyāsartīrtha, is quite *vague and uncertain*. This is not surprising as it was during this period that the “Maṭha-traya” was crystallizing and no reliable chronology has been maintained on account of the vicissitudes of their fortunes. I have, therefore, distributed the interval of 56 years between the date of demise of Jayatīrtha and the accession of Raghunātha Tīrtha (1444) among the *five intervening Pontiffs*, in my own tentative way, keeping in view all the relevant data about them. I have accordingly assigned to Vidyānidhi a period of fourteen years rule from 1430-1444, which seems fairly reasonable.

Aufrecht in his *Catal. Cat.* calls him the seventh successor of Ānanda-tīrtha, probably counting Jayatīrtha as the second, instead of as the fifth. Only one work, a c. on the *Gītā*, is traditionally ascribed to Vidyānidhi. No ms. of it has, however, been discovered. His tomb is at Ergola.

2. VEDEŚA BHIKṢU (C. 1570-1620)

Vedeśa Bhikṣu describes himself in his works as a disciple of both Raghūttama and his successor Vedavyāsa Tīrtha (1596-1619). The latter has been confounded with the famous author of the *Nym.*, by Keith² and Aufrecht.³ A careful scrutiny of the introductory verses⁴ and colophons of his works would, however, show that this is baseless. Nothing is however definitely known about his personal history. The epithet “Bhikṣu”⁵, taken up by him, shows that he was a Sannyāsin. He was what is known as a “Biḍi-Sannyāsi” or stray ascetic,—not the Pontiff of any Mutt. He has ten works to his credit which are all of them illuminating glosses, some on the Upaniṣad-Bhāṣyas of Madhva and the rest on a few of Jayatīrtha’s works. All save three of his works have been printed. His tomb is at Maṇūr on the *Bhimā* river, which was a centre of learning right from the days of the predecessors of Raghūttama himself.

WORKS

(1) Vedeśa’s gloss on the *Tattvodyota-Pañcikā* (P)⁶ runs to 1500

1. ततो रक्ताक्षिशरदि चतुर्थ्यां कृष्णपक्षके ।
कार्तिके स्वर्गमगमत् विद्यानिधिमुनीश्वरः ।
सप्ताब्दं नवमासं तु त्रयोदशदिनाधिकम् ।
महासंस्थानमकरोत् * * * ॥ (ii, 139-40).
2. Mill Mss. 90 (Bodleian Cat. P. 62, col. 2).
3. *Catal. Cat.* P. 619.
4. रघूत्तमगुरुप्रोक्तो भावो जयमुनेरिह ।
वेदेशभिक्षुणा बालबोधायाप्ततयेरितः (K. L. gloss)
सक्तान्तःकरणान् रघूत्तमयतीनानम्य
विद्यागुरुन्वेदव्यासयतींश्च * * (PP. gloss)
गुरुरघूत्तमयोगिसुशिक्षितो जयमुनेरभिसन्धिरयं मम ।
प्रकटितोऽलवबोधहृदबुजस्थितरमापतितृप्तिमभीप्सता ॥ (Td. gloss)
5. इतिश्रीमच्छांदोग्यभाष्यस्य टीकायां वेदव्यासतीर्थपूज्यपादशिष्यवेदेशभिक्षुविरचितायाम् (Colophon to gloss on *Chān. Up. Bhāṣya*).
6. Bombay, 1896 and Belgaum.

granthas. It throws fresh light on many passages of the original. He quotes several times from earlier commentaries¹ and sometimes criticizes them.² He has quoted also from the *Samkṣepaśārīraka* (i, 167)³ and the *Saptapadārthi* of Śivāditya and a c. thereon.⁴ Similar glosses on Jayatīrtha's cc. on (2-3) the *PL* and *VTN*. have also been ascribed to him; but no mss. have been traced. (4) The gloss on *KL* has been published. (5) His *KN* is mentioned by Aufrecht p. 83.

(6-9) Vedeśa has commented upon four out of the ten Upaniṣad Bhāṣyas of Madhva : the *Ait. Chān. Kāṭha* and *Talavakāra*(p). The first is available in ms.⁵ That on the *Chān. Up.* entitled *Padārthakaumudī*(p) is the biggest, running to 6000 granthas. The gloss on *Kāṭha* (Bby 1905) quotes and criticizes⁶ the Bhāṣya of Śaṅkara on this Up. These references are valuable not only for a comparative study of the two Bhāṣyas but also for establishing the genuineness of the c. attributed to Śaṅkara. The Bhāṣyārtha and the Khaṇḍārtha are both given by the gloss. (10) *Pramāṇa Paddhati Vyākhyā*(p)⁷ in 1400 granthas is found to quote about seven times⁷ from the gloss of Vijayīndra Tīrtha and criticize it thrice.⁸ He refers to another gloss also (pp. 40 and 131) not yet identified.

Vedeśa's works are all of them well-written and afford very valuable help in understanding the originals. His style is clear and his comments always brief and to the point. He is to be reckoned as one of the important glossators of the school though he has not commented on the more important or leading dialectical works of the system. Among the minor commentators, he stands foremost.

3. KEŚAVĀCĀRYA (1605-1660)

Keśava was the favourite disciple⁹ and according to the *S. K.* (1896, p. 81). the younger brother of Vidyādhīśa But according to the

1. Pp. 11 lines 10, 22, 17; 10-12; 23, 13-14; 24; 4; 25, 14; 40, 5-10; 43, 4.

2. P. 8, lines 7-11; 13, 7-15; 16, 24-26.

3. P. 39, 4.

4. तच्च प्राक्संबद्धस्वाभावविरह रूपत्व इति । प्राक्संबद्धस्वाभावः प्रागभावः तद्विरहश्च प्रध्वंसः तत्सरूपत्वं वर्तमानत्वमिति तत्फक्किकार्यः । (39, 7)

5. Pejavar Mutt Mss. Tulu, palmleaf.

6. P. 3, 6-9; i, 1, 20; P. 8, 8-9; i, 2, p. 17; 28; 36, 11, 18; 41, 11.

7. (a) केचित्तु आकांक्षादेर्दोषाभावत्वेनोपयोगाभावाल्लक्षणान्तरमाह इत्याहुः (iii, 1) (b) केचित्तु ननु पक्षाभासस्यानुमितिप्रतिबन्धकत्वं वदता तस्य हेत्वाभासत्वमवश्याभ्युपेयम्, अनुमितेर्हेत्वाभासमात्रप्रतिबद्धत्वनियमात् इत्यत आह—साधनमिति । तथा च, तयोरेव नियमभंग इति भावः इत्याहुः (ii, 78) (c) केचित्तु हेतुसमानाधिकरणप्रतियोगिविरोध्यभावप्रतियोगिसाध्यसामानाधिकरण्यमित्यर्थः । अतो न नियमस्य व्याप्तिवत्त्वेनात्माश्रयाशङ्केत्याहुः । अत्र व्यधिकरणे नदीपूरादावव्याप्तिः कथं परिहरणीयेति चिन्त्यम् (iii, 1) (d) रश्मिद्वारेत्यस्य तत्तदिन्द्रियैकदेशद्वारेत्यर्थ इति केचित् p. 102 Cf. Vij. p. 148 Dharwar Edn.

8. (a) एतेन तदपि निरस्तं यत्केनचित् उक्तं—तथा तथा प्रतिपन्नत्वमज्ञात्वापि विप्रतिपत्तिवाक्यस्थपदैः कोट्युपस्थितौ सत्यां मानससंशयाभावात् कथमेतत् नहि साधारणो धर्म एवात्र नास्तीति (ii, 1) and (b) Vedeśa p. 122, 14-17 etc.

9. श्रीमद्विद्याधीशमुनीन्वन्दे गुरुन्मम ।

तेषामाज्ञां पुरस्कृत्य करोमि सौधगूढार्थशेषवाक्यार्थचन्द्रिकाम् ।

(Ver. 12-14, of his gloss on *NS.*)

Vidyādhīśa-Vijaya and his own gloss *NS-Vākyārthavinoda*, he was only a cousin of Vidyādhīśa. In addition to Vidyādhīśa, Keśava refers to two other teachers of his : Ānandabhaṭṭāraka (ver. 10 of his c. on NS) and Śrīnivāsa,¹ who scored many victories against Māyāvādins (ver. 11). These according to the *S. K.* were his own father and elder brother respectively.

Keśava professes very great regard for Vidyādhīśa whom he dubs an “incarnation of Vyāsātīrtha”.² He also applies to him the epithet “Gururāja,” and his own works are sometimes, for this reason, designated as “Gururājīya.” This has caused some confusion between him and Vādirāja who is also referred to as “Gururāja”.

Sixteen works have been attributed to Keśava in the *G. V. L. Cat. Kumbakonam*, (p. 109). These include cc. on the ten *Prakaraṇas*. In the *Mys. O. L.* have been preserved his glosses on (1) *Td-ṭikā* (A-388) in 2000 granthas, (2) *VTNṭ* (p)³ (C-2329) and TS (4334). The *G. V. L. Cat.* also ascribes to him two cc. on the *Candrikā*, a short and a longer one and a c. called *Vākyārthamañjari*⁴ on NS in addition to his *Śeṣavākyārthacandrikā* on it, and glosses on the *Prameyadīpikā*, TP and the *Rgbhāṣyaṭikā*.

His c. on the *Candrikā* has been published along with that of Rāghavendra, from Bombay. The original name of the gloss is *Prakāśa*,⁵ but it is generally known as “Gururājīyā” to distinguish it from the gloss of Rāghavendra, bearing the same name.⁶ The former is much less diffuse than the latter. It runs to 6000 granthas in the printed portion which covers the I Adhyāya alone. Besides displaying his acquaintance with the *Vyākaraṇa* (pp. 11-13) and *Mīmāṃsā* (77-78; 21-22) systems, the author quotes from the *Prakriyākaumudī* of Rāmacandra (p. 122 lines 5-9) and the c. of Viśvakarma thereon (lines 9-10) as well as from the *Upasamhāra-Vijaya* of Vijayīndra.⁷

1. To him are ascribed in the *G. V. L. Cat.* (1) a c. on TP (called *Tattvasubodhini* of which a ms. in his possession is reported by K. T. Pandurangi) and another on the NS. (p. 125).

2. Cf. निष्काश्याद्भुतखण्डनत्रयमुखव्याख्यानरत्नोच्चयं

* * * * श्रीव्यासतीर्थो बुधः ।

विद्याधीशमुनीन्द्रसद्गुरुवरः किं नावतीर्णः स हि (Introd. c. NS.).

3. Included in the Edn. of *Daśaprakaraṇas* with cc. pub. by Palimar Mutt, Udipi, 1969.

4. Ms. in possession of K. T. Pandurangi. It is said to criticize Yadupati.

5. चन्द्रिकायाः प्रकाशोऽयं केशवेन प्रकाशयते (ver. 8).

6. विस्तरस्तु चन्द्रिकाप्रकाशे द्रष्टव्यः । (*TP-Bhāvadīpa*, Bby. p. 39)

The “Gururājīyā” attributed to Vādirāja on p. 316 *Vij. Sex. Com. Vol.*, is an instance of the confusion over the name “Gururājīya”. The Mysore Govt. O. L. edn. of *Candrikā* does not include Keśava’s gloss as wrongly stated by the Editor of *T. P. L. Cat.*, (XIV, p. 6029). Keśava’s family now bears the surname “Pāṇḍuraṅgi”, which would be difficult to account for, if Keśava was *not* the direct brother of Vidyādhīśa, but his cousin, as it appears from the *Vidyādhīśa Vijaya* unless it is assumed that his family also migrated to Pandharpur with Vidyādhīśa.

7. एतच्च विषये प्रायदर्शनात् * * * उपसंहारविजये विवृतम् (p. 189, 2-4)

His *Śeṣavākyaṛthacandrikā* is a continuation of Vidyādhīśa's c. on the NS. from the sixth adhikaraṇa onwards of the AV. The c. has been published (together with the NS) from Dharwar. The author has made use of earlier commentaries¹ on the NS freely, especially that of Yadupati, which he does not always acknowledge.² He exhibits a thorough knowledge of Grammar, Logic and Mīmāṃsā, in the course of his discussions. Discussing the accentuation of the term "Pañcajanāḥ" (under B.S. ii, 4, 11) he quotes from the *Bhāṣika Sūtras* dealing with the system of accentuation in the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*.³ His c. is, in many places, based on Yadupati,⁴—the author enlarging on topics briefly dealt with by him.⁵ He carries on many abstruse discussions on grammatical issues (iii, 4. adh. 4, pp. 36, 50) and quotes from *Kāśikā Vṛtti*, the *Mahābhāṣya* and Kaiyaṭa, not to speak of the *Prakriyākaumudī*. Among the other works and authors cited by him are the *Tantrasāra* (Mīmāṃsā) the *Nym* and *Taraṅgiṇi*, *Tarkatāṇḍava*, *Nyāyavārttika-Tātparyatikāparīśuddhi* of Udayana (iii, 2, p. 35), a c. called *Tattvabodha* on the *Nyāyavārttika* (iii, 2, p. 65) Yāska's *Nirukta* (iii, 2, p. 110), Vardhamāna Upādhyāya's c. on *Kusumāñjali* etc., as well as his teacher Vidyādhīśa (under the title "Svāmināḥ" ii, 3, p. 44, iii, 2, p. 65). His c. is the most discursive one on the NS. and said to have been commented upon by Nṛsiṃha (Mysore O. L. C-2207).

4. BIDARAHALLI ŚRĪNIVĀSĀCĀRYA (C. 1600-1660)

He is a prolific glossator of the early 17th century. He was the disciple⁶ and according to some, a cousin⁷ of Yadupati. There is a tradition in the Uttarādi Mutt that Rāghavendra T. conferred on him the ascetic title of "Tīrtha" by way of appreciation of his learning and contributions. But the colophons to his works do not affix this title to his name. Even as late as the 19th century, the great scholar of the Uttarādi Mutt, Hulugi Śriyaḥpatyācārya, author of the famous *Dvaitadyumaṇi* still refers to him merely as "Varṇāpalli-Ācāryāḥ" (p. 62) and does not seem to have been aware of the suffix "TĪRTHA" having been in use, while referring to him. This makes it difficult for us to accept the genuineness of the tradition. He is known as "Bidarahalli Śrīnivāsa" to distinguish him from his

1. ii, 3, p. 5; 30 b; iii, 2, p. 110 including the *Parimala* of Rāghavendra (Cf. iii, 1, p. 1 with p. 370 of *Parimala*).

2. Cf. Keśava iv, 2, p. 49 with Y; K. iv, 2, 35; Y. iv. 2, p. 17b; K. i, 2, 9; : Y. p. 135; K. i, 2, 12 : Y 135; K. iii, 4, adh. 4 : Y. p. 324 line 16; K, iii, 2, 136 : Y. 302.

3. भाषिकसंज्ञके तु शतपथब्राह्मणस्वरविधायकग्रन्थे 'स्वरितोदात्तो वा' इति सूत्रेण यो मन्त्रदशायामनुदात्तः स्वरितो वा स ब्राह्मणदशायामनुदात्तो भवतीत्यपवाद आश्रितः (i, 4, p. 52) For Mss. of *Bhāṣikasūtras* : Aufrecht p. 410.

4. K. iii, 3, adh. 29 : Y. p. 318. Cf. also discussion on (*Upādi Sūtra* 5, 1) in both.

5. Cf. Y. iii, 3, adh. 29 p. 218; 321, iii, 4 adh. 7, p. 333—K. 86.

6. यैरहं शुकवत्सम्यक् शिक्षितोऽस्मि कृपालुभिः ।

तान्वन्दे यादवाचार्यान् सदा विद्यागुरुन् मम ॥ (VTN-*t* gloss)

7. S. K. p. 190. The Vij. Sex. Com. Vol. (p. 318) makes him a nephew.

S. K. gives his father's name as Kṛṣṇappa.

namesakes bearing the surnames of “Śarkarā” and “Liṅgeri”.¹ His native village of Bidarahalli is in the Dharwar district, some fifteen miles from the junction of the Tuṅgā and Varadā rivers.

Nearly thirty-seven works have been ascribed to him. They are mostly glosses and they enjoy the widest popularity among the followers of Madhva, on account of their simplicity and directness of exposition.

(1-10) DAŚA-PRAKARANA GLOSSES

Śrīnivāsa has left glosses on all the ten Prakaraṇas and all save the one on KL. have been printed (Bombay, 1895-1898). The gloss on the PL. known as *Vākyaarthakaumudī*, runs to 3000 granthas. That on the VTNṭ (*Vākyaarthadīpikā*) is a voluminous one in 6700 granthas. The KN gloss has 700. His c. on the *Tattvodyotaṭikā* is claimed to be a supplement to that of Vedeśa’s, explaining passages not covered by the latter as well as those which remain stiff even after his explanations.²

SŪTRA PRASTHĀNA

Of his c. on *Aṇubhāṣya* (G. V. L. Cat.) K. T. Pandurangi reports a Devanagari ms. in his collection. His gloss on the TP is attested by two mss. from Madras (R. no. 39285 and 754). His c. appears to go by the name of *Tattvabodhini* or *Vākyaarthakaumudī*. (Printed SDVP). His gloss on the NS has been published from Dharwar. It is a sort of complement to the c. of Yadupati³ and is much indebted to it, following it rather closely.⁴

(14-19) UPANIṢAD-PRASTHĀNA

Glosses on six out of the ten Upaniṣads excepting *Kaṭha*, *Praśna*, *Chān.* and *Bṛh.* are ascribed to him. Only those on *Māṇḍūkya*, *Aitareya* and *Taitt.* are actually available. The gloss on *Ait. Up.* (*Aitareyabhāṣyārtharatnamālā*), in 7000 granthas, is preserved in the Baroda O. L. (no. 10373). The other two have been printed. The gloss on the *Taitt. Up.* refers to Vidyādhiraṅga (ver. 5).

(20-24). GĪTĀ, ṚK AND PURĀṆA PRASTHĀNA

The author’s cc. on the *Gītā-Tātparyā-Nyāyadīpikā* and the *Ṛg Bhāṣya-ṭikā* are not available. Extracts from his gloss on the *G. B.-Prameyadīpikā* have been given in T. R. Krishnacharya’s edn. of the *Prameyadīpikā* with

1. For his works See *Appendix I*.

2. वेदेशतीर्थटिप्पण्यमव्याख्यातानि यानि च ।
व्याख्यातान्यपि दुःस्थानि वाक्यानि विवृतान्यलम् ॥

This and the acknowledgment of Yadupati as his Guru, shows that he could not be identical with the glossator on *Nym.* criticised in the *Kaṇṭhakodhāra* (C. O. S. ix, p. 62) as assumed by Anantakrishna Sastri, there. Vasudeva Shastri Abhyankar proposes fantastic dates (1300 and 1800 for Yadupati and Śrīnivāsa, in his introd. to his edn. of *Sarvadarśana Saṅgraha*, Bby. p. 517.

3. Called “यादुपत्यक्त” or “अगृहीतसुधावाक्यार्थविवरणम् ।”

4. Cf. Ś. iii, 4, adh. 5-6 and Y. p. 330 b.

the *Bhāvaratnakōśa* of Sumatindra. A ms. of this gloss of Śrīnivāsa is recently reported to have been acquired by the T. P. L. (gr. 3500). His c. on the XI Skandha of the Bhāgavata has been published from Dharwar. Skandhas IV-V are available in mss. (Pejavar Mutt Coll. Uḍipi). Nothing is however known of his (24) c. on the *B. T.* of Madhva mentioned in M. M. Saṅgha List.

OTHER WORKS

His c. on the *Pramāṇa Paddhati* is complementary to Vedeśa's.¹ His c. on the Nym. is the most popular one.² Those on the *Vādāvali* and *Bhedojjivana* are not available in print. Among his miscellaneous works are (29) *Adhikaraṇārthasaṅgraha*, a summary of the adhikaraṇas of the B. S. It is difficult to guess the subject-matter of (30) his *Vikṣiptakhaṇḍārthasaṅgraha*. An incomplete ms. in 900 granthas is preserved (T. P. L. 7899) of his *Mbh. T. N. Bhāvacandrikā*. His *Mantroddhāra* is a c. on *Tantrasāra*. His glosses on *Puruṣasūkta*, *Vāyustuti* and (35) *Sadācāra Smṛti* (*Āhnikakaustubha*), are not available.

5. ŚARKARĀ ŚRĪNIVĀSA (C. 1590—1640)

He was another of Yadupati's disciples. He has left us some four works in all. The chief of these is a fairly elaborate gloss, *Vākyārthamañjarī* (p)³ on the TP. in 5500 granthas. It is very widely read and is by far the *simplest gloss* on the TP free from digressions. It is quoted and criticized by Jagannātha Tīrtha, in his *Bhāṣyadīpikā*.⁴ Once, by mistake, Śarkarā attributes to Rāmānuja (under B. S. i, 1, 2) a view,⁵ which is the reverse of what is found in the *Śrībhāṣya*.⁶ His other works are (2) a gloss on *Bhedojjivana*, (p) one on *Sadācāra Smṛti* and another (4) on *Tantrasāra* both noted in M. M. Saṅgha List. The next minor commentator after Śarkarā Śrīnivāsa, is Satyanidhi Tīrtha (1638—48) of the Uttarādi Mutt, to whom are attributed, a gloss on the *Bhedojjivana* and a *Vāyu-Bhārati-Stotra*.

Satyanidhivilāsa (p) is a Kāvya in honour of Satyanidhi in 8 cantos, by his disciple Śrīnivāsa. It has been published by the SDVP, Bombay.

1. वेदेशमुनिसन्त्यक्तवाक्यार्थो लिख्यते मया (ver. 1).

It stops with ii, 61 of the original (Poona, 1934).

2. Bombay 1907. Anantakrishna Sastri's assumption (C. O. S. ix,) that this c. is criticized by *Nym-Kaṇṭhakoddhāra* is untenable. Śrīnivāsa quotes from *Taraṅgiṇi* (See p. 192b; 589).

3. Ms. G. R. Savanur, Dharwar. Printed. Gujarati Printing Press, Bombay, 1892.

4. Cf. Śarkarā p. 35 and *Bhāṣyadīpikā*, p. 93.

5. जन्मादि यस्य पालनस्येति * * बहुव्रीहिणा पालनकर्तृत्वमेवोच्यत इति रामानुजव्याख्यानसंग्रहः ॥ (p. 23).

6. It is from NS that Śarkarā derives this information. But there it is attributed to certain Vaiṣṇava interpreters other than Rāmānuja. See my *Catussūtrī Bhāṣya* of Madhva, Madras, 1934, p. 117.

6. LAKṢMĪNĀTHA TĪRTHA (C....1643—1663)¹

Lakṣmīnātha Tīrtha was Pontiff of the Vyāsarāya Mutt after Lakṣmīvallabha.² He was the seventh in succession from Vyāsatīrtha. He was the recipient of two grants, one in 1643 A.D. from Tirumala Nāyaka (1623-1659) of Madura and another from Śrīraṅgarāya III (1642-1667), the last of the Emperors of Vijayanagar, who had his capital at Penukoṇḍa, in 1663.

He seems to have been a Pontiff of great influence and remained on the Pīṭha of the Vyāsarāya Mutt³ for about twenty-five years. The exact dates of his succession and demise are not known. We may however place his Pontifical rule roughly between 1640—1665. He mentions Yādavendra⁴ as his Vidyāguru. This Yādavendra is probably the same as the senior disciple of Sudhīndra (1596—1623) already referred to. He passed away at Srirangam.

His only work is a learned commentary on the *Nym.* of which we have a couple of mss at the Madras O. L. (R. nos. 1302 and 388 b). It is said to be intended for the benefit of average students. One of the mss (1302) terminates at the end of the section : अज्ञानस्य वाचस्पत्युक्तजीवाश्रितत्वभंगः (Pari. i) and runs to 8000 granthas. On p. 65 of this ms. is an interesting reference to and quotation from Vijayīndra Tīrtha's c. on the *Nym.*—विजयीन्द्रस्वामिनस्तु— * * * (सामान्यतो मिथ्यात्वनिरुक्ति). A fascinating feature of this c. is the lucid and elaborate exposition of several Mīmāṃsā nyāyas pressed into service, in the *Nym.*

7. KUṆḌALA GIRI SŪRĪ (C. 1620—80)

One of Lakṣmīnātha's disciples,⁵ was Kuṇḍala Giri Sūri, a powerful writer of the period. He was the son of Koṇḍubhaṭṭa⁶ of Belūr and a proêtgè of Saudarya (Sundara) Rāja Paṇḍita, one of the ministers at the court of Śrīraṅgapatna.⁷ The *S. K.* makes him a contemporary of Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita and Lakṣmīnārāyaṇa Tīrtha of the Vyāsarāya Mutt, whom he is said to have met at Banaras, when he was staying there till his thirtieth year. This is evidently a mistake, as Lakṣmīnārāyaṇa was the second in succession from Lakṣmīnātha, the avowed Guru of Kuṇḍala Giri Sūri. It was

1. These are only dates of c. p. grants to Lakṣmīnātha.

2. लक्ष्मीवल्लभयोगीन्द्रं गुरुराजमहं भजे (introd. verse in his *Nym.*-c.) This Lakṣmīvallabha wrote a *Prabhātapāñcakastotra* in five verses, printed in *S. M.* p. 144.

3. श्रीव्यासराय संस्थानाधिपतिगलाद श्रीरामचन्द्रतीर्थ * * * * *

लक्ष्मीनाथतीर्थश्रीपादस्वामिगल मठद गोपालकृष्णस्वामिसेवेगे ॥

(Yelahanka c. p. grant of Śrīraṅgarāya, *Ep. Car. Sup.* to Vols. 3-4., p. 252).

4. श्रीयादवेन्द्रमनिशं वन्दे विद्यागुरुन्मम ।

5. लक्ष्मीनाथमुनिं शान्तं मम देशिकमाश्रये ॥

(Giri Sūri, c. on *Nym.*, Mysore O. L. 2192).

6. Not "Kaṇḍibhaṭṭa" as in Madras O. L. Cat.

7. Vide the colophon to his works : इति श्रीमत्पश्चिमरङ्गराजधानीप्रधानिसौन्दरराज-पण्डितमान्येन * * * * ॥ (Also *Sudhā* gloss).

presumably Lakṣmīnātha himself that is meant by the *S. K.* His successor Lakṣmīpatī is also referred to by Kuṇḍalagiri, in his c. on the *Nym.*

Tradition ascribes to him, a criticism of the *Advaitakaustubha*¹, of Bhaṭṭoji, modelled on *Madhvamatavidhvamsana* of Appayya. This criticism is probably the same as the *Bhaṭṭoji-Kuṭṭanam*** also ascribed to Giri Sūrī.

His other works include glosses on (2) the TP** and (3) NS (Mys. O. L. 2192 Nagari). His *Tattvodyotaṭikā-gloss* is known from Pejavar Mutt List (232, Tulu, Sritāla). His c. on *Mbh. T. N.* (called *Kaṇṭakoddhāra*) is mentioned in *S. K.* (1896, p. 107). The most important of his works are however (6) his c. on the *Nym.* in 6784 granthas of which we have a ms. in the Madras O. L. (R. No. 861) and another on (7) the *B. S. B.* of Madhva, entitled *Bhāṣyārthadīpikā* of which a fragment containing the first pāda alone of Adh. I, is available at the Madras O. L. (D. C. Supple. XXIV, no. 14904). It is given to a good deal of technical discussions of grammatical and other points and quotations from the *Mahābhāṣya*, Kaiyaṭa etc. (p. 46) occur.

THE CHALĀRI FAMILY

Close abreast of Lakṣmīnātha and Kuṇḍalagiri come four generations of the Chalāri family, distinguished for their solid contributions to the commentatorial literature in Dvaita Vedānta. They are : Chalāri Nārāyaṇa, Nṛsiṃha, Śeṣa and Saṃkarṣaṇa.

8. CHALĀRI NARASIMHĀCĀRYA

He was the son of Chalāri Nārāyaṇācārya,² and a contemporary of Satyanātha Tīrtha (1648—1674) of the Uttarādi Mutt. He was a prolific writer and over fifteen works of his are known, of which some three or four only have, so far, been printed. Chalāri (reported to be a village near Malkhed) is said to have been the habitat of the family wherefrom it derives its surname. The members of the family were evidently all disciples of the Uttarādi Mutt as is clear not only from the numerous references to the Svāmis of that Mutt in the *Smṛtyarthasāgara* of Chalāri Nṛsiṃha, but also from the fact that his grandson, Saṃkarṣaṇa, was a disciple of Satyābhinava Tīrtha.

Nṛsiṃha's works include cc. on the *T.S.*(^m), the *Īśa*³ and the *Praśna Up.*⁴ (4) the *Sadācāra Smṛti*** (5) *Pramāṇa Paddhati*** *Samgraha Rāmāyaṇa***, *Śivastuti*,(^p) *Pārijātāpaharaṇa* of Nārāyaṇa Paṇḍitācārya, the *Dvādaśastotra*, and *Yamakabhārata*** of Madhva. The G. V. L. Cat. also mentions (11) a *Brahmasūtrārthādhikaraṇasamgraha*** (12) *Bṛhat-tāratamya-stotra* and (13) *Bhaṭṭojidikṣitakṛtikūṭṭanam*, among his works.

1. Printed. Srikantha Sastri (Vij. Sex. Cen. Com. Vol. p. 321) is wrong in naming the criticism of Bhaṭṭoji's work as "Dvaitakaustubhakhaṇḍanam".

2. The G. V. L. Cat. (p. 148) ascribes to him (1) a c. on *Mbh. T. N.*, (2) an *Adhikarānārthasamgraha*** and (3) *Jātinibandha***

3. Printed, Kumbakonam.

4. Ms. Baroda O. L.

Among his major works should be reckoned his c. on the *Bhāgavata-Tātparya*¹ and the (15) *Rgbhāṣyaṭikā*(p);² which latter, is, undoubtedly, his *magnum opus*. His (6) *Smṛtyarthasāgara* is an independent work on religious law and observances, in four sections (taraṅgas) : Kāla, Āśauca, Āhnikā and Vastuśuddhi (ver. 6) dealing with fasts, pollutions, daily rites and purificatory ceremonies. It is followed by Mādhvas.

Nṛsiṃha's gloss on *Rg-Bhāṣya-ṭikā* (granthas 6200) throws considerable light on many dark corners of the original Bhāṣya and several stiff passages in Jayatīrtha's c. thereon, furnishing a good deal of useful information of a miscellaneous character, as well as critical and exegetic notes on the hymns of the *Rgveda*. He displays profound mastery over Pāṇinian grammar and the *Uṇādi Sūtras* and is well acquainted with the commentary of Sāyaṇa, the *Nirukta* and other aids to Vedic interpretation, which enable him to offer suitable justifications for the many deviations of Madhva from the 'traditional interpretations'³ of Sāyaṇa and others. One may, therefore, admit his claim that his work has been the result of a patient study of many interpretational aids. He seems to hint at the existence of critics who were only too anxious to discredit the line of interpretation adopted by Madhva and pick holes in it, somehow or other:

अविज्ञाय चेद्दूषयेत्कश्चिदेतद् भवेद्दूषणं नाग्रहस्तत्र मे स्यात् (p. 214)

(17) Yet another work of his is the *Śābdikakaṇṭhamāṇi* (Jewel for the necks of Grammarians) referred to on p. 11 (i, 2) of his *Rgbhāṣyaṭikā*. There are also two other references to this work (pp. 14 and 29), judging from all of which, it would appear to have been devoted to elucidation of topics like Vedic accentuation, the seven svaras, their definitions etc. Mss. of this important work are known to exist in some private collections, in Karnatak.⁴ There can be little doubt that it would be a very valuable addition to the existing works on Vedic Grammar, when brought to light. The author gives the date of the composition of his gloss on the *Rgbhāṣya-ṭikā* as Śaka 1583 (Plava)⁵ i.e. 1661 A.D. This establishes his contemporaneity with Lakṣmīnātha, Satyanātha and Rāghavendra.

9. CHALĀRI ŚEṢĀCĀRYA

Eleven works have been attributed to Śeṣa in the G. V. L. Cat. (p. 147). These are glosses on the *Aṇubhāṣya*, *T.S.K.N.*, *Praśna Up.*** *B. T.*, *Tantrasārasaṁgraha*,** as well as on *Vāyustuti*, *Madhvaviṇaya*(p) (called *Mandopakāriṇi*) and the *Nakṣastotra*. (10) His *Pramāṇa-Candrikā*(p) dealing

1. Printed Dharwar.

2. Bombay, 1901.

3. For example, in support of his plea that a departure from Yāska is no sin, he cites अरुणो मा सकृत् वृकः (R. V.i, 105, 18) which in the Padapāṭha of Śākalya is split into "मा" and "सकृत्" (as two different words) while Yāska reads मासकृत् as a compound.

4. It is understood that a ms. of this work together with a com. exists in the Library of the Uttarādi Mutt at Bangalore.

5. शके त्रिवसुपञ्चेन्दुसम्मिलिते शकवत्सरे ।

मासि चत्वे पुणिमायामपिता हरिपादयोः ॥ (Concluding ver. 4).

with Dvaita logic and epistemology, in the course of a small tract for beginners, is a very useful work. (12) A *Nirṇayaratna* or *Bṛhacchalāriya* (a Smṛti work) is also attributed to him by Aufrecht who also mentions a metrical epitome of the *Gṛhya Sūtras* of Āśvalāyana, by Śeṣa's father Nṛsiṃha.

10. CHALĀRI SAMKARṢANĀCĀRYA¹

Śeṣa's son, Samkarṣaṇa, wrote a life of Jayatīrtha, in five cantos : *Jayatīrtha-Vijaya* (Belgaum, 1881), and another metrical biography of Satyanātha Tīrtha (1648—1674) entitled *Satyanāthābhyudaya*, in eleven cantos. Two mss. of this work are noticed by Aufrecht (L. 807 and N. P. ix, 14, *Catal. Cat.* i. p. 689). The text is preserved in the T. P. L. also (VI, 3740) with a commentary (VI, 3741) by the author's brother Subrahmaṇya,² also a disciple of Satyābhinava (1676—1706). Samkarṣaṇa does not impress us with grace or beauty of style as a versifier. (See i, 46; iii, 5, 10). He imitates the *Madhvavijaya* (See i, 8-10; iii. of his *Satyanāthābhyudaya*). This work is presumably the same as the *Satyanāthamāhatmyaratnākara*³ quoted in the newly discovered *Koṅkaṇābhyudaya* of Sāgara Rāmācārya.

11. SATYĀBHINAVA TĪRTHA (1676—1706)

To Satyābhinava Tīrtha, successor of Satyanātha, we owe (1) a c. *Durghaṭabhāvadīpa*,^(p) on the *Bhāgavata*, running to 8160 granthas and (2) another on the *Mbh. T. N.* in 3220 granthas (T. P. L. No. 7898). He was a contemporary of Aurangzeb and the Keladi Queen Cannamāmbā (1672—1698). The *Koṅkaṇābhyudaya* mentions certain Bulls addressed by this Pontiff, to the court of Keladī, referring to the Koṅkaṇi-Brahmin subjects of the Queen.⁴ Satyābhinava lies buried at Nachiarkoil, six miles from Kumbakonam. We have an account of his life and career in the *Satyābhinavodaya*^(m) (ms. preserved in the Uttarādi Mutt, Library).

Almost on every page of his gloss⁵ on the *Bhāgavata*, we find certain criticisms on the *B. T.* of Madhva repudiated. The determination and persistence with which he pursues these critics show that the *B. T.* had been severely criticized by some later-day commentators (probably Advaitic) of unknown identity. The commentary throws light on many knotty points. Its special merit lies in hunting up the criticisms against the *B. T.*,

1. He does not seem to have taken orders at any time. The title "Tīrtha" applied to him, by R. Rama Rao, in his paper on Hinduism under Vijayanagar Kings, (*Vij. Sex. Com.* Vol. 1936, p. 49) is, thus, baseless.

2. He wrote a c. on the *Maṇimañjarī* (Belgaum, 1890).

3. It has been indifferently ascribed to both Śeṣa and Samkarṣaṇa by Aufrecht (pp. 661 and 683).

4. पूर्वोक्तसुगुणोपेतैः सत्याभिनवतीर्थकैः ।

केलदीचन्नमाम्बां राज्ञीमुद्दिश्य लेखिताः ॥ etc. (VI, 273-98).

5. E. g. i, 7, 23; i, 12, 53 : i, 12, 34; i, 16, 5, 26; i, 19, 12; iii, 1, 7; i, 4, 11; iii, 8, 19; iii, 9, 25; iii, 13, 42; iv, 3, 1; iv, 4, 13; vi, 2; v, 9, 11; v, 9, 6; 14, 40; vii, 4, 14; x, 54, 57 : x, 90, 48; x, 93, 14; x, 100, 53; xi, 17, 43; xii, 7, 45 : xii, 12, 34.

and silencing them. His disciples Satyādhīśa and Satyādhirāja did not succeed to the Pīṭha as they both predeceased him. (See also under Venkā Muṅgi).

2. RAGHUNĀTHA TĪRTHA *alias* ŚEṢACANDRIKĀCĀRYA (C. 1700—1755)

Tenth in succession from Vyāsatīrtha and as one whose greatness is believed to have been presaged by him,¹ Raghunātha Tīrtha holds a high place in the affections of the followers of Madhva. To his great learning and saintly life, he seems to have added a good deal of political sagacity and though he could not rise to such paramount heights as his illustrious predecessor, in the realm of letters or in the political history of his times, his influence as a scholar and as a Saint were widely felt; for it lent fresh glory and light to the position he occupied as the representative of the “Vidyā-simhāsana” of Vyāsarāya.² This is clear not only from the fact that it was he who successfully carried out the task of completing the *Tātparyacandrikā* of Vyāsatīrtha on the same elaborate plan, but also from the regard and recognition which he was able to obtain for himself and his Mutt, from far-off chiefs like (1) Vijayarāṅga Cokkanātha Nāyaka³ (1705—1731) of Madura (2), Vijaya Raghunātha Setupati Kāttadevar⁴ of Ramnāḍ, (3) the townsmen of Karaikkūḍi,⁵ and (4) Kolūr Kanakarāyar.⁶

We have a subsequent grant of the Setupati,⁷ dated Śaka 1638 (1716 A.D.) which is made out in the name of “Lakṣmīnidhi Tīrtha” disciple of Raghunātha Tīrtha. This may lead one to suppose that Raghunātha Tīrtha was already dead by 1716. But we learn from other sources that he was living as late as the years 1726 and 1729. Copies of Sanads issued by Kṛṣṇarāja Odeyars I and II of Mysore to Lakṣmīdhara Tīrtha, Pontiff of the Cannapatna Maṭha of Brahmanya Tīrtha (*Mys. Arch. Rep.* 1925. Bangalore Dt. no. 2) go to show that Raghunātha Tīrtha continued to be

1. “दशमो मत्समो भवेत्” ।

2. Cf. the eulogy of Raghunātha in the *Bhāṣyadīpikā* of his successor Jagannātha Tīrtha :

येनायं निरणायि मध्यगुरुसद्भाष्यप्रकाशाशयः
प्राखण्डि प्रतिवादिदर्शनगणः प्राबन्धि गुर्वर्णवः ।
शिष्येभ्यः समदायि वित्तमुभयं प्रालम्भि विद्यासनं
सोयं श्रीरघुनाथतीर्थयतिराट् शुद्धिं विदध्यान्मतेः ॥

3. Cokkanātha says in this grant that “whatever dues were being paid in the Madura Kingdom, to the temple of Cokkanāthapura, were to be paid to the Maṭha also,” (*Mys. Arch. Rep.* 1912, p. 55) showing the great respect in which he held the “Lord of the Vidyā-simhāsana of Śrī Vyāsarāya : श्रीमद्व्यासरायलवारि विद्यासिंहासनाधीश्वरलैन श्रीरघुनाथतीर्थपूज्यपादलवारि मठं (Telugu).

4. His grant registers in 1707, the grant of certain taxes on the exports and imports of the Kingdom, on behalf of the Mutt, to its Agent at Rāmeśvaram (*Mys. Arch. Rep.* 1912, p. 55).

5. Copper plate grant dated 1709.

6. Date 1712 A.D.

7. *Ep. Car. Supple.* to Vols. iii-iv, Mysore.

the Pontiff of the Vyāsarāya Maṭha between the years 1726-39.¹ As he is reputed to have occupied the Pīṭha for more than half a century his demise may be placed many years later, about 1755 A.D. No doubt the mention of "Lakṣminidhi Tīrtha" as a successor of Raghunātha in 1712 and 1716 requires explanation. The matter is further complicated by the fact that there is absolutely no mention of this Lakṣmīnidhi Tīrtha, anywhere, in the genealogical tables of the Vyāsarāya Mutt. But we cannot doubt the genuineness of the inscription. The only explanation of this puzzle is to be deduced from the tradition preserved in the Vyāsarāya Mutt² that Raghunātha Tīrtha was once very much incapacitated by illness and afterwards recovered and that Jagannātha Tīrtha himself (his acknowledged successor) was obliged to remain as heir-apparent to the Pīṭha for well-nigh thirty years after his ordination, before he could actually succeed to the pontificate. The ordination of Lakṣmīnidhi of the inscription, might therefore, have taken place during the time of the illness of Raghunātha about 1712 when the Svāmi was very old, probably over sixty. The disciple might have done some touring on his own account as Junior Pontiff of the Mutt, when probably he was honoured by Vijayaraghunātha Setupati, as the disciple of Raghunātha Tīrtha. The omission of Lakṣmīnidhi Tīrtha's name from the Mutt list can be accounted for by the assumption that he died even during the lifetime of Raghunātha, in or about 1718. It was probably thus that Raghunātha came to be later on succeeded by his other disciple Jagannātha Tīrtha whose ordination might have taken place about 1720. There is a parallel to this in the Yādavendra-Rāghavendra ordination already referred to. Other cases, of Junior Pontiffs coexisting for shorter or longer periods, with their Seniors, are not unknown.

As tradition gives Raghunātha a long life of ninety years, we may take it that he was born in or about 1652 and succeeded to the Pīṭha in or about 1700,³ and ruled till 1755 A.D. He passed away at Tiru-mukkūḍlu, at the junction of the Kāveri and Kapilā rivers in the T. Narasipur taluk of the Mysore Dt., at a distance of three miles from Sosale, the present headquarters⁴ of the Vyāsarāya Mutt.

1. It would appear from the sanads that in 1726, the properties of "the Cannapatna Maṭha of Lakṣmidhara" were directed to be handed over to the keeping of "Raghunātha Tīrtha of the Vyāsarāya Maṭha", in lieu of which, an annuity was settled on the former. In 1739, Kṛṣṇarāja Odeyar II, directs the restoration of these to the Cannapatna Maṭha, issuing instructions that the annuity that was being paid to the said Lakṣmidhara Tīrtha, may now be discontinued. This makes it clear that Raghunātha was Pontiff of the Vyāsarāya Mutt between 1726-1739 and for a few years before and after and incidentally that the *Kundāpūr Maṭha* was never regarded as a *Vyāsarāya Maṭha*, or known by that name, at the time of these Mysore Rulers and that the claim made, in recent years by that Mutt, is not justified.

2. I am indebted to the late Vidyāvāridhi Tīrtha Svāmi of the Vyāsarāya Mutt, for the details of the tradition re. Raghunātha Tīrtha.

3. His Parama-Guru, Lakṣmīpati Tīrtha received a grant in 1690 from Ranga Krishna Muddu Virappa, at Śrīraṅgam.

4. It was in the days of Vidyāvallabha that Sosale became the head-quarters of the Vyāsarāya Mutt, in or about 1809.

Raghunātha wrote six works, the most celebrated of which is the *Śeṣa-Tātparya-Candrikā*^(m) à commentary on the TP of Jayatīrtha, in continuation of the (incomplete) *Tātparya-Candrikā* of Vyāsarāya. He is therefore generally known as “Śeṣacandrikācārya” in virtue of the brilliant service rendered by him in bringing the critico-polemical literature of the Dvaita school on the Sūtra-Prasthāna, up to date.

His other works are (2) a *Padārthaviveka*** (of which nothing more is known than its name) dealing presumably with the categories of the system (3) *Tattvaka(r)ṇika*^(m)¹ being a lengthy c. on the *Tantrasāra* of Madhva and commentaries on (4) the *Karmanirṇaya*,² and (5) the *Bṛhatisahasra*.³ His fairly elaborate c. in 1720 granthas on the *Īśāvāsyopaniṣad-Bhāṣyaṭīkā* has been printed (Bombay, 1907). Keith and Burnell (India Office Cat. ii, 1, no. 4868, Oxford, 1935) dismiss this c. as a “very elaborate and valueless” one, “quoting from many recent texts”. But the reference in this c. to the *Śrutaprakāśikā-Bhāvaprakāśikā*⁴ of Raṅgarāmānuja, is bound to be of value in placing that Viśiṣṭādvaitic commentator before 1700. The author commands a particularly engaging style and quotes from the various works of Jayatīrtha, from the *Candrikā* and from the c. of Raghūttama on the *Bṛh. Up.* (p. 20b). He delights in grammatical discussions, and quotes from the *Uṇādis*, and *Kāśikāvṛtti* and reproduces the discussion on the *Uṇādi Sūtra* (V, 1) already found in the works of Yadupati and Keśava.⁵

As many as five mss. all incomplete, of his *Śeṣacandrikā* are found in the Mysore O. L. A complete ms. (from ii, 3, 1 to iv, 4) is available in private collection at Kumbakonam.⁶ Only a part of the *STC* (from Adhy. III Pāda 1 to Adhy. III. Pāda 2 adhi. 12) has been published by the PPRI Bangalore (1967) with my illustrative resumé of its contents. The bulk of valuable materials of the entire work has been incorporated in the second and third vols. of my *BSPC*. to which further attention is invited.

The inherent value of the work is enormous. Its exposition is always refreshingly clear and the style forcible and telling. The author quotes from the *Kalpataru* of Amalānanda, the *Bhāmati*, Bhāratīrtha, *Śribhāṣya*, *Śrikanṭhabhāṣya*⁷ and Śaṅkara's bhāṣya on iii, 3, 32, as well as from

1. Mysore O. L. B—533 Devanagari, ff. 353.

2. Ms. in private collection at Kumbakonam.

3. Mysore O. L. A—464.

4. एतच्च ‘स्थेमा स्थितिरिति श्रुतप्रकाशिकाव्याख्यायां भावप्रकाशिकायां स्पष्टम् ॥ (Ms. p. 211. I. O. Cat).

5. न च प्रसिद्धोणादिवृत्तिषु—‘अदिभुवो हुतच्’ * * * मूलकोशेषु, ‘अदिभूभ्याम्’ इत्येव पाठदर्शनात् । वृत्त्यन्तरे तथा पठित्वा व्याख्यातत्वाच्च । धातुव्यतिरिक्तस्य ‘अदि’ इत्युपसर्गस्याभावेन, अदिभुव इति पाठस्थायुक्तत्वाच्च । निघण्टुभाष्ये धातुद्वयसमुदायादेकप्रत्ययस्य बहुशोऽभिहितत्वाच्च । (P. 56). Raghunātha contends that there is no such prefix as “adi” other than the root.

6. Ms. with Kūsaṇṇāchārya Rāmacandrācārya, Kumbakonam.

7. शैवस्तु—‘कामादयस्तत्र तत्र चायतनादिभ्य’ इत्यपपठ्य, * * * * कैवल्योपनिषदि ‘त्रिलोचनं नीलकण्ठं प्रशान्तं’ * * * (p. 153 Ms.) Śaṅkara reads : “कामादीतरत्न”

Pārthasārathi Miśra, Vyāsatīrtha (*Nym*) and others. The plan of the work and method of exposition¹ are the same as those of the *Candrikā* and there is obvious imitation of the latter even in the turns of expression :

इत्युभाभ्यां व्याख्यातं तन्न । * * टीकाक्षरार्थस्तु * * ॥

Raghunātha refers to three earlier commentaries² on the Sūtra-Prasthāna (1) *Nyāyamālā* (2) *Nyāyaratnāvali* and (3) *Sambandhadīpikā* of Śaṅkarācārya, brother of Trivikrama Paṇḍitācārya. The first two are yet to be traced and identified.

13. SUMATĪNDRA TĪRTHA (1692—1725)

Sumatīndra belongs to the Mutt of Rāghavendra, being the third in succession from him. The Mutt list places him on the Pīṭha between 1693 and 1725. By his learning, piety and geniality of disposition and fine literary taste, he seems to have made a lasting impression on contemporary rulers in the Tamil country, where he spent most of his years, as epigraphic and literary evidences show. He raised the prestige of his Mutt to fresh heights and endeared himself so much to the people at large, that it came to be called “Sumatīndra Maṭha” after him, a designation which is still current in the South.

He appears to have spent a considerable portion of his life as Pontiff, at Kumbakonam, Tanjore and Madurai. In 1698 A.D. he received from Maṅgammā, Queen of Madurai (1689-1706) the villages of Āyirdharma etc. (*Mys. Arch. Rep.* 1917, p. 57) and certain concessions in 1699 from Uttamarāṅgappa Kālākatoḷa Vaḍayāri of Payaraṇippālayam (*Mys. Arch. Rep.* 1917, p. 58). His *Jayaghoṣaṇā*, a laudatory poem on the Maratha ruler Sahaji I (1684-1710) of Tanjore affords ample proof of the fact that he was honored and patronized by that Ruler and was very friendly to him.

According to *Gurucarite*, Sumatīndra's former name was Muddu Krishnācārya. He was the grandson of Rāghavendra Tīrtha's brother Gururājācārya (already referred to). He is reported to have studied under Rāghavendra himself and to have been one of his favourites. It is also interesting to note that both his elder brothers Vāsudevācārya³ and Veṅkaṇṇācārya⁴ preceded him on the Pīṭha as Pontiffs of the same Mutt. Sumatīndra is also reported to have been a contemporary of the then Jahgirdar of Ārṇi, Subhānu Rao, who was a great scholar in Vyākaraṇa, Sāhitya and Vedānta.⁵ The *Gurucarite* gives an interesting account of a meeting between the two when Sumatīndra is said to have introduced himself to the haughty Jahgirdar with the words :

1. In giving the Pūrvapakṣa, Siddhānta and other interpretations and lastly the “Tīkāṣarārtha”.

2. In dealing with the manner of fixing the adhikaraṇa in respect of B. S. iii, 3, 19—22; अत्र त्रयः पक्षाः । दर्शयति च (iii, 3, 22) इत्यन्तं सूत्रचतुष्टयमेकाधिकरणं * * इति । अयं च न्यायरत्नावलीकारस्य सम्मतः ॥ (pp. 77-78).

3. He became Sūrindra the second Pontiff after Rāghavendra.

4. He became Yogindra the immediate successor of Rāghavendra.

5. His brother's *Bheda-Taraṅgiṇī* is preserved in the Madras O. L.

अनाराध्य कालीमनास्वाद्य चोलीं विना मंत्रतंत्रे ऋते शब्दचौर्यात् ।

प्रपंचे प्रसिद्धप्रबन्धं विधातुं विरिचप्रपंचे मदन्यः कविः कः ?

He spent the last days of his life at Śrīraṅgam, where he died in 1725.

WORKS

Over a dozen works are known to have been left by Sumatīndra, who was both a prolific and a powerful writer. He was however no mere doctrinaire, but a keen Ālankārika and a good poet. His Vedāntic works are six : (1) a gloss entitled *Bhāvaratnakośa*¹ on the *G. B.-Prameyadīpikā* of Jayatīrtha and similar glosses on (2) the *Rg-Bhāṣya*² (3) *Sūtrabhāṣya*³ (4) *TP*⁴ and (5) *NS*⁵ and (6) an *Adhikaraṇaratnamālā*, summing up the adhikaraṇas of the B. S. in alternate verses dealing respectively with the Pūrva-pakṣa and Siddhānta. (7) A c. on the *Tantrasāra*⁶ is also ascribed to him. His minor works in the form of Stotras are (8) *Yogīndra-Tārāvalī*⁷ which is in all probability a laudation in 27 verses, of his predecessor Yogīndra (9) *Rāma-Tārāvalī*⁸ (10) *Rāmadāṇḍaka*⁹ (in praise of the tutelary deity of his Mutt) and a *Nṛsiṃhastuti*¹⁰.

Sumatīndra's gloss on the *G. B.* and its *ṭīkā*, throws welcome light on many passages in Jayatīrtha's commentary,⁷ besides quoting fresh authorities from certain Purāṇas.⁸ The commentaries of Narahari Tīrtha and Padmanābha Tīrtha are quoted many times under the name of *Bhāvaprakāśikā* and *Prācīnatīkā*. Reference is made in one of the opening verses to the author's father and Guru : Venkaṭanārāyaṇa :

भूरिमनीषागमचित्चरणान् श्रीजयतीर्थव्रतिकृतिशरणान् ।

सन्ततमीडे सुचरितवरणान् वैकटनारायणगुरुचरणान् ॥

The gloss on the *Tattvaparakāśikā* (Mys. 1713) is an elaborate though not quite so valuable a c. The Mys. ms. ending with the I Adhyāya of the B. S. runs to 4640 granthas. The author refers to Vyāsātīrtha, and Rāghavendra and to his own Guru Venkaṭanārāyaṇa. Passages are cited from the *Candrikā*, the *NS* and *Tattvapradīpa* (p. 99) and the works of Madhva. Grammatical notes are provided where occasion demands them.

His works on Kāvya-Ālankāra, are (12) *Madhudhārā*,^(m) a commentary on the *Ālankāramañjari* of Sudhīndra, (13) *Rasikarañjini* ^(p) a c. on the *Uṣāharāṇa* of Trivikrama Paṇḍitācārya (14) *Jayaghoṣaṇā*.^(m) The

1. Catal. Cat. p. 89 (Rg. B. 666) A ms. is preserved at the Mutt at Nanjangud. (Mys. Arch. Rep. 1917). Part of the c. upto *Gītā*—iv, 4-5, has been published by T. R. Kṛṣṇācārya of Kumbakonam.

2. No ms. of this has so far come to light.

3. Mys. O. L. A-354, Devanagari, ff. 196.

4. Mys. O. L. (1173) Devanagari, ff. 190.

5. Known as "Vākyārtharatnakośa" (G. V. L.). But no ms. is known.

6. Vide *Pratāparudriya*, ii, 78 cd.

7. Cf. his remarks on the verse "य उपाधिलगति" cited from a Nyāya work by Jayatīrtha while commenting on the benedictory verse of G.B. Also See Sumatīndra's illuminating notes on "तन्नामसु पाठात्" (J) : तन्नामसु वासुदेवसहस्रनाममध्ये । i.e. in the *Padma Purāṇa*.

8. Such as *Pādma*, *Mātsya*.

Gurucarite mentions, in addition to these, (15) a c. on the *Vyāsarāja-Vijaya*** of Vijayīndra and another on the (16) *Subhadrā-Parīṇaya* (of Vijayīndra) and (17) *Abhinavakādambarī*** and (18) *Yogīndravijaya*** and a few minor works like (19) *Cakravālaprabandha* (20) *Sāhuvijaya*.

The text of the *Madhudhārā* is preserved together with its original, in the Tanjore Palace Library.¹ It is quoted on two or three occasions in his own c. on the *Uṣāharaṇa*.² It appears from these quotations that the original work of Sudhīndra contained verses commemorating the deeds of Vijayīndra³ and verses in various "Bandhas".⁴ Sumatīndra's work contains similar laudatory Bandhas in praise of Sudhīndra and Yogīndra, in the section on Yamakas.

The c. on the *Uṣāharaṇa* is very exhaustive and well-written.⁵ It teems with quotations from various standard works on Grammar, Poetics, Kāvya and Lexicography. The following are some of the authors and works cited :

1. Vira Nārāyaṇa (*Sāhityacintāmaṇi*) pp. 13, 14, 16, 22, 25, 26.
2. Śaraṇadeva (*Vaiyākaraṇa*) : *Durghaṭavṛtti*.
- 3-4. Hari Dīkṣita and Dakṣiṇāvartanātha, commentators on *Kumārasambhava*
5. Rakṣita p. 124.
6. Keśava p. 30.
7. Kāñcīnātha (*Ratirahasyadīpikā*) p. 206.
8. Vidyānātha (*Pratāparudriya*).
9. *Candrāloka*.
10. Amaru.
11. *Ratnakośa*.
12. *Saundaryalahari*.
13. *Rabhasa-Kośa*, p. 112.
14. *Kavidarpaṇa*.
15. *Rudrakośa* p. 136.
16. *Vāsavadattā*.
17. *Alamkāramañjari* pp. 23, 30.
18. *Śubhodaya-Kāvya* (Nārāyaṇa Paṇḍitācārya), p. 306.

There are many references to earlier commentaries on the *Uṣāharaṇa*, (pp. 159, 193, 242, 246, 342 and 308.) though no other earlier cc. are known to exist in mss.

The *Jayaghoṣaṇā* (deemed a work of his Pre-Pontifical days by the author of *Gurucarite*) is a special *genre* of laudatory Kāvya (minor poem) whose definition is given by the author himself :

1. T. P. L. X. 5129.
2. मदीयमधुधारायामस्य वाचनप्रकारः । (p. 324).
3. यथा "विजयीन्द्रयोगिवर्यं..." इत्यलंकारमंजरीम् एतदर्थस्तु मदीयमधुधारायां द्रष्टव्यः (p. 324).
4. चक्रबन्धे बलयद्वयं * * * * मदीयालंकारमंजरीव्याख्याने द्रष्टव्यम् ॥ (p. 333).
5. Printed, Uḍipi, 1927.

शौर्यादिगुणवानेष एवेति भुवि घुष्यताम् ।

घुष्यतामिति शब्दान्तैर्नेतुः शौर्यादयो गुणाः¹

A complete ms. of this work in 320 granthas is preserved at the T. P. L. (vii, 4237). The subject of the composition are the deeds of Sahaji I (1684—1710), Maratha Ruler of Tanjore.² It is divided into five sections : (1) Jayaghoṣaṇā (2) Birudāvalī (3) Gāthā (4) Prasāṅga and (5) Cāṭu-śloka. “Jayaghoṣaṇā.” is just the title of the opening section.

14. SATYAPRIYA TĪRTHA (1737—1744)

He was the successor of Satyābhinava Tīrtha of the Uttarādi Mutt. Five of his works are available in mss., in the Mutt Library, at Bangalore : (1) an erudite commentary on the *Mahābhāṣya* (fragmentary); glosses on (2-3) the *Muṇḍaka* and *Māṇḍūkya* Upaniṣads and (4) on the *TP* called a *Vivṛti* and (5) a *Candrikābindu*. He passed away at Mānāmadurai. Ghanaśyāma Kavi, a Maratha (Smārta) Brahmin minister of Tukoji of Tanjore (1728-1735) wrote his *Pracaṇḍarāhūdaya*, a Prakaraṇa in honour of Satyapriya. This has been published from Belgaum. Satyapriya's grand disciple, Satyasandha figures as the subject of a panegyric in Alam-kāras, entitled *Satyasandhālamkāra* of which a ms. is in the possession of my friend Prof. K. T. Pandurangi of Bangalore. The author, Kṛṣṇa, gives the definitions and illustrations of one hundred arthālamkāras commemorative of Satyasandha.³

15. JAGANNĀTHA TĪRTHA (C. 1755-1770)

As already pointed out, Jagannātha Tīrtha seems to have succeeded his Guru Raghunātha Tīrtha, as Pontiff of the Vyāsarāya Mutt, only long after his ordination. We have no information about his early life or career. Tradition gives him a long life of over seventy years. From the facts already stated of his predecessor, we may place his ordination about 1718. His date of birth may be tentatively fixed about 1695. We may assign him a Pontifical rule of about fifteen years from 1755—1770. He is said to have stayed at Bhavāni, (near Erode) where he built a Mutt for his use.

1. गद्यैः प्रत्येकपद्यान्तैश्चतुर्भिर्वर्णयेत्क्रमात् ।
अवधित्वेन पूर्वादिचतुर्दिक्सीमपर्वतान् ॥
ततः सप्तविभक्त्यन्तैः सप्तभिर्गौडरीतिकैः ।
पद्यगद्यद्वयैः सर्वे जनाः शृणुत मद्वचः ॥ etc.
2. उद्यच्चण्डिमडिण्डिमध्वनिघनैरुदामधामप्रभा-
वाचाटैर्लटहैश्च जैत्रपटहैः शुण्डालषण्डाहितैः ।
के लोके न नमन्ति भूमिपतयो यात्रासु गोत्रातुरा-
साहं साहमहीपमित्यपि जना भो घुष्यतां घुष्यताम् ॥

The title “Sumatindra-Jayaghoṣaṇā as in T. P. L. Cat. is misleading.

3. Cf. विशेषालंकारो यथा—

बहवो यतयः सन्ति काषायवसनाः कलो ।
सत्यसन्धयतिविद्याविभवैर्जगतां गुरुः ॥
* * * * कृष्णाभिधेयः कृती ।
श्रीमत्सत्यसुसन्धतीर्थसुगुणानाश्रित्य विद्वन्मुदे
साफल्याय वचःश्रियः शुभगुणं काव्योत्तमं निर्ममे ॥

He seems to have been an indefatigable writer and a voracious reader, to judge from his truly voluminous and at the same time very useful commentary on the *B. S. B.*, of Madhva. He seems to have spent the last years of his life at Kumbakonam, where he passed away. His tomb is at the Vyāsarāya Maṭha, at Kumbakonam, where lie buried two other Pontiffs of his Mutt.

WORKS

Only three works have been ascribed to him, two of which are available in print. The third, a c. on the *Ṛg-Bhāṣya-Tīkā*,¹ has not been discovered yet. Of his two published works, the *Sūtradīpikā* (P)^D is a short Vṛtti on the B. S. in 1630 granthas indicating the barest sense of the Sūtras, according to Madhva and free from all digressions, discussions or explanatory notes.

The *Bhāṣya-Dīpikā*,² is both literally and substantially his *magnum opus*. It is a gigantic work running to over 19150 granthas. It is the most elaborate *direct* commentary on the B. S. B. of Madhva, *explaining every word and quotation to be found in it*. It takes no notice, however, of the rival interpretations of other schools or their super-commentaries. *For a clear and adequate understanding of the Madhva-Bhāṣya, as such, without reference to its commentaries, this work is of incomparable value and stands alone*. Another equally distinguishing feature of this work is the numerous references that abound in it, to so many earlier commentaries of the Dvaita school on the Sūtra and other Prasthānas. The value of these references stands enhanced by the fact that some of these commentaries are rare and almost unknown. Within the ambit of his own school, he has *quoted and sometimes criticized* the commentaries of many early writers like Vādirāja,³ Raghūttama,⁴ Rāghavendra,⁵ and many other less important authors like Śarkarā Śrīnivāsa.⁶ There are numerous quotations from the *Tattvapradīpa* of Trivikrama and the *Sattarkadīpāvalī*⁷ of Padmanābha Tīrtha. He tries in many places to reconcile the minor differences in interpretation between the commentaries of Trivikrama and Jayatīrtha.⁸ His study of Madhva's works is so close that attention is frequently drawn by him to the different interpretations of the same Śruti texts given by Madhva, in his Upaniṣad

1. M. M. Saṅgha List.

2. Printed at the Grove Press, Teynampet, Madras, 1900 and Prabha P. Press Bangalore, 1964.

3. P. 177 and 1097.

4. Pp. 237, 438, 779 and 803.

5. ii, 2, 3 (See *Tantradīpikā*).

6. P. 93.

7. Pp. 237, 138, 250, 333, 378, 381-82 and 396.

8. He has an evident liking for the *Tattvapradīpa*, whose interpretations he supports against more modern ones and tries to reconcile them if possible, with those of Jayatīrtha. See pp. 387; i, 4, 25; p. 976-77.

Bhāṣyas and in his other works like the *G. B.*, *NV.*, or *B. S. B.* Among the works and authors mentioned by him are :

1. *Ānandamālā*.
2. Viśveśvara Tīrtha (c. on *Ait. Up.*).
3. Vyāsa Tīrtha (c. on *Up.*).
4. *Prameyadīpikā*.
5. *Tattvamañjarī* of Nārāyaṇa Paṇḍitācārya.
6. *Nayacandrikā*.
7. *Nyāyadīpikā*, (pp. 46, 58, 92).
8. *Sattarkadīpāvali*.
9. *Tattvapradīpa*, pp. 180 728, 1037, etc.

16. VĀDĪNDRA TĪRTHA (1728—1743)*

In 1725, Upendra Tīrtha¹ succeeded Sumatīndra as Pontiff of his Mutt. He died in 1728 and was succeeded by Vādīndra, the great-grandson² of Rāghavendra, in the male line. He is believed to have occupied the Pīṭha for twenty-two years and died at Mantrālaya in Pramodūta, 1750. There is evidently some mistake about the year of his demise as recorded in the Mutt list; for, a grant was made in 1746 A.D. by the Ariyalūr Chief to Vādīndra's successor Vasudhendra (*Mys. Arch. Rep.* 1917). We may therefore agree to a slight revision of the Pontifical date of Vādīndra's demise and place it about 1743.

Among his works, (1) the *Guruguṇastava* (p),³ a poem in thirty-six Sragdharā verses, composed in praise of Rāghavendra and giving much useful information about his life and works, ranks as one of the main sources of information about him. (2-3). His gloss on *Tattvodyota*** and his *Madhvāryā* ** are not traced. (4) The G. V. L. Cat. mentions his *Viṣṇu-saubhāgyasikharīṇī*** about whose contents nothing is known. The *Gurucarite* (p. 353) refers to the following works of Vādīndra as available in the Nanjangud Mutt (5) gloss on TP (entitled *Mīmāṃsānayadarpaṇa*) (6) *Bhūgolakhagolavicāra* (7) *Rāghavendramatthagata-Arcāgatikrama* and (8) *Navyaduruktiśikṣaṇam* (written before he became a Pontiff). *Vādīndra* is also reputed to have composed a few padas (songs), in Kannaḍa.

17. VARADENDRA TĪRTHA (1761-1774)

He was the nephew of Vādīndra and his second successor on the Pīṭha of the Rāghavendra Svāmi Mutt. A metrical c. in Kannaḍa on M's *Tantrasāra* is ascribed to him. He was a great patron of the Dāsa-Kūṭa and was a contemporary of Vijaya Dāsa, Gopāla Dāsa and Jagannātha Dāsa. He bestowed special grace on Jagannātha Dāsa's disciple Prāṇeśa Dāsa of Liṅgasugūr. The well known Varadendra Sāhitya Mandali

1. He is said to have composed a *Madhva-Tārāvali*. See ver. 10, of *Guruguṇastava*.

2. Not the grandson, as in the Introd. to Mys. O. L. edn. of *Tarkatāṇḍava* (vol. i, no. 74).

3. Printed in the *S. M.*, Belgaum, 1923.

of Liṅgasugur which has done pioneering work in publishing Dāsa-Sāhitya in Kannaḍa is named after him.

Varadendra was also a distinguished scholar in Vedānta. The most notable event in his Pontifical career was the philosophical disputation between him and Rāma Śāstri Prabhuṇe of Māhuli (Satarā Dt.) the celebrated spiritual and political adviser of Peshva Mādhavarao (1761-1772) of Puṇe. According to the terms of the debate Rāma Śāstri surrendered possession of his palatial mansion in Lakshmi Road, Puṇe to Varadendra's Mutt who converted a part of it into a Mutt and lived there and passed away there in 1764. His mortal remains are entombed there and āraḍhana is conducted annually. The Varadendra Mutt has recently been renovated.

18. DHĪRENDRA TĪRTHA

He was the Pūrvāśrama-son of Vādīndra and a very distinguished scholar in Śāstras. He is said to have participated in the debate between Varadendra and Prabhuṇe Śāstri. Later, he became a Sannyāsin; but he did not succeed to the Pīṭha. He is the author of five works : (1) a c. on Vādīndra's *Gurugunastava* which has been printed, (2) *Kāraka-Vāda** and glosses on (3) *Nārāyaṇopaniṣad* (4) *Manyusūkta* and (5) *Viśayavākya-Saṅgraha* (Gurucarite, p. 363). He passed away at Ritti near Haveri.

19. SATYAVARA TĪRTHA (1783-1794)

He was a Pontiff of the Uttarādi Mutt. He has left a c. on the *NS* which is available for Adhy. II, Pādas 1 and 2 only and (2) another c. on the *MBh. T. N.* Both of these have been published by the SDVP. Bombay (1965).

20. SATYADHARMA TĪRTHA (1798-1830)

Satyadharma marks practically the close of the history of Dvaita Literature, in the traditional sense of the term. He is the last of the Pontifical writers of the Mādhva school and a contemporary of Sujanendra Tīrtha of the Sumatīndra Mutt, (d. 1836) to whom is ascribed a *Candrikā-bhūṣaṇam*,¹ in the *Mys. Arch. Rep.* 1917.

Within the Uttarādi Mutt itself, there was a break in the religious and literary activities of the Svāmīs, during the 18th. century, which was only temporarily relieved by Satyavijaya Tīrtha (1726—1737)² and others. After Satyapriya, we have really no writer of outstanding merit among the Pontiffs of that Mutt, until the dawn of the nineteenth century. The

1. *Candrikābhūṣaṇadūṣaṇam* is not the correct title of this work as given in the *Mys. Arch. Rep.*

2. His disciple Varkheḍ Timmaṇṇācārya, was a powerful glossator and controversialist. His c. on the VTN. (no. 8064), *Gajapañcānana* (8134) and *Sudhānārambhaṇīya-khaṇḍanam* (8136) are to be found in the T. P. L. The first one has been published as no. 31 of T. S. M. L. Series.

first and in another sense, the last also of the *writers* of the old school, to meet the eye (among Pontiffs), in this century, is Satyadharma Tīrtha.

LIFE

According to the *S. K.* Satyadharma was a contemporary of the Peshwa Baji Rao II (1795—1818) and his adviser Ghorpaḍe,¹ who is said to have honoured him with presents in Pune. He was also a contemporary of Dewan Purniah of Mysore and the Svāmis Vidyāvallabha and Vidyākānta of the Vyāsarāya Mutt. He is said to have patronized Kāśi Timmaṇṇācārya and other distinguished Pandits of the nineteenth century. He died at Hoḷehonnūr, in the Mysore State, in 1830 A.D. The *Gurucandra Kalodaya* in his honour by Kallapur Ramacandrācārya has been published by SDVP. (No. 16).

WORKS

Some ten works have been attributed to Satyadharma. His gloss on the TS. has been printed at Bombay. It refers to a host of earlier authorities like *Sattattvaratnamālā* (pp. 33, 40) Roṭṭi-commentary, Satyānanda Tīrtha² (p. 35b) Pāṇḍurangi-c. on NS. (34b) and quotes from *Laghuśabdenduśekhara*, *Siddhāntakaumudī*, and its c. *Subodhini*. His c. on (2) the *VTN*** and the *Sanatsujātiya*** are not available. His gloss on the *Bhāgavata* is a complement to that of Yadupaṭi³ (Sk. I, 5 and 7 and VI-XII). A private ms. of his (5) c. on the Udyoga Parva of the *Mbh.* is reported from Dharwar. (6) His *Nityasaṁsāri-Liṅgabhaṅga*,⁴ is a theological tract refuting a 'schismatic' view that even the class of "Nitya-Saṁsāri" souls have to undergo destruction of their "liṅga-deha". (7) The *Rāmāmṛtam*** and *Gaṅgālahari*** are evidently Stotras composed by him.

His most outstanding work, however, is (9) his useful partial commentary on the *Vālmiki Rāmāyaṇa* (Kāṇḍas ii-vi) extracts from which have been published by T. R. Krishnacharya, in his edn. of the Epic (Bombay, 1910). As the *Vālmiki Rāmāyaṇa* has received practically little canonical recognition at the hands of Madhva or his commentators, who look to other versions like the *Mūla Rāmāyaṇa* for inspiration and support, this commentary on Vālmiki's work, assumes special significance. The doctrinal aspect is not lost sight of by Satyadharma in his commentary. He refers to Nāgoji Bhaṭṭa's *Śabdenduśekhara* (V, 48. 12) and to an important work of his own (10) *Bhāṣyadīpikā-Yukti-Vātyā*⁵ which is presumably a refutation of the

1. Said to have been a Mādhva Brahmin and a disciple of the Mutt.

2. Commentator on *Candrikā*. He was Svāmi of the Uttarādi Mutt, for a brief interval after Satyanātha (d. 1674).

3. *Yādupaṭyaviṭṭi-Śeṣapūraṇi*, Printed, Dharwar.

4. Mysore O. L. (C—1692) Devanagari, ff. 14.

5. इदंप्रकारस्तु भाष्यदीपिकायुक्तिवात्यायामस्मत्कृतायां विस्तरेणोदञ्चितः । (V, 48, 12). The "Vātyā", is probably another title of it. It cannot be a c. on the *Advaitakālānala* of the layman Nārāyaṇācārya, as stated in the G. V. L. Cat. Kumbakonam.

Bhāṣyadīpikā of Jagannātha Tīrtha, undertaken in defence of some of the interpretations in the commentaries of Raghūttama, Satyanātha, Śarkarā and other writers belonging to the Uttarādi Mutt, rejected by the *Bhāṣyadīpikā*.

21. KṚṢṆĀVADHŪTA PAṆḌITA (1864-1909)

(*alias* Muddu Kṛṣṇācārya)

He was born in Nārāyaṇadevanakere, now submerged in the Tungabhadra Dam, in the Hospet taluk. He was the Āsthāna Paṇḍita at Sonḍūr (a former princely state). He was a gifted Sanskrit scholar of great versatility. He won laurels for āśukavitā in the darbars of Baroda and Travancore. He was an adept in black magic, Tantra and Yoga Śāstras. His scholarship in Śāstras was very wide and was not confined to Dvaita Vedānta alone. He has left brief but illuminating works on the three schools of Vedānta : (1) *Advaitanavanitam* (p) (2) *Viśiṣṭādvaitasāra* and (3) *Madhva-matasarvasvam* and (4) an epitome of M's Brahmasūtra-interpretation which has been published by the G. O. MSS. Library Madras. He has also left us lucid works on (5) the elements of Tarka (6) Vyākaraṇa and (7) Alankāra Śāstras (8) The *Mandāramakarandacampū*, an Īhāmṛga, *Adhyātmanavanita* and (11) a *Rāghavendra Stotra* are among his other works. His memory is held in respect even to this day for various miracles performed by him, in upper Karnatak and in the Bellāry dt.

Territorial Expansion of the Dvaita School Through Social, Religious and Literary Propaganda

CHAPTER XXXVIII

REFORMATORY AND DEVOTIONAL MOVEMENT OF THE HARIDĀSAKŪṬA ITS HISTORY AND LITERATURE

MENTION has been made in CHAP. XIX. P. 228 and CHAP. XXV. P. 295, of the birth of the Haridāsakūṭa in Karnatak, as a result of the Vaiṣṇava revival brought about by Madhvācārya and his followers. The history of the Dāsas was in obscurity until Kittel¹ and Rice² drew the attention of the modern world to splendid contributions of the Haridāsas to Kannaḍa literature.³ The order of the Dāsas was inaugurated in the Kannaḍa country as a result of the spread of the realistic philosophy of Vedānta propounded by Madhva. It spread over upper and lower Karnataka in the next two centuries after him and in course of time began to inspire kindred movements of devotionism beyond the frontiers of Karnataka also.

The order of the Dāsas was an itinerant one. It was composed of a regular band of saintly souls who dedicated themselves to the service of the Lord and singing the praises of Hari, wandered from one end of the country to the other. The saints of this order centred their affections on Viṭhala of Pandharpur, as their patron deity. There is reason to show that Karnataka held cultural sway over Pandharpur and its neighbourhood where the worship of Viṭhala developed in ancient times, though in later days the region passed under the political and cultural hegemony of Maharashtra and Pandharpur itself came to be looked upon as the holy city of Maharashtra mysticism. But even as early as the days of Jñāneśvara, Viṭhala

1. *Nāgavarmana Chandassu*, ed. Kittel, Mangalore, 1875 (Introd).

2. *History of Kannada Literature* (H. I. S.).

3. R. Narasimhacharya (*Karnataka Kavicarite*) gives valuable materials. Other works on the Dāsa Kūṭa which deserve mention are : (1) H. G. Bengeri's booklet on Haridāsa Kūṭa (Kollegal, 1931); 'Mystic Teachings of Haridāsas of Karnatak' by A. P. Karmakar and N. B. Kalamdani (Dharwar, 1939); Belur Keśava Dās's 'Karnāṭaka Bhakta Vijaya' and Dāsa Sāhitya Vimarśe (in Kannaḍa); and R. S. Panchamukhi's learned work of Haridāsa Literature, published by the Kannada Sahitya Parishat, Bangalore (1952) in Kannada with an English introd. R. D. Ranade has dealt with the Mysticism of the Haridasas of Karnatak in his lecture on the subject (published by the Karnatak University, Dharwar (1953-54). Vide also my article on Vaiṣṇava Saints of Karnatak in the *Cultural Heritage of India*, Vol. IV. (Ramakrishna Mission, Calcutta, 1956).

of Pandharpur was still spoken of as 'the deity beloved of the Karnatakas, enshrined in Karnataka' : कानडाहा विठ्ठल कर्नाटकु ॥ (Abhaṅga ascribed to Jñāneśvara).¹

The Saints of Karnataka were thus the first to develop the cult of devotion to Viṭhala and make it a living faith and a powerful instrument of mass uplift through the medium of soul-stirring music and bhajana, in the language of the people. The emphasis laid by the Dāsas on true devotion to God and the comparative unimportance of social and caste barriers in spiritual advancement is echoed in the writings of the Maharashtra Saints also.

The Dāsas exercised a powerful influence on the mass-consciousness. They did for the average Kannadigas and for the women and the lower strata of society not acquainted with Sanskrit, what the great writers on the Vedānta had done for the higher strata. Their compositions were in easy colloquial language which captured the heart and the imagination of the people at large. In this respect, they differed from the authors of the Tevāram and Prabandha literature in Tamilnadu whose language and style were highly literary. The Dāsas extolled the merits of Jñāna and Bhakti and gave wholesome advice to the people in religion and ethics. By the power of their *padas*, set to music in different rāgas, they roused the fervor of the masses and reclaimed the erring and the pusillanimous. Many Dāsas were proficient in Sanskrit and in philosophical learning and most of the doctrines of Madhva were simplified and put in easily intelligible verses in the people's language. As ardent followers of Madhva, the Dāsas naturally tried to show how much more satisfying, intellectually and emotionally the system of Madhva was than other systems, particularly Śaṅkara's Advaita. Though viewing the world as impermanent and full of misery, and therefore counselling Vairāgya and Bhakti to get rid of the transmigratory career, the Dāsas were zealous advocates of reform and condemned sham and cant in strong terms. They denounce pseudo-religiosity, and exhort the people to be truthful in thought, word and deed. They laid bare the weak spots of society and offered wholesome advice to raise the spiritual standard. They preach an altogether austere form of devotion, in which there is no trace of erotic associations, such as we find in the Bengal school of Vaiṣṇavism.

Many of the Dāsas were proficient in Sanskrit also. Small wonder then that every principle of Dvaita theology and metaphysics has been dealt with by them including the esoterics of its theosophy. Ardent followers of Madhva that most of them were, they have criticized the Advaita doctrine in no uncertain terms. Though viewing the world as full of pain and suffering, and hence counselling Vairāgya for the riddance of bondage, they emphasize the principle of dependence of the world on God. They

1. See S. N. Rajapurohit, 'Maharashtra va Karnatak' *Kesari*, Poona, 1912-13 and A. P. Karmarkar, *Mystic Teachings of Haridasas*, Dharwar 1939. The Mangalvedhe taluk is, even now, acknowledgedly a Kannada speaking area.

are zealous advocates of reform and spiritual self-discipline and criticize all sham and cant, in telling phraseology. While the later Dāsas like Vijayadāsa and Jagannātha wrote particularly for Mādhva circles, the earlier ones like Purandara, Kanaka and Śrīpādarāya preach the general code of ethics and devotion applicable to all. The mystic and psychological experiences of the Dāsas are also recorded in some of the songs.

The beginnings of the Dāsa Kūṭa are lost in obscurity. Acalānanda Viṭhala (888 A.D.) and some precursors or “Ādyas” as they are called, by Vijayadāsa, are believed to have been its precursors. The Ādyas are surmised to have been “Smārta” Bhaktas of the Bhāgavata school. Some others hold that the Ādyas were the pioneers of the movement who flourished between Narahari Tīrtha and Śrīpādarāja, but whose names have been forgotten. The example of the Vīraśaiva Vacankāras might also have had an indirect influence on the rise of the Haridāsa Kūṭa in Karnatak under the aegis of the Mādhva school.

The regular history of the Haridāsa Kūṭa as at present traceable is thus only from the time of Narahari Tīrtha. This literature is very voluminous and many interpolations and corruptions have crept into the corpus of the materials, owing to lack of central authority and tradition and widespread diffusion in various parts of the country. An authentic and definitive edition of the entire literature is a desideratum. In some cases it is difficult to fix the actual limits of contributions of individual Dāsas, which tradition has exaggerated to fabulous extent. Difference of style and use of distinctive “Mudrikās” (nom-de-plume) help to distinguish the songs of individual Dāsas. The extant literature, has been published, for the most part, from Uḍipi, Bellary, Bangalore, Belgaum, Dharwar and the Raichur and Gulbarga districts of the former Hyderabad State.¹ Much unpublished material still remains. The names of over a hundred Dāsas up to recent times are preserved. Authentic historical particulars are available only for some of them.

1. NARAHARI TĪRTHA (1324-33)

The earliest Dāsa of whom we have definite information is Narahari Tīrtha. He has already been mentioned (P. 226) as one of direct disciples of Madhva. Madhva himself is believed by some to have left a few songs in Kannada. This is however, doubtful; though there is no doubt that he set the ball rolling by his stirring pieces of devotional lyrics such as the *Dvādaśa-Stotra* and other compositions. The *M. Vij.* (xv, 84) throws a hint in this direction.

Coming to Narahari, we have only three songs of his so far discovered. They are (1) ಏನು ಮರುಲಾಡೆ ನಾನೆನು (How deluded have I become, how deluded)

1. The Varadendra Sāhitya Mandali, Lingsūgūr has published many fascicules of Dāsa Sāhitya with Kannada translations. The *Haridasa Bharati*, a Kannada Journal from Bangalore (ed. by Gopala Dāsarū), is doing pioneering work in the propagation of Dāsa Sāhitya.

* * * * (2) हरिये इहु सरिये (O Hari, is this proper?) and (3) तिलको निमोलगे नीने (Know within thyself). His *mudrikā* is “Narahari” or “Narahari-Raghupati”. Assuming that Narahari was fairly well-acquainted with Kannada to be able to compose songs in that language, even though it was not his mother-tongue (as he was either an Āndhra or a native of Oriya) we have still to fill the gap of over a hundred years between him and the next famous figure in the history of the Dāsa Kūṭa : Śrīpādarāja (1420-86). Perhaps, the reference to Narahari in the Śrīkūrmam inscription as :

कलिसमयप्रल्हादप्रभावपरितोषितनृहरिरूपेण ॥

may lend weight to the supposition that he was specially connected with the rise of some kind of great devotional movement. Internal evidence of the songs of the Dāsas would however seem to give the credit of pioneering the Dāsa Movement to Śrīpādarāja. The problem has therefore to be left an open question for the present. Tradition in Andhra Pradesh traces to him, the impetus given to the performance of ‘Kūcipuḍi’ dances in temples.

2. ŚRĪPĀDARĀJA (C. 1420-86)

Details of his life and career have already been given in PART VI. His songs are very sublime and possess a happy blending of rhythm and meaning. His sincerity and passionate devotion are transparent in his songs. His important pieces are the Bhramara-gīta, Veṇu-gīta and Gopi-gīta, in addition to disconnected songs. They show a high order of musical excellence and literary graces. His nom-de-plume is “Raṅga-Viṭṭhala”. The personalistic element in his songs is most touching. In true mystic grammar, he analyses the defects and mental agonies of man and lays them bare, before the Lord, praying for light and vision, impersonally, on behalf of struggling souls.

3. VYĀSATĪRTHA (1478-1539)*

His life and works and contributions to Dvaita metaphysics, in Sanskrit, have already been dealt with. He was the most gifted disciple of Śrīpādarāja, even in the field of Dāsa Kūṭa. He composed many beautiful songs under the Mudrikā “Śrī Kṛṣṇa”, and its variants. More than for his own contributions, he is remembered as the farsighted Saint who gave to the Order, its three greatest geniuses : Purandara Dāsa, Kanaka Dāsa and Vādirāja. He shows marvellous powers of musical effect in his songs and has left many padas, Sulādis, Ugābhogas and other varieties of compositions. In technical parlance, “Padas” are composed both before and after God-vision is obtained by the Dāsa. “Sulādis” are used for preaching doctrinal points after he has attained Aparokṣa and “Ugābhogas” while he is pouring out his experiences of ecstatic meditation. The ready recognition which he gave to Purandara and the encouragement given by him to Kanaka Dāsa, in the face of opposition by the orthodox section indicate the catholicity of his outlook and breadth of vision, and moral courage. His admission of Kanaka to the Order of Dāsas was truly a reform of Lutheran proportions.

4. PURANDARA DĀSA (C 1494-1564)

The tradition¹ which holds that "Purandara Dāsa" was born in Purandaragaḍ in the Pune district and that he carried on a prosperous family business in precious stones and jewellery there can no longer be accepted. (See Appendix). He was the son of Varadappa Naik, a wealthy merchant. His former name is said to have been Śrīnivāsa Nayak. It would appear from one of the songs attributed to him इष्ट पापगल * * * (Bangalore i, 237) that he was born in Vaiṣṇava family. Doubts have however been expressed on this point by writers like R. S. Panchamukhi and Gopala Dāsarū of Bangalore, who refer to certain songs attributed to the wife of Purandara अक्का अकटकटेन्न गण्ड (Uḍipi, iii, 159) and his own अंकितविल्लद देह निषिद्ध etc. in support of the view that he was originally a Smārta Brahmin. The evidence is not, however, convincing. The song attributed to his wife, running down certain "Vaiṣṇava ācāras" admits of a general application as a sort of "Nindāstuti" of Vaiṣṇava way of life as contrasted with others without any personal implication. The reference to the Vaiṣṇavite mode of wearing the "Śāri" in the third stanza in the above song of his wife would be equally inexplicable on the assumption of her husband having been a Smārta earlier. For the mode of wearing the Śāri with "Kaccha" is the same for all Deśasth Brahmin women irrespective of their belonging to Mādhva or any other Sampradāya, in Uttara Karnataka and Maharashtra. The song itself is in bad taste and seems to be apocryphal. The other song "अंकितविल्लद देह निषिद्ध * * " appears to emphasize the efficacy and indispensability of Taptamudrāṅkana for a Vaiṣṇava without implying that Purandara was not a Vaiṣṇava before. The words शुद्धवैष्णवकुलदलुद्भविसिदे नानु * * in Bangalore i, 237, offer a real difficulty, even if it is dismissed as a song not of Purandara but his son, as the reference to शुद्धवैष्णवकुल would naturally mean that the family was not a recent convert to Mādhva faith.

After the age of thirty, Śrīnivāsa Naik seems to have renounced all his wealth and sought spiritual guidance from Vyāsātīrtha, who took him as his disciple and gave him "aṅkita" of "Purandara-Viṭhala". Purandara Dāsa visited all the sacred places in India from Badari to Ramesvaram, celebrating them in his songs. He has left many songs in honor of his Dikṣā Guru Vyāsātīrtha, which contain valuable, historical information.

He wields a simple yet epigrammatic style full of music, alliteration and harmony. His name is familiar to every child in Karnatak. His songs range from the most homely to the most sublime topics and are capable of moving one to tears at times. He made several improvements to the system of Karnatic Music and was its greatest exponent and systematiser. He has illustrated each Rāga with a song. He was the favorite disciple of his Guru Vyāsātīrtha who seems to have regarded him as an ideal Dāsa (दासरेन्दरे पुरन्दरदासरैय्य * *). The date of Purandara's demise is given by his son Madhvapati-Viṭhala Dāsa as 1564 A.D. (Raktākṣi).

Purandaradāsa is credited with the authorship of 4,75,000 songs, according to one estimate and 4,25,000 according to another. As in the

1. Song of Vijayadāsa; पुरन्दरगण्डदल्लि जनिंसि * * *

case of Tyāgarāja, who is also credited with a staggeringly large number of Kṛtis, of which not more than 700 are said to be extant, not even a thousand authentic compositions of Purandara Dāsa are now accessible to us. Perhaps the traditional estimate is a pious exaggeration of the extent of his voluminous contributions. Or, perhaps it may represent the total number of words of his literary output,—each word being regarded as a Bhagavannāma (as in the Sahasranāma), in the true sense of Nāmopāsanā, and Nādotpāsanā. If this view is taken, it may bring down the total number of his songs (Padas, Sulādis etc.) to a reasonable figure.

The songs of Purandara Dāsa are believed to include a large number of Lakṣaṇa-Gītas, none of which has been preserved; while of his Lakṣya-gītas only a few have been handed down to us. The responsibility for the loss of the former must be laid on the shoulders of the Dāsa Kūṭa whose members, in later days, were least interested in the art of music in its scientific aspect. This is the price which a musical Saint has to pay at the hands of his devotees and followers. But for the vicissitudes of the Vijayanagar Kingdom, a much larger part of his Lakṣyagītas and many of his Lakṣaṇa-gītas could have survived. Tulajendra, one of the scholarly Rulers of Tanjore, quotes numerous Sulādis of Purandara Dāsa, which are not now current. The shifting of the centre of gravity of S. Indian culture from Vijayanagar to regions further south, after the fall of Vijayanagar, was to a great extent responsible for the undeserved oblivion which enveloped the splendid contributions of Purandara Dāsa.

The debt which Karnataka Music, as we now have it, owes to Purandara Dāsa can never be repaid. Whatever the nature of the older Tevāram “paṇs” they could not be totally divorced from the basic and standard schemes of the Saṅgīta Śāstra derived from Bharata. This is clear from the adoption of Sanskrit titles of works on ancient Tamil music (*Isai Nūl*) like *Pañca-Bhāratīyam*, *Bharata-Senāpatīyam*, *Indra-Kāliyam* etc., cited by Aḍiyārku-Nallār (16th century?) in his commentary on the *Śilappadikāram* (2nd century A.D.). The stream of thought is the same.

Even at a later stage, the so-called Northern and Southern systems of Indian Music had and do even now have much in common and have bifurcated from the same common source. Unlike the northern system, which did not have the advantage of any great master who combined in himself mastery of the art and science of music, the Southern system has been blessed with a galaxy of masterminds in the art and science of music, headed by Purandara Dāsa himself. The name Karnataka Music as applied to the system is appropriate in that it was shaped by the great Gurus of Purandara Dāsa like Vyāsātīrtha and Śrīpādarāja and standardized by Purandara himself and further crystallized by another distinguished son of Karnataka,—the famous Veṅkaṭa Makhī, a scion of the Hoysala Karnataka family of Govinda Dīkṣita of Tanjore and minister of Śevappa Nāyaka and Acyuta Nāyaka, Rulers of Tanjore. It is an established fact, though not so well known that Tyāgarāja 1767-1847 himself was greatly inspired by Purandara Dāsa and has recognized him as his inspirer, among

others, in one of the introductory verses (Kandapadya) to his *Prahlāda-Bhakta-Vijaya* :

“दुरितव्रातमुल्लेख्य परिमार्चयि हरिगुणमुल बाहुचु नेप्पुडुन्
परवमुड वेलयु पुरन्दरदासुनि महिमेलनु दलचेद मदिलोन् ॥” (Telugu).

It is also admitted by authorities in the field that a comparison of the songs of Purandara Dāsa and Tyāgarāja bears out the close affinity of style and thought between them. It is also conceded that Muthusvāmi Dikṣitar's frequent use of Suḷādi “Saptatālas” and his shaping of melodious forms of antique Rāgas, embodied in the Devaranāmas of Purandara Dāsa, is proof of the former's indebtedness to the latter. The “Suḷādi-Sapta-Tālas” are themselves regarded as the unique contribution of the Dāsa Sāhitya from Śrīpādarāja onwards. Some of the padas of Purandara containing the Nāyaka-Nāyikābhāva motif are, but for the language, “apt to be fancied as Kṣetrajña's.”

That Purandara Dāsa was not merely a Dāsa in the limited sense of the term but an authority on Music, who felt called upon to systematize the Saṅgīta-Paddhati of his times, is clear from his introduction of the Mālavagaula scale as the basis of musical instruction. Besides this he devised a graded series of lessons which till recently prevailed in the whole of S. India, in the teaching of music, irrespective of the language of the learner. The Svarāvalis, “Jaṇṭe-Variśais”, Alamkāra and Gītas, laid out by him form the right royal road to the mastery of Karnataka music in all its intricacies.

5. KANAKA DĀSA

Purandara's contemporary and friend Kanaka Dāsa was a native of Bāḍa in the Bankāpūr taluk of the Dharwar district. He is believed to have been a shepherd or Kuruba by caste and a chieftain of Bāḍa. He calls himself an unlettered man :

बरहव तिलियबेडेनुतेन्न नोसलोलु बरेदु निर्मिसल्ल । अदरिन्द बरहवनरिये ना ॥
पदविट्टु कडितदोलु बरेदु माडिद कृतियल्ल ॥ (*Mohana Taraṅgiṇi*)

This may however be a poetic exaggeration common to most Mystics.¹ For, his works reveal a perfect mastery of Sanskrit and Kannaḍa literature² and show that he was well-versed in contemporary literature. He styles himself “Kanakadāsottama” in his *Mohana-Taraṅgiṇi* (ii, 1).

According to Beṭageri Krishna Śarmā (*Nānu Kaṇḍa Vijayanagara*, Karnataka Jana Jivana, Dharwar, 1939) Kanaka Dāsa was a staunch Śrīvaiṣṇava (follower of Rāmānuja) and remained so throughout his life and that there is no evidence that he became a “disciple” of Vyāsātīrtha or adopted the Mādhva dīkṣā, at any time, (p. 67, *op. cit.*). The evidence on which he takes his stand is that Kanaka Dāsa, in his *Mohana-Taraṅgiṇi*, pays homage to Rāmānuja and to (Tirumalai) Tātācārya, his Guru :

1. Cf. हलगे बलपव पिडियदोन्दगलिके (Kumāra Vyāsa); Nammālvār, *Tiruvāimozhi*, ii, 3, 3.

2. Cf. *Mohanataraṅgiṇi* ii, 20-30 with Bāṇa's *Kādambari*;
यत्र मलिनता हविर्धूमेषु... etc.

श्रीमद्गुरुराय दुरितविजेय दुष्कर्मविच्छेदनाह्लाद ।

तामसगुणनाश सात्त्विकोल्लास रामानुजमुनि शरण ॥

ई रीतिय पेम्पु पडेद सद्गुरुकरवारिजोद्भव शिष्यजनर ।

पेरिसि नाल्वगे फलवीव ताताचार्यरडिगलिगरगुवेनु ॥ (i, 2-3; 4)

and xxvi, 2. As against this, we have to take into account the reference to Kanaka in the songs of Purandara, the tradition about “Kanakana Kṇiṇḍi” at Uḍipi and the evidence of Kanaka’s own songs (Uḍipi 98-99) which tend to show strongly that at least in his later days (as we know him through his Padas) he had come under the influence of the Mādhva faith and had had his initiation at the hands of Vyāsātīrtha as Mādhva tradition has consistently held and as the Dāsa Kūṭa has accepted without demur. Betageri Krishna Sarma, moreover, has overlooked the fact that despite his respectful references to Rāmānuja and Tātācārya, in his *Mohana Tarāṅgiṇī*, Kanaka Dāsa has clearly violated the *Śrīvaiṣṇava Sampradāya*, in having bowed down, at the beginning of the *Mohanatarāṅgiṇī* itself, to the gods Śiva, Gaṇeśa and to Pārvatī and in the order of merit in which he mentions them : Rudra (ver. 8) Brahmā (9) Pārvatī (10) Sarasvatī (11) Gaṇeśa (12) Garuḍa (13) Śeṣa (14) etc. Now, as “Nityasūris” Garuḍa and Śeṣa, occupy, in Śrīvaiṣṇava creed, a higher status than Brahmā, Rudra and others, and Rudra is scrupulously assigned a place below Brahmā as his son. (See songs of Tōṇḍaraḍippōḍi Ālvār). In any case, Gaṇeśa’s mention above Garuḍa (known as “Periya Tiruvaḍi” in Tamil) and Śeṣa as “Nityasūris” would be sacrilegious for any true Rāmānujīya. We may therefore conclude from these facts, that though Kanaka was under the influence of Tātācārya in his early life, he *could not and did not subscribe wholly to the dogmas of Śrīvaiṣṇavism against the worship*¹ of Śiva etc., and that was why, in later years, he felt more drawn to the Vaiṣṇavism of Madhva as preached by Vyāsātīrtha which was certainly more tolerant and accommodative of the worship of other gods like Śiva, Gaṇeśa and others of the Hindu pantheon and became his disciple. There are songs like शरणु शरणु and अस्तु भजिपरैय्य । (Uḍipi, 98-99)² which point clearly to a change of faith.

Kanaka died at Kāginele,³ where he built or consecrated a temple to his favorite deity Ādikeśava, whose name, he adopted as his pen name later for his songs. Unlike Purandara, he was a ‘free-thinker’. Caste and creed were no barriers to Mokṣa, in his opinion. He was persecuted for his extreme views by the orthodox followers of Vyāsātīrtha. This is alluded to in one of his songs by Purandara himself (Uḍipi, 215, p. 92, 1952).⁴ But Vyāsātīrtha stood firm and revealed the greatness and

1. Cf. आ ब्रह्मस्तंबपर्यन्ता जगदन्तर्व्यवस्थिताः ।

प्राणिनः कर्मजनितसंसारवशवर्तिनः ।

यतोऽतो न हि ते ध्याने परेषामुपकारकाः ॥ (Rāmānuja, *Śrībhāṣya*).

2. Quoted by R. S. Panchamukhi, ‘Karnataka Haridāsa Sāhitya, Bangalore, 1952, (p. 66).

3. Sixteen miles from Haveri railway station (Bangalore-Hubli section).

4. कनकदासनम्याले दयमाडलु व्यासमुनिमठदवरेल्लदूरिकोम्बुवरो । (Uḍipi, i, 215).

devotion of Kanaka to his other disciples. Even to this day. "Kanakana Khiṇḍi" (Kanakan's Window) at the temple of Śrī Kṛṣṇa at Uḍipi, is a witness to his marvellous devotion to God. The *Vādirāja—GVCA* (V, 11-18) composed at the time of the second successor of Vādirāja (in about 1640 A.D.) refers to Kanaka's residence at Uḍipi, after undergoing Viṣṇudikṣā and Taptamudrāṅkana.

Besides many devotional songs including "Muṇḍiges" (allegories) he wrote the *Mohanatarāṅgiṇi*,^(p)¹ *Haribhaktisāra*,^(p)² *Rāmadhyāna Carite* and *Nalacarite*. His portrayal of feelings is vivid, and penetrating. He can be most homely and sublime as occasions demand and rises to inimitable perfection of art.

6. VĀDIRĀJA (1480-1600)

Vādirāja, the erudite author of the *Yuktimallikā* and other Sanskrit works, was also a Dāsa of outstanding merit. He has left *Rāmagadya*, *Vaikuṇṭhavarṇane*, *Lakṣmīśobhānehāḍu* etc. His *mudrikā* was "Hayavadana". There are quite a number of songs of other Dāsas who came after him, referring to the fact of his having been a disciple of Vyāsātīrtha

7. VIJAYADĀSA (1687-1765)

The next leading figure in the Dāsa Kūṭa was Vijayadāsa, a native of Cikalparavi in the Mānvi taluk of the Raichur district. (Karnataka). He died at Chipgiri, four miles from Guntakal. Though considered to have been a disciple of Purandara, there is a gap of about 150 years between them. He composed many songs and Sulādis. His style is stiff and full of Sanskritisms. Some of them are of great length. His thorough grasp of the Śāstras is manifest at every step. He is an ardent Vaiṣṇava extolling Madhva as the Saviour of mankind. His *mudrikā* is "Vijaya-Viṭhala". He had many disciples, the best known of whom were Bhāgaṇṇa Dāsa or "Gopāla-Viṭhala" (1717-57) and Timmaṇṇa Dāsa of Adoni. The former belonged to Masurkallu, in the Devadurga taluk of Raichur.

9. JAGANNĀTHA DĀSA (1726-1809)

Bhāgaṇṇa's reputed successor was Jagannātha Dāsa,² native of Byāgavata in the Mānvi taluk of Raichur. He was the most distinguished Dāsa after Vijayadāsa. His *mudrikā* is "Jagannātha Viṭhala". He is said to have been miraculously converted to faith in the Dāsa Kūṭa, after a cruel illness, by Vijayadāsa, who caused his disciple Gopāladāsa to part with forty years of his life in favor of Jagannātha. Jagannātha's former name was Śinappa. He is a very forcible writer and known chiefly for

1. It is a metrical Kāvya, in the Sāṅgatyā metre, in 42 Sandhis of about 11,000 verses, depicting the story of Uṣā and Aniruddha, in a highly romantic vein.

2. He should be distinguished from Jagannātha Tīrtha of *Bhāṣyadīpikā-fame*, who was also his senior contemporary. Dr. K. M. Krishna Rao has published a good study of Jagannātha Dāsa. (Mysore, 1956).

his prodigious scholarship in Sanskrit and mastery of original Sanskrit texts of the system. He has burning enthusiasm for the cause of Madhva philosophy and writes a powerful style laden with technical wisdom and theological intricacies. His style is highly Sanskritised and his work teems with the details of Bhakti, Mukti, Tāratamya, Aparokṣa etc. His *magnum opus*, the *Harikathāmṛtasāra*,¹ is a mine of information on Mādhva theology and is honored as a great authority and standard work of reference on the Esoterics of its theology, by the adherents of the Dāsa Kūṭa. It is written in the Bhāminī Ṣaṭpadī metre and is an epitome of Mādhva theology, in 32 Sandhis (chapters). This Kannaḍa work has the special honour of having a very recondite Sanskrit commentary by Saṅkarṣaṇa oḍeyaru (d. 1862) disciple of Viśvapriya Tīrtha of Sode Mutt.

His best known disciples were Śrīda-Viṭhala and Prāṇeśa-Viṭhala. Among his successors may be mentioned Yogīndra Dāsa and Veṅkaṭa Dāsa of Bellary, who died in 1925.

The Dāsa Kūṭa is thus, to this day, a living force in Karnataka and many itinerant Dāsas are still keeping up the hoary traditions of their Order.


1. Printed (1910) at Belgaum with a commentary of Kamalāpati Dāsa.

INFLUENCE OF MĀDHVA THOUGHT ON BENGAL VAIṢNAVISM

NATURE AND EXTENT OF INFLUENCE

(A) EARLY WRITERS

ACCORDING to the Vaiṣṇava traditions of Bengal, the religion of Caitanya was an offshoot of the Mādhva faith. Though Caitanya himself had his ordination as a monk from Keśava Bhāratī,¹ who undoubtedly belonged to an Advaitic Order,² yet, he is said to have inherited his "Vaiṣṇava Dīkṣā" from Īśvara Purī, who is said to have come from the Order of Bhaktas founded by Vyāsatīrtha thro' Lakṣmīpati and Mādhavendra Purī.³ The teachers Mādhavendra Purī, Īśvara Purī, Nityānanda and Advaita,⁴ were probably not Mādhvas in outlook. It is, no doubt, true that Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa, one of the leading exponents of the Caitanya cult in the 18th century, expressly states in his *Prameya-ratnāvalī* and other works, that Caitanya *belongs* to the Madhva-Sampradāya, by virtue of his descent from Vyāsatīrtha through Lakṣmīpati and other monks and quotes the genealogy of teachers already mentioned by Kavikarṇapūra, in his *Gauragaṇoddeśadīpikā* :




1. *Caitanyacandrodaya* of Kavikarṇapūra, 1854, p. 140.

2. प्रभु कहे आमी होय हीन संप्रदायी (*Caitanyacaritāmṛta*, i, 7, 64, p. 152).

3. See *Gauragaṇoddeśadīpikā*.

4. Purī is a title of an Advaitic order of Monks.



In recent years, however, the accepted Mādhva descent of Caitanya (Sampradāya) has been seriously questioned and sought to be repudiated by certain Bengali writers like Dr. S. K. De¹ and Amarnath Ray² and the genealogy given by Baladeva dismissed as a forgery and a concoction. This has met with stout opposition from traditional quarters in Bengal and Assam and a keen fight is still going on over the issue.³

The genealogy furnished by Kavikarṇapūra and Baladeva, is to some extent, defective. The names of Jñānasindhu and Dayānidhi are nowhere to be found among the successors of Jayatīrtha. Vidyānidhi is evidently a mistake for Vidyādhirāja and Jayadharma a variant of Jayadhva. As for Vyāsātīrtha himself, there is nothing to show that he could not have had a North Indian disciple of the name of Lakṣmīpati, who might have been initiated into the Bhakti Pantha, which he transmitted to Mādhavendra Purī and other monks obviously of an Advaitic order. As a matter of fact, Madhva himself received orders from Acyutaprekṣa, who for all practical purposes represented an Advaitic order, so far as outward appearances went. It might also be remembered that the Ekadaṇḍi order is common to both the Śaṅkara and Madhva Sampradāyas, while other Vaiṣṇava orders differ from them. The point, therefore, stressed by some Bengali writers against the Mādhva affiliation of Caitanya, on the ground that Caitanya took what they call "Māyāvāda-Sannyāsa", (meaning Ekadaṇḍi order), is, thus, of no force. In this way, Caitanya himself might have inherited the gospel of Bhakti from his teacher Īśvara Purī. But there are not sufficient proofs that Īśvara Purī was, at any time, imbued with purely "Mādhva" ideas. Even if he had been, his title "Purī",⁴ is a sufficient indication that he could not have belonged to the Mādhva order, which in the 16th. century could not have

1. See his paper in Winternitz Com. Vol. Leipzig, 1933, p. 201, which suffers from several misapprehensions re. the order of Mādhva Sannyāsins such as that these ascetics retain their Śikhā and yajñopavīta after ordination and do *not* use the salutation "Nārāyaṇa-smaraṇam".

2. See his paper on Caitanya and Madhva in Assam Research Soc. Journal, July 1934, April 1935.

3. See Rejoinder to above by Acyutācaran Tattvanidhi J.A.R.S. Jan. 1935.

4. We have seen Vyāsātīrtha had many Advaitins among his disciples such as his biographer Somanātha. But the title Purī is distinctively "Advaitic" See *M. Vij.* xii, 2.

tolerated such a distinctly 'Advaitic' title for one of its brethren. We know too that Caitanya himself (1485-1533) was a younger contemporary of Vyāsātīrtha (1478-1539). It sounds rather strange that Caitanya should have preferred to take orders from an Advaitic monk in or about 1509, when he might have known that the illustrious Vyāsātīrtha (the Paramaguru of his Paramaguru, according to the tradition of Baladeva) was then alive and at the height of his power in the South. All things considered, it appears more or less certain that Caitanya had not heard of Vyāsātīrtha at all, until much later, say about 1520 when he went to the South. It is not, however, unlikely, that a Bhakti Movement was started in the North by Rājendra Tīrtha and his disciple Jayadhva, during their sojourn there. The tradition, in the Vyāsārāja Mutt, is that Rājendra, after his ordination, went north and never returned and we have no record of his place of interment in any place in S. India. We have it from Kavikarṇa-pūra, that the celebrated Viṣṇu Purī, author of *Bhaktiratnāvali* was a disciple of Jayadhva.¹ Most probably, it was this Viṣṇu Purī, who was the real founder of the Bhakti Movement in the North and the teachers Lakṣmīpati, Mādhavendra Purī and Īśvara were descended from him and of these Īśvara was probably contemporaneous with Vyāsātīrtha and presumably well-acquainted with him. This may, in a way, explain, how, in later days when the genealogy of the Caitanya Sampradāya had to be put up, he came to be reckoned in the line of Śuddha Vaiṣṇava monks descended from Madhvācārya. So far as Caitanya himself was concerned, there is no means of estimating the exact nature and extent of influence of the special doctrines of Madhva, on him, as he has not left us any philosophical works of his own. Judging from his biographies, this influence does not appear to have been very pronounced.

Even at the time of his visit to the South, he does not seem to have been taken up over-much with Mādhvaism.² The Bengali biography *Caitanyacaritāmṛta* speaks of his visit to Uḍipi, the birth place of Madhva; but quite apart from the fact that its account is by no means flattering to the then Svāmīs of the Kṛṣṇa Maṭha, the criticisms³ said to have been made by Caitanya on the doctrines of Madhva, suffer from a serious misunderstanding and misrepresentation of the true and actual position taken up by Madhva on the relative positions of Karma, Jñāna and Bhakti,⁴ in the scheme of

1. Cf. श्रीमद्विष्णुपुरी यस्य भक्तिरत्नावलिः कृतिः ।

जयधर्मस्य शिष्योऽभूत् * * * ॥

2. कियन्त एवात्र वैष्णवा दृष्टाः । तेऽपि नारायणोपासका एव !

अपरे तत्त्ववादिनः । तेऽपि तथाविधा एव ! निरवद्यं न भवति तन्मतम् ॥

(*Caitanyacandrodaya*, VIII, p. 174, Bib. Ind. 1854).

3. Cf. "प्रभु कहे ज्ञानकर्म दोहे है हीन ।

तोमर सम्प्रदाये देखि सो द्वयि चिन्ह ॥"

4. नैवान्यसाधनं भक्तिः फलरूपा हि सा यतः ॥ (*Bṛh. Up. c.*)

See c. on *Gītā* iii, 21. The same texts from the *Bhāgavata* as have been cited by Madhva, have been put into the mouth of Caitanya in the Bengali biography of Kṛṣṇadāsa, in expounding the ideal nature of Bhakti.

Sādhana. Perhaps, Caitanya had ample time, afterwards, to revise his opinion of the faith of Madhva and instruct his disciples accordingly.

However that may be, it is *not* true to say that “Bengal Vaiṣṇavism came under the influence of Mādhva thought, through Jīva Gosvāmin, the nephew of Rūpa and Sanātana”. For, Rūpa himself, *was considerably influenced by Madhva’s special doctrines*, in his *Laghubhāgavatāmṛta*. He not only quotes¹ from Madhva, but is also *anxious to reconcile his views with those of Madhva*, on certain very intimate doctrines of his Śuddha-Vaiṣṇavism² and quotes the very passages cited by Madhva from the *Brahmatarka* (a work quoted *only* by Madhva and not known to us through any other source, or recognized by any other system), on the unity of the Divine constitution. The doctrine is known as that of “Saviśeṣābheda” between God and His attributes and all Avatāras and is based on the peculiar doctrine of “Viśeṣa”, that is distinctive of Mādhva metaphysics (which has been dealt with at length under VIṢṆUDĀSĀCĀRYA and VYĀSATĪRTHA in Chapters XXIV and XXIX of this work). The conception of “Acintyaśakti” that is introduced by the Caitanya school, is again clearly set forth by Madhva under *B. T. X*, 7, 49 and is only a terminological variation of the same idea of “Viśeṣa”. Rūpa also appeals to the many authorities, cited by Madhva³ on this issue, in his *Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya*, *Bhāgavata-Tātparya* etc. Thus, the influence of Mādhva *thought* in moulding an important aspect of Vaiṣṇava theology of Bengal and its conception of Godhead, even in the works of Rūpa Gosvāmin, cannot be seriously denied.

Still, it could not be said that Rūpa had decided to adopt Madhva as his sole and only guide and teacher or was prepared to entirely agree with him, in all matters. His respect for Madhva does not exclude his homage to the great Advaitic commentator on the *Bhāgavata* : Śrīdhara Svāmin, whom he quotes⁴ and mentions⁵ several times.

Rūpa’s nephew, Jīva Gosvāmin, is no doubt greatly influenced by the views of Madhva⁶ and is prepared to take his word for it, that such sources as *Caturvedaśikhā*, *Brahmatarka*, are genuine.⁷ But, he is equally well-disposed towards the memories of Śaṅkara⁸ and Rāmānuja.⁹ The attitude of the early followers of Caitanya, then, seems to have been one of eclecticism.

At the same time, the Bengal Vaiṣṇava writers have, as a rule, shown

1. *Laghubhāgavatāmṛta*, Veṅkaṭeśvara Steam Press, Bombay, 1902, p. 55.

2. *Op. cit.* pp. 125 (*Pādma*) and 162-63.

3. इत्येषा दर्शिता मध्वाचार्यैर्भाष्ये निजे श्रुतिः (P. 222).

4. इति स्वामी (p. 18).

5. P. 60.

6. *Ṣaṭsandarbha*, pp. 15, 18, 77, 93, 101, 102 etc.

7. *Op. cit.* p. 22.

8. *Op. cit.* p. 17.

9. *Op. cit.* p. 164.

their *undisguised antipathy to the Māyāvāda of Śaṅkara*¹. Jīva says in so many words, that he would follow the lead of Śrīdhara Svāmin, ONLY so far as it would be in keeping with the principles of genuine Vaiṣṇavism of the *Śuddha-Vaiṣṇava type*: माय्यरूपा च तद्व्याख्या श्रीधरस्वामिचरणानां, शुद्धवैष्णवसिद्धान्तानुगता चेत् तर्हि यथावदेव लिख्यते ॥ (*Śaṭsandarbha*, p. 20). The term “Śuddha-Vaiṣṇava”² is traditionally applied to the system of Madhva as distinguished from that of Rāmānuja and others. The implication in Jīva Gosvāmin’s words is obvious that he cannot and would not follow Śrīdhara in his predilections for Advaita.

All these show that the Gosvāmins³ were equally divided in their allegiance between Madhva and Śrīdhara. It may therefore be observed that till the days of Jīva Gosvāmin, the Bengal Vaiṣṇavas were *only partially influenced* by the writings of Madhva and his followers. The dependence on and attachment to the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* shown by Madhva’s system, was also very probably one important factor which brought the Caitanya cult closer to it than to those of Śaṅkara or Rāmānuja and paved the way for its ultimate affiliation with it, which was bound to come as a logical fulfilment of its “Śuddha-Vaiṣṇavism”.

(B) It was in the 18th century that this influence became *very pronounced and predominant*. The two great writers of this period were (1) Rādhādāmodara,⁴ a Kānyakūbjā Brahmin and (2) his disciple Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa of Orissa or S. Bengal.

1. RĀDHĀ DĀMODARA (C. 1710-60)

He wrote a *Vedānta Syamantaka*, which has been published from Lahore.⁵ It is a short tract in six Kiraṇas (chapters) dealing with the Pramāṇas to be accepted, the five Prameyas viz., God, Souls, Prakṛti, Time and Karma. Chapters iii-vi, deal with the Prameyas one after the other. Rādhā Dāmodara quotes passages from the *B. S. B.* of Madhva (p. 14) and pleads vigorously for the distinction of the Jīva and Brahman and repudiates the doctrine of Avācyaṭva of Brahman (p. 21).

2. BALADEVA VIDYĀBHŪṢAṆA (C. 1720-90)

His pupil Baladeva, is said to have belonged to the Balasore district of Orissa lying in the southern border of Bengal proper. He was a contemporary of Jayasimha, Ruler of Jeypore, who flourished in the

1. In the *Caitanyacaritāmṛta* itself (Ādilīlā, vii, st. 121 ff.) Caitanya, on the occasion of a meeting with Advaitins at Banaras, is represented as establishing the *anūtva* of the Jīvas and as having severely criticized the Vibhutva-interpretation of that adhikaraṇa, by Śaṅkara. (P. 161-64, Gauḍīya Edn.).

2. See chap. XVI.

3. Sanātana, in his *Vaiṣṇavatoṣiṇī* c. on the *Bhāg.* refers to Śrīdhara Svāmin with respect (No. 3522-3, Ind. Office Mss.).

4. राधादामोदरः कान्यकुब्जविप्रावतंसः । स्वस्य मन्त्रोपदेष्टा ।
(Baladeva, *Siddhāntaratna*, VII, 34 (p. iv, Introd. to Punjab Oriental Series, no. 19).

5. Punjab Oriental Series, XIX, 1930.

beginning of the 18th century. Aufrecht notes that one of Baladeva's works, a commentary on the *Utkalikāvallari*, was written in 1765 A.D. He was a painstaking scholar and an enthusiastic follower of Caitanya though not always quite an accurate authority on the philosophy or theology of Madhva, judging from certain mis-statements of his. But of his zealous acceptance of and devotion to Madhva Sampradāya, there can be no doubt. He "studied Vedānta in Mysore and became well-versed in the commentaries of Śaṅkara and Madhva and got himself initiated into the cult of the latter" (M. Nandi. *Philosophy of Baladeva*, p. 18). He lived up to a ripe old age and spent his last days at Bṛndāvan, adopting Sannyāsa.

WORKS

Over a dozen works¹ are ascribed to him, which include (1—10) cc. on the ten Upaniṣads** (11) the *Viṣṇusahasranāma*** (12) a *Stavamālā*** and commentaries on (13) the *Laghubhāgavatāmṛta*^(p) of Rūpa Gosvāmin and (14) on the *Ṣaṭsandarbha*^(p) of Jīva Gosvāmin. We have also an independent tract of his entitled *Prameyaratnāvali*^(p) and (16—18) three works dealing with the *Brahmasūtras*.

Of these, the *Prameyaratnāvali*,² is an exposition of the nine cardinal principles of the Vaiṣṇavism of Caitanya which are identical with and based on the nine fundamental tenets of Madhva's religious and philosophical thought, summed up in the well-known verse cited by Baladeva with the remark : तदुक्तं प्राचा —

श्रीमन्मध्वमते हरिः परतरः सत्यं जगत्तत्त्वतो
भिन्ना जीवगणा हरेरनुचरा नीचोच्चभावं गताः ।
मुक्तिर्नैजसुखानुभूतिरमला भक्तिश्च तत्साधनं
ह्यक्षादित्तयं प्रमाणमखिलाम्नायैकवेद्यो हरिः ॥

which he paraphrases with one of his own, indicating the perfect harmony of views between Madhva and Caitanya on those points :

श्रीमध्वः प्राह विष्णुं परतममखिलाम्नायवेद्यं च विश्वं
सत्यं भेदं च जीवान् हरिचरणजुषस्तारतम्यं च तेषाम् ।
मोक्षं विष्ण्वंघ्रिलाभं तदमलभजनं तस्य हेतुं प्रमाणं
प्रत्यक्षादित्तयं चेत्युपदिशति हरिः कृष्णचैतन्यचन्द्रः ॥

and writes ;

आनन्दतीर्थे रचितानि यस्यां प्रमेयरत्नानि नवैव सन्ति ।
प्रमेयरत्नावलिरादरेण प्रधीभिरेषा हृदये निधेया ॥

It is in this work that he gives the Guruparamparā of Caitanya from Madhva through Rājendra Tīrtha and Vyāsātīrtha (Vide Tables of Mādhva Mutts pp. 208-209).

His most important work is however the *Govinda Bhāṣya* on the B. S. which draws heavily on the B. S. B. of Madhva.³ We have a ms. of this

1. See Introd. to *Laghubhāgavatāmṛta*, Venkatesvar Press, Bombay, 1902.

2. A translation of this work, in English, has been published in the S.B.H. Series, Allahabad.

3. For details see Appendix V,

work¹ in the Madras O. L. (R. No. 2290). The *Siddhāntaratna* or *Govindabhāṣyapīṭhikā* (Madras O. L. 2989) is a sort of introduction to the above and contains the following eight pādas :

- | | |
|------------------------|----------------------------------|
| १. परमपुरुषार्थनिर्णयः | २. भगवदैश्वर्यनिर्णयः |
| ३. विष्णुपारम्यनिर्णयः | ४. सर्ववेदवेद्यत्वनिर्णयः |
| ५. केवलाद्वैतनिरासः | ६. त्रिधान्तरेण केवलाद्वैतनिरासः |
| ७. केवलानुभूतिनिरासः | ८. पुरुषार्थनिर्णयः |

The author bows in his work to Rūpa and Sanātana calling them “veritable clouds in dispelling the dust-storms of Māyāvāda” (ver. 4) and concludes with a handsome and reverential tribute and homage to Madhva :

आनन्दतीर्थप्लुतमच्युतं मे

चैतन्यभास्वत्प्रभयातिफुल्लम्।

चेतोऽरविन्दं प्रियतामरन्दं

पिबत्यलिः सच्छवितस्त्वबाहः ॥

He wrote his own c. on the *Siddhāntaratna* (Madras R. no. 2989). It is remarked in the course of this c. that the author wrote his *Siddhāntaratna*, to reinforce his *Govindabhāṣya*.² Here, too, is affirmed Caitanya’s descent in Sampradāya from Madhva : अथात्मनः श्रीमध्वान्वयदीक्षितभगवत्कृष्णचैतन्य-मतस्यत्वमाह—‘आनन्दे’ति ॥

Dr. Nandi has tried to show:³ that “any judgment on Baladeva’s philosophy being similar to Caitanya’s or Madhva’s will be onesided and unjustifiable” (*Op. cit.* p. 509). The data on which he has arrived at such a conclusion are full of inconsistencies. Referring, for example, to the doctrine of Viśeṣas accepted by Baladeva, he writes, “Dasgupta and M. N. Sircar think that Baladeva has borrowed the original idea of the doctrine of Viśeṣas from the Madhva school, to which he formally belonged. *I think it would be more correct if we say that he has borrowed it, if at all, from his spiritual preceptor Rādhā Dāmodara; the reason being that the examples [Be-ness exists; Distinction is different; Time exists] which Baladeva has used and the purpose for which the doctrine of Viśeṣas has been brought up are exactly the same as used by Rādhā Dāmodara in his work Vedānta-Syamantaka*” (p. 77. italics mine). A reference to P. 355 ante and f. n. therein would at once disprove any originality for the formulation of the doctrine of Viśeṣas or the purpose for which it has been introduced or the examples with which it has been supported either for Baladeva or for his teacher Rādhā Dāmodara (who has himself quoted from Madhva’s *B. S. B.*) as these examples given by Baladeva and his teacher have been taken bodily from the *Nyāyāmṛta* of Vyāsātīrtha.⁴

1. Translated into English by Srish Chandra Vasu, *S. B. H. Series*.

2. अथ सोऽयं गोविन्दैकान्ती बलदेवाख्यो विद्याभूषणो ब्रह्मसूत्रेषु गोविन्दभाष्याभिधं विवरणं निर्माय, तत्परिपोषाय सिद्धान्तरत्नाख्यं तत्पीठं निर्मातुकामः Govindā Ekānti was probably the ascetic name of Baladeva.

3. M. Nandi, ‘Philosophy of Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa’ (doctoral thesis at the Bombay University, 1955. Typecopy : Bhāratīya Vidyā Bhavan Library).

4. किं च, * * * * ‘सत्ता सती’, ‘भेदो भिन्नः’ * * * * ‘कालः सदा अस्ति’, ‘देशः सर्वत्र, इत्यबाधितव्यवहारार्थं विशेषोऽङ्गीकार्यः॥ (Nym. P. 564 b) .

Dr. Nandi would not have claimed any originality for the doctrine of Viśeṣas or the examples supporting it for Baladeva and his preceptor, had he been aware of the existence of such a work as the *Nyāyāmṛta* and of this particular doctrine having been established there, argumentatively, in the section on Viśeṣas ! Since it is admitted by Nandi himself that Baladeva studied Vedānta in Mysore and got himself initiated into Madhva's Sampradāya (there ?), it hardly stands to reason that Baladeva had not studied such a monumental work on the Mādhva system as the *Nym*. Nandi is wrong, again in endorsing without proper examination, Sircar's view that while Madhva accepts Viśeṣas in relation to the attributes of the Absolute, the Jīvas and the world also, "Baladeva *confines* his Viśeṣas to the distinction of attributes in the Infinite and (does) *not* (extend them) to the categories of existence such as Jīvas, Prakṛti etc. and *hence, breaks off from the Mādhva traditions*". (p. 78. Italics mine).

For, a little thought bestowed upon the significance of the examples actually cited by Baladeva to elucidate the category of Viśeṣa (from his preceptor's work) would show the absurdity of Dr. Nandi's contention that Baladeva *confines* his Viśeṣas to the infinite Brahman and does *not* extend it, like Madhva, to other categories of existence such as the Jīvas and Prakṛti. For the examples : सत्ता सती, भेदो भिन्नः, कालः अस्ति, and the examples of the Sun and his light, the serpent and its coil (*ahikuṇḍala*) cited by Baladeva in his c. on B. S. iii, 2, 28, *pertain to the realm of Prakṛti* and the material world and clearly involve the acceptance of the theory of Viśeṣas as a necessary logical truth already verified and accepted in respect of the categories of existence and applied, by parity of reasoning, to the realm of Brahman *also*. Otherwise, these examples would not be competent to establish the presence of the *sādhya* ("Viśeṣas") in Brahman, to regulate the relation of *dharmadharmibhāva* between Brahman and its attributes, without reference to an actual or absolute difference.

In the same way, the supposed non-acceptance by Madhva, of the four kinds of Mukti viz., Sālokya, Sārūpya, Sāmīpya and Sāyujya, which Nandi has urged as another formidable proof of Baladeva's "breaking off" from the Mādhva tradition is equally imaginary. It is not based on any first hand acquaintance with the works of Madhva. For, the existence of these four kinds or aspects of Mokṣa has been fully recognized by Madhva and it has been actually used by him as one of the many arguments in favor of his thesis of gradation of intrinsic bliss (*ānandatāratamya*) among souls, in Mokṣa :

तद्वापि क्रमयोगेन ज्ञानाधिक्यात् समीपगाः ।
सालोक्यं च सारूप्यं सामीप्यं योग एव च ॥

(Madhva, B. S. B., iv, 4, 19).¹

1. See also Madhva, G. B., ii, 52.

EXPANSION OF MADHVA SAMPRADĀYA IN MAHARASHTRA AND AMONG THE GAUḌA-SĀRASVATAS AND OTHER COMMUNITIES IN VARIOUS PARTS OF INDIA

DR. BHANDARKAR, in his *Vaishnavism, Saivism, etc.*, has left the impression that the Mādhva system has not taken roots in Maharashtra or found any widespread response there. This is not correct. There are clear evidences of the penetration of the Mādhva Sampradāya, right from the days of Madhva and his immediate disciples, into the whole of Southern Maharashtra covering the present districts of Kolhapur, Sholapur, Satara, Poona, Nasik and Ahmednagar. There is adequate evidence that in the 12th and 13th centuries, there existed a considerable percentage of Kannaḍa-speaking people in the population of these parts of Maharashtra. The northern limit of this influence appears to have been the district of Ahmednagar along the course of the *Godāvari*.¹ The system of Madhva does not, however, appear to have penetrated into the Vidarbha country, the Marathwada region and the Khandesh and Konkan districts. But there are, to this day, many Maharashtrian Brahmin families (exclusively Deśasthas) in the Satara, Kolhapur, Poona, Nasik and Sholapur districts, owing denominational allegiance to Madhva-Sampradāya,² though their number is small. Many families seem to have migrated to Karnataka and to Tamilnad, owing to disturbed political conditions in the 16th and 17th centuries and for religious reasons as well, in the wake of the itineracy of the Uttarādi Mutt. Instances of certain families in Maharashtra having become lukewarm in their faith in Madhva-Sampradāya, on account of inability to conform to the rigidity of beliefs and conduct imposed by it and gradually drifting away from it into the Advaita Sampradāya, for all practical purposes, have also been recorded. The rehabilitation of the fortunes of this Sampradāya in Maharashtra would have to be taken up by the Uttarādi Mutt, which claims jurisdiction over this area. Similar is the case with the Āndhra area; where, also, the much larger percentage of followers of Madhva Sampradāya is not having that much of close contact with the Mutt that is desirable in the interest of keeping up the community-sense alive. There is no adequate literature in these two regional

1. This was also the traditional boundary of Karnataka according to the 10th century work on Kannaḍa Poetics : the *Kavirājamārga* of the famous Rashtrakuta King Nṛpatuṅga :

“कावेरिचिन्दमा गोदावरि वरमिदं नाडदा कन्नडदोल्
भाविस्तिद जनपदं वसुधावलयविलीनविशदविषयविशेषम् ॥” (i, 36).

2. Such as for example the Laḍḍu, Ghāṭge, Suru, Wāṭve, Raḍḍi, Shingre and Gajendragadkar families,

languages on Mādhva philosophy to satisfy the religious and philosophical needs of the people of these parts. It is high time the Uttarādi Mutt takes up the matter and rouses the interest of people in these areas.

The *M. Vij.* (x. 4) records Madhva's having passed through Maharashtra on his way to Badari and back. It also refers to his meeting Mahādeva (1266-71), Ruler of Devagiri. Madhva's first meeting with his first disciple from outside Tuḷunād, Padmanābha Tīrtha, seems to have taken place, in all probability, at Puntāmbā (or Paiṭhaṇ) on the Godāvarī. Padmanābha Tīrtha himself has already been shown to have been a Uttara-Karnāṭaka (p. 223). The presence of a good percentage of Kannaḍa-speaking people in the population of the Ahmadnagar district and the currency of Kannaḍa language in the district in the 13th century (side by side with the "Marhāṭe" language of the majority) have been conclusively established by discovery of the presence of a good number of Kannaḍa words redolent of the life of common people, in the *Jñāneśvari* and other works of Jñānadeva (1275—96). The special reference in the *Jñāneśvari* to "Dvaita"¹ and "Advaita" systems side by side (in addition to separate references to Mīmāṃsā and Tarka-Śāstra among 'Dualistic systems forming part of the Śaḍdarśanas) shows that the "Dvaita" school of 'Vedānta' (of Madhva) should have made its presence felt in Jñānadeva's own district at the time of his writing his c. on *Gitā*. We may therefore take it that some Maharashtrian families in the Godāvarī region had joined Madhva's faith, in his own lifetime. We have evidence that the families of at least two famous writers in Dvaita Vedānta, in the 17th century, viz. (i) Rāmācārya-Vyāsa of *Nym-Taraṅgiṇī* fame and (ii) Ānandabhaṭṭāraka, author of *Nym-Kaṇṭhakoddhāra*, hailed from the same district of Ahmadnagar, to which Jñānadeva himself belonged. The families of both Rāmācārya-Vyāsa and Ānandabhaṭṭāraka hailed from the village of Puntāmbā on the Godāvarī.² Ānandabhaṭṭāraka's son was eventually chosen for the high honor of succession to the Pīṭha of the Uttarādi Mutt, in 1619 A.D. His family, which then settled in Uttara-Karnataka subsequently came to be designated as the "Pāṇḍuraṅgī-family". It now holds a very influential position in the Dharwar district. The family regards itself as Kannaḍiga by descent and language. Another branch of this family is known to have migrated to the Tanjore district (in Tamilnād), in the wake of the establishment of the Maratha principality there, along with many other families. This branch regards itself as Maharashtrian by descent and language. The most curious fact, in this connection, is that yet another branch of the same family, settled in Āndhradeśa³ regards

1. प्रमेयप्रवालसुप्रभ । द्वैताद्वैतनिकुंभ ।

सरिसे एकवटति इभमस्तकावरि ॥ (*Jñāneśvari*, i, 17).

2. Cf. (a) सद्योजातजटाजपावनसरिद्विगोदावरीतीरतो

गव्यूतिर्वसतिः सतां कुलवतामम्बापुरी तत्र ये ।

व्यासाख्या उपमन्युगोत्रजबुधाः * * (*Taraṅgiṇī* p. 356)

(b) See *Vidyādhīśa-Vijaya*.

3. Shri P. Kodanda Rao, a well-known member of the Servants of India Society, from Āndhradeśa, belonged to the Pāṇḍuraṅgī family.

itself as Telugu by descent and language. The "Vyāsa" family to which Rāmācārya, author of the *Nym-Taraṅgiṇi* belonged, appears to have been definitely Maharashtrian by descent, judging from its surname. It is interesting to note that in earlier times, members of this family had played an important part in the history of the Mahānubhāva Pantha in Maharashtra. The names of Bhāve-Vyāsa, disciple of Cakradeva (1263—72) and author of *Cakradeva-Dinacaryā*,¹ and of Mahindra (Mahibhaṭṭa)—Vyāsa, author of *Lilācarita*, both of whom wrote their Works in Marathi, are well-known in the history of the Mahānubhāva sect.² The philosophy of the Mahānubhāva sect was frankly dualistic, in that it admitted the reality of the world and the difference between Jīvas and Brahman as ultimate. But its belief in the *independent reality of the world* and the 'Nitya-baddhatva' of Devas was in complete opposition to the teachings of Madhva. This shows that it must have originated independently in the beginning; though later, its opposition to Advaita might have received further stimulation from the teachings of Madhva as they spread in those parts. One of the works of this sect : the *Jñānaprabodha* of Viśvanātha (1331 A. D.) contains (*Ovis* 643—64) a severe criticism of Brahmājñānavāda.³ The famous Marathi poet Tryambak *alias* Madhva Muni (C. 1690—1731) was a Mādhva by birth,⁴ and a native of the Nasik district. He has left many Padas, Caritas and āratīs, in Marathi and some compositions in Hindi and Sanskrit. He was the Guru of the celebrated poet Amṛtarāya (1698—1753) and passed away at Sendurwadi. He is known for his Padas describing practical life rather than for his narrative poetry. His Padas like 'Cimṇāsā rāmā' 'Uddhavā śāntanava karajā' are sweet as honey. After Tukārām he came forward to popularise the Bhakti cult by his appealing words. Veṅkā Muṅgi (C. 1720) author of *Satyādhirāja-Praśasti*⁵ in Marathi, was also a Mādhva by birth.⁶ Kumbhāri Ācārya (17th cen.) author of a controversial tract in Dvaita-Vedānta (See Appendix) was a native of Kumbhāri, in the Ahmadnagar district. Varkheḍ Timmaṇṇācārya, bearing an obviously Kannaḍa name and belonging to Varkheḍ⁷ in the

1. The work gives interesting information that Cakradeva used to put on the Urdhvapundra mark, with Gopicandana, on his forehead :

भालप्रदेशी गोपीचन्दनाचा ऊर्ध्वपौण्ड्र टीला रेखीति ।

(*Gadyabhāg*). Q. p. 35. *Prācīna Marāṭhī Sant Kavi*, J. R. Ajgaonkar, 1957.

2. Vide *Marāṭhī Vāṇmayācā Itihās*, Pt. i. L. R. Pangarkar, 1932.

3. *Op. cit.* p. 470.

4. *Mahārāṣṭra Sārasvat*, V. L. Bhavē, 1951, pp. 1028—9.

5. Satyādhirāja was the second disciple of Satyābhinava Tirtha (1674—1706) the first one being Satyādhiśa. Both these died within a year of their ordination. The next Pontiff after Satyābhinava was Satyapūrṇa (d. 1726). V. L. Bhavē, following V. K. Rajwade, gives 1778 as Veṅkā Muṅgi's probable date. But as Satyādhirāja died within a year of his ordination in or about 1704, it is likely that Veṅkā Muṅgi's work was written not long after his Guru's demise.

6. *Op. cit.* p. 1042.

7. Varkheḍ Narasimhācārya one of the eminent Pandits of the Mādhva school settled in Pandharpur also hails from the Ahmadnagar dt.

same district, migrated to Tanjore district in Tamilnāḍ, during the itineracy of Satyavijaya Tīrtha (1795—1818), whose disciple he was. The famous Marāṭhī poet Vāmana Paṇḍita (1610—73) of Koregaon in the Sātārā district was a Mādhva by birth; though he subsequently embraced Advaitism as he himself tells us in his *Dvārakāvijaya* :

‘कण्टाललों मी तुमच्या मतात देखोनि सर्वत्र असमतातें ।

पाहेन भी माधव सर्वभूतीं अद्वैतविद्या हरीची विभूति ॥’

The boundaries between Karnataka and Maharashtra in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries were not surely what they are today. Much of the present Southern Maratha country was then under the rule of the great royal houses of Karnataka like the Cālukyas, Rāṣṭrakūṭas and Kalachuris. Under them Kannaḍa literature had reached great heights of fame by the 12th century. Kannaḍa was also the accepted language of administration and of inscriptions in the northern and western parts of these kingdoms, even though ‘Marahāṭhe’ was obviously the spoken language of the majority of the people of those parts. In these circumstances, it was but natural that a large number of Kannaḍa words relating to the daily life of the common people should have found their way into the *lingua franca* of the area. This explains the presence of a large number of Kannaḍa words of common currency in the *Jñāneśvari* itself and in the *Amṛtānubhava* and in the Abhaṅgas of Jñānadeva himself,¹ who wrote his *Jñāneśvari* in 1290 at Nevasa in the Nāgarī² (refined) speech of the Ahmadnagar district.

In the light of one of the *abhaṅgas* attributed to Jñānadeva himself :

कानडा हा विट्ठल कर्नाटकु । त्यानें मज लाविलें वेष्टीं ।³

and another to Ekanātha (1533—99) :

तीर्थ कानडे देव कानडे । क्षेत्र कानडे पंढरिये ।

विट्ठल कानडे भक्त हे कानडे । पुण्डलिकें उघडे उघडे उभें केले ।

एका जनार्दनी भक्ताचिया चाडा । विट्ठल कानडा विटेवरी⁴ ॥

it seems fairly certain that the more southerly areas of Pandharpur and its neighbourhood were, at least as late as the sixteenth century, considered to form part of Karnāṭaka country. The Haridāsas of Karnāṭaka seem to have maintained their contacts with Pandharpur at least till the time of the installation of Vijaya-Viṭṭhala at Hampi (1513). After the downfall of Vijayanagar in 1565 A.D. and the growing popularity of the Vārakārī Sampradāya in Pandharpur, the chances of further progress of

1. Such as e. g. बेम्बल(ल), मेरे, मातु, मसी, भङ्गार, उण्डि, वयसु, सान, तूक, हरलु, ओरेगल्लु (वरकल्लु) ओडवे, पावुटी, कसु, विडार, मेचु (मेच्चु) अकसला (अगसलरु); मदवी, बाहाल (बहाल), आडवल्ली, ऊलिंग, ओगर, घाणा (गाण), बावि, बीदि, ओलेग (०गे), ओ(ड)डियाण, बन्दु, तन्ति ॥ etc. For further details See Shri Bhalacandra Ramachandra Patwardhan's paper : “Śrī Jñāneśvar Kālin Marāṭhī Va Kānaḍī” published in the *Śrī Jñāneśvar Darśan*, Pt. i. Ahmadnagar, 1934, and Shri K. V. Gajendragadkar's paper : *Śrī Jñānadev Mahārājaṅce Abhaṅg*, *ibid* : p. 313.

2. श्रीकृष्णार्जुनसंवाद । नागरी बोली विशदु
सांगोनि दाऊं प्रबंध । ओवियेचा (xiii, 1149).

3. Q. in B. R. Patwardhan's paper, in the *Jñāneśvar Darśan*, Pt. i. p. 175.

4. *Ibid*.

the Madhva-Sampradāya in that part of Maharashtra must have receded considerably.

The *Jñāneśvari* was written by Jñānadeva at Nevasa, in the Ahmadnagar district, in 1290 A.D. Madhva had already made his name by that time and had established contacts with many disciples in the Godāvarī region. He had also, by that time, written his commentaries on the *Gītā* and the *Brahmasūtras*, in which the doctrine of Parā-Bhakti as the quintessence of Bhāgavata-Dharma and the uninterrupted continuation of such Bhakti and Hariguṇagāna as an end in itself, even after enlightenment and in the released state were most vigorously and impressively advocated by him, quoting authorities from the *Bhāgavata-Purāṇa* and other sources¹, for the first time in Indian philosophy. This aspect of Madhva's "Dvaita-Vedānta" should have made a deep impression on Jñānadeva, in the passionate emphasis which he lays on the superiority of Bhakti to the "Saguṇa" to realization of the "Avyakta" (Nirguṇa)-Brahman, by "Jñāna" and "Yogābhyāsa" in his commentary on *Gītā*, xi 2-5. Nevertheless, it is to be noted that in Jñānadeva such Bhakti still remains at the Sādhana-level and is not conceived as continuing in the state of Mokṣa also, as an end in itself (*siddhir evātra sā yataḥ*) as it does in Madhva's view and in some of the utterances of later mystics like Tukārāma. Here, evidently, Jñānadeva could not afford to follow Madhva (or the *Bhāgavata*), (Cf. भक्तिः सिद्धेर्गरीयसी । नैकात्म्यतां मे स्पृहयन्ति केचित्) as he was far too much in agreement with Śaṅkara's view (See his comment on *Gītā* xiv, 2), of the merger of the individual and the Brahman, in the final state of Mokṣa, which leaves no room for any sense of duality and loving devotion to one beyond one's own self. Both the philosophy of Jñānadeva and his general trend of interpretation of the *Gītā* are in substantial agreement with Śaṅkara's. In this sense he must be admitted to be a follower of Śaṅkara. His *Amṛtānubhava* is a vigorous and persuasive exposition of Advaita philosophy inclusive of Māyāvāda. But in the c. on the *Gītā* the emphasis is not so much on Māyāvāda as on viewing the Universe as a sort of "Cid-vilāsa". The aim of the work is to bring the teachings of the *Gītā* within the reach of the common man, the women and the masses. This is clear from the style and method of exposition which is highly poetic, emotional and chary of arguments and discussions of other established interpretations. Though following Śaṅkara in the main, he has in some crucial instances given his own interpretations which are opposed to Śaṅkara's (Cf. the two on XV, 16—17 and VII, 4—5). We cannot therefore conclude from the following reference :

तैसा व्यासाचा मागोवा घेंतू । भाव्यकारांतें पुसतु ।

अयोग्य ही मी न पवतु । कें जाईन ॥ (xviii, 1701)

1. See नहि तन्नैव वैराग्यमुपपद्यते । न च ज्ञानिनां भगवन्महिमादिश्रवणे विरक्तिर्भवति । 'आत्मारामा हि मुनयो निर्ग्राह्या अप्युरुक्मे । कुर्वन्त्यहेतुकीं भक्तिमित्यंभूतगुणो हरिः' (*Bhāg* i, 7, 10) (इति वचनात् अनुष्ठानान्च शुकादीनाम् । न च तेषां फलं सुखं नास्ति । तस्यैव महत्सुखत्वात् । तेषां 'या निर्वृतिस्तनुभूतां तव पादपद्मध्यानाद् भवज्जनकथाश्रवणेन वा स्यात् । सा ब्रह्मणि स्वमहिमन्यपि नाथ माभूत्' (*Bhāg*. iv, 9, 10) इत्यादिवचनात् । (II. 52) Also BSB. iii, 3, 27-31.

at the close of the *Jñāneśvari*¹, that its author was unreservedly or exclusively following the lead of Śaṅkara. Under ii, 46, his interpretation is more in agreement with Rāmānuja's than with Śaṅkara's. Under ii, 70, there is a very *striking agreement in thought and wording* (in bringing out the significance of the comparison between the Sthitaprajña and the Ocean which receives the rivers into itself), between the explanation given by Madhva in his *Gītābhāṣya* and *Gītā-Tātparya* and that given by the Jñāneśvari :

(a) तेन विषयानुभवप्रकारमाह—आपूर्यमाणमिति । यो विषयैरापूर्यमाणोऽप्यचलप्रतिष्ठो भवति, नोत्सेकं प्राप्नोति, न च प्रयत्नं करोति, न चाभावे शुष्यति । न हि समुद्रः सरित्प्रवेशाप्रवेशनिमित्तो वृद्धिशोषो बहुतरौ प्राप्नोति; प्रयत्नं वा करोति ॥ (*M. G. B.* ii, 70).

(b) भुञ्जानोऽपि हि यः कामान् मर्यादां न तरेत् क्वचित् ।

समुद्रवत् धर्ममयीं नासौ कामी स उच्यते ॥ (*Madhva, G. T.* ii, 70).

(c) ज-हीं सरिता ओष समस्त । परिपूर्णं होउनि मिलत ।

त-हीं अधिकु नव्हे ईषत् । मर्यादा न संडी ।

ना तरि ग्रीष्मकालीं सरिता शोषोनि जाती सर्वथा ।

परि न्यून नव्हे पार्या । समुद्र जैसा

तैसा प्राप्ति ऋद्धिसिद्धी । तेया क्षोभु नाहीं बुद्धी *Jñāneśvari* (ii, 357—9)

The *Gītābhāṣyas* of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja neither make any reference to the *Bhāgavata-Purāṇa* nor quote from it. But Madhva, in his *G. B.* quotes profusely from the *Bhāgavata* in bringing out the deeper significance of the verses of the *Gītā*. The *Jñāneśvari* seems to follow this lead given by Madhva in making frequent allusions to various episodes from the *Bhāgavata* and significant contexts thereof; though it does not actually quote passages from the *Bhāgavata*, as it is not a regular commentary in the traditional sense of the term. Madhva's impassioned advocacy of Parābhakti (after attainment of Aparokṣa-Jñāna and even in release) on the authority of *Bhāgavata* must indeed have made a very deep impression on Jñānadeva. Above all, there is a most striking correspondence in the beautiful and highly poetic simile used by Madhva to describe the *Bhagavad-Gītā* as :

वासुदेवार्जुनसंवादरूपा सर्वमहाभारतार्थसंग्रहा भारतपारिजातमधुभूता

in the beginning of his *G. B.* and the Jñāneśvari's description of it in the same poetic strain as :

भारतकमलपरागु गीताख्यु प्रसंगु जो संवादला श्रीरङ्गु अर्जुनेसीं (i, 50)

Madhva was a champion of Bhāgavata-dharma and recognized the *adhikāra* of Bhaktas born in the lower Varṇas for “Nāmajñāna”² and conceded the possibility of Pulkasas and others outside the pale of Cāturvarṇya remaining true “Bhaktas” of God.³ In his *G. B.* he has referred to the way of Yogic technique to attain Jñāna as the more arduous and difficult way and the way of Bhakti and Harikathā-Śravaṇa as the easier way within the

1. *Jñāneśvari*, Govt. Central Press, Bombay, 1960.

2. अन्त्यजा अपि ये भक्ता नामज्ञानाधिकारिणः (*B. S. B.* i, 1. 1) अन्त्यजा वर्णबाह्याः (TP)

3. सत्त्वाधिकः पुल्कसोऽपि यस्तु भागवतः सदा । (*G. T.* xviii). वर्णबाह्या भागवताश्चेत् किमित्यत आह—सत्त्वेति । यः पुल्कसोऽपि भागवतोऽसौ राजसेष्वपि सत्त्वाधिक इत्यर्थः (*Jayatirtha ND*)

reach of all,¹ an idea which is warmly echoed by Jñānadeva. (xii, 4, 5). In view of these significant points, it may be accepted that Jñānadeva did come under the influence of Madhva's teachings in some important respects though he could not subscribe to the thesis of "Bimba-Pratibimba-bhāva" between God and Souls (being realized in Mokṣa, as a corollary of the concept of Parābhakti).

Opinion is still strongly divided among experts on "Śānta-Sāhitya" in Marāṭhī, whether the Vārkarī Sampradāya of Jñānadeva, Nāmadeva, Tukārāma and others was only ostensibly "Advaitic" in its doctrines and outlook or whether it had accepted denominational allegiance to Śaṅkara-Vedānta together with its Māyāvāda. The well-known Marathi writer and research scholar, Prof. S. N. Banahatti, in his *Vāṇmaya-Vimarśa* (Poona 1955) has tried to show that these Mystics of Maharashtra were more the votaries and propagators of the Bhāgavata-Dharma than strict philosophers or metaphysicians concerned with questions of credal or doctrinal affiliations and that they kept themselves advisedly aloof from logical or interpretational discussions of theory and doctrine. He has also pointed out that many of the outpourings of these Mystics describing the state of Brahmic realization attained by them, in frank monistic phraseology, are *not incapable* of being explained consistently, in terms of the vivid and all-comprehending realization of the immanence of the Supreme Being in the entire Cosmos and in one's own self, which is the highest point of Theistic realization. He has also cited passages from the writings of Tukārāma, which disclose a very pronounced distaste for a goal of cold subject-objectless oneness and a passionate longing, on the other hand, for the sweetness of continued service of the Lord and singing His praises, *even after the attainment* of realization.² To what extent these Theistic

1. वायुजयादिरहितानामपि ज्ञानभक्तिवैराग्यादिसंपूर्णानां भवत्येव मुक्तिः । तद्वतां त्वीषज्ज्ञानाद्य-
संपूर्णानामपि निपुणानां तद्वलात् कथंचिद्भवतीति विशेषः । उक्तं च भागवते (iii, 5, 45—46) पानेन ते देव
कथासुधायाः प्रवृद्धभक्त्या विशदाशया ये । वैराग्यसारं प्रतिलभ्य बोधं यथाजसा त्वापुरकुण्ठधिष्ण्यम् ॥ तथा परे
त्वात्मसमाधियोगबलेन जित्वा प्रकृतिं बलिष्ठाम् । त्वामेव धीराः पुरुषं विशन्ति तेषां श्रमः स्यान्नतु सेवया ते
(M.G.B. viii 10). साधका द्विविधा भक्त्यादिप्रधाना वायुजयादिप्रधानाश्च (Jayatirtha).

2. ऋद्विसिद्धि पाचारितां त्या घुंडिती हरिभक्ता
मोक्ष सायुज्यता । वाट पाहे भक्तांची
असती जेथे उभु ठेले । सदा प्रेमसुखें घाले ॥
भक्तिप्रेमसुख नेणवे आणिकां । पण्डित वाचकां ज्ञानियांसी
आत्मनिष्ठ जरी झाले जीवन्मुक्त । तरी भक्तिसुख दुर्लभ त्यां
तुका म्हणे कृपा करील नारायण । तरीच हें वरं ठायीं पडे ॥
पैल आले हरी शंखचक्र शोभे करीं
घोटवीन लाल ब्रह्मज्ञान्या हातीं । मुक्ता आत्मस्थिति सांडवीन ।
ब्रह्मभूत काया होतसे कीर्तनीं । भाग्य तरी ऋणी देवा ऐसा ॥
अद्विती तो माझे नाहीं समाधान । गोड हे चरणसेवा तुझी ।
करूनि उचित देईं हेंचि दान । आवडे कीर्तन नाम तुझें ॥
नको ब्रह्मज्ञान आत्मस्थितिभाव । मी भक्त तूं देव ऐसें करी ।
दावी रूप मज गोपिकारमणा । ठेवीन चरणावरी माथा ॥

leanings of Tukārāma (1608—50) were influenced by contacts with notable Saints of the Haridāsa Kūṭa of Karnataka and particularly the illustrious Rāghavendra Svāmi (1623—71), who is known to have toured in Maharashtra and visited Pandharpur, is worth an investigation.

The absence of any substantial literature in Marathi, whether ancient or modern, on Mādhva literature and philosophy is indeed a serious handicap to its propagation among the people of Maharashtra. Under the inspiring guidance of the late Svāmi Satyadhyāna Tīrtha, an organization was started in Poona (1923) to publish a Marathi magazine devoted to the propagation of Madhva Siddhānta. The Journal became defunct after some time. The most outstanding contribution to Mādhva philosophical literature in Marathi, in recent times, is indeed the excellent translation into Marathi of the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* of Madhva with the famous commentary of Jayatīrtha by (the late) Raḍḍi Raṅgācārya, published under the direction of the late Satyadhyāna Tīrtha in 1926. Prof. Banahatti who believes that Jayatīrtha was a Maharashtrian by descent, has done the right thing in making a strong and fervent plea in the chapter on 'Marāthī Vāṇmaya āṇi Vaiṣṇava Sampradāya,' in his work, to all historians of Maratha culture that the name of Jayatīrtha should be counted among those of the illustrious religious teachers of Maharashtra, such as Jñānadeva and Nāmadeva and that it would be sheer ingratitude on their part if they do not do so.¹

In the same work, Prof. Banahatti has reprinted his article on the subject of works in Marathi literature on Madhva-Sampradāya (originally published in the *Ratnākara*, 1927) in which he has brought to the notice of Research scholars in Marathi, for the first time, the existence of two important metrical works in Marathi pertaining to the Madhva-Sampradāya and belonging to the 17th century. These two works are : (1) a Marathi rendering of the *Bhāgavata* Skanda X, following the Mādhva textual tradition (of Vijayadhva) and (2) another metrical version of Madhva's *Mahābhārata-Tātparya Nirṇaya* (in Marathi). It is reported that the mss. of both these works are preserved in the Uttarādi Mutt Library at Bangalore. It is further reported by Prof. Banahatti that the ms. of the Marathi rendering of *Bhāgavata* Skandha X, contains only adhyāyas 1 to 25 and a part of adh. 37. He presumes that the original (of which the major part seems to have been lost or damaged) should have covered all the 103 adhyāyas of the text. The author's name is given as Mallāri Ambāji. A special feature of the work is stated to be this that he has followed rigidly the same metres as the original verses of the text. The rendering of the

1. वैष्णवमताच्या परंपरतील सर्वाधिक योग्यतेचे स्वामी अस्सल मराठी कुलांतले होते ही गोष्ट सर्वच महाराष्ट्रीयान्स अत्यंत अभिमानास्पद वाटण्याजोगी आहे. * * * ज्ञानदेव, नामदेव इत्यादि दहा-वीस साधुसंतांचीं नांवे या पत्तीकडे त्या बेलच्या कर्तृत्वशाली महाराष्ट्रीयान्चीं फारच थोडी नांवे आपणांस माहीत आहेत, अशा कर्तृत्वशाली पुरुषांच्या अल्पशः नामभालिकेंत श्रीमज्जयतीर्थाचें नांव प्रामुख्याने समाविष्ट होण्यास योग्य आहे संशय नाही. तसें तें समाविष्ट न झाल्यास त्यांत महाराष्ट्रीयान्चीच कृतधनता दिसून येणार आहे.

Mbh. T. N., (also by the same author) is stated to contain only twentytwo adhyāyas (barring 4, 5, 9, 15 and 21). Prof. Banahatti has given illustrative extracts from both the works.¹ He has given high praise to the author for his outstanding ability in composing such extensive works in Samaśloki and Samavṛtta form.

A Marathi samavṛtta rendering of Jagannātha Dāsa's *Harikathāmṛta-sāra* written a hundred and fifty years ago has recently been published from Pune, by the zealous efforts of my young friend Sri T. N. Joshi of Chembur. He has in his collection a *Vāṇikathāmṛta* or *Vaiṣṇava*.—*Jñānāmṛta* in Marathi verse by Appa Sahib Kalgikar.

The system of Madhva seems from the very beginning to have received solid support from Uttara-Karnataka region north of the Tuṅgabhadra. Even to this day, it commands the largest following in this region. The period of Vyāsātīrtha represents the heyday of Madhva Siddhānta and its spread in the whole of S. India. There was a great renaissance of this school under the lead of Vyāsātīrtha and his illustrious disciple Vijayīndra Tīrtha, in Tamilnādu. There is an appreciable percentage of Kannaḍa-speaking Mādhyas domiciled in Tamilnādu for several centuries past, to be found in almost every district of Tamilnādu without exception. This influx of Kannaḍa-speaking population there would appear to date from a very remote past touching the Pallava, Chalukya and Kālābhra periods in S. Indian history. It is difficult to determine, at this distance of time, how much of this Kannaḍa-speaking population, now following the Madhva Sampradāya, in the various part of the Tamilnādu, could be traced to original Kannaḍa origins and how much to Tamil groups merged or absorbed into the body of other Kannaḍa speakers after conversion of faith. The possibility of such absorptions in the past could not altogether be ruled out; but the fact remains that there are today no followers of Madhva in Tamilnādu *who speak Tamil as their mother-tongue*.

There is a tradition that in the early 15th century, Rājendra Tīrtha carried the message of Madhva into Bihar and Bengal and that his disciple Jayadhva was the Guru of Viṣṇupurī, one of the precursors of the Caitanya school. Viṣṇudāsācārya, disciple of Rājendra Tīrtha, seems to have made a deep impression in N. India, by his great dialectical works : the *Vādaratnāvalī*, *Khaṇḍana-Khaṇḍana* and *Vivaraṇa Viḍambana*, a century before Vyāsātīrtha. Another disciple of Rājendra, the redoubtable Vibudhendra Tīrtha, is believed to have gained fresh following to Madhva Siddhānta in upper Karnataka and elsewhere by his dialectical power and active propaganda :

1. See *Op. cit.* pp. 51-54.

“तीर्थाहूनहि पावना विरचिली आनन्दतीर्थी कथा
आनन्दप्रद मज्जना अतिशयें हे युद्धकाण्डस्थिता ।
ते केली पुरती यथामति महाराष्ट्र (...) योजना
मल्लारी विनयें करून करितो विज्ञांस विज्ञापना ॥”

श्रीमत्पूर्णप्रबोधप्रकटितपदवीधाविमेधाविधीमत्-
सेनानासीरसीमासमुदितविदिताबाधयोधाधिनेता ।

मायासिद्धांतदीक्षाविघटनघटनासर्वतन्त्रस्वतन्त्रः

श्रीरामव्यासदासो विलसति विबुधेन्द्राभिधः संयमीन्द्रः ।

(*Guruguṇastava*, 5.)

In the 16th century, in the South and N. Kanara districts, Vyāsa-tīrtha's disciple Vādirāja devoted his extraordinary energies and scholarship to overcoming stiff opposition to the spread of Mādhva faith in those parts and added much to its prestige and popularity, by his own works and by the forcefulness of his towering personality. He is reported to have gained good following for his faith in Gujarat and in Konkan. He enjoyed the patronage of the Keladi Kings and strengthened the position of his creed in the whole of his native district and established friendly relations with the community of Gauḍa-Sārasvatas, which had already adopted the faith of Madhva and had important settlements in the district. Tradition speaks of his friendship with Jīvottama Tīrtha,¹ the spiritual Head of the Gauḍa-Sārasvatas at the Gokaṇṇa Maṭha at Bhatkal. In the first quarter of the 17th century, Vidyādhīśa Tīrtha, of the Uttarādi Mutt, was able to gain some converts to the Mādhva fold, in Bihar, from among the Brahmins of Gayā, who still profess allegiance to the Mādhva school. Attention has already been drawn to a similar mass-conversion to the Mādhva fold, of many families in the Coimbatore district, in the same century, by Kambālu Rāmacandra Tīrtha of the Vyāsarāja Maṭha.

The influence of the Pontiffs of the Uttarādi Mutt was naturally uppermost in the Uttara-Karnāṭaka areas as a whole. The vast majority of the followers of Madhva are still to be found in the Bijapur, Belgaum, Dharwar, Raichur, Gulbarga and Bidar districts. After Purandara Dāsa and his successors, the former Nizam-Karnatak area became the stronghold of the Dāsa Kūṭa. Its role in the spread and popularization of Madhva-Siddhānta could not be lightly passed over. In the areas of the former Mysore State and its adjoining Kannaḍa areas of 'Rāyalseemā' the influence of the Vyāsarāja and Rāghavendra Svāmi Mutts was great. The migrations and itineracy of the Pontiffs of these three Mutts, in the Southern districts of Tamilnadu and their political influence with the ruling dynasties of Vijayanagar and its dependencies and feudatories in the South, were also responsible for the establishment of small scattered settlements of the Mādhva community all over the Tamil districts of the Madras State, between the 15th and 17th centuries. This does not, as we have seen, rule out the possibility of still earlier communities domiciled in Tamilnadu having adopted Madhva-Sampradāya, in these parts in the days of Vidyādhīrāja, Vibudhendra and others, who are known to have hailed from the South. S. Kanara, of course, remained under the exclusive influence

1. The Editorial f. n. on p. 24 Vol. 1 of the *Jīvottama*, Kumta, questioning their contemporaneity, is baseless. The contemporaneity is accepted by the Head of the Gokaṇṇa Mutt also as well-founded.

of Uḍipi Mutts. Vādirāja, in his days, reclaimed the Maṭṭu and Koteśvara Brahmins of S. Kanara and enlarged the sphere of his influence by taking in the Konkaṇī-speaking Daivajña or "Svarṇakāra" community of N. Kanara into the fold of his Vaiṣṇavism by extending to them "dikṣā" and "mudrā". Thus, the Sode and Adamār Mutts of Uḍipi, have to this day, many disciples from the Svarṇakāra and other communities, under their spiritual jurisdiction. The Vyāsarāja Mutt also has similar disciples from the Akkasāla or goldsmith community in the Salem district and elsewhere. Prior to the establishment of separate Mutts for the Gauḍa-Sārasvata community, it seems to have remained largely under the general spiritual jurisdiction of the headquarters of the Madhva Sampradāya at Uḍipi¹. There is, however no conclusive evidence to fix the precise date of or the actual circumstances that led to the establishment of a separate Mutt for the Gauḍa-Sārasvata Mādhvas. It is also difficult, with the meagre evidence at our disposal, to decide which of the two present Gauḍa-Sārasvata Mutts, following the Madhva-Sampradāya, is the earlier one; or whether both of them had an independent and contemporary origin. This question has been discussed in the Appendix.

The coastal districts of Āndhradeśa seem to have been brought under the influence of Madhva Sampradāya in the period of Madhva himself and of his disciple Narahari Tīrtha, who was Minister of Kaliṅga for many years and has left many inscriptions in the Śrīkūrmam and Simhācalam temples. To this day, Madhva's system retains its hold on Āndhradeśa, where it has a staunch following in the coastal districts and in the Telan-gaṇa and the Rayasleema areas. Indeed, it is much more of a living force in Āndhra than in Maharashtra today, owing to the more frequent and living contacts of Mādhvas in Āndhradeśa with their coreligionists in other parts and with the Mādhva Maṭhas themselves. But, in the context of present-day needs, even this is inadequate and it behoves the Uttarādi Mutt (to which the majority of the Mādhva population in the Andhra and Maharashtra areas belongs) to do more durable and substantial work for the revival of interest in Madhva-Sampradāya in these areas. The late Svami Satyadhyāna Tīrtha did notable work in this direction; but his successors have lapsed into inactivity.

The "Savāśe" Brahmin community (to be found in large numbers in the Sātārā, Vālva, Tāsgaon, Koregaon and Karad taluks of the Sātārā dt. and in parts of the Dharwar dt.,) is believed to have been brought under the fold of Madhva-Sampradāya at the time of Rāghavendra Svāmi or his successor. This is a rich and influential community which has made a mark in the field of business. My friend H. G. Bengeri of Haveri, claims the "Savāśe" community to be of Kashmirian origin, on epigraphic evidence.

1. The *Guruṣaṅgāparāmrta* of Kumta Nārāyaṇācārya (Khanapur, 1903) gives (i, 21) 1476 A.D. as the date of ordination of Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha, first Svāmi of the (combined) Gokarna and Kāśī Maṭhas, by Rāmacandra Tīrtha, tenth successor of Hṛṣikeśa Tīrtha of the Palimār Mutt of Uḍipi. This tradition has come to be questioned recently. See *Appendix*.

Even as late as the 19th century, an enterprising Svāmi of the Majjigehalli Maṭha of Mādhava Tīrtha (See Genealogical Table II), is known to have converted many families of the "Saurāṣṭra" (or Paṭṭunūl) merchant community¹ of the Madurai dt. in Tamilnaḍu, who now follow the Mādhva faith. There are followers of the Rāmānuja school also, in this community. They speak a corrupt form of "Saurāṣṭrī", with much admixture of "Tanjore"-Marāṭhī. They seem to have come into Tamilnadu sometime during the later Vijayanagar and Nayak Rulers.

Many Shivalli Brahmin families belonging to the Mādhva fold have settled in the former Cochin and Travancore States. The *Koṅkaṇābhya-daya* shows that there were settlements of Gauḍa-Sārasvatas (Mādhvas) in both these areas in the 17th century.

A successful, though not widespread attempt to spread the message of Madhva, in the former Cochin State, was made by an enterprising Svāmi of the Sode Vādirāja Maṭha; Śrī Viśvādhiśa Tīrtha, in the beginning of the 19th, century. This attempt was renewed by his renowned grand disciple : Viśvapriya (d. 1865). As a result of their efforts, some members of the Cochin royal family, including two or three Maharajas who sat on the throne of Cochin and their kinsmen, including some royal ladies, a few learned Nambūdri and Nāyar families adopted the faith of Madhva. The royal families in question are now extinct and the descendants of the other families seem to have reverted to their previous faith. The *Viśvapriya-Vilāsa*² of my great-grandfather, Cochi Raṅgappācārya, gives an account of these events. This historic conversion of the Cochin Maharajas has been recorded in the *Cochin State Manual*.³ (1911)

In the history of the Mādhva-Sampradāya, many Mādhva families from the Kannaḍa areas of the former Bombay and Hyderabad States, which migrated to Tamilnadu and the old Mysore state in the wake of the Maratha occupation of Tanjore and in the course of the itineracy of the

1. Their main business is trade in silk-thread. Hence the name "Paṭṭu-nūl".

2. See under "Cochi Raṅgappācārya".

3. Cf. "The cousin and namesake of Raja Rama Varma, popularly known as Śaktan Tambirān (d. 1805), was a mild and benevolent Prince, an eminent scholar, but a weak ruler. He devoted his time and attention chiefly to religious and philosophical studies and left the government of his State in the hands of his ministers. In the preceding reign, the Swamiar of the Sode Mutt at Uḍipi, visited Tripunittura and by his preachings and discourses led this Raja and his brother to accept the tenets of Mādhvaism. The late Rājā thereupon unceremoniously expelled the Swamiar from the State and as the princes stood in wholesome dread of him, they made no open profession of their new faith during his reign. Soon after his death, however, the brothers sent for the Swamiar, publicly announced their conversion to Mādhvaism and actively exerted themselves, thereafter to make converts to their faith. As sectarian differences were unknown in the State since the days of Śaṅkarācārya this conversion created great excitement in the country and gave considerable annoyance to the people, especially the Nambūdris. The members of the royal family, however, remained staunch Mādhvas and continued to be so for about half a century. The last militant Mādhva in the family was the Raja who died in 1864. Since his time the family returned to its ancient Smārta fold". (*Op. cit.*, Chap. II. pp. 139-140)

Svāmīs of the Uttarādi Mutt (to which most of them belonged), appear to have changed over to Marathi as their language, in course of time, for reasons of the socio-political advantages going with such a change, in the social and political set-up of the times. Their descendants now found in many districts of the Tamilnāḍu and (old) Mysore States and known as “Deśasthas”,¹ still retain their old Kannaḍa affiliations, geographical surnames² and other titles, which, in many cases, go to prove their original Kannaḍa origin³ and connections with Karnataka.

1. This term, current in Maharashtra and Uttara-Karnāṭaka and imported into the South from there, has really no linguistic implication, whatever. It has merely a geographical connotation and means an inhabitant of the “Deśh” or tableland of the Deccan as distinguished from a resident or native of “Konkan” (or the region below the W. Ghats) known as a “Koṅkanasth” (i.e. Citpāvan). There are thousands of Kannaḍa-speaking Brahmin families all over the Dharwar, Belgaum and Bijapur districts and other Upper Karnatak areas, belonging to both Smārta and Mādhva groups, who are all known as “Deśasthas”, just as other Marathi-speaking “Deśasthas” are, in Maharashtra and Upper Karnatak. See also *Bombay Gazetteer*, Vol. XXII, 1884 pp. 56–58 (Dharwar) and Ch. XV. The present use of the term in the South, to exclude a Kannaḍa-speaking person, is due to an ignorance of the true origin of the term.

2. Such as Kaulagi, Umarji, Utgi, Apsaṅgi, Mudgal, Raichur, Pāṇḍuraṅgi, Toṇpi, Kaḍkol, Paski, Toravi, Aṣṭaputri, Caturvedi, Guḍi, Hubballi, Maṅgalvedhe, Rubguṇḍ (Rūpanguḍi-Bellary dt. ?) and many others, most of which are place-names and surnames still current in Uttara-Karnatak, *exclusively* among Kannaḍa-speaking families of Deśasthas there and unknown in or among Maharashtrian Brahmins proper.

3. A standing example within recent memory was furnished by a branch of the Ādya family settled at Kumbakonam. The original seat of this family was at Maṇūr and Agarkhed in the Inḍi taluk of the Bijapur dt. Its descendants are now to be found mainly in the Bijapur and Dharwar dts. and speak Kannaḍa as their mother tongue. Another branch which migrated to Dharmapuri in the Salem dt. still retains its Kannaḍa. The celebrated Bhāgavata Śāmaṇṇācārya of Kumbakonam who belonged to the Ādya family, was speaking only Kannaḍa as his home language, while his grandson, (the late) Bhāgavata Raṅganāthāchārya, regarded himself as a Marathi-speaking Deśastha by descent and was speaking (the Tanjore) Marathi as his home language under a misconception that a Deśastha must necessarily be a Marathi-speaking person.

Modern Period

CHAPTER XLI

1. TRANSITIONAL LITERATURE
OF XIX CENTURY AND AFTER

SATYADHARMA was the last of the Pontifical writers of the old school. With his demise in 1830, we are on the threshold of a new era of what may be called the "Modern Period", in the history of Dvaita Literature. It is marked by the rise of a learned band of lay scholars who almost monopolise the field of Vedāntic scholarship for the rest of the century and the next. From henceforth, the Pontiffs of various Mutts, recede into the background and are, for the most part, content with extending their support and encouragement to the scholars of the day and taking such part in the advancement and propagation of their school as may be suitable to the times. Among the distinguished galaxy of scholars of this age, may be mentioned Aḍavi Jayatīrthācārya, Kāśī Timmaṇṇācārya, Hulugi Śrīyaḥpatyācārya, Āṇepācārya, Cochi Raṅgappācārya, Bhāgavata Sāmaṇṇācārya, Gauḍageri Veṅkaṭaramaṇācārya, Sātārā Rāghavendrācārya and others. Most of these enjoyed a great reputation for scholarship in Navya Nyāya and other branches of learning. Lack of historical material, for which the indifference of their descendants is not a little to blame, prevents a fuller account of some of these celebrities.

1. AḌAVI JAYATĪRTHĀCĀRYA ALIAS VIṢṆU TĪRTHA
(1756-1806)

According to G. R. Savanur,¹ Aḍavi Jayatīrthācārya was born in 1756 A.D. at Siddhāpūr near Savaṇūr (Dharwar district). He took Sannyāsa from Satyavara Tīrtha (1794-97) and was a contemporary of Satyadharma also. He is reported to have entered Bṛndāvana at Mādanūr, 6 miles from Koppal.

His most important works are (1) *Bhāgavatā-Sāroddhāra*,^(p) an anthology of 367 select verses from the Bhāgavata arranged on a definite scheme of topics (2) a. c. on the NS., a c. on TP; *Ājñāpatra* and *Ātmasukha-bodhini* available in ms. and three tracts (3) *Ṣoḍaśī* (4) *Caturdaśī* (5) *Adhyātma-māmṛta-taraṅgiṇī*, the first two dealing with theological topics and the last a Stotra. These have been published by G. R. Savanur.

1. Preface to his edn. of *Ṣoḍaśī* and other works.

2. VEDAGARBHA PADMANĀBHĀCĀRYA (C. 18th cent.)

To Vedagarbha Padmanābhācārya, we owe an excellent manual of Dvaita theology and metaphysics, entitled *Madhvasiddhāntasāra* (printed : Bombay, 1893) in 5,000 granthas. This work together with the author's own commentary, is a good compendium of Mādhva doctrine and theology, written in the traditional manner of text-books of Nyāya Vaiśeṣika schoolmen, giving numerous quotations from the standard works of the system, including the originals used by Madhva as well as extracts from the commentaries of Jayatīrtha and others. It is a most useful and reliable reference book and could be safely studied by those wishing to have a correct knowledge of the doctrines of Madhva from without. It is in many ways, analogous to *Yatindramatadīpikā* on the Rāmānuja's system. It deserves to be translated into English and other languages as a proper manual of Mādhva tenets.

It opens with the enumeration of the ten categories (Padārthas) recognised in the system and these are expounded in the course of the following sections, in the order of the triple methodology of the Naiyāyikas: *uddeśa*, *lakṣaṇa* and *parikṣā* :

- | | |
|-------------------|-----------------------------|
| 1. पदार्थनिरूपणम् | 4. सृष्टिस्थित्यादिनिरूपणम् |
| 2. द्रव्यनिरूपणम् | 5. मोक्षसाधननिरूपणम् |
| 3. गुणनिरूपणम् | 6. मोक्षस्वरूपनिरूपणम् । |

The *Brahmasūtrabhāṣyārthamañjarī* is one of the works recently acquired by the Madras O. L. and written by Nārāyaṇa, a member of the Vedagarbha family.

3. HULUGI ŚRIYAḤPATYĀCĀRYA

He is another celebrated writer of the early XIX century. His most important work is the *Dvaita-Dyumaṇi* (P) which is supposed to be a refutation of the *Brahmānandīya*, but is in reality a very recondite c. on *Tattvodyota* and its *ṭikā* by Jayatīrtha.¹ He is also credited with a c. on the *Bhedojjivana*** and another in defence of the *Tarkatāṇḍava*, against certain contemporary criticisms. (4) The *Sattattvapeṭikā*** is mentioned as another of his works. He was a contemporary of the well-known Advaitic scholar Tryambaka Śāstri whom he is said to have encountered in several debates and whose *Śrutimatodyota* (P) and other tracts (containing adverse comments on certain of Madhva's works) have been refuted by him in the course of his c. on *Tattvodyota*. The c. on the *Pramāṇapaddhati* called *Ādarśa*, (published at Dharwar) is by one of his disciples. Śriyaḥpatyācārya belonged to the village of Hulugi near Koppal on the Hubli-Guntakal section.

१. Cf. अधिकं गुरुपादकृतद्वैतद्युमणौ तत्त्वोद्योतप्रकाशे द्रष्टव्यम् ॥

(p. 444, Hulugi Narasimha's c. on PP. Dharwar, 1933). He is called Śrināthācārya in verse 7 (introd.) of the c. There is a ms. of the work in Mys. O. L. (4893). The first part of the work with the original text of Td. & its *ṭikā* by Jayatīrtha, has been printed in 1943 running to 392 pages of closely printed matter. The author refutes certain criticisms contained in the *Advaitacandrikā* also.

4. ĀNEPPĀCĀRYA

Nothing is known about the life and career of this author. His works are said to be five (1) *Tattvasudhānidhi*** (2) a c. on the PP (3) a review of the five great works on Dvaita-Advaita polemics (Nym.-*Advaitasiddhi* etc.), a c. on (4) the *Bhāgavata*** (Sk. vi-vii) and (6) *Svarnanikāṣa*** a c. on the V. T. N. His date is not ascertainable.

5. KĀŚI TIMMANNĀCĀRYA (C. 1800-50)

He was a native of the Mysore State and is reputed to have studied Śāstras in Banaras and established his reputation as the foremost scholar of his day, in Navya-Nyāya. He was a contemporary of Tṛyambakā Śāstri and Satyadharmā Tīrtha. He wrote half a dozen works, mostly glosses, on the TS*, Td, *Bhedojjivana*** *Kṛṣṇāmṛtamahārṇava*, PP and the NS(p) (for the i adhikaraṇa alone). The (7) *Dvaitabhūṣanām* (p) is evidently a work of the same author refuting the *Candrikākhaṇḍanām* of Raghunātha Śāstri. His descendants are living.

6. THE SĀTĀRĀ FAMILY

Sātārā Rāghavendrācārya, 1792-1853, was a famous Vaiyākaraṇa. His standard c. on the *Paribhāṣendusekhara*, called *Tripathagā*, has been printed from Banaras. He wrote cc. also on the *Sabdendusekhara*, *Sabdaratna* (*Prabhā*), *Viṣṇusahasranāma*, *Gitā* and *Śvet. Up.* His son Nārāyaṇācārya, is credited with the (1) *Māyimahāvākyaṛthakhaṇḍanam*** and a c. on the *Śvet. Up.* from the Dvaita standpoint. His son Anantācārya was a contemporary of Satyavara Svāmi of the Uttarādi Mutt and wrote a c. on the Tiṇanta portion of the *Sabdendusekhara* and a tract condemning the arguments for post-puberty marriages of Brahmin girls.¹ This family now bears the surname of Gajendragadkar,² having migrated from Gajendragad in the Gadag taluk of the Dharwar district. Its original place appears to have been Satara where a branch still exists. The family probably belongs to a Kannaḍa stock and it owes allegiance to the Mutt of Rāghavendra Svāmī.

7. COCHI RAṄGAPPĀCĀRYA³ (1820-91)

He was the youngest son of Śrīnivāsācārya of Coimbatore. His great grandfather Śrīnivāsācārya alias Vṛddhācārya was a contemporary of Jagannātha Tīrtha. He studied Nyāya under the great Śatakoṭi Rāmā Śāstri of Mysore. At twenty he distinguished himself at an assembly of Pandits at Tiruppunittura (former Cochin State) and was invited by the

1. Satyavara's successor Satyadhira, met with severe opposition on this question from Dewan Raghunatha Rao of Kumbakonam, who constituted himself leader of the Reformist group.

2. Prof. S. N. Gajendragadkar (Wilson College, Bombay) and Justice K. B. Gajendragadkar are from this family.

3. My maternal great-grandfather.

Maharaja to settle down there as his Āsthāna Paṇḍita, which he did. He then studied Dvaita Vedānta under Viśvapriya Tīrtha of Sode Mutt. He wielded great influence at the Cochin court in religious matters and gave good encouragement to scholars visiting Cochin. At the instance of his Guru, he wrote (1) *Candrikābhūṣaṇam*^(m) in refutation of the *Śaṁkarapādabhūṣaṇam*^(p) of his contemporary, Raghunātha Śāstri Parvate (1821-59)¹ A fragment of the *Candrikābhūṣaṇam* covering the *Jijñāsādhikaraṇa* has been published from Kumbakonam (1905). The full ms. of the work in Nandināgari is in my possession. The work maintains an equal level of scholarship in Navya Nyāya with that of Raghunātha Śāstri, who was a good Naiyāyika and a commentator on the *Gādādhari* and the *Kṛṣṇaabhāṭṭiya*.

Raṅgappācārya's other works are (2) the *Nayamālikā*^(m), a metrical summary of the adhikaraṇas of the *B. S.*, in Sragdharā metre;² (3) *Gurvaṣṭaka*^(p), in praise of his Guru Viśvapriya Tīrtha; (4) *Vādirājāṣṭaka*^(p) and (5) *Rjuttvacandrodaya*^(p) establishing the Rjuttva of Vādirāja. Special historical interest attaches to his (6) *Viśvapriya-Vilāsa*^(p), a poem in five cantos, describing the visit of Viśvapriya Tīrtha to the Cochin court, to strengthen the allegiance of the Cochin Royal family to the faith of Madhvācārya, to which it had been converted² at the time of his Paramaguru Viśvādhīśa.

8. COCHI MADHVARĀYĀCĀRYA (1857-1931)

After Raṅgappācārya, his son Madhvarāyācārya took his place at the court of Cochin. He was also a well-equipped Naiyāyika and taught many disciples. He wrote many Kroḍapātras on Nyāya Śāstra and a. c. on his father's *Nayamālikā* ^(m).

9. GAUDAGERI VENKATARAMANĀCĀRYA

He was a native of the Mysore state. He wrote *Candrikā-prakāśa-prasara*^(p) in refutation of the *Candrikā-Khaṇḍanam* of Tiruviśanallōre Rāmasubbā Śāstri, an Advaitic scholar of the Tanjore district, well-known for his prolific writings, some of them even critical of Śaṁkara's own views.

10. SATYADHYĀNA TĪRTHA (1913-42)

The most active and zealous of the Pontiffs of our own time, was Śrī Satyadhyāna Tīrtha, the illustrious Svāmiji of the Uttarādi Mutt. He succeeded to the Pontificate in 1913. He had wide experience of the administration of the Mutt, for many years as Dewan of the Mutt. He was a distinguished Naiyāyika at the age of nineteen. He was a shrewd

1. Mm. Anantakrishna Sastri has made a mistake of more than 300 years in giving his date as 1510-50, in the introd., to his edn. of the *Nyāyacandrikā* (p. 147). P. K. Gode has adduced evidence to show that his correct date is as above, in his paper; the 'Chronology of Raghunātha Śāstri Parvate and His work' (Annamalai Chettiar Com. Vol. 1941, p. 197)

2. Cf. जिज्ञासा नैव कार्या विषयविरहतः स्वप्रकाशो हि जीव-
स्तदभिन्नं ब्रह्म नास्ति स्फुटमहमिति च ज्ञायमानेऽपि नार्थः ।
एवं प्राप्ते ह्यभाणीद्वरितमितगुणप्रापकब्रह्मशब्दा-
ज्जीवान्यब्रह्मसिद्धेः श्रुतिविहितविचारस्य कर्तव्यतेति ॥

. For details see Ch. XL.

judge of men and things. He had a keen sense of humor and had a ready way of putting every one at ease with him. He was always accessible to students, scholars and those interested in philosophical problems. He appreciated Śāstraic learning wherever it was found, irrespective of sectarian affiliations. He had a knack of discovering the hidden talent in the younger generation and inspired many young scholars who had taken University degrees in Sanskrit and Philosophy with a zest for research work in Vedānta. I still remember vividly the thrilling experience of my own first meeting with him in 1929 and many others in subsequent years.

He championed the cause of Dvaita Vedānta for more than a quarter of a century and made a deep and lasting impression on the world of traditional scholarship in Vedānta, by his tours and disputations and by his publications, distributed free all round. He was an untiring propagandist, acknowledgedly the best debater of his days and almost a terror to his adversaries in philosophical polemics. At the famous Dvaita-Advaita debate at Kumbakonam in 1929-30, he made history by engaging some of the veteran scholars of Advaita headed by Mm. Anantakrishna Sastri and forcing them all to retreat in despair.

He was the author of *Candrikāmaṇḍanam*, refuting the critique of *Candrikā* by Tiruviśanallōre Rāmasubbā Śāstri. He got published many tracts, pamphlets and booklets in Hindi, Marathi, English and Tamil, Telugu and Kannaḍa, relating to controversial polemics, such as *Vedāntic Civil Suit* (in five vols. published in all the above-mentioned regional languages), the *Gitā-Vimarśa*, *Sabhāsāra-Saṁgraha* etc. His Sanskrit works are *Brahmasūtra-Vimarśa*¹ *Advaitabhāntiprakāśa*, etc. all of which have been published. He engaged leading men of his day like B. G. Tilak in philosophical debate; and founded a chair of Dvaita Vedānta and an endowment for the publication of Dvaita works written by North Indian authors, at the Banaras Sanskrit College and edited *Abhinavagadā*, *Advaitakālānala* and other controversial classics. It was at his initiative and inspiration that a splendid Marathi translation of Madhva's *Brahmasūtra-Bhāṣya*, with the *Tattvaparakāśikā* of Jayatīrtha, was published for the benefit of a large number of the followers of Madhva in Maharashtra proper. He gave sumptuous encouragement to scholars of all schools of thought and used to hold annual Sabhās of scholars at Tirupati and elsewhere, to examine and reward scholars in various branches of learning. He was the foremost of the Pontiffs of Hinduism. He travelled all over India many times, visiting great centres of traditional learning and places of religious importance like Banaras, Gayā, and Dwaraka in the north and places in the south. He passed away at Pandharpur in 1942. He created a country-wide revival of interest in Madhva Siddhānta and raised the prestige of the system in the estimation of the followers of other schools of Vedānta. He made a deep impression on contemporary philosophical life, by his magnetic personality and by his untiring energy and drive. He was, undoubtedly, the intellectual giant of his days.

1. Published by SMSO Sabha, Tirupati, 1978.

NEW LITERATURE IN ENGLISH AND OTHER
MODERN LANGUAGES

STEPPING into the present century, we find among pioneers of the times a lively sense of awareness of the needs of the community under the changed conditions of modern education. This resulted in the establishment of a central organization to make the followers of Madhva more fully appreciative of the greatness of their system and propagate its tenets as widely as possible. The Śrīman Madhva Siddhānta Unnāhini Sabhā, accordingly, came to be founded at Tirupati in 1878. It served the needs of the community, excellently for many years. Later, internal dissensions caused a split among its members, which led to its decline. Its annual event was a three-day conference of its members numbering several thousands, at which besides regular written and oral examinations of students in Madhva Śāstra, including Dāsa Sāhitya, there used to be discourses by eminent scholars. Prizes and honoraria were awarded to Examiners and successful candidates. The Sabhā's activities included a plan for the publication of unpublished texts of the system and of lectures delivered at the conference. It is still functioning, though not on the same broad basis as in its earlier years. It celebrated its centenary in 1978 (Feb).

It was in the beginning of this century that the first attempt to print and publish the bulk of Mādhva literature, consisting of the works of Madhva and his great commentators and expositors, was made by the daring spirit of T. R. Krishnacharya of Kumbakonam, braving the opposition of Mutts to bringing the works of Madhva in print by surmounting the difficulties in collecting manuscripts, copying, comparing, editing and publishing them, and finding the necessary funds for the purpose.

Pioneers like Seḍam Subbarao and C. M. Padmanabhachar of Coimbatore then came forward to translate and expound the works of Madhva. Subbarao gave the first English translation of Śrī Madhva's *Brahmasūtra-Bhāṣya* and the *Gītā* and Padmanabhachar published his English and Kannaḍa versions of his *Life and Teachings of Madhva* and his *Critical Study of the Bhagavad-Gītā* (first six chapters) with translation (1916). Another great stride was taken, when the talented Bengali scholar Sris Chandra Vasu published his translations of Madhva's Bhāṣyas on the *Aitareya*, *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* and *Chāndogya* Upaniṣads (besides a few others) between 1916-17. This drew the attention of Western scholars to Madhva's school of Vedānta. The attention roused in this way paved the way for the appearance of H. Glasenapp's work in German : *Madhvas Philosophie des Viṣṇu-Glaubens* (Leipzig, 1923). The wheel was now set in motion. In 1929, C. R. Krishna Rao published his *Śrī Madhva, His Life and Doctrine*, giving a brief and persuasive account of the principal tenets of Madhva's

philosophy contained in the famous verse : श्रीमन्मध्वमते * * * . At his initiative, the Madhva Muni Sevā Saṅgha of Uḍipi was founded in 1926, for the purpose of publishing the complete works of Madhva (in the Kannāḍa script) with Kannāḍa translation. The project has been completed in twelve vols. between 1926-68. With the appearance of R. Nagaraja Sarma's *Reign of Realism in Indian Philosophy* (Madras, 1937), representing his doctoral thesis at the Madras University, Madhva's philosophy may be said to have established its *entree* into the citadels of modern thought, in modern garb. This work contains a recondite exposition of the *Daśa Prakaraṇas* of Madhva in the light of Jayatīrtha's commentaries on them. It combines a strictly orthodox outlook and faithful presentation with a happy and judicious use of modern philosophical terminology. His *Studies in Nyāyasudhā*,¹ (adh. i) gives a learned exposition of a very important section of one of the most important source-books of Mādhva philosophy. In Dasgupta's *History of I. Philosophy*, Vol. IV, we have a concise treatment of the doctrine of Madhva, a summary of Madhva's interpretation of important adhikaraṇas in the *Brahmasūtras* and an exposition of some of the principal topics in the controversy between Vyāsatīrtha and Madhusūdana Sarasvatī. It is, undoubtedly, the most important and appreciative treatment of the subject of Dvaita philosophy as developed by Madhva and his two great interpreters : Jayatīrtha and Vyāsatīrtha, to appear, for the first time, in the most accredited *History of Indian Philosophy*, published so far. It gives students of eastern and western thought a clear idea of some of the very solid and remarkable contributions which the thinkers of Dvaita Vedānta have made to the great problems of logic and philosophy. H. N. Raghavendrachar's *Dvaita Philosophy and Its Place In Vedānta* (Mysore, 1941) has struck a new path in interpreting Madhva's philosophy as a 'true' Monism. His standpoint is absolutistic. His interpretation of some of the important tenets of Madhva (such as those relating to the "Svarūpa-Srṣṭi" of Jīvas) has been considered unorthodox and revolutionary by many and has given rise to strong protests and criticisms from traditional scholars like D. Vasudevachar of Mysore. The *Dvaita-Pradīpa* of D. Vasudevachar (Mysore, 1946) is a reply to the above work of H. N. Raghavendrachar. The latest work of H. N. Raghavendrachar, in Kannāḍa : *Dvaita Vedānta* (1959) follows his earlier standpoint. The works of Ālūr Venkatarao, the G. O. M. of Karnatak who has, at great personal sacrifice, published many original works (in Kannāḍa) embodying the results of his studies in Dāsa Sāhitya, the Gītā and Madhva philosophy, deserve careful study. His splendid Kannāḍa translation of Tilak's *Gītā-rahasya* is well-known. A man of deep religious feeling, with an alert mind, his interest in philosophy has been unflagging. In his *Mukhyaprāṇamahime* (Dharwar 1955), he has given us a new insight into Mādhva Symbolism. In his *Mādhvaru Dvaitigaḷalla* (Dharwar 1958) and in his *Pūrṇa-*

1. The first 124 pages of this work are reported to have been published by the Vaishnava Theological University, Brindavan (U. P.).

brahma-Vāda (Dharwar, 1954), he has tried to give a new orientation to Mādhva thought in the light of the concept of "Pūrṇa-Brahman" which he regards as the pivot of Mādhva Siddhānta. Without entering into the merits of these new approaches and viewpoints, one may say that such fresh attempts to understand and interpret Madhva along newer lines is still an undeniable proof that Mādhva thought is still a living force affording inspiration for newer shades of thought and interpretation from within. v

In his attractive translation (with Notes) of Jayatīrtha's *Vādāvali* (Adyār 1943) and in his *Mādhva Epistemology* (based on *Pramāṇa-Paddhati*), Adyār 1958, P. Nagaraja Rao has enabled modern English-educated Mādhvas and others to understand the logic and philosophy of Madhva, at close quarters, through the masterly expositions of Jayatīrtha. His work *Introduction to Vedānta* (Bombay, 1958) contains a chapter on Madhva's philosophy. But its account has not been fair to Madhva in some points. In the second edition of this work (Bombay 1960), this chapter on Madhva has been revised and recast eliminating certain statements to which objection had been taken. In the *Madhvamuni-Vijaya* (Dharwar, 1958), in Kannaḍa, we have besides a good sketch of Madhva's life, following the *M. Vij.*, by S. R. Yekkundi a synopsis of all the thirty-seven works of Madhva by notable writers in the field and a good exposition of Madhva's philosophical doctrines by Śrī Viśveśa Tīrtha, Svāmiji of the Pejavar Mutt. S. S. Raghavachar's handy English translation of the text of Madhva's *Viṣṇutattvanirṇaya*, published by the Ramakrishna Ashrama, Mangalore (1959), is a careful rendering of a very important work of Madhva, containing a brief, but powerful exposition of his thought and an equally powerful criticism of Advaita philosophy. This publication is, in one sense, a tribute to the greatness of Madhva as a thinker, coming from Advaitic quarters. It is no less a compliment to the catholicity of spirit of the Ramakrishna Ashrama. In another sense, it is perhaps a sad commentary on the strange indifference and indolence of the many Mādhva religious institutions (Mutts), upon which such constructive ideas for the propagation of their own philosophy do not seem to have dawned yet !

It is, therefore, a matter of sincere gratification to students of Mādhva thought, to note that thanks to the facilities for research work provided by the National Centre of Scientific Research in France, the Institut Francais D' Indologie, Pondicherry, has brought out two valuable studies on Madhva's *Aṇu-Vyākhyāna* (covering B. S. i, 1, 1-12), with Sanskrit text in Devanagari, translation, Notes and critical exposition of some topics, in French, by Suzanne Siauve (published in the years 1957 and 1959). Her valuable work brings Madhva's philosophy, now, to the notice of French readers and Orientalists in their own language.

Besides her translation of M's *AV* she also published her learned dissertation—*Le Doctrine de Madhva*, in French (Pondicheri, 1968). Her premature death at a very young age in Aug. '75 in France has removed from the field of Dvaita studies a very amiable foreign scholar of clear vision and understanding of the Dvaita system.

In his recent work on *Madhva and Brahma-Tarka* (Udipi, 1960), C. R. Krishna Rao has refuted the claim that scientists are fast giving up the theory of difference and gradations in the Universe and are getting nearer to the philosophy of non-difference and that, therefore, Dvaita philosophy can have no support from modern science. Citing extensively from the writings of leading scientists, he has shown that it is mere wishful thinking to say that modern science has abolished difference from the cosmos or is interested in doing so. Rao's work fills one with satisfaction that there are, luckily, at least a few among present-day followers of Madhva, who could apply their minds to such intricate questions in the light of modern scientific theories and meet the challenge of their times, convincingly.

Some stir has recently been caused by the publication of Mm. Anantakrishna Sastri's *Advaitasudhā* (1960) wherein he has tried to refute some of the criticisms of Jayatīrtha on the Advaitic interpretation of the B. S. and his own interpretation of these sūtras in accordance with Madhva's views. Mm. Sastri's work contains only very few fresh points and pertinent arguments for and against the different interpretations, the rest of his voluminous work being irrelevant digressions and usual literary flourish and verbosity. Śrī Satyapramoda Tīrtha of the Uttarādi Mutt has already published his refutation of the above. Heads of some other Mādhva Mutts have also announced their forthcoming refutations.

Of my earlier works *Madhva's Teachings in His Own Words* has appeared in its third edition and the second edition of my *Philosophy of Sri Madhvācārya* will follow. My 'Lectures on Vedānta' has been published by the Karnatak University. The three volumes of my comparative study of the *Brahmasūtras and Their Principal Commentaries* are already in the field. Time, resources and health permitting, I may next bring out a book on the Ten Upaniṣads as expounded by Madhva.

Mādhvavāṇmayatapasvīgalu (Mādhva Men of Letters) in Kannaḍa by Pandharinathacharya Galgali (Gadag 1969) is a voluminous, popular and painstaking compilation on authors and works of the Dvaita school both ancient and modern.

Of the two works of Dr. K. Narain : *An Outline of Mādhva Philosophy* (Udayana Pub. Allahabad 1962) and *A Critique of the Mādhva Refutation of Śāṃkara Vedānta* (1964) the first is appreciative holding that "the philosophy of M. school draws its strength from some of the internal weaknesses of the idealism of Śāṃkarite philosophy;" while the second denounces almost all the criticisms advanced by the Nym of Vyāsatīrtha against the philosophy of S. and his followers as resting on "a confusion of standpoints between the Vyāvahārika and Pāramārthika aspects of knowledge to which the opponents of S. have shown a persistent tendency". One wonders what could have led to Dr. Narain's executing such a complete somersault within a brief space of two years. Whether or not there is any substance in his contention about the effectiveness of the Mādhva critique of Advaita Vedānta, it is up to M's followers to put their record straight, as the polemical ball in its modern appearance in English is now in their court.

Prof. V. B. Inamdar of the Wellington College, Sangli has made a detailed study of J's *Pramāṇa-Paddhati* for which he has been awarded the Ph.D. degree of the Poona University.

My son Dr. Sudhindra K. Bhavani of the Somaiya College, Bombay-77 has made a critical and comparative study of M's *GB* and *GT* with J's cc. on them in relation to the interpretations of the S and R. schools as well as those of the *Jñāneśvari* in Marathi and Tilak's *Gitārahasya* and Aurobindo's. This work which was awarded the Ph.D. degree of the Bombay Uni. (1968) awaits publication.

Dvaita Vedānta and Its Contributions to I. Philosophy by Dr. T. P. Ramachandran (Madras 1977) is a fair well-arranged treatment of the subject though there is no separate treatment of its "contribution" to I. Philosophy.

Dr. Krishnakant Chaturvedi's *Dvait Vedānt Kā Tāttvik Anuśilan* (Delhi, 1971) in nine chapters is the first comprehensive study of Dvaita doctrine to appear in Hindi. It deals with the origin and development of the school, its categories, doctrine of Difference, Pāñcabheda, God, Jīva and the world, relation of Dvaita to other Darśanas and has a concluding Estimate.

The work is based on Sanskrit originals and works in English on the system by earlier writers. Much of its adverse estimate of crucial Dvaita positions such as on Sākṣī as Upajīvyapramāṇa in arriving at a harmonious purport of Śrutis regarding the nature of ultimate truth suffers from misunderstanding of their real significance.

One of the questions raised in the concluding chapter "Why did M. establish his views as a Vedantic school while holding a Dualistic doctrine" is 'to say the least' funny. It is vitiated by the age old fallacy of idealistic thinking that a Vedantic school must necessarily be monistic in outlook, which is begging the question. Such a preconceived notion is hardly consistent with the author's claim to have kept an open mind (*Taṭasthavṛtti*). Preface p. 2.

The answer suggested is that it is all probably due to "M's great attachment to Vaiṣṇavism and its deep influence on his thinking". But then the influence of Vaiṣṇavism was equally deep on Rāmānuja and yet according to our author R's "leanings were towards oneness (*advayon-mukhi* Preface p. 1). The only conclusion to be drawn from such shifting of grounds is that in the opinion of this author, no philosophy committed to belief in the reality of difference for all time between God, world and souls and souls among themselves (as are those of R. and M) can ever be admitted to the fold of Vedānta Darśana, unless it is prepared to relegate all such differences to the level of *mithyābheda*, euphemistically called 'Vyāvahārikasatya'. But that is a tall order. A system of philosophy has got to be judged by its inner consistency of thought and tenability of its premises and not on any thing else. The Dvaita system can stand these tests and cannot therefore be denied a place within the forum of Vedānta, whether one likes it personally or not.

The author's other criticism of M's position that Abheda Śrutis cannot on account of their being opposed to their Upajīvyapramāṇa be accepted

in their literal sense and that therefore they have to be understood in suitable metaphoric senses *restricts the power of Śrutis* to convey their meaning and *devalues them*, which does not do credit to the prestige of a founder of a school of *Indian philosophy* (p. 210) is equally misconceived.

The principle of Upajīvyapramāṇaprābalya is universal in its application to epistemology and textual exegesis. There will be no *raison d'être* for the Pūrva and Uttaramīmāṃsā Śāstras, if the literal sense of Śrutis is to prevail everywhere without question, whether in Vidhis, or arthavādas or statement of facts or philosophical pronouncements. The resort to Gaunārtha in case of Upajīvyapramāṇavirodha is an exegetical principle accepted in Pūrvamīmāṃsā while the criterion of Akhaṇḍārtha and two-level theory of truth as Paramārtha and Vyāvahārika resorted to in Advaita for the reconciliation of Bheda and Abheda Śrutis is only the brain-child of Śāṃkara Vedānta. The former is an objective standard while the latter is purely subjective. Dr. Krishnakant Chaturvedi also misses the point that the Bheda and the Saguṇa Śrutis are also Upajīvyapramāṇas in their turn with reference to identity and Nirguṇa texts and that in *such cases* there is no question of the Śruti being devalued by Sākṣipratyakṣa. Dr. Chaturvedi's inability to correctly evaluate M's way of harmonizing Dvaita and Advaita Śrutis in their proper perspective is betrayed by the manner in which he has completely ignored the grammar of such Samanvaya in the light of M's metaphysical ideology of one Svatantra-advitīya-tattva so impressively spelt out by Jayatīrtha in one of the most important passages of his NS quoted in this work on Pages 4 and 254, beginning with the words : *Sarvānyapi hi Vedāntavākyāni . . .* One looks in vain for a reference to this most important passage from the N. S. in Dr. Krishnakant Chaturvedi's study of Dvaita Vedānta running to 231 pages. His criticism of the adequacy of Sākṣi as Upajīvyapramāṇa in resolving the conflict of Bheda and Abheda Śrutis in M's philosophy suffers from putting Sākṣi on a par with sense perception in principle and substance which defeats the very purpose for which Sākṣi has been recognised in M's philosophy as not only Jñānagrāhaka and Jñānapramāṇya-grāhaka but as invariably veridical (*niyamena yathārtham*) in its judgments.

D. N. Sanbhag's 'Some Problems of Dvaita Philosophy in their Dialectical Setting' has received the Ph. D. of the Bombay University.

A complete Bibliography of Dvaita Vedānta has been included in the first volume of 'Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies' published by the AIIS, Poona (Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi). A separate volume of the Encyclopedia is to be devoted to Dvaita Vedānta.

M. Ramarao of Kumbakonam has published Tamil renderings of Gītā and Brahmasūtras according to M's position.

The Sukrtindra Oriental Research Institute, Cochin has published (1977) M's *Khaṇḍanatraya* with English tr. and explanation.

Strafford Betty of the State College of California has recently published his English tr. with notes of the first Sāra of Vādirāja's *Nyāyaratnāvali* with my Foreword (Delhi 1978).

RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT

LOOKING back on the long course of development of Dvaita thought and literature dealt with in the course of this History, one cannot fail to be impressed by the weight, volume and originality of the contribution which writers of this school have made to India's religious and philosophical lore. As Dasgupta has rightly pointed out, the achievement of the thinkers and writers of the Dvaita school is quite on a par with the achievement and output of its philosophical rival, the Advaita Vedānta of Śaṅkara.

The founder of the Dvaita school was gifted with remarkable originality of thought and interpretation. He was a creative thinker who cared little for the conventions of fashionable belief and interpretation or for empty technical display. He went to the fountain-heads of the ancient thought itself and followed the channels of interpretation emerging naturally from them and running through the Epics, Purāṇas and other interpretative literature of more ancient standing than the views of later-day commentators, howsoever eminent. There was a strong note of mystic fervor in his thought. His arguments were so closely linked up with the authorities he had taken so much pains to collect from forgotten or fading sources¹ as to appear to be almost entirely dependent on them. It was his great commentator Jayatīrtha who brought out the independent character and value of Madhva's arguments apart from the binding force of his 'authorities' as such. There were certain great ideas behind Madhva's writings,—ideas of tremendous philosophical power and possibilities, such as the conception of Sākṣī, the doctrine of the "Svatantratattva", "Viśeṣas" in relation to the notions of identity, difference, causation etc., and 'creation' in the sense of "Parādhīnaviśeṣāpti". With these fruitful ideas, he built up an independent system of philosophy, worked out its details and put it on an enduring basis of textual sanctions and logical strength. He had urged the necessity of adopting a fresh set of fundamental concepts in place of the old and worn out ideas of the fashionable schoolmen, including the latest in the field, so that, once the logical necessity of rejecting the worn out theories and going in for new concepts and modes of approach was established, the whole course of philosophical thought and inquiry would have to take a new turn and enter upon a new terrain. He also stabilized the secular fortunes of his new system by the creation of a compact society of followers and enthusiastic bands of disciples to carry on his work. Some of his disciples helped in various ways to widen the sphere of influence of his system.

1. Cf. * * * ब्रह्मतर्कस्येदानीं खिलत्वात् ।

(Vijayindra, *Madhvādhva-Kaṇṭhakodhāra*, p. 14).

Its most brilliant exposition and systematic interpretation were however given by Jayatīrtha. His standardization of Dvaita thought and his constructive and critical exposition of its principles, categories, definitions and methodology of interpretation stand out as *the second great phase in the history of the development of the Dvaita School*. This phase was naturally marked by a certain change in the manner and method of treatment and exposition. The strong mystic fervor and authoritarian note which marked the earlier phase had now receded into the background. They were, no doubt, necessary and appropriate for a system-builder; but not for an interpreter who wants to convince his readers by argument. The fundamental bases of thought, of course, remained the same. The authorities were now more explicitly treated as additional arguments, on their own merits. They were not given any undue importance in virtue of their position. This was implicit in Madhva's works. Jayatīrtha made it more explicit. By his brilliant and lucid exposition of Mādhva's views in the light of contemporary philosophical ideas and terminology and by his effective use of the dialectical method of presentation, he was able to place Madhva's thought in a new and better perspective so far as contemporary philosophy was concerned. He also put it on a self-sufficient basis in regard to the richness and depth of its dialectics, as well as the suppleness of its Adhikaraṇaprasthāna. The work done by the pre-Jayatīrtha commentators on Madhva's interpretations of the Sūtras and Gītā was far from adequate to put it on terms of complete equality with the achievements of the two other schools of Vedānta in this direction. So great was the confidence created by Jayatīrtha's works in the minds of his successors, that in the next generation they were actually in a position to take the offensive and challenge the forces of Monism to a battle royal.

Thus, after Jayatīrtha, Dvaita philosophy entered upon a more ambitious programme of dialectic conquest in both the Adhikaraṇa and Vāda Prasthānas. The creative urge and interest in exposition were now replaced by a burning zeal for dialectical conquest and doctrinal expansion. The metaphysical ideology of "Svatantrādvitīyatattva" now recedes into the background as a result of the growing struggle with Monism and acosmism; and a greater philosophical emphasis comes to be laid on the reality of the individual self and its difference from the Supreme Reality on the one hand and the पारमार्थिक reality of the cosmos and its values on the other. This subtle change of emphasis and tenor are signalized by the new slogan of philosophical Realism :

यादृशं ब्रह्मणः सत्त्वं तादृशं स्याज्जगत्स्यपि ।

which henceforward becomes the keynote, as it were, of Dvaita philosophy.

To meet the new requirements, the dialectical machinery of the school is now thoroughly reconditioned and enriched in the light of the exegetical principles and interpretive rules and sanctions of the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā and Vyākaraṇa Śāstras, which had not been utilized to any notable extent by Madhva or Jayatīrtha. These new aids were now harnessed to both the constructive exposition of the Siddhānta interpre-

tations of the Brahmasūtras *and* to a further systematization of the dialectic criticisms of the doctrines and interpretations of other schools of thought, particularly of the Advaita. The formal aspects of argumentation based on the rigid technique of the Navya-Nyāya of Gaṅgeśa and his commentators were also introduced to a much greater extent than before. No wonder the works of Viṣṇudāsa, and more particularly of Vyāsatīrtha, noticed earlier touched the summit of dialectic and exegetical perfection reached in Dvaita Vedānta. It is a matter of genuine satisfaction, therefore, that the greatest historian of Indian philosophy, in modern times, has paid a memorable tribute to Vyāsatīrtha's greatness as standing "almost unrivalled in the whole of Indian thought" for his logical skill and depth of acute dialectic thinking". Under Vyāsatīrtha the philosophical credit of the Dvaita Vedānta rose to the highest level in the estimation of the public. The exigencies of the task he had before him tended to emphasize the *fundamentum divisionis* of the Dvaita system from the Advaita, more than the former's metaphysical ideology of "Svatantra-advitiya-tattva" though the ideology itself is nowhere lost sight of. But attention is now lavished, of necessity, upon questions touching the "Apara-Siddhānta",—the status of the world and the Jīvas in the scheme of reality as Pāramārthika reals, rather than on the "Para-Siddhānta" as such. This change of emphasis and interest may be said to be reflected in the adoption of the name "Dvaita" for the system, "officially" so to say, henceforth.

A diminution of dialectic and polemical level set in some time after Vyāsatīrtha. The intellectual atmosphere of the schools came to be invaded by a spirit of sectarian passion and prejudice. The responsibility for lowering the standards of polemics from pure philosophical dialectics to sectarian controversy must, however, be laid on the shoulders of the Advaitic critics of Madhva like Appayya Dīkṣita. Once the controversy was started on this plane, champions of the Dvaita system like Vijayīndra and Vādirāja had naturally no alternative left but to animadvert on the same level of sectarian controversy. Such a controversy was an equally important phase in the development of the Dvaita school and its literature and it contributed in a very vital and significant manner to the survival and stability of the system.

But no system could live on fine-spun dialectics and interminable sectarian controversies alone. The Dvaitins had realized this truth very early and had devoted equal attention to the development of non-controversial literature of the system, from the very beginning. There is thus an age of peaceful commentary-making in Dvaita literature, led by a galaxy of writers like Raghūttama, Rāghavendra and others.

After a couple of centuries even this literature began to decline in quality and increase in quantity ! When the plethora of commentaries and commentaries upon commentaries failed to give real inspiration to the people and sustain their interest in things of the spirit, there came a new revival of the Dāsa Kūṭa to give a fresh stimulus to the people and a second

wave of devotionism passed over society. The first wave of this Devotional movement was the outcome of the sublimation of the spirit of religion and philosophy under Śrīpādarāja and Vyāsātīrtha and his illustrious disciples : Purandaradāsa and others. The revival of the Dāsa Kūṭa under the great Vijayadāsa and his successors instilled a fresh sense of seriousness of purpose in life, in the minds of men. It rehabilitated the spiritual atmosphere and satisfied the emotional needs of the people which had been starved by reason of an excess of intellectualism of a cheaper quality.

The success and popularity of the Dāsa Kūṭa brought on a cleavage of views and ways between the "Intellectuals" and "Emotionalists" typified by the terms "Vyāsa-Kūṭa" and "Dāsa-Kūṭa" which came into vogue. The Pontiffs of the Mutts, naturally, constituted themselves the custodians and the spokesmen of the "Vyāsa-Kūṭa".

Later, the Mutts themselves began to decline. Disruptive tendencies have now taken hold of most of them, for lack of enlightened leadership. Petty strife and dictatorial tendencies, internal feuds, intellectual stagnation, obscurantism, and lethargy have all taken hold of them. Their very complexion and constitution must change, if they should justify their place in modern society. They should cease to be "vested interests" and become once more, true intellectual and spiritual centres radiating light and learning. Under the stress and strain of modern views and conditions of life, religion and philosophy are fast losing their hold on society. It is the Mutts that should come to the rescue of their flock and reinfuse the spiritual outlook into our lives. But, for doing so, they must realize their high purpose and function in society and prepare themselves for giving a new lead to society. They must therefore tone themselves up for their mission in life. The sooner they do it, the better it would be for the future of their flock.

Many there are who sincerely regret that Dvaita Vedānta is practically unknown to most people beyond S. India. To the west, it is more or less a sealed book. But few stop to consider why. The pioneering work of Orientalists and the organized work of Vivekananda and the Ramakrishna Mission and other bodies have made the system of Śaṅkara well-known all over India and abroad. It is not too much to expect the rise of similar towering personalities and organizations from within the Dvaita school. There are unmistakable signs that present-day trends in Indian philosophical thought are registering a growing dissatisfaction with the rigid and uncompromising Monism such as that of Śaṅkara. His "Nirviśeṣādvaita" seems to be fast losing its hold on the minds of even some of its most distinguished former exponents. In his latest work on the Brahmasūtras, Dr. Radhakrishnan himself, whose intellectual sympathy with Śaṅkara's Advaita has been so obvious in his earlier writings, has taken up a position that is vastly different from Śaṅkara's "Ekāntavāda". For, he has accepted in his latest work, both the Nirguṇa and Saguṇa, the Nirviśeṣa and the Saviśeṣa aspects of Brahman as valid forms of the

same reality. *Īśvara* is the creative dynamic aspect of Brahman. He is not Brahman falsely regarded, due to Ignorance, as the cause and controller of the Universe. *Māyā* is the real creative energy of *Īśvara*. Creation is a losing forth of what is already contained in the nature of Brahman. The world is a self-manifestation of *Ātman*. The individual is a ray of spiritual light and so, obviously real. It is not separate from Brahman. It is not also an unreal reflection of Brahman in *Māyā*. Not only is the self real; but it keeps its distinctive individuality in release. Such new ideas as these are hardly consistent with or faithful to the unexpurgated "Nirviśeṣādvaita" of Śaṅkara, as set forth in his famous commentary on the *Brahmasūtras*. It would be clearly impossible for anyone to affirm philosophical conviction in and loyalty to the views of Bādarāyaṇa as set forth above and at the same time accept the truth of the Nirviśeṣādvaita of Śaṅkara and the *mithyātva* of the world as defined by his accredited followers. That such an impossible compromise between the two is being attempted is itself a proof that faith in the absolute truth of Nirviśeṣādvaitavāda is evidently waning from the hearts of those who had hitherto regarded it as the highest reach of thought. If this be so, the future seems very promising, indeed, for a full-fledged Theism like Madhva's.

The intellectuals' disillusionment with *Māyāvāda* finds expression in another outburst from another unexpected quarter in a recent work the "Path of Saints — As the Fulfilment of Vedānta" by Swami Anand" (B. V. Bhavan, 1977, pp. 61-62) : "The greatest harm however done to Hinduism by him (Śaṅkara) was the theory of illusion (*Māyā*) to explain away everything in the world or in life as unreal and Brahman alone as the reality. This dangerous doctrine, which is an illusion in itself, being no more than an extra-ordinary feat of Ś's philosophical genius, has been the greatest weakness of Hinduism and has been more responsible than anything else as a single factor throughout subsequent ages for the trait of hypocrisy to be found generally in the nature of an average Hindu. Indeed, it has made the Hindu an object of ridicule and humiliation the world over".

The social and material standards of the Mādhva community call for an urgent rehabilitation. Till these are improved, the necessary conditions for an intellectual renaissance of Mādhva philosophy would not be there. In our secular democracy, the right to flourish, build and develop its institutions and propagate its philosophy of life is given to every cultural group and community of people. If Dvaita philosophy and its literature should not merely be confined to a small section of the people of S. India, but shed their light far and wide, by right of their innate worth and vigor, it would require sustained effort in many directions.

So long as the great truths of this system and its deepest thoughts on the perennial problems of philosophy and religion are confined to the Sanskrit originals without any attempt being made to interpret them to the present generation, which is not in a position to study these texts in the originals, it would be impossible to expect any favorable results in this

direction. It is imperative that this philosophy should be presented in the light of modern knowledge. The system is fortunately, still, a living force in S. India. Its undeniable merits, as a system of reasoned thought, would fully justify its being properly presented to the modern world. It is symptomatic of this urge, if not a true representation of Mādhva thought, that we come across a work like D. K. Ramarao's "Madhva Śāstra Explained and Presented from a Modern Outlook" (Sri Shakti Electric Press, Mysore, 1955) in which the author tries to outline Madhva's teachings from the point of view of Pratyakṣa and Anumāna as primary bases and Āgama as secondary and rejecting such vital doctrines as Vedāpauruṣe-yatva, प्रारब्धकर्मणो भोगेनैव क्षयः and Sarvaśabdasamanvaya. It is however, one thing to adopt a purely philosophical standpoint without going into the theological and ritualistic aspects of the system, in placing it before the world, and quite another to repudiate those aspects which are common to practically *every other system of Vedānta*. However that may be, it would certainly conduce to the better appreciation of the system in modern times if, in its presentation, the *odium theologicum* met with in traditional literature is eschewed. It may also, with advantage, be divested of much of its colorful theological trappings so as to enable its purely metaphysical contours to be clearly perceived. Good renderings of its important logical and philosophical works, preferably abridged, and translated into English and other languages, to introduce the higher thoughts of the system to the modern world would also be a step in the right direction. Its intricacies of Pañcarātra and Tāntric esotericisms of doctrine and theology may have to be left out in any modern presentation of its religious and philosophical thought. Much of the intricate dialectics of its traditional logic and philosophy could be *re-presented* in less technical and more easily assimilable form.

Textual research in Dvaita literature, with particular reference to the linguistic, bibliographical and other aspects, upon which the authenticity and genuineness of Madhva's sources in favor of the particular line of interpretation of the Vedānta adopted by him would rest, must be undertaken in all seriousness, if the textual *bona fides* of the system is to be placed on a satisfactory basis, to the satisfaction of modern minds, which require one's cards to be placed on the table. As a preliminary aid to such an investigation, I have given a consolidated list of all the unfamiliar sources from which Madhva has drawn his materials for his own philosophical reconstruction, in Appendix I. My esteemed friend C.R. Krishna Rao has done a useful service in piecing together all the quotations from the *Brahmatarka* (a non-extant source) running to nearly 700 verses occurring in the various works of Madhva and arranging them under a few leading topics, and arguing a case for accepting the genuineness of the work.¹

1. His main argument in favor of the genuineness of the *Brahma-Tarka* is that passages cited from it by Madhva in his works should have been accepted as genuine by his adversaries like Acyutaprekṣa, Padmanābha Tirtha and Trivikrama Paṇḍita, who later

The need for critical and authentic expositions of Madhva's thought in English and in the regional languages of India cannot be overempha-

embraced his faith. This line of argument has its own obvious limitations, and cannot be pressed very far. Apart from that, quotations from *Brahmatarka* need not necessarily have figured in the disputations between Madhva and his erstwhile adversaries; or the authenticity of the passages may have been conceded just by way of *abhyupagamavāda*. Another point made in this connection is that there is one citation from the *Brahmatarka* (in Trivikrama's *TD.*), which does not (seem to) occur in any of the passages cited by Madhva from the same source. This is not also a very conclusive argument; as it may very well be that Trivikrama derived this verse from Madhva himself, on the latter's own authority. The issue cannot thus be solved merely on the basis of internal evidence from the works of Madhva or his own followers. What will clinch the matter is some *external evidence* that the *Brahmatarka* as such or some crucial passage from it (preferably one that has been cited by Madhva himself) has been cited by some one *who did not belong to his school*. It gives me very great satisfaction to record here that such clinching evidence is luckily available. It is this :

M. has quoted some 24 verses from the *Brahmatarka* in his *VTN* defining the nature, scope and relative strength of the three Pramāṇas accepted by him. One of the verses is :

प्राबल्यमागमस्यैव जात्या तेषु त्रिषु स्मृतम् ।

उपजीव्यविरोधे तु न प्रामाण्यममुष्य च ॥

The first half here refers to the superiority of Scripture to the other two Pramāṇas, as a general principle (*utsargataḥ*). It is however made clear in the second half that this superiority is not absolute and unqualified but subject to the condition of the scriptural statement not being in conflict with the basic proof (*upajivya-pramāṇa*) of its own data. Where there is such a contradiction, the scriptural statement which is bound by the data given by the *Upajivya-pramāṇa* for its operation will have to submit to a modification of its meaning, as Scripture cannot be rejected outright as invalid.

This guiding principle restricting the scope of identity texts has been applied by M. to reject the claim of absolute superiority of Advaita Śrutis over Bhedaśrutis and the reality of Jiveśvarabheda and of the world established and certified by Sākṣipratyakṣa which is the *Upajivya-pramāṇa* in respect of the data on which even the identity texts have to operate. This position taken by M. on the complete evidence of the two halves of the verse from *Brahmatarka* is sought to be overruled by Advaitānanda in his *Brahma-vidyābharaṇa* (a c. on Ś's BSB (17th. cent.) by bringing in the *nyāya* Upadeśānupadeśatve viparitam balābalaṃ' and consequently restoring the absolute sway of Scripture regardless of *Upajivya-pramāṇavirodha*.

However, as a matter of fact, the principle of 'Upadeśānupadeśatve' applies to cases of conflict of data given by uncertified superficial commonsense view or perception of things and authentic evidence of science as in respect of the limited size of the moon seen through the naked eye and the evidence of its real dimension established by astronomy. Unlike the perception of the limited size of the moon through the naked eye, the reality of the world and of the difference of Jiva from B. are established, as M. has shown, by Sākṣipratyakṣa which is duly certified (*parikṣita*). The principle of 'Upadeśānupadeśatve' does not therefore apply to these cases.

Leaving aside that point, what is of special interest to us here is Advaitānanda's discussion of the question by quoting the first half of the verse 'Prābalyam āgamasyaiva jātyā teṣu triṣu smṛtam/cited by M. and questioning the correctness of the thesis of

उपजीव्यविरोधे तु न प्रामाण्यममुष्य च

maintained by M. by appealing to some other principle of 'Upadeśānupadeśatve...' involves a complete recognition of the genuineness and authenticity of the source from which M. has derived his thesis which the author of *Brahma-Vidyābharaṇa* tries to reject in the interest of his own thesis of the absolute validity of Scripture (i.e. 'identity texts'). There is no attempt however at questioning the genuineness of the source from which the quotation has been drawn. That is what matters to us, in this context.

sized. Such publications are absolutely necessary if the erroneous impressions and sometimes purposely distorted estimates of the system circulated by writers who have no intellectual sympathy with the views of Madhva, in India and abroad are to be set right and counteracted. The ancients did their duty by their school of thought, in their own way, in the cultural and scientific medium of their days, viz., Sanskrit. Present-day Mādhvas owe an equally important duty to their Ācārya and his great expositors, to do something in a language or languages suited for the purpose. They are not doing even a fraction of what modern followers of Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja and other thinkers of India *have done and are doing*, for their respective Ācāryas. A central cultural organization representing the entire Mādhva community or its thoughtful and progressive sections should undertake such responsible work which would be obviously beyond the means and capacity of individuals.

It is heartening to note that years after the debacle of the S. M. S. O. Sabha of Tirupati, a new Akhila Bhārata Mādhva Mahāmaṇḍal has come to be established in 1953 at Udipi, by the pioneering efforts of the farsighted Śrī Viśveśa Tīrtha Svamiji of the Pejavar Mutt. Its objectives are to foster and develop a sense of fellowship and solidarity in the entire community of Mādhvas in India, irrespective of its linguistic, geographical and other differences and promote its best interests in the social, economic and cultural spheres and to spread and propagate Mādhva thought and way of life, by preaching, publications and *research*.

The Mandal has a broadbased constitution representing both secular and religious interests. It has an ambitious programme and has established about a hundred branches and a membership of a few thousands ranging over the former Mysore, Andhra and Madras States and in a few other places outside. It is conducting residential Hostels for High School and College students at Mysore and Dharwar and a Mādhva Vidyā Pīṭha at Bangalore, in which instruction is offered in advanced Śāstric learning. The Mandal should establish an all-India Mādhva Research Institute on the pattern of the B. O. R. I. Poona, and turn out *organized work* on scientific lines, for the collection, preservation and editing of mss., of rare and unpublished works and publishing them. It should also publish original works, translations and expositions of both “Vyāsa” and Dāsa Sāhitya. The “Dāsa” Sāhitya in Kannaḍa is a great asset to both the Mādhva school of thought and to the cultural heritage of Karnatak. It is unfortunate that nothing substantial has been done in this field. The Madras University has done commendable work in publishing scholarly expositions of the *Tiruvāimozhi* and its commentaries on Tamil Vaiṣṇavism. Classical literature in Tamil Śaivism has also received due attention. So far as the Dāsa Sāhitya in Kannaḍa is concerned, it is a legitimate expectation that either the Mysore or the Karnatak University would make proper provision for research work in it. Irrespective of the work done by religious and denominational institutions, in such cases, our regional Universities can do really substantial work in bringing to light the cul-

tural heritage of the country enshrined in the great literatures in the different languages of our country. The Mādhva Mutts also could meet the Universities halfway and found chairs and provide scholarships for the study of Mādhva philosophy at the Post-Graduate level, in as many Universities as possible. It is time that responsible public opinion in the community is moulded to make such provision for the advanced study of and research in Mādhva literature and philosophy at the University level of education in our country. There is provision for the study of Mādhva philosophy at Post-Graduate and Ph.D. level in the Sanskrit and Philosophy courses of the Bombay University and for M. A. Examination in Sanskrit at the Madras, Karnatak and Mysore Universities. But no Mādhva Mutt has as yet shown its interest in the good work the Universities have been doing, by coming forward to make suitable endowments in the interests of the students who take up the study of Mādhva philosophy at these Examinations. By doing so, they would be serving the best interests of Mādhva philosophy in the context of modern education.

It is time other Mādhva Maṭhas draw inspiration from the establishment of the Sukritindra Oriental Research Institute in Cochin by the Kāśī Mutt and its disciples to have an All-India Mādhva Research Institute to provide opportunities for the fullest expression and utilization of the talents of present and future generations of the entire community in making Mādhva philosophy a 'weltanschauung.'

A publication trust should also be created to encourage authors to give good books on Mādhva literature and philosophy, to the public. A scheme for compulsorily ear-marking an adequate part of the income of the various affluent Mādhva Mutts, for this purpose, should be devised and implemented. Had such centralized assistance been available, the present work and others of its kind would have seen the light many years ago.

Most of the original texts of Dvaita philosophy published over fifty years ago have now become out of print and nowhere available, for love or for money. Copies extant are in a crumbling state. There is great need for better and handier editions of these texts in more modern garb. Critical editions of select texts or portions of them, leaving aside their digressive matter and well-chosen extracts from the different commentaries, instead of their verbatim reproductions in all their wearisome repetitions of one another, followed by critical notes and brief translations, are also a desideratum. Definitive editions of the Dāsa Sāhitya and their translations are also very necessary. Some of the leading Mutts could as well set apart part of their income for this most important service to Mādhva philosophy and revival of interest in it, with financial assistance from the Sāhitya Academy of India, if necessary. The Mutts which were once the fountain heads of the literary and philosophical activity of the community have now lapsed into apathy. They should try to regain their lost position and justify their existence by doing what is legitimately expected of them. What the public wants from them is concrete proofs of their

burning zeal for and interest in the advancement of religion, philosophy and literature,—not mere proclamations of their pious intentions of what they intend to do. Wisdom lies in moving with the times and anticipating the needs of the community.

As the Mādhva Mahamandala happens to be the only influential public institution enjoying the confidence of the community at large, it is up to it to give serious thought to this urgent problem of publications and research and give it top priority in its programme. For not until the wisdom of Madhva and his distinguished followers enshrined in their original works in Sanskrit is made to reach the present and the future generations through more easily understandable media than the original Sanskrit, could his philosophy be expected to make any effective or lasting impression on the minds of the present generation and the future ones or regain its proud position of strength and vitality as a vital limb of Indian philosophy. Nor could its authentic voice of Vedāntic Theism reverberate through the length and breadth of our country as of old and make itself felt in foreign countries as well through suitable media of English and other languages, otherwise.

India has emerged into independent status and has already made international contacts and rapprochement in her own right. She has given the world her message of international welfare through peaceful co-existence of nations. Her authentic voice in philosophy also should now be conveyed to the world, without looking up to external blessings. In this great task, the Dvaita Vedānta of Madhva would have a major part to play. Let us hope that it will rise equal to the occasion and fulfil its expectations in a manner worthy of its glorious achievements in the last seven hundred years.

May this History of the Dvaita School of Vedānta and its Literature narrated here in this Volume be a source of legitimate pride and pleasure and inward satisfaction to the Mādhva public, in the achievements of its past and may it pave the way for greater publicity and wider propagation of the philosophy of Madhva in our own country and in the other countries of the East and West. May it help our present generation of scholars, University Professors and students of Indian history and culture to have a proper and adequate estimation of the place of Madhva Siddhānta and its literature in the history of Indian thought and enable them to give it the recognition that is its due.

India has attained independent status politically and has established international contacts and rapprochments in her own right. She has given the world her message of international peace and understanding through peaceful coexistence of nations. Her authentic voice in Philosophy should also be heard all over the world without looking for outside blessings. In this great task, Dvaita Vedānta has a worthy part to play.

The distinctions of East and West are fast becoming obsolete in this space age of ours. As the world is getting closer and more and more unified, it is essential that the treasures of thought and expression throughout the world be made accessible to all mankind—not as curios but as living

achievements of the human spirit, to build for the future world-community a deeper understanding of identities and differences in ideas. Let us hope Dvaita Vedānta and its literature will ere long rise equal to these expectations in a manner worthy of their achievements during the last seven hundred years and more.

LIST OF *WORKS CITED BY MADHVĀCĀRYA

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|-----------------------------------|-------------------------|
| 1. Atharvāṅgīrasa Up. | 36. Tantraprakāśikā |
| 2. Adhyātma | 37. Kāpileya Saṁhitā |
| 3. Anabhimlāna Śruti (S.V.) | 38. Kāraṇaviveka |
| 4. Abhidhāna | 39. Kālakīya |
| 5. Ayāsyā Śākhā (S. V.) | 40. Kālanirṇaya |
| 6. Antaryāmi Saṁhitā | 41. Kāśāyaṇa Śākhā |
| 7. Ākalpa | 42. Kriyā Yoga |
| 8. Āgniveśya Śruti | 43. Kaurma |
| 9. Āgamatātparya | 44. Kauśika Śruti |
| 10. Āgneya | 45. Kauśārava Śruti |
| 11. Ācāra | 46. Kauṇḍinya Śruti |
| 12. Ātmasaṁhitā | 47. Kauṇṭharavya Śruti |
| 13. Āditya Purāṇa | 48. Gatisāra |
| 14. Ardhanārīnārāyaṇa Tantra | 49. Gāndharva |
| 15. Ādhāra | 50. Gāyatrī Saṁhitā |
| 16. Āruṇīśruti | 51. Gāruḍa |
| 17. Amśaviveka | 52. Gītākalpa |
| 18. Indradyumnaśruti | 53. Gītāsāra |
| 19. Udara-Saṇḍilyaśruti | 54. Guṇaparama |
| 20. Uddāma Saṁhitā | 55. Guruviveka |
| 21. Uddālakāyana Śruti | 56. Gautamakhila |
| 22. Udyoga | 57. Caturvedaśikhā |
| 23. Upagītā | 58. Cākrāyaṇa Śruti |
| 24. Upanārādīya | 59. Caitanyaviveka |
| 25. Upāsanālakṣaṇa | 60. Chandovidhānā |
| 26. Ubhayanirukta | 61. Jābālakhila |
| 27. Ṛg.Vedakhila | 62. Jñānaviveka |
| 28. Ṛk. Saṁhitā (Post-Vedic) | 63. Jyotis Saṁhitā |
| 29. Ācāryasaṁhitā | 64. Jīvatattva |
| 30. Aitareya Saṁhitā (Post-Vedic) | 65. Tattvanirukta |
| 31. Aiśvarya | 66. Tattvanirṇaya |
| 32. Kamaṭha Śruti | 67. Tattvasāra |
| 33. Karmaviveka | 68. Tattvasaṁhitā |
| 34. Karmasaṁhitā | 69. Tattvodaya |
| 35. Kalāpa Śruti | 70. Tattvodyoga |
| | 71. Talavakāra Brāhmaṇa |

*The list does not include well-known Vedic, Upaniṣadic Epic and Purāṇic texts, which have also been cited plentifully.

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| 72. Tantra-Bhāgavata | 118. Pañcarātra |
| 73. Tātparya | 119. Prakāṣaśruti |
| 74. Tantramālā | 120. Brāhma |
| 75. Tārtiya | 121. Bhaktiviveka |
| 76. Tura Śruti | 122. Prakāśa Samhitā |
| 77. Triyoga | 123. Prakṛta |
| 78. Traikālya | 124. Prakṛti Samhitā |
| 79. Traividya | 125. Prakṛṣṭa Samhitā |
| 80. Dattātreyā Yoga | 126. Prajāpati Samhitā |
| 81. Devahārda | 127. Praṇavamāhātmya |
| 82. Daivī Mīmāṃsā | 128. Pratisamkhyāna |
| 83. Dharmatattva | 129. Pratyaya |
| 84. Dharma Śruti | 130. Pratyāhāra |
| 85. Dhyāna Yoga | 131. Pradyota |
| 86. Nāmanirukta | 132. Pradhyāna |
| 87. Nāmasamhitā | 133. Prabhava |
| 88. Nāradya | 134. Prabhañjana |
| 89. Narasimha Purāṇa | 135. Prayoga |
| 90. Nārāyaṇa Gopāla Kalpa | 136. Prabhāvali |
| 91. Nārāyaṇa Tantra | 137. Prabhāsa |
| 92. Nārāyaṇa Śruti | 138. Pravṛtta Samhitā |
| 93. Nārāyaṇa Samhitā | 139. Pravṛttitattva |
| 94. Nārāyaṇādhyātma | 140. Prākāśya |
| 95. Nārāyaṇārāma Kalpa | 141. Prācīnaśāla Śruti (S. V.) |
| 96. Nārāyaṇāṣṭākṣara Kalpa | 142. Prāṇa Samhitā |
| 97. Nārāyaṇīya | 143. Prāṭisvika |
| 98. Nirṇaya | 144. Prāthamya |
| 99. Naigūṇya | 145. Prādhānya |
| 100. Nityasamhitā | 146. Bābhravya Śākhā (S. V.) |
| 101. Nibandha | 147. Bāṣkala Śākhā (R. V.) |
| 102. Nivṛtta | 148. Brhat Tantra |
| 103. Nisarga | 149. Brhacchruti |
| 104. Padaviveka | 150. Brhatsamhitā |
| 105. Parabhoga | 151. Boddhavya |
| 106. Paramaśruti | 152. Brahmakaivarta |
| 107. Paramasāra | 153. Brahmatattva |
| 108. Paramasamhitā | 154. Brahmatarka |
| 109. Parāyaṇa | 155. Brahmadarśana |
| 110. Pavamāna | 156. Brahmasāra |
| 111. Puruṣottama Tantra | 157. Brahmavaivarta |
| 112. Pavamānavijaya | 158. Brahmasamhitā |
| 113. Pādma | 159. Brahmāṇḍa |
| 114. Pārāśaryāyana Śruti | 160. Bhadramāna |
| 115. Pippalāda Śākhā (A. V.) | 161. Bhadrīkā |
| 116. Paiṅgi Śruti | 162. Bhaviṣyatparva |
| 117. Pautrāyaṇa Śruti | 163. Bhaviṣyat Purāṇa |

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| 164. Bhāgavata-Tantra | 209. Vatsa Śruti |
| 165. Bhāvatattva | 210. Vahni Purāṇa |
| 166. Bhāvaviveka | 211. Vastutattva |
| 167. Bhāvavṛtta | 212. Vākyanirṇaya |
| 168. Bhāllaveya Śākhā | 213. Vāmana |
| 169. Bhoganirṇaya | 214. Vāruṇa (Śruti (S. V.)) |
| 170. Mahākaurma | 215. Vāyuprokta |
| 171. Mahāmīmāṃsā | 216. Vāsiṣṭha Śākhā (S. V.) |
| 172. Mahātattvaviveka | 217. Vāsudevādhyātma |
| 173. Mahāyoga | 218. Vāllabhya |
| 174. Mahārava Śruti | 219. Vikṣepa |
| 175. Mahāvarāha | 220. Vicāra |
| 176. Mahavyākaraṇa Sūtra | 221. Vijñāna |
| 177. Mahāśālina Śruti | 222. Vinirṇaya |
| 178. Mahā (Sanatkumāra) Samhitā | 223. Viparītaśruti |
| 179. Mahodadhi | 224. Vibhūtittattva |
| 180. Mahopanīṣad | 225. Vimardaśruti |
| 181. Māthara Śruti | 226. Vimalasamhitā |
| 182. Māṇḍavya Śruti | 227. Viveka |
| 183. Mātsya | 228. Viśva Samhitā |
| 184. Mādhucchandasa Śākhā | 229. Viśvanirṇaya |
| 185. Mādhyandināyana Śruti | 230. Viśvambhara Śruti |
| 186. Mānasa | 231. Viṣṇutattva |
| 187. Māna Samhitā | 232. Viśvatantra |
| 188. Mānya Samhitā | 233. Viṣṇudharmottara |
| 189. Māyavaibhava | 234. Viṣṇu Samhitā |
| 190. Mārkaṇḍeya | 235. Vedārthavicāra |
| 191. Māhātmya | 236. Vaibhava |
| 192. Muktitattva | 237. Vaibhāvya |
| 193. Muktisamhitā | 238. Vaiśāradya |
| 194. Mūrtibheda | 239. Vaiśeṣya |
| 195. Mūla Śruti | 240. Vaiśvānara Samhitā |
| 196. Mūla Rāmāyaṇa | 241. Vyakta |
| 197. Mānava (Smṛti) | 242. Vyāsa Tantra |
| 198. Maitrāyaṇīya Śruti | 243. Vyāsanirukta |
| 199. Mokṣadharma | 244. Vyāsa Yoga |
| 200. Maudgalya Śruti | 245. Vyāsa Smṛti |
| 201. Yajus Samhitā (Post-Vedic) | 246. Vyāhṛti Sāra |
| 202. Yādavādhyātma | 247. Vyoma Samhitā |
| 203. Yāska Śruti | 248. Śaktitattva |
| 204. Rājanīti | 249. Śabdatattva |
| 205. Rāma Samhitā | 250. Śaktiviveka |
| 206. Lakṣaṇa | 251. Śabdanirṇaya |
| 207. Liṅganirṇaya | 252. Śāṇḍilya Śruti (S. V.) |
| 208. Lokatattva | 253. Śabda |
| | 254. Śārkarākṣya Śruti (S. V.) |

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| 255. Śrīviṣṇu Purāṇa | 274. Sūda Śāstra |
| 256. Srutinirṇaya | 275. Sṛṣṭivikṣepa |
| 257. Śāḍguṇya | 276. Saukarāyaṇa Śruti (S. V.) |
| 258. Satkāra | 277. Sauparṇa Śākhā (R. V.) |
| 259. Sat-tattva | 278. Saṁkalpa |
| 260. Satya Saṁhitā | 279. Saṁkṛti Śruti |
| 261. Satsaṅga | 280. Saṁkhyāna |
| 262. Sadguṇa | 281. Saṁdrśya |
| 263. Sadbhāva | 282. Saṁdhāraṇa |
| 264. Sanatsujāta | 283. Saṁdhyāna |
| 265. Samanvaya | 284. Saṁyajñāna |
| 266. Samayācāra | 285. Skānda |
| 267. Sahasrāvaraṇa | 286. Svātantrya |
| 268. Sātvata Saṁhitā | 287. Svādhyāya |
| 269. Sādhananirṇaya | 288. Svābhāvya |
| 270. Sāma Saṁhitā (Post-Vedic) | 289. Hayagrīva Saṁhitā |
| 271. Sāmya | 290. Harivaṁśa |
| 272. Sāranirṇaya | 291. Hari Saṁhitā |
| 273. Sumata | 292. Hiraṇyanābha Śruti. |

And other well-known Śrutis (Ṛg Veda, Taitt. Saṁhitā, Upaniṣads, Āraṇyakaṣ) Mbh. Purāṇas, Upapurāṇas, Smṛtis, Bhāgavata etc.

THE ŚRIKŪRMAM INSCRIPTION OF NARAHARI TĪRTHA

(Epigraphia Indica Vol. vi, no. 25)

१. देवः श्रीकमलाविलासलहरीपात्रं कलिप्रोल्लसत्-
 क्लेशक्लिष्टजनेऽखिलक्षितितले संलीनबोधोदये ।
 स्वीयश्रीपदपङ्कजैकशरणान् संरक्षितुं सन्मुनि-
 जतिः श्रीपुरुषोत्तमाभिधमहातीर्थः सुमत्यग्रणीः ॥
२. तस्य ज्ञानकलाकलोदयकलो वैयासिकं गोगणं
 मन्दैर्भिन्नपथप्रचारितमलं सुव्यक्तभेदे पथि ।
 नेतुं संघृतदण्डमण्डितकरो यः प्रादुरासीन्मुनि-
 ब्रातैः सेव्यपदारविन्दयुगलादानन्दतीर्थो मुनिः ।
३. यन्मुनिभाषितभाष्यं भाष्यं किल तीर्थिकप्रवरसंघैः ।
 उन्मदवादिद्विरदप्रतिकुंभमकुशं भवति ॥
४. यन्मुखनिःसृतभाषा ललिता ललितप्रकारपदविन्यासा ।
 कमलापतिपदकमलं भजते भजमानभवभयारातिम् ॥
५. आनन्दतीर्थभगवत्पादाचार्यसरस्वती
 लोकेऽत्र हरिपादाब्जयुगलप्राप्तये नु सा ॥
६. तस्माल्लोकसुरक्षणातिनिपुणात् संप्राप्तकर्तव्यघ्नी-
 द्वैधामुत्र तथात्र योऽवति जनान् कालिङ्गभूसंभवान् ।
 पित्राचारमुपैति सूनुरिति सन्नीतिस्थितो धर्मतः
 शत्रुक्षमापतिवर्गदुर्गनिवहान् भीतानभीतः स्वयम् ॥
७. यश्च श्रीकमठाधिनायकमहाकार्यैकबद्धव्रतः
 तस्य प्रच्युतिवारणाय शबरानीकक्षितिघ्नाशनिम् ।
 घत्ते सत्करवालमस्य तटिता संत्यक्तजीवे रिपौ
 हन्तव्यानवशेषणात् निजविधिर्नो यस्य बोध्यस्तराम् ॥
८. तेनानेन श्रीमन्नरहरितीर्थास्थयतिवरेण्येन
 कलिसमयप्रह्लादप्रभावपरितोषितनृहरिरूपेण ॥
९. स्वस्ति श्रीशकवत्सरे हुतवहव्योमद्वयक्षमायुते (= १२०३)
 मेषे शुक्लशशाङ्कशेखरदिने वारे च सौम्ये वरे ।
 प्रासादं कमठाधिपस्य पुरतो निर्माय शर्मप्रदो
 योगानन्दनृसिंह एष भगवान् प्रीत्या प्रतिष्ठापितः ॥

N. B. The second and third verses in the inscription seem to have been transposed, as no *bhāṣya* of Puruṣottama Tīrtha (Acyutaprekṣa) is known or could have been written as explained on p. 76. The two verses have, therefore, been given by me in their logical order, as I conceive it.

That this is the correct order of the verses will be clear from the natural way in which the opening words in ver. 3 (Yanmunibhāsitabhāṣyam) catch up with their antecedent 'Ānandatīrtho muniḥ' at the end of ver. 2. The terms in which the Bhāṣya in question has been praised as the one fit to be expounded by leading philosophers and acting as a goad

in humbling the pride of disputing philosophers can only refer to the Bhāṣya of Madhva and not to a bhāṣya of Puruṣottama Tīrtha (alias Acyutaprajña) which is utterly unknown to this day. We cannot also expect Narahari T. to go into raptures over a (no-existent) Bhāṣya by Puruṣottama Tīrtha and ignore M's own *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* in his own inscription especially after his own statement that the purpose of M's avatar was to guide humanity in the path of Jīveśvarabheda which had been obscured by the evil influences of Kali. (ver. 2). Even the Epigraphist will have to be guided by reason and established facts of history and consolidated tradition in interpreting epigraphical data. In the present case, the original order of verses 2 and 3 in the Śrīkūrmam inscription as found engraved in the pillar at the Śrīkūrmam temple contradicts all known facts and established traditions about M. and his predecessor Puruṣottama T. It requires therefore to be slightly changed by transposing verses 2 and 3 which makes proper and admirable sense and is free from all difficulties. Yet I found to my dismay at least one Epigraphist in Mysore who was swearing by the 'epigraphical order' of the verses and would not allow himself to be persuaded to see reason.

INSUFFICIENTLY KNOWN OR UNDATABLE AUTHORS
AND WORKS IN DVAITA LITERATURE

1. *Mādhavācārya*. 'Pūrṇaprajñadarśana' being a chapter in his *Sarva-darśanasamgraha* on Madhva's system. It is a succinct and reliable account of the doctrines of the school, given by a celebrated Advaitin (C. 1375 A.D.)
2. Rājarājeśvara T. (g. 1433) disciple of Vidyāmūrti T. of Palimar Mutt. author of (i) *Maṅgalāṣṭakam* (wrongly ascribed to Vādirāja) and (ii) *Rāmasandeśa*, a Khaṇḍakāvya.^(p)
3. *Jīvottama T.* (Gokarna Mutt) author of 'Tīrthāvala'.
4. *Puruṣottama T.* (Gokarna Matha) author of *Karmasiddhānta*^(m) and *Sannyāsapaddhati* on 16 Saṁskāras.
5. *Vedāṅga Tirtha*. (1) a c. on the *Mbh. T. N.* referred to in verse 4 of Janārdana Bhaṭṭa's c. on the same original : (2) *Kavikarṇāmṛta* a c. on Vāyustuti (Madras O. L. 1434 a) and (3) another on *M. Vij.* (Madras D. C. 12160). (C. 1500 A.D.)
6. *Viśvapati Tirtha*. (1) *Samgraharāmāyaṇaṭikā* (Madras 4103) (2) a c. on Dvādaśa Stotra^(p) and (3) another on *M. Vij.* (printed 1951, with my English Introd.) Date circa 1600.
7. *Sāgara Rāmācārya* (circa 1700). He was the son of Sāgara Veṅkaṭeśācārya and Śāntābāi. He was a distinguished scholar of the Gauḍa-Śārasvata (Koṅkaṇa) Brahmin community of the Madhva Sampradāya and wrote some seven works in all. His most important and epoch-making work was the *Koṅkaṇābhyudaya* in ten Prakaraṇas, devoted to the establishment of the fullfledged Brahminical status of the Gauḍa-Śārasvatas, disputed by other groups. It is also known as "Daśa-Prakaraṇas", of which only six have been accessible to me in the mss. consulted. The author cites numerous Smṛtis and letters patent and Bulls issued by the Keladi Rulers and Pontiffs of some of the Mutts at Uḍipi and of Satyābhinava (1674-1706), and Yogīndra (1671-80), and others. He was a devout Mādhva and wrote (2)a *Sanniti-Rāmāyaṇa*^(p) (Indian Printing Press, Bombay, 1892) in the form of a moral Kāvya. In the concluding verses at the end of each canto the author refers to his other works like (3) *Suniti-Bhāgavata* ^(p) (4) *Kathāsamgraha* (5) *Śabdanirṇaya* (iv, 32) (6) *Jyotiṣanīratna* (v. 22) (7) *Madhvamantra-Sauramantra-com.* and (8) *Tattvasamgraha* (vii, 22). He was a disciple of the Gokarna Matha and refers to Raghucandra T. of Gokarna Mutt as his father's Guru and patron. in the introductory ver. 8 of his *Suniti-Bhāgavata*.
8. *Appayya Dikṣita* (16th cent). His *Nyāyamuktāvali* is a summary in verse, according to Madhva-Bhāṣya, being a part of his *Caturmata-*

- sārasaṅgraha*¹ devoted to the summary of the Adhikaraṇas of B. S. according to every one of the four great commentators, Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, Madhva and Śrīkaṇṭha. Mss. of this work relating to Madhva's bhāṣya are reported to be very rare : (Appendix to edn. of *Śivārkaṇḍīpikā*, Kumbakonam).
9. *Janārdana Bhaṭṭa*. (1) c. on the *Mbh. T. N.* printed at Bombay 1891. Claims to follow Vedāṅga T'S Com. (2) c. on *Pramāṇa-Paddhati*, printed at Poona. Date circa 17th cent.
 10. *Vedātma Tirtha*. a c. on *Vāyustuti* (Madras R. no. 856) Date C. 1460.
 11. *Puruṣottama*. *Vāḍibhūṣaṇam*, a treatise refuting the thesis that bondage is unreal (India Office Lib. No. 6052) author a disciple of Vidyādhīśa. Date circa 1630.
 12. (Anonymous). *Tattvadīpikā* a criticism of the *Tattvakaustubha* of Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita (Mys. O. L. C-2371) date 17th. cent.
 13. *Anandatirtha*, son of Lakṣmīnaraśimha Sūri. A c. on *M. Vij.* (Madras O. L. latest acquisition)—author a disciple of Yogīndra (1671-80) and presumably a brother of Nārāyaṇa author of *Rāghavendra Vijaya*.
 14. *Śrinidhi Tirtha*. A. commentator on the *Nym.* (Pejavar Mutt Coll.). Author a Svāmi of Puttige Mutt, Uḍipi, between circa 1637-50.
 15. *Viśvanātha Pañcānana*. The well-known author of the *Muktāvali* on the Nyāya, wrote a *Bhedasiddhi*, in general defence of Dualism as against Advaita. The three writers nos. 15-17 illustrate the influence exercised by the school of Madhvācārya on North Indian writers of the 17th century.
 16. *Veṇīdattācārya Tarka Vāgiśa*. *Bheda-Jayaśrī* (Sarasvati Bhavan Texts, no. 47, 1933). A Prakaraṇa in defence of the reality of Difference and the other views of Madhva and vigorously repelling the attacks of Nṛsiṃhāśrama, expressed in his *Bhedadhikkāra* and *Advaitadīpikā* (See pp. 26, 29, 32, 39, 44). The author was evidently a North Indian. A ms. of one of his works, is said to be dated Sam. 1750 i.e. 1694 A.D. He was a profound Naiyāyika and wrote some tracts criticizing the views of Śiromaṇi. For his other works see Introd. to the edn. of the *Bhedajayaśrī*.
 17. *Śaṅkara Miśra*. *Bhedaratnam* (Printed, Lahore). He is the same as the author of the gloss *Upaskāra* on the Kāṇāda Sūtras. Date Circa 17th. cent. Work in defence of realism.
 18. *Dhūṇḍirāja* (1690-1710). *Girvāṇa-Padamañjarī* a conversational grammar of Sanskrit. Author a Mādhva Maharashtrian Brahmin settled in Banaras (P. K. Gode *Studies in Indian Lit.*, Vol. 3).

1. Cf. आनन्दतीर्थमुनिलक्ष्मणदेशिकेन्द्र—
 श्रीकण्ठयोगिपदवीरदवीयसीर्नः ।
 आचार्यपादसरणिं च विविच्य बोद्धुं
 संगृह्यते मतचतुष्टयसारलेशः ॥ (Appayya).

19. *Raghunātha*. son of Vedāji Bhāskara. *Bheda-Taraṅgiṇi* (Madras R. no. 1298) The author was a brother of Subhānu Rao, the then Jahagirdar of Ārṇi and a disciple of Satyapūrṇa Tīrtha of the Uttarādi Mutt (1707-1726). His work was evidently in defence of "Bheda".
20. (Anonymous). *Nyāyaratnākara*^(m) (Madras O. L.) a summary and review of the respective positions taken up by the five polemical classics beginning with the Nym. Author unknown.
21. *Raghunātha Yati*. *Tattvamañjari* (Mys. C-303). An epitome of the teaching of Madhva. Nothing is known of the author. Date uncertain.
22. *Liṅgeri Śrīnivāsa*. Not "Śrīgeri" Śrīnivāsa as he has been called on p. 318 of Vij. Sex. Cent. Com. Vol. He is reputed to have been a disciple of Yadupatiyācārya and a contemporary of Bidarahallī Śrīnivāsa Ācārya. Over twenty works have been ascribed to him in the G. V. L. Cat. These include Tippanis on (1-10) the Daśa Prakaraṇas and cc. on (11) the *Mbh.* Parvas i-x, (12) the *Bhāgavata* (13) the NS called *Siddhāntaprabhā* (14) *Samgraha Rāmāyaṇa* (15) *Aṇu Bhāṣya* and (16) *Mañimañjari*. (17) a *Tattvavādi-kaṇṭhābharaṇa* alias *Bauddhadhikkāra* (18) *Smṛtimuktāvali* (on Dharmaśāstra) (19) *Cakramimāṃsā* (20) *Rukmiṇiharaṇam* (21) *Āśaucanirṇaya* and (22) *Padārthasamgraha*.
23. *Liṅgeri Vyāsācārya*. son of no. 22 above. A c. on the Bṛndāvanākhyāna (2) and on the *Praśna* Up. (3) on *Vāyustuti* (4) the *Pramāṇacandrikā*. (5) *TS.*, (6) *M. Vij.* (Vij. Sex. Com. Vol.).
24. *Narasimha* son of no. 23. (1) *Āhnikatarāṅgiṇi* (2) C. on Īśa, and (3) *Praśna Up.*
25. *Kṛṣṇācārya*. *Smṛtimuktāvali* (Printed Uḍipi) a digest on domestic ritual and dharma in four chapters. (i) Kālanirṇaya (ii) Āhnika prakaraṇa (iii) Śoḍaśakarma (iv) Śrāddha. Author said to have been a disciple of Rāghavendra Yati (1623-1671).
26. *Vibudhavya Tīrtha*. (1) *Subhadrāharaṇa* a kāvya with his own c. Printed Uḍipi. date circa 18th cent. (2) c. on *Viṣṇu Sahasranāma*.
27. Śrīnivāsa son of Viṭhalācārya author of *Kiraṇāvali* (p) c. on J's GT-*Nyāyadīpikā* author a disciple of Satyapūrṇa (1707-26).
28. *Umarji Tirumalācārya*. Disciple of Yadupati. Wrote (G. V. L. Cat.) cc. on *Dvādaśastotra*, *G. B. Prameyadīpikā* and *Śivastuti*.
29. *Umarji Prahlādācārya* son of 28. The G. V. L. Cat. ascribes to him fourteen works. They include cc. on *G. B.*, *V. T. N.*, the *Bhāṣyas* on the *Taitt. Brh. Kaṭha*, *Muṇḍ. Ups. Vādāvali*, the NS, *Jayantinirṇaya*. *Prameyadīpikā* and one on the *Muktāvali* (Nyāya) called *Tarkadīpāvali*.
30. (Anonymous) *Sannyāyamālā*, a c. on the *Candrikā* (Pejavar Mutt Coll. 234).
31. (Anonymous) *Vimalabodha* c. on *Mbh. T. N.* (Pejavar Mutt).
32. *Rāmakṛṣṇa*. *Dvītvaviveka*. c. on *Tattvaviveka* of Madhva (Pejavar Coll. 295) Date uncertain.
33. *Yādavendra*. c. on *Bhāgavata* (Pejavar, 328, Nagari) Date uncertain.

34. *Samkarṣaṇa Tirtha*. c. on *Bhāgavata* i-vi. (Pejavar, 328, Nagari) Date uncertain.
35. *Ādya Varadarājācārya* Teacher of Raghūttāma Tirtha (d. 1596). com. on *Mbh. T. N.* (referred to in his son's great-grandson's Kannada c. on the *Gītā*).
36. *Ādya Narahari* eldest of the two sons of Varadarājācārya (above) (1) a com. on *Bhāgavata-Tātparya* of Madhva called *Dīpikā*(p) and (2) c. on *Viṣṇu-Purāṇa* (called *Smṛtikaustubha*) Both these have been referred to in introd. verse 6 of the *Gītā* com. in Kannada, (Printed at Belgaum in 1903) of Varadarāja great grandson of *Narahari* (above) He has given his genealogy also.
37. *Varada Tirtha*. (1) c. *Mbh. T. N.* (Tanjore. 7910) and on (2) *TS.* and (3) *Tattvaviveka* (Pejavar 268).
38. *Ānandabhaṭṭa Tattvaviveka* (com?)—India Office, 6041. Date uncertain.
39. *Samkarṣaṇa Oḍeyaru*. Initiated into Sannyāsa by Satyaparāyaṇa T (1842-63). former name Tammanna Nayak. He belonged to Guilahosur and studied under Viśvapriya T. of Sode Mutt (d. 1864). Author of the Sanskrit c. on *Harikathāmyṛtasāra*. Published with Kannada translation in 3 Vols. from Bangalore 1976-77. Entombed at Karampundi near Polur (S. Ry.).
40. *Sorattur Śrinivāsācārya* disciple of Wai Bālācārya author of *Dvaita-bhūṣaṇam*(p) (Jñānacakṣus Press, Poona 1892.)
41. *Ānandatirthavara*. Son of Viṭhala. Work-*Sattattvaratnamālā* a treatise on the categories of Dvaita system. Printed Bombay, 1918. Date uncertain.
42. *Mahāmahopādhyāya Vyākaraṇam Subbarāyācārya* (1883-1918). (1) *Sūtrārthamañjari* (Printed, Mysore). cc. on *Paribhāṣenduśekhara* and *Laghuśabdenduśekhara* (in mss).
43. (Anonymous) *Aṁśāvatāranirṇaya* (Mys. C.-973) a prose tract in 112 granthas on *aṁśas* and *avatāras* of God.
44. *Mahāmahopādhyāya Setumādhavācārya* (1871-1955) (1) *Vyāsa-Pāṇini-Bhāvanirṇaya*. a learned and highly suggestive dissertation on the Pāṇinian Sūtras throwing light on the religious and philosophical views of Pāṇini. Work discusses also references in *Mahābhāṣya*, *Kaiyaṭa* etc. (2) *Tattva Kaustubhakulīṣa* (criticism of Bhattoji Dikṣita's work). Published by S. V. O. College. Tirupati).

THE KĀŚĪ AND THE GOKARṆA MAṬHAS

THE Kāśī and the Gokarṇa Maṭhas are the two influential Mādhva Maṭhas commanding the allegiance of a large section of the Gauḍa Sārasvata Brahmin community in S. India. The Sārasvatas are believed to have come into S. India in the hoary past when the legendary hero Paraśurāma came to the South. According to the *Sahyādrī-Māhātmya*, Paraśurāma made the Arabian sea recede with his arrow and colonized the land with Brahmins brought from the land of the R. Sarasvatī, Ahicchatra and other places. Tradition includes the Taulava, Nambūdri, Havika Koṅkaṇa and Sārasvata Brahmins among these.¹ Vādirāja Svāmi speaks in his *Tirthaprabandha* (i, 6) with pride and affection, of his native land of Tuluva as the land of Paraśurāma, extending from Gokarṇa to Kanyākumārī :

कर्णे पदन्यस्तरुची रिरंसुवाराशिवस्त्रं जघनाद्धि यस्याः ।

अमूमुचद् बाणकरेण भूमेः श्रीभार्गवः सा जयति क्षितिर्नः ॥

The whole coastal belt from Sopārā to Kanyākumārī is sometimes referred to as “Sapta-Koṅkaṇa.”

As a result of the Inquisition, this community of Gauḍa Sārasvatas, which speaks the Koṅkaṇī language, made a large scale exodus from various parts of the Portuguese Goa, between 1540-60 A.D., and settled mostly in the coastal districts of North and South Kanara and in the Malabar, Cochin and Travancore areas and in parts of the Belgaum district. A very large section of this community has adopted the Madhva-Sampradāya. It is, however, difficult to fix, with any degree of certainty, when the conversion of this community to the Mādhva fold was first made and by whom. The devotion and loyalty with which it has stuck to the Madhva-Sampradāya, to this day, has been remarkable. The establishment of two separate Mutts within this community itself, presided over by a line of Pontiffs drawn from the Sārasvata community must have contributed in a very large measure to this devotion and loyalty of the community to the Madhva faith being kept alive. The more ancient Mādhva Maṭhas in the country such as the Uḍipi Mutts and the Maṭhatraya have also, as we shall presently see, shown their *esprit de corps* in extending their support and co-operation in the matter.

The traditions about the first conversion of the community to the Madhva Sampradāya are vague. The available evidences carry us only as far as the middle of the 15th or 16th century; but not earlier. Two inscriptions from the Kṛṣṇa temple at Uḍipi dated Śaka 1536 (1614 A.D.)

1. Cf. केरलान् तोलवान् हेवान् कोङ्कणांश्च स्वयोगतः ।

सृष्ट्वा देशानयैतेभ्यः चतुर्धा व्यभजत्प्रभुः ॥ In (*Koṅkaṇābhyudaya*)

go to show that the members of this community were already well established in Sonda and in the areas adjoining Uḍipi, in the beginning of the 17th Century and were making gifts to the Kṛṣṇa temple. But there is no mention in these records of the Mutts to which these donors belonged. The *M. Vij.* (x, 51-52) mentions Mādhva's visit to Goa and his stay there.

अवाप्तवान् स पुनरिषुपातमस्मरत् रमापति स परशुराममादरात् ।

स शंकरपदद्विजोपहृतमाप्य गोवास्थगं * * *॥¹

It is possible that he might have converted many there to his fold then and that in the succeeding centuries some of the Uḍipi Mutts themselves were looking after the spiritual needs of the Sārasvatas in Goa who had embraced the Mādhva faith, till the large scale migrations of the members of the community and its exodus began as a result of the Inquisition.

As this community of Sārasvata-Mādhvas grew larger and began to spread in other parts, in the interests of self-preservation and religious freedom, the need to minister to its growing needs must have necessitated the founding of a separate Mutt or Mutts. A tradition widely accepted in this behalf and recorded in the *Guruparamparāmṛta*, published in 1904 (seventy four years ago) under the authority of the late Indirākānta Tīrtha, Svamiji of the Gokarṇa-Partagāli Mutt, makes Rāmacandra Tīrtha, tenth successor of Hṛṣīkeśa Tīrtha of the Palimār Mutt, Uḍipi, the Sannyāsa Guru of Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha, who established the first Mādhva Gauḍa Sārasvata Maṭha at Bhatkal, in 1476 A.D. This became known as the Gokarṇa or Partagāli Mutt subsequently. In the *Gurupravara-Maṅjari* of the Kāśī Mutt also, it is admitted that the Kāśī and Gokarṇa Mutts had a common ancestor in Rāmacandra Tīrtha; though about his precise identity some divergence of opinion has lately arisen.

The disciples of the Kāśī Mutt are to be found largely in the coastal belt of the Cochin-Travancore State and in the South Kanara district, while those of the Gokarṇa Mutt predominate in the Koṅkan and the Karwar districts, and in Goa. The Gokarṇa Mutt regards the Kāśī Mutt to be of subsequent origin from the time of the Raghucandra Tīrtha (C. 1682) of the Gokarṇa Mutt. This is untenable as one of the records in the Gokarṇa Mutt itself dated 1590 mentions Yādavendra Tīrtha of the Kāśī Mutt as a contemporary of (Aṇu)-Jivottama Tīrtha. The Kāśī Mutt believes that both the Mutts were of contemporary origin. *It is however, difficult to say what the necessity was for starting two separate Mutts for a small community, unless such a need was felt after the diffusion of the community in widely separated regions along the west coast, with difficult intercommunications.*

Recent opinion in one of the Mutts seems to have become sceptical of the earlier tradition of their spiritual descent from the Palimār Mutt of Uḍipi. Two scholars of this community Messrs H. L. Kamath of Gangoli and V. N. Kudva, Madras, who are working on the subject are

1. इत्थं श्रीमध्वविजये गुर्वनुग्रहशालिका ।

अस्मदीयस्य विप्रस्य संप्रोक्तास्ति निशम्यताम् ॥ (*Koṅkanābhyudaya*, vi, 397)

reported to be inclined to affiliate the Gokarṇa Maṭha with the Uttarādi Mutt and trace the origin of the Kāśī Mutt to the Mutt of Vijayīndra Tīrtha at Kumbakonam. They seem to rely on various evidences of early ties and association of the Gokarṇa and Kāśī Mutts with the above-mentioned Deśastha Maṭhas of the Mādhva community disclosed by the various records in the Gokarṇa and Kāśī Mutts. Before going into this issue in detail, it may be pointed out that the question of origin and associations are different. The tradition of the origination of the Gokarṇa Mutt from the Palimār Mutt can be traced as far back as 1862. It was recorded in the official version of the Mutt's genealogy as embodied in the *Guru-paramparāmṛta*, published in 1904. It must naturally have had some basis in the firmly rooted traditions of older generations to have found Pontifical acceptance. Moreover, a descent from one of the Uḍipi Mutts seems to be strongly suggested by the system of Bālāśrama ordination that is rigidly followed in both the Kāśī and Gokarṇa Maṭhas, as in the Taulava Maṭhas, which is not the case with the Deśastha Mādhva Maṭhas.

In a recent work in Marāṭhī, dealing with the history of the Śārasvata community (*Śārasvatabhūṣaṇa*, Bombay, 1950), the text of a copperplate Sanad in the Kannaḍa language, purporting to be a communication from Surendra Tīrtha (predecessor of Vijayīndra Tīrtha) to "Yādavendra Tīrtha of the Kāśī Mutt" has been published (p. 506).¹ The cyclic year of the grant is given as *Plava* (1542 A.D.). The terms of the grant imply some sort of protective control and jurisdiction of Surendra's Mutt over the Kāśī Mutt. But it does not throw any light on the question of the origin of the Kāśī Mutt, as such, unless it is assumed that it was founded by Surendra Tīrtha himself. The Śaka year of the Sanad has not been given in the text of the grant. The usual Maṅgalācaraṇa also is not there. The original of this Sanad, which is said to be in the custody of the Kāśī Mutt at Mūlki, will have to be carefully examined by the experts of the Epigraphic department before one could unhesitatingly make use of its data for definite historical purposes.

There are two serious considerations which tend to raise a legitimate doubt about the genuineness of this Sanad. (i) The *Koṅkaṇābhyudaya*

1. Cf. "श्रीमत्परमहंसपरिव्राजकाचार्यराद, पदवाक्यप्रमाणपारावारंगतसर्वतंत्रस्वतंत्रराद, श्रीमद्वैष्णव-सिद्धान्तप्रतिष्ठापनाचार्यराद, रघुपतिवेदव्यासदेवर दिव्यश्रीपादपद्याराधकराद, श्रीमज्जितामित्तवयंतीर्थश्रीपाद-ओडेयरकरकमलसंजातराद, श्रीमद्रघुनन्दनतीर्थश्रीपादओडेयरवर कुमारकराद श्रीमत्सुरेन्द्रतीर्थ श्रीपादओडेयर, अस्मत्परमप्रियराद कोंकणस्थकाशीमठव यादवेन्द्रतीर्थओडेयरिगे प्लवसंवत्सरद माघशुद्ध ५ मीयल्लु नावु बरिसिकोट्ट ताम्रशासन वेनन्दरे नीवु नम्म संस्थानदल्लि बन्दु देवर दर्शनदिगळन्नु माडिकोण्डु नम्म अनुग्रहक्के पात्रिरावकारण, निमगे, व, निम्म शिष्यपरंपरेयवरिगू सह, देशसंचार माडुवाये, विभवादिगळु, धरिसिकोण्डु संचार माडबेकाद संबन्ध, नावु उचितवागि कोट्ट रामदेवर, व्यासप्रतिमे, सालग्राम, पालकी श्वेतछत्र, उभयचामर, उभयासन, उभयदिवटिगे, धवलशंख, नगारी, पाठकर, तालगळु मृत्ताद नम्म संस्थानक्के उण्टाद अशेषबिरुदुगळु धरिसि कोण्डु निम्मवर्गद अशेषब्राह्मणरिगे मंत्रमुद्राधारणे माडुव रीति अप्पणे कोट्टिदेवे । अदे रीति उत्तरोत्तर नडकोम्बोदु ॥ निमगे यल्यादरु विवाद बन्दरे नावे परिहरिसि कोट्टेवु * * * * इन्ती नारायणस्मरणानि ॥"

of the great Mādhva Sārasvata scholar, Sāgara Rāmācārya, was written in 1700 A.D., with the avowed object of establishing the *Ṣaṭkarmitva* and equality of status of the Gauḍa Sārasvata Brahmins of the Sāṣaṣṭi and Antūrja and other groups of Sārasvatas who had migrated to Kerala, Taulava, and Karnataka country with the other Brahmins there along the West coast. A great dispute is reported to have arisen over the Brahminical status of these settlers in the Keladi Kingdom during the period of Śivappa Nāyaka and Queen Cannamāmbā, which came up for decision before an assembly of Brahmins. The dispute was decided in favor of the Gauḍa-Sārasvatas, whose spokesmen placed voluminous evidence in their favor. Sāgara Rāmācārya's own father, Sāgara Venkaṭeśācārya, a renowned scholar, was one of the important speakers on the occasion. Rāmācārya's work was intended to put on record all the arguments and counter-arguments on the question and summarize the contents of the various records, letters, grants, Rāyasas and other communications received by members of the Sārasvata community as well as other documents preserved in the Maṭhas of the Gauḍa-Sārasvatas in the form of grants and Śrī-mukhas issued by Heads of other Mādhva Maṭhas and by various ruling chiefs. In such a work as this, written by a Gauḍa Sārasvata himself, it is natural to expect this most important document of the Kāsī Mutt to be mentioned. It is therefore, not a little surprising that this Sanad has been completely passed over in the copious recital from various grants, Rāyasas and other documents which the author of the *Koṅkaṇābhyaudaya* makes in the course of his work. He has referred to the Nirūpas, and Rāyasas sent from time to time by the Pontiffs of several Mādhva Maṭhas such as the Uttarādi Mutt, the Rāghavendra Svāmi Mutt, the Vyāsarāja Mutt, Mulbāgal Mutt and the Aṣṭamaṭhas of Uḍipi. But the grant of Surendra Tīrtha to Yādavendra Tīrtha of Kāsī Mutt, which has also material evidence to offer on the point at issue, is conspicuous by its absence. Indeed, there are very special reasons entitling this Sanad to prominent mention. In the first place, it is the earliest datable record of the community, pointing to the historical existence of a Gauḍa-Sārasvata Maṭha as early as 1542. Secondly, it proves the existence of a recognized order of Vaiṣṇava ascetics within that community and establishes the right of its disciples, as Brahmins, to Ṣaṭkarmas and to receive *mantra and mudrā* from their own Gurus. Such an early document as this would have great evidentiary value from the point of view of the author. In these circumstances, his not having referred to it is very strange and unaccountable,—all the more so, when he has cited from Rāyasas and other documents emanating from *much later Pontiffs* like Satyābhinava Tīrtha (1676-1706), Rāghavendra (1623-71), Yogīndra (1671-88) and Sūrīndra (1688-92), and has also referred to the services rendered by Rāghavendra Tīrtha of the Kāsī Mutt to Satyābhinava Tīrtha, during one of his visits to Banaras. Thus, the non-mention of Surendra Tīrtha's copperplate grant (dated 1542), to Yādavendra Tīrtha of the Kāsī Mutt, throws a grave doubt upon the genuineness of that record.

(ii) This is confirmed by another point which emerges from two records in the Gokarṇa Mutt. One of them is a Kaṇḍita in Sanskrit, recording the Puṇyatithis of the Pontiffs of that Mutt; and the other is a Sanskrit record of an agreement reached in 1590 A.D., in Cochin, between (Aṇu)—Jivottama Tīrtha of the Gokarṇa Maṭha and Yādavendra Tīrtha of Kāśī Maṭha, regarding their respective privileges and rights over collections made from the disciples of their community.

The first record informs us *inter alia* that Yādavendra Tīrtha was a disciple of Jivottama Tīrtha of the Gokarṇa Maṭha and that he went over to Vijayīndra Tīrtha and became his *śiṣya*, by resorting to *daṇḍaparivṛtti* (changing the ascetic staff, as prescribed by rules) :

अथ जीवोत्तमशिष्याणां विजयीन्द्रकरादाषाढपरिगृहीतानां तिथिक्रमः ।

आषाढे कृष्णपंचमी यादवेन्द्रमुनेस्तिथिः ॥ * * *

This information is repeated in the record of the agreement reached between Aṇujivottama and Yādavendra and their followers : 4691 गतकलि एकनवत्यधिकषट्शतैश्चतुःसहस्राब्दके (= 1590 A.D.) कोच्चीमहादेवस्थाने श्रीवेंकटेशसन्निधौ वदिक-प्रभृति सर्वे गृहस्थैश्चैकत्र मिलित्वा, श्रीमद्ध्वीयजीवोत्तमानुवादपूर्वकं, भट्टकलस्थसंमत्या, सर्वेषामस्मदीयानां कोच्चीपट्टणस्थानां च संमत्या, विजयीन्द्राणां च अस्मासु अतीव प्रीतिः । नितरां च सत्प्रतिपक्षित्व-दर्शनेन च, तद्वस्तात् दण्डपरिवृत्तिः क्रियते यद्वहतीर्येन । इति सकलसंमत्या चैकं ताम्रपट्टं लिखित्वा अस्माकं तेषां च मर्यादा यथायोग्यतयेति तत्रापि पट्टे लिखितमस्ति । अस्मद्भिर्विजयार्जितं यदसु तत्तृतीयांशः तेभ्यः । तथा तैरर्जितस्यास्मत्तः तत्तृतीयांशोऽस्माकमिति ॥ अस्माभिर्यदार्जितं तत्सर्वं पूर्वं विठ्ठलापणं विघ्नाय युष्मद्वर्गपालनं कर्तव्यम् । एवं वृत्तं, तस्य कारणं सर्वं लिखित्वा, गोकर्णेऽ (णु) जीवोत्तमस्वामिस्वहस्तेन लिखित्वा, गोविन्दाचार्यस्य निकटे स्थापितमिति ॥

Now this information about the *daṇḍaparivṛtti* of Yādavendra and his becoming a disciple of Vijayīndra, in 1590, given in these two records, if true, would make it virtually impossible for us to agree that the Kāśī Mutt was in existence before the date of this agreement (1590) or that it was presided over by Yādavendra Tīrtha from 1542 onwards, as it would appear from the Sanad of Surendra Tīrtha.

The crux of the problem is that the information given about Yādavendra Tīrtha in the two sets of records is manifestly irreconcilable. One of them will have to be rejected as untrue. We have already seen that the grant of Surendra Tīrtha to Yādavendra Tīrtha finds no mention in the *Koṅkaṇābhyudaya* and that such an omission considerably weakens its authenticity and genuineness. If the Kāśī Mutt had already come into existence in 1542 (or earlier ?) with Yādavendra Tīrtha as its Head, though acting under the spiritual suzerainty of Surendra Tīrtha's Mutt, there would have been no conceivable reason at all, for Yādavendra's resorting to *Daṇḍaparivṛtti*, in 1590, to become a *Śiṣya* of Vijayīndra ! Even supposing that Yādavendra had been ordained by Surendra Tīrtha himself, in or before 1542, there would be no justification whatever for Yādavendra's resorting to *daṇḍaparivṛtti* and becoming a disciple of Vijayīndra, inasmuch as there was absolutely no chance of his being allowed to succeed to Vijayīndra's own Pīṭha. This mystery of Yādavendra's *daṇḍaparivṛtti* can

not therefore be explained on any other hypothesis except that he had been originally a disciple of the Gokarṇa Maṭha and that for some important reason he had decided to sever his connection with it and take a fresh ordination by *daṇḍaparivṛtti*. According to the Gokarṇa Mutt tradition, this was precisely the reason for his secession. The name "Yadūdvaḥa" by which he is referred to in the record of 1590 is perhaps a pointer to his earlier Pontifical name which was presumably given a slight change as "Yādavendra", later. The agreement of 1590, it will be seen, makes a reference to the misunderstanding and estrangement of relations (सत्प्रतिपक्षित्व) between the two Pontiffs. The agreement itself might have been entered into between the parties soon after Yādavendra's secession had become a *fait accompli*. In that case, the Sanad of 1542 may be regarded as having been drawn up anachronistically, after the installation of Yādavendra as the first Head of the Kāśī Mutt with the blessings of Vijayīndra Tīrtha himself. The tradition in the Kāśī Mutt that Yādavendra was educated and trained for some years in the Kumbakonam Mutt under Vijayīndra would make this theory all the more probable. Subsequent contacts of Vijayīndra with the Kāśī Mutt are shown by his installation of the idol of Nṛsiṃha at the temple of Mūlki, in S. Kanara.

सन्मूलिकापुरवरे गोत्रद्वयसुपूजितः ।

स्थापितोऽहं हरिः श्रीशो विजयीन्द्रयतीश्वरः

(*Koṅkaṇābhyudaya*, vi, 515).

and of Ananteśvara at Mañjeshwar. His successor Sudhīndra (1596-1623) installed the deity at the Tirumala Devasvam at Cochin, belonging to the Gauḍa Sārasvata community. (*Sārasvata Bhūṣaṇa*, p. 133).¹

The *Koṅkaṇābhyudaya* gives details of numerous Rāyasas sent by the successors of Vijayīndra viz., Rāghavendra, Yogīndra and Sūrīndra to the Rulers of Keladi and to the leading men of the Sārasvata community at Basrūr, Bednūr and other places and by Satyābhinava Tīrtha of the Uttarādi Mutt and his disciple Satyādhīśa. In these Rāyasas the Ṣaṭkarmitva of the Gauḍa-Sārasvata Brahmins and the right of the Heads of the Kāśī and Gokarṇa Mutts to administer *mantra* and *mudrā* to their disciples, in the absence of Heads of these suzerain Mutts, are clearly set forth. They show that the heads of these well-known Mādhva Maṭhas in the Desh stood strongly by the Sārasvata Mādhvas in their hour of need and warmly supported their rights, which were being challenged in some quarters. There is a false impression, that only the Uttarādi and Rāghavendra Svāmi Mutts supported the cause of the Gauḍa-Sārasvatas, when they were fighting for their rights and that Heads of the Uḍipi Mutts were more or less hostile to them. *Such a view is entirely misplaced.* The *Koṅkaṇābhyudaya* cites many Rāyasas issued at the time of this great controversy by the Head of the Vyāsarāya Mutt and by Lakṣmīkānta Tīrtha of the Mulbāgal Mutt and by the Heads of the Aṣṭamaṭhas of Uḍipi :—

1. Cf. शाके क्षमानयनेषुभूपरिमिते वर्ष विकार्याह्वये * * * 1599 A.D.

शुके श्रीविजयीन्द्रतीर्थयतिनश्चात्रैः सुधीन्द्रैर्वरैः

श्रीमद्वेङ्कटनायको विजयते गोश्रीपुरे स्थापितः ॥

इत्यमेव हि मध्वेशश्रीकृष्णार्चनतत्परैः ।

उडुपाष्टमहायोगिश्रीपादकुलसंभवैः ॥

वेदशास्त्रपुराणज्ञैः सर्वैरपि यतीश्वरैः ।

लिखितानि प्रतिग्रामं शतशोऽप्य सहस्रशः ॥

सन्ति साधकभूतानि पद्माण्यद्य निशामय ॥ (VI, 207-10)

The names of Viśvavandya Tīrtha and Viśvapati Tīrtha of the Pejāvar Mutt have also been specially mentioned in this connection. The tradition of the origin of the Gauḍa-Sārasvata Mutts from the Palimār Mutt of Uḍipi cannot, therefore, be dismissed on this ground of any supposed indifference or hostility of feelings between the Uḍipi Mutts and the Sārasvata community. The two inscriptions in the Kṛṣṇa temple in 1614 A.D. recording grants of Dāmarasa Prabhu¹ and Liṅga Pai² are an eloquent proof of the harmony of feelings that existed between members of the Gauḍa Sārasvata community and the Pontiffs of the Uḍipi Mutts. Such recognition of their Brahminical status had, however, nothing to do with the Taulava and other Drāviḍa Brahmins not interdining or intermarrying with the Gauḍa Sārasvatas. As the Gauḍa Sārasvatas were newcomers in Tuluva, Kerala and Karnataka and were not strict vegetarians (See *Sārasvatabhūṣaṇa*, pp 569-74), there was bound to be a certain natural reluctance on the part of the other Drāviḍa Brahmins like the Nambūdris, the Taulavas, the Havikas and Deśastha Brahmins of Karnataka to inter-dine and intermarry with them. This has tended to keep the Gauḍa Sārasvata Mādhvas, as a community, rather aloof from the rest of the Mādhva world and has prevented its closer integration with it. Such integration may come in the future, when such differences in tastes and habits are not there to divide them into distinctive groups.

In the record of the Puṇyatithis of the Pontiffs of the Gokarna Mutt, the line *prior* to Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha is described as coming from Mādhva down to Raghūttama Tīrtha. This would appear to suggest that the Gokarna Mutt is descended from the Uttarādi Mutt, and that therefore there is no truth in the older tradition that it was an offshoot of the Palimār Mutt. But a careful scrutiny of the text here :

मध्वप्रभृतिरभूत्तमपर्यन्तं तौलवपरंपरा ज्ञेया ।

नारायणमुनिप्रभृति कोङ्कणपरम्परा ज्ञेया ।

would show that the passage *confirms the view of Taulava descent in so many words*. The mention of "Raghūttama" in this connection, is obviously an inadvertent scribal error for "Rāmacandra Tīrtha" (of the Palimār

1. वेद द्वितीयश्रीपादंगळ उडुपिन श्रीकृष्णदेवर मि ** न कालदलू सासष्टिग्राम ओळगण अष्टग्राम-
मुख्यबाव मठग्रामक्के मोदलिंगराव कौशिकगोत्रद ऋक्शाखेय दामप्रभुगळ मग दामरस प्रभु
माहिद धर्मद विवर ॥ (S. I. I. vii, no. 303)

2. स्वस्ति श्री जयाम्बुदयशालिवाहनशकवर्ष 1536 आनन्द संवत्सरद पुष्यशुद्ध 10 स्थिरवार विद्या-
धीशतीर्थ श्रीपादंगळ, विद्योपदेशतीर्थश्रीपादंगळ उडुपिनळ श्रीकृष्णदेवर पूजाकालदलू कोलपि ग्राम ओळगिन
संकुवाली अग्रहारद कोंकाणवर्गद ब्राह्मण ऋक्शाखे भरद्वाजगोत्रद सोदेय चिन्नवरद
नारणपेये मग लिङ्गपेय लिङ्गपेय * * * (S. I. I. vii, no. 303).

Mutt). For, if, by “Raghūttama” in the above passage, the Svamiji of the Uttarādi Mutt, of that name, had been meant the description of the *whole Paramparā from Madhva down to Raghūttama* as a “Taulava Paramparā”, in the text, would be singularly inappropriate and preposterous; as barring (Madhva and) Vidyānidhi there are *no other Taulavas in that line representing the Uttarādi Mutt*. The line of the Palimār Mutt from Madhva to Rāmacandra Tīrtha (the Sannyāsa Guru of the first Head of the Gokarṇa Mutt, according to the tradition of the *Guruparamparāmṛta*), on the other hand, is *an exclusively Taulava Paramparā, without a single exception*. This description of the Paramparā prior to Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha as a “Taulava Paramparā” and of the line from Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha onwards as the “Koṅkaṇa Paramparā”, in the record, is itself a standing proof and conclusive evidence that *even at the time when this record was prepared, in the days of Raghucandra Tīrtha of the Gokarṇa Mutt (d-1682 A.D.), who is the last named Pontiff in that list, the tradition of the descent of the Gokarṇa Mutt from a purely Taulava Paramparā was quite firmly established*.

There are some striking indications of some kind of residuary powers and jurisdiction vesting in the Uttarādi and Rāghavendra Svāmi Mutts in regard to the Kāśī and Gokarṇa Mutts, in some of the Rāyasas cited in the *Koṅkaṇābhyudaya* :

(i) पूर्वोक्तसुगुणैः श्रीमत्सत्याभिनवतीर्थकैः

* * * *

श्रीराघवेन्द्रतीर्थश्रीपादा अद्य समागताः ॥

अस्माभिर्बहु सम्मानं प्रापिताश्चैव यत्कृतम् ।

मन्त्रमुद्राधारणं स्यादस्माभिरिव तत् कृतम् ॥

इत्थं विज्ञायैव मठमर्यादाः सकला अपि ।

प्रवर्तनीया युष्माभिः : * * * (vi, 244-46)

(ii) प्रागुक्तसुगुणोपेतैः सत्याभिनवयोगिभिः ॥ २५६

* * *

श्रीराघवेन्द्रतीर्थश्रीपादा रामेश्वरापरां गतिम् ।

कृत्वा वैकुण्ठसत्सेवे समागत्य विलोक्य नः ।

अस्माभिरप्यनुज्ञाताः कोङ्कणब्राह्मणात्मनाम् ।

कर्तुं स्वजातिशिष्याणां मन्त्रमुद्राप्रधारणम् ॥ (vi, 263-64)

(iii) श्रीमद्द्विग्विजयाख्या रामचन्द्राख्यतीर्थकाः ।

श्रीपादस्वामिनो ये हि राघवेन्द्राख्यतीर्थकैः

* * *

भवतां दर्शनेऽस्माकं बहुतात्पर्यमस्ति हि ।

तद्यत्नापुरपर्यन्तं समागत्य विलोक्य च

उक्तिप्रत्युत्तरं चोक्त्वा तथा यूयं सहायिनः ।

सागरादिषु संचारं विघ्नाय स्वस्वशिष्यकान् ।

मन्त्रमुद्रादिदानेन समुद्धृत्य समस्तशः ।

गोकर्णं हाटकेशं च कृत्वा देवेशदर्शनम् ।

कृत्वा तत्र स्थितान् शिष्यानां शीर्वाचाभिनन्द्य च ।

अस्मासु प्रेषितेष्वग्रे बह्वी कीर्तिः शुभास्ति वः ॥

इत्याद्या कुंभघोणश्रीराघवेन्द्रमुनीश्वरैः

गोकर्णसंस्थानपतीन् श्रीमद्विग्विजयादिकान्

रामचन्द्राख्यतीर्थश्रीपादानुद्दिश्य लेखिताः

ब्राह्मण्यव्ययहारस्य साधिकाः पश्य पत्रिकाः

- (iv) इति रीत्यैव नगरे स्थितान् भट्टकुलाभिधे ।
 बसरुरे कोडियाले¹ बिदरुरेऽपि संस्थितान् ।
 सबकोङ्कणवर्गस्थान् बिद्वद्वैदिकरूपकान् ।
 महाजनान् कोंकणसद्वर्गशेषगृहस्थकान् ।
 समुद्दिश्येति लिखिताः सत्याभिनवतीर्थकैः
 श्रीराघवेन्द्रतीर्थश्रीपादा अस्मदनुज्ञया ।
 मन्त्रमुद्राधारणाय तत्र सन्ति समागताः ।
 पूर्वतोऽपि विशेषेण भवद्भिरखिलैरपि ।
 मन्त्रमुद्राधारणादि ग्राह्यं शिष्टमथाखिलम् ।
 वक्ष्यन्ति वेङ्कटाचार्याः सागरादिपदाह्वयाः ॥ (vi, 345-52)

- (v) बिदरुरस्वजातीयशिष्यान्कुरितुं पुरा ।
 एते यदागतास्तत्र भवद्भिः सकलैस्तदा ।
 एताः सम्यगबुद्धवैव सति कार्यप्रयोजने ।
 एषां चैतद्गृहस्थानां कृतोपेक्षाऽभवत्किल ।
 इतः परमपि ह्येतद्रायसस्यानुसारतः ।
 एषां चैव गृहस्थानां विषये सकलैरपि ।
 प्रवर्तनानुकूल्येन विघातव्यातियत्नतः ।
 * * * *

तर्ह्यनुग्रहपात्रं नो भविष्यथ समस्तशः

अन्यथाकरणस्येवं गुरुद्रोहविधायिनः ।

भविष्यथ * * * (272)

वयं तु काशीयात्रार्थं यदा यातास्तदैव नः ।
 म्नेच्छानां पीडया काश्यां प्रवेशश्च विनिर्गमः ।
 दुर्घटोऽभूत्तदा तत्र राघवेन्द्रसमाह्वयाः ।
 श्रीपादाः क्षत्रियबलं कृत्वा श्रीराजमन्दिरे ।
 प्रवेशं कारयित्वा नः किञ्चिद्गन्तुं च मासकम् ।
 * * *

एते नः कारयामासुः गयाक्षेत्रप्रवेशनम् ।

ततो हेतोरिमे चास्मत्स्वाम्यतिप्रियशिष्यकाः

इत्यादिनिर्णयोऽस्माभिः कृतस्तेन हि हेतुना

एतेषां बहुमानस्य महतः करणेन हि ।

अस्माकं परमानन्दो नितरामनुजायते ॥ (vi, 267-79)

According to V. N. Kudva the fact that Yādavendra T. was completely in the background at the time of the grant of 1542 and Rāghavendra was also in the background at the time of the installation of the idol of Venkatachalapati in Cochin by Sudhīndra T. (in 1599) shows that the Svāmīs of the Kāśī Mutt were not considered as Gurus of the followers of Kāśī Mutt in their own right but merely as deputies specially authorized to carry out the functions of their Gurus of the Kumbakonam Mutt, in their absence.

There were probably certain mutual tensions between the two Sārasvata Maṭhas which obliged them to seek the intervention of the Uttarādi and Rāghavendra Svāmi Mutts towards a peaceful settlement of their differences, as a result of which they probably came to have closer reapproachments with them, than with the Uḍipi Mutts. But this need not upset the fact of the original descent of the two Sārasvata Mutts from the Palimār Mutt, as has been accepted by the earlier tradition.

Perhaps, the wisest thing would be to agree to leave the whole question of the origin of the Kāśī and the Gokarṇa Mutts an open question for the present and await more conclusive evidences which the future may bring to light from the unexplored records of the Uttarādi, Rāghavendra Svāmi and Uḍipi Mutts themselves, in addition to those of the two Sārasvata Mutts. The evidence so far available to us on this question is rather one-sided in that no confirmatory or corroborative evidences have been discovered from the records and literary works of the other Mādhva Maṭhas such as the Uḍipi Mutts and the 'Maṭhatraya' to verify or supplement the information furnished by the *Koṅkaṇābhyudaya* and the records of the Kāśī and the Gokarṇa Mutts. When these unexplored sources are fully tapped, we may get a truer and more complete picture of the precise nature and extent of the socio-religious contacts and relations between the Mādhva Sārasvata community in the country and its Mutts on the one hand and the rest of the Mādhva community in the country and its various Mutts, on the other. Such a systematic inquiry is bound to be rewarding in its results. It is to be hoped that some enterprising and competent Mādhva scholar will undertake this task and benefit the entire Mādhva community.

In the present Head of the Kāśī Mutt, Śrī Sudhīndra Tīrtha, we have a Pontiff who has received the benefit of modern liberal education besides traditional learning. His attachment to the philosophy of Madhva is deep and sincere. He has established the Sukṛtīndra Oriental Research Institute in Cochin, which is doing good work.

If the Mādhva community would unite to mobilize its full strength by enlisting the support and cooperation of all its Pīṭhādhipatis and carry out a long-range programme for its own social, religious and philosophical advancement, the school of Madhvācārya, its literature and its philosophy are bound to have a great future. In this great task, the Heads of Mutts themselves will have to inspire and lead the community.

While the Gokarṇa Mutt. has only one succession list of Pontiffs to which it adheres, the Kāśī Mutt has the dubious distinction of being provided with as many as four different succession lists published by its accredited authors and research scholars like Ganapatrao Igal, V. R. Bhat, H. L. Kamat and V. N. Kudva in addition to the official version given in the *Gurupravaramaṅjarī* of its seventeenth Pontiff Vibudhendra Tīrtha (1800-34). These lists differ from one another in several details. Vibudhendra's version includes Raghucandra and a Saṁyamīndra in its list while they really belong to the other Mutt. Igal includes only the second Pontiff in the Kāśī Mutt. Three of these authors begin the succession list

of the Kāśī Mutt right from Madhva and Padmanābha T. and project the view that the Pontiffs Raghuvarya, and Vāgīśa in their list were also Sārasvata Yatis. We have seen the chronological difficulty to which this is open. We have therefore to set aside the reconstructed lists of these modern authors. Unfortunately, the 'official' version of Vibudhendra is open to grave doubts as it bristles with howlers created by its own fancies without any regard for facts of history or even self-consistency. It is surprising the modern authors have not drawn attention to these. Even the review of the Kāśī Mutt lists in Kumta Anant Vaikunth Bhat's book (1973) has not noticed them. For example the *Gurupravaramaṇjari* makes Vidyānidhi its seventh Pontiff (after Padmanābha T) a contemporary of Rāghavendra T. (1624-71) of the Kumbakonam Mutt. It makes the most astounding statement this Vidyānidhi, who is otherwise unknown to fame as an author of any scholarly works, went to the rescue of the illustrious Rāghavendra T. (who has written such erudite works as *Bhāṭṭasaṅgraha*, *Candrikā-Prakāśa*, *Sudhā-Parimala* and the great c. on the *Tarkatāṇḍava* and many others, some forty in all) when he (Rāghavendra T.) was finding it impossible to repulse in argument some Advaitic scholars with whom he was thrown in disputation. There cannot be a more absurd story. For, according to literary and epigraphic evidence the Pontifical date of Rāghavendra is 1624-71. In the very next *Stabaka* of the *Gurupravaramaṇjari* we are told that this Vidyānidhi's successor Yādavendra T. sought the help of Surendra T. of the Kumbakonam Mutt against the harassment and opposition to him from some quarters and obtained from Surendra T. (in 1542) rights, privileges and honors from him rehabilitating his position and status in the community as Guru of the Sarasvatas. Now, according to sober history, Surendra T. was the third predecessor of Rāghavendra on the Pīṭha of the Kumbakonam Mutt. It is humanly impossible for Vidyānidhi to have been a contemporary of both Surendra-T. (1515-39) and his great-grand-disciple and successor on the Pīṭha viz. Rāghavendra. These howlers are enough to show that no reliance can be placed on the succession list of the *Gurupravaramaṇjari*. We have therefore to go back to the record of agreement dated 1590 between Yādavendra and Aṇu-Jīvottama in consequence of the former's secession from the Gokarṇa Mutt and getting installed as the first Head of the "Kāśī" Mutt by Surendra Tīrtha successor Vijayīndra. This will smoothly explain the origination of both the Gauḍa Sārasvata Mādhva Mutts from the Palimar Mutt of Uḍipi.

BALADEVA'S GOVINDA BHĀṢYA AND THE CONCEPT OF ACINTYABHEDĀBHEDA

IN his article on "Govinda-Bhāṣya History of its Composition", published in the *Gauḍīya*, 1960 (Vol. V. pp. 57-60) Dr. S. Das has explained the special circumstances that led to the emergence of the *Govinda-Bhāṣya* of Baladeva on the B. S. According to this account, the Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavas were facing a stiff-opposition to their existence from the rival sect of Rāmānandis at Galta (Amber). They were called upon by their rivals either to accept Madhva's B. S. B., and his system completely, or else to establish their claims to be recognized as an authorized sect by producing their own commentary on the B. S. It is said that Baladeva took up this challenge and was given eighteen days' time to complete his commentary.

Evidently, Baladeva must have found himself in a fix. He could not renounce his allegiance to Madhva or deny the historical and spiritual descent of the Caitanya Sampradāya from Madhva's. At the same time, he could not disavow the strong Pantheistic trend which had marked the teachings of the early followers of Caitanya. He had therefore to "follow a middle course" and try to find an answer to Madhva's criticisms of Brahmapariṇāmavāda and reconcile them with the Pantheism of the Bengal Vaiṣṇavas in the light of the theory of Acintyabhedābheda. We cannot otherwise explain his diverging from Madhva's interpretation of the Prakṛtyadhikaraṇa, Bhoktrāpattyadhikaraṇa and Tadananyatvādhikaraṇa and departing from Madhva's interpretation of the Sūtra ii, 1, 6 while endorsing his interpretation of ii, 1, 5. and falling back upon Pariṇāmavāda interpretation in the abovementioned adhikaraṇas and at the same time affirming his supreme allegiance to Madhva at the end of his *Siddhānta-ratna*, which is a sort of Pīṭhikā to his *Govinda-Bhāṣya* and in his own commentary on it and in his *Prameyaratnāvali*.

Even for this, it would appear that the fault lay with some of his own predecessors in the Caitanya school who seem to have overworked the theory of "Acintyabhedābheda", in their newfound enthusiasm for it, as it came to them from Madhva and his works, in its original form of Saviśeṣābheda between substance and attributes (applied to the Brahman and its attributes, powers and manifestations and between other sentient reals and their attributes as well). But then, the followers of Caitanya seem to have lost sight of the very well-defined scope and limitations of this theory of relations pointed out by Madhva himself and his accredited followers :

(i) भेदहीने त्वपर्यायशब्दान्तरनियामकः

विशेषो नाम कथितः ॥ (AV)

(ii) न चैवं घटपटादेरपि भेदाभावमङ्गीकृत्य विशेषबलेनैव व्यवहारसिद्धिः स्यादिति वाच्यम् । तत्र भेदस्य प्रत्यक्षसिद्धत्वात् यत्र हि, भेदाभावे प्रमाणमस्ति, भेदव्यवहारश्च प्रमितः, तत्रैव भेदप्रतिनिधिर्विशेषः । (*Vādaratnāvali*, iv)

By putting together Madhva's belief in the अचिन्त्याद्भुतशक्ति of Īśvara and his acceptance of the thesis of Saviśeṣābheda between substance and attributes in certain well-defined instances, they ended up by extending the scope of the latter beyond its legitimate jurisdiction to the mutual relation between (1) the Brahman and the Jīvas on the one hand and (2) between the material world of Prakṛti and Brahman as well. This was doing violence to the original conception as it stood in Madhva's metaphysics and stretching it beyond its proper sphere.

How this erroneous extension might have originated could be gathered from what Dr. Das himself says about the roots of the "Acintyabhedābheda" doctrine going back to Madhva's *Bhāgavata-Tātparya* itself; though "he (Madhva) did not attach importance to it nor develop it into a system" (*Op. cit.* p. 60) (Italics mine). To make the position clear, it is necessary to quote Dr. Das further, "The Gāuḍīyas do not differ from Madhva; but on the contrary, constructed in part, the superstructure of their doctrine on the basis of Madhva's philosophy of difference between Jīva and Godhead. We have remarked elsewhere that though Madhva was the promulgator of the Śuddha Dvaita system of philosophy, which is the theme of his writings, yet it was he who, for the first time, gave the idea of and mentioned the Acintyabhedābheda theory in his *Bhāgavata Tātparya* (xi, 7, 51), citing a verse from the *Brahma-Tarka*, an ancient treatise on *Tantra*. Jīva was aware of the existence of the clue to his Acintyabhedābhedavāda in Madhva's *Bhāgavata-Tātparya*, when in the beginning of his *Ṣaṭsandarbha* he tells us that he follows Madhva's *Tātparya* and accepts references in them to works such as the *Brahmatarka* as genuine, tho' he could not consult the latter in the originals." (p. 59)—Italics mine.

It would, however, be clear from the actual verses of the *Brahma-tarka* cited by Madhva in this connection :

"(a) अवयव्यवयवानां च गुणानां गुणिनस्तथा ।
शक्तिशक्तिमतोश्चैव क्रियायास्तद्वतस्तथा ॥
स्वरूपांशांशिनोश्चैव नित्याभेदो (i) जनार्दने ।
(ii) जीवस्वरूपेषु तथा (iii) तथैव प्रकृतावपि ।
चिद्रूपायाम्; अतोऽनंशा अगुणा अक्रिया इति ।
हीना अवयवैश्चेति कथ्यन्ते ते त्वभेदतः ।
पृथक्गुणाद्यभावाच्च नित्यत्वादुभयोरपि ।
विष्णोरचिन्त्यशक्तेश्च सर्वं संभवति ध्रुवम् ।
क्रियादेरपि नित्यत्वं व्यक्त्यव्यक्तिविशेषणम् ।
भावाभावविशेषेण व्यवहारश्च तादृशः
विशेषस्य विशिष्टस्याप्यभेदः तद्वदेव तु ।
सर्वं चाचिन्त्यशक्तित्वाद् युज्यते परमेश्वरे ।
तच्छक्त्येव तु जीवेषु चिद्रूपप्रकृतावपि ॥

(b) भेदाभेदौ तदान्यत्र ह्युभयोरपि दर्शनात् ।

कार्यकारणयोश्चापि निमित्तं कारणं विना ॥” इति ॥

that the reference in them to the relation of “Saviśeṣabheda” is strictly limited to the relation between sentient reals like *God, the Jīvas and Cetana Prakṛti alone vis a vis* their respective attributes, characteristics, powers etc. It is recognized in these verses that as between Brahman and its auspicious attributes like reality, consciousness and bliss, and many others of a transcendental nature (such as *Bala, Virya, Audārya, Saundarya* and so on) as well as the actions, manifestations, powers, limbs etc. of Brahman, there is “Saviśeṣābheda” and therefore no difference as such. The same thing applies, it is said, (by the mysterious power of God) between the Jīvas in relation to *their own attributes* and powers and also between “Cetana-Prakṛti” and *her powers attributes etc.* It is also expressly stated, in the above verses, that as regards Jaḍa-Prakṛti and her various attributes, modifications etc., and in the realm of material causality in general, the relation of “bheda-bheda” is to be recognized, because both the types of relations are evidenced therein. That is to say, the material substance and its changes are not seen in isolation like two extended fingers; at the same time, *the qualities are seen to change though the substance remains and endures.*

It would be noticed that the verses cited above speak *only* of the “Acintya-Śakti” of Īśvara or His mysterious or inscrutable powers whereby His indivisible oneness of essence is maintained side by side with his infinite powers, functions, manifestations etc. This “Acintyaśakti” has also been designated by Madhva’s commentator as the “Aghaṭitaghaṭanāpaṭīyasī śaktiḥ” of the Lord and it has been ably expounded by his commentators in so many contexts in the light of the doctrine of Viśeṣas.

It should however be noted that Madhva has *not* used the term “Acintyabheda-bheda” anywhere in his writings; nor does it occur in the above passages cited by him from the *Brahmatarka*. He has made it crystal clear in the above passages and elsewhere in all his writings, that only (*Saviśeṣa*)-*abheda* by virtue of Acintyaśakti subsists between sentient reals and their natures, powers, attributes, functions etc. both in their latent and patent states (*vyakti* and *avyakti*) and that “Bhedābheda” (difference-cum-identity) should be recognized in respect of all insentient reality and its various states, qualities etc.

These verses would not therefore allow us to bring the relation in which the souls and the material world (which is a modification of Prakṛti) stand to Brahman under the purview of either Śaviśeṣābheda or-Bhedābheda through the Acintyaśakti of the Lord. For this relation of Saviśeṣābheda or Bhedābheda for that matter would apply only within the sphere of one given substance (*dharmi*) and would *not* apply as between two distinct “Dharmis” as Jīvas and Brahman or Jaḍas and Brahman or Jaḍas and Jīvas or between one Jīva and another. Madhva has also made it clear in his *B. S. B.* ii, 3, 43, that between Jīvas and Brahman *both difference and identity could never be accepted in their primary sense :*

भेदाभेदौ न मुख्यतः ।

It would thus be impossible on his view or on the authority of the above verses of the *Brahmatarka* to talk of any relation of "Bhedābheda" at all between (i) Brahman and the Jīvas or (ii) between the world and Brahman. I have already drawn attention to an unhappy misinterpretation of Madhva's words occurring in J. E. Carpenter's *Theism in Mediaeval India* and his comments on Madhva arising from such a misunderstanding.¹ It is strange that a similar misconstruction of the passage should occur in the article on Acintyabhedābhedavāda published in the *Gauḍīya*, Vol. v, i, p. 55, where the author says that "*Madhva has, however, admitted Bhedābheda; though not so fervently as his 'Bheda', when he says (B. S. B. ii, 3, 43) that Bhedābheda may be accepted, but not principally*". [*Italics mine*].

This mutual incompatibility of Bheda and Abheda, between one sentient real and another or between a sentient real and an insentient one, would remain absolute and irreconcilable at all levels. It could not be got over by adding a prefix¹ *acintya* to their juxtaposition; or by an appeal to the *acintyaśakti* of God to bring about contradictions. For, according to Madhva, God's inscrutable powers should not be invoked in a manner that would offend against or compromise His own sovereignty. Inconsistency with divine majesty would itself be the criterion of what is unworthy of acceptance. All proofs and authorities including the "Śrutārthāpatti" from which the Caitanya school proposes to derive its doctrine of "Acintyabhedābheda" (between the world, God and the Jīvas) should be interpreted in the light of this supreme criterion :

"न युक्तमीशितुः किञ्चिदीशत्वस्य विरोधि यत्² ।

यदीशत्वविरोधि स्यात् तदेवायुक्तम् ।

ईशत्वस्याविरोधेन योजयित्वाखिलाः प्रमाः" ॥ (A. V.)

"न चेतनविकारः स्यात् यत्र क्वापि ह्यचेतनम् ।

नाचेतनविकारोऽपि चेतनः स्यात् कदाचन ॥" (A. V.)

The theory of actual Parīṇāma of Brahman would undermine its pristine purity of essence (*nirvikāritvam*) as taught by the Śrutis and would be very compromising to the Divine nature. It has therefore been rejected by Madhva, Jayatīrtha and Vyāsātīrtha in their writings on very strong grounds. Baladeva has done nothing to answer their criticisms before venturing to reintroduce the same old theory into his philosophy. The only change he has made in its set-up is to introduce a distinction between the Parā or Svarūpa Śakti of Brahman and its Māyā-Śakti and make the Brahman in its Svarūpa or Parā aspect remain *nirvikāra* and unmodified and make it the material cause of the world of Prakṛti in respect of its Māyā-Śakti, which is subject to change. Jīvas are the modifications of the 'Aparā Śakti'.

1. See p. 120.

2. For further remarks on this point see my *Madhva's Teachings in His Own Words*, Bharatiya Vidyā Bhavan, 1961, p. 112.

But all this does not carry one very far; as ultimately, Śakti and Śaktimat are accepted in the Caitanya school itself as identical, following Madhva : शक्तिशक्तिमतोश्चापि न विभेदः कथंचन ।

This *has to be so* as the Caitanya school accepts no 'Svagatabheda' within Brahman. But under B.S. ii, 1, 13, Baladeva seeks to distinguish Śakti from Brahman: तथा शक्तिमतो ब्रह्मणः शक्त्यभेदेऽपि शक्तिब्रह्मणोः सो (=भेदः) 'स्तीति न क्षतिः ।

The acceptance of three different orders of Śaktis in Brahman viz., Parā, Aparā and Māyā Śakti to get over the difficulties involved in actual Brahmapariṇāma would not help in the least. This sort of Śakti-pariṇāma of Brahman has been fully anticipated by Madhva and refuted by him and his commentator in their works :

“भागेन परिणामश्चेद् भागयोर्भेद एव हि ।

यो भागो ह्यविकारी स्यात् स एवास्माकमीश्वरः ॥ (AV.)

अथ मतम्—द्विरूपं ब्रह्माभ्युपगम्यते अनन्तानन्दचिदात्मकं, सदात्मकं चेति । तत्राद्येन रूपेण निमित्तं, द्वितीयेनोपादानम् । अतो न कश्चित् दोषः । निर्विकारित्वं चिच्छक्तिविषयत्वाददूषणम् । तेन, सच्छक्तिक ब्रह्म परिणामीत्यङ्गीकारे न युक्तिविरोधोऽपि

यदि ब्रह्मणः सद्भागेन परिणामः, चिद्भागेन निर्विकारत्वमङ्गीक्रियते, तदा वक्तव्यम्—तयोर्भागयोरभेदो भेदाभेदो वा ? न तावदभेदः, द्वयोरपि परिणामित्वापत्त्या भागद्वयकल्पनावर्प्यात् । नापि भेदाभेदौ । अभेदेन संकर भेदाभेदो वा ? न तावदभेदः, द्वयोरपि परिणामित्वापत्त्या भागद्वयकल्पनायवैयर्थ्यात् । नापि भेदाभेदौ । अभेदेन संकर प्रसंगात् । भेदोऽभेदकार्यं निरुणद्धीति चेत्; किं तर्हि अभेदेनाप्रयोजकेन ? तस्मात्, भागयोरत्यन्तभेद एवाङ्गीकार्यः । ततः किमित्यत आह—‘यो भाग’ इति । परस्परमत्यन्तभिन्ने द्वे वस्तुनी । तत्रैकं निर्विकार जगन्निमित्तमेव । अपरं परिणामि जगदुपादानमेव; इत्यङ्गीकारे नेश्वरस्य केवलनिमित्तत्वादिनामस्माकं कश्चिद्विरोधः । निर्विकारस्य जगन्निमित्तस्य अस्माभिरीश्वरत्वेन, परिणामिनो जगदुपादानस्य प्रधानत्वेन चाङ्गीकृतत्वात् ।

अत्र ‘यो भाग’ इति पराभ्युपगमेनोक्तम् । स्वमतेन तु, ‘यद्वस्तु’ इति ज्ञातव्यम् ॥”

(Jayatīrtha, NS. i, p. 200).

[If you think—“there are two aspects of Brahman,—one that is essentially blissful and of the nature of unlimited consciousness and the other of the nature of “Sat” (pure reality). It is efficient cause in its former aspect and material cause of the world in the latter aspect. The immutability of Brahman is thus to be understood with reference to the former aspect. There is no violence to logic on this view that Brahman in its aspect of “Sat” transforms itself into the world of matter....”

The advocates of such a theory will have to define if these *aspects* are identical with each other; or are partly different and partly identical. They cannot be identical as both the aspects will have to transform themselves, in that case. Nor can they be *different and identical*. For, at least in respect of identity, there will be overlapping of the aspects and then the same nemesis of transformation of both the aspects. If it is argued that the ‘difference’ will prevent the identity from coming in and the nemesis from following, then, why not dispense with the ‘identity’ that is so palpably powerless and impotent against ‘difference’?

Therefore, it must be admitted that the two aspects are entirely different. Thus, it comes to this that there are, in reality, two different entities, —one of which is essentially immutable and acting as the operative cause

alone of the Universe and the other liable to transformation and acting as the material cause of the Universe.

If so much is admitted, we, who are advocates of the view that Brahman is the efficient cause only, of the Universe, have no quarrel with you. For, on our view, God is that principle which is essentially and absolutely immutable and is the efficient cause alone of the world's origin etc. We designate the other principle that is the transforming and material cause of the Universe as "Prakṛti".

In the above discussion, the term "aspect" (or part)—*bhāga*, should be understood to have been used from the point of view of the Pūrvapakṣin. From the point of view of the Siddhāntin, the two "aspects" are really two different principles or substances.]

—Tr. quoted from my *Svatantrādvaita or Madhva's Theistic Realism*, 1942, p. 45.

This criticism of Jayatīrtha would apply with equal force to the type of Brahmapariṇāmavāda that Baladeva has adopted and attempted to justify in his c. on the B. S. We can only say therefore that whatever might have been Baladeva's reason for departing from Madhva's stand in respect of actual Brahmapariṇāma, his attempt to improve upon Madhva's philosophical position on this point and revive Brahmapariṇāmavāda under the aegis of Brahman's *acintyādbhutaśakti* and justify it on the basis of the concept of "Acintyabhedābheda" cannot be accepted as satisfactory or convincing.

Baladeva has drawn heavily upon Madhva's B. S. B. and incorporated many of his special and peculiar interpretations of the Sūtras that differ completely from those of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja. This by itself is a tribute to the intrinsic merit of Madhva's interpretation of the Sūtras from one who tried to write an independent commentary on the Sūtras, in the special interest of a north Indian school of Vaiṣṇavism. At the same time, as we have seen, he has not chosen to follow Madhva's line of thought and interpretation on certain important points of doctrine and dogma. Except on the issue of Brahmapariṇāma it is, however, difficult to see any definite principles upon which he thought it fit to fall in line with Madhva or diverge from his interpretations.

For instance, he does not adhere to the principle of direct Samanvaya of the entire Śāstra in Brahman (*Sākṣāt paramamukhyavṛtṭyā*) in the I Adhyāya as accepted by Madhva; though he quotes with approval Madhva's view in favor of direct Samanvaya and his authority from the *Bhāgavata* :

मां विवर्त्तेजमिषते मां विकल्प्योऽपोह इत्यहम् (xi, 21.43) for such direct Samanvaya. In the Sūtra : आनन्दमयोऽभ्यासात् (i, 1, 12) he accepts the repeated use of the word *brahma* (ब्रह्मशब्दाभ्यास) in connection with it as the *hetu* for regarding Ānandamaya as Brahman; but fails to apply the same principle to Annamaya and others as he ought to have done, if regard be had for consistency.¹ He seems hardly to have paid any

१. Cf. यदा खलु ब्रह्मशब्दादानन्दमयस्य ब्रह्मतामसाधयत् सूत्रकारस्तदा ब्रह्मशब्दवतामन्नादीनामपि ब्रह्मतामनुजज्ञे । तथैव द्वितीयं सूत्रं नैवम् । अन्यथा, अन्नमयादिषु सन्नपि ब्रह्मशब्दो ब्रह्मतामसाधयत् कथमात्रानन्दमयस्यापि साधयेत् ? कथं चान्नमयादिषु स्थितो मयट्शब्दः प्राचुर्यमलभमानः आनन्दमये श्रुतो लभेत ॥ (TP.)

attention to the powerful arguments of the *TP* and *TC.*, in this connection. Similarly, in his interpretation of B. S. i, 1, 2; i, 1, 31; गुहां प्रविष्टौ (i, 2, 11) and in the interpretation of most of the adhikaraṇas of the fourth pāda of the Samanvayādhyāya, he has *departed* from Madhva's interpretation and has followed the others. In ii, 1, 6; 13; 14; 3, 17 (तद्गुणसारत्वात्) and ii, 4, 7-10; iii, 1, 19; 2, 19-20: समना चानुसृत्युप० (iv, 2, 7) and iv, 2, 8 also, he *diverges* completely from Madhva. But he *follows* Madhva's lead, *against all other commentators* in his interpretation of the Īkṣatyadhikaraṇam (i, 1, 5-11) in terms of the refutation of the theory of the Avācyaṭva of Brahman and of भूमा संप्रसादात् (i, 3, 8) and न विलक्षणत्वादस्य (ii, 1, 4); ii, 1, 21; 26; उत्पत्त्यसम्भवात् (ii, 2, 42 seq.); अणुश्च (ii, 4, 13); ii, 3, 49-50; iii, 1, 16-17; of the सन्ध्याधिकरण (iii, 2, 1) and the pādopādhi of pāda ii of the iii Adhy., (iii, 2, 14); iii, 2, 23; 28, 30-32; iii, 3, 40-41; प्रदानवदेव तदुक्तम् (iii, 3, 44-45). iv, 1.3.; न प्रतीके न हि सः (iv, 1, 4); ब्रह्मादृष्टिरुत्कर्षात् (iv, 1, 5). These contexts are a standing testimony to the very deep impression which the Madhva-Bhāṣya had made on the religious and philosophical thought of the followers of Caitanya. Baladeva's interpretations of i, 1, 18; i, 2, 19-20 and i, 4, 3 point to the clear recognition of Prakṛti as a distinct material principle subject to Brahman as in Madhva's system; which makes his departure from Madhva in making the Brahman itself the material cause of the Universe, in the Prakṛtyadhikaraṇa and elsewhere, all the more incongruous and inconsistent with his own stand.¹

His interpretation of कारणत्वेन चाकाशादिषु ... (i, 4, 14), स्मृत्यनवकांश-दोषप्रसङ्ग * * (ii, 1, 1) इतरव्यपदेशात् ** (ii, 1, 21), come very close to Madhva's. Under अम्बुवदग्रहणात् * * (iii, 2, 19) अत एव चोपमा सूर्यकादिवत् (iii, 2, 18) प्रकृतेतावत्त्वं हि... (iii, 2, 22); iii, 3, 34; आदरादलोपः (iii, 3, 40); and तदापीतेः संसार * * (iv, 2, 8), he *could have followed Madhva with much more-advantage to his Theism.* His acceptance of the *two eternal Hells*: तामिस्र and अन्धतामिस्र following Madhva² (iii, 1, 16) is remarkable; though curiously enough he does not follow the same line of thought in interpreting न तृतीये तथोपलब्धेः (iii, 1, 19). He commits himself definitely towards Madhva's line of interpreting the Sūtras in designating the second pāda of Adhy. III as Bhaktipāda and cites the *Gauṇavāna Śruti* also from Madhva, clearly establish him to be a confirmed Bhedavādin. This is confirmed by his interpretation of B. S. iv, 4, 9 and iv, 4, 17.

1. For a similar inconsistency on Rāmānuja's part See p. 105 and f.n.

2. It would be obvious from Baladeva's acceptance of these two *eternal* Narakas that they are to be inhabited by some Jivas who are "born in sin" so to say and are not eligible for Mokṣa. It is thus difficult to see the point in the unhappy comment that is reported to have been made with reference to Madhva's belief in the existence of Tamoyogya by a learned Svami of the Gaudiya Mutt, in reply to a question put to him by a disciple—See *Gaudiya*, Vol. V. Sep. 1960, p. 90. This doctrine which Baladeva himself endorses does not become "absurd" by merely calling it so. Nor is the opinion of the Svamiji referred to in the article that "Madhva merely stated the doctrine and adduced no reasons in support of it" (p. 90) correct. For reasons adduced by Madhva in support of this doctrine which is part of his doctrine of Jīva-traividhya, See his *AV.* iii, 4, Ver. 109-40. *B.S.* B, ii, 3, 32; ii, 3, 51-53; iii, 1, 13-15.

under iii, 2, 2. But his Pūrvapakṣas in the subsequent Sūtras of this adhikaraṇa are not so well placed or penetrating and have not been shown to have so direct a bearing on the subject-matter of the Pāda (i.e. Bhakti) as they have been in Madhva. Indeed, in अम्बुवदग्रहणात् न तथात्वम् (iii, 2, 19), Baladeva has really missed a great and significant opportunity for bringing out the sublimity of the conception of Bhakti and its key position in the philosophy of Bādarāyaṇa, by *not following* Madhva's remarkably original and highly suggestive interpretation of this Sūtra which he could have done, *without the least prejudice to any of his philosophical views*. He could even have given a proper place to the exposition of his own doctrine of Rucibhakti here. It is indeed very strange that such deeply sensitive and emotional thinkers as the exponents of Bengal Vaiṣṇavism, of whom Baladeva is one, should have been so irresponsible to the appreciation of the beautiful significance and poetic feeling that runs through the remarkable interpretation of the Sūtra अम्बुवदग्रहणात् न तथात्वम् given by Madhva and so lucidly expounded by the illustrious (Jayatīrtha and) Vādirāja.¹

In iii, 2, 23-29; and 32, his fidelity to Madhva is unqualified as also in iii, 3, 59 and iv, 1, 4-5, where Madhva's Theism rises to its highest pitch of transcendentalism. Perhaps the most remarkable departure of Baladeva from Madhva's Bhāṣya is in regard to the status of Mukhya Prāṇa (ii, 4, 7-10). It is doubtful if Baladeva would have persisted in holding such a view if he had occasion to comment on some of the Upaniṣads, where the cult of Mukhya Prāṇa has been prominently taught. As regards the Sūtras bearing on the status of Lakṣmī (iii, 3, 40-41), Baladeva has stuck to Madhva's line of interpretation, ignoring the interpretations of all other commentators here. There is however some slight variation in details between him and Madhva. It is to be noted here that no commentator on the *Brahmasūtras* other than Madhva has felt the necessity to find a place in the Theism of the Sūtras for Lakṣmī, who is recognized in Vaiṣṇava theosophy as the presiding deity of Prakṛti. It is passing strange that Baladeva did not think it necessary to follow Madhva's interpretation of B. S. iv, 2, 7-8, in terms of the status and position of Lakṣmī, while following him earlier in iii, 3, 40-41. The reason for such halting and half-hearted adherence on his part would seem to lie in his not having taken a comprehensive view of Scriptural evidences in so thorough-going a manner as Madhva has done.

Baladeva's definition of the Jīvas as "Bhinnāmśas" of God (ii, 3, 45) following Madhva and his interpretation of ii, 3, 48, as denying any equality between Jīvas and the Avatāras of God and his acceptance of difference between the Jīvas and Brahman and of the presence of intrinsic differences in the nature and quality of Bhakti among the released souls themselves²

1. See the passage quoted from his *TP-Gurvarthadīpikā*, p. 111.

2. Cf. एवं साम्येऽपि वैषम्यमैहिकं कर्मभिः स्फुटम् ।

प्राहुः पारित्रिकं तत्तु भक्तिभेदैः सुकोविदाः ॥ (*Prameyaratnāvali*)

He does not, therefore, seem to have succeeded in freeing himself from a fundamental faith in Bhedavāda, despite his attempt at giving a Pantheistic interpretation of the Prakṛtyadhikaraṇa and others. In reality then, his "Acintyabhedābheda-vāda" does not seem to have gone very much beyond the interrelation between Brahman and its attributes, powers and manifestations. This is confirmed by his interpretation of ii, 3, 47-48; iv, 4, 9; 17 and so many others on the one hand and his recognition of the category of Prakṛti as a dependent reality in i, 1, 18-19 and i, 4, 3.

These facts are sufficient to establish that Baladeva is virtually in agreement with Madhva on all the fundamental points of his system. That is why we find him proclaiming his loyalty to Madhva and affirming the historical and spiritual descent of the Caitanya Sampradāya from Madhva, *without any hesitation or mental reservation, not only in the Prameyaratnāvali, but also in his Siddhāntaratna* (See quotation given earlier on P. 529) which is an introduction to his *Govinda-Bhāṣya* and in his own commentary on it, quoted earlier (P. 529). This should suffice to place his allegiance to Madhva Sampradāya *beyond question*.

We have therefore to put down his divergences in interpretation from Madhva's Bhāṣya, including the divergence in the interpretation of the Prakṛtyadhikaraṇa and others to the special circumstances that necessitated the composition of a new commentary on the *B. S.*, representing the point of view of the Caitanya school. The urgency and unavoidable hurry with which such a difficult and complicated task had to be carried through and completed within the appointed time (of eighteen days, if the tradition on this point is reliable) to meet a crisis and save the reputation of the Caitanya school would also seem to furnish another plausible reason for some at least of the divergencies from Madhva's interpretations, which are neither so necessary nor logically sustainable.

Notwithstanding these limitations and shortcomings, Baladeva's commentary on the *B. S.*, bears the stamp of the greatest influence and impact of Mādhva thought and interpretation upon it. In him Mādhva influence on the Caitanya school has certainly reached its zenith.

A NEW CONTROVERSIAL WORK OF VYĀSATĪRTHA

IT gives me very great pleasure, to announce the discovery of *a hitherto unknown polemical work of Vyāsatīrtha*. The name of this work is *Sattarka-Vilāsa*. It is referred to by name in the course of his *Mandāramañjari* (gloss) on Jayatīrtha's *Māyāvāda-Khaṇḍana-Tīkā* :

“जीवन्मुक्तस्य सुषुप्त्यवस्थायां वृत्त्यभावेन, निःशेषाविद्यानिवृत्तिप्रसंगादिति । प्रपञ्चस्तु सत्तर्क-
विलासेऽस्माभिः कृतो द्रष्टव्यः । (P. 11 b Bby, 1890).

The existence of this work has not, so far, been attested by any manuscripts from any of the well-known Mss. Libraries in the country whether public or private. I have not come across any mss. of it in any of the Mutt Libraries to which I have had access. No quotation from or reference to it has come to light in any work of the Post-Vyāsatīrtha period, in Dvaita Literature. As Vyāsatīrtha's *Mandāramañjari* itself does not appear to have been commented upon by subsequent glossators, the existence of this work by Vyāsatīrtha seems to have been lost sight of within the Dvaita school.

The discovery and publication of this work of Vyāsatīrtha would undoubtedly be a great asset to Dvaita-Vedānta. I earnestly hope that the future may bring to light this new polemical work of Vyāsatīrtha as well as the two great polemical classics of his illustrious predecessor Ṣaḍ-darśanīvallabha Viṣṇudāsācārya,— which have not yet become known to us through mss. However, with the present discovery of his *Sattarka-Vilāsa*, by name the total number of Vyāsatīrtha's works (in Sanskrit) comes to nine.

In all probability, this is the short controversial work of Vyāsatīrtha that Somanātha has described in the incident recorded by him in the *Vyāsa-carita*. (See Ch. XXV. pp. 291-292).

THE BIRTH-PLACE OF PURANDARADĀSA

TRADITION in the Dāsakūṭa holds that the Dāsa was born in “Purandara-gaḍa” and concludes that his name is derived from that of his place of birth. The opinion has come down that this is to be identified with Purandargaḍ near Poona. But of late some scholars of Karnatak history like the late Dr. P. B. Desai and Kapatral Krishnarao have questioned the correctness of the tradition which identified the place of birth of Purandara Dāsa with Purandaragaḍ which lies 28 kilometres south of Pune and is a wellknown military fort dating from the time of the Yādava and the Baha-mani periods and later famous in Maratha history.

The main difficulties in accepting the identification of the Dāsa’s birthplace with this fort or its vicinity are that there is and has been no town or village of the name with any civil population affording facilities for peaceful life, flourishing business and trade for miles around the historic and strategic fort of Purandar which is situated amidst the ghats at a height of 4565 ft. above the sea level. The fort has changed hands many times in history and has withstood many sieges. Neither the fort nor its neighbourhood is hospitable to any flourishing settlement of a large civil population. It is utterly impossible for any business in jewellery or precious stones such as the Dāsa and his father before him are said to have carried on as their family business, to have flourished in such a wilderness. Thus, quite apart from the other consideration of the impossibility of the Kannaḍa language being the language of the area, which was in the heart of Maharashtra even in the 16th. century, there seems to be no adequate basis to identify it with the Dāsa’s birthplace. Having read the views of Prof. Desai and Krishnarao I was induced to go and see the place for myself and verify the position. Accordingly, I paid a visit to Purandara-gaḍ on the 11th Nov. ’77 with my friend Annarao Belgal of Bijapur and inspected the entire area and the fort and made local inquiries too. I am now fully satisfied that Fort Purandar and its neighbourhood could not at all have been the birthplace of the Dāsa. The tradition in this respect is evidently due to a mistaken identity, based on arguing from the ‘ankita’ or pen-name of the celebrated Dāsa.

Following the tradition associating the Dāsa’s birthplace with a place bearing the name of Purandaragaḍa or ‘Purandaraghaṭṭa’, Kapatral Krishnarao has argued that most probably the Dāsa came from a well-known town of the original name of “Kṣemapura” figuring in some well-known Kannaḍa inscriptions in the area around Shimoga and Tirthahallī. Quoting one such inscription (Sorab 27). he has suggested in the course

of his article on the subject of the Dāsa's birthplace published in his *Collected Essays (Karnāṭakasanskṛitiya Saṁsodhane*, Mysore 1970, pp. 281-83) that the city of "Kṣemapura" with a flourishing and prosperous population, temples and gopuras, which has been described as "Purandarapura-prakhyam" तस्मिन्नुन्नदीतटे श्रीक्षेमपुरं पुरन्दरपुरप्रख्यं स्फुरद्गोपुरम् । in the inscription, was probably the birthplace of the Dāsa. On a careful reading of the inscription, it will be seen that the city of Kṣemapura has merely been described in the high flown language of poetic exaggeration, usual in inscriptions, by way of 'atīśayokti' as resembling in its glory the city of Purandara or Indra i.e. 'Amarāvati'. Krishnarao seems to have passed over the significance of the term 'prakhyam' (meaningsadrśam) placed after the words 'Purandarapura' in the said inscription. In other words, the inscription does not say that "Kṣemapura" was otherwise known by the name of Purandarapura. It merely describes it in highflown language as a city equal to or resembling the city of Amarāvati the capital of Indra. This is no conclusive evidence to hold that Kṣemapura was at any time *known as* "Purandarapura" and draw the conclusion that it was the birthplace of Purandaradāsa. We need much more categorical and positive evidence for a correct identification of the birthplace of Purandara Dāsa. The circumstance of the occurrence of certain names of persons as Ādyas and Ārādhyas in some inscriptions in the area and even of "Nāyaks" cannot be pressed too far. For one thing Arādhyā' is not an exclusive suffix of Brahmin names. It is found among Liṅgāyat names also. 'Nāyak' is also a common surname among Gauḍa Sarasvats who are known to have settled in the Sagar and other areas about the middle of the 16th century. It is equally incredible that any sons of Purandara Dāsa who gave away his entire fabulous riches before taking the Dāsa-dīkṣā would have accepted any land-grants by way of personal property. The inscriptions purporting to refer to such grants to sons of Purandara Dāsa called by queer names like Hebana require closer investigation. Tradition also is firm that the Dāsa's sons were given "aṅkitas" such as "Madhvapati-Dāsa". There is no reason why the alleged inscriptions should have called them by their 'earlier' names.

The inclination to trace Purandara Dāsa's birthplace to some town or village bearing the name of 'Purandara' seems to be due to a *basic misconception that the Dāsa's name was derived from that of his native place*. We may note in this connection that his name is closely connected with his full "aṅkita" of 'Purandara-Viṭṭhala'. The popular name Purandara Dāsa is only the short form of 'Purandaraviṭṭhaladāsa'. We may note further in the history of Dāsa Kūṭa and its tradition the 'aṅkitas' of all Dāsas are associated with the names of the Supreme Being (note 'Vijaya-Viṭṭhala' 'Gopāla-Viṭṭhala, 'Jagannātha-Viṭṭhala etc.) and never with any such ephemeral thing as the name of the place of their birth. Would the illustrious Vyāsātīrtha, the Guru of Purandara Dāsa, who gave "aṅkita" to his disciple, have done otherwise in this case? I doubt it very much. What was the sacrosanctity of the Dāsa's place-name to merit such honor?

This leads to the last question of the real significance of the term

“Purandara” forming part of the Dāsa’s ‘ankita’. It is this. “Purandara” is one of the sacred names of Viṣṇu in the Sahasranāma, and it has a deep philosophical or ‘adhyātmic’ meaning. It means the Supreme Lord who destroys or tears asunder the ‘Lingaśarīra’ of Jīvas prior to their Mokṣa, by His grace. The Sanskrit derivation is ‘puram dārayatīti Purandarah’. The servant of such a Lord who was to sing His praises through his great songs worthy of respect as “Purandaropaniṣad” is indeed rightly to be known as the servant and devotee of “Purandara”.

My conclusion is that *the name Puranadara-Dāsa has nothing to do with the birthplace of the Dāsa*. It is derived from the name of the supreme Lord Viṣṇu. As for the actual birthplace of the Dāsa, we have to leave it as undetermined in the present state of our knowledge and information. Let us hope future research of historical records may solve that question also. The dramatic incidents connected with the historic induction of the Dāsa into the Dāsakūṭa seem to have overshadowed the minor question of the name of his place of birth and pushed into oblivion, leading to guess work in later times to locate it.

THE GOKARṆA-PARTAGĀLI JĪVOTTAMA MAṬHA
—A HISTORICAL SKETCH

HINDU Dharma flourished all over the territory of Goa for many centuries of the early Christian era. The land was studded with temples to the gods and goddesses of the Hindu religion pertaining to the Śaiva, Śākta and Vaiṣṇava cults and tutelary deities. The Tantras and Āgamas were followed in temple worship. The Sārasvata Brahmins had been settled in the Gomantaka part of the holy land of Paraśurāma originally for centuries. They were ardent followers of the Vedic Śākhās and their Śrauta and Śmārta rituals along with the worship of their family deities. The land was watered by the sacred rivers like Kuśāvatī and Aghanāśinī. It was a land of plenty and prosperity,—a part of the holy land reclaimed from the sea by Lord Viṣṇu in his incarnation of Paraśurāma, extending from Bāṇāvalī (near Maḍgaon in Goa) in the north, right down to Kanyākumārī in the south, comprising the land of the Sārasvatas, the Havīkas, the Taulavas and the Nambūdris. A region such as this could not but have attracted the attention of the great Vedantic Ācārya moving through the length and breadth of Bhāratavarṣa to propagate Śuddha Bhāgavata Dharma.

The *M.Vij.* (x. 52) refers to Madhva's visit to and stay in Goa territory (the name 'Goa' itself is used in the text). His first visit to Goa seems to have taken place soon after his return from his first northern journey to Badarinath and after the composition of his *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*. There is also reference to a second visit in later years. It was during these visits that the majority of the Gauḍa-Sārasvatas of Goa joined the fold of the great Ācārya and became his ardent disciples and followers. The principle of Antaryāmi-Paramātmānusandhāna in the worship of their family deities and other gods provided for by Madhvaśāstra in the spirit of the Gītā :

Ahaṁ hi sarvayajñānām bhoktā |

Ye'pyanyadevatābhaktās te'pi mām eva yajantyavidhipūrvakam ||

left them the necessary freedom to continue to follow their former way of worship of their household gods and goddesses without clashing with their new and enlarged Vaiṣṇavadharma. The same phenomenon can be seen even today in less pronounced form in the socio-religious life of the Shivalli Brahmin followers of Madhva in S. Kanara.

For nearly a century and a half after its conversion to the fold of Madhva the Gauḍa-Sārasvata community of Goa seems to have been under the spiritual guidance and ministrations of the Aṣṭamaṭhas of Uḍipi

itself. As was the custom of the Taulava-Mādhvas of S. Kanara, the members of the community were not required to attach themselves exclusively to any one of the eight Maṭhas for purposes of receiving Mudrā and Mantropadeśa as part of their Vaiṣṇavasamśkāra. They could receive them from any one of the eight Maṭhādhipatis as they chose, according to convenience. Communications between the region of S. Kanara and Goa thro' land and coastal sea routes being quite easy, frequent and unimpeded as yet by the conquest and occupation of Goa by the Portuguese power, the need for having a separate religious institution to cater to the needs of the Gauḍa-Sārasvata Mādhvas had not risen in the early stages.

The position changed after a century and a half. By this time, the original Mādhva Gauḍa-Sārasvata community of Goa scattered over Sāsashti, Bārdesh, Antūrja, Kuśasthalī etc. had grown very much larger and closer knit and had been steadily migrating in the wake of growing Muslim competition and penetration and settling down in the neighbouring parts of Karnataka on the coast and in the interior to find greater scope for its enterprising nature in the fields of trade and commerce. The Vaidika section also had naturally to accompany the Laukikas in their new settlements to help them keep up their religious and spiritual obligations, rituals and worship of the deities. The difference in language, habits and cultural background between these Gauḍa-Sārasvata settlers and the native Brahmin communities of the new regions were such as were bound to keep them apart in those rigidly orthodox times when merger and integration were inconceivable and impracticable. A flourishing and prosperous community like the Gauḍa-Sārasvatas was bound to feel instinctively the need and the urge for the preservation of its separate identity within the larger fold of the Madhva Sampradaya. These were satisfied by the farsighted vision of the tenth Head of the Palimar Mutt of Uḍipi Rāmacandra Tīrtha in 1476 A.D. The first Pontiff of the Palimar Mutt, Hṛṣīkeśa Tīrtha, and his successors have by tradition been given the place of honor among the Yatis of the Aṣṭamaṭhas of Uḍipi as "Aṣṭotkrṣṭa". It was in the fitness of things for the Head of the Palimar Mutt to rise equal to the occasion and take the lead in founding the first separate Maṭha for the Gauḍa-Sārasvata Mādhvas by ordaining a competent person from the community in the person of Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha as the first Head of the Gauḍa Sārasvata Maṭha which was established at the central place and meeting-ground between the south and the north Kanaras and beyond at Bhatkal. There is no substance in the contention of Udyayar Vaman Shenoy (*History of Kāśī Mutt*) that Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha received his ordination *not* from Rāmacandra T. of the Palimar Mutt of Uḍipi but from another Svami of that name belonging to the line from which the Uttarādi and Rāghavendra Svami Mutts are descended. According to the genealogy given by Sri Shenoy his "Rāmacandra Tīrtha" is the third in succession from Padmanābha T. the first disciple of Madhvācārya. This would place his third successor and the Gauḍa-Sārasvata ascetic Nārāyaṇa T. ordained by him within less than a hundred years interval from Padmanābha T. whose

date of demise is 1324 A.D. This will put the ordination of Nārāyaṇa T. to a date *half a century earlier* than even 1476—which both Shenoy and V. N. Kudva are *against accepting* as correct. Apart from this, there is no agreement between the actual genealogy of the Maṭha descended from Padmanābha T. (as preserved in the authentic records and tradition of the Deśastha Maṭhas) and the one put up by Shenoy which gives the names in the line as Padmanābha, Raghuvarya, Vāgīśa and Rāmacandra (upto Nārāyaṇa T.) The difficulty is that Raghuvarya given as the successor of Padmanābha T. is in actual fact the *eleventh in succession* from Padmanābha T. It is thus difficult to accept the genealogy of the Kāśī Mutt *as we have it in its different forms till we come down to Rāghavendra T. whose date is verifiable*. To escape this difficulty some have tried to suggest that the three Gurus after Padmanābha T. were different from the ones (of the same names in the Deśastha Maṭhas). But this *widens the interval between* Padmanābha T's death in 1324 and the succession of Nārāyaṇa T. the *fourth Guru* in 1580 or the death of Rāghavendra T. the *fifth Guru* in 1680 to 250 to 300 years respectively, *which can hardly be true*. V. N. Kudva has ascribed Nārāyaṇa T's ordination to Raghūttama T. of the Uttarādi Mutt somewhere about 1560. He is averse to accepting the tradition of the Gokarṇa Maṭha that Nārāyaṇa T. was (as we have seen) ordained by Rāmacandra T. the tenth Head of the Palimār Mutt of Uḍipi.

The fact that both the Kāśī and the Gokarṇa Maṭhas of the Gauḍa-Sārasvata Mādhvas adhere strictly to the system of Bālasannyāsa (restricting ordination for purposes of succession to the Pīṭha only to unmarried youths) as in the case of the Aṣṭamaṭhas of Uḍipi,—whereas in the Deśastha Maṭhas “Gr̥hasthāśrama-Sannyāsa” is the prevailing custom and practice (with very rare exceptions) in their history is in itself a strong ground for accepting the lineal affiliation of the Gauḍa-Sārasvata Mādhva Maṭhas with one of the Uḍipi Mutts. The geographical closeness of the Gauḍa Sārasvatas on the west coast to Uḍipi would also predispose one to accept the lineal descent of their Mutt from one of the Uḍipi Mutts rather than with some far off Deśastha Maṭha. The ties and contacts with the Uttarādi and Rāghavendra Svāmi Maṭhas came to be developed only much later about the middle of the 17th. century in a different set of circumstances connected with the historic controversy regarding the rights and social status of the Gauḍa-Sārasvata Brahmin community. This is amply borne out by the overwhelming evidence let in by Sāgara Rāmācārya in his *Koṇkaṇābhyaudaya*, through the extracts from numerous letters and Rāyasa patras quoted by him as written by various Pontiffs of the Uttarādi, Rāghavendra Svāmī, Śrīpādarāja Mutt and others to members of the Gauḍa-Sārasvata community and sometimes to some of their Svāmīs. But this is a *different issue* altogether from the question of the *origin* of the Gauḍa-Sārasvata Maṭha. Even the alleged copper plate grant of Surendra T. to Yādavendra T. of the Kāśī Mutt (whose genuineness is open to doubt on other grounds as has been shown) is basically concerned with the practical question of the rights of the community and its social and religious

status. It should be clear from this that the origin of the Gauḍa-Sārasvata Maṭhas from the Palimār Mutt of Uḍipi is in no way upset by their subsequent links with other Mutts.

Sāgara Rāmācārya wrote his *Koṅkaṇābhyudaya* in 1700 A.D. In that work there is reference to Digvijaya Rāmacandra T. of the Gokaṇṇa Mutt. In his other work *Suniti-Bhāgavata*, the same author has mentioned Raghucandra T., successor of Digvijaya Rāmacandra, as his father's Guru. His *Koṅkaṇābhyudaya* refers by name to Rāghavendra T. of the Kāśi Mutt also. Thus *the separate existence of the Kāśi and the Gokaṇṇa Maṭhas presided over by Rāghavendra T. and Raghucandra T., respectively round about 1670 is well established.* It is however difficult to place this Rāghavendra T's Paramaguru Yādavendra in 1542 as given in the supposed grant of Surendra T., which, curiously enough, finds no mention among the numerous sources from which the *Koṅkaṇābhyudaya* has quoted. For a gap of 120 years is rather too wide between Yādavendra and Rāghavendra who is counted as *the second in succession from him.*

At the same time, we cannot accept the suggestion that the Kāśi Mutt originated from Raghucandra's disciple Saṁyamindra T. as alleged in some quarters. For it is clear from the *Koṅkaṇābhyudaya* that Digvijaya Rāmacandra and his successor Raghucandra were both more or less contemporaries of Rāghavendra T. and could not have been separated from him by a very wide stretch of time as would be the case, if Rāghavendra T's Paramaguru Yādavendra were himself to be regarded as a disciple ordained by Raghucandra's last disciple. The tradition preserved in the Kāśi Mutt that Yādavendra was educated in the Maṭha of Vijayindra T. at Kumbakonam and the record in the Gokaṇṇa Maṭha referring to the circumstances of his secession from the Maṭha of Jīvottama and going over to the Maṭha of Vijayindra by 'Daṇḍaparivṛtti' make it probable that Yādavendra was established as the Head of the Kāśi Maṭha in or about 1602, by Sudhindra T. in accordance with the wishes of Vijayindra. Anyway, so far as the history of the Gokaṇṇa Maṭha is concerned, there is no difficulty in accepting the traditional view that it was founded with Nārāyaṇa T. as its first Head, by Rāmacandra T. of the Palimār Mutt of Uḍipi in 1476.

Nārāyaṇa T. established his Maṭha at Bhatkal and later passed away there. His successor Vāsudeva T. passed away at Pandharpur. The third Head of the Mutt was the famous Jīvottama T. after whom the Mutt takes one of its present names. He was a contemporary of Ali Adil Shah (1557-80) of Bijapur. Tradition says Jīvottama was on very friendly and cordial terms with the illustrious Vādirāja T. of the Sode Mutt of Uḍipi. Like Vādirāja he was also a great Yogi. He established his Maṭha at Gokaṇṇa for the first time. The *Suniti-Bhāgavata* of Sāgara Rāmācārya refers to his authorship of several learned works. None of which has come down to us. The author of *Guruparamparāmrta* however refers to a *Sārasaṅgraha* of Jīvottama dealing probably with the origin of the Mutt. During his Tīrthayātrā in the north he is said to have acquired three idols

of Viṭṭhala of which Vīra-Viṭṭhala became the chief Saṁsthānapratimā.

Jīvottama was a noted organizer. He started new centres for the benefit of the Gauḍa Sārasvata. Mādhvas at Ankola, Basrur and other places. Towards the latter part of his life, he ordained Puruṣottama T. as his successor and went on a pilgrimage to the south visiting Kāñchi, Tirupati, Trivandrum and Uḍipi and returned to Bhatkal where he entered Samādhi in 1598.

His successor gave special encouragement to the study of Śrauta and Smārta prayoga works and ritualistic literature among his followers. It is these branches which even now are most widely studied by the priestly class among the Gauḍa Sārasvatas,—the Bhāṣya and Vāda-Prasthānas have hardly any absorbing interest to it. Puruṣottama Tīrtha composed a digest called *Karmasiddhānta* dealing with the 16 Saṁskāras. A ms. of it is available in the Mutt's Library.

Puruṣottama was succeeded by Aṇu-Jīvottama. The Mutt papers disclose that during his period there arose a sharp litigation between his Mutt and the Sode Maṭha of Uḍipi over the benefice-village of Hegare which went on for years until it was finally decided in favor of the Gokarṇa Maṭha, in the days of his second successor Digvijaya Rāmacandra. Aṇu-Jīvottama was the first to take up his abode at Dicoli in Goa where he passed away in 1638. His successor Rāmacandra was the first to come over to Partagali and build a Mutt there and make it his headquarters, as it is at present. He installed the idols of Rāma, Lakṣmaṇa and Sītā which he had brought with him, in a temple constructed for the purpose. He also set up another temple for Vīra-Māruti (made of Tulasikāṣṭha) at Partagali. He attained Samādhi at Revaṇ in Goa. His successor Digvijaya Rāmacandra attained great spiritual powers by propitiating Nṛsiṁha and Mukhya-Prāṇa according to the procedure laid down for Puraścaraṇa by Vādirāja Svāmin. Later, he went down from Revaṇ to Partagali and celebrated the Rathotsava there for Rāma. Tradition says some obstruction to the smooth conduct of the Rathotsava was caused at the instigation of the then Pontiff of the Sode Mutt who was carrying on the litigation over Hegare with the Gokarṇa Maṭha. The Nārāyaṇabhūta sent to obstruct the Rathotsava had brought the chariot to a standstill. Digvijaya Rāmacandra is said to have lifted the obstruction by paralysing the Nārāyaṇabhūta by breaking a coconut at the feet of Vīramāruti after praying to him. A small niche at the footsteps of the Vīramāruti tower at Partagali with a bust of Nārāyaṇabhūta can now be seen at Partagali as marking the incident. The *Koṅkaṇābhūdāya* refers to certain letters that passed between Digvijaya Rāmacandra and Rāghavendra Svāmi (1623-71) of the Kumbakonam Mutt. Digvijaya Rāmacandra passed away at Ankola.

His successor was Raghucandra T. He has been referred to by the author of the *Koṅkaṇābhūdāya* (written in 1700) as his father's Guru, who was greatly pleased by the successful way in which Sāgara Veṅkaṭeṣācārya had argued the case for the acceptance of the complete social and religious

equality of status of the Gauḍa Sārasvata Brahmins with other Brahmins of the Desh in the historic debate at the Ikkeri court.

Tradition has it that Raghucandra attempted to introduce the system of Aṣṭamaṭhas of Uḍipi at Gokaṛṇa and started ordaining several disciples. But as except three the rest of them died one after the other, he abandoned the project.

He was succeeded by Lakṣmīnārāyaṇa T. who made pilgrimages to Kanci Ramesvaram, Dhanuskoti, Tirupati etc. He was honored by Queen Cannamāmbā of the Keladi state and by the Ruler of Kolhapur. He was succeeded by Lakṣmīkānta, Ramākānta, Kamalākānta, Śrīkānta and Bhūvijayarāmacandra.

His successor Ramānātha T. made frequent visits to Partagali, Gokarna, Ankola and other centres of his Mutt. He was succeeded by Lakṣmīnātha T. who renovated the Mutt at Gokaṛṇa. He passed away at Baroda.

The next Head of the Mutt, was Ānandatīrtha. Records relating to him are available for the period between 1819-27. He renovated the Mutt building at Partagali and ordained Pūrṇaprajña T. as his successor. He made a long stay at Bhatkal devoting himself to the study of Madhva's Sūtrabhāṣya and J's NS with one of the famous scholars there and returned to Gokaṛṇa and later to Partagali where he taught these standard works of Mādhva lore to many disciples. He ordained Padmanābha T. and went on pilgrimage to Śrīśailam, Tirupati, Rameśvaram Trivandrum and returned to Partagali. After a brief stay he went on another pilgrimage to Kolhapur, Prayāga, Kāśī and other places. The Pandits of Kāśī gave him a public address and paid tributes to his learning. On his return journey he received a similar address from the Pandita Sabhā at Pune in 1862. *It is worth mentioning that in this address he has been hailed as the propagator of the spiritual tradition of the Palimar Mutt of Uḍipi.* He passed away at Partagali.

His successor Padmanābha T. was deeply read in the NS and other classics of Mādhva philosophy. He made pilgrimages to Tirupati, Trivandrum, Mañjeshvar, Uḍipi, Basrur, Bhatkal and Gokaṛṇa and returned to Partagali. In 1892, he ordained Indirākānta T. as his successor and later passed away at Partagali.

Indirākānta T. is undoubtedly the most outstanding, beloved and universally respected Svami that has adorned the Pīṭha of the Gokaṛṇa Mutt in recent history. He was the most pious, learned and farsighted religious Head. He was a profound scholar of Mādhva lore and the NS had the greatest fascination for him. The sumptuous library of Dvaita Vedānta works and works on several other Śāstras and Vedic lore built up by him at Partagali bear witness to his insatiable thirst for knowledge and his dedication to learning. His historic visit to Kumta and stay there is still remembered there with reverent love. He made pilgrimages to Srirangam, Kumbakonam, Tirupati, Bhatkal, Madgaon, Basrur, Mulki, Manjeshwar, Mangalore and Cochin. He visited Uḍipi during the

Paryāya of the celebrated Raghumānya T. of the Palimar Mutt (1936-38), and was received with marked affection. The meeting was symbolic of and cemented and renewed the historic relationship of the Gokarṇa Mutt with the Palimar Mutt. During his Pontifical period, Indirākānta T. ordained Narahari T. who however predeceased him. The bereavement caused him great sorrow . He wrote a commentary in Marathi on the Gītā according to the interpretation of Madhva for the benefit of his followers. He made pilgrimages to Sangli, Kolhapur, Mardol (Goa) and Shahapur. His disciple Kamalānātha T. ordained Dvārakānātha T. in 1942. Indirākānta T. passed away at Partagali.

His successor Dvārakānātha T. opened up a new chapter in the progressive history of the Gokarṇa Mutt. He was a dynamic personality with suave and winsome ways and was very open-hearted. He had a modern outlook and understood the needs of the times and took up progressive steps for the betterment of the community, while preserving and fostering the permanent values of the past. His faith in and reverence for Śrī Madhva and his Darśana were deep and sincere and his “Vaiṣṇavadīkṣā” was remarkable. He was an eloquent speaker in Kannada, Marathi and Hindi besides Koṅkaṇi. He started Pāṭhaśālās for Sanskrit studies at Dicholi, Partagali and Bombay. The Dvarakanath Bhavan and Rama Mandir at Wadala, Bombay are standing monuments to his memory. He cooperated fully with the Svamijis of the Pejavar and Palimar Mutts in the activities of the Akhila Bharata Mādhva Mahamandal and attended several philosophical Conferences of the Mandal at Hyderabad, Coimbatore, Vijayawada. He worked for the advancement of the Sārasvata community as a whole in all walks of life and conferred with the Heads of the Chitrapur and Kāśī Mutts for this purpose and gave full support to the All-India Sārasvata Conference at Bombay. The *Jivottama* a quarterly Journal in Kannada devoted to social and cultural subjects is being published under the patronage of his Mutt. In his recent demise, a couple of years back, the community has sustained a great loss.

He has left a worthy successor in Vidyādhirāja T. who tho' young in years has already laid the foundations for a great future by his untiring efforts and enthusiasm, in spite of an acute physical ailment. His Vaiṣṇavadīkṣā, humility, gentleness, strict adherence to the exacting discipline of the ascetic life and his ceaseless study of Madhvaśāstra are his greatest assets. He celebrated the fifth centenary of the foundation of his Mutt in 1977 at Partagali which was attended by the Svamis of Pejavar and Palimar Mutts of Uḍipi.

KRṢṆADEVARĀYAKṚTIḤ by KRṢṆADEVARĀYA

THE famous ruler of the Vijayanagar Kingdom. From the palm-leaf manuscript of the work (incomplete) preserved in the Madras Government Oriental Manuscripts Library bearing D. No. 18299.

क्षीराम्भोधितपःफलेन महता नीराजितोरःस्थल-
 स्ताराधीशदिनाधिनाथनयनो धाराधरश्यामलः ।
 यो वेदान्तगिरामलक्ष्यमहिमा देवेशमुख्यैः स्तुतः
 सोऽयं तिष्ठतु मामकीनहृदये श्रीवेङ्कटेशामिधः ॥१॥
 सान्द्रानन्दघनः समग्रकरुणासंपूर्णनेत्राञ्चलो
 मन्दाकिन्यधिवासमञ्जुलजटाजूटो.....तः ।
 कल्याणाचलकार्मुकः कलयतां कल्याणमव्याहृतं
 चन्द्रालंकृतमौलिरद्वितनयाभृङ्गारिताङ्गःशिवः २ ॥
 ब्रह्माण्डान्यखिलानि चेन्न सततं व्याप्तानि तत्तादृग-
 प्याकारं शब्दमात्रतामुपगतं यस्यैव सत्यात्मनः ।
 तं वेदान्तवचःप्रपञ्चितगुणं लक्ष्मीमहीवल्लभं
 नित्यानन्दमजं निरस्तदुरितं वन्दे मुकुन्दं विभुम् ॥३॥
 श्रीमानभूत् तुर्वसुवंशमौलिः श्रीतिम्मभूपो जगदेकवीरः ।
 स देवकीनाम्नि कलत्ररत्ने प्रा त धीरं सुमतीश्वराख्यम् ॥४॥
 स कर्तुमीशः सकलानकर्तुं तथान्यथा कर्तुमपि क्षितीन्द्रान् ।
 यथार्थयन्त्रीश्वरनामधेयमेकातपत्रामवर्नि प्रशास्ति ॥५॥
 स बुक्कमाम्बां परिणीय तस्यामौदार्यगाम्भीर्यविवेकशौर्यैः ।
 दाक्षिण्यकारुण्यनयैश्च युक्तं लेभे तनूजं नरसक्षितीशम् ॥६॥
 स बाल्य एवावनिमणं वान्तामाक्रम्य शौर्येण निरङ्कुशेन ।
 मान्धातृमुख्यान्महितान्महीपान् यशोविशेषैरखिलानजेषीत् ॥७॥
 बाह्वोर्बलेनाजितवित्तजातः कृतार्थयित्वाखिलमर्थिसार्थम् ।
 काशीप्रयागादिमहार्हतीर्थैः महान्ति दानानि मुहुश्चकार ॥८॥
 कुलेन शीलेन गुणेन भक्त्या प्रेमानुकूल्येन च संयुतायाम् ।
 नागाम्बिकायां नरसक्षितीशः प्रासूत मां न्यक्कृतवैरिवर्गः ॥९॥
 सोऽहं स तन्वानघं गुणान्वितायां तिम्माम्बिकायामिह तिम्मभूषम्
 उत्पाद्य नामास्य सहार्थजातैः समार्पयं बेंकटशैलभर्त्रे ॥१०॥
 एवं च चेतस्यनवाप्य तृप्तिं वाचापि पूजां कलये कथं वा ।
 श्रीवेङ्कटेशाधीशितुरित्युदारं चित्ते विचारं कलयन्नवात्सम् ॥११॥
 उत्साहं मम वीक्ष्य मद्गुरुरथ श्रीव्यासतीर्थो मुनिः
 पर्यालोच्य पुराणशास्त्रविविधाम्नायेतिहासादिकान् ।
 लब्धास्तत्र कथा हरेः पशुपतेः साम्यं निरस्याधिकं
 विष्णुं कीर्तय सर्वथेत्युपदिशन् मह्यं मुदा दत्तवान् ॥१२॥

(Transcript by courtesy of R. Kalyana Sundaram, Curator in charge
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| 150 | 12 | ऐक्यवत् स्वरूपस्यैव | ऐक्यवत् स्वरूपस्यैव |
| .. | 13 | जीवस्यैक्यं वदतः सिद्धै | जीवेश्वरैक्यं वदतः सिद्धै |
| 308 | 19 | comprehend invalidity | comprehend validity |
| 415 | 24 | S. Kanara | S. and N. Kanara |
| 432 | 5-6 | The first two works have been | The first work has been |
| 432 | 25 | Tattvavaiśāradin | <i>Tattvaiṣivarād</i> |
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| 555 | | Strafford | Stafford |
| 608 | 19 | प्रा त | प्रासूत |